PARL. PAPERS
FOR REFERENCE ONLY.

605272

# REPORTS

FROM

# COMMISSIONERS:

*TWENTY VOLUMES.*

---

—(4.)—

ARMY (MILITARY INQUIRY).

---

Session

31 *January*——29 *July* 1856.

---

VOL. XXI.

1856.

# REPORTS FROM COMMISSIONERS:

## 1856.

---

*TWENTY VOLUMES:—CONTENTS OF THE*

FOURTH VOLUME.

---

N.B.—*THE* Figures *at the* beginning of the line, *correspond with the* N° *at the foot of each* Report; *and the* Figures *at the* end of the line, *refer to the* MS. Paging *of the Volumes arranged for The House of Commons.*

---

ARMY (MILITARY INQUIRY):


[2119.] REPORT of the Board of General Officers appointed to inquire into the Statements contained in the Reports of Sir *John M'Neill* and Colonel *Tulloch*, and the Evidence taken by them relative thereto, animadverting upon the Conduct of certain Officers on the General Staff, and others in the Army; together with the Minutes of Evidence taken by the Board, and an Appendix - - p. 1

422. INDEX to Report of the Board of General Officers - 651


---

# REPORT

OF THE

# BOARD OF GENERAL OFFICERS

APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO

# THE STATEMENTS

CONTAINED IN THE

REPORTS OF SIR JOHN M'NEILL AND COLONEL TULLOCH, AND THE EVIDENCE TAKEN BY THEM RELATIVE THERETO,

ANIMADVERTING UPON THE

CONDUCT OF CERTAIN OFFICERS ON THE GENERAL STAFF, AND OTHERS IN THE ARMY;

TOGETHER WITH THE

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BY THE BOARD;

AND AN APPENDIX.

---

**Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.**

---

LONDON:
PRINTED BY GEORGE EDWARD EYRE AND WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
PRINTERS TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.
FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

1856.

[2119]

# TABLE OF CONTENTS.


PAGE

REPORT :

Preliminary Observations - - - - - - i

Opinion of the Board on the Case of—

Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan, K.C.B. - - ii

Major-General the Earl of Cardigan, K.C.B. - - - vi

Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B. - - - ix

Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon, C.B. - - xv

Commissary-General Filder - - - - - xx

Notice on the Case of—

Captain Leopold George Heath, C.B., R.N. - - - xxix

Conclusion - - - - - - - - xxx

PRELIMINARY MEETING OF THE GENERAL OFFICERS - - - xxxi

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE - - - - - - 1

APPENDIX - - - - - - - - 411

# REPORT.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY,

IN obedience to Your Majesty's Warrant, which bears date the 25th February 1856, commanding us, the General Officers whose names are subscribed hereto, to make strict examination into the statements contained in the two Reports of Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch, dated respectively Constantinople, June 10, 1855, and London, January 1856, and into the evidence taken by the said Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch relative thereto, animadverting upon the conduct of certain officers on the general staff and others in Your Majesty's army, and to make a report to Your Majesty thereon, together with our opinion whether the said officers of Your army be or be not responsible to any and what extent for the unsatisfactory condition of Your army, or any portion thereof, noticed by Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch in their reports, and evidence thereunto attached.

We have, at several meetings, perused and considered Your Majesty's orders and instructions as transmitted to us by the Right Honourable Lord Panmure, Your Majesty's Secretary of State for War, together with sundry letters and other documents therewith transmitted, and have, to the best of our ability, made examination into the statements and evidence contained in the two Reports above referred to, and have heard such witnesses as the several parties who appeared before us desired to call, and also such other persons as appeared likely to be able to give information upon the said matters, and whose attendance could be obtained; and in order that Your Majesty may be fully possessed of every circumstance which has appeared in the course of this inquiry, we beg leave to lay before Your Majesty the whole of our examinations and proceedings to this our Report annexed:

And further humbly to submit to Your Majesty the following preliminary observations in explanation of the course which we felt constrained to adopt in our endeavour to give effect to Your Majesty's intentions, as signified in Your Royal Warrant, namely,—

That the inquiry which we were commanded to institute appeared to us to be—

First, Very peculiar in its nature; and,
Secondly, To be attended with unusual difficulties.

It appeared to us to be very peculiar in its nature, and one with which our military experience had not rendered us conversant, inasmuch as it was an inquiry in England into the correctness of conclusions which Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch had founded on information obtained by themselves in the Crimea two years previously, whereas the duties of a Court of Inquiry are ordinarily limited to an original investigation into certain matters of fact, or into the conduct of certain persons with reference thereto.

It appeared to us to be attended with unusual difficulties, inasmuch as some of the statements which were to be inquired into were founded, in part,

on evidence which we had not the means of investigating; and the attendance of several witnesses, whom it would have been desirable to examine, could not be obtained.

Under these embarrassing circumstances, we felt it our duty, on the one hand, to give to each and to all of the parties referred to in Your Royal Warrant every facility for bringing their cases under our consideration in such a manner as seemed most likely to afford opportunity for a full inquiry, and, on the other hand, to exercise such care and caution in giving expression to an opinion thereon as the character of the inquiry, and the peculiar difficulties above mentioned, seemed to render especially necessary, as well for the interests of truth as of justice.

And we do, therefore, now, in further obedience to Your Royal command, most humbly report to Your Majesty—

That having been directed to inquire into the cases submitted to us by the following officers—

1. Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan, K.C.B.;
2. Major-General the Earl of Cardigan, K.C.B.;
3. Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B., *Quartermaster-General;*
4. Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon, C.B., *Deputy Quartermaster-General;*
5. Commissary-General Filder, C.B.;

We proceeded to inquire into them in the order above given.

---

## Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan's Case.

The Earl of Lucan called our attention to the following passages in the Report of the Commissioners, pp. 20–21 :—

Loss of Horses during the winter.

"With reference to the effect of the deficiency of forage, and the other privations to which the horses of the army were exposed, we have ascertained the loss among them from various causes in the cavalry and artillery. A summary of the returns obtained on that head will be found at page 193 of Appendix, which shows the loss attributable to sickness to be as follows, for the six months from October to March inclusive :—

| | Strength. | Died by Sickness. | Ratio per cent. of Deaths. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Heavy Cavalry .. .. | 1,055 | 493 | 47 |
| Light Cavalry .. .. | 1,161 | 439 | 38 |
| Artillery .. .. .. | 2,832 | 1,190 | 42 |
| Total .. .. | 5,048 | 2,122 | 42 |

"On referring to the loss sustained by the commissariat animals during the same period, it will be found rather less than in the cavalry or artillery;

the deaths among them having, according to a return furnished by Deputy Commissary-General Adams, amounted to about 889 out of 2,329, originally imported into the Crimea, or in the proportion of 38 per cent., a result which could scarcely have been expected, considering the advantages which cavalry horses might be supposed to have over hard-worked baggage animals, to whom little attention could be paid at such a period."

Shelter for Horses.

Pp. 36, 37.—" The date at which the hutting of the cavalry commenced was in no case earlier than the end of January or beginning of February, and it was not completed before the middle of March, by which time the severity of the season had so far abated that this shelter was of comparatively little importance. Considering that these men were within about a mile of the store where the wood might be obtained, that they had no work in the trenches, and that the only duties likely to interfere with the application both of horses and men to this important object was the carrying up of their own forage from Balaklava, and furnishing parties occasionally to bring down sick, and carry up provisions to the front (which seems never to have occupied more than about a fifth part of the whole), it appears strange that more rapid progress was not made in obtaining the advantage of hut accommodation, particularly when they are described as having suffered so much in their tents.

" Considering, also, the suffering and severe loss of horses from exposure to the weather in the commencement of the winter, there appears to have been a want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising for them some means of temporary shelter, such as saved the baggage horses of the sappers and miners at Balaklava. Experience has now proved that even a very moderate degree of shelter would have been sufficient to save the lives of many of the horses, if not to maintain them in serviceable condition: and it must be presumed that such measures were considered practicable, for a proposal to erect, with the assistance of his men, some sort of cover for the horses of the corps, appears to have been made by the officer commanding the Scots Greys, but the manner in which it is stated to have been received by the Lieutenant-General commanding the cavalry was calculated to deter other officers from making any similar proposal."

With reference to these passages the Earl of Lucan proposed to show, that they contained animadversions on him as commander of the cavalry, and that they were unfounded (pp. 8, 21) ; and his Lordship objected, in particular—

1. To the calculation of the Commissioners with respect to the deaths of the cavalry horses (Proceedings, p. 8);

2. To the comparison instituted between the loss of horses sustained by the cavalry relatively with that of the commissariat (p. 9);

3. To the statement respecting the period of the hutting the horses (p. 11);

4. To the statement respecting the nature and amount of the duties to be performed by the cavalry soldiers (p. 17);

5. To the statement respecting the hutting of the men (p. 19);

6. To the statement respecting the providing temporary shelter for the horses (p. 21);

7. To the statement respecting a proposal made to the Earl of Lucan by the officer commanding the Scots Greys to erect temporary shelter for his horses (p. 20).

In reply to these objections on the part of the Earl of Lucan, Colonel Tulloch alleged:—

That the Commissioners had not animadverted on Lord Lucan's conduct (see Proceedings, pp. 48, 53, 54, 108, 109, 110, 113, 130, 139, 141, 165);

That the statements, alleged by Lord Lucan to be erroneous, were correct, —(see Proceedings, pp. 49, 50, 51, 54, 55); and that, if in some instances the statements were incorrect, it was owing to the Commissioners having been furnished with incorrect information by the officers in the Crimea, and that for this the Commissioners were not responsible.—See Proceedings, pp. 111, 140, 173.

With regard to the passages above mentioned, we are of opinion that the remarks of the Commissioners therein contained amount to animadversions upon the conduct of the Earl of Lucan as commander of the cavalry.

With regard to so much of those passages as is referred to in Objection 1, we are of opinion that the mode in which the per-centage of deaths has been stated by the Commissioners is calculated to convey an erroneous impression, inasmuch as, though the figures are perfectly accurate, neither the rate per-centage of deaths (contained in the table given at page 21 of the Report), nor the per-centage of deaths according to the average strength given in the summary subsequently furnished by Colonel Tulloch, give the actual per-centage of mortality.

With regard to so much of those passages as is referred to in Objection 2, we are not enabled to offer an opinion thereon, as, on examining the returns which were furnished to us by the Audit Office relative to the matter in question, we found that the difficulties of ascertaining the periods at which the commissariat animals arrived in the Crimea, and of distinguishing between those lost or stolen, and those that died, were so great as to render any comparison of deaths between them and the cavalry impossible.

With regard to so much of those passages as is referred to in Objection 3, it appeared that the words "Shelter for horses," as entered in the margin of the passage above set forth (page 36 of the Commissioners' Report), had inadvertently been annexed thereto, instead of to the following paragraph, to which they properly belonged.

This was explained by Colonel Tulloch, and the Earl of Lucan's objection appeared to be thereby obviated (page 112).

With regard to so much of those passages as is referred to in Objections 4 and 5, it appeared that after the cavalry went to Kadikoi, the hutting was not carried out until January or February, owing to delays and difficulties which appear sufficiently to explain it; inasmuch as, in addition to the ordinary duties of a cavalry soldier in the field, the duties performed by the cavalry from the 12th December to the 19th January, in conveying stores to the front, and afterwards in transporting the sick, materially interfered with the operation of hutting the men and putting up stables for the horses.

Proceedings, p. 11.

Proceedings, p. 187.

Appendix to Commissioner's Report, p. 3.

Appendix, p. 3.

Pp. 57, 65, 86.

The insufficiency and bad quality of the intrenching tools added to this difficulty.

With regard to so much of those passages as is referred to in Objection 6, it was stated in evidence by Colonel Chapman, R.E., that—

Page 318.

"The temporary shelter erected for the baggage horses and mules of the sappers and miners was merely formed by a house and three other walls; there

were three dwarf walls forming an inclosure of a court-yard against the house, and one end of a sail was stretched, as it might be, against that wall [the witness pointed to the wall of the Court], and the other end was brought down, and with a rope fastened to the dwarf wall on the opposite side; that was all the covering that we used for the shelter of the baggage animals; but a shelter of that sort is totally different from what would have been required by the cavalry in a place like the plateau; it is not a parallel case at all; what can be done in one place where there are walls, cannot be done in another where there is nothing of the sort."

We completely concur in this opinion; and with regard to the general charge of "want of promptitude or ingenuity," as attaching to the cavalry under the command of Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan, it appears by the statement made to us by Colonel Tulloch, and by the whole course of his examination of witnesses, to have been founded on the assumption that tools and materials (including canvas) and labour, were either at hand or might have been procured from the fleet, or from Constantinople—an assumption which does not appear to be borne out by the evidence. Proceedings, pp. 55, 149, 185.

The uncertainty with regard to the occupation of the plateau by the cavalry appears to us to form a very material element in the consideration of this matter, added to which, the difficulty of transport to that place was such, that even if it had been possible to have procured the before-mentioned tools and materials (including canvas), they could not have been there made available.

It further appears, that after the cavalry arrived at Kadikoi, the Earl of Lucan was unceasing in his endeavours to erect shelter for the horses. Proceedings, p. 180.

With regard to digging pits as a means of shelter for the cavalry horses, the Earl of Lucan stated—

"In that country, with that soil—a soil that puddles after three or four hours' rain, consisting chiefly, as it did on the plateau, of a strong brick clay, I say that without a roof, or unless you could pave, any such trench as is talked of would have been totally useless, and it would have been mischievous, because it would very much have obstructed you in what is far more essential, namely, the constant removal of your horses. When you talk of a pit, a pit is not only useless, but it is perhaps the most mischievous thing into which you can possibly put a horse. It was attempted—and there is an officer in this Court now who could establish the truth of what I say if he were examined upon the subject—with the Land Transport; they did make pits for their horses, and those pits were dug on the side of the hills. Still, it was found impossible to drain them sufficiently, and the horses suffered so much that the Turks, who had charge of them, could not be got to use the pits after they were dug. In short, a pit that is neither roofed nor paved would be more appropriately called a grave than a pit." P. 185.

This is borne out to a certain extent by the evidence of other officers, and we are of opinion that, unless materials existed for paving or covering those pits, they would have been attended with no advantage to the cavalry. Pp. 65, 67, 68, 74.

With regard to so much of the passages as is referred to in Objection 7, the question therein raised seems to relate to the motive which induced the Pp. 27, 29, 31.

P. 181.

Earl of Lucan to threaten to put the officer commanding the Scots Greys (Colonel Darby Griffiths) under arrest.

Proceedings, p. 103, 112, 113, 114, 115.

We were informed by Colonel Tulloch, that the Commissioners did not consider it consistent with their instructions to examine any of the officers who were stated to have been present on the occasion referred to, and we have not had an opportunity of doing so.

Colonel Griffiths, by his answer to Question 66, does not appear to have ever contemplated erecting any shelter for his horses, but merely the digging of a drain in front and rear of them, provided he could obtain a guarantee from the Earl of Lucan that his camp would not be moved.

Whatever may have been the misunderstanding between the Earl of Lucan and Colonel Griffiths, it does not appear by the evidence adduced that any officers were influenced by it. It is therefore to be regretted that such an inference has been sought to be established reflecting on Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan.

Upon the whole, we are satisfied by the evidence, documentary and oral, adduced before us, and by a perusal of the Earl of Lucan's divisional orders and correspondence, that his Lordship used every exertion to meet the peculiar difficulties which he had to contend with, and that he is therefore not chargeable with neglect in the performance of the important duties attached to his command.

---

## Major-General the Earl of Cardigan's Case.

The Earl of Cardigan called our attention to the following passages of the Report of the Commissioners, as containing the statements of which he complained (p. 198.):—

Pp. 19, 20.

"There is one case, however, from which such serious consequences have arisen, that it requires some special notice.

Want of forage in Light Cavalry Brigade.

"The Light Cavalry Brigade, which had for some time previously been stationed in the valley adjacent to Balaklava, was removed, first to the vicinity of head-quarters for two or three days, and thereafter on the 1st or 2nd of November to Inkermann, where it was stationed near the Windmill, a distance of at least seven or eight miles from Balaklava. This change, at a time when the roads were in an extremely bad state, and where there was great difficulty in obtaining the means of transport, created very serious obstacles to a proper supply of forage being obtained.

"It is alleged by Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Crookshanks that there was a certain quantity of hay at Balaklava, but not the means of carrying it to the front; occasionally he managed to bring up a little, till the 14th of November, when the supply failed entirely. After that date, the want of transport affected the supply of barley also, which on several days did not exceed 1½lb. to 2lbs. daily per horse, being all that they had to keep them alive. The returns of one of the regiments show that, for the last four days they were on the ground, the average was only about 2½lbs. for each horse, previously exhausted as they had been by the want of hay or straw during the early part of the month.

" When the supply began to fail, the Commissariat Officer referred to, who appears to have done everything in his power to meet the difficulties of the case, proposed—as he knew there was plenty of barley at Balaklava—that if a detachment of the horses were allowed to go down daily he would engage to bring up enough for the rest of the brigade.

" This proposition appears to have been brought specially under the notice of Lord Cardigan by Lieutenant-Colonel Mayou, Assistant Quartermaster-General of Cavalry, who states that his Lordship declined to accede to it, as he had previously done when a similar proposition was made to him to send the horses down for hay before that supply failed.

" The whole brigade remained in this state till the 2d of December, when it was directed to return to its previous position, but by that time the horses were reduced to such a state from starvation, that they could no longer bear the weight of their riders; they had to be led down many were left on the ground in a dying state, and of the remainder, seventeen died on the road before they could reach their former station, a distance of only about six miles.

" It is no part of our duty to enter into the military reasons which may have led to the detention of this brigade on a spot where the horses could not be foraged by the Commisariat, or which may have induced a refusal to adopt the only measure by which apparently they could be subsisted; we merely call attention to the fact, as one of the instances of a deficiency of supply which formed the special subject of an inquiry."

His Lordship's complaint was—

That the Commissioners had here charged him with having contributed to the ultimate inefficiency of the Light Brigade by his refusal to adopt a suggestion which, in the opinion of the Commissioners, was calculated to improve the condition of the brigade, viz., the sending the troop horses down to Balaklava for forage (p. 198).

He contended that, in not adopting that suggestion, he had exeraised a sound discretion, and one which was calculated to enable the brigade, so far as the difficulties permitted, to continue to discharge its various duties (p. 198).

Inasmuch as had the horses been sent down, he thought it very uncertain whether they could have obtained supplies (p. 204).

And further, because such a journey, in the then state of the roads, would in his opinion have caused a greater loss of horses than actually occurred from the insufficiency of the supplies (p. 205).

He further contended that had he thought it expedient to send his horses to Balaklava, he should not have considered himself at liberty to do so; since the absence of so many as would have been required to convey the forage from Balaklava (for an indefinite number of hours) would have been inconsistent with the positive orders of Lord Raglan, that the Light Brigade should, for military reasons, retain that position (pp. 206, 207, 213, 219, 229).

It appears, by Lord Cardigan's statement, that his Lordship did not demand an inquiry into his conduct, but that he gladly availed himself of the opportunity of appearing before the Board, in order to enter more fully into the consideration of the remarks of the Commissioners in their Report, which refer to his command whilst with the Light Brigade of Cavalry in the Crimea. P. 197.

It appears that on the 2nd of November, the Light Brigade was moved to the heights of Inkermann, under a special arrangement between Lord

Pp. 199, 200. Raglan and the Commander-in-chief of the French army, and continued in that exposed situation, for military reasons, until the 2d of December, the Earl of Cardigan having resigned his command on the 29th of November.

After the storm of the 14th November, the men and horses were exposed to inclement weather. The rations of forage, owing to the diminution of means of Commissariat transport, were reduced, and towards the end of November the supplies of hay failed entirely.

P. 201. The Commissioners have charged Lord Cardigan with having contributed to the ultimate inefficiency of the Light Brigade by his refusal to adopt a suggestion which, in the opinion of the Commissioners, was calculated to have preserved the Light Brigade from the destruction that threatened it, namely, the sending the troop horses to Balaklava for forage.

P. 219. It appears that at the latter end of November the greatest number of horses in the encampment of the Light Brigade was 330, of which, owing to so many men being sick and absent, only 286 could be mounted.

From this number it would have required 120 horses to have brought up forage from Balaklava. And to have detached so large a proportion of the force would have diminished it to such an extent as to have rendered it virtually useless for the purpose for which it had been placed in the position it occupied.

See evidence of Sir R. Airey, p. 219, Question 1,146. With reference, therefore, to the military reasons noticed by the Commissioners, it appears to us, that Lord Raglan alone could judge of the fitness of a measure; and that it could not have been resorted to without his sanction.

He appears to have been made acquainted by the Major-General commanding the brigade, by the Lieutenant-General commanding the division, and by Commissary-General Fielder, with the hardships which the cavalry were suffering. But there is no evidence to show that Lord Raglan's attention was particularly called to the proposal of the Assistant Commissary-General, that the horses should be sent to bring forage from Balaklava. What steps, therefore, might have been taken by Lord Raglan had that proposal been distinctly brought to his notice, can now be only matter of conjecture. The military reasons for keeping a large proportion of the cavalry in the position which they then occupied, seem to have rendered the case peculiarly embarrassing; for these reasons appear in some degree to have been irrespective of considerations of forage.

The opinion, however, expressed by Lord Cardigan, that to have sent the horses for that purpose to a place so distant as Balaklava would only have augmented the losses of the brigade, although not in entire accordance with some of the opinions offered in evidence before us, appears to be supported by a reference to the difficulties experienced by the Royal Artillery at the same period. For it is in evidence, that the horses in that force were, on two occasions, between the 23rd and 27th November 1854, at great wear and tear, sent down to Balaklava for hay, at the urgent request of the Commissariat, and on their arrival there it was found that no hay was procurable.

P. 86, Appendix to Commissioners' Report.

Letter of 4th December 1854, from Quartermaster-General Airey to Commissary-General Filder, p. 86, Appendix to Commissioners' Report.

## Major-General Sir Richard Airey's Case.

Sir Richard Airey said:—

"With regard to the passages which I regard as containing matters of animadversion, they are intermixed with other passages involving no animadversion, so that it would be difficult to point out the exact sentence, or parts and bits of sentences of which I complain; but I can say it is the whole of the London Report, down to the end of the 6th line of the 37th page, and to that part I invite inquiry." P. 251.

At the commencement of his address, Sir Richard Airey commented on the circumstances under which the evidence was taken by the Commissioners, and contended that those circumstances rendered it dangerous to draw conclusions from that evidence, and scarcely possible to assign a value to a report Pp. 230, 231. founded thereon.

He set forth at length various reasons for entertaining this opinion, which reasons will be found in the proceedings (pp. 230–1–2–4–5; 252; 261; 337–8–9).

He stated that the evidence, as printed by the Commissioners, varied in some material particulars from the evidence, as given by some of the officers in the Crimea (pp. 259—267, Questions 1,244 to 1,257; p. 280, Questions 1,272 to 1,278; p. 300). And in his closing address he said, "I had intended to impugn the Report, by showing that the conclusions therein contained would have been prevented by that very testimony, which, though not printed with the rest of the evidence, was, in truth, actually given before the Commissioners; and I had intended, I confess, to invite the attention of the Board to the circumstances under which the displacement of the evidence had occurred. From this second portion of my case I am debarred by the absence of Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch" (p. 337).

He called the attention of the Board to the precise limits of the Quartermaster-General's Department, and the nature of its duties (pp. 235–6–7–9; 253–4–5; 335–6; 341), and proceeded to give an explanation on those matters, which, falling within the range of the Quartermaster-General's Department, had been made the subject of observation by the Commissioners (p. 235), and contended that there was no ground whatever for the animadversions upon his Department which are contained in the Report (p. 337).

With a view to a clear statement of the result of our inquiry into the correctness of those animadversions, we now proceed to report on each of the matters commented on by the Commissioners, in the order in which they have taken them.

### "Separation from knapsacks." P. 23, Commissioners' Report.

As regards the separation of the men from their knapsacks on landing in the Crimea, it appears to the Board that this was a matter entirely within the Department of the Adjutant-General, who, under the orders of the General Commanding, could alone see the measure carried into execution; but Sir Richard Airey having stated his readiness to give any information in his power, has said that when the force recovered its communication with the sea, active

measures were taken for restoring them; and it is in evidence (Questions 1,214–1,218) that in consequence of the physical weakness of the men who embarked at Varna, a discretionary power as to landing with or without knapsacks was given to officers commanding regiments, and that most of them availed themselves of that power to lighten the men's burdens.

It also appears that no blame is attributable to the Quartermaster-General's Department, although much delay was occasioned in recovering knapsacks from the transports, in consequence of various obstacles over which that Department had no control. It may, however, be observed that the packs contained very little that could have added to the comfort of the men, a proportion of the men's necessaries having been left in the squad-bags at Scutari.

Question 1,229, p. 226. Compare Colonel Gordon's evidence, p. 348.

P. 253, Question 1,221; p. 265.

P. 24, Commissioners' Report.

P. 341.

## "Issues of Warm Clothing from England."

Sir Richard Airey has stated that the Quartermaster-General's Department had no stores, no storehouses, no storekeepers, no issuers, nor means of landing transport, none, in fact, of the machinery necessary for receiving stores, or for keeping them, or for transporting or delivering them to the men, and that the only duty of the Department, in relation to the issue of stores, was that of determining the proportions in which they should be shared by the troops.

It appears to us material to observe that although the term Quartermaster-General's Stores seems to have been applied by the Commissioners to all stores for which the Quartermaster-General made requisition, the responsibility of that officer must be understood to be limited to the duty of making requisitions for certain stores, and not to their safe custody, stowage, or even issue.—See Colonel Wetherall's evidence, p. 269.

We now proceed to give our opinion as to the manner in which the Quartermaster-General performed the duties of his Department.

P. 30, Commissioners' Report.

## "Distribution of Warm Clothing."

Sir Richard Airey complained of the following statement:—

"The arrangements relating to the issue of the supplies from the Quartermaster-General's stores appear to have been of questionable expediency."

Sir Richard Airey thinks it is made to appear, inferentially, that this supposed want of care in the working of the Department may have been the occasion, not of mere inconvenience and trouble, but of some of those dreadful privations to which the soldier was subjected in the winter of 1854 and 1855, and that although there always was a supply of warm clothing in the harbour of Balaklava, official formality or mismanagement stood up as a barrier between the soldiers and his supplies.

P. 254.

Warm clothing being an extra issue, very unusual in the service, the principle adopted by the Quartermaster-General as to the apportionment of it appears to have been a very judicious one, viz., that of sending orders that the regiments should apply for it according to their strength, for which purpose

P. 256-7.
P. 288.
Quests. 1,320–25

Sir Richard Airey placed an officer (Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie) at Balaklava, who appears to have performed his duties most efficiently; but the cause of those supplies not reaching the men for a considerable time after the orders were given was owing to the deficiency of transport, a fact fully admitted by the Commissioners. P. 31, Commissioners' Report.

"Rugs and Blankets." Rugs and Blankets.

Sir Richard Airey complained (p. 259) of the passages in the Commissioners' Report, referred to in the margin; he said,— P. 26, Commissioners' Report.

"It is there made to appear that the blankets fell short, and that the men were kept without warm clothing, because it occurred to no one to give the 8,000 rugs which were lying in store."

With regard to rugs the Commissioners state,— P. 26, Commissioners' Report.

"These rugs were nearly as well calculated as blankets to keep out the cold, and were perhaps better suited to resist wet, yet, when the supply of blankets fell short, it does not appear to have occurred to anyone that the rugs were available as a substitute."

The statement is distinctly contradicted by Colonel Wetherall, in the following words:— P. 272.

"It was a yellow, half cotton, half worsted rug, and, though the Commissioners state that they were nearly as well calculated to resist wet as blankets, no one else in the Crimea thought so, and that was the very reason why they were never used, because they did not resist wet."

Colonel Wetherall further stated, that— P. 272.

"The rugs were always placed under the same category as blankets, and requisitions were frequently altered to blankets or rugs, and that if a regiment asked for blankets, and they were not available, and rugs were, the regiment had permission to take rugs."

This statement appears to be completely borne out by the evidence of Mr. Boyd, the Storekeeper, and the returns of issues. P. 309–10. Appendix to Commissioners' Report, p. 89.

With regard to "blankets," they were one of the articles which were issued on requisitions made in the usual form, and approved by the Quartermaster-General, and it appears that these requisitions were approved of greatly in advance of the power of regiments receiving the same to draw the blankets, owing to the want of means of transport. Colonel Cobbe (p. 279, Commissioners' Report) says, that the requisitions of warm clothing or blankets were always in advance of the means of transport at his disposal. P. 260.

Colonel Wetherall, in his evidence given to the Commissioners in the Crimea, informed them that:—

"In the month of December alone, no less than 22,740 blankets were issued by the Department, though only 17,323 were carried away."

Compare pp. 267-8, Quests. 1,245-57.

This portion of Colonel Wetherall's evidence was omitted by the Commissioners in their Report, but was laid before us by Sir Richard Airey (p. 259).

"Great-Coats."

The Commissioners' remarks of which Sir Richard Airey complained, on the subject of great-coats, commence at p. 27, Commissioners' Report.

P. 258.

It appears that Lord Raglan, in the due exercise of his dispensing power, substituted for the complicated War Office form of requisition for great-coats, the following form:—

"Required for the Regiment

"Quartermaster-General's Office _____

See Appendix.

And a tabular statement laid before the Board, and hereto annexed, shows that orders had been issued, up to January 20th, for 6,577 great-coats, of which only 3,049 had been drawn: and it is stated by Colonel Wetherall in his evidence, that every man had at that time been supplied with a sheepskin coat.

P. 283.

The only reference made by Colonels of regiments, in their replies to the Commissioners (respecting great-coats) was that made by Colonel Douglas, 79th Regiment, who states that on making a requisition for 300 coats, it was promptly complied with.

Commissioners' Report, p. 277, Question 19.

P. 28, Commissioners' Report.

"Watch-coats, Coatees, Trowsers, Shoes."

In regard to the apportionment of these articles it appears to us, from the evidence of Colonel Wetherall, the officer who superintended their apportionment, that every means were taken to issue to the troops such of them as were actually in store, or available for use. But all the coatees were found to be too small for the men by reason of the great quantity of under-clothing worn by them. The shoes were also much too small for all purposes of service in the field.

P. 269.

P. 284.

P. 196, Appendix to Commissioners' Report.

This statement, with respect to boots and shoes, is borne out by the proceedings of a "Board of Survey on the unfitness of ammunition boots issued to the men," held in the 19th Regiment on the 8th of January 1855.

P. 32, Commissioners' Report.

"Tents."

P. 144.

With reference to tents, it appears that Sir Richard Airey, on the 28th of November 1854, sent home a large requisition in consequence of the destruction of tents and hospital marquees in the storm of the 14th of November, but that requisition, addressed to the Board of Ordnance, although sent direct to England under most pressing circumstances, was not complied with until May 1855.

P. 246.

Therefore the Quartermaster-General's Department is completely exonerated from all blame on this head.

Commissioners' Report, pp. 26 and 27.

"Paillasses."

"The vessels before referred to, which arrived about the middle and end

of November, had also brought 21,450 paillasses to protect the soldier from the moistness of the ground, of which, however, 10,000 were lost in the 'Prince.' It was intended that they should be stuffed with hay or straw, but at that time these were deficient in the camp, and no effort seems to have been made to provide a substitute, though wool from the opposite coast might probably have been procured, if proper measures had been taken for that purpose. Had even the paillasse sack, together with one of the rugs in store been issued, it would have afforded the soldier some protection from the moisture of the ground, till a better bed could be procured for him. None of the paillasses, however, were issued to the troops, and of a subsequent supply of 6,000 only about one-half were used for the hospitals; the whole of the rest remained in store.

"It was not necessary that there should be a paillasse for each man, and, indeed, a tent could not have contained that number; one to every two men would have been sufficient, for nearly one-half were out on duty at night, and even in the end of November the number in store would have afforded that proportion."

In answer to the observations of the Commissioners, imputing blame to the Quartermaster-General's Department for the non-issue of paillasses, and which might have been used by the men as a protection from the moisture of the ground, Sir Richard Airey contended that a coarse linen paillasse cover to lay down upon the wet ground would have been of no use whatever, and that no man would have taken the trouble to walk down to Balaklava to have obtained any number of them. P. 260.

Moreover, there were the same difficulties in moving the paillasses to the front as in the case of the blankets and other clothing.

It is also in evidence that there was no hay or straw to stuff them with, and no wool, or the means of rendering it available, if procured as a substitute, as suggested by the Commissioners. P. 283.

Sir Richard Airey's statement on this head is corroborated by the evidence of Colonel Wetherall (p. 283) and Mr. Watson (p. 334), and confirms us in our opinion that the paillasses could not have been made serviceable in the mode recommended by the Commissioners.

## "Huts."

P. 33, Commissioners' Report.

With regard to the subject of hutting, it appears that the Quartermaster-General's Department completely fulfilled their duty, by ordering huts at an early period from Constantinople, viz. 8th November 1854, but the conveyance of the material to the front for hutting the men formed no part of the Quartermaster's-General's duty, as, at that period, that duty rested with the Commissariat Department. P. 242. P. 241.

It appears that from the first supply of planks and scantling, which arrived from Constantinople on November 25, 1854, to the second supply, which arrived on January 21, 1855, the Land Transport was insufficient to carry up to the front even the subsistence for the men, much less was it possible for them to transport a heavy weight of planks and scantling. P. 301.

It appears, therefore, that the Quartermaster-General's Department is relieved from all responsibility on this head.

The responsibility of the Quartermaster-General's Department was confined to making a requisition for such materials as could be made available for the purpose, and as early as October (before it was known where the army were going to winter), a communication was made to the principal agent for transports, Captain Christie, to obtain all the spare sails, spars, and tarpaulins.

P. 33.

On its being decided that the army was to winter in the Crimea, the Quartermaster-General states, in answer to the Commissioners, that he procured 200 Turks as labourers, and all the timber and planks necessary from Sinope and Constantinople.

P. 188, Evidence before the Commissioners.

P. 247.

But it does not appear that any timber or planks were distributed in the Crimea before the middle of November or end of December, or that any means of transport were available for that purpose.

So far as the Report of the Commissioners may be supposed to animadvert upon the Quartermaster-General's Department, in regard to the want of "promptitude or ingenuity in devising 'temporary shelter' for the horses," and the employment of canvas for that purpose, we are of opinion that the evidence of—

P. 36.

P. 147. Admiral Sir E. Lyons, R.N.,

P. 301. Major Keane, R.E.,

P. 306. Admiral Sir J. Dundas, R.N.,

P. 318. Colonel Chapman, R.E.,

P. 331. Major Hackett, *Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General*,

P. 332. Captain Derryman, R.N.,

completely refute the statements of the Commissioners.

Before we close our observations on the case of Sir Richard Airey, we think it important to refer to the subject of the road from Balaklava, a matter which so pre-eminently falls within the range of the Quartermaster-General's duties, and about which so much has been said.

Sir Richard Airey has considered it sufficient for his vindication to quote the words of the Commissioners in their own Report, as satisfactorily explaining, so far at least as his own department was concerned, the causes of the defects, and the difficulty which existed in remedying them.

Commissioners' Report, p. 18.

"The want of a road from Balaklava to the front, passable for commissariat carts, greatly increased the difficulty of supplying the army after the middle of November; but the officers commanding divisions who were examined upon the subject are unanimous in their opinion that it would have been impossible to employ a sufficient number of men to make the road, and at the same time to carry on the military operations in which the army was engaged."

To this passage may be added the admission of the Commissioners, that hired labour could not be obtained, and the demand for the services of the troops in the trenches, and for other military duties, was such that they could not be spared for other purposes. (Commissioners' Report, p. 33.)

On a careful review of the imputations, whether express or implied, against the Quartermaster-General's Department in the Crimea, of which Sir Richard Airey complained,—

We are of opinion that, in the performance of their several duties, neither that officer, nor any of those who served under him, are justly chargeable with mismanagement or neglect; but that, on the contrary, they used their best exertions to promote, as far as depended upon them, the welfare of the army.

That their endeavours often failed in their object, cannot fairly be matter of charge against a department, which, although ostensibly responsible for the performance of duties of the very first importance to an army in the field, is yet left unprovided with any means at its disposal of carrying out its own arrangements, and thus becomes entirely dependent on the precarious aid of other departments, which, on this particular service, were over-taxed far beyond their strength and resources.

Formerly the Quartermaster-General's Department was on a very different footing in this respect; the greater part of a staff-corps of infantry, composed entirely of artificers, and commanded by officers specially trained, or selected with a view to staff employment, was attached to the Quartermaster-General's Department, and its services were at all times available for the performance of duties which could not otherwise be provided for.

It is in evidence that in the Crimea the Quartermaster-General endeavoured to obtain the assistance of the Royal Engineers for erecting huts for the cavalry, but that none could be spared, as the operations of the siege occupied the entire strength of that corps. P. 188.

It is also stated in evidence, that in the Crimea the French army had a "Corps d'Arts et Métiers" disposable for the construction of field ovens, &c., at a period of great suffering, when not a man of the British army could be obtained for a like purpose. P. 375.

---

## The Honourable Colonel Gordon's Case.

Colonel Gordon called the attention of the Board, in the first instance, to the following statements, which had been made by Colonel Tulloch during the course of the proceedings before the Board; and which statements he considered to be incorrect as regarded himself, and prejudicial to him if left unchallenged:—

I.—A statement to the effect that all the originals of the evidence given by the officers in the Crimea were sent to them for correction.

Colonel Gordon said that this was not done in certain instances with his evidence; and that the evidence that was submitted to him, and which purported to be an original, was materially different from the actual original (pp. 343-4).

II.—A statement with regard to Colonel Wetherall's evidence, viz.:—

"Those notes were never introduced into the body of the evidence, because the marked difference between what was received in the one case, and acknowledged in the other, showed that the inquiry would lead to no beneficial result, and I therefore struck out the whole of the latter part of the memorandum, and in that state it was subsequently sent to Colonel Gordon for Colonel Wetherall, along with his evidence, to save the trouble of re-copying it." Commissioners' Report, p. 210.

Colonel Gordon said that the memorandum there mentioned never was sent to him, and that he never saw it till he saw it printed in this country (p. 344–5).

III.—Colonel Gordon also complained of Query 7, p. 200, of the Commissioners' Report (Evidence), as attributing to him a statement which he had never made, and containing assertions which were entirely incorrect (p. 346).

"7. You state (page 169 of your evidence) as a reason for not making these issues that you thought 'when the men had two blankets, a sheepskin coat, a fur cap, a pair of leggings, a waterproof hood, one-third of a buffalo robe, two guernsey frocks, two pairs of drawers, two pairs of socks, a pair of winter boots, a comforter, and two pairs of gloves, as well as an extra suit of uniform, &c.,' that they were not so badly off. Were you aware, when you made this statement, that the returns received from the Quarter-master-General's Department show that the articles, of which the non-issue is complained of, arrived at Balaklava between the 21st and 28th of November, while those to which you refer (with the exception of the blankets) were not received till near the middle of January? How, then, could the issue of the latter have operated as a reason for the non-issue of the former, when they were not available for at least six weeks after the 28th November, during which period the sufferings of the men from want of sufficient clothing were at their greatest height?"

7. This question assumes as a fact that which I have not stated, and contains assertions which I believe to be entirely incorrect; I must, therefore, decline entering on a question founded in error.

IV.—Also of the following paragraph, p. 26 of the Report, the accuracy of which he unequivocally denied (p. 348-9):—

"It will be observed, that Colonel Gordon in his evidence, assigns as a reason for the non-issue of many of these supplies, that he conceived the men had enough, and he enumerates a long list of articles supplied to them; but he overlooks the fact, that the greater number of these were not issued till about the end of February, whereas the period during which the men principally suffered, was in the months of December and January, when it appears that there were supplies enough in hand to have averted much of that suffering."

V.—Also of the following paragraph (p. 27 of Report), which he considered to be wholly unsupported by the evidence (p. 349-50):—

"One of the reasons assigned for not issuing the regimental great-coats, was, that the regulations of the service, as established by the Queen's Warrant, did not authorize such issue more frequently than once in three years. The proportion of corps in the Crimea entitled to them in terms of that Warrant was very limited, and it does not appear that any instructions dispensing with its restrictions were received there, or that any intimation was given of the intention with which they were sent out. Had an application been made, however, it is not probable that the General commanding would have refused to authorize, on his own responsibility, the distribution of articles of clothing which were likely to contribute to the health and efficiency of the troops; and if the Quartermaster-General doubted his own powers in this matter, it appears to us that he ought to have applied for that authority."—

VI.—Colonel Gordon also complained of the following paragraph, in p. 24 of the Report, as implying that he had not sufficient grounds for the statements which he had made to the Commissioners as a witness (p. 347–8):

"It will be seen from the evidence of Colonel Gordon, then Assistant Quartermaster-General, that he attributes the non-recovery of the knapsacks at an early period to the General Officers of Divisions, with the exception of the Duke of Cambridge, preferring not to receive them. On referring, however, to two of the officers who commanded divisions on that occasion, one of them states positively that no such offer was made to him; another, that he has no recollection of it, though it may have been so; the third being absent, we have had no opportunity of communicating with him on the subject.

VII.—Colonel Gordon also said—

"A point upon which I think I have some reason to complain, is the fact that after having obtained from Major Wetherall and myself, and from numerous other officers, the materials from which these portions of their Report to which I have been adverting were drawn up, the Commissioners should not have put to Sir Richard Airey, the Quartermaster-General, in justice to himself, as well as to his subordinate officers, a single question upon the subject, either of the knapsacks, or the issue of clothing, which had unquestionably formed in their minds, from an early period, so important a feature of the inquiry. I was shown by Sir Richard Airey the questions (sixty-three in number) which were sent to him, as containing the points upon which the Commissioners required information, and finding that there was not one relative to the issue, or non-issue, of clothing, or to the knapsacks, I had every right to conclude that the evidence of Major Wetherall and myself had on the subjects been deemed satisfactory." (p. 351.)

*Complaints I.–II.*—With respect to the subjects referred to in complaints I. and II., after giving due consideration to the reasons set forth by Colonel Tulloch in his paper marked B, in explanation thereof, we entirely acquit the Commissioners of being actuated by any improper motives in adopting the course complained of by Colonel Gordon; inasmuch as, with respect to the evidence given to the Commissioners by Colonel Gordon, we think that the Commissioners were under the impression that that officer had sufficient opportunity of correcting it.

P. 344. But as that impression does not appear to have been correct, we are of opinion that Colonel Gordon's complaint, in this respect, is not without foundation.

With respect to Colonel Wetherall's evidence—

The Commissioners refer to the fact of Colonel Wetherall's absence from the Crimea in explanation of the circumstance of his evidence not having been signed by that officer. They forwarded it to Colonel Gordon on the 4th June, 1855, apparently with the intention of procuring its signature and revisal by Colonell Wetherall, overlooking, however, the circumstance of Colonel Wetherall
P 344. being at that time at Constantinople; for it appears that after Colonel Wetherall's examination was finished, viz. on the 28th May, he applied to the Commissioners to know whether he might leave the Crimea, and the Commissioners, having consulted together, stated that they had nothing further to ask from him; that they had ascertained all they wished as to the clothing, and he was perfectly at liberty to go to Constantinople. He accordingly left Balaklava, either on the 31st May or the 1st June (p. 281, Question 1,288.)

His evidence was returned to the Commissioners by Colonel Gordon without alteration.

Pp. 275–6. The Commissioners state that they were led to believe, in consequence, that its correctness was admitted, even though Colonel Wetherall's signature was not appended.

The value, however, of the evidence given by the officer who was charged with the apportionment of the articles in store, and the importance of that portion of Colonel Wetherall's evidence which was omitted when the other portion was forwarded to Colonel Gordon for correction, both bearing upon the delays and omissions supposed to have occurred in supplying the troops with comforts that were available, induce us to express our regret that Colonel
P. 249. Wetherall's attention had not been particularly called by the Commissioners to these points, and to the absence of his own signature; especially as, with reference to the non-issue of various articles of clothing, the Commissioners appear to have formed conclusions which subsequent explanations, and a comparison of returns, do not warrant.

*Complaint III.*—Colonel Gordon's complaint of Query 7, page 200 of the Commissioners' Report, as founded upon incorrect assumptions of what he had said, appears to be borne out by a reference to page 169 of the Commissioners' Evidence, where Colonel Gordon gives, as a reason for not issuing a rug, a third blanket, and second great-coat to the men, that there was not a sufficient quantity in store previous to the arrival of other warm clothing, "and not to his considering they were not so badly off."

See Commissioners' Report, Appendix, pp. 100–101. The supplies of the articles enumerated in the following list, are shown to have been authorized as soon as possible after they were landed and received into store:—

| | First Arrivals. |
|---|---|
| Sheepskin coat - - - | December 28. |
| Fur cap - - - - - | January 20. |
| Pair of leggings - - - | February 9. |
| Waterproof hood - - - | February 9. |
| Buffalo robe - - - - | December 25. |

| | First Arrivals. |
|---|---|
| Guernsey frock | November 21. |
| Drawers | Ditto. |
| Socks | Ditto. |
| Winter boots | January 30. |
| Comforter | December 24. |
| Gloves | January 6. |
| Coatee | November 28. |
| Trousers | Ditto. |

See Appendix to Commissioners' Report, p. 62.

The first of these supplies, consisting of the articles most wanted, namely, Guernsey frocks, drawers, and socks, commenced before the end of November, they having arrived on the 21st of that month; and the assertion that the greater number of them were not issued till about the end of January or beginning of February, appears to be disproved by the returns above referred to.

Commissioners' Report, Appendix, p. 117.

*Complaints IV.-V.*—In our observations on Complaint No. III, we have commented by anticipation on Complaints Nos. IV. and V., and we may here add, that so far from the Quartermaster-General having doubted his own authority, or delayed making an application to the Commander-in-chief, as supposed by the Commissioners (Report, p 27), it appears that Lord Raglan at once dispensed with the forms that interferred with the issue of great-coats, and of any other articles that were required for the use of the troops.

P. 350, Commissioners' Report. Evidence, p. 163.

*Complaint VI.*—With regard to Complaint No. VI., Colonel Gordon called our attention to the evidence which he had given to the Commissioners, and intimated that it contained a correct statement of the matter. He then said, "As the Commissioners have not thought it necessary to state the names of the two Generals to whom they applied, or to insert the correspondence which passed on the occasion, so neither do I wish to introduce into this explanation any matter of a mere personal nature between the Generals of Division and myself; I will, therefore, merely repeat the steps taken by the Quartermaster-General to enable them to obtain the knapsacks of their men."

P. 348.

With respect to the recovery of the knapsacks, we have given our opinion thereon in our report on Sir Richard Airey's case.

*Complaint VII.*—With regard to complaint No. VII., we think that Colonel Gordon might reasonably infer, from the circumstances therein detailed, that the evidence of himself and Colonel Wetherall had been deemed satisfactory by the Commissioners.

## Commissary-General Filder's Case.

Mr. Filder referred to his letter addressed to Mr. Peel (which was laid before both Houses of Parliament), as containing the particular passages of the Report of which he chiefly complained (p. 356).

He objected to the tone and spirit of the whole Report, as well as to the more precise charges contained in it, and contended that it was not justified by the actual facts (p. 357).

He also complained that no inquiries were made of himself on either of the two examinations which he attended, or of his officers when examined, which could have shown them where the Commissioners thought there had been neglect or omission, or could have given them an opportunity of clearing up any misapprehension which might exist in the minds of the Commissioners (pp. 357, 362).

Further, that the Commissioners had not taken into account the particular difficulties of his position; and that their Report, even as a statement of facts, was a misrepresentation in many parts, and exaggeration in others (p. 357).

In support of these positions, Mr. Filder set forth the nature of the duties of the Commissariat Department while in his charge, and the means which he had of performing them (pp. 357-8).

In illustration of the difficulties of his position, he referred to the insufficient establishment both of officers and employés (pp. 358, 377); the uncertainty of the position of the army during the winter (pp. 358–73); the consequences of the storm of 14th of November, 1854; the effects of the wants of a road (pp. 359); and of the want of sea transport (p. 360).

He contended that the real question to be considered, with reference to his conduct as Commissary-General, was this:—

Whether he could, from the middle of November 1854, to the end of February 1855, have increased the number of transport animals in the Crimea, and whether when he had got them there, he could have obtained from any quarter sufficient forage to supply them with food" (pp. 363, 383).

He said that on this question of transport depended the consideration of various other matters of very great importance, which had been made the subject of charges against him (p. 360); he instanced the supply of fresh meat (pp. 360-1-2), and of fuel (p. 363).

He showed, in detail, what had taken place with reference to the supply of forage from England (pp. 364-5-6-7-8-9, 370-1; 381-2; 388; Questions 1,981-1,996; 390-1-8; 2,016-19, 35, 41; p. 406); and contended that the authorities there had omitted to comply with his repeated requisitions, and that by no exertions of his own, or of the commissariat officers acting under his direction, could the deficiency have been remedied from local resources (p. 372-3).

He referred to some other charges, relating rather to the peculiar quality or nature of the supplies given out, than to any deficiency; and as to which he said that, "the Commissioners seemed to have been more misinformed, and

more ready to arrive at conclusions, than as to any other matters on which they had grounded their charges against him" (p. 373) :—

1. Vegetable food—p. 373-4.
2. Lime juice—pp. 374-5.
3. Fresh bread—pp. 375-6.
4. Tea—pp. 381-2.
5. Green coffee—pp. 381-2, 386-7.
6. Rice—p. 382.

We have thought it right, in the first instance, to give this outline of Mr. Filder's address to the Board, in order that the statement of his complaint might appear in the form in which he submitted it to us. But we have found it convenient in our Report to observe the arrangement which he has adopted in his letter to Mr. Peel.

We now, therefore, proceed to give our opinions in that order on the several matters on which he has there adverted.

## Quantities in Store (p. 6).

Under this head, the Commissioners observe, with regard to—

*Biscuit.*—That "the ration of biscuit having, on the 15th October 1854, been increased by General Order to 1½ lb., in consideration of the severe labour to which the troops were subjected, it was reduced on the 7th November to 1 lb. on the express ground of the 'supply of biscuit being insufficient to furnish the increased ration lately authorized."

Report I, p. 4.

On this, Mr. Filder remarks,—

"The established ration for all troops in the field was not reduced, but the *extra* allowance was discontinued. It was a matter of notoriety, that 1½ lb. of biscuit was more than the men could eat, and that they sold, or gave away, a part of what they received, to the French troops who frequented our lines; this was before the storm or any deficiencies had occurred. My motive for recommending the discontinuance, *under such circumstances*, of the extra allowance, was, that its issue impeded the progress of the depôt which I was then forming in the front.

P. 62. Evidence before Commissioners in the Crimea.

"Had the extra quantity of biscuit issued to the troops in camp, been allowed to accumulate in depôt there, the animals which, during the winter, were occupied in transporting that article, might have been employed in carrying up other supplies, which were then so much needed; the extra quantity issued very greatly exceeded all the deficiencies of biscuit which occurred throughout the winter."

Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 6.

In this view of the case, we consider that Mr. Filder was justified in recommending the discontinuance of the extra allowance.

The Commissioners further observe, with regard to—

*Salt Meat.*—"From the returns handed to us by the Commissary-General, and from his statements, it appears that, although the commissariat had at that time in store sufficient for several days' consumption, there was still (in consequence of some mistake, it is stated, on the part of the commissariat officers at Constantinople) cause for considerable anxiety lest the whole army should be left without salt meat, at a time when no other articles of food were available, except biscuit, rum, and the ordinary groceries. The arrival of a vessel with a supply of salt meat, before that which had been obtained from the navy was issued, relieved the Commissary-General from the anxiety which he had previously felt on the subject."

Report I, p. 4.

On this, Mr. Filder remarks:—

"That although some apprehension on the subject of a short supply existed in his mind, no positive deficiency ever occurred in the commissariat stores: that the lowest number of days for which he had supplies of salt meat on hand, was eight or nine; and that the circumstance of his having had even so short a supply as that, arose partly from the loan he had made of that article to the navy, partly from the detention of the vessels by contrary winds."

Proceedings, Question, 1,927 to 1,933.

He further remarked, that—

"The Commissioners have omitted to state what is shown by the evidence annexed to their Report (p. 158), that the salt meat received from the navy only replaced the quantity which had been supplied from the commissariat stores for seamen and marines serving on shore. This supply from the navy was not, therefore, a loan, but a restitution of a loan."

Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 6.

## Short Rations (p. 7).

Under this head, the Commissioners state, that—

"In the Crimea, during the greater part of November and December, and also in a great measure during January and a part of February, the soldier was confined exclusively to biscuit in addition to his salt meat."

Commissioners' Report, p. 5.

The returns quoted in margin, show that there were issued to the troops in the month of—

Appendix to Commissioners' Report, p. 13.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| November | 340,818 lbs. | of vegetables. |
| December | 22,797 „ | ditto. |
| January | 77,250 „ | ditto. |
| February | 558,925 „ | ditto. |

Also, in the months of—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| November | 79,059 lbs. | of rice. |
| December | 63,014 „ | ditto. |
| January | 155,241 „ | ditto. |
| February | 118,400 „ | ditto. |

It appears, therefore, that the statements of the Commissioners are by no means borne out. Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 9.

We may here add, with respect to the remarks of the Commissioners on the subject of Vegetable Food (p. 8), that we entirely concur in the view of the Commissary-General, that his department is not responsible for the particular articles of diet which constitute the ration of the men; his duty is only to furnish it according to the order of the General commanding.

Fresh Meat (p. 8).
Abundance of Cattle (p. 16).
Importance of Fresh Meat (p. 17).

It appears to the Board that the insufficient supply of fresh meat arose from various causes, but primarily from the want of sea transport, which want Commissary-General Filder appears to have used every exertion to remedy.

The number of transports at the disposal of the commissariat was diminished during the month of December by the circumstance of two of the most efficient cattle vessels being then under repair, and useless.

The supply of fresh meat during the same month was rendered less than it otherwise would have been, owing to the commissariat officer at Eupatoria having sent back empty two transports dispatched to that place for a supply of cattle, he having given over the cattle he had in charge there to the French and Turks, who had arrived without any supplies of fresh meat, or the means of providing any. P. 362.

Mr. Filder says on this subject:—

"I was at all times fully alive to the importance of providing fresh meat, for the use of the troops, and employed to the utmost all the suitable vessels I could obtain (see paper annexed, marked D), but I consider sailing vessels to be unsuitable for the service in winter, particularly in the Black Sea. Of all the cattle which were forwarded in sailing transports from Varna at the end of October and beginning of November, more than one-third were lost. Even on board steamers, which were not fitted up as cattle-vessels, the casualties were very great. To have continued the use, therefore, of sailing vessels, would have been to destroy the supplies of the army, and must have led to a deficiency; for in winter it would have been impracticable to obtain large supplies of cattle from the interior of Turkey to replace such losses." Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 16.

With reference to the observation of the Commissioners, that—

"Slaughtered meat might at that season of the year have been carried without much loss," and their opinion that "fresh meat in much larger quantities might have been, and ought to have been, supplied to the army,"—

Mr. Filder says—

"Slaughtered meat was sent by the cattle-vessels during the winter, in addition to their cargoes of live cattle, notwithstanding that the plan, in a climate where the variations of temperature are so extreme, was attended with much loss. It was possible for the Commissioners to have inquired into the manner in which this important service had been conducted by Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 17.

the commissariat, and they would have discovered that their suggestion had been anticipated by our practice."

"The Commissioners cannot, it is presumed, mean that slaughtered meat should have been forwarded in sailing transports, as vessels of that class were often, in winter, nearly a month in performing the voyage from the main-land."

Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 8.

Mr. Filder also says—

"The average quantity of fresh meat supplied by the commissariat during the five winter months, from November to March, was nearly 10 lbs. per man per month, exclusive of that furnished for the troops on board hospital-ships in harbour, the aggregate force being 158,617 men, and the quantity of fresh meat issued by the commissariat 1,525,949 lbs."

The issues in December fell greatly below the average, that is, to 6½ lbs. per man, in consequence of the cattle-vessels, which had been damaged in the hurricane, being still under repair during that month.

That the healthy did not receive the ration which these figures would indicate, was unfortunately owing to the large numbers of sick, who, in some divisions, received full rations of fresh meat daily, in others, five days a-week, thus curtailing the rations of the rest of the troops."

P. 9.

## Lime-Juice (p. 9).

The Commissioners in their Report state—

"That from the 10th of December the lime-juice brought by the "Esk" was lying in the Commissariat stores at Balaklava, and none of it was issued till the first week in February, an interval during which the sufferings of the army from scurvy were probably at their height."

P. 374.

It appears by the evidence before us, that there is some contradiction as to the date of the arrival of the "Esk."

The Commissary-General stated that that vessel did not arrive until the 19th of December, in which he is confirmed by Mr. Archer. However this may be, it appears clear that the casks of lime-juice in the "Esk" were landed and delivered into the commissariat stores on the 20th of December; that information of this arrival was given to the Purveyor of Hospitals, who appears to have actually removed some of it away from the beach while it was being taken out of the vessel.

Proceedings, p. 375.

The Medical Department was therefore duly apprised of this supply, and Lord Raglan also appears to have been duly informed that there was lime-juice in store, but the issue of it as a regular ration to the troops generally was not authorized until the general order of the 31st of January, 1855.

Proceedings, p. 375.

Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 10.

Steps were promptly taken to procure supplies from Malta and Sicily, and as soon as they were procured, the issues were regularly maintained; therefore, in respect to this matter, no blame seems to attach to the Commissary-General.

P. 11.

## Fresh Bread (p. 11).

Pp. 356, 375.

Mr. Filder complains that the Commissioners have charged him with an indisposition to make the attempt of baking fresh bread.

He replies to this, and in our opinion satisfactorily, by bringing forward his purchase of three months' supply of flour for the purpose of baking bread, but contends that, as bread requires 50 per cent. more of transport for its conveyance than biscuit, "it would have been impossible in the then state of the roads, and the transport, to have found the means of carrying it up to the camp." Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 11.

A floating mill and bakery which he had applied for did not arrive from England till the 12th of May.

In proportion as the state of the sea transport improved, bread was brought from Constantinople sufficient for an issue twice a-week.

When, on the arrival of the floating bakery, its capabilities were found insufficient, and the construction of ovens was commenced, the means existed of baking so as to allow of an issue to the troops on three days in the week.

The different organization of the French army is sufficient to explain the circumstance of their being more regularly supplied with fresh bread than was the case with the English. Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 11.

The Quartermaster-General's letter of March 21, 1855, to the Commissioners, points out the difficulties which at present exist in the British service with regard to employing soldiers as bakers. Appendix, p. 21.

## Green Coffee (p. 12).

Mr. Filder was in no degree responsible for the coffee not being roasted; it was sent out in a green state by the Treasury, and it was no part of Mr. Filder's duty, nor was he ordered to cause it to be roasted previously to its being delivered to the troops. Pp. 386–7. Questions 1,958–1,970.

No complaint was made on the subject till the month of November.

Mr. Filder stated that a Military Board decided on issuing coffee as a ration to the troops, and that the Board knew that it was sold to the men in a green state. He added—

"Subsequently a small quantity of roasted coffee was sent out from England as an experiment, upon which I was desired to report; but although ordered in July, it did not reach the army till towards the end of September, when we were on the march from Kalamita Bay to Sebastopol; and as soon as I learnt that it was approved of, I recommended that coffee should be sent out roasted, but none arrived till about the 24th of January, from which date green coffee ceased to be issued to the troops." Letter to Mr. Peel, p. 13. Lord Raglan's General Orders, June 26, 1854.

With respect to the suggestion of the Commissioners that tea should have been issued to the troops instead of coffee, on account of the difficulties attending the roasting of the latter, owing to the scarcity of fuel, it is obvious that fuel would have been equally required for making the tea; and as much tea appears to have been issued during the months of January and February as was consistent with maintaining a supply necessary for the use of the sick. P. 381.

## Fuel (p. 14).

It appears that, on the 1st August, the Commissary-General brought this subject to the notice of Lord Raglan, and a depôt of fuel, viz. wood and Memorandum A, appended to Mr. Filder's letter.

charcoal, was formed at Scutari. Early in November 800,000 rations of charcoal ordered by Lord Raglan, arrived at Balaklava, and the issue to the troops commenced on the 8th of December.

Proceedings, p. 363.

In the course of that month a large additional quantity arrived. Mr. Filder states there never was at any time after the beginning of November a want of fuel at Balaklava; the only difficulty was to find the means of conveying it to the front.

Mr. Filder having thus actually formed a depôt of fuel at Scutari, under the impression that the army might winter there in barracks, having also sought instructions relative to the formation of a similar depôt at Varna, supposing the army might winter in the Principalities, and having, moreover, taken prompt measures to supply the troops in the Crimea, when the local resources were on the point of exhaustion, cannot, in our opinion, be justly charged with any want of foresight or exertion in this respect.

Pp. 23–6.

## Land Transport and Hay (pp. 23–26).

The insufficiency of land transport appears to have been the principal cause of most of the sufferings experienced by the army, and this insufficiency appears to have been occasioned by the want of means of supporting more animals.

As relates to Mr. Filder, therefore, in his position of Commissary-General, the question is, in our opinion, correctly stated by him to be—

"Whether he is to blame for the deficiency of forage, to which, step by step, all other deficiencies were mainly attributable, as limiting the number of transport animals that could be maintained in the Crimea, and whether he availed himself of all the sea transport which he could obtain for the conveyance of forage and live cattle."

Proceedings, p. 383.

Mr. Filder stated, at the outset of his case, and we think correctly, that,—

"If it was expected that he should provide transport for the conveyance of indefinite quantities of huts, timber, buffalo-robes, warm clothing, &c., it must be obvious that it would have been wholly impracticable, even had there been no difficulty with respect to forage. The additional transport power could only have been procured by long previous preparation, the time for which was never allowed him."

Proceedings, pp. 363–4.

He showed, that even for the most ordinary commissariat purposes, no more sea transport was available than that which he actually used. And he, in our opinion, satisfactorily accounted for the circumstance adverted to by the Commissioners, that the Land Transport was, for a few days, reduced to an effective number of 333 pack-horses and mules, and 12 camels.

Proceedings, pp. 364–407. Question 2,166.

Proceedings, pp. 364–5.

With regard to forage, Mr. Filder stated that—

Proceedings, p. 365.

"As the deficiency of fodder for the animals of the army in the Crimea during the winter of October 1854–5, had been made the chief ground of accusation against him in respect of his management of the supplies, it became necessary for his vindication, more especially since the appearance of Sir C. Trevelyan's statement, to enter into a fuller explanation with regard to this head than he thought necessary with the other charges."

He stated that—

"So early as the time at which an expectation was entertained that the army would advance to the Danube, I made a contract for about 3,500 tons of hay, to be delivered loose at different places in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, and I also desired the commissariat officer there to form a depôt of chopped straw, in case the army should return and occupy cantonments in Turkey during the winter. I took these steps as a precaution, notwithstanding that supplies of chopped straw, the usual forage of the country, can be obtained to almost any amount along the shores of the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora, and these arrangements would have been adequate to the object in view, had the army been cantoned in these districts." Proceedings, p. 365.

It appears that on the 13th September, when the fleet was crossing the Black Sea to the Crimea, Mr. Filder wrote to the Treasury, requesting that 2,000 tons of hay might be sent from England; and he stated that—

"By every subsequent mail, or nearly so, from the time of our arrival before Sebastopol, throughout the months of October, November, and December, and up to the 22nd January, I represented, in either official or private letters, addressed to Sir Charles Trevelyan, that it would be impossible to convey by sea sufficient quantities of unpressed hay and straw to meet the consumption of the army, or, if it were possible, that we could not land or issue sufficient quantities of forage in that shape, and that we should, consequently, be dependent upon supplies of pressed hay from England, the quantity of that article which could be procured from Constantinople being quite inadequate to our wants. One or other, and sometimes all, of these topics were mentioned by almost every mail." Proceedings p. 365–6.

"On the 13th November I transmitted an estimate of supplies required to be forwarded from England for the service of the army in the East, during a period of three months, in which the supply of hay is stated at 5,820,314 lbs. or 2,600 tons, or 866 tons per month.

"On the receipt by me, after I had transmitted the evidence above-mentioned, of an intimation from the Treasury by letter, dated 9th November, that shipments of hay would only be made at the rate of 357 tons per month, I immediately informed Sir C. Trevelyan by letter, dated 27th November, that this quantity would not suffice, and that I should require 580 tons per month for the artillery, cavalry, and commissariat transport animals alone; and by the next mail, that is, on the 8th December, I wrote to say, that in consequence of Lord Raglan having ordered full rations of forage to be issued for al the baggage animals of the army, I should want the whole of the hay estimated for, or 866 tons per month. So little attention did this meet with, that, in fact, even the 357 tons per month was not sent; the total quantity shipped and forwarded, during the two months of October and November, not having exceeded 270 tons, that is to say, by the—

| | lbs. |
|---|---|
| "Belgravia" | 402,775 |
| "Esk" | 108,100 |
| "Helen" | 88,425 |
| Total | 509,325 " |

Treasury Statement, p. 11.

The following passage in the Treasury Statement is confirmatory of the latter portion of this statement by Mr. Filder:—

"The shipments of hay actually made from England up to the end of January were as follows:—

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1854. | In June and July .. .. | 1,203,800 lbs. | = 537 tons in 5 vessels. |
| | In August and September .. | 1,023,300 lbs. | = 457 tons in 6 vessels. |
| | In November .. .. | 599,300 lbs. | = 267 tons in 3 vessels. |
| | In December .. .. | 1,417,600 lbs. | = 633 tons in 9 vessels. |
| 1855. | In January .. .. | 800,100 lbs. | = 357 tons in 7 vessels. |

With regard to the 537 tons shipped in June and July, Mr. Filder said—

"That quantity was originally sent out, partly by the Admiralty to complete the horse transports, and partly on my requisition to replace the quantity I had expected to receive from the horse transports, but which I never got. I got but very little from the horse transports."

Proceedings, p. 369.

He added: "Supposing all that had been sent out from England from the commencement, that is, from June, or 944 tons, had been available, it would have left me deficient 1,006 tons of my requisition of 13th September, and I only got, or there was shipped on account of that 1,006 tons, according to Sir C. Trevelyan's own statement, up to the 1st or the 5th December, 268 tons."

Proceedings, p. 370.

With regard to the 633 tons shipped in December, Mr. Filder stated that he did not get them till February. He said—

"I never received, up to the end of January, more than 510,000lbs., or 228 tons. To have done it properly, the shipments ought to have been consecutive and immediate; and allowance should have been made for the time occupied in the voyage."

Proceedings, p. 370.

It therefore appears to us, that Mr. Filder used all the means in his power to communicate to the Treasury the absolute necessity of sending supplies of forage to the army from England; and that he made known the wants of the army in that particular by a constant series of letters, in which the requirements of the commissariat were clearly set forth in pressing and urgent language.

See Appendix

And we are disposed to concur with Mr. Filder in thinking, that "if the authorities in England are to judge of the expediency of complying with the requisitions of a Commissary-General in charge of the supply of an army in the field, founded on his personal knowledge derived on the spot, of his wants and resources, it seems clear that the responsibility of that officer must be at an end."

Proceedings, p. 370.

In concluding our observations on the case of Commissary-General Filder, we think it desirable to advert to certain passages of the Commissioners' first Report, in which it is stated that they do not mean to infer, from their notice of arrangements which appeared to them to be defective, that that officer, or the officers of his department, failed to make any exertion of which they were capable, to provide for the exigencies of the public service, and that it is but

just to direct attention to the unusual nature of the duties required of them, under the following adverse circumstances :—

1. The army occupied, as it were, a barren island.
2. The Department was without a sufficient number of hands.
3. A great disaster was occasioned by tempest.
4. There were constant difficulties in landing the vast supplies required for a large army, owing to the peculiarities of Balaklava harbour ; and,
5. They advert to the breaking up of the road to the front, and the impossibility of sparing from their military duties a sufficient number of men to make it practicable to commissariat carts.

On this trying state of things the Commissioners remark, with direct allusion to Mr. Filder's management, that "a man of comprehensive views might probably have risen superior to these disadvantages, and created an organization suited to the circumstances." Report I, p. 21.

It is difficult, however, to believe that any man of even the highest inventive resources and administrative capacity, could have effectually provided beforehand for daily and ever-increasing demands, many of which, extending as they did, infinitely beyond the limits of all previous commissariat administration, were not, and, from their very nature, could not, be foreseen.

It was a great aggravation of these evils, that the question of where the army was to winter could not be decided, and made known to Mr. Filder till only a very few days before the weather broke, and his difficulties had commenced.

It is in evidence that he used every means to obtain the earliest information on this point, with the express view of making timely arrangements.

On the whole, therefore, we are of opinion, that Commissary-General Filder's conduct in the management of his Department, was not, and is not, justly liable to the unfavourable animadversion, either express or implied, which is conveyed in the Report of the Commissioners ; and we humbly submit to Your Majesty that he does not appear to us to be justly responsible, as regards the supplies, for the unsatisfactory state of Your Majesty's army in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-5.

---

The terms of Your Majesty's Warrant did not appear to us to call for an expression of our opinion on any cases except those of the five officers whose complaints we have already considered.

But, in conformity with the directions conveyed to us in a letter addressed by Your Majesty's Secretary of State for War to the Judge Advocate-General, we received certain explanatory statements from Captain Leopold George Heath, C.B., R.N., which will be found in pp. 401 to 415 of the Proceedings, and in the Appendix.

Having been honoured with Your Majesty's commands, not only to report an opinion upon the matters referred to us as set forth in your Royal Warrant,

but also to submit to Your Majesty what, in our judgment, may best be done thereon—

We have, in obedience to Your Majesty's commands, stated, in this our Report, our unanimous opinion on the cases of the undermentioned officers:—

Lieutenant-General the Right Honourable the Earl of Lucan, K.C.B.;
Major-General the Right Honourable the Earl of Cardigan, K.C B.;
Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.;
Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon, C.B.;
Commissary-General William Filder, C.B.

And, in conclusion,

We beg leave further humbly to submit to Your Majesty, that there does not appear to us to be any ground for further proceedings thereon.

All which is most dutifully submitted.

ALEXANDER WOODFORD, *General, President.*
BEAUCHAMP, *General.*
G. H. F. BERKELEY, *General.*
JOHN BELL, *Lieutenant-General.*
WILLIAM ROWAN, *Lieutenant-General.*
W. KNOLLYS, *Lieutenant-General.*
J. PEEL, *Major-General.*

*Chelsea, July* 4, 1856.

AT A

## PRELIMINARY MEETING OF THE GENERAL OFFICERS

APPOINTED TO FORM THE

## Board of Inquiry, under the Provisions of the Royal Warrant, dated 25th February 1856,

*Held at the Judge Advocate General's Office on the 28th March 1856,*

FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSIDERING THE

## METHOD OF THEIR PROCEDURE.

The Royal Warrant, and the Letter of the 28th day of February, 1856, addressed by Lord Panmure to Viscount Hardinge, were read out.

The General Officers deemed it their duty, in the first instance, to ascertain the precise nature and extent of the duties imposed on them thereby.

For as those documents appeared on the one hand to be the only authority to which they could refer for the discharge of their duties, and on the other to be the only authority to which the parties interested in the inquiry could refer for a knowledge as to their right to appear before the Board, or their position when before it, they considered it to be in the highest degree important, as well for the purposes of justice as of order, that they should have a clear and correct understanding as to the limits of their jurisdiction, with a view to rightly carrying into effect Her Majesty's gracious intentions as signified in the Royal Warrant.

After carefully considering the terms of the Warrant, and in connexion with it the terms of the letter of the 28th day of February 1856, addressed by Lord Panmure to Viscount Hardinge, they were unanimously of opinion that it would be desirable, before they formally commenced their proceedings, to receive authoritative instructions with reference to the following matters, viz :—

I. "What parties are to be considered as having of right a locus standi in the Court?"

(1.) Whether those officers only whose conduct has been animadverted upon in the reports of the Commissioners, and the evidence taken before them, and who, prior to the first meeting of the Board, shall have demanded a full inquiry into their conduct.

(2.) Or whether in addition to the foregoing, any officers whose conduct has been animadverted upon in the said reports and evidence, and who shall, either at any time during the sitting of the Board, or within some definite time to be fixed by the Board at their first meeting, demand such inquiry.

II. Also, whether any parties, civil as well as military, whose conduct may be animadverted upon in the course of the inquiry, and who may wish to make answer thereto before the Board, are to be deemed to have a right to be heard.

III. Also, whether with reference to Statute 14th and 15th Victoria, cap. 99, section 16,—

"Every Court, Judge, Justice, Officer, Commissioner, Arbitrator, or other person, now "or hereafter having, by law or by consent of parties, authority to hear, receive, "and examine evidence, is hereby empowered to administer an oath to all such "witnesses as are legally called before them respectively," the evidence taken before the Board was to be upon oath.

The Judge Advocate General was requested by the General Officers to take the requisite steps to procure authoritative instructions for the guidance of the Board, with reference to the several matters above set forth.

On the 29th March 1856, the foregoing minute was transmitted by the Judge Advocate General to Lord Panmure :—

On the 31st March 1856, it was notified to the Judge Advocate General by Lord Panmure with reference to the several matters as to which the General Officers requested to be advised, that —

I. " The Cabinet are of opinion that the Board of General Officers are bound to hear, " in the first instance, all the officers to whose conduct reference is made in the " Report of the Commissioners, and who apply to be heard in defence or " explanation :" that—

II. " Any parties whose conduct may be impugned in the course of the inquiry must " be heard in justification :" that—

III. " The Lord Chancellor is clearly of opinion that the 16th section of Statute " 14th & 15th Victoria, cap. 99, is inapplicable to this Board, and that it has " no power to take evidence on oath, and that no such power can be conferred " upon it except by a special Act of Parliament."

# MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE

# BOARD OF GENERAL OFFICERS.

# MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE

## BOARD OF GENERAL OFFICERS

APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE

STATEMENTS contained in the REPORTS of SIR JOHN M'NEILL and COLONEL TULLOCH, and the Evidence taken by them relative thereto, animadverting on the Conduct of certain Officers on the General Staff, and others in the Army,

## AT THE ROYAL HOSPITAL, CHELSEA.

---

### FIRST DAY.

**Thursday, April 3d, 1856.**

The Judge Advocate General read the Royal Warrant appointing the Board, as follows:—

"VICTORIA R.

WHEREAS by instructions issued by Our Secretary of State for the War Department, bearing date the Nineteenth day of February One thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch were directed to proceed to the Crimea, in order to inquire into the whole arrangement and management of the Commissariat Department, and to acquaint themselves with the mode by which supplies of food, forage, and any other articles were obtained for Our army there, and also to examine carefully into the system of accounting, with a view to its simplification: And whereas by additional instructions issued by Our said Secretary of State, bearing date the Twenty-second day of February One thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, the said Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch were further directed to make inquiries into the alleged delay in unshipping and distributing the clothing and other stores supplied for the use of Our said army: And whereas the said Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch made to Our said Secretary of State two Reports, the first dated Constantinople, the Tenth day of June One thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, and the second dated London, January One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, and the same have, by Our command, been laid before Our two Houses of Parliament, together with the evidence taken by the said Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch: And whereas the conduct of certain officers on Our General Staff and others in Our army has been animadverted upon in the said Reports and evidence: And whereas the said officers have demanded a full inquiry into their conduct: Now We, taking the whole matter into Our consideration, and being desirous that the truth should be made manifest, and that justice should be done to all parties, think it necessary that an inquiry should be made by the General Officers herein-after named into the statements contained in these Reports and evidence affecting Our officers above referred to, Our will and pleasure therefore is, and we do hereby nominate and appoint Our right trusty and well-beloved John Baron Seaton, General of Our Forces, Knight Grand Cross of the most Honourable Order of the Bath, and Knight Grand Cross of the most distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George; Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Thomas M'Mahon, Baronet, General of Our Forces, Knight Commander of the most Honourable Order of the Bath; Our right trusty and well-beloved Cousin Henry Beauchamp, Earl Beauchamp, General of Our Forces; Our trusty and well-beloved Sir John Bell, Lieutenant-General of Our Forces, Knight Commander of the

most Honourable Order of the Bath: Our trusty and well-beloved Sir William Rowan, Lieutenant-General of Our Forces, Knight Commander of the most Honourable Order of the Bath; Our trusty and well-beloved Jonathan Peel, Esquire, Major-General of Our Forces; Our trusty and well-beloved William Thomas Knollys, Esquire, Major-General of Our Forces, to be a Board, of which We further appoint John Baron Seaton to be President, who are to meet accordingly for the purposes above mentioned: And you are hereby required to give notice, with as little delay as possible, to the said General Officers when and where they are to meet for the said inquiry: and you are hereby directed to summon such persons as may be judged necessary by the said General Officers to give information upon the said matters; and the said General Officers are hereby directed to hear and examine such persons touching the same; and they are further hereby authorized, empowered, and required, after strict examination into the matters before mentioned, to make a Report thereupon, together with their opinion whether the said officers of Our army above referred to be or be not responsible to any and what extent for the unsatisfactory condition of Our said army, or any portion thereof, noticed by Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch in their Reports, and the evidence thereunto attached; all which you are to transmit to Us through Our Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, to be by him laid before Us for Our consideration; and for so doing this shall be as well to you as to Our said General Officers and all others concerned a sufficient warrant.

Given at Our Court at Buckingham Palace, this Twenty-fifth day of February One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, in the Nineteenth Year of Our reign.

By Her Majesty's command,
(Signed) PANMURE.

To the Judge Advocate General or his Deputy."

The Judge Advocate General stated, that since the issue of the original Warrant Lord Seaton had stated his inability, on the ground of ill health, to take his seat at the Board as President thereof, and that consequently another Royal Warrant had been issued by Her Majesty to Sir Alexander Woodford to occupy the place of Lord Seaton.

The same was read as follows:

"VICTORIA R.

WHEREAS We did by a Warrant under Our Royal Sign Manual, bearing date at Our Court at Buckingham Palace the Twenty-fifth day of February One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, in the Nineteenth Year of Our Reign, and countersigned by one of Our Principal Secretaries of State, nominate and appoint the several Officers therein named to be a Board, which is to be convened at the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, and to consider such matters as may be submitted to it and as are set forth in Our said Warrant: And whereas Our right trusty and well-beloved John Baron Seaton, General of Our Forces, Knight Grand Cross of the most Honourable Order of the Bath, and Knight Grand Cross of the most distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, appointed to be a Member and also President of the said Board, hath since obtained Our permission to resign his seat at the said Board, and a vacancy hath thus happened therein, and also in the office of President of the said Board, which We have deemed it expedient to supply: Now know you, that We have thought fit to nominate and appoint and do by these presents nominate and appoint Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Alexander Woodford, General of Our Forces, Knight Grand Cross of the most Honourable Order of the Bath, and Knight Grand Cross of the most distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, to be a Member of the said Board, and also to be President thereof, in the room of the said John Baron Seaton.

Given at Our Court at Windsor, this Thirty-first day of March One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, in the Nineteenth Year of Our Reign.

By Her Majesty's command,
(Signed) PANMURE.

To the Judge Advocate General
of Our Forces, or his Deputy."

The Judge Advocate General further stated, that it had been communicated to the Commander-in-Chief that Sir Thomas M'Mahon would be also unable, from the state of his health, to attend the Board, and that therefore another Royal Order had been issued appointing Sir George Berkeley in his stead.

The same was read as follows:

"VICTORIA R.

WHEREAS We did by a Warrant under Our Royal Sign Manual, bearing date at Our Court at Buckingham Palace the Twenty-fifth day of February One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, in the Nineteenth Year of Our Reign, and countersigned by one of Our Principal Secretaries of State, nominate and appoint the several officers therein named to be a Board, which is to be convened at the Royal Hospital, Chelsea, and to consider such matters as may be submitted to it and as are set forth in Our said Warrant: And whereas Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Thomas M'Mahon, Baronet, General of Our Forces, Knight Commander of the most Honourable Order of the Bath, appointed by Us to be a Member of the said Board, hath since obtained Our permission to

resign his seat at the Board, and a vacancy hath thus happened therein, which We have deemed it expedient to supply: Now know ye, that We have thought fit to nominate and appoint, and do by these presents nominate and appoint, Our trusty and well-beloved Sir George Henry Frederick Berkeley, General of Our Forces, Knight Commander of the most Honourable Order of the Bath, to be a Member of the said Board, in the room of Sir Thomas M'Mahon.

Given at Our Court at Buckingham Palace, the Seventeenth day of March One thousand eight hundred and fifty-six, in the Nineteenth Year of Our reign.

By Her Majesty's command,
(Signed) PANMURE.

To the Judge Advocate General
of Our Forces, or his Deputy."

The Judge Advocate General further stated, that subsequently to receiving the Royal Warrant appointing the Board, and stating the purposes for which they were to meet, a letter, giving further directions as to the proceedings of the Board, had been addressed, by the Secretary of State for the War Department, to the Commander-in-Chief, from whom he had received it.

The same was read as follows:

MY LORD, "War Department, 28th February 1856.

I AM to signify to your Lordship that the Queen has been pleased to appoint a Board of General Officers, which should be convened as soon as possible, for the purpose of taking into consideration so much of the Reports on the supplies to the British army in the Crimea, lately presented by Her Majesty's commands to both Houses of Parliament, as animadverts upon the conduct of certain officers upon Her Majesty's General Staff and in Her Majesty's army.

It is considered that such a Board will best bring before the Queen the explanations which these officers are desirous to make of their conduct as affected by the said Reports, and ultimately lead to a just judgment thereon.

I am further to state to your Lordship the importance of giving to this inquiry every degree of solemnity and publicity which usage and precedent have in like cases admitted of, and that the Judge Advocate General be specially instructed to convey to the Board Her Majesty's commands, not only to report an opinion upon the matters referred to them, but also to submit to Her Majesty what it may be in their judgment best to be done thereon.

Your Lordship will be pleased to receive Her Majesty's pleasure with respect to the proper measures for carrying these Her Majesty's commands into execution.

I have the honour, &c.
PANMURE.

Field-Marshal Viscount Hardinge, G.C.B.
&c. &c. &c."

The President asked whether the Judge Advocate General was able to furnish the Board with the names of the officers referred to in the Warrant as having been animadverted upon in the Reports of the Commissioners, and who had demanded an inquiry.

The Judge Advocate General stated, that after receiving the Royal Warrant he made application to the Commander-in-Chief for the purpose of ascertaining who the officers were referred to in the Warrant, whose conduct had been animadverted upon in the Report of the Crimean Commissioners, and who had complained thereof, and that in reply, on the Fifteenth of March, he received the following letter from General Yorke:—

SIR, "Horse Guards, 15th March 1856.

HAVING submitted to the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief your letter of this date, requesting to be officially informed of the names of the officers referred to in the Royal Warrant of the 25th ultimo, whose conduct has been animadverted upon in the Reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, and the evidence taken before those Commissioners, and who have in consequence demanded a full inquiry into their conduct, I am directed to acquaint you that the names of the officers referred to are—

Major-General the Earl of Lucan, K.C.B.
" " the Earl of Cardigan, K.C.B.
" " Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B, Quartermaster General.
Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon, C.B. (Grenadier Guards), Deputy Quartermaster General.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant,
(Signed) C. YORKE.

The Right Hon. C. P. Villiers, M.P.
&c. &c. &c."

The President requested the Judge Advocate General to read the rules to which the Board had agreed for the conduct of their proceedings.

The same were read as follows:

"RULES for the Conduct of the Proceedings before the Board of General Officers appointed by the Royal Warrant, dated 25th February 1856.

I.—The proceedings of this Board will be conducted as nearly as possible in accordance with the practice of ordinary Military Courts of Enquiry.

II.—Evidence may be given before the Board either in form of written statements, to be read out to the Board by the parties tendering such statements, or by the oral examination of witnesses, conducted as nearly as possible in accordance with the ordinary military practice.

III.—This Board is not empowered to examine witnesses on oath.

IV.—Every military witness will be informed that he is at liberty to decline making any statement which may form the subject of a charge against him before a Court-Martial, and that any statement which he may make after being so cautioned will be admissible in evidence against him.

V.—The cases of the several parties who are considered to have a right to appear before the Board will be taken separately."

The Judge Advocate General further stated, that the officers whose names were mentioned in the letter of General Yorke had not yet been summoned; but that he believed that notice could be given to every person interested in the inquiry before Monday next.

The Judge Advocate General was informed by the President that the Board desired to have laid before them copies of the evidence taken before the Committee of the House of Commons of last Session upon the State of the Army before Sebastopol, and of the Report of the Committee; and of all other papers which had been laid before Parliament relating to the subject of this inquiry.

Also that the parties to whom notice was to be sent were the officers named in the letter of General Yorke as having demanded an inquiry into their conduct.

Also that the Board proposed to take the cases of the several officers in the order of their military rank, beginning with the Earl of Lucan, to whom notice was to be sent that the Board would proceed with his case on Monday next.

Also that the names and addresses of the witnesses proposed to be called were to be sent by the several parties to the Judge Advocate General, by whose direction summonses were to be issued for their attendance.

And further, that notice was to be given of these proceedings to Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch.

Adjourned to Monday next, at Eleven o'clock.

SECOND DAY.

7th April 1856.

## Monday, April 7th, 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

(*President.*) I feel it to be my duty to impress upon the audience the necessity there is to keep strict silence, and to refrain from any expression of approbation or disapprobation in the course of these proceedings; and I trust that there will be no interruption of the decorum and good order which ought to prevail on such an occasion.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) Your Lordship has stated in a letter, dated the 7th of February, that you consider that you have ground to complain of certain opinions offered by the Commissioners in the Report of the inquiry as to the supplies for the British army in the Crimea?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Is my letter of that date before the Board?

(*President.*) Yes, it is.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Is the answer of the Commissioners before the Board?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Yes, which I understand your Lordship has also received Will you now explain to the Board in what parts of that report you consider your conduct is animadverted upon; and before you do so, I am directed by the Board to inform your Lordship that it is not compulsory on any witness to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against him before a court-martial, but that any voluntary statement which he may make will be admissible in evidence against him.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, before I go into my case, I wish to be allowed to put a question to yourself and the general officers composing this Board, as to whether it is your intention to take my case separately, consider it separately, and decide upon it separately; I consider that that is all important to me, and that it is essential that it should be in no manner intermixed with the case of any other officer. I cannot see why my case, if it is to be taken separately, should not be also considered separately, and disposed of separately. I might, perhaps, take it for granted that this would happen, but I have reasons for supposing that a different intention may be possibly entertained. I can very well understand that there may be objections to giving immediate publicity to the decision of the Board, but I can see no reason why they should not consider and decide upon my case; and therefore, if I may be allowed to take so great a liberty with this Board, I would suggest that my case should be separately taken, considered separately, and decided upon separately. Then it will entirely rest with this Board to put their decision aside, and to leave it in their box until the inquiry shall finally close. I submit this with the greatest respect and deference to this Court, but I must say at the same time that I attach the greatest importance to it. Indeed, I consider that any other course must tell—although I am quite sure that this Board would not wish it to do so, but I am sure that it must—very seriously to my prejudice and disadvantage.

(*President.*) Lord Lucan, it is the opinion of the Board that we cannot adjudicate upon your case separately. At any rate we cannot give any answer at this stage of the proceedings.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Of course, when I address a board of officers, every one of whom is my superior in professional knowledge, I must submit my suggestions with the greatest respect; but I repeat with great deference, but at the same time I hope with as much force as I can, that I really consider it essential to my case, and as the issue is essential to my professional character, I really consider it a point upon which I must lay as much stress as possible. I quite admit that if the Commissioners were here upon their trial, and if I were only preferring charges against those Commissioners, it would be only fair to them that all the charges should be heard before their case was decided upon; but I consider that the Commissioners are not upon their trial. They are not on their trial, however much they may be interested in the issue. I consider that the person on his trial is myself, and that I have nothing to do with any of those officers who may find themselves similarly situated. I therefore think it essential to justice that I should have my case considered and disposed of separately. I am not here advised by any counsel. I thought it would be more convenient to this Court if I came singly and unaided by anybody, and I shall most unwillingly begin if I am not assured that the intention of the Board is to decide upon my case separately.

(*President.*) I have already stated that the Board are of opinion that they cannot adjudicate upon your case separately.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Then I must ask this Board to give me twenty-four hours to consider whether I will go into the case at all.

[The Board deliberated.]

7th April 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed to call your Lordships attention to the fact that you have stated that you consider that you have ground to complain of certain opinions offered by the Commissioners in the Report of the inquiry into the supplies for the British Army in the Crimea. Your Lordship has now been called upon to explain to the Board in what parts of that Report you consider your conduct to have been animadverted upon, and being called upon so to explain to the Board you have asked them whether they intend to decide upon your case separately and at once upon hearing your case.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Not at once. I do not at all wish to hasten the decision of this Board. I merely wish to detach my case from that of other parties.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Your Lordship has requested the Board to decide upon your case separately. The Board feel it quite impossible to comply with your Lordship's request until they have heard your case. They are unaware at this moment how you may implicate other parties, or connect your case with other cases that it may be their duty to hear, and they cannot therefore give you any definite answer to your question until you have stated what your case is. You are now called upon, upon your own statement that you have reason to complain of the Commissioners' Report, to state what parts of that Report you consider as animadverting upon you.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I understand that the objection which the Board entertains to decide my case separately is, lest other parties should be implicated by anything that may be brought out in this inquiry. Now I cannot see the force of that. If I understand rightly, any person implicated would have a perfect right to come before this Board, and ask to be at once examined, and it would be far better if any person so implicated should be examined at once before my case is decided, than that he should only be examined at some later period. I placed myself in communication with the Minister of War upon the subject yesterday, and I have come here wishing to show the greatest possible submission and respect to this Board, but at the same time not to do myself what I believe in my conscience would be the grossest possible injustice, were I to allow myself hastily and precipitately to be dragged into this case without having an opportunity of considering whether I can do so without prejudice. I must, therefore, request this Board, and I do so with great submission, to allow me twenty-four hours to consider whether I can go on to-morrow under the arrangement proposed, which is, that I am to be heard separately, but that my case is to be mixed up with other cases.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) That is not what the Board has stated. The Board has stated that they will hear your case first, and your case has been selected, in consequence of your military rank, to be taken first, but the Board do not know what that case is. This inquiry does not originate with the Board, but it is in consequence of your having called for an opportunity to make your explanations; and this opportunity is now afforded to you. It is impossible that the Board can know what you are going to say till they have heard it. It may be that your Lordship is under some misapprehension with respect to your rights hereafter of being heard.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Not a bit; I do not wish to be heard again.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) If any person should refer to your Lordship in a subsequent stage of the proceedings you would have the fullest right to come before the Board.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Naturally. I wish when the Board have my case before them that they should decide upon it without reference to the case of any other parties.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board consider that they have a duty to perform in obedience to Her Majesty, to receive your explanation in consequence of your own complaint, and they can receive no direction from you as to the course they are to pursue. They sit here to hear your explanation, and they have appointed this day for that purpose.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) You allowed one word to escape you which I do not think you intended. I thought I had guarded everything that fell from me, and that I did not expose myself to the charge, that I had taken so unwarrantable and improper a liberty as to direct at all. I believe I said what I intended to say, which was, to offer in the most respectful and submissive manner possible what I believe to be necessary to secure justice. I beg leave to say that I do not presume, and I hope I never shall presume, to direct any one of those General Officers sitting on this Board. I hope the Board will give me twenty-four hours to consider what I may do in my novel position.

[The Board retired to deliberate, and after a short time returned.]

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you, that if after the intimation that has been communicated to you that your case, like all the others that are to come before them, will be reported upon to Her Majesty upon its own merits, your Lordship is still of opinion that twenty-four hours delay are necessary to you, the Board is willing to accede to your request.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have but to express my thanks and my gratitude to the Board for having given consideration to what in my conscience I believe to be essential to justice

7th April 1856.

in my case, but I have during the absence of the Board from the hall considered the matter, and I shall not avail myself of the indulgence which the Court has granted me, but I shall expect that there will be no objection on the part of the Board to my entering a protest against my case not being adjudicated upon singly. I propose before my case is concluded to submit that protest to be added to the proceedings of the Board. Under these circumstances, if the Board see no objection to that protest, rather than cause any inconvenience, which it must naturally do, I am willing to waive the permission which this Board has so indulgently granted, and to go on.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am desired to inform you that the Board does not distinctly understand what you mean by saying that your case will not be heard singly. It is the intention of the Board to hear your case separately; nor do they understand what protest it is you wish to make.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I understood the Board to decide that though they heard the case separately, they would not hold themselves called upon to consider it separately, or to decide upon the issue before they entered into any other case. I maintain,—most respectfully, undoubtedly, but I maintain,—that it is essential to my case and to justice, that the case should not only be taken separately,—and I cannot consider the case as taken separately unless the case is taken separately, considered separately, and adjudicated upon separately and thus finally disposed of;—I have not the least wish to presume to offer any opinion of my own as to when the decision of this Board should be made public;—they will unquestionably exercise the right they have to lock up that case until it shall suit them to publish it, or until the end of the inquiry;—I have but to repeat that I think it essential to my case and to the cause of justice that my case should be finally adjudicated upon by this Board before any other case is entered upon. That is all I require. Of course I am willing, rather than forego this opportunity of giving an explanation of my conduct, to submit to what I believe a very great disadvantage, to say the least of it. All I seek is this, to be allowed by this Court to put in a protest against a course of proceedings which I think will most unfairly, however otherwise intended by the Board, tell to my prejudice. I therefore only seek to be allowed before my case is closed to put in a protest to be attached to the proceedings of the Board.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I refer to what the Board has already decided, that they will report upon the merits of each case separately when they make their report to the Queen, and that they will not depart from that rule. In your case they will do the same.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I am aware that the report will be a separate report, a report divided into parts; but that does not, I beg humbly to state, satisfy me. I consider that the case should be adjudicated upon by them before they embark in any new case whatever. The request I have to make to this Board is, that they will be indulgent enough to allow me to enter a protest against a course that I think will seriously militate against my case and therefore my professional character.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you now proceed with your case?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Am I to understand that my protest——

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I have already conveyed to your Lordship that the Board does not understand what occasion there can be for a protest; they are not informed what your Lordship's case is, and they can give no other decision than I have just read to you.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I ask only whether I may be allowed to protest. The other course would be for me to give trouble to the Board which I am anxious to avoid, and which would be to accept their indulgence for twenty-four hours, when I should come prepared with this protest, and which they would just accept or refuse as they should think fit. It appears to me that the Board are obliging me to do what I shall most unwillingly do, which is to put them to the inconvenience of adjourning when I am most anxious for them to go on at once. The Board have indulgently said that they would give me twenty-four hours to consider the course I should pursue; if I can have no information from the Board that such a protest as I am prepared to offer will be received, I shall then be obliged to avail myself of the indulgence of the Board, and to ask for an adjournment for twenty-four hours, and come to-morrow with a protest which I shall submit for their consideration.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board will not come to any other decision than they have done already. If you require a delay for twenty-four hours they are willing to accede to it, but they adhere to their decision that they shall report separately and distinctly upon the merits of each case, and that they cannot make any distinction with respect to your case.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Then so determined am I that it shall not be imputed to me that I have given any unnecessary trouble to this Board that I shall proceed, but I shall submit a protest to this Board, and it will be for them to receive it or reject it as they shall think fit. Sir Alexander Woodford, I think it would be better that I should begin by stating the course which I propose, with your consent and that of the Board, to take. I propose reading first a written statement which will contain the different parts of the Report to which I consider myself as having a right to object. The Board will perhaps allow me to change my mind if I find it necessary, but I do not propose at the present moment to call any witnesses to examine in chief; but I do propose to call upon three or four officers, to cross-examine them upon the evidence that they have already given before the Commission; and having done so, I shall ask the permission of this Court to give me a few hours

7th April 1856.

to prepare an address to state what I think they are not likely to learn from the Report of the Commissioners. If there is no objection to that course I will proceed.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is the Board to understand that you first propose to read those parts of the Report of which you complain, and then to rely upon your answer to those passages for your defence?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I propose to read a statement giving the different parts of that Report to which I take exception. That is the first step. Then I propose to go on, not to read all the parts together at first, but I propose to take those parts separately, and, where it is necessary, to call upon those three or four officers whom I have alluded to, and by their cross-examination to show that those parts of the Report of the Commissioners are unfounded. Having done that, having rebutted, as I hope to do, every part of the Commissioners' Report animadverting upon me, I shall then ask leave of the Board to make an address more explanatory of my case.

Sir Alexander Woodford, my lord and gentlemen. In obedience to your instructions communicated to me by the Judge Advocate General under date of the 3d of April instant, I have the honour to submit for your consideration a statement of those parts of the Reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch which I consider to reflect upon me personally during the time when I had the honour of being employed with the army in the East, and upon the cavalry, for which, as their divisional commander, I desire to be held responsible. I cannot deny myself the gratification of premising that I enter upon my exculpation with the most perfect confidence that I shall establish to your entire satisfaction the groundlessness of every charge made by these Commissioners, and show that their Report, so far as the cavalry are concerned, is not only most insufficiently, if not altogether, unsupported by evidence, but totally at variance with the fact and the truth. Nor do I expect that I shall find it necessary to trespass at any length upon your attention in controverting every line which at all reflects upon me; and so strong is my conviction that I have the means of removing from the cavalry and myself the slightest breath of reproach, that I must express my anxious desire that if I should be found against my wish and intention to pass by any sentence which can in the slightest degree tell to their prejudice or to my own, you will kindly direct my attention to it, and thus allow me, what will be alone wanting, the opportunity of explanation and refutation. I am not, I trust, too sanguine when I express my hope and expectation that I shall succeed in convincing you not alone that no loss of horses can be justly charged on me or the cavalry officers generally, but, on the contrary, that we did all in our power to mitigate and avert what unhappily, under the circumstances in which we were placed, and the orders to which we owed submission, proved entirely beyond our control.

Immediately on this Report appearing I addressed to the Minister of War a letter which I presume is before the Board. A copy of the Commissioners' answer was transmitted to me ten days since, and I know now that that is also in the possession of the Board. It appears to me that this letter is no answer at all, but a reiteration of the errors, mis-statements, and fallacies contained in their Report, to which they seem determined to adhere with a pertinacity which I cannot think will in the end do them much honour. Their answer contains one passage that I should wish not to leave unnoticed. The Commissioners take upon themselves to say "that the examination of "Lord Lucan in regard to commissariat supplies as proposed by him could not, it is "believed, bring out any information of public importance." Upon what that belief is founded they do not say. I will therefore only observe with great respect to the Commissioners that I should, I think, be allowed to be the best judge of the importance of the information I myself possess. That the Commissioners should be still satisfied with their Report may indeed surprise me, but it is no matter of surprise to me that they do not recommend any further inquiry. As I have said, it is no answer to my letter, and I shall not have to give it much notice. I refer now to page 20 of the Report, and I will take up the points as they appear in the Report. The first objection that I have to make is in page 20, to the calculation entered into upon the death of the cavalry horses, and I state with regard to that calculation, that those gentlemen are in error. I am obliged to take the Commissioners' own figures, because I have nothing to refer to that would tell me exactly what was the strength of each regiment at the particular time they refer to. Taking the six months from October to March inclusive they say such was the strength of the cavalry, and they talk about the 1st of October, but it so happens that the heavy cavalry had not arrived on that date; that however I do not care about, for they arrived subsequently. My object in this is solely to show the incorrectness of the Commissioners. It is not whether their Report will tell more to their disadvantage or less to their disadvantage, but it is solely to show that whenever they speak of the cavalry those gentlemen are unfortunately always in error. They say that the heavy cavalry that were in the Crimea from the 1st of October amounted to 1,055 horses. They say that 493 died. As I have already stated, I am obliged to take the figures of the Commissioners, and they say therefore that 47 per cent. died in the six months between the 1st of October and the 1st of March. It does not require much of an arithmetician to show the inaccuracy here. If the Board will be good enough to refer to Appendix, page 193.

If the gross number in the heavy cavalry were 1,055, and eighty-three horses were killed in action, and you calculate your casualties upon the remainder, there will be left 972 horses. If it is, as is stated, true that 493 horses died by disease, taking 493 from 972 would leave

479, and 479, I think, upon 972, would, instead of being, as the Commissioners state, 47 per cent., be 50 per cent. The error of the Commissioners has arisen in this way, that they have considered the horses killed in action as having died subsequently. In the light dragoons, having lost more in action, their error is more glaring. They say there were 1,161 horses in the Crimea, and that there were 489 horses either transferred to other corps or killed in action, or which died subsequently of wounds. Of course there must be deducted from the 1,161 489 before you can come to any estimate of what the deaths had been. Therefore, instead of deducting from 1,161 you must deduct from 672. Then if 439 died, as they say, that leaves only 233 horses. Then, instead of the deaths amounting only to 38 per cent., they amount to 65 per cent.

(*Major General Peel.*) The numbers are 439, and not 489, the number that died of disease in the light cavalry?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Then it is a misprint here, that will alter it a little, but not much.

(*Major General Peel.*) No; it will take off 50.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is a misprint here, the 3 is turned into an 8; therefore it will still leave it above 60 per cent.

(*General Knollys.*) By the return here the heavy brigade of cavalry on the 1st of October consisted of 1,055, and the light brigade at the same period were 1,161.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Not at the same period, though that does not signify, in the Crimea.

(*General Knollys.*) Making a total of cavalry of 2,216. Of the heavy cavalry there died —I do not take those that died in action, but died from disease—of heavy cavalry there died 493, and of light cavalry 439, making a total of 932, which I make 42 per cent.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I think that the Board must confine themselves to the calculation of the Commissioners. It would make no very great difference, but it would oblige me to make a different calculation. What I state is this: that with regard to the light cavalry there were 1,161 horses in the Crimea, and 489 horses were either killed in action or transferred to other corps. I deduct 489 from 1,161, and that leaves 672; then I take 439 from 672, and that leaves 233.

(*Major General Peel.*) They were killed in action or transferred to other corps.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Yes; I think I am correct in stating that in lieu of 47 per cent. in the case of the heavy cavalry it was 50 per cent., and in lieu of being only 38 per cent. in the light cavalry it was 65 per cent. I only wish to establish to the satisfaction of the Board that the figures of the Commissioners are wrong.

In page 21 there is a comparison of losses of commissariat animals and cavalry horses. The passage is this:—"On referring to the loss sustained by the commissariat animals "during the same period, it will be found rather less than in the cavalry or artillery, the "deaths among them having, according to a return furnished by Deputy Commissariat "General Adams, amounted to about 889 out of 2,329 originally imported into the "Crimea, or in the proportion of 38 per cent., a result which could scarcely have been "expected, considering the advantage which cavalry horses might be supposed to have "over hard worked baggage animals to whom little attention could be paid at such a "period." Now, doubtless, if I can satisfy the Board that instead of 47 per cent. there were 50 per cent. in one case, and instead of 38 there were 65 in the other, one would naturally suppose that I had been damaging my case now before you. Not at all. I have not made it unquestionably so strong as it would have been, but the calculations of those Commissioners have been so wonderfully wrong that it will even admit of that margin.

Now I have great difficulty in arguing this case very accurately. I think probably that the Board will find it necessary and right to call for returns which will enable them to do what I have a difficulty in doing, which is, thoroughly to investigate and sift this account. But there is one error on the face of it which I think must strike the Board at once. The Commissioners enter into a comparison between the losses in the cavalry and in the transport animals, with a view of disparaging the cavalry. The Board will, I think, agree with me that for such a comparison to be made you must place the horses of both services on the same footing. If they take the losses of the cavalry to commence with the 1st of October and to end with the 1st of March, their transport animals should equally have been in the Crimea during the whole of the same period. But when I am prepared to show that of this number of 2,329 not one half could have been in the Crimea at all until subsequently to the month of February, then I say that it is monstrous to say that horses freshly imported at a time when they could be well housed, and well fed, with the cavalry which had to undergo all the hardships of the preceding five months. It appears to approach very much to an absurdity. I have no means of stating to the Court the exact number of commissariat animals at the different periods; but I think I can come sufficiently near it to show them that there is the grossest mistake that any two gentlemen ever fell into.

Now, the first return that I find is the return, Appendix No. 9., page 66. This return purports to be, "A general return of transport employed for the service of the British "army in the Crimea, 16th January 1855." If the Board will be good enough to look

7th April 1856.

at the account, it is not only an account of the animals at the commissariat depôt, but it purports to give the number of baggage animals with the different corps or in the Crimea at all on the 16th January. The Board will see that the gross number of effective animals on that date was 333; at the same date there were 170 non-effective; making a total of 503 animals living in the Crimea. Now this is on the 16th of January. If the Board have made themselves acquainted with that return I wish them to be good enough to refer to page 69, Appendix. This Table is supposed to show the horses received by the commissariat officers since the 16th of December, and the number of horses which remained on the 11th of January, only five days preceding the other return. If the Board will be good enough to go into that they will find that per "Jason" they received 250 and by other vessels they received 435 horses, of which 281 only from Eupatoria. In passing I wish that the Board would be good enough to take a note of this, that I believe those figures 281 to be wrong. I was told at the time that there were 600 or 700 horses bought at Eupatoria, not by Commissary General Filder, but by Lord Raglan's orders; they may not all have arrived at this time, which would account for the discrepancy; but instead of 281 I believe the number was 600 or 700, as I have stated. Now I wish the Board to recollect that this is rather a complicated question, and that they will be good enough to recollect that 716 is not the number of horses that happen to have been in the Crimea on the 11th, but it is the number of horses that were landed in the Crimea in the period between the 16th of December and the 11th of January; therefore every horse that landed with the army in the Crimea in September, every horse that landed in the Crimea between September and the 16th of December, is not included in this number of 716; therefore on the 11th of December they had imported into the Crimea 716 horses in addition to every horse landed with the army, and subsequently landed up to the 11th of December. Three days afterwards they only had 503 horses; therefore it follows that the whole of the transport of the army landed up to December the 16th, and 203 horses subsequently imported, had all of them disappeared. Now, as I stated to the Board, I have no means of arriving at the exact number that there were in the Crimea; but if they will be good enough to refer to Commissary General Filder's evidence I think he says there were 492 commissariat animals landed within a fortnight of the army's reaching the Crimea. It is also well known to those who were in the service that there were other horses landed in the Crimea between the 1st of September and the 11th of December. I have no return of those horses; all that I can state is this, that the whole of them had disappeared on the 16th of January, and 203 of those that were imported during the subsequent month. If you take that month, and do not suppose that there were any other horses, the commissariat lost 30 per cent.; between December the 11th and January the 16th they lost 30 per cent. of the horses in addition to the losses of horses previously imported.

Now when this comparison is entered into, and most invidiously entered into, for the purpose of throwing discredit upon the cavalry, it must be recollected that when the cavalry lost their horses it was when they were exposed to all the inclemency of the weather, in the wettest month we had during the whole of the campaign, when they were removed from forage, and laboured under every difficulty. I have before me a return taken from states which I have fortunately with me, by which I can show the date, though not quite as accurately as I could wish. I have found indeed that in a campaign it is very difficult to exact from the officers very strict daily returns; and I take this opportunity of stating that if these returns were allowed to pass incorrect the brigadier's staff, and my own staff, it was because no opportunity was given to correct them. There was a system in that army which I consider an exceedingly inconvenient one, and one that offered no advantage: by a certain hour in the day, eleven or twelve o'clock, our divisional states went in, accompanied by the brigade and regimental states; therefore the divisional staff and the brigade staff had no opportunity of very closely sifting and correcting them. I wish only to show that there were no grounds for disparaging the cavalry. Mr. Commissary General Filder in his examination says, that he took good care that his baggage animals should be fed before the other animals of the army. I thank him for that admission. He says that he took care that if there was anything to eat his own horses should have it first; in short, those horses were fed in preference, I believe, to the other horses of the army. I suspect, though I am obliged to speak in this loose way, because I have not those returns which I hope the Commissioners will call for, that in the transport animals are included the ambulance animals, because the ambulance had ceased to exist ere the 16th of January. It must therefore be supposed that the ambulance mules perished with the rest. What I wish to submit to the Board is, that if they would call for a return of the amount of baggage and ambulance animals on the 1st of every month during the six months that those Commissioners refer to, they would then see how far they could compare the one with the other; but it is monstrous to say, that of the 1,000 animals that may have been landed in the Crimea in the month of January, because they were not dead, therefore better care was taken of the commissariat horses than of the cavalry, which had to undergo all the privations and exposure to the weather of the worst part of the winter. There is another thing I would mention: Lord Raglan, on the 24th of January, asked me, as the commanding officer of cavalry, to give cavalry officers and cavalry non-commissioned officers the charge of looking after a shipload of something like 270 mules. And I believe,

7th April 1856.

indeed I think I can say it confidently, that after having had them in charge from the 20th of January, when they were given to me, till the 13th of February, when I left the army, I succeeded in preserving every one of those animals, and now they are brought against me to show that I neglected my own cavalry because those animals did not die like the rest, Those 270 mules were given up to officers and non-commissioned officers of cavalry, and they were in perfect condition when I left the army. I think I have said enough to satisfy the Court that it is difficult to enter into a fair comparison, but enough has been shown to establish that instead of the losses of the transport animals being smaller they were very much greater than what the cavalry suffered; therefore I think that I was justified in my letter in saying that it was notorious in that army that the losses in the transport and the ambulance far exceeded those in the cavalry.

I shall now go on to the next point. Until now it has been figures and calculations, by which I hope I have satisfied the Board that the Commissioners were exceedingly wrong. I am now coming to facts. I really might say on this occasion what has been already wittily observed, that with these Commissioners there is nothing so incorrect as their figures, except their facts. In page 36 the Commissioners state, "The date at "which the hutting of the cavalry commenced was in no case earlier than the end of "January or beginning of February." I wish the Board to understand that from the word "date" down to the word "proposal" I shall take this paragraph of the report to pieces and meet every assertion. The first sentence is, "The date at which the hutting of "the cavalry commenced was in no case earlier than the end of January or beginning "of February." Now, the light cavalry brigade marched to Kadikoi, or rather to a valley in the neighbourhood of Kadikoi, on the 3d of December, and the weather was so extremely rough and bad that the heavy cavalry were only able to move on the 5th. I wish the Board to refer to the divisional order of the 5th of December 1855, page 32. The Board will recollect that the heavy cavalry marched on the 5th, and on the 5th there is a divisional order marked No. 1. "The Lieutenant General desires that all the public "baggage animals, including the forge cart mules, be assembled for the purpose of carrying "the materials to be used in the construction of stabling. The commanding officer will "therefore inform the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General by four o'clock this "afternoon how many are in the possession of each regiment, to enable the Lieutenant "General to make provision for their care. It is wished that they be well marked, that "at the end of this service no confusion may take place in their restoration to their "regiments." The heavy cavalry arrived on the 5th, and there is some stir made on the same afternoon; and it will be obvious to the Board that the construction of stabling of that sort was perfectly novel to myself, and I may say that there was not an individual in the cavalry division who had ever seen a horse hutted at all. It is right that I should tell the Board that if they had not had the experience themselves they were not likely to take it from our allies, for they not only had no horse hutted at that time, but they had not hutted one when I left the army on the 13th of February. I shall show, I believe, to the satisfaction of this Board, that up to this time there had been no engineer officer given to me at all. I will show the Board afterwards, when I go into another part of the case, that though I had two visits from two officers, I had no assistance from any engineer officer. On December the 4th I received this letter. It is signed by Captain Bouchier, brigade major to the engineer corps, to this effect:—"Lieutenant Lennox has been specially appointed by the commanding "engineer for the purpose of superintending the construction of cavalry stables, and "orders will be sent to that officer to report himself forthwith to Lord Lucan, and to "remain at his head quarters for the period mentioned by his Lordship."

(*President.*) What is the date of that letter?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) December the 4th. I cannot recollect the exact period for which I had asked the attendance of an engineer officer, but I am quite satisfied it was a very short one, for I knew the great difficulty that existed in giving me such assistance at that moment. When LieutenantLennox arrived I did hope that I had at last succeeded in getting what I had been positively so long entreating for. He passed one hour with me, and he said that he would return the next day, and begin operations; but I never saw him from that hour to this. I was then told that no officer of the engineer corps would come at all, but that a Major Hall, belonging to the Madras engineering establishment, had been taken upon the staff of our army, and that he would superintend the construction of the stables. I again flattered myself that I was going to have the constant attention of an engineer. Major Hall having been appointed, after some days called upon me, and told me that he would give me any assistance and advice he could, but that the cavalry stables formed a very small part of his duty, for that he would be fully occupied in Balaklava, where he had to build warehouses and stores and wharfs, and in short to attend to nearly everything except building stables for cavalry.

It is right that I should here observe that another great difficulty with regard to the construction of stables for the cavalry was that our men were very sickly. I will show the Board that really there were scarcely men to take care of the horses, let alone to build stables. I therefore requested the Quartermaster General that I should have Turks, and that he would send a body of them to assist in the construction of the stables. The Quartermaster General seemed undoubtedly always anxious to give me this assistance, as he did, indeed,

7th April 1856.

the assistance of the engineer officer, because, although I did not get him the Quartermaster General ordered him. And so with the Turks, the Quartermaster General ordered the Turks, but I did not get them. So long as we were on the hill, I was to get Turks from Sir Colin Campbell, who always found reasons, which I believe were very good reasons, for not sending them; but after dispatching an aide-de-camp at the same hour every day I got none. Before we arrived at Kadikoi we had not the assistance of a single Turk. On reaching that place I was told that Osman Pasha, who had taken the command of the Turkish troops, would be the person, and not Sir Colin Campbell, to apply to for Turks. I am now speaking from a journal, not my own, but the journal of Lord Bingham, who was my aide-de-camp at the time: and it appears to have been very accurately kept. It is to be remembered that the Light Cavalry moved on the 3d, and the Heavy Cavalry on the 5th. Already on the 2d Lord Bingham says, "Sent to Osman Pasha "and to the Quartermaster General for Turks." He sent for those Turks to Osman Pasha before either brigade had arrived, for the Turks to be ready when they did arrive. On December the 2d he says, "I come down to Sir Colin Campbell to ask about Osman "Pasha, and then I go to the Quartermaster-General." On December the 3d he says, "I go to Osman Pasha." Therefore on the 2d he tries to find out Osman Pasha and see what he can do; on the 3d he sees Osman Pasha, but I was not quite satisfied with a message from Osman Pasha, and the next day I went myself. "Lord Lucan called on "Osman Pasha about the Turks." At this time the Heavy Dragoons had not arrived. On December the 4th, "I call on Osman Pasha, and he promises, in the most faithful "manner, that I shall have the Turks the next day. He refers me to Roostum Pasha, the "Brigadier-General commanding the Turks at Balaclava." Therefore Lord Bingham is sent the next day to Roostum Pasha to get the Turks. On the 6th General Airey sent an aide-de-camp to me ostensibly for the purpose of inquiring how I was getting on with the stabling. I told him the difficulty I felt myself under, being bandied about between Sir Colin Campbell and Osman Pasha and Roostum Pasha, and getting no assistance whatever. On the next day I ride to the Quartermaster General myself, and I tell him all the difficulties I had experienced with regard to hutting. I think the Board will observe that on every day, the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, there is something done, though not much progress made. On the 8th Lord Bingham goes to Roostum Pasha for the Turks. On the 10th I assembled all the commanding officers of the two brigades in the rear of the camp, for which I had two objects; one was the better supply of necessaries for the troops in the field, the second to discuss this very question of hutting, and to ask them whether they would prefer remaining on that site where they stood to being moved a little nearer. I took their opinion upon the subject, and we decided on that day that they should be encamped as near as possible on the ground they then occupied. I think I have brought the Board down from the 2d to the 10th. I see nothing about the 9th. Roostum Pasha was induced to give a few Turks. To the best of my recollection,—I know nothing very positive,—but I think he did give something like 100 Turks or 150. I think about 100 for one or two days only. If the Board will be good enough to refer to page 93, they will find a letter from me to the Quartermaster General, dated December 21st, "Sir, I find myself again compelled to "request your attention to the great difficulties I experience in the construction of the "stabling for the troop horses. Employed as every dragoon is at this time in regimental "duties, I can receive no assistance from them, and all Turkish assistance is altogether with-"held. Having by your direction applied to Osman Pasha for Turkish soldiers, he gave an "order to Roostum Pasha to give me all the men I might require. During a few days only, "a small number of Turks was given; he then refused to send any more without a positive "order from Sir Colin Campbell, who, I am sorry to state, has informed me that he is "unable to send any Turks to aid in this operation, in consequence of the numbers "already employed on different fatigue duties.

"In consequence of being thus deprived of the Turkish soldiers, the masons belonging "to the division are obliged to wait upon themselves, thus rendering the work slow and "costly. The disappointment I experience is most annoying, as I am satisfied that the "stabling will not be constructed to an extent or in time to be of much use to the cavalry "horses."

It is right I should state that the first thing I did after the arrival of the division was to take every artificer from the regiments and begin the construction of stables at Kadikoi, the engineer officer having agreed with me that the most expeditious and readiest way of furnishing cover for the horses would be to extend as far as possible the stabling at the depôt that I had some time previously placed at Kadikoi. There were many advantages in this, for the depôt was one mile nearer to the stores than the head quarters of the regiments. There were walls and houses near, which materially, as will be supposed, assisted in those constructions; and from it being a mile nearer, naturally, with our small power of transport, we could make twice the number of journeys to the timber stores in a day that we could have done if we had begun our construction at the head quarters of the regiments. Therefore, at the moment that the Light and Heavy Brigades arrived they were made to give over the whole of their artificers, which were very few,—the whole of their masons and carpenters,—to the engineer officer, and a very excellent corporal of sappers, who was given to me for that purpose; and we commenced the construction of those stables, I think, to the best of my recollection, on the 6th of December, and never discontinued it until they were com-

pleted. And how this depôt and this stabling for between 200 and 300 horses so entirely escaped the notice of the Commissioners I really cannot divine; but they chose to say that the construction of the stabling did not commence at all, because they trace in the evidence of some of the regimental officers that it did not commence with them at the head quarters of their regiments before that date. I am quite free to admit that at the head quarters of the regiments the most distant, their stabling did not commence for some time; and I will give reasons why it did not. All I mean to say is this,—that I am prepared to show to this Board that every endeavour, every strain, and everything on earth that could be done to promote and hasten the building of those stables, was done; that not an hour was lost; that the operations commenced actually before the troops had taken their winter quarters; and that they were superintended by myself, and carried out by the other officers with an energy which I say deserves credit and not discredit; and I am prepared to show again by my orders, for I have no other means of proof, that so far from the stables not having been commenced till the end of January, they were nearly completed at that time.

(*Major-General Peel.*) To what extent did you propose to make the stabling?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) For 200 or 300 horses. You will find afterwards that the whole of the 17th occupied that stabling, and it was further occupied by detachments from all the other regiments. In page 45 the Board will find Order No. 3. I wish the Board thoroughly to understand that this Book of Orders which I hold in my hand includes every order that I ever gave during the time that I commanded the cavalry division in the Crimea; and if they find some of the numbers missing, it is only because those numbers are detail duty orders and not standing divisional orders. If the Board refer to Order No. 3, page 45, they will see these words, "The Lieutenant-General directs that when a hospital hut has "been carried for each regiment, the whole attention of commanding officers may be "devoted to the drawing of timber for completing the hutting for the horses, which Lord "Lucan considers should be done within a few days." Now this, be it observed, is at the very period that the Commissioners give us credit for commencing them.

I see in my notes here that I refer to the first order of December the 5th. I think I have already read that about the baggage animals coming down. The next one is December 16th, at page 37. I gave out an order on December the 16th to this effect:—"It is quite evident, from the difficulty of getting a sufficient number of Turks, and the "little work that can be got out of them, that unless we make stabling for ourselves we shall "be without, which cannot fail to be attended by the fearful consequence of our becoming "altogether dismounted. The ground for the stabling is already marked out; the regi-"ments are in possession of a certain number of intrenching tools, and if required more "shall be given them. The Lieutenant-General does entreat commanding officers to "endeavour by every means in their power to give shelter to their horses. Lord Lucan "conceives that they could readily scarp away in their front, and pave under their horses' "feet, and he will anxiously watch the progress of the work." Previously to that date Lord Raglan had called upon me to give him 500 effective horses for the transport service of the army. That was on the 12th of the month, and it was not possible to find 500 effective horses, and at the same time find sufficient horses for foraging for ourselves. Therefore the Board will readily understand what this order means. It means, that the carriage of timber was all at once set aside, that there was not an animal left for the purpose, and that they had been all taken for the transport of the army. Therefore, I had only to entreat the officers, as they could not draw timber or erect stabling, that they would scarp away and make the situation of the horses a little better than it would be without it. I wish the Board to understand that I shall, before I conclude, show them that from the 12th of December (and I think that the Board know enough already to be aware that the Light Dragoons, when they came down from the heights of Inkermann, were not in a condition to do much harassing work for a few days) until the 19th of January every effective horse was taken for the transport of the army, so that I found it even difficult to be allowed to reserve sufficient horses for foraging, but there was not one horse left for any other service whatever. There was a cavalry picquet in addition, which took forty horses. I read a letter that I addressed to the Quartermaster General on the subject of the Turks. I have not got his answer, but my answer will sufficiently explain what the Quartermaster General's answer was.

The Board will recollect that I wrote it was hopeless to expect any Turks on the 21st of December. The Quartermaster General appears to have written to me on the 20th, and it is evident that I had not received his letter when I wrote on the 21st. I did write again on the 22d, the next day, to this effect:—"Sir, your letter of the 20th instant, "received yesterday, informed me that 200 Turkish soldiers would be sent, and placed "under my command this morning, and instructed me, as I understood, to select a spot "in the neighbourhood of the works to be carried on for their encampment. This I "immediately arranged with the Assistant Quartermaster General. I did not under-"stand that I was to advise you of my having done so. From the absence of Lieut.-"Colonel Mayow, I am unable at this moment to refer to your letter. I have received "information from Sir Colin Campbell that he has selected a body of Turks already "encamped close by, and recommending that I should allow them to continue there. "This I propose to do, as I cannot see that it will be inconvenient. Should it, however, "prove so, they can be removed. I hope and expect to have the Turks at work to-"morrow." I think I have shown this, that, so far as giving me Turkish assistance,

7th April 1856.

the Quartermaster General did all that he could. No doubt 200 were selected for this purpose, but the largest number that ever I got to work was 150; it was at that time that there was that fearful mortality among the Turks, and the number from 150 dwindled down to one half or one third, and the remainder were such fearful objects that Sir Colin Campbell called upon me, and appealed to my humanity, whether I would insist upon the Turks, who may be said to have become more like corpses than living men, working. We agreed that it was an act of cruelty, and I was obliged to give up the Turks, because I felt that I should be positively responsible for their deaths: therefore as to those 200 Turks, they began by supplying me with 150, and they dwindled down to less than one third of the amount at the end of three weeks or a month; and by the interposition of Sir Colin Campbell—though perhaps it is not altogether to my credit that I should have waited for it—I was induced to give up having any more assistance from that quarter. Here is another order—not a very important one—in page 38. There had been a difficulty about timber. In short, we were drawing timber quicker than our artificers were getting on with it at the time, and I discontinued it: for I found that when we did draw it, it was quite impossible to prevent its being taken and burnt. Then on the 18th of December I called from the Quartermaster General for twenty-four baggage animals and twelve men in charge to draw timber for the stabling. I may state that the stabling at what I call the depôt was completed on the Saturday preceding the 17th of January.

(*President.*) Could you name the regiments that were hutted?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) No. These were the stables that I was constructing myself at the depôt; they were completed on the Saturday. And it is right that I should inform the Board that with regard to this hutting, every evening, as it was roofed, some regiment was ordered to send horses to occupy the stabling; and for the last ten days or a fortnight they used to send in from fifteen to twenty horses, and generally from those regiments which were experiencing the most difficulties, from distance or from other reasons, in hutting; they were generally ordered to to send in as many horses as shelter during the day had been provided for. This went on until the 14th of the month, and then I thought that the stabling having been completed, the most convenient course would be to move the 17th Lancers, and to make them occupy this stabling, which they did. And if the Board will refer to the evidence of Major Benson they will find he says, that on the 16th of the month the 17th regiment were all hutted, and that the hutting had been built by Lord Lucan.

It is right that I should state to the Board that on the 16th of the month the commanding officers having said that they really could do nothing in this matter, I thought that I would satisfy myself of what they could do and what they could not do, and I called for a nominal return from each regiment to explain exactly how every man had been employed the day before. I have those returns here, and I do not know how a Divisional General can do much more to ascertain what exertions are making. The Board will know it is not a very usual proceeding to call for such a nominal return for such purpose, but I did it; and I think that a reference to those returns will show that in some regiments there was not a single man available; and I may perhaps mention what happened as to the return of the 4th Dragoon Guards. The clerk of the 4th Dragoon Guards, by mistake, addressed the return to Lord Raglan instead of addressing it to me. Lord Raglan read the return, and he stated, "Well! I am very glad to see they are all so well employed." I mean to show that there was not that day in that regiment a single man who was not on regimental duty or public duty, and it is right that I should say that. About the middle of January, thinking that there was not so much expedition, though I cannot exactly say I thought it, but it was rather to prevent any inactivity than to complain of it, I made one brigade report to me every Saturday the number of horses they had given shelter to in the week, and the other daily the progress of the day before, under the supposition that less exertion was being made in the latter.

The Commissioners in their letter replying to mine, rely upon Colonel Doherty's evidence, and they state that Colonel Doherty said that his stabling was not completed before the 23d of February. This Board will perhaps recollect that I state in my letter to the Minister-at-War, that so far from the construction of the stabling, as I understood them to allude to that solely, having only terminated in the middle of March, the whole had been completed on the 11th of February. Though speaking very much from recollection, I will just mention why I think I could not have been in error. When I embarked, my Adjutant General, Colonel Shute, on taking leave of me offered me his congratulation that I was not leaving the army with one horse unsheltered. That was the last thing that that officer said to me on board ship. He said "I congratulate "you upon this, a thing you have had so much at heart, that you have succeeded in shelter-"ing every horse before you leave this army." I had done so two days before I embarked, on the 13th of February, and I can show further that on the 11th of February I visited the 8th Hussars camp to see that their stabling was constructed, and that the carpenters were still nailing the roof, and when I complained that the roof had not been finished the night before, as had been promised, they said that the whole of the horses had been in on the night before, because they had just given them a temporary shelter, but they were making it more complete on that day. This was on the 11th, and, therefore, I say boldly, that every horse of that cavalry, consisting of about 792 to the best of my recol-

7th April 1856.

lection, was hutted and sheltered on the 11th. These gentlemen rely upon Colonel's Doherty's evidence, and they say that Colonel Doherty said, "On the 23d of the month." Now I do not propose to call and examine any witnesses in chief, but I do propose to cross-examine three or four officers, and to try to show by cross-examination that they have, unintentionally I am sure, said that which is not quite correct. If Colonel Doherty is not here, I can produce evidence nearly as good from my own orders. There is the order of February 7th. I have nothing to say to Colonel Doherty, except to put two questions.

(*President.*) He had notice to be here, and to remain in readiness; he can be summoned, however, for another day.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is unimportant. In conversation with me, he has since admitted that he was speaking loosely, and did not exactly know what he was saying. At all events I would rather not read that order if he is not here, although if he does not come I shall be obliged to read that order.

I have now, I think, shown the Board that at all events there was no great want of energy or desire to hut the horses. I have shown that there was very great difficulty in the carriage of the materials in consequence of the horses being employed in the transport of the army. I have shown again that there was great difficulty in effecting the work in consequence of there being no men and very few Turks to assist. And I will now state that there were other difficulties; for instance, with regard to the timber—(the Board will, I hope, recollect that I confine myself now to the hutting after we came down). If the Board will refer to Major Hall's evidence—the dates will be seen at page 34 of the Report—it gives the arrival of the different ships with timber. This table in page 34 will show the Board the dates of the arrival of the timber, and it will show what those cargoes of timber chiefly consisted of. I wish the Board to observe, that although after the beginning of December there was no great scarcity of planking, there was a very great scarcity of scantling and timber that was requisite for uprights and rafters. If the Board will be good enough to refer to that table, they will find that whilst on the 25th of November there were 14,431 pieces of planking, there were only 1,692 pieces of scantling fitted for uprights and for roofing. Then again, on the 1st of January the "Paramatta" arrived, and on the 6th the "Sea Nymph;" one of those vessels brought 10,560 boards and planks, and she only brought 3,793 pieces of scantling. On the 6th the "Sea Nymph" brought 22,738 boards and planks, and no scantling for roofing or uprights at all. Therefore, I wish to show that another difficulty arose, that we were stopped because we could not find the proper scantling to construct the roof. And it is right that I should state, that when those baggage animals on the 5th December were all ready for the purpose of carrying this timber, and were taken the next day to the stores, they were told that it was irregular, that they had not come armed with sufficient power or orders, that there was no order from the commanding engineer, and therefore nothing could be given. I, on that wrote to the Quartermaster General, and suggested that a discretionary power should be given to me, and that on my requisition the building materials should be supplied. I was then told that that again would be an irregularity; but I must at the same time say, that after Major Hall was stationed at Balaklava there was no difficulty whatever in obtaining anything that was there; no unnecessary forms were required; and if Major Hall had the timber he gave it. Another difficulty that offered itself, the want of which delayed us three or four days, was nails. After we were ready for the roof, it was discovered that no nails had been provided, and it was necessary to wait till their arrival from Constantinople. Therefore, I wish the Board to recollect that on those occasions we were waiting for the timber and for the nails. It is not necessary that I should state now how the cavalry ceased to give transport, and therefore I do not intend to go into that; but after the 19th of January we discontinued furnishing the transport for the provisions, but we still continued, I see by the papers that have come under my notice, to have the carriage of the sick, and we continued to do it up to the end of March. I am not quite sure whether it was the beginning of March or the end of March, but we continued to do it for a considerable time. A few baggage ponies had arrived, and we then found it easier to carry our timber, but the difficulty then of want of proper scantling; and I may say if there had been proper timber, instead of the stabling having been completed only on the 11th of February, there would be no difficulty in showing that it might have been done two or three weeks earlier. Therefore I may say, that for the last ten days or a fortnight it was the want of uprights and rafters that prevented our completing the stabling. I wish the Board to be good enough to refer to the letter I addressed to Lord Raglan under the head of Cavalry Transport, page 116. It refers to the hutting, and states that it was stopped by that duty. It is dated "Kadikoi, January the 17th, 1855," and is addressed to the Adjutant General.

"Sir,—It is with much regret that I find myself compelled to represent the fearful "consequence to the cavalry of having to continue in the discharge of transport duties "and to make another appeal in their behalf to the Field Marshal. The horses continue "dying fast: the discipline and economical management of the regiments deteriorate; "feelings of disappointment and dissatisfaction are felt by the officers commanding "brigade regiments and others; and in addition, this army is losing a cavalry it will be "difficult to replace, whilst the country is suffering an enormous and in my opinion a "needless pecuniary loss. Since the 12th December when the cavalry were first made to

7th April 1856.

" give commissariat transport, no less than 426 horses have died, many daily sinking under " their load and then left helplessly by the way to perish; the mortality and sickness are " indeed so great that unless the regiments are relieved quickly of these duties a sufficiency " of horses will not survive to forage for the sick and weakly, and the whole must starve " or be destroyed; whilst a cessation of these duties with great care and nursing might yet " in my opinion save 400 or 500 or more. When the commissariat duties were first given to " the cavalry I indulged in the confident expectation that it was an extreme temporary " measure to meet an extraordinary unforeseen difficulty in provisioning the infantry, not " likely to last beyond a few days, but it has now continued above five weeks; and however " bad the state of the roads and weather without the intermission of a single day and some- " times when the provisions carried were not for immediate use, but taken to the front to be " stored, and during this time baggage animals have been landed, 200 or 300 at a time, " to an aggregate amount, I should suppose, of thousands, without any apparent intention " of relieving the cavalry of these onerous duties. Independent of the loss to the army of " so important a branch of the service, the pecuniary loss to the country from the destruc- " tion of so many horses is enormous. Much above 400 are gone already; as many more " may be expected to go. 800 horses will have been worth 60,000*l.*, and I wish to direct " the attention of the Field Marshal to the fact, that whereas a troop horse is worth 75*l.*, " baggage ponies can be procured in Asia Minor and elsewhere at 5*l.* a head to any " amount; and as the pony carries on a pack-saddle two bags of biscuit, a load requiring " four troop horses, two to ride and two to carry, the pony costing 5*l.* is equal to a trans- " port power from troop horses of 300*l.* The saddlery, from improper use, constant " exposure to weather, without the means or time for giving it proper care, is suffering " severely. The discipline and economical arrangements of the regiments are suffering " from the fact that the men leaving camp early in the morning, and only returning late " in the afternoon, are scarcely ever seen by their troop officers; the whole of the messing " is deranged, and it is found impossible to hold any parades or have any inspections " whatever; and further, from the great number of men employed in this way, and in " foraging, it is not possible"—(I should not, perhaps, have read this letter now, but for this)—" to make much progress in the hutting of the horses, by which they again have to " suffer, for I cannot doubt that but for this constant occupation of the cavalry the hutting " would ere this have been completed, and the horses all under cover. Having now stated " the dreadfulness and explained the many inconveniences consequent on the cavalry " acting as Commissariat transports, I must not withhold from his Excellency the great " disappointment—I might add the great dissatisfaction—felt by the officers commanding " brigades, regiments, and indeed by the officers generally, at the long continuance and " without any apparent early termination, of duties so totally foreign to their profession. " In the beginning they were hurt at being told that these duties were given them in " consequence of their having no field duties to perform; they now find that they are " becoming rapidly dismounted, and that their inefficiency will be complete when they " can consequently no longer look for that honourable service and distinction in the field " which was the ambition of all, and with many the sole inducements to undergo the " hardships and privations of the campaign. They again feel that, though having " profited of an opportunity which has not yet offered itself to the French cavalry " of distinguishing themselves against the enemy, still they find themselves humiliated " in the eyes of those allies by having to discharge duties strange to cavalry: " such feelings the Field Marshal will not, I am sure, think discreditable or improper, " but I trust deserving of his indulgent consideration. With every desire to obey every " order and carry out every wish expressed by his Excellency, I find myself com- " pelled, as Lieutenant General in this army, and responsible for the efficiency of the " cavalry, to lay those facts before him, and to express my hope that he will be disposed " to relieve my division from duties onerous and destructive, and which, from their nature " are so distasteful, that they cannot fail seriously to lessen that zeal and that *esprit de* " *corps* which are so essential, and which unquestionably it is always an object to promote." I have read this letter chiefly to show that I had already stated that the transport duties, first by occupying and then destroying our horses, prevented our constructing stables, and retarded their completion until February. I hope I have satisfied the Board that the construction of stabling did commence before the end of January; and with regard to its termination, the Commissioners now state that there has been a misconception from the displacement of a marginal note. I will read so much of their answer, they say, " His " Lordship further alleges that it is inferred in the report, and without foundation, that the " cavalry only commenced the construction of the stables at the end of January or beginning " of February, and only terminated in the middle of March." I think I have established that the earlier part of that is certainly incorrect, that they had commenced, instead of at the end of January, at the very beginning of December. There is no mistake in the print, for they distinctly state the date at which the hutting of the cavalry commenced, and they cannot escape from it. They add:—" This, however, we observe, has arisen from a mis- " conception; (unfortunate word, that word 'misconception,' it seems to haunt one,) for which " his Lordship is not responsible." At all events I am not responsible this time for a mis- conception. " The paragraph referred to merely gives the substance of the answers by the " Officers commanding the Cavalry Corps." Really, when one comes to consider that of these two Commissioners, one has been a Poor Law Commissioner, and therefore, I

7th April 1856.

suppose, very much accustomed to business; and the other, the Statistical Clerk of the War Office, one would expect great accuracy from them. But they say, "The horses "never having been in tents, the paragraph would obviously not refer to them. We regret "that the accidental displacement of the words 'shelter for the horses' in the running "margin from the succeeding paragraph which alone relates to that subject, and in which "no date is mentioned, should have given Lord Lucan the trouble to disprove what has "never been asserted." Now, the unfortunate part of this error of the Commissioners is this,—it is not only that they deceived Lord Lucan, but they did what was very much worse; they, by their displacement of the words, as they call it, have left an impression abroad from which I have been suffering much obloquy for the last six weeks; and these Commissioners say now, that although they talked in the beginning of the horses, in the end they talked of the men, although it is in the same paragraph. With regard to the men I will come to that directly; but I hope that I have satisfied the Board, or shall do so, by the examination of Colonel Doherty, when I can, that if the Commissioners rely upon Colonel Doherty's evidence, Colonel Doherty will disappoint them, and will say that so far from not having completed his hutting for the horses by the 23d, he had completed it on the 6th of the month; and I can state that the whole of the hutting of the horses, of which the 8th Hussars were the last, was completed on the 11th. I do not think I ought to leave this part of the subject without referring to the printed Report of the Commissioners, in which they say that the men were within one mile of their stores. If the Board wish, I will put up any dozen gentlemen who happen to be here now, to show that they are as incorrect in their distances, as they are in their other facts. This mile from the store, was in no instance so little as a mile; and in the instance of the head quarters of some cavalry regiments, I can say that the distance was two miles. In the case of the 11th Hussars, whose commanding officer is here, the distance was fully two miles. The Commissioners give credit only for half the distance. They state in their Report, "Considering that those men were within about a mile of "the store where the wood might be obtained, that they had no work in the trenches, "and that the only duties likely to interfere with the application both of horses and men "to this important object was the carrying up of their own forage from Balaklava, and "furnishing parties occasionally to bring down sick and carry up provisions to the front." These gentlemen say that we were occasionally carrying the sick, and occasionally carrying provisions to the front.

Now I wish to observe that an order came on the 12th, and there is a letter of mine to the Quartermaster General explaining how I proposed to carry out the order I had for 500 horses for transport by the following morning. It is right I should state to the Board that this was on the 12th, when we had been only a very few days down—when we were trying if possible to recover our horses. I called all the commanding officers of the regiments and the brigadiers together, and took their opinions as to how this duty could be rendered least destructive to the horses. The Board may readily understand the despair with which all the commanding officers received this order. They though it was a *coup de grace*, and that it decided the fate of the remaining horses. I exempted at first the Light Cavalry from this onerous duty in consequence of their more debilitated condition. I wish to guard myself particularly against being supposed to throw out any reflection with regard to this Brigade, because it laboured on that plateau under disadvantages that the Heavy Brigade did not, and therefore it would be most unjust to attribute blame to them from their having been in worse condition than the others. Their horses were in the most hopeless condition, and giving them at that moment duties so onerous would have led to their destruction. Finding from the Commissariat officers that there were hopes that the "Jason" would arrive in two or three days, and that on the arrival of the "Jason" this duty would cease, I called upon General Scarlett, and I got him to agree to furnish the whole of the transport duties; the arrangement being that the Light Brigade should go twice in the day for forage, and should furnish the picket, however unfit for such a duty. The first complaint of General Scarlett was that the transport duty was giving his horses sore backs (which was what I had to refer to Lord Raglan), and I state in my letter of December 17th, to the Adjutant General, "I have been "obliged to give the whole of this duty to the Heavy Brigade, making the Light Brigade "forage for both brigades, and take the picket in consequence of the latter in their "reduced state being unable to undergo such fatigue." In the last paragraph of that letter, I mention that in consequence of the reduced state of the Light Brigade, the Heavy Brigade are doing the whole of this transport duty, the Light Brigade foraging for them. On the 22d of December General Scarlett writes to me, and says, "My Lord, I have with "regret the honour to call your attention to the number of sick horses, and the daily "deaths of from four to five horses in the regiments in my brigade. This decrease of "effective horses is so rapid, that some of the regiments will be unable to furnish the "required number of pack-horses, and draw their own forage when it becomes their turn "to give the picket." It is right that I should say, that about the 19th of the month, the Light Brigade said that whatever my disposition was in giving them the foraging, and the others the transport duty, they thought that having to go twice to the town, which made eight miles altogether, to forage for both regiments, was harder upon them than to take the transport, and then I allowed them to take their share; that was about the

7th April 1856.

19th of the month. "The improvement which had taken place since the horses came to "a more sheltered spot has within the last twelve days ceased to be visible." I am anxious to observe that Colonel Hodge, in his evidence, states, that during these twelve days he never lost a horse at all, nor did he lose a horse until he was called upon to furnish the transport duty. General Scarlett continues, "Many are becoming affected with disease "of the lungs, &c., which ends in glanders. The cavalry, when they came down here, were "in a state that required care and grooming to renovate and restore them to condition. "They are now employed six hours per diem in carrying provisions or forage, which leaves "the men few hours of daylight to groom and clean arms and appointments in such "weather as this, and leaves no possibility of proceeding with hutting or building stables. It "is for your Lordship to consider whether the cavalry can perform their present duties, and "also retain any chance of doing effective service in the field when called on, now or at any "future period. It may be for the good of the service generally that they should perform "their present duties; but it can scarcely be relied on that they will also be effective as "cavalry at a future period. There has been latterly no deficiency of forage; but many "horses are off their feed from debility and low fever, contracted from long exposure, and "are unfit for work in consequence. I wish, lastly, to advert to the want of veterinary "medicines." I can come back to that question if it is of any consequence. On December the 23rd I wrote to the Adjutant General, enclosing General Scarlett's letter. This is at page 114:—"I consider it my duty not to withhold from the Field Marshal the enclosed "letters from Brigadier General Scarlett, commanding the heavy brigade in the cavalry "division. Like the Brigadier General, I feel keenly and with the deepest regret the "serious losses of horses occurring daily in the different regiments of cavalry, occasioned "as they are by their carrying up provisions to the front of the army; a labour occupying "many hours, in the very bad state of the roads, and, with their own reduced condition, "far beyond the power of these animals. So many have died, and so many more have "fallen sick, that it is not even found possible, with this duty, for these regiments to "forage for themselves; the 5th Dragoon Guards in consequence only drew a part of "their allowance yesterday. I feel that I ought not to conceal from his Excellency that "on the part of the Brigadier General, and the officers commanding regiments, a strong "feeling exists that their regiments will become altogether dismounted, and that, in the "total inefficiency of their regiments for any service in the field, their own characters "will become compromised; a feeling in which, from the situation I hold, I must more "than share. These officers have all expressed to me their desire to endeavour, in the "provisioning of the infantry, to give all the assistance in their power; but from the long "continuance of this onerous duty they are apprehending the most serious consequences." I got as an answer to that letter and its enclosure a memorandum to this effect:—"Lord "Raglan can form no opinion on this matter without knowing how many horses are em-"ployed in carrying provisions to the troops, how many in fetching forage for themselves, "and how many are left at home." I wish the Board to recollect that when the Commissioners talk about a few horses being occasionally employed, I have brought them down from the 12th, the day that we received the order, to the 25th, when we were finding, but with great difficulty, the 500 horses, which took away every effective horse. My reply on the 25th of December was to this effect:—"In answer to the information you call for, "No. 1, How many horses are employed in carrying provisions to the troops? No. 2, "How many in fetching forage for themselves? No. 3, How many are left at home? I "have the honour to state that in the heavy brigade there were on the 23d inst. on commis-"sariat duty 381, regimental foraging 128, pickets 40, deficient for foraging 8." If the Board consider what a horse carries—suppose he was to carry a hundred weight—that regiment lost one hundred weight of food that day from not having horses to draw the forage. "In the light brigade the same day for duty 201; commissariat duty, 122;" (making altogether 503 horses on transport duty.) "Regimental foraging, 72; orderlies, 7; total, 201." Therefore there was not one horse, nor could there have been one, on any day from the 12th of December to the 25th of December; but, on the contrary, they occasionally fell short of the horses they required to obtain forage for their own horses. I end by saying, "It "thus appears that no horse was left in on the day named, but that there were eight horses "deficient for the foraging of the heavy brigade. I think it necessary to give a daily list of "the dead horses, since the cavalry have had to perform transport duties, amounting up to "this morning to 121 horses; the increase of sick in the same time appears to be ninety-"three. Dead horses:—December 13th, two; 14th, thirteen; 15th, six; 16th, five; 17th, "fifteen; 18th, eight; 19th, nine; 20th, seven; 21st, six; 22d, five; 23d, seven; 24th, nine; "25th, twenty-nine;" making a total of 121 horses. I write this letter on the 25th of December, and on the next day I write again, and say, "I think it necessary to report that twenty-"one troop horses have died in the last twenty-four hours, making an aggregate of 142 "since the 12th instant. I cannot exaggerate the concern with which I view so fearful a "mortality amongst the troop horses." On the 3d of January I write again, "I feel "myself again compelled to request your attention to the great mortality of horses, which "continues to a fearful extent. In my letter of the 26th ult. I reported that "from the 12th of that month, when the cavalry gave the commissariat transport, "142 horses had died, since when seventy-four, making in the whole a loss of 216 horses. "My fears are, I am sorry to say, fully realized, and unless the troop horses can get

" more forage, and be eased in their work, I apprehend that no care will save them." 7th April 1856.
" P.S. I think it necessary to add that the hay issued to the cavalry is worthless rubbish,
" and quite unfit to nourish any animal." This was not English hay, but hay that came from Anatolia. On January the 6th, three days after, I write again :—" It is with much
" concern that I have to report that 28 horses were reported dead yesterday, 16 the pre-
" ceding day, and 43 this morning, 87 in three days; making a total loss of 303 horses
" since the 12th ultimo, when the cavalry first commenced doing commissariat transport
" duties." Then I do not write from the 6th to the 17th, having made as I thought official reports and complaints enough. At last I was driven to making what I on the 17th January called a last appeal, two days after which we ceased to perform this destructive duty. I have been obliged to go into this because I think that this statement very little corresponds with what would be inferred from the report of the Commissioners, " that the only duties likely to interfere with the application both
" of horses and men to this important object was the carrying up of their own forage
" from Balaklava, and furnishing parties occasionally to bring down sick and carry
" up provision to the front, which seems never to have occupied more than about a
" fifth part of the whole." I quite admit that if those gentlemen's facts were facts at all their conclusions would not be altogether unfair, but their facts are singularly and unexceptionally erroneous. The Commissioners go on to say, "It appears strange that more
" rapid progress was not made in obtaining the advantage of hut accommodation,
" particularly when they are described as having suffered so much in their tents." It is right I should observe here, that early in the month of January the men's huts arrived from England; and it is right I should mention another thing,—I am not prepared to produce as much documentary evidence as I should like, and as I think a divisional general ought to be able to furnish in a contingency like the present. I think that the system in the army, if I may venture to say so, is one attended with exceeding inconvenience, and I think with great risk to the general officer; it is this, that the daily officer of your staff waits upon the senior officer of his own department, and a communication is thus carried on verbally, leaving the divisional general afterwards without any documentary proof, either that applications have been made or of anything that has transpired. There may be advantages in the system, but I am not aware of them; and I am labouring under the disadvantage at this moment. Those letters were remonstrances, and those letters were only addressed to those departments when I found that all the ordinary applications through the staff officers had failed. I wish it to be thoroughly understood that those letters were letters written latterly; when I am free to admit that I thought it necessary, for my own safety, that I should commit to paper what perhaps previously I should not have done; but I am deprived of what I think a divisional general should always be armed with, which is, documentary evidence to show how he carries on his duty. And so long as the system continues for the general staff of the army attached to the divisions to communicate the wishes of their divisional general verbally to the head of the staff, and only bring back verbal answers, the divisional general will be deprived of anything in the shape of documentary proof. I have already mentioned that early in the month of January the men's huts arrived from England; and the Board will see that Captain Kean, an officer of the engineer department, arrived about the 5th of January. When they arrived the instructions I received were, that I was to get erected a hut for each regiment as a hospital; and Captain Kean I believe had been sent out, being supposed to understand that business. The whole of the hutting at that time (I do not know what happened subsequently) was under his management. To carry out this, he was given two or three sailors, and I think two or three infantry soldiers. At all events he only undertook first to erect one or two for us. After having shown us how we were to construct them, we were to put the others together in the best way we could. I must say with regard to Captain Kean that he certainly did give me all the assistance he possibly could, for I prevailed upon him to allow me to keep one or two of his carpenters until I had completed a hut for the hospital of each regiment.

Now I wish to observe that the Commissioners complain that the huts were not put up earlier. The huts were not given me to put up. I had huts for the hospitals on the 25th of January. In consequence of a great quantity of spare saddlery belonging to the horses that had died, for which there was no possibility of finding storeage in Balaklava, I thought it best to obtain a hut as a depôt for the saddlery of each brigade. I was told distinctly that the huts were not to be had at that time; because they were wanted for the army in front; it was only late in January or the beginning of February that we were ordered to put up as many huts as we could. Therefore, I say, even if we could have done it, the huts were not at our disposal till quite the end of January if not the beginning of February. With regard to the huts, no doubt regiments might sometimes have drawn part of a hut; but I found it objectionable; the timbers got misplaced, and perhaps some of them were burnt in the night, and the only way to have a hut safe was to have the whole brought at one time; for which reason I stopped the regiments when they had one or two spare horses only, and I said, "This is not like drawing planking, or
" scantling, or rough timber, this is assorted timber, and if you mix the materials of one
" hut with the materials of another hut, you will make them both useless," therefore I required that the hut should be brought perfect, and on the same day. Again, the Board

7th April 1856.

will readily understand that there was no use in bringing huts up quicker than the artificers could put them together. On the day that I received my recall I had given out an order on that subject. It is dated February 13th, "Until further orders, the Light Cavalry "Brigade will furnish thirteen baggage ponies, the Heavy Brigade twelve, making altogether "twenty-five, which will, under the Quartermaster of the day, draw the whole of the "soldiers' huts, the allocation of which will always be directed by the Assistant Quarter-"master General of the Division." If I had allowed a regiment to draw their own huts they could only have drawn a small portion of them, and before they were finished the greater part of the timber would have been stolen; therefore I thought it better to make the Quartermaster General of the Division responsible for the drawing of those huts, and assist him from the two brigades. When the men's huts were completed I cannot speak to, as it must have been after I left the army. I believe I have disposed of that paragraph. I have read every word of it. I may observe, that when I made application on the 25th of January for the two huts for the saddlery, it was at once conceded; but they were not used, because two days afterwards I thought it better to fit up saddlery shops in Constantinople. The Quartermaster General and Lord Raglan consented. I have now come to the last paragraph, and I may perhaps say that it is only part of this paragraph in the whole Report that directly affects me. Until now I have been more defending the cavalry than myself. I say that as their Divisional General I was responsible for that cavalry; and if any officer in it failed to do his duty, I was answerable.

Now I come to what is more the personal reflection against myself. It begins at page 36 of the Report. "Considering also the sufferings and severe loss of horses from "exposure to the weather in the commencement of the winter, there appears to have been a "want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising for them some means of temporary shelter, "such as saved the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava." This is a preposterous comparison. The expression "in the commencement of the winter" must be supposed to refer to the period between the 12th of November, when the weather broke, to the end of the month, during which time the cavalry were detained on the two positions near Sebastopol; and to compare the circumstances of a considerable body of cavalry encamped upon a bleak and distant plateau without tools or a particle of material for construction, with the circumstances of a few baggage animals belonging to a corps consisting entirely of engineers and artificers stationed at Balaklava, where they could avail themselves from their own engineer stores of all necessary tools and materials, shows too clearly a spirit of detraction and injustice, but is unjustifiable by any sophistry, or any system of reasoning whatever.

As for the baggage ponies, I hope that I have said enough to dispose of any comparison, for I never heard of what accommodation the engineers provided for them. I have no doubt they took very good care of themselves. I never knew engineers that did not; people in general do; and I have no doubt that if they had the means, they fully appreciated the value of their baggage ponies, and having the materials, and having the artificers, turned them to good account. So far, it is true that they did give shelter to a few baggage ponies, which could be done with much ease; but I suspect that there is nobody who would be more surprised than those very engineer officers if they were told that, because they had succeeded with all those advantages, of every one of which we were deprived, that, therefore, we were to blame, because other parties so totally differently circumstanced had succeeded. That very comparison shows the animus of the Commissioners. I am prepared to rest the question of the animus of the Commissioners upon the absurdity, and I might say, the malice and malignity of this comparison. That the engineers had a very good opportunity, and that they very properly, as I am sure they would, availed themselves of it, was quite right. The only thing for me to show the Board, is whether I neglected any opportunity, and whether I had any available means of giving any shelter whatever during the time we occupied the heights. With the permission of the Board, I shall wish to cross-examine Colonel Griffiths, but my attention has been called to a point that escaped me. I said in my original statement, that the statements of the Commissioners were insufficiently supported by evidence. Those gentlemen say that the hutting was never completed before March, but I cannot put my finger on the paragraph which establishes that point at all; I cannot find it.

(*President.*) Colonel Griffiths is present; he is not in uniform, but we will dispense with that.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I should wish him not to be in Court until I call him.

I do not comment any more upon this part of the case only to show the animus that appears to have dictated it, and the absurdity of it in itself. I shall have to come back to it when I cross-examine Colonel Griffiths. They go on, "Experience has now proved that "even a very moderate degree of shelter would have been sufficient to save the lives of "many of the horses, if not to maintain them in serviceable condition." I am unable to guess what possible experience Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch have had. From my experience, I know that to save the lives of horses during a very wet season in the east, it is indispensable to give them so much shelter as shall protect them from the rain, and afford them dry standing; and it is again necessary that the shelter shall be constructed of sufficient strength to resist the violent storms of that country. I defy the Commissioners

7th April 1856.

to show that any amount of promptitude or ingenuity would have availed in devising any such shelter or any shelter at all for the cavalry so long as they continued on the plateau. And they have ventured to give expression to this insinuation, or rather to bring this grave charge upon no other foundation than the unsupported opinion of Colonel Griffiths, of the value of which this Board, from the cross-examination of that officer, will be able to form their own judgment. Then the Report goes on, "And it must be presumed that such measures were "considered practicable, for a proposal to erect, with the assistance of his men, some sort "of cover for the horses of the corps appears to have been made by the officer commanding "the Scots Greys; but the manner in which it is stated to have been received by the "Lieutenant-General commanding the Cavalry was calculated to deter other officers from "making any similar proposal." Now to justify such a presumption, which, if well founded, must militate against the character of an absent general officer, it was incumbent upon the Commissioners to examine to this point some of the other cavalry officers; but this they appear to have purposely avoided. Then it goes on, "But the manner in which it is stated "to have been received by the Lieutenant-General commanding the Cavalry was calculated "to deter other officers from making any similar proposal." Colonel Griffiths states in his evidence that on the occasion referred to there were present Colonel Hodge, Lord William Paulet, and others; and it would appear but fair if, when the character of a general officer was so assailed by a subordinate officer, who must so clearly have been influenced by personal feelings in making such a statement at all, the Commissioners should, as they had the opportunity of doing, not only have cross-examined that witness, but have examined Colonel Hodge and Lord William Paulet, and the others referred to. Colonel Hodge underwent an examination before these Commissioners not many days after, and the subject appears not to have been mentioned. Lord William Paulet must have had much communication with them at Constantinople, but he does not appear to have been examined at all, and of the "others" the Commissioners appear to have taken no account whatever. And it is nothing less than monstrous that the Commissioners should have allowed themselves to conclude that other officers were deterred from the proper discharge of their duty by what might have occurred between me and Colonel Griffiths, without a particle of evidence that such was the case, and indeed in ignorance whether the transaction in question had ever come to their knowledge at all.

Colonel Darby Griffiths called.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I am told that Colonel Griffiths wishes to wait for some memorandums, but perhaps it will be as well to proceed, and when any difficulty of that sort presents itself it will be time to stop.

(*Colonel Griffiths.*) The only thing is this, that I may forget some few questions. I have merely put them down on paper to jog my memory; it will not be very long. I sent my servant immediately for them, and I received them about a quarter past two.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I beg to call the attention of the Court to this, that Colonel Griffiths does not tell you that he is waiting for any minute taken at the time, but he says he is anxious to have some papers, upon which he has written notes recently to refresh his memory. I believe that he will not be allowed to refer to those notes. I appeal to the Judge Advocate General to say whether, if those notes have been made recently, and they are not notes taken at the time, he has any right to make use of them?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) When the question arises it will be time to decide that.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) We are told that the notes are only notes made quite recently by Colonel Griffiths, and I think it is obvious that there can be no sufficient reason to delay the proceedings to wait for what I believe are illegal as evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I understand that they are memorandums made by himself, and he wishes to refer to them to refresh his memory.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I should not object to them if they were here, but I object to them now, as a ground for arresting the proceedings of the Court; they are not strictly evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Griffiths.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you that it is not compulsory upon you to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

(*Colonel Griffiths.*) I think I have a right to ask the Board to allow me to wait for the papers which I shall have. I think that till then I have no right to answer a single question, particularly after the warning I have received. I say this most respectful.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I take this opportunity to submit for legal opinion whether notes made in the way described are admissible. I think that the case has arisen. The Board will not sit after 4, and I thought, if we had gone on, that I should have completed Colonel Griffiths' evidence to day; but I think I can see from the non-production of these papers that the examination may be a little more dilatory than I had anticipated; as I should be very sorry that the Court should adjourn in the middle of this officer's examination, if it were not any great inconvenience, I would really prefer myself to begin to-morrow, or

7th April 1856.

any other day that the Court shall direct, rather than leave off with Colonel Griffiths in the middle of his examination.

(*President.*) Will it be a long examination?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) There will not be a great many questions, but I strongly suspect that it will take a long time, and I am quite positive that if we begin now we shall not finish with Colonel Griffiths to day.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Have you any other witnesses whom you intend to call?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) There are General Airey and Colonel Gordon.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Is it necessary to proceed with Colonel Griffiths first, or could you go on with any other witness?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I can examine Colonel Gordon certainly; that will be a matter of only a few minutes.

(*President.*) Then will you defer the examination of Colonel Griffiths to-day, and examine Colonel Gordon?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have already disposed of all that the Commissioners stated in their report; but I think myself ntitled also to go into parts of the letter of the Commissioners in answer to my letter to Lord Panmure of the 7th instant. They support their accusations of the want of promptitude in stabling the horses in the early part of the winter, upon the evidence of Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon and Major-General Sir Richard Airey, which renders it necessary to cross-examine those witnesses.

---

Colonel the Hon. ALEXANDER GORDON, C.B., called.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you that it is not compulsory on any witness to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against him before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement will be admissible in evidence against him.

1. (*Earl of Lucan.*) In your evidence before the Commissioners you state, "On the "same day Lord Lucan was directed to make temporary stables as he best could till the "timber arrived; and on the 12th of November an engineer was placed at his disposal for the purpose of assisting him." The question I put to you is this: Be good enough to tell the Court who that officer was, and what knowledge you have upon this subject?—That officer, as well as I can recollect, was named Stokes, or some name like that, who was first of all appointed by the officer commanding the Royal Engineers, and afterwards, I think, that officer was changed for one of the name of Lennox; but, not having been aware of what questions were to be put to me, I have no papers to speak from. I think those were the names of the officers.

2. Can you say, of your own knowledge, that Mr. Stokes was given this duty on the 12th of November?—I think the officer commanding the Engineers reported that Lieutenant Stokes had been ordered to do this duty.

3. On that day?—Without the papers I cannot be quite certain whether it was on that very day. I know perfectly well that you wrote to say that he had either not come, or had come and gone away again. I recollect some representations of that kind coming from you.

4. That he had not come?—My impression is that he came and went away again. You wanted him to live with you at the camp: he went and lived at his own camp. I recollect there was some complaint that his services were not so available as you wished and had expected.

(*Earl of Lucan to the President.*) I do not know to what use the Court will allow me to turn this journal. The history of it is simply this: it was kept by my son, Lord Bingham, who left it in England, locked up in a box. I wrote to the Crimea for the journal. I had the box broken open, and this is it; and I can produce fifty people that can swear to the handwriting of Lord Bingham, and who would prove that every word of it is in Lord Bingham's handwriting. I should think this would be evidence in any court of justice, because it is the best evidence that can be produced. Lord Bingham is now in the Crimea. I expect it would be good evidence anywhere.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You will inform the Board whether you propose to put that journal in.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I propose to put it in to inform the Board whether Colonel Gordon is not in error. I shall put it in to show that he is altogether in error. By this journal of Lord Bingham's I will prove that Mr. Stokes never got an order at all at that time; that evidence will establish the whole case of Mr. Stokes and of the engineer officer, which I can myself depose to, for I can give my own evidence also in support of this journal. It is to be recollected that Lord Bingham was my aide-de-camp.

(*President.*) You can make any use of the book to refresh your memory, but not to use it as evidence.

5. (*Earl of Lucan to the Witness.*) Are you aware that Captain Chapman was the first engineer officer appointed to this duty, and that he only visited the camp for the first time on the 17th of November?—I never heard of Captain Chapman having been appointed

*Colonel Gordon, C.B.*

7th April 1856.

to that duty, and as he had charge, if I recollect rightly, of the left attack, I certainly am surprised to hear that he was appointed to construct huts for the cavalry; this is the first time I have ever heard of such a suggestion.

6. I have said that he visited the camp for the first time on the 17th of November?—My answer is, that I have never heard of Captain Chapman having been employed on such duty until now; my belief is, that Lieutenant Stokes and Lieutenant Lennox were the two officers who had charge of it.

7. Can you tell on what days, or how often, Mr. Stokes attended at the cavalry camp?—No, I cannot.

8. Can you say that he attended on more than one occasion?—Not of my own knowledge.

9. In short you cannot say that he did attend?—No; I cannot say whether he attended, or how often he attended, of my own knowledge.

10. Did you ever hear of a visit made by me to Captain Gordon, the commanding engineer, on the 22d of November, to induce him to act in obedience to the Quartermaster General's order, to give me an engineer officer, if only for three days?—Now that you mention the circumstance, I am not sure but that I have some slight recollection of something of the kind. I know there was a great endeavour made by you, and that you were very anxious about it, but what was done I do not recollect. I think it is very possible, but I have not recollected the circumstance at all.

11. There is no reason why you should know it?—No, I have not recollected it, but I have some faint impression that you did something of this sort about this time.

12. You mentioned that Lieutenant Lennox was appointed to succeed Lieutenant Stokes in this duty. Can you say whether this officer, Lieutenant Lennox, did more than present himself, and whether he was allowed to give any part of his attention to this matter?—I have stated that Lieutenant Lennox and Lieutenant Stokes were the two officers who were appointed for that duty, I believe, by the Engineers' commanding officer, but I have no knowledge as to what amount of attention they gave to it. I know it was expected that they should be taken off all other duty, for the purpose of attending to the cavalry duty; but how far it was carried out I have no means of knowing; I believe you did not get the assistance from those officers which you expected. I recollect some correspondence upon the subject, but I cannot recollect the days on which the officers were appointed. That would not have come under my knowledge at all. The Commanding Royal Engineer would have had a knowledge of all those duties which I should not.

13. Would it then surprise you to be told that Lieutenant Stokes attended only on the 22d of November, and only on that one occasion, and then to look over the ground, and that Mr. Lennox attended only on the day that he came to present himself, and this because Captain Gordon refused to take either of them off their roster for their trench duties, or to allow them even three days to continue with the cavalry camp?—Nothing surprises me.

14. Then you do not think it improbable? Would it not surprise you to be told that?—It does not surprise me.

15. In short, such a thing is possible?—If you will ask me a question I will answer it. I have told you that it does not surprise me.

16. I ask you this: How do you know that I was directed to make temporary stables?—Because I stated so in evidence in the Crimea,—evidence which I gave from the records in the Quartermaster General's office; and probably in the archives of the cavalry division there will be a letter from the Quartermaster General's office containing instructions on the 8th of November, which is the day when the principal part of the steps were taken for the timber supplies after the battle of Inkermann.

17. You say, if I understand you, that you have no personal knowledge of the matter, but you are induced to suppose so from some record?—You quite misunderstood me. I stated that this evidence which I gave about Lord Lucan being directed to make temporary stables as best he could, is taken from the official records of the Quartermaster General's office in the Crimea.

18. You have no personal knowledge upon the subject; but from some record that you have seen in the office you can take upon yourself to say that there was such an instruction given?—I beg to correct what you say about my having had no personal knowledge; it is impossible for me to say whether I have or not. That letter may have been actually written by myself, but I have no real means a year afterwards of knowing whether I did write it or not. There it is, in the records of the office as having been written on that day, and from that entry I gave my evidence.

19. Can you tell the Board that there were any written instructions at all?—I can state, that on that very day, the 8th of November, most probably in my own handwriting, there is an entry in the Quartermaster General's office book in the Crimea,—to the effect, that Lord Lucan was directed to make stables as he best could; and I recollect perfectly the circumstance now; I perfectly recollect that it was when the cavalry were on the hill towards the sea from head quarters, and they were to make temporary shelter as best they could. I recollect the circumstances now perfectly well of that letter being written

*Colonel Gordon, C.B.*

7th April 1856.

on the 8th of November, and I can state that of my own knowledge, now that the circumstances are brought back to my memory.

20. On what day was it?—On the 8th November.

21. Did you ever hear that I, having waited upon Lord Raglan of my own accord, received from him his verbal instructions on that very day?—I never heard that. If I have heard of it, I have now no recollection of your calling upon Lord Raglan; that is a circumstance which I should not be acquainted with the least in the world, that you should call upon Lord Raglan; I have no knowledge of it at all.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I only wish to know from what information Colonel Gordon could possibly have been speaking at the time. I think there is no use in protracting his examination. The Quartermaster General of the army will know more than Colonel Gordon, therefore, I would rather wait to hear him. It is quite clear that Colonel Gordon thought that I had the assistance of an engineer officer, which I think I have shown the Board I had not.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) You have misunderstood me. I state in my evidence that an engineer officer was placed at your disposal. That is the amount of my evidence, and there is nothing further to say, whether he attended or not.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) To place an engineer officer at the command of another officer, without the consent of his chief, appears inexplicable. With the best intentions on the part of the Quartermaster-General, I was still left without what I wanted, namely, an engineer officer.

Adjourned to to-morrow, at Eleven o'clock.

## THIRD DAY.

### Tuesday, April 8th, 1856.

8th April 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) My Lord and gentlemen, before I proceed with my case I think it due not only to myself, but to those officers who will hereafter find themselves in the same position, to request the attention of this Board to the "Times" newspaper that has appeared this morning. Just before leaving home, a copy was put into my hands. I can say that I really have not had time thoroughly to read it; but I have read sufficient to enable me to say that an article more improper in itself or more unjust, looking at the manner in which the writer has commented upon all that transpired yesterday, the manner in which the article scans and sifts the evidence of the different witnesses, the manner in which it compares what transpired yesterday with what is already in the Report to which I object, also the manner in which the writer brings forward the evidence of those persons that he knows from his own report of the proceedings I am going to produce before the Board, for cross-examination, for the purpose of upsetting the whole of that evidence—for he has the audacity to bring that forward as if it was evidence to meet such evidence as I have brought already before you—I do not hesitate to say, that an article more disgraceful to the writer never appeared in any paper whatever; and that when this paper pretends to be the leader of public opinion in this country and of Englishmen, there is no honest Englishman who would not feel ashamed of having taken part in the writing of such an article. Having said so much, I think it only necessary to call the attention of the Board to it. I am not lawyer enough to say whether it is legal or illegal, whilst the inquiry is proceeding, for any paper to allow itself to indulge in these comments; but I am quite certain that it is a very gross injustice, and if it is legal, it still should not be allowed. I hope and trust that if it is in the power of this Court they will stop a repetition of this injustice.

(*Deputy Judge Advocate General.*) Lord Lucan, I am directed by the Board to inform you, that the matter to which you have called their attention will have their consideration, and they will let their opinion be known before the rising of the Court to-day.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Perhaps the Board will allow me to submit, for their consideration, the course which I wish to pursue. It is, to proceed with the examination of Colonel Griffiths, and afterwards of Sir Richard Airey, when I shall offer myself to the Board for examination, if they wish to examine me. Having done that, I would ask the Board to adjourn to to-morrow, when, perhaps, they will be good enough to allow me to address them, speaking to evidence, and in reply. If that course will not be inconvenient to the Board, it will be the one I should prefer.

(*Deputy Judge Advocate.*) I am directed to inform you that the Board will consider your suggestion, and will give you an answer as quickly as they can.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) In case the Board wished to put any questions to me now, I thought it would be more convenient for them to reserve those questions till I tendered myself as a witness.

I understand that the Board are desirous to know whether I can furnish them with Lord Raglan's orders to take the transport duty, and what that duty amounted to. I believe that I can do so, and I rather think that I can furnish the original order.

If the Board will refer to my letter in answer to that order, it acknowledges the receipt of it, and tells Lord Raglan how I propose to carry it into effect. My letter is dated, I think, the 12th of December. I have the order before me, which I will read. It appears to be a letter from the Quartermaster-General, from Sir Richard Airey:—"Head-quarters, Sebastopol, "12th December 1854.—My Lord, I have the honour to acquaint you, by the desire of "the Commander of the Forces, that as the cavalry at this moment are not in the per- "formance of any field duties his Lordship is pleased to direct that (500) five hundred "horses be employed daily in conveying provisions to the infantry divisions on these "heights. His Lordship proposes that these horses should proceed early every morning "in charge of a regimental officer to Balaklava, where they will take up their load at the "commissariat store, and proceed therewith to camp. I have the honour to request you "will be good enough to inform me with the least possible delay of the arrangements you are "prepared to make for carrying out his service." On the back of this letter there appears a memorandum from me to Commissary General Filder: "The Commissary General Filder "will observe that 500 cavalry horses are to be employed on this service daily; and allowing "12 serjeants, that would leave 238 baggage horses. Besides, Mr. Filder is requested "to state how this service can be best promoted, and with the least pressure upon the "horses. Signed, LUCAN." I got Commissary General Filder's answer, dated the same

8th April 1856.

evening, the 12th of December. I have several small notes telling me that those duties are to continue. It was only because sometimes the sick might have been carried, and then to secure that the transport duties should proceed when there were no sick. I used to get short memorandums; but on every day till the 19th of January there was transport duty, except, perhaps, on two occasions. I think that they were carrying transport up to the 19th of January.

(*President.*) There was a question put at the rising of the Court yesterday, which your Lordship stated that you would answer.

(*Major-General Peel.*) The question put to you was, what the horses actually did.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The 500 horses were divided into different parties to go from our camp; in the case of some of the regiments, they were two miles from Balaklava, and they had to go from the camp in the morning, say, the first party about seven or eight o'clock, a dragoon riding and leading a baggage horse; but be it recollected with the saddles of the regiment, because the Commissary General had signified to me that they had no pack-saddles for the purpose. They were divided generally into three or four parties. They were loaded in the town of Balaklava, and they then proceeded to the different divisions. There were four or five divisions in front, and they would be divided into parties to carry to each division.

(*Major-General Peel.*) What weight did each horse carry?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The Board will see by my letter to Lord Raglan, that, in consequence of there not being any pack-saddles, it was not found possible to put more than one hundredweight upon a horse's back; when with a pack-saddle you might have put nearly double that weight. The Board will observe in my calculation given in my letter of the 17th January, that I state how injudicious it is to allow troop horses instead of baggage horses to perform this duty. I state that the baggage horses could carry double the weight that a troop horse could, in consequence of having a pack instead of a regimental saddle. Even with one hundredweight, it was perfectly fearful the destruction that was occasioned to the horses' backs. The horses were already in a very low state and condition, therefore their ribs were very much exposed; and they were subject to sore backs, when a horse in condition would not be.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Will you state what the forage duty was that the horses did? You have stated that the Light Cavalry for a certain time did double forage duty?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I mean this, That to enable the Heavy Dragoons to find 500 effective horses, it was impossible to furnish a horse for their own forage; therefore the Light Dragoons were to carry the whole forage for their own brigade, and the Heavy Brigade; but that led to two journeys to Balaklava instead of one; and if the Board refer to my orders they will find what I state with regard to chopped straw and hay, that one horse is to be reserved to forage for every four effective and non-effective. Therefore the calculation was, that with loose hay, barley, and chopped straw,—for recollect that chopped straw is a very bulky thing,—it would require one horse in four to be reserved; therefore if you have to forage for 800 horses it will be necessary to keep 200 for that duty.

(*President.*) Will you name the regiments of cavalry, the order in which the several regiments got under cover, the period when they commenced hutting their horses, and when it was finished?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The Board will recollect that I mentioned yesterday that to secure as far as I could due diligence on the part of the different regiments, I made one Brigade from about the middle of January report to me weekly, and I made the other Brigade report to me daily the progress of the day before. I received those reports, but the Adjutant General did not consider it necessary that I should bring those reports to England, therefore I can only speak from recollection. I have applied to the officer who acted as brigade major for the Heavy Brigade, Major Conolly; I applied to him last night to ask him whether he could assist me in giving anything like documentary evidence upon the subject. He told me this morning that he could not; but I believe I can speak nearly as accurately upon the subject as if I had documentary evidence. The Board will recollect very possibly that by the advice of the engineer, and for the different reasons I mentioned yesterday, and particularly in consequence of its propinquity to the town, the chief part of our attention was at first devoted to the depôt. When that hutting was completed, I thought it more convenient than occupying it entirely by detachments to make the 17th Lancers change their camp and come and occupy those stables; therefore the 17th Lancers were first hutted, not from any exertion of their own. I believe the Board will find, by the evidence of Major Benson, that the 17th Lancers were hutted on the 16th of January. Now with regard to the other regiments, I was asked when they began. I hope and believe that they all began as soon as they were ordered. Those regiments that were quartered nearest to Balaklava had the advantage of being assisted by some Turks; for when I had 150 Turks, by the advice of the corporal of Sappers who conducted the works I kept only about half of them at the hospital stables, and the other half was sent to assist those regiments which were nearest to Balaklava. Those regiments were first the Inniskillings, then the Greys, then the Royals, then the 5th Dragoon

8th April 1856.

Guards; after those came the light regiments, who occupied the further end of the valley. I believe the furthest regiments were the 4th, the 11th, the 13th, the 8th, and the 4th Dragoon Guards the most remote of all. Therefore it is right that the Board should know, in order to do justice to the different regiments, that it would be unfair to suppose that, because those distant regiments were not hutted so soon as the others, therefore they had exerted themselves less. Those regiments not only had a greater distance to carry the materials, but they had not the same assistance from Turks that the regiments nearest Balaklava had. As to the completing, I believe that the first regiment hutted was the Royals. I am now speaking from my belief. I believe that the next regiment hutted was the Inniskillings. I believe that the next regiment was the Greys. I believe the next was the 5th Dragoon Guards, and after that came the 11th (though I am not quite sure), then the 13th, and the 8th. I think as nearly as possible that was the order. If the Board will refer to the evidence, they will find that Colonel Griffiths says that the horses of the Greys were all hutted by the middle of January.

*Col. D. Griffiths.*

Colonel DARBY GRIFFITHS called, and examined by the Earl of Lucan.

21. Will you state to the Court on what day or days you were examined by the Crimean Commissioners?—My examination was complete in one day. I do not know what date it was; I have not the slightest idea of what month it was in, now.

22. Will you be good enough to name the Commissioner or Commissioners who were present on that occasion?—There were Sir John M'Neill, Colonel Tulloch, the Doctor of the 93d, Major Thompson, and several other persons, in the room at the same time.

23. In your evidence before those Commissioners you observe that you were on one occasion in the month of November threatened by me to be placed under arrest. Will you be good enough to inform the Board on what day this happened, and state as minutely as you can, under what circumstances you found yourself in communication with me on that day, and all that was said or that passed between us?—I cannot recollect the exact date; but it was the day that I was the field officer of the day. I think it was on the 16th, two days after the storm. I went to ask your Lordship's orders regarding the picket, and the picket not being ready at the moment——

24. Did you come on or go off duty?—I came on duty. The picket not being ready at the time, you remarked the coat that I had on, and for some little time there was a conversation about this coat. I then said to you, "My Lord, I fear that if something is not "done immediately for my horses, they will suffer considerably, and that I shall lose the "greater part of them," having at that time lost a considerable number. You expressed great dissatisfaction; and as far as I can remember the words, they were, "Do you think "that I have not thought of that myself, Sir? I have a great mind to put you under arrest;" but as to your having found fault with me, or being displeased with me, I can only say that my impression was at the time, and my impression is still, that the threat to put me under arrest arose from my suggestion. It may not have been from that, but that was my impression; and I was very sorry indeed that I should have said anything to you at that time that should have caused such a threat.

25. Is that your answer?—That is my answer. I may say this, that there may have been warm expressions on my part towards your Lordship, but I am quite convinced that I used no expression of warmth until your Lordship had said very harsh words to me which called them forth.

(*Earl of Lucan to the President.*) It appears to me that Colonel Griffiths is not giving a full answer. He is convinced, he says, that he only did it after harsh words had been used to him. If he said that he was convinced that he would only do it after harsh words had been used to him I could understand it; but when a man says I am convinced that I did not do it till such and such a thing, I think he is bound to say what passed; he is bound to say whether anything more was said than he tells the Board, and it strikes me that his answer is not a full answer to that question.—I am quite convinced of this, that neither I nor any other man would have gone to ask you a favour, and have gone in an impertinent and disrespectful manner. I should never ask a favour of any one and go to him in a disrespectful manner.

26. Will you be good enough to answer this question. Do you recollect the storm of the 14th of November?—Yes.

27. What ground did your regiment then occupy?—The lowest ground of all.

28. Was it the first encampment?—It was on the hill, I think, my Lord.

29. Was not it the first encampment?—I could not say—I do not know. I know that the ground was so low that at the very time that I made my statement to your Lordship, there was a goose swimming in an officer's tent—that would show the quantity of water the horses were standing in.

30. My question is this—You now perfectly well that on the hill the Heavy Dragoons occupied two different grounds ofencampment?—Three, I think, my Lord.

31. Two?—The Greys occupied three.

32. I ask you whether, on the 14th of November, you occupied the original ground, or rather the first ground that we took up on going up the hill, or had you already moved? I am sure that it was the first ground.

*Col. D. Griffiths.*

8th April 1856.

33. Did you keep a journal during the autumn and the winter of 1854–55?—I kept a few memorandums.

34. Are those memorandums at this moment producable?—No, I do not think that I could get them; they are certainly not in England.

35. Do you not recollect, that so soon as the weather permitted after the storm, you changed your ground from the Coline to a position nearer Sebastopol?—We had not changed the position, my Lord, when I spoke to you. After the storm of the 14th we moved to a new position opposite Lord Raglan's.

36. Then I understand you that subsequently to the storm that you were moved to another position, and that position was nearer to Lord Raglan's?—It was only half a mile at the farthest.

37. In your evidence you state not only that Colonel Hodge and Lord William Paulett were present on the 16th, but you mention that there were others. Will you be good enough to inform the Board who the others were to whom you alluded as being present on that occasion?—It is so long ago, and I have never spoken to any officer to ask him whether he heard it or not. I stated to the Commissioners that So-and-So was present, and I state so now; but who the others were, I am not able to recollect, but I think your own son was there, and I think Colonel Walker was there; and to the best of my belief the party were from ten to eleven who were with you, but I am sure I do not know who they were, except those I have mentioned. I think Colonel Walker was there.

38. Do you recollect at what hour this took place?—It was the usual hour in the morning when the field officer came to you. I cannot exactly remember the hour: it might have been eleven or ten. I could not say what time it was; it might have been ten or eleven, or half-past nine, perhaps.

39. Did you on one or on how many occasions wait upon me with your brigadier and the commanding officer of the heavy regiments about this time, and if so, state on what date?—I have no recollection, previously to the storm of the 14th, of ever having met my brigadier; or do you mean at any time during the winter?

40. The question is this: Did you on one or on how many occasions wait upon me with your brigadier and the commanding officers of the heavy regiments about this time, and if so, state on what date?—But at which time?

41. Whilst you were on the hill.—I have no recollection of ever having been present on the hill, my Lord. I may have been, but I have no recollection of it.

42. Do you not recollect on one occasion a difference between yourself, General Scarlett, and myself in consequence of some remark you made about taking the saddles off?—If anyone will remind me of that circumstance I shall be most happy to speak to it, but I do not recollect it.

43. You do not recollect having complained of not having been informed equally with the other regiments of their being dismissed?—Yes, I recollect that perfectly.

44. Was it not a meeting of commanding officers?—No, my Lord, I think it was one morning, it was very damp, the morning that General Scarlett moved the brigade about. I think it was that morning; it was in the first encampment where we were; I had not received the order—it was a mistake.

45. This means simply this, not that this difference took place on that day, for it could not have taken place on that day; it was a complaint made the next morning. I had better inform the Board what the custom was when we were behind the French lines. We did not always turn out of a morning, but the horses were always saddled, and always continued saddled and bridled, and the men ready to turn out, till the field officer of that day called upon me. He was supposed to have placed the pickets and outposts, and when that officer referred to me, I either desired him to turn the men in altogether, that is to unbridle and unsaddle or to unbridle only, leaving their saddles on. On this occasion what I refer to is this, the saddles of the Greys were left on longer than the saddles of the other regiments. Colonel Griffiths made a complaint at the meeting of commanding officers, and I asked General Scarlett whether he had not informed Colonel Griffiths, and the answer was that Colonel Griffiths should have known it as well as the other regimental officers. I do not bring that as a charge against Colonel Griffiths, but just to bring to his recollection that there were such meetings which have escaped his recollection?—Colonel Sullivan was at the meeting, but I was not very well. I knew there was a meeting of officers.

46. Then I wish the Board to understand that this admits very much what I want to establish; that at this time there were meetings of commanding officers for the purpose of consulting upon different questions relating to the cavalry. What the witness says is this, that in consequence of being unable to attend, he was represented by his own major, Major Sullivan?—Yes; I think I was right in saying that.

47. Do not you recollect meeting the commanding officers in Lord William Paulett's tent upon one or two occasions, he at that time having gone to Scutari?—I am not aware of having been at any one meeting in the front. I cannot tax my memory with having been at any one meeting up in the front; I may have been, but I cannot remember it. I was at plenty of meetings at Kadekoi, but I am sure I was never at any meeting of commanding officers up in the front.

(*Earl of Lucan to the Board.*) What I understand the witness to wish to show, is this—he says he cannot speak with accuracy as to the time when he was on the hill, but he well recollects there were plenty of such meetings when he went down the hill. I only call the attention of the Board to that, that there were plenty of meetings of commanding officers of regiments and brigadiers with me to consult upon the horses. (*To the Witness.*) You cannot answer this question positively? You do not recollect any of these meetings?—I do not recollect being at any meeting up in the front. I may have been, but I do not recollect it.

49. I think you have already said that you do not recollect when the cavalry changed their first encampment?—I could easily bring that forward. I think Major Sullivan was the field officer of the day on the day of the storm. I think the junior field officer, Colonel Hodge, was the senior, and I came next; therefore, it must have been on the 16th. That is the only way by which I can judge by dates.

50. If I understand you rightly, you say it was on the very same day that this altercation took place?

[The Board intimated to the Earl of Lucan that the mode of examination was very irregular, and that he should not explain the answers of the witness after he had given them.]

51. Can you say whether this altercation took place on the same day that the cavalry moved?—It took place the day that I was field officer of the day, my Lord; the day after the storm of the 14th.

52. Did you not say in a very loud voice "You were not speaking to me as a gentleman," before one word was said to you about arrest?—No, my Lord.

53. Did you subsequently make use of those words, or any other words like them?—Yes, my Lord, I did.

54. State to the Board what they were?—I said that I had only addressed you as one gentleman would another, and that you had no right to use the expressions which you did to me.

55. What were those expressions?—I have stated them.

56. You are requested to be good enough to repeat the expressions to which you allude?—I have done so before, my Lord.

(*President.*) That is no answer to the question.—I have a difficulty in recollecting the exact or precise words that Lord Lucan made use of; but my addressing Lord Lucan, and suggesting something about making some covering for my horses was my first communication; and Lord Lucan then said, "Do you think I have not thought of that myself? I have "a great mind to put you under arrest." He then used some very harsh words to me, which may have brought warmth of answers in return;" and the finish of my communication was that I said, "My Lord, I have only spoken to you as one gentleman would do to another, "and you have no right to use those words to me, or apply those words to me"—that was all I had to say. I then was ordered to join my regiment. I was the field officer of the day. "Join your picket," the precise words I do not profess to remember at this time, though there are many others who I dare say would.

58. What were those harsh words of mine to which you refer?—I say that I cannot recollect the precise words. I know you used very strong language to me. I know you became very excited. Major Conolly was the first person I spoke to immediately after being dismissed from you; perhaps he can remember the words. I told him immediately.

*Major Conolly.* I was parading the picket?—Yes, you were the first man I told. I told immediately those who I was with of my own regiment every word that I said, and I have no doubt that there are officers here who would remember the words. I say only that I have not communicated with the other officers who were present that day with you, but from that day to this I should never have said a word if I had not been called upon to give evidence before the Commissioners; it was extracted from me by the evidence I gave to the questions the Commissioners asked me. The Commissioners did their duty towards me, and I did my duty towards the Commissioners. I consider the only evidence I gave before the Commissioners was in self-defence; and to show that I had not in myself neglected the interests of my own regiment, I was asked as to several reports I had made; whether I had made them in writing. I said I was not aware of having made any in writing, but I had made repeated reports verbally.

59. Did you make any official complaint of this to your brigadier?—Of your report?

60. Of my conduct towards you? Did you make any official complaint to your brigadier of what had occurred?—No, I made no complaint to any one.

61. Had you not at this time ninety-five men of your regiment sick, present and absent?—I dare say I had, my Lord; I could not say whether I had or not.

62. Do you not know when the cavalry first changed their camp that it was proposed, so soon as the materials could be got and the assistance of the Turks given, that the permanent camp should be moved a little more to the southward, a distance of less than a quarter of a mile?—Which camp?

63. The cavalry camp.—Which one were we in?

64. You have stated that on the 16th, so soon as the weather permitted, the cavalry were moved from their first ground to their second ground? I only ask you this, whether when they moved to that second ground you were not aware that it was proposed still to move again to another position within a quarter of a mile?—So far as I recollect, I know nothing

*Col. D. Griffiths.*

8th April 1856.

at all about it. I could get no information about it in any way. I think there was an order some day or two before we left the heights of Balaklava, but more than that I do not remember anything.

65. Did you then believe that the cavalry would remain where they then were during the winter?—No, I certainly did not expect that, because we had changed so often, and therefore that was my reason for asking you the question at the time I did. I think we had moved twenty-seven or some twenty odd number of times from our landing at Balaklava, or our going before Balaklava.

66. At the time you mention what sort of covering did you propose to give to the horses?—I would have dug, if it had been only half a foot, a drain in front of the horses heads, and in rear of the horses; that in itself would have kept the horses from being covered with water and mud, as I proved afterwards in the encampment at Kadekoi. In the mud where we were, when a horse lay down he was very nearly covered with mud and water or with both, and, as there was a change at almost all periods of the day and night, if a hard frost came when a horse lay down he almost became frozen in this mud and paralyzed, and many of them which lay down perfectly well, when they did lie down never rose again, because the frost had paralyzed their spines. The Turks, and there were only a few of them, built a large number of very fine huts.

67. (*President.*) There is no question put at present.—I think I was asked how it was proposed to be done. I am only mentioning what occurred. The Turks, who were close to us, built a large number of huts, which General Scarlett purchased for 30*l.*

68. (*Earl of Lucan.*) This has nothing on earth to do with the horses.—They were all before my eyes, and I might form my own ideas, and surely I may bring up what entered my head. You have asked me a question, and I should have a fair opportunity of answering it. At this period that I speak of I knew a great number of the captains of ships, and they were always saying to me, "Why do not you ask for our men to be employed "to put up temporary shelter?" At that time I laughed and thought it was only a façon de parler on their part; but it was proved possible afterwards by two batteries of artillery, that were covered with sail cloth and spars from some of the transport ships. Shortly afterwards there was a Captain Methuen of the "Colombo," I think it was, and he was a cousin of an officer in my own regiment; I never heard him state it myself, but I heard it stated in the camp, that this Captain Methuen had made an offer, or intended to make an offer, to cover the whole of the cavalry with tarpaulins and sail cloth and spars from the various ships. I would have dug holes myself, and I would have drained the camp. I do not say that they would have been very good; but if a horse had only been protected as far as his stomach, and his legs protected with mud walls, or anything, am quite confident that the horses would have been very much benefited by it.

69. Was it your business, or the divisional general's business, to drain your camp?—I should not of course think it was our business, nor perhaps if it were put to me do I think it is my business, either, to drain the camp I should be very sorry to say anything that I ought not to say, but I do not think it is the duty of a colonel to drain a camp; that is the engineer's department, I should say.

70. (*Major General Peel.*) Was it necessary to obtain anybody's permission or sanction for such a trifling work as cutting a small drain in the front or the rear of the horses?—I have explained that we have moved so often that I was anxious to have a sort of little guarantee to ask the men to dig. It must be recollected that the weather was very bad, and I had a good many men sick. I had lost a good many men; and I merely wanted a sort of guarantee from my superior that the men would not be working for nothing, because I did not think that one could expect the soldiers to work all day to-day if they were going to move to-morrow.

71. Is it true, as stated in the Report of the Commissioners, that you proposed to Lord Lucan to induce your men to erect some kind of covering to save the horses, provided you could hold out any encouragement to them to the effect that they were to remain any length of time in the camp that they then occupied?—Yes.

72. You have omitted to state that?—I think those were my words, or near about my words.

73. I think what you stated was, that you had lost a great many horses, and would lose more if something was not done for them; but I think you omitted to state that you had made any proposition to do anything yourself?—That was an omission.

74. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Will you state to the Board whether I had anything to do with the moving of the cavalry?—Upon my word I cannot answer that question. You gave the orders for the movement I do not know whom the orders came from.

75. At what date did those captains of transports offer to provide shelter, and to whom was that offer made?—I do not know whom the offer was made to. I only know that it was the talk in the camp amongst the friends that I spoke to. I cannot say exactly who they were now, but there were several of them who came up and asked me why we did not get the order to have the horses covered with canvas. Who they were exactly I cannot at this moment say. It will not do to mention names without I am quite certain, and therefore I will not do so.

76. Did you cover your own horses at this time on the hill, or at any other time, with canvas?—No.

*Col. D. Griffiths.*

8th April 1856.

77. Your own private horses?—No; I did not cover my own horses, because it was of no use my going to the expense when I did not know how many hours we might remain in the camp that we were in, otherwise I would have done it.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I do not propose putting any more questions to the witness.

78. (*Major General Peel.*) It is stated by Lord Lucan that every artificer from every regiment was taken in order to construct stables at the depôt, which, when completed, were given over to the 17th Lancers? Did this interfere with or impede in any way the other cavalry regiments in erecting their hutting?—It took away, I believe, the only carpenter I had at that time; but as I never thought of that since the time, I cannot exactly say.

79. You do not offer that as any excuse; it did not interfere with your hutting of your horses?—It did interfere with our hutting our horses, but I forget now how many men I had; whether I had one or two, or whether there were more than that; I think I had two, but I almost forget that.

80. (*General Sir George Berkeley.*) If you had cut the drains in the front and rear of your horses, how would you have got them out in a night alarm?—As wide as this (describing about eight inches) would have kept the horses from the water, but there were many greater impediments than a little drain of that sort.

81. (*Earl Beauchamp.*) Did the movement of the cavalry camp rest with Lord Lucan?—I do not know. I should think that Lord Lucan was the best authority at all events.

82. (*Lieut.-General Rowan.*) Do you state positively that Lord Lucan threatened to place you under arrest for representing the wretched state of your horses, and for that only?—I have no reason to alter my opinion. I expressed my anxiety for the protection of my horses. I can only say this, that it is impossible to know what was passing in Lord Lucan's mind at the time; but he made no such distinction then as to the cause of his displeasure as he now specifies.

83. Will you just answer the question positively?—My impression is, that it was solely for my suggestion. I may be wrong, but that was my opinion; and it is my impression at this moment.

84. (*Deputy Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) The Board understand that you do not wish to put any further questions to the witness?—I do not.

(*Deputy Judge Advocate General to Colonel Griffiths.*) The Board have no further questions to put to you, but I am directed to inform you that you must consider yourself in attendance during the continuance of this investigation.

*Major General Sir R. Airey.*

Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B., called and examined by the Earl of Lucan.

(*Deputy Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you that it is not compulsory on any witness to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against him before a Court Martial; and that any voluntary statement that he may make will be admissible against him.

85. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Were you personally examined by the Crimean Commissioners?—No; never personally, my Lord.

86. Will you be good enough to tell the Board whether you recollect the morning of the 8th of November, when I was in conversation with Lord Raglan?—I cannot say that I particularly recollect that. Your Lordship was so constantly in communication with Lord Raglan, on subjects regarding the Cavalry, that it is impossible I can define any particular day. But if your Lordship has any recollection of a conversation with Lord Raglan, I should say, certainly, that it had taken place.

87. Did I not, on that morning, or on any morning, ask for instructions of Lord Raglan about the winter encampment, and did I not, myself, after that, either see you personally, or communicate with you nearly every day on the subject of giving shelter to the cavalry?—Yes; most certainly.

88. When you stated in your answer to the Commissioners that an Engineer was placed at my disposal, did you mean more than that you had ordered one—did you mean to convey the impression that any Engineer Officer had really been given to me at that time?—I should like to remark here, that the only thing I regret, is, that your Lordship did not do me the favour to let me know, or give me some little insight, not into the exact questions, but the subjects as to which you would like my evidence, because I am persuaded that both your Lordship and the Board would have found that I should have been able to establish facts more accurately than I am able to do now, merely by chance. The examination upon this subject commenced yesterday with Colonel Gordon. Since that time I have tried to collate and get together a few papers on that subject to refresh my memory; but, as I said before, if Lord Lucan had done me the favour to let me know upon what subjects he required information, or what facts he was desirous to establish for the information of the Board, I should have been more perfect in my replies. But I can answer the question to a certain extent, I think, satisfactorily. Lord Lucan pressed, I may say, from the very commencement, two questions very decidedly and very imperatively. The first was, where he was likely to be, begging particularly to know, so that he should commence operations for the shelter of his horses. I do not know what his Lordship may have said to Lord Raglan upon that subject, but I am quite prepared to state with regard to myself that it was constantly mentioned. As for documentary evidence, it is impossible to be

*Major-General Sir R. Airey.*

8th April 1856.

guided here only by documentary evidence. The only business of an army in the field is conducted frequently and almost uniformly by word of mouth, particularly on such subjects as that; but I was in a position, both officially and privately with Lord Raglan, to know what was going on, and I was able to tell Lord Lucan that I could not give him that information. I could not inform him where it was likely to be. At the time that the cavalry were on the heights near the head-quarters; he continually importuned that something should be decided where the cavalry were to be, but, as I said before, it was impossible from circumstances connected with the Allies, that any thing should be settled with regard to the position of the cavalry. But so soon as it was possible to be settled, the cavalry were ordered down near the village of Kadekoi. No sooner had Lord Lucan got there, than he recommenced his applications to me for materials and for assistance, and for anything to shelter the cavalry. This was brought before Lord Raglan on every occasion. The fact was, that we were all actuated by precisely the same sentiment, which was, to save the horses, and give them every shelter and cover which we could. Then the cavalry made a commencement, but in a very few days I got a letter from Lord Lucan, saying that the assistance of an engineer officer would be of the greatest advantage, and that if he had an engineer officer he should be able to lay out his ground and save a great deal of labour; in fact, it would be the greatest possible assistance to him. This is your Lordship's letter to me on the subject, dated the 11th of November, in which you say that you are going on as quickly as you possibly can with the construction of stables for your horses, but that in your opinion they would be much more satisfactorily planned and executed if you had the assistance of an engineer officer. Then you say, "If the Commander of the Forces "will kindly authorize the appointment of an officer for this purpose, I will give him all "the assistance in my power, so that the horses shall be protected from the weather as "expeditiously as possible." When I got your Lordship's letter, I referred immediately to my own department, and I said, "Inform Lord Lucan that application will be made for an engineer officer for him." My next note upon that letter is, "Apply to engineers for this assistance." On the 17th, Lord Lucan wrote to me again upon the subject, and he was informed that I had applied to the commanding officer of the Royal Engineers, by the desire of the Commander of the Forces, to send an officer of engineers to assist in the construction of the cavalry stables. That, of course, was a matter of military detail, and the Commanding Royal Engineer obeys the order that he gets from the Commander of the Forces, through the Quartermaster General. An engineer officer was sent, and on the 17th, only a few days afterward, Lord Lucan writes to me, and he says, "A young officer of engineers," (*reading the same to the word*) "urgency." Captain Gordon was the Commanding Officer of Engineers at that time for the practical part of the service. Sir John Burgoyne was there, but the officer who exercised all the practical function was Captain (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Gordon. I spoke to him about whether this officer of engineers could not be left permanently with Lord Lucan, but the want of engineer officers was so felt at that moment of pressure in the siege that Captain Gordon said, "I cannot spare him, we are "so short of officers; so few officers of engineers have been sent out from England. We "are carrying on siege operations of the greatest magnitude, and I cannot spare one "engineer officer for that one service only. He shall go there whenever he can, and he will "give such assistance as, during the time at his disposal, he can do, but he cannot be "placed entirely and solely at the disposal of the commanding officer of the cavalry." There was an instance that took place yesterday that I should wish to advert to. Lord Lucan produced the journal of Lord Bingham, and a question arose as to whether he could produce this as testimony, and there was a little argument about its legality. Now, I do not know how far this is a legal Court, or how far the proceedings have to do with legality or illegality, but I am quite prepared to say, with very great deference to this Board, that I am quite ready to admit anything that Lord Bingham may have written in his private journal. No young officer could have put in anything but the truth and the actual facts as they occurred, and therefore I am quite ready to admit anything that Lord Bingham may have put in his private journal.

89. May the Board suppose, from all that passed within your knowledge upon this subject, that there was no want of promptitude or ingenuity in providing shelter for the cavalry horses, but on the contrary?—I should say, certainly, that every exertion was made by your Lordship in forwarding the sheltering of the horses; but from the actual duties of the cavalry, from the circumstance that every sick man who goes into hospital renders two men inefficient, and throws all the extra labour upon those men who are still efficient,—the excessive duties that the cavalry had to perform in the maintenance of their appointments, and their equipments and their saddlery, independently of the horses,—it would be utterly extraordinary that a cavalry soldier of himself could do anything in the way of constructing stables.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I do not propose to put any more questions to Sir Richard Airey.

90. (*General Sir George Berkeley to the Witness.*) With regard to forage, I see here that there was a letter written by you to the Commissary-General, dated 24th of October 1854, and again on the 4th of December, urging in the strongest manner the supplies for the horses: will you state what was done between those two dates, and to what purport was the Commissary General's answer, because I cannot find any answer here?—I do not think that I shall be able to reply very specifically to that question. But the whole facts of the time and the circumstances that were going on during that period are so patent and fresh

*Major General Sir R. Airey.*

8th April 1856.

to my mind that I can answer generally. I do not know whether the inference of your question was that nothing had been done between those two dates.

91. I want to know what was done. I do not suppose that nothing was done?—The representations of want of forage for all the animals, not only the cavalry but the artillery batteries, the horse artillery, the bât animals of the infantry divisions, as well as infantry and cavalry officers, every day came to me. They were also addressed to the adjutant general, to the military secretary; and then the general officers of divisions asked to whom they were to address them, which induced Lord Raglan to issue a memorandum that all questions regarding forage and rations should be made to the adjutant-general, as they affected the efficiency of the soldier; and instead of going at all to the quartermaster-general, they should go the adjutant-general; and also the assistant adjutant-generals of divisions were directed daily to make a report to Lord Raglan of the issues of rations during the preceding 24 hours. With regard to this specific question now put to me by the Board as to the forage, it was the invariable rule directly to send those applications down to the commissary-general for explanation; and the answer was, I may say, always to the same effect;—that he had been disappointed either with his contracts with the people in the Levant, who did not understand the nature of the contracts, for they were a set of schemers and adventurers, who undertook a contract without even the expectation of fulfilling it wholly, but particularly that he had been disappointed in his supplies of pressed hay from England that he had been promised and assured that he was to receive (but I beg to remark again that I am speaking now from memory;—that he had expected to receive I do not know how many tons of pressed hay;—at all events a shipload every fortnight; that only one ship had arrived, and that therefore he had not the means of supplying the forage. He could have supplied barley, to any amount; but everybody knows that barley is a description of food for horses that alone will not answer. A horse will die upon barley, but he will live upon hay alone; therefore, as for increasing the ration of barley to make good the want of hay, that is more mischievous than the absence of it I perceive that the answer of the commissary general is contained in this Blue Book, at page 85. It is in answer to a letter that I wrote to him on the 25th

92. But where is the answer to yours of the 4th of December, in which you call his attention to the other letter?—Mr. Commissary General Filder is here himself, and he very likely will be able to explain. The letter of the 4th of December has been put out of its place in page 9 of the Appendix.

93. (*Lieut. General Rowan.*) Are there any printed orders issued by Lord Raglan, or a collection of them, in England, that can be laid before the Board?—Yes, they have been condensed and printed.

94. (*Deputy Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed to inform you that the Board do not wish to put any further questions to you?—(*Major-General Sir R. Airey.*) Perhaps the Honourable President will allow me to say a word or two at this moment upon what has taken place to-day; and I think, perhaps, it is as well to do it now while the impressions are warm, so that a proper understanding should be taken upon it. It is with regard to the evidence of Colonel Griffiths. An officer in the position of Colonel Griffiths has, as he states himself, really, perhaps, no other ground for forming an opinion, or taking up an impression, except from camp rumours, and what is the talk of the camp; and he made an observation with regard to the non-employment of the crews of the ships, and of tarpaulins and spars, and spare sails, and so on, which would leave it to be inferred that such an object of vital importance as that had been wholly neglected, or had not suggested itself to anybody whose duty it was to think of everything upon such a subject. Lord Lucan, some time in October, I think late in October, in a conversation which possibly his Lordship may not himself recollect, spoke to him upon the subject. But it is to be observed that at that time nobody in the army had the slightest idea where they were going to winter; but it came up in a conversation which we had together, and in consequence of that I, in October, was in communication with the principal agent of transports, to obtain all the spare sails and spars and spare tarpaulins, and everything that could give shelter or cover of any kind. However, from the ships being continually on the move, no sooner discharging their cargoes than being required for other services, I could not obtain anything for a considerable time; but afterwards it was pretty well ascertained and known where the cavalry was going to be. On the 4th December I had a letter from Captain Christie, the principal agent for transports, and he says, "I beg to "acquaint you, for the information of Lord Raglan, that I have ordered all the small "spars, sails, and awnings, &c. to be collected on board the transports in Balaklava, and "as they are now ready to be landed I request you will be pleased to inform me to whom "they are to be delivered. It would be necessary for a responsible officer to give receipts "for such stores." On the following day an officer was sent, and all those were collected, and they were applied to the covering of the stables, but I do not believe that the cavalry got any of them, the want was so great there at the moment for those who were nearest, namely, the artillery and commissiarat mules, the officers' baggage animals, and the bât animals of the divisions, some of which were also at Balaklava; the supply was extremely scanty, and long before they got to the distance of two miles, where the cavalry where, they were absorbed. I bring this forward for the information of the Board, for fear that they might go away with the impression that no steps were taken with regard to a subject so natural that it would suggest itself to everybody, though I do not in the slightest degree

*Major-General Sir R. Airey.*

8th April 1856.

impute blame or anything approaching it to Colonel Griffiths, for not knowing what was going on in the higher parts of the service, with which he was not at all intermixed.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I now tender myself as a witness, to answer any questions that the Board may think proper to put.

(*President.*) The Board wish to adjourn for a short time, and after that, if they have any questions to put to your Lordship, they will do so.

[The Board retired to deliberate, and after a short time they returned.]

(*Deputy Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) With reference to the appeal made by your Lordship to the Board upon the subject of the comments that have appeared in the public prints on the evidence given by you yesterday before the Board, I am directed by the Board to inform you that however much they regret and deprecate any comments upon the proceedings during the continuance of the sittings, they will, at present, confine themselves to an expression of their opinion that considerations of impartiality and justice peremptorily require that no comments should be published on the proceedings of the Board, either during the continuance of this sitting or until the report of the Board shall have been laid before Her Majesty.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Colonel Doherty of the 13th Light Dragoons is present, and I should wish to examine him.

(*President.*) Very well.

---

*Col. C. Doherty.*

Colonel CHARLES DOHERTY called, and examined by the Earl of LUCAN.

(*Deputy Judge Advocate General*). I am directed by the Board to inform you that it is not compulsory on any witness to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against him before a court martial, and that any voluntary statement that he may make will be admissible against him.

95. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Do you recollect my visiting your camp, that of the 18th Light Dragoons, on the afternoon of the 6th of February?—I recollect your visiting the lines. I do not recollect the day; it was somewhere about that time.

96. In your evidence before the Crimean Commissioners you are represented to have said that the hutting of your horses was not completed before the 22nd of February. Do you still adhere to that statement, or have you not reason to suppose that in that date you may have been incorrect?—I might certainly have made a mistake, but I do not recollect at all at this moment, nor could I find out now, unless I was there to ascertain from others. I took it chiefly from what my Acting Quartermaster said.

97. Do you recollect that some days previously to my recall, on the 13th of February, the daily reports which I required from your brigade as to the progress in each regiment with regard to the stabling of the horses were discontinued in consequence of the hutting having been completed?—I recollect that return; I do not know the date.

(*Earl of Lucan*). I have nothing more to ask the witness.

98. (*Major General Peel.*) It is stated in your evidence that you made no personal application to be allowed to send the troop horses for forage, because you had learned from other commanding officers that they had been refused permission to do so; by whom were they refused permission to send?—I suppose by the brigadier.

99. (*Lieut.-General Rowan.*) By the General Officer commanding the Brigade, and not the General Officer commanding the Division?—I do not know. I cannot say.

100. (*General Sir George Berkeley.*) You made no personal application to be allowed to send troop horses for forage, because you had learnt from other commanding officers that they had been refused permission to do so; do you know why?—I cannot state, or by whom. I presume by the Brigadier, but I cannot state positively.

(*Deputy Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) In consequence of Colonel Tulloch not appearing to day I am directed by the Board to inform you that an application has been made by him of the following nature. He wishes to know whether, in the event of his thinking it necessary to appear before the Board, in order to maintain the integrity of the Report of the Commissioners, he will have a right to call and cross-examine witnesses. The answer that I am directed to give him by the Board is, that as one of the Commissioners he will have that right.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Of course in that case I should have an opportunity given to me of rebutting anything that might be stated. The further the inquiry extends the more agreeable will it be to me, but it will be more troublesome to the Court. If it is the intention of the Board, as I hope it may be, to examine me, could a more convenient opportunity offer than the present, I should suppose that the way in which my evidence would be perhaps most useful, would be to meet the evidence which the Board have heard from Colonel Griffiths.

101. (*Deputy Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed to put this question to your lordship. Lord William Paulett states in a letter to Lord Cardigan, dated the 18th of November, 1854, that he submitted his (Lord Cardigan's) letter and those of five commanding officers, to Lord Lucan, who has them now in his possession, and he thinks that he does not intend forwarding them for Lord Raglan's consideration. Did your Lordship receive those letters, and if so, what measures were taken?

*Col. C. Doherty.*

28th April 1856.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have the letters in my possession, and I will lay them before the Board. Those letters were written, or they were purported to have been written, on the 16th of November. They were received by me on the 17th of November, and I immediately sent an order to the commanding officers and to the brigadier of the light cavalry brigade, that they were the next day to assemble at their own camp, when I would meet them. On the next day, the 18th, I attended at the camp; Lord Cardigan did not appear. To the best of my recollection there was some reason given, that he was not well, but at all events he did not appear. The five commanding officers were all present. I had their letters in my hand, and I went through those letters, and I said, "Now, gentlemen, I have considered well what ought to be done with these letters; they appear to me "every one of them to refer to the men's necessaries." And those letters, as the Board will see when they are laid before them, wonderfully agree. Perhaps one officer may have expressed himself a little more concisely than another, but the purport of the letters agrees perfectly. I think in every instance I said, "It strikes me that the object of these letters "is to represent to Lord Raglan that you are short of necessaries, and that you are "suffering very much at this moment from want of necessaries." I said to them, "You are "well aware, I suppose, that so long ago as the 8th of the month I called upon Lord Raglan, and "more especially for this purpose, to inform him that the whole of the cavalry were suffering "very much from want of necessaries;" and I continued, "You are perhaps aware, and of "course you do know, that it is already settled, with the concurrence of Lord Raglan, that a "troop sergeant major from each regiment in charge of the quartermaster of the Greys should "be sent to Constantinople to bring the whole of your regimental stores from Constantinople, and to provide you with all the necessaries that are there available for your "different regiments." And I added, "You know this, that there was an order instantly "given, and it has been delayed by Captain Christie not being able to find passage for "those men." I think if the Board will kindly refer to the divisional order of November 9th, at page 30, No. 1 order, they will see that it in these terms: "The Lieutenant General "is most anxious that every man of the cavalry division shall at the earliest moment have "his valise and his entire kit; and he is much surprised that commanding officers of regiments have not availed themselves of the opportunities of landing the baggage left on "board the different ships. He desires that a return may be sent in to the adjutant "general, stating on board what ships, or where, their kits are. 2. The Lieutenant-"General proposes sending a regimental quartermaster, to be accompanied by a troop "serjeant major of each regiment in the division, to Constantinople, to-morrow if possible, "with the object of giving to commanding officers an opportunity of bringing from their "stores at Scutari so much as they may require for their present use, and also to provide "themselves with those necessaries which will conduce to the comfort of the men, as also "render them more creditable in their appearance. An immediate inspection of necessaries should be held to ascertain what is deficient; and his Lordship hopes that there "will be no further want of oil, blacking, pipeclay, chrome, buttons, soap, and horse and "other brushes. The men's gloves and gauntlets must also be completed." There was a delay in consequence of the state of the weather, from the 8th, when I obtained Lord Raglan's permission, until the 17th. And on the 17th I issued another order:— "Camp before Sebastopol, 17th November 1854. A passage to Constantinople is given "on board the 'Medway' steamer, for to-morrow, to the troop serjeant majors of the different cavalry regiments. She will sail at 11 o'clock a.m. The Lieutenant General "hopes that commanding officers will avail themselves of the opportunity to provide "everything that is necessary for the comfort of the men, their personal cleanliness, and "the cleanliness of their arms, clothing, and appointments." This was on the day previously to my meeting those officers; therefore I told them that I thought everything had been already done that they could possibly desire in respect to their necessaries. There was nothing much else in their letters, unless it was with regard to the kits of the men; and I think I observed at the time, "I am not particularly anxious to bring that under Lord "Raglan's notice; you know I am not very well satisfied with it myself, and as it can lead "to no good, I have no wish to do so." At the same time I thought that there had been on the part of the officers not quite that activity in the recovery of their valises which there might have been. They told me that the fault had not been theirs; that it was chiefly from the great difficulty which they experienced in finding boats, and communicating with the ship. I stated at the same time that I always thought it my duty never to approach Lord Raglan with anything of that sort, unless I thought that it could conduce to some good.

102. (*Major General Peel.*) Do you agree with Colonel Griffiths that the cutting of a small trench in the front and rear of the cavalry horses would have afforded them any relief.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I am in very great hopes that if such a trench would have had such an effect the commanding officers would not so altogether have neglected their duty as not to have cut a trench. The entrenching tools that are given to the commanding officers are for that very purpose.

103. (*Major General Peel.*) Was there any description of shelter, however temporary or trifling, that could have been had recourse to, previously to the erection of stabling for the horses.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) None whatever. I do not hesitate to state that you might as well have attempted in the middle of the ocean to construct stabling as upon that plateau at

*Col. C. Doherty.*

8th April 1856.

that moment. The Board will of course recollect that none of the timber had arrived until we had already reached Kadikoi.

(*President.*) The Board have no more questions to put to your Lordship at the present moment.

104. (*Deputy Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you that it is possible that Colonel Tulloch may wish to put some questions to your Lordship. He is not here now; and I believe the probability is that he will not be prepared to put any questions until to-morrow. It is therefore for your Lordship to determine whether you will submit any observations that you have to make now, or will wait till you hear whether Colonel Tulloch takes that course to-morrow or not

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It would naturally be better for myself, and, I think, for the Board, that I should defer any observations until I have heard what Colonel Tulloch has to say.

105. (*Major General Peel.*) Your Lordship stated, in answer to a question which I put to you before, that there was no description of shelter that could have been erected. Does that apply to canvas?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I should perhaps have given my answer at greater length, and have said that there was nothing in the world on that plateau that offered materials for hutting. Though I have heard in the course of this day that the horses might have had shelter at that time from canvas, I certainly at that moment did not know that there was any canvas to be had. And this I can state, and defy contradiction, that on that plateau it would not have been safe to have placed any horse under canvas. On the 14th, as everybody knows, there was not a single tent that was not blown down; and no man but a madman would have thought of placing a horse under canvas on that plateau.

Adjourned to To-morrow at Eleven o'clock.

## FOURTH DAY.

### Wednesday, April 9th, 1856.

9th April 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, it is with very great reluctance that I in any way add to the difficulties or the trouble of the Board, by bringing anything at all extraneous, as it may be called, to your consideration: but as I stated yesterday, I am not actuated in this, solely by a desire to secure justice to myself, but more, or at least equally, to secure justice to those officers who will soon find themselves in the same position in which I stand. I think, therefore, that I am only discharging my duty when I request the attention of this Board to an article that has again appeared in the "Times" of this morning. I offer no comment on this article. I shall consider that I have done enough when I request the attention of the Board to it, and I ask them if they will kindly read it and consider how far this article is in accordance with the resolution which was passed by this Board yesterday.

(*President.*) The Board will not fail to give their attention to it.

106. (*Deputy Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to say that they wish to put one or two questions to your Lordship, and the first is, to what do you attribute the great mortality amongst the horses?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Does that question refer to any particular period, or am I to mention what occasioned, in my opinion, the mortality among the horses from the time that the cavalry division was under my command?

107. (*Deputy Judge Advocate General.*) The question now is altered in this way, to what do you attribute the great mortality amongst the horses during the time that the cavalry division was under your command?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Of course those horses were not under my command till they landed in the East, therefore it is unnecessary that I should refer to those lost on their passage. This is a very large question, and I am afraid that it requires a very long answer.

Independently of the horses lost in action, every one of which I will explain if called upon, I must attribute the loss of the horses in the army in the East first to insufficient feeding,—excepting for a day or two, the horses of my cavalry were not properly fed any one day that they were under my command. From the insufficiency of their food, and from the irregularity with which they got it, the horses were never in condition at any time during the whole period that they belonged to the division that I commanded. The horses deteriorated very much in condition from the moment that they landed at Scutari or at Varna, until at last they got into that desperate state of emaciation, from starvation, that a very small proportion of them survived. It is well known to any person who is conversant with horses, (and not only horses, but I believe it is equally so with regard to all other animals,) that when exposed to the weather they require more food than they do at any other time. I say that the ration of food issued to the cavalry was insufficient even when the whole of that ration was given to them, which happened but on very few occasions. In Bulgaria, and I confine my remarks chiefly to what occurred to those regiments which were under my immediate command in the neighbourhood of Varna,—I would rather not speak to what happened at Devna, because I have no personal knowledge, as I was not there, and the Brigadier kept me very imperfectly informed of what occurred; therefore I will confine myself to what happened, as I may say, under my own eye. I can however state what was the condition of the Light Brigade when its horses returned to my immediate command at Varna. It is scarcely worth while to refer to what happened at Scutari and Constantinople, for very few landed there, and they were there for a very short time, but at Constantinople there was no great difficulty in providing them with barley and chopped straw. Perhaps it would be well before I go into detail as to what happened afterwards, to state that after arriving at Scutari, I was President of a Board which sat to inquire into the rations of forage for the troop horses and artillery horses, and for the baggage animals of that army. It went into other matters, such as fuel and light, which it will be unnecessary to allude to at this moment. By that Board it was arranged, and Lord Raglan approved of the proceedings, that for the artillery and cavalry horses of the army there should be supplied 12 lbs. of barley, and 10 lbs. of hay, or 16 lbs. of chopped straw. For the baggage horses they were to have, to the best of my recollection, one fourth less of barley, but the same quantity of straw or hay.

It will be my duty now to narrate what happened in the foraging of the cavalry, and to see how far they got that ration. At Varna, until the fire, I think about the 10th of

9th April 1856.

August, there was no deficiency of barley. The cavalry were stationed at first about two miles from the town, and we drew our own forage. There was a great deal of obstruction and difficulty occasionally in getting it, but we always, I think, got our barley; and I think we also generally got hay. I am speaking from recollection. We got chopped straw at first. It is right that I should observe that an order had been issued by Lord Raglan that all the hay that remained on board the different transports after landing the horses was to be retained, in case of those supplies being subsequently wanted; a very proper order, but one the commissary general found it practically necessary to depart from. Whilst at Varna we occasionally had hay, but instead of 10lbs., until we went into the Crimea, we never had more than 6 lbs. of hay whenever it was issued. When it was issued to us in the Crimea, the largest quantity we had was 8 lbs., in one instance, it was 4 lbs. short, and in the other, 2 lbs. short of the ration, which we had fixed at Constantinople; and after the fire at Varna, where a very large quantity of barley was lost, there was some difficulty in foraging us. We were then encamped on the Adrianople Road, about four miles from Varna. Then the commissariat brought our forage; we had only to furnish escorts. But I may say, that after the fire at Varna, there was a great want both of barley and of everything else. This was early in August, and the corn of the country was not harvested; indeed, in some instances, it was not cut. At that time I had no other commissariat officer than a Mr. Murray, who was quite new to the service. I do not think he had ever been in that department previously, and at this time of great anxiety and great difficulty, with regard to obtaining forage, I found it necessary to appoint one of my aide-de-camps, Captain Walker, exclusively to attend to the foraging of the regiments. His duty was, every morning, to visit every commanding officer and to hear from him what forage he had drawn, what forage he could expect, and in short to inform himself, as closely as possible, of the state of the forage of each regiment. He was then to take Mr. Murray with him, if he would go, and I believe he generally did; but he was himself to ride over the country, until he himself secured the supplies. I must take this opportunity of saying that Captain Walker did this with great assiduity and zeal, and with great success; the infantry divisions soon arrived from Devno to prepare for the expedition to the Crimea. Of course, with those different divisions came their commissariat officers; and if there was one thing that showed more mismanagement—more total absence of all order, and all forethought, and all arrangement than another, it was, that those commissariat officers—all of them young men, and very few with any experience whatever—were allowed to ride about the country, bidding and competing against each other for the forage, naturally raising the price very much, and adding very much, by the confusion, to the difficulty of obtaining supplies. We were so short of forage at this time, that my own baggage horses never were allowed rations at all, or but a very small ration. I mention my own case; but I do not think that there was any difference in that army, for whenever the soldier's horse was deficient, the general's horse was just as deficient as the soldier's. My own horses fared exactly as the troop horses did. The issue was so small that I found it necessary to give all the rations allowed for my baggage horses to my chargers, and to send the others about the country to pick up anything they could get. This irregularity and deficiency, I should say, continued more or less during the whole time we were in Bulgaria; and it is indisputable that our horses deteriorated very much from the time of their landing till they were embarked for the Crimea. The Board will find no documentary proof of what I am stating. At the beginning it was the wish of everybody that there should be as little correspondence as possible. The way in which I always communicated was this. When I did not communicate personally, which I did generally, with the quartermaster general, and with the commissary general, and with the different departments, I always communicated through my aide-de-camps or my staff officers by memorandums;—they taking my verbal directions, and bringing me back verbal directions, of which they always made a memorandum, therefore I have no document which will support any part of this statement. But I can say that I called upon Mr. Commissary General Filder very frequently; and that although I was always prepared to give him the greatest possible credit for the manner in which he rationed the men, I must, with equal fairness, say that I was always dissatisfied with the way in which he fed the horses. I cannot say that I ever had an interview with Mr. Commissary General Filder on the subject of the forage that I did not come away very dissatisfied indeed. I found that from the insufficiency of the forage my horses were failing, and as my horses were nearly my first care, I could not be satisfied. I recollect perfectly on one occasion complaining to Mr. Commissary General Filder of what I have stated to this Board, and stating that it was the positive duty of the commissary general to make such arrangements as that the forage of the country should be more available. I told him that the interests of the public were suffering severely from that want of arrangement. I told him that allowing young men to ride about the country bidding against each other created great confusion, and added enormously to the price, for it had already more than doubled the ordinary price of sheaves of corn. To the best of my recollection, a sheaf that ought to have cost from two to three piastres was fetching from four to five, solely from competition amongst ourselves. I suggested to Mr. Commissary General Filder that he should allocate different parts of the country to different

9th April 1856.

commissaries, and fix a maximum price, allowing us to secure the forage on those terms. But this never was done. I must state now that the Light Cavalry Brigade having come in from Devno, I inspected them in watering order on the morning after their arrival. With regard to their condition, excepting a part of them, the others were not in worse condition, nor was there much difference in condition between them and the heavy regiments with me; I saw no great difference. It is fair that I should state that Lord Cardigan, when he was asked about the commissariat before the Sebastopol Committee, stated that the Light Cavalry were well foraged when at Devno. General Scarlett, who had two regiments with him, certainly was not very well satisfied with the foraging of his two regiments, though they were in the same neighbourhood. The Board will observe that I excepted some part of the Light Brigade, they were the 200 horses that had accompanied Lord Cardigan to Devno; though they had returned on the 14th of July, and I only inspected them on the 28th of August, still there was that difference in condition between the horses that had gone on that patrol and the others, that when the troops, I could name every horse which had belonged to that patrol, and I did. On the 30th of August, and during the 1st and 2d of September, we embarked about 1,100 horses of the Light Brigade. I am called upon to make a statement, and of course I must withhold nothing. The thing which showed the greatest absence of all forethought, and the greatest mismanagement of all, was what occurred now. The Board will recollect that some of the regiments had been on board two or three days before we sailed—that we remained two days at Batschick, and that we sailed until we anchored in the Black Sea, whilst Lord Raglan was reconnoitering. On the Sunday we had not been one week at sea before the officer of the "Simla" told me that they had not sufficient forage on board. If the Board will refer, I think, to Mr. Filder's evidence, he states that there was an order from Lord Raglan that no horse transport was at any time to have less than six weeks provisions on board. On the eighth day, however, after our embarkation, there was a deficiency of water and hay, and, I rather think, of oats. I am, I believe, correct in stating that to a greater or to a less extent those deficiencies showed themselves in the other four horse transports. I should mention here that the cavalry were embarked in the "Jason," the "Himalaya," the "Simla," and the "Trent," and the horses that could not be conveyed in them were carried partly in a sailing transport that was taken in tow, called the "London." I cannot speak positively upon this subject; but I state very positively that there was a deficiency on board the "Simla," and that I had to submit to short rations already on the Sunday, at the end of seven days; I am very positive that there was a deficiency already, and I think it prevailed in the others. It certainly struck me as a very extraordinary circumstance that vessels sailing on such an expedition should not have been properly supplied; and recollect it was intended that they should not only take the Light Brigade, but that immediately on their landing they were to return to fetch the Heavy Brigade; and it is to be recollected that it was most important there should be no delay, for the very moment they got rid of the Light Cavalry they would have to be sent back to Varna to embark and bring us what we so much wanted, the aid of the Heavy Cavalry;—from this deficiency that had already showed itself, it was not only necessary to shorten our rations, but it became necessary to provision the ships, water, coal, and forage them, before they could embark any part of the Heavy Brigade. I never heard to the contrary, and I believe that the Heavy Brigade were well foraged afterwards.

With regard to the Crimea. The disembarkation of the cavalry occupied nearly three days. There was little communication between the ships. I landed on the second day, so soon as the boats were sent. The landing was entirely directed by the naval authorities. They were landed as they thought best, and from what ships they chose to take first. When I landed on the second day, I found that a considerable party had been sent with Lord Cardigan on a patrol, accompanied by two guns and some riflemen. Those horses, to the best of my recollection, were out from very early in the morning till very late at night; and I have no hesitation in saying that the patrol very much fatigued the horses. They were without water on that occasion nearly thirty hours. I wish the Board to recollect that the horses had already deteriorated in condition in Bulgaria, and suffered much from short forage and short water on board ship. The two or three hundred employed very much suffered from this harassing patrol, as I believe. I waited upon Sir Richard Airey, who had only just assumed the position of quartermaster general, for orders. He had been in command of his brigade, even after part of the expedition was embarked.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*)—That is correct.

(*Earl of Lucan.*)—I waited upon Sir Richard Airey for orders; and I received orders to take all the cavalry the next day to a village called Steneskoi, four miles inland in an easterly direction. We found stacks of fodder at the village of Steneskoi, but there was a total absence of all corn. I do not think any corn was issued to us. We reached Steneskoi on Sunday, stayed there Monday, and marched on Tuesday. I have little hesitation in saying that there was this deficiency at Varna, first from having a very tolerable recollection of it, and from what a gentleman has told me within the last ten days or a fortnight; he said the first time he ever saw me was when I was excessively angry with Mr. Filder

9th April 1856.

about there being no corn for the horses. I am right in saying that there was a very great deficiency of corn, and I complained to Mr. Filder accordingly. The deficiency continued till the morning of the battle of the Alma; there might have been a little corn issued at the Bulganalk. On the morning of the battle the want became alarming; although, not a very opportune moment, so soon as Lord Raglan came on the field, I rode up to him and complained of both men and horses having been left deficient of both food and forage. His answer was, that I should have come to him before about it; he was then reconnoitering the front; I excused myself on the ground that we had been promised that we should have a supply that morning. During the two days that we continued at the Alma we had a little the first night, and the next day, I was told, that if I sent all my horses three miles, I should get some corn; I sent them all, and the greater part returned without corn. The horses were every day getting weaker from want; they had to carry their riders during a great many hours, and were far too low in condition for their work. On the day of the battle the horses were not out much less than twelve or fourteen hours. They rested undoubtedly at the Alma, but again at Duvankoi I think we must have been twelve hours upon our horses. Although there was not a total absence of corn, there was always a great deficiency: we managed to fodder generally for ourselves. If the Board will be good to refer to page 103 they will find a letter dated "Bivouac Balaklava, 29th of September 1854." It is addressed to the quartermaster general. We had arrived on the 26th, and this letter is dated the 29th. I say, "Even at "such a moment as the present I am driven to complain of the commissariat arrange- "ments, and the very defective manner in which their duties are carried on in the cavalry "division under my command. The men and horses have constantly to bear with privations "which seriously impair their efficiency, more particularly the horses; with them it is no "exaggeration to state that they are occasionally bordering on starvation. I have in the last "few months repeatedly—indeed, on every occasion, remonstrated with Commissary "General Filder, and entreated his attention to the wants of the cavalry, but to no "purpose whatever. He insists upon leaving the commissariat duties with youths "altogether without experience, and who do not show any zeal or desire to make "up for their personal deficiencies. Seeing them as I do every day, and often in "the day, I have still failed in getting them to exert themselves sufficiently to afford "a hope that they will at all adequately discharge their duties. Unlike other divisions, "Commissary General Filder persists in leaving the cavalry division without any "superintending commissariat officer. It appears irrational that the cavalry requiring "more and larger supplies than the rest of the army, should be left in the hands of the "most inexperienced and the most inefficient, and without a head to instruct or control "them. With the very small number of horses at present with this army, and operating as "it is, so close to the seaboard, there can be no real difficulty in providing corn, still our "supplies are always most irregular, and frequently fail us altogether. The 4th Light "Dragoons, who I was informed received one day's supply yesterday, have just reported "to me that they got none, and that their horses are suffering much. Not one grain of "corn was issued to the troops here on Wednesday, and it was only very late yesterday "that they received one day's forage. I am unwilling to extend this letter, or I could "add very much on the positive grievances of which, as the General commanding the "Cavalry, and responsible for their efficiency, I have to complain. No care will make up "for want of food."

108. (*Major General Knollys.*) To whom was that addressed?

*Earl of Lucan.*—To the quartermaster general. Perhaps the Board will think that this explains what happened previously. I have said enough to enable the Board to see that from the moment we landed there was a very irregular and very short supply of forage. We found at Varna a great many stacks of fodder, but no corn. We found a great many stacks, and, as far as I possibly could, I secured them by sentries; and I got the adjutant general, through the commissariat officers, to place sentries wherever there was forage, and we took as much care of it as we could. I should say that the fodder lasted the cavalry from two to three weeks; it would have lasted a great deal longer, but Lord Raglan found it necessary to give up a large part of that fodder to the French. I know I was deprived of what I had calculated upon for my own horses. During the time we continued in the valley—from the 26th or 27th of September until the 27th or 28th of October—there was for the first two or three weeks no deficiency of fodder of the country or of barley. At that time we were within a mile of the town of Balaklava, and the commissariat always brought us our barley, and the horses certainly never were during that campaign in better condition than they were at the battle of Balaklava—a very fortunate circumstance. There was a difficulty always in watering them; it had to be done from wells, and was a long and tedious operation. I have always considered that the horses suffered as much from the deficiency of water as from the deficiency of anything else; there was always a difficulty about water. When our fodder ceased we were given a little hay; whether it was 8 lbs. or 6 lbs. I cannot say; but I am quite sure that it did not exceed 8 lbs. On the 30th of October we marched up to the plateau. The Board will recollect that the weather can scarcely be said to have broken before the 10th or 12th of November. With regard to the barley, I think we got our allowance of barley, but what fodder we got at that time, and

very irregularly, never exceeded 8 lbs. of hay. The artillery were receiving 10 lbs., and I was assured by the commissariat that that was done with the sanction of Lord Raglan. Lord Raglan, at a later period, said that the reduction had been made entirely by the commissariat, unknown to him, and that it ought to have been reported to him. Our complaints were always met by our being told that Lord Raglan said that, as there would be a deficiency of hay, the artillery were always to receive 2 lbs. more than ourselves. Now, it is right that I should state that I received information, or notification rather, on the evening, I think, of the 1st of November, that the light cavalry brigade, which was at this time with me on the plateau near the coline, were to move to Inkermann, and I was requested to go there and select the place. I went that same afternoon and it was obvious at once that at that distance, which I think was nearer eight than seven miles from Balaklava, it would be most difficult, if it was not altogether impossible, to hope that they would be well foraged. Of course I had nothing to do with the strategical reasons. I was to send them there. I wrote to the quartermaster general's department. I did not see General Airey, but I saw Colonel Gordon, and I told him that I had been there and that I dreaded the idea of the cavalry being sent there, and that it would be quite impossible for horses at that distance to be properly foraged. I begged that it might be laid before Lord Raglan in the strongest manner possible. I thought that nothing could be more unfortunate than sending those horses there. I could not hope, at that distance, and with the transport and the roads breaking up, that there would be any possibility of foraging the cavalry. I repeated my objections in writing the next morning, and received a note to state that my representation had been laid before Lord Raglan, but that I was still ordered to carry out the orders. The light cavalry, on that, marched. The light cavalry were thus stationed at a distance of three or four miles from my camp, and I wish the Board to know that, when detached, I left to my brigadier the entire responsibility of rationing and foraging; the commissariat officers being under the command of that brigadier, who, by my divisional orders, was required to report to me specially on these points. When, however, troops were immediately under my command, I took the entire responsibility on myself. I made the commissariat officer come to me every morning at eight or nine o'clock with a return showing exactly how he proposed feeding the men and horses on that day, and what he had in store, and what he was likely to require; but when the cavalry were at any distance, and under the brigadier, I then thought it was no longer my duty, and indeed I could not, without impropriety, interfere. Again, when the cavalry were under the divisional generals of infantry, I always considered that those generals were responsible for that cavalry. Now, with regard to the light cavalry, perhaps the Board will be good enough to refer to two letters from Commissary General Crookshank. I ought to have had an assistant commissary general, whose business it would have been to have superintended the foraging of the whole of the cavalry, whether present or absent, and unquestionably I should have known from him daily what was going on; but I was deprived of that information, because the commissariat officer did not consider me, but the brigadier, as his commanding officer. There appears in this evidence attached to the Report a letter of Mr. Crookshank's, dated the 18th of November, addressed to me, and he says, "In obedience to your Lordship's orders." Now I had met Mr. Crookshank, and he had represented to me, not that the horses were not foraged, but he represented to me what I had foreseen from the beginning, which was, that there would be extreme difficulty in foraging the horses from their position. The Board will see by this letter that it is merely a repetition of that warning which I had already myself given. I requested that he would write to me, that I might make use of his letter; and he says in this letter, "In obedience to your Lordship's orders, I beg to report to you upon the "subject of my yesterday's communication with regard to the foraging of this brigade "during the winter." Therefore he is speaking more of the future than of the present. "I would commence by bringing to your Lordship's notice that at this distance from "Balaklava I cannot be afforded any assistance in transport by the brigade,—I mean "regiments cannot send their horses in for barley,—and that the whole transport devolves "upon the commissariat." Perhaps the Board will be good enough to allow me to state this: I have always understood that in the Peninsula the Duke of Wellington so arranged that the cavalry, if called upon by the commissariat to do so, should always forage for themselves, provided the distance did not exceed three miles. I am assured that that was the principle laid down. I wish it to be observed that I believe that to be an excellent arrangement. I believe that unless the cavalry have other duties to perform they can well forage for themselves within three miles. I think it rather an advantage than otherwise; but if the distance exceeds three miles, it becomes a very harassing duty to the regiment, and if it much exceeds three miles I believe it to be totally impracticable. And when you forage at a distance of three miles it must be considered the forage should be ready at hand. If, as at Balaklava, when you arrive there you are told that your corn is still on board ship, and you must depend upon chance whether it is ever landed, and the men and horses are to be kept waiting about that town up to their hocks and knees in mud; for so far from finding the forage ready for them, sometimes it took them from two to three hours to get it, and frequently they came away without it. I say that, under those circumstances, the cavalry had put upon them a duty most harassing and most destructive to the horses. Mr. Crookshank goes on to say in his letter, "The transport allotted to

9th April 1856.

9th April 1856.

" me is insufficient, and at present no more can be given me, nor do I see any prospect " of a future increase to the strength. The mules are already showing symptoms of " overwork, and as araba after araba breaks down (I have now only five out of " seventeen),"—those are the arabas,—" so much more labour devolves upon the " mule transport. To bring up a day's supply, according to the present strength, " 63 mules are required, as the sacks weigh 160 lbs., and they can only carry one " each, and, owing to the distance, can make but one journey a day. I have never " yet been able to procure more than 35 mules per day (not often that); and with the " eleven mule carts and five arabas attached to this brigade, I have just been able to " complete the requisite quantities of barley and hay." I think that carries the Board up to the 18th. " The least bad weather prevents this exactness,"—nothing can be clearer than that they were full foraged up to this date,—" and throws me in arrears, " whilst such bad weather as we have lately had altogether stopped the transport " for one day, and has not yet allowed me to recover ground; in fact, I owe the brigade " nearly one and a half day's corn, and some hay." I cannot understand the consistency of that; he talks of great exactness up to that hour, and now he says that he is a day and a half in arrear. " Should the present weather hold, I hope to make good all arrears; but " after due and careful deliberation, I do not hesitate in saying that I fear the ordinary " weather to be expected at this season, putting aside the possibility of any repetition of " the late severe weather, will render the roads so bad that at times the transport will fail " in bringing forage to so great a distance. I cannot conclude without further bringing " to your Lordship's notice the great delay and hindrances we are subjected to when in " Balaklava by the slow and awkward manner the barley is landed. The first can be " remedied, but the latter, from the nature of the wharf, probably not." Well, the same commissariat officer writes on the 19th of November to Lord Cardigan, and states, " I have the honour to report to your Lordship that the late severe weather prevented " my keeping the brigade regularly supplied with forage, nor has the state of the roads " since permitted me to make good the consequent arrears. At this moment I owe nearly " one and a half day's corn and some hay to the brigade; but I am in hopes, from the " present state of the roads, to make that good. A certain quantity of forage has been " issued daily since the storm; and last night thirty-nine sacks of 160 lbs. each were " issued, and this morning fourteen sacks of like weight. More barley will be up to-day, " probably upwards of forty sacks, together with some hay; the men's rations have " been regularly issued, and I apprehend no difficulty in that respect. I have, &c. " (Signed) A. Crookshank."

The third letter, dated November the 21st, is supposed to be addressed to Lord Cardigan, but it is an error—it is addressed to me:—" Balaklava, November 21st, 1855. " My Lord, I must again bring to your Lordship's notice the state of the Light Cavalry " Brigade with regard to forage. In my last letter I informed your Lordship that one " and a half day's corn and some hay was due to the brigade, but instead of my having " been able to make good any part of that, I have fallen into further arrears. The " weather is in part the cause, but it is chiefly to be attributed to the want of transport. On " the 19th I had only ten extra mule carts allowed me; yesterday, the 20th, none whatever, " until so late an hour (and then only fifteen pack animals) as to be of no use. It is now " mid-day, and as the transport has not yet come into Balaklava from its own camp, I " have only been able to despatch thirty sacks of barley on my own carts, each only " carrying three sacks on the present roads. I would wish further to bring to your " Lordship's notice that the Light Brigade suffers in another respect. Even when I " have transport on the beach, and a boatload of barley arrives, a dozen or more heavy " dragoons, or so many artillerymen, jump in, carry out the sacks, load their transport,— " my few wretched Turks or Maltese having a very poor chance in the mêlée. Whilst " writing this, Deputy Assistant Commissary General Goold, in charge of the depôt " transport, has come in, and assures me the mules are nearly done up—almost incapable " of further work."

Now I wish to call the attention of the Board to this fact, that up to the 21st, and indeed I may say that this was the last communication I had from Commissary General Crookshank, he never once applies for assistance from the cavalry; and I do not mean to say, that if Mr. Commissary General Crookshank was to tell me that the horses would starve to-morrow if I did not send these horses, it would not be better to knock the horses up than to starve them. But I do say this, that with the state of the roads as they were then, and with the state of the weather as it was then, I have no hesitation in saying now what I have already said before the Sebastopol Committee, that up perhaps to the 24th or 25th of the month, perhaps not so long, it would have been possible, with a fearful strain upon the horses, to have sent some of them to have drawn their forage from that town. But I have no hesitation in saying here, although the question I believe concerns me far less than it may another, that what I said before the Sebastopol Committee was true and correct; which was, that for the last few days that the Light Cavalry were at Inkermann their horses were already too much reduced to undergo that tremendous exertion of bringing the forage sixteen miles there and back in the then state of the roads. The object of writing this letter is for the purpose of showing how far they were well foraged. There is another letter to Colonel Mayow. The Board will certainly have observed that those letters of Commissary General

9th April 1856.

Crookshank do not call upon me to order any cavalry horses to be sent; and under such representations as those, I should have thought it most culpable in me if I had suggested what I believe would have been destructive to the horses, and, therefore, until some further representation was made, I had nothing to do in the matter. On November the 21st, he says, in his letter to Colonel Mayow, "I have had occasion to bring to the notice of the "major general commanding this brigade, as well as to the Earl of Lucan, commanding the "cavalry, the difficulty of keeping up the supply of forage in this brigade in its present "position. For the last fortnight the ration of barley has not been a full one to each "regiment. But I beg to inform you, and I request you will bring it to the major "general's notice, that some of the regiments have not sent in a correct return to me. It "is not in my power to sift the matter, but one instance I give: the 11th Hussars, on the "24th instant, drew for 160 troop horses and charges; on the following day, that number "was reduced to 130, although, on application to the adjutant, I was informed 127 was "the total. Such a discrepancy cannot have occurred in one night; and in juxta position "to the quantity of barley I have owned to being in arrears to the 11th." Now there is an inconsistency in this letter, which I do think deserving of the attention of the Board; and I should very much like to see the original letter, if it could be found, because the letter is dated the 21st of the month, and it states, "The 11th Hussars, on the 24th "instant." Now, what that can mean I do not know. I am in hopes that the misdate is in the November the 21st, because, in his letter of November the 21st, he is complaining of what occurred on November the 24th. There is evidently a mistake here. I hope the mistake is in the date of the letter. He says, "The 11th Hussars, on the 24th instant, drew for 160 troop horses and chargers." In this letter there is something on the face of it which shows great inaccuracy. First of all, as I understand, it complains of what happened three days subsequently to the writing of the letter; then again, it talks about drawing for 160 troop horses and chargers. Now the 11th Hussars had no such number as 160 horses and chargers. On that date, to the best of my recollection, that number was reduced to 130, although, on application to the adjutant, I was informed 127 was the total. "Such a discrepancy cannot have occurred in one night; and in juxta posi-"tion to the quantity of barley I have owned to being in arrears to the 11th. I "would wish to know for how many horses, and for what length of time they have over-"drawn. In no one instance have I found the ration return and memorandum of horses "actually with the regiments this day to agree, (save the 17th Lancers, whose acting "adjutant was absent, and from whom I got no memorandum,) and I submit to you that "the same precision should be observed in a ration return as in any other document signed "collectively by commanding officer, paymaster, and quartermaster." All that I wish to observe as to this letter is this, that if the mistake is in the date of the letter, and not in the subsequent date, then it will show not only that the Light Cavalry were very tolerably rationed up to the 24th instant, but in some instances they had drawn rations in excess. What happened in the last few days I believe is pretty well known to the Board.

I shall now go back to the Heavy Brigade. I think I said, with regard to the Heavy Brigade, that they generally got their small ration of hay, 8 lbs., while the Artillery were getting 10 lbs. I have mentioned, I think, that up to the day of the storm, the commissariat provided us on the plateau, which was something like a distance of 3½ miles from Balaklava, very tolerably with that small allowance of 8 lbs. of hay. I repeat here, that I believe that the feeding a horse upon 8 lbs. in that tremendous weather, without any covering, is starvation,—that is my belief; I believe that you cannot keep a horse in condition on 8 lbs. of hay exposed to such weather as they were there. It is to be observed that the cavalry at home have 12 lbs., and that no work-horse in my cart stable has less than 16 lbs., and more commonly they get 20 lbs., and I believe on many farms the horses get half a truss of hay a day. They did not get the 8 lbs. of hay with regularity, and I believe the 12 lbs. of barley they got with regularity. Immediately after the storm our transport failed us, and it became necessary to send, and I believe we always did send, for our barley; we sent generally for what fodder there was, but that was the lightest of our duty, drawing our fodder, for none was given us. I was asked after the storm whether I thought that the horses would eat hay that was floating about the harbour. I said that if the compressed hay had only continued 24, or say 48 hours in the water, I believed, except just the outside of those trusses, it would be perfectly good for two or three days. We got some of it, and it answered, and I believe there may have been a little straw, but very little; in short, I think I can confidently state that at one moment there was none, and for this reason: on the 22nd of October I called on General Canrobert, and complained of the state of the horses, saying, "They are getting nothing but a little barley, and they are suffering tremendously from "the weather." General Canrobert said immediately, "Why it is as much an object to "me to preserve your cavalry as if they were my own." And he sent for Colonel Martimpré, the chief of his staff, and asked him to inform him what were their supplies of forage, and whether they could give any assistance. Colonel Martimpré said, that if an engagement could be entered into that the forage would be restored to them at the end of thirty days, in that case they could give us thirty days chopped straw. Whether I informed the quartermaster general upon that subject, I am not prepared to say. I have a sort of idea that I told Lord Raglan in the course of conversation, but I informed the commissariat officer of it immediately; and I know there was some commu-

9th April 1856.

nication passed, I think, between Commissary General Filder and my commissariat officer. This is mere hearsay; but that that information was conveyed to Commissary General Filder through my commissariat officer I entertain no doubt whatever. I know I have been told since that that fodder never was given. I recollect hearing at the time that it was not taken because Commissary General Filder did not feel sufficiently secure of being able to keep the engagement as to restoring it at the end of thirty days. I never had' to my recollection, any communication with Commissary General Filder personally on the subject. I can say that the deficiency of fodder continued, and so long as we were on the hill there was a very short supply of straw. It is fair that I should say that Mr. Commissary General Filder called upon me at Kadikoi on December the 4th, or 3d, and told me that he had already represented to Lord Raglan, or to the quartermaster general, that the cavalry, or rather the heavy brigade, were to blame for this, for that they had actually left the fodder on the wharf, when they could have removed it. I considered this a very serious charge, and I referred it to General Scarlett, and he referred it to the several regiments, and it was met by all of them with the most positive denial. The Board will observe that at page 106 of my book there is a letter addressed to the commissary general by myself on this subject. I wrote on the 15th of December.—"Cavalry Head Quarters, December 15th, 1854,"—the correspondence between me and General Scarlett of the heavy brigade had taken place the days intervening.—I say, "Sir, in reference to "the conversation you had with me, and the correspondence which has passed since,"—because there appears to have been a letter from Commissary General Filder, which I have not got (at least, I cannot put my finger on it),—"the correspondence which has passed since,"—I rather think General Scarlett's letter was referred to Commissary General Filder. Then Commissary General Filder writes to me, and then I replied to Commissary General Filder on this date,—"I am bound to say that you have not "established against the dragoons that, having the hay at their disposal, they left it on "the quay to save themselves the trouble of removing it. I have myself visited the "landing wharf, and I am quite satisfied that there has been a deficiency of hay landed, "and that the troops have received short rations, and have severely suffered in "consequence."

I think I have now brought the cavalry down to Kadikoi; at Kadikoi, Commissary General Filder laid down a rule, and I believe it was a rule of his own, that if the horses are kept altogether for a week without food, or on short rations, that no arrears were to be made good. This was a question that was disputed by me with Mr. Commissary General Filder, I may say during the whole time I commanded that cavalry. There is an order in that book, I think, of July, that the cavalry are to draw 14lbs. instead of 12lbs., in consequence of the great arrears of corn that were owing to them. I did this after communicating with the commissariat officer of my division, and Mr. Filder instantly said, "No, I never will allow that; it is contrary to the rules of the service that there "should be any deficiency ever made good." Anything more unjust or preposterous I think I never heard; I was obliged to submit; though I was supported in my view by the quartermaster general of the army.

(*Lieut.-General Rowan.*) It is the general custom of the service, except under peculiar circumstances.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Then Mr. Filder was supported by rule. I do not think when that rule was established, it could have been foreseen what happened to us. If the rule was not applicable to us in our then situation, it was for Mr. Filder, when desired by the quartermaster general to do so, to have attended to that order. I speak with great respect and deference, but my opinion is, that the commissary general is only a subordinate officer to a quartermaster general of the army. My belief is, that it is for the commissary general to receive the instructions of the quartermaster general as the instructions of the commander-in-chief, and to obey them; I say that any other system would be dangerous. I have no hesitation in saying, that the commissary general of that army did not so consider it. After the light cavalry crawled down to their new encampment, Deputy Assistant Commissary General Crookshank did take upon himself, in spite of Mr. Filder's order, for a few days to give as much forage as they could eat, and as he could find them, but it was to very little purpose, a great many of the horses were so much off their appetite, that they could scarcely eat what would have been their rations. In the heavy brigade Deputy Assistant Commissary General Murray strictly attended to the orders of his chief, and made good the deficiency. My correspondence will show that between the 2d of the month, when the light brigade came down, and the 5th of the month when the heavy brigade came down, and until the 12th, when they got their transport duties, in consequence of their receiving more shelter in the valley of Kadikoi, and of their being near their supplies, they improved very much indeed. I wish the Board to know that I had found myself in an awkward position, for, whilst to the commanding officers I was obliged to point out that they must bear with what they were suffering, because the necessities of the service required it, I had to impress upon the quartermaster general and Lord Raglan that if they required us to remain on that plateau, they would sacrifice every horse belonging to the cavalry. I believe I am correct in stating, that the cavalry were only sent to Inkerman, and were only retained on the position near the coline in consequence of an arrangement with General Canrobert. I believe it was to secure French assistance necessary for the defence

of Balaklava that it was done. I believe it was in consequence of arrangements affecting the cavalry that General Vinois' brigade was sent to Balaklava. I believe that to have been the case; I am quite satisfied that without General Vinois' brigade, with the enemy so close to us, it would have been hopeless to have made any defence of that town. I have great reason for supposing you would not have had that brigade if we had not furnished the light brigade to assist in the defence of Inkerman, and the heavy brigade to defend the rear of their position near Sebastopol. I will explain that, General Canrobert called upon me the moment I got upon the hill——

109. (*President.*) Will you be so good as to keep more to the question as to the cause of the mortality among the horses?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) My object is to show that the cavalry were kept there more by General Canrobert than by Lord Raglan. I believe Lord Raglan did not feel himself more at liberty to remove the cavalry than I did, in consequence of the engagement he had entered into. I called upon him on the 26th of December, and I told him that their state was so fearful that I could represent them in no other condition than as totally inefficient. Lord Raglan turned upon me and said, "Do you mean, Lord Lucan, that your cavalry are *hors de combat?*" I said, "My Lord, they are entirely so; "and I have no hesitation in saying, that if you do not remove them from "the position at once, in a very few days I shall have to report to you that "they have ceased to exist altogether." Lord Raglan seemed to concur in the necessity for removing, but said, "I can say nothing to you about it till I have arranged "with General Canrobert." The next day passed, I went to head quarters, inquired, and there was no answer for me. Lord Raglan told me he had nothing to say; and on the day after that I was told they had come to a determination to continue the cavalry where they were, but that I might increase the depôt, if I liked, at Kadikoi, to 200. On the Thursday morning I was informed that they had come to a resolution to march the cavalry down, and we marched down as best we could.

Now, with regard to forage, if the Board will refer to my correspondence on this head, then that will give a good idea of the difficulties about forage. Hearing Lord Raglan had said that he never authorized that reduced quantity of hay, a communication was made to him, and he ordered immediately that the baggage horses which had no rations were to get their full rations, and the cavalry horses also were to have full rations; when this was communicated to Mr. Commissary General Filder, he issued a memorandum to this effect on the 14th of December. "Head Quarters, "14th December, 1854.—Having represented to the Field Marshal commanding, that "in the present state of the supply of hay in the commissariat, not more than eight "pounds could be issued to the cavalry, his Lordship has directed that issues are to be "continued at that rate for the present, but that the deficiency should be made up with "chopped straw." On December the 15th I write to the commissary general, and on December the 16th I write to the quartermaster general, "Sir,—I consider it incumbent "upon me to state that reports are made to me daily by the officers commanding brigades "and regiments, that the men and horses are, in all weathers, detained for very many hours "in consequence of their finding neither hay nor corn landed, adding as this does very "seriously to the duties of foraging; indeed the dragoons are frequently obliged to go on "board ship, and there throw it out of the holds themselves. Until the commissary "general can be induced to land some forage in advance, these difficulties must continue; "but I hope, Sir, that you will be able to make arrangements that he should do so." On December the 23d General Scarlett writes,—"For the information of the lieutenant "general commanding the cavalry, I have the honour to report that the regiments "in the brigade under my command received their full rations and forage "yesterday, except the 5th Dragoon Guards, who are deficient 84 lbs. of barley, "not having been able to send sufficient horses to carry forage, and also to furnish "their number for carrying provisions to the infantry and mounting the picket. It will "also be necessary this morning to send for forage those horses that have been on picket "the last twenty-four hours. The time consumed in carrying provisions to the infantry "yesterday was from seven to seven and a half hours." On December the 31st I write to the adjutant general, "Sir,—I find it necessary to report that out of the ten regiments "composing the cavalry division, only two were given hay yesterday. The partial substitu- "tion of oats I consider no equivalent, and the horses, from their low condition, their exposure "to cold, and the hard duties imposed upon them, cannot afford any deficiency of their small "ration. I much lament that it should be found impossible to land one or two days' forage "in advance." On January the 1st I write to the quartermaster general, "Sir,—I am "compelled to request earnestly your attention to the accompanying report; on two succes- "sive days scarcely any hay has been supplied to the troop and officers' horses. The arrange- "ment by which the cavalry only forage in the afternoon, becomes most inconvenient and "objectionable when all the hay landed is taken by the artillery, which forages first. If "some method cannot be devised by which the cavalry can be supplied with their small "rations of forage daily, I quite despair of saving the few horses which survive. I "earnestly hope for your assistance." I should mention that, independently of those special reports, every deficiency of ration, either of man or horse, was always put upon the back of the morning state for the information of the adjutant general, to whose department this duty had been already transferred. On the 2nd of January I write to

9th April 1856.

Mr. Commissary General Filder:—"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your "letter dated 26th instant, but only handed to me two days since. In the return of "forage you have selected a period from the 4th to 16th in the month of December, when "the whole of this correspondence referred to what had occurred pervious to the 4th, when "you called upon me. Doubtless in my letter of the 15th December I mentioned having "visited the landing wharfs, and stated that the arrangements were so faulty that I was "satisfied there must have been a deficiency of hay landed,—an opinion I still adhere to; "and I must observe the heavy charge you made against the dragoons of 'through idleness "'leaving the hay upon the wharf;' when called upon to prove it, you have not attempted "to do so. I am aware that since the 13th December, when the cavalry have often to a "horse been called upon to perform commissariat duties, carrying provisions to the "infantry, it has on some days been found impossible to forage completely for ourselves, "which explains short forage in the 5th Dragoon Guards and Royal Dragoons." It becomes a question whether the Board wishes me to read all those letters.

(*President.*) I think not.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) With regards to the deaths of the horses, I see by a letter, that was written to the military secretary before we left Varna, that I asked for reinforcements from England, and I then stated that we were eighty-one horses deficient at that time. I recollect our strength should have been at that time sixteen squadrons of 125 horses each; and in that letter to the military secretary, just before leaving Varna, I say, "I hope that he will "apply for both men and horses." I think I state something like 150 men and eighty-five horses. I have a return here showing what number of horses the light brigade lost during the month of September. There were some horses thrown overboard, and there were some lost, indeed a considerable number lost, in landing them, and altogether they lost between fifty and sixty, above fifty and under sixty horses in that month; that included the horses lost in action.

Now we come to the heavy brigade. I cannot exactly say what number of horses were lost in that brigade during the ten days or fortnight they continued in Bulgaria after I left, but I believe the horses lost on the passage amounted to 226 troop horses, a considerable number of baggage horses, and a great number of officers' chargers. I believe the total was nearer 300 horses than anything else. There is a letter of mine enclosing the report of the Board convened for the purpose of inquiring into this very matter, and I there stated that the number was something like 300. I know many of the officers lost every one of their chargers. Colonel Wardell lost all his chargers, and there was another officer who did so. I believe I am right in stating that they lost 226 troop horses.

110. (*Lieut. General Rowan.*) In how many days?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) They were lost at sea. Some of the vessels ran back to Bulgaria, and others for the Bosphorus. They were scattered all over the Black Sea. Some of the Inniskillings and the Royals did not arrive for a considerable time. A correct return can be given.

(*President.*) We do not require it, but only your opinion as to the cause of the mortality among the horses.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) 226 were lost in that passage, and fifty-six were lost in the light brigade before they reached Balaklava. In November there were some horses lost by straying from the lines after the storm, but no great number. In October was the battle of Balaklava, and the heavy brigade appear to have lost forty-six killed and sixty-eight wounded, the greater part of those probably unserviceable afterwards. The light brigade, it has been stated, lost about 340 horses or 341, but from my return I cannot make out that the light brigade lost at the battle of Balaklava more than 300, and some of those horses were cut away from their picket lines.

(*President.*) We do not want the loss of horses killed in action.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) If the Board will refer to my correspondence on the subject of the transport, they will find that I say to Lord Raglan that above 400 horses were sacrificed by the transport.

111. (*Deputy Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to put this question to your Lordship:—Referring to your Lordship's order of the 28th of November, did you take measures to ascertain whether your recommendations were acted upon by the several regiments as far as it was practicable?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) May I be allowed to read the order?

(*President.*) Yes.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) "Camp before Sebastopol, 28th November 1854. The first and great "object of general officers commanding brigades must and will be, to give the men and "horses all the benefit in their power of the driest spots in the neighbourhood of the "encampment. The lieutenant general wishes it to be perfectly understood that he relies "upon those officers to keep this great object in view; and it is his order that, without "reference to those secondary objects, uniformity or appearance of any sort, any command-"ing officer shall shift his men and horses always at the earliest moment and to the most "suitable places that shall offer; commanding officers will, of course, communicate their "wishes to their brigadiers personally, if possible; but when this cannot be done imme-"diately, they are hereby authorized to act of their own accord at once, informing their "brigadiers as soon as possible that they have done so." Now when that order was issued,

I had already told every officer to disregard appearance or uniformity; and when they changed, my orders were that they should always leave room enough on their flanks and to the front, that they might be able to shift to each flank, or to the front, or to the rear. The commanding officers of the heavy brigade acted under those orders from the commencement; and that order would never have been issued at all, but I received a communication from head quarters, whether private or official I do not know, informing me that such was not the practice in the light cavalry brigade; that the commanding officers had been checked in doing it; and it was in consequence of their being checked in doing it, that I thought it necessary to issue that order. The order was issued on the 28th, but did not reach that brigade in consequence of some hesitation on the part of Lord Cardigan; indeed, it ended by not being given out by him at all, but Colonel Doherty, who was left the senior officer in command,—Lord Cardigan having resigned his command on the night of the 29th. He objected to some part of this order, and therefore the delay occurred. I wish the Board to know that these instructions had already been given verbally to the commanding officers of the light brigade on the 18th of November.

112. (*Major-General Peel.*) I understood your Lordship to state that the cavalry deteriorated in condition from the time of their arrival in the East, and that they suffered in their passage to the Crimea from the want of full rations?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Yes.

113. (*Major General Peel.*) You do not therefore agree in the opinion expressed by Lord Cardigan, in the evidence which he gave before the Sebastopol Committee, that the cavalry, that is, the light brigade which he commanded, were in excellent condition when they landed in the Crimea?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) If the Board will refer to an order of mine, issued at Bulganak, I think that it will meet that very case. I must say that if such was the opinion of Lord Cardigan, my opinion was very much and entirely the reverse. I felt amazingly concerned for the state of the horses when we were at Steneskoi; so concerned did I feel, that I found it necessary to issue this Order:—"Camp, Steneskoi, Crimea, September 18th, 1854. "No. 1.—The lieutenant general commanding the cavalry feels much concerned at the "very reduced state of the light cavalry brigade. He much fears that many horses will "be found not in a condition to enable them fully to do the arduous which await them "The lieutenant general feels, as must the major general, and all the commanding officers "of regiments, that their own characters are involved in the due efficiency of the corps "under their orders; and he does hope and expect that every effort will be made to "give flesh and condition to the horses. To effect this all-important object, every exer-"tion must be made well and perfectly to water them, and to give them the best and "largest quantity of food that can be procured. This alone will avail little unless it is "thoroughly instilled into all officers, that every unnecessary exertion, however trifling, "must be spared the horses. The dragoon should not be allowed to sit upon his horse, "except when indispensably obliged to do so. Parades and inspections should be as short "and as few as possible, and the men taught and made to dismount at the first moment "practicable. The pace, again, should be as slow as the service will admit of." The Board will find that the orders are constant about that. I looked over this order book the other day, and I found no less than seventy-two orders on this subject of the care of the horses. It is quite right that I should mention not only that we lost 226 horses of the heavy brigade on their passage from Varna, but the whole of that brigade landed with their horses in such a condition that I should scarcely have recognized them, from what they had suffered at sea, and, I believe, from not having been well foraged at Varna.

The Board retired to deliberate, and in a short time returned.

114. (*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) I believe you are anxious to make some statement to the Board?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I am.

115. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board wishes you to be informed that you are not compelled to make any statement which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement which you may make will be admissible in evidence against you.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) In coming before the Board on this occasion, it is to me a subject of deep regret that I should have to appear alone, and that, at a time when his assistance would have been so valuable to me, I should suffer under the absence of my valued coadjutor. Had I held merely a civil position, I should probably have adopted the same course as he has taken; for to me nothing can be more painful than such scenes as the present. But in my capacity as an officer it is my duty, not merely to obey your call, but to be ready now and at all times to afford to any other officer who may feel aggrieved by any act of mine the fullest explanation and, if need be, reparation in my power. I am cheered in this part of my duty by the thought, and, indeed, I may say, by the confident expectation that the result of my statement will have the effect of removing much of the misunderstanding which I fear unhappily prevails on some of the matters under discussion, and which has prevented, at the commencement, those mutual explanations which both myself and my colleague have always been ready to give, and which were so necessary considering the great range of public duty which devolved upon me and Sir John M'Neill as commissioners. I think it necessary, however, to premise any observations which I may

9th April 1856.

make, or any proceedings that I may take before this Board, by requesting that they may be distinctly considered as in no way affecting my colleague, because I have no right, by any statement of mine given independently here in the capacity of an officer, to affect him in his position as commissioner. Had there been no distinction between us in that respect we should either have stood here together, or not at all. To have completed such a duty as was imposed upon us without giving offence to some one by our conclusions was, indeed, scarcely to have been expected; but however much I may lament the soreness and acrimony of feeling on the part of the officers who may feel themselves aggrieved, both myself and my colleague have at least the satisfaction of knowing that by Her Majesty's Government and the public our Report has been considered temperate and moderate; and I have full confidence in this Board arriving at the conclusion that it has done injustice to no one. Judging from the tone of the address of Lord Lucan to the Board, I am apprehensive that he considers the commissioners as actuated in their remarks by some feeling of hostility against himself and the cavalry. Nothing can be more unfounded. Of his Lordship I have no personal knowledge, and till the present hour have, I believe, never seen him; consequently, any ill-feeling or ground for ill-feeling as regards him is out of the question; and I have too great a respect for the officers of cavalry in the Crimea whose acquaintance I do enjoy, to disparage in the slightest degree the fame which has been acquired by that arm of the service; but a want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising temporary expedient to supply the place of stables is certainly not a very heavy charge against them, when it can scarcely be denied that so severe a loss of horses as they sustained was not altogether without a remedy. Even the mere comparison of the loss sustained by the cavalry, artillery, and baggage horses respectively, excites Lord Lucan's indignation, though at the same time he accuses the commissioners of having concealed or mis-stated nearly half of the loss of the cavalry in that comparison, which they were certainly not likely to have done had they been actuated by the motives which he attributes to them. But in order that I may enter on this and other points more in detail, I must refer to the printed report of the proceedings as given in the "Times," which will, I hope, be sufficiently accurate for my purpose, not having been here myself.

(*President.*) You had better read from the Board minutes.

[A copy of the minutes of the first day's proceedings was handed to Colonel Tulloch.]

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I refer to the proceedings of the first day. The first objection which is taken by Lord Lucan is to that letter which we sent in answer to his representations addressed to the Minister-at-War, and in which we stated that the examination of Lord Lucan in regard to commissariat supplies, as proposed by him, could not, we believed, bring out any information of public importance; but with that reply he finds fault. He seems to think that he was the best judge of the importance of that part of the inquiry. I wish to state the reason why we objected to that; and if the Board will allow me I will read that part of the letter to Lord Panmure which was in answer to his proposition that he should be examined as to the commissariat supplies:—"The examination of Lord "Lucan in regard to commissariat supplies, as proposed by him, could not, it is believed, "bring out any information of public importance upon that subject beyond what has "been furnished by the officers commanding all the regiments that were under his Lord-"ship's orders in the Crimea. If Lord Lucan should on that occasion make any new "statement, it would be necessary, according to his Lordship's own view, to give the "commissariat a similar opportunity of answering it; and if that course should be pur-"sued in regard to Lord Lucan and the commissariat, there is no reason why it "should not be extended indefinitely to every one else who is interested, and may "desire it. This would be in fact to re-open in England the inquiry that was "closed in the Crimea. The question, therefore, appears to be whether it is expe-"dient, by complying with Lord Lucan's request, to enter upon a course that may "probably lead to such a result." There is another reason, which I need not enter into, why it would not have been expedient, and it was this,—that we already had in this Appendix a statement of the whole of the deficiencies from the 1st of January, and prior to the 1st of January the deficiencies were admitted to a very large extent indeed. Perhaps the Board will allow me to read what we state in regard to the commissariat deficiencies. I should be very sorry indeed if his Lordship supposed that any suggestion of his would not have been at once acceded to if it had been in our power, for any one who has heard his Lordship to-day give that clear and explicit statement with regard to the commissariat must have seen that the information which he possessed was of very great value if we had been in a position to receive it. What we say is this at page 18 of the Report:—"With respect to deficiencies of forage, which form the next branch of our "Report, there is very considerable difficulty in arriving at accurate conclusions, "because previous to the 1st of January no account of such deficiencies was kept by "the quartermaster of cavalry; but it is admitted, both by the regimental and com-"missariat officers, that very large deficiencies did occur in the hay and chopped "straw prior to that date. There appears always to have been enough of barley "in store or in harbour, though there was occasionally much difficulty in getting at "it, owing to the crowded state of the shipping, and it was at all times difficult to find "conveyance for it to any considerable distance. The hay and straw began to fail

9th April 1856.

" about the 14th of November, after the gale in which so many vessels were lost off the " coast; prior to that date no serious deficiencies have been established. During the great " scarcity of hay and straw between the 14th of November and 1st of January, the commis- " sariat seem to have been in nearly the same difficulty as the quartermasters, in regard to " furnishing any accurate statements of their issues. The forage had to be sent up on the " regimental bât animals, there being no other means of transport. It was often late before " they reached Balaklava, and they were in so weak a state that the men sent with them " could only venture to carry up a portion of the forage due; what was left behind would " probably be considered by the quartermaster a short issue, while the commissariat officer " would, perhaps, hold that he had made an issue in full. It is admitted on all hands, " that there was great irregularity in the arrangements at that time, which we hope will " be considered a sufficient reason for our not attempting to enter into any details of " the deficiencies at that period. It may suffice to state, that they must have been very " considerable indeed, and coupled with exposure, were no doubt the cause of very " heavy loss and inefficiency." If we were in that difficulty in the Crimea, for all the returns were at hand then, the Board may easily imagine that it would have been utterly impossible to have gone into that in any satisfactory way here. It was impossible to ascertain what was a deficiency and what was not a deficiency. Sometimes the quartermasters contended that they had not received the proper issue, and the commissariat officers contended that they had received the proper issue, and it was impossible to ascertain it from them, because the commissariat officer, in several instances, said that he had issued what was required, and the quartermaster said that he could not carry it away, and it was left on the beach. Up to the 1st of January there was nothing but confusion, and after the 1st of January we, with very great difficulty, did establish a pretty fair return, in which all parties agreed to the extent of the deficiency which had occurred, and that will be found at page 58 of the Appendix, where the Board will see every deficiency that we could establish in the months of January, February, and March, and also that which it was equally necessary to give to me, namely, the surplus. In many cases there had been a very great surplus given in one article to make up what was deficient in another; and I do trust that Lord Lucan, after this explanation, will believe that it was only owing to those circumstances, and the want of power in our case to open up in this country the investigation which we had closed in the Crimea, that prevented us from paying more attention to his wishes than we did.

I now come to that point which relates to the deaths among the cavalry horses. It is stated in the minutes, "That taking the six months from October to March the Commissioners " say such was the strength of the cavalry, and they talk about the 1st of October, but no heavy " cavalry were there on that date, and that shows the incorrectness of the Commissioners." Now really that is a very strong statement, and certainly not a very bad statement to commence with; but when I hold in my hand returns forwarded to the War Office, showing that all the regiments of the heavy cavalry brigade, with the exception of one, were in the Crimea at that date, I must certainly express very considerable surprise at his Lordship's assertion. Here is a return which I beg to hand in to the Board (*handing in the same*) of the "First Regiment of Dragoons, Head Quarters, Balaklava, 1st of October " 1854." That is a return received at the War Office, and if an officer signs false returns in what a position must commissioners be who are sent to obtain information for the public benefit founded on these returns. The next is, "5th Dragoon Guards, Head Quarters, " Crimea, 1st October 1854" (*delivering in the same*). The next return is "4th Royal " Irish Dragoons, Head Quarters, Balaklava, 1st October 1854," (*delivering in the same*). Each of those is signed by the commanding officer. The next return, "6th Enniskillen " Regiment of Dragoons, Head Quarters, Balaklava, 1st October 1854," (*delivering in the same*). Now these are four returns, and there are five returns in the whole of the heavy brigade. The remaining regiment is the Scotch Greys, which I have no doubt his Lordship must recollect arriving shortly after the battle of Alma. There are the returns and there are the facts. If the returns are wrong, I trust that measures will be adopted to prevent any such returns ever arriving at the War Office. It was not, certainly, a bad statement to commence with, because it was a very strong one. Now, he says, "My " object in this is solely to show the incorrectness of those commissioners. It is not " whether their Report will tell more to their disadvantage, or less to their disadvantage, " but it is solely to show that, whenever they speak of the cavalry, those gentlemen are " unfortunately always in error." I have already referred to the fact to show that really, if we have committed an error it has been on the side favourable to the cavalry, as I shall hereafter have occasion to show the Board. "They say that the heavy cavalry that " were in the Crimea from the 1st of October amounted to 1,055 horses." Then follows a long dissertation, in which it would appear that we are all in error in regard to the statistical parts of our calculations, but the result of it is certainly not to bring out that we had been at all unfavourable to the cavalry, but that we had falsified our results to show that the cavalry were uncommonly healthy. Now I am sure I need scarcely mention to the Board that there are two ways in which the loss in a regiment can be calculated, or is usually calculated. In the one you say I arrived in the Crimea with 1,000 men six months ago; my strength just now is only 400; I have lost 600, and the proportion upon that is so much, it is 60 per cent: that is the ordinary course. You do not go into the calculation of what was the strength upon the first day of the month, the 1st, and the 2d, and so on. You do not take into account what number joined during that time, but

9th April 1856.

you merely give a rough statement. If you go more minutely into it, the way is this:—You may say I want the average mortality, for the other is the aggregate mortality, (really I am sorry that it is necessary to explain this, for I supposed there was not an officer who did not know it.) The average mortality is taken upon this principle. You start with 1,000, in January died 100, remain 900; died another 100 in February, remain 800; next month 100 out of 800 die, and there remain 700, and so on. The result is this, that when you add the whole of the strength together, you find that the average strength is only 750, instead of being 1,000, and yet the total number lost is 600, as before, thereby making your mortality, calculated upon that principle, instead of 60 per cent., 80 per cent. Now, if there are two modes of calculating such as that, the one being a very strict and proper mode, and the other being one which does not go so much into particulars, the question was, which of the two modes was I able to adopt. I did not wish to leave the public without information. I wished to give it to them as well as I could, and it was necessary that they should have it.

I shall now refer to the return of the mortality, and I would refer the Board to the return of Mr. Deputy Commissary General Adams, at page 69 of the "Evidence." That was the only information that I could get, and I believe the only information to be got, in the Crimea. The Board will there see that there was no means of getting at all that information as to how many were alive on the 1st of the month, and how many left, and how many joined. Therefore, this was the only information that I had. If I could have got the other I should have been very glad, for it would have made a more complete return, but one infinitely more unfavourable to the cavalry, because it would have nearly doubled the proportion. It is here stated:—"Transport imported into the Crimea since "the landing of the army on the 14th of September 1854: horses and mules, 2,329; "Maltese carts, 296. The transfer to the Land Transport Corps is not yet completed. "The numbers will be about: horses and mules 1,200; carts, 200. Issued for regimental "and other purposes: horses, 160. In possession of commissariat storekeepers, con- "ductors, interpreters, and orderlies, &c.: horses, 80." Then are stated the casualties:— "Died and shot, at the sick depôt at Karani, since the 1st of January 1855: horses and "mules, 200. Died from the severity of the weather, fatigue, and exposure: horses and "mules, 689. Lost or destroyed: carts, 96." Now among those were upwards of 200 horses and mules which were lost. The Board will see the statements in regard to that in the correspondence between Lord Raglan and the commissary general, in which great fault is found because so many had been lost, whereas only fourteen died. That being the only information that I could get, I was obliged to construct my tables according to the information that I had as to the transport, and those of the cavalry in the same way, and the result was, that the deaths in the heavy brigade were 47 per cent.; the light cavalry, 38 per cent.; the artillery, 42 per cent; and the commissariat animals, 38 per cent. It is very properly observed by Lord Lucan, that a considerable proportion of those transport animals arrived late, and hence that would make t lange probably in the mortality; but he forgets altogether to notice that there were no m,055 cavalry horses of heavy cavalry during the time that I refer to in this return, whicheakes 47 per cent., but very little more than 500 or 600; that they dropped down by d grees, which, of course, made the mortality as here shown:—"Heavy cavalry, 1,055: died by sickness, 493. "Light cavalry: strength, 1,161; died by sickness, 439. Artillery: strength, 2,832; "died by sickness, 1,190." I was rather taken by this return, because it brought them all so nearly to a par. It seemed to show that all had been suffering pretty much alike. Since I returned to the War Office I have gone into these matters more minutely, and I am able from those returns to make an abstract of what the mortality was—the maximum mortality, which is the point at which I understand Lord Lucan aims—thinking that still it will be considerably lower than in the case of the transport animals.

Now I have got it, and I may mention that the loss in five months has been frightful. In the Heavy Brigade I find that out of an average strength of 727, there died in the months of November, December, January, February, and March, 501. I have not the returns of the other months, or rather, they are intermixed; and, be it recollected, that not one was killed in action. All these I have taken out from the returns, yet positively 501 died out of 727, making a mortality of 69 per cent. His Lordship can see from that whether in the original statement I had wished to injure the cavalry. To the Light Brigade I will refer in the same way. There, the strength of every month, and the deaths in the same month are taken out, and I am almost afraid to say what the mortality is. His Lordship was very anxious to learn it, and I can tell him—out of the average strength of 427, 394 died—this is from authentic returns, signed, if not by his Lordship, by his Lordship's officers. Now, as to that mortality, I must make it up, as his Lordship wishes, that is to say, taking month after month, removing those that arrive, taking out those that go away, it is 92 per cent. of the horses—or out of 427 horses, 394 died. I am very glad to be able to bring this statement before the Board, for this reason, that I am certain when they see a frightful mortality like this, such as probably never occurred before, and such as probably never will occur again, they certainly will not find fault with me, or with my co-commissioner, for expecting that, at that time, every possible mode that could be adopted, and everything that human ingenuity could devise, would be devised for the purpose of saving the few horses on which, perhaps, the salvation of the British army depended. I think I have said quite enough about the difference in the

9th April 1856.

mortality, and his Lordship will see from this that statistics are rather dangerous tools. It is very necessary that they should be correctly understood, and even when they are correctly understood, in circumstances such as these, which surpass in mortality all that has ever been heard of, it is an exceedingly difficult thing indeed to draw your conclusions,—indeed to draw any but one conclusion, that probably never in the memory of man has such an event been heard of, and it is probable that never will such an event be heard of again.

His Lordship next states, "Now, when this comparison is entered into, and most "invidiously entered into, for the purpose of throwing dirt and discredit upon the cavalry, "it must be recollected that when the cavalry lost their horses, it was when they were "exposed to all the inclemency of the weather in the wettest month that we had during "the whole of the campaign, when they were removed from forage, and laboured under "every difficulty." Now I know perfectly the difficulties that they were labouring under; but I must certainly disclaim any intention of throwing dirt or discredit upon the cavalry. And I think that a person who has put forward before the public a statement showing a loss of 44 instead of 92 per cent., cannot be accused of exaggeration. I am sure his Lordship should be the last person to say we had attempted to disparage the cavalry.

I next come to that part in reference to the hutting of the cavalry. His Lordship states, "I shall now go on to the next point. Until now it has been figures and calculations, "by which I hope I have satisfied the Board that the Commissioners were exceedingly "wrong. I am now coming to facts. In page 36, the Commissioners state, 'The date "'at which the hutting of the cavalry commenced was in no case earlier than the end of "'January or beginning of February.' But I wish the Commissioners to understand, "that from the word 'date' down to the word 'proposal,' I shall take it to pieces and shall "answer every sentence. My first sentence is, 'The date at which the hutting of the "'cavalry commenced was in no case earlier than the end of January or beginning of "'February.'" I must say, that it appears to me very disingenuous of his Lordship, after we had sent to him a letter explaining that this paragraph had no reference whatever to the stables, again to refer to it. The paragraph that is alluded to is this: "The date at "which the hutting of the cavalry commenced was in no case earlier than the end of "January or beginning of February, and it was not completed before the middle of March, "by which time the severity of the season had so far abated that this shelter was of comparatively little importance; considering that these men were within about a mile of the "store, where the wood might be obtained, that they had no work in the trenches, and "that the only duties likely to interfere with the application both of horses and men to "this important object was the carrying up of their own forage from Balaklava, and furnishing parties occasionally to bring down sick and carry up provisions to the front "(which seems never to have occupied more than about a fifth part of the whole), it appears "strange that more rapid progress was not made in obtaining the advantage of hut accommodation, particularly when they are described as having suffered so much in their tents." Now, as horses do not live in tents, and they did not live in tents there, I cannot imagine that any one could possibly mistake this passage as applying to the horses; therefore, I have only to refer to the evidence upon which this statement was founded. That evidence I shall give you seriatim. In order that there might be no mistake in regard to many of those questions upon which it was important to have dates and signatures, a series of circulars was sent round to each of the officers, and their attention was called to certain queries upon which answers were required. One of these queries was to this effect:—"At what date did you commence to hut your corps, and when were they all hutted?" A plain and simple question; and the answer to it was from Major Wardlaw of the 1st Royal Dragoons: "Commenced at the latter end of January and completed the "hutting by the 1st of March" Lieutenant-Colonel Griffith of the 2d Dragoons. "I "made requisition for huts, and got some of them early in February, and the regiment "was hutted partially (the issue not being enough for the whole regiment) on or about "the middle of March last." Lieutenant-Colonel Forest, 4th Dragoon Guards: "First "hut for hospital completed upon the 28th of January. The duty men hutted in the "course of February and March." Lieutenant-Colonel White, 6th Dragoons: "In "February. There are now five huts for the men and two for the hospital." Major Thompson, 5th Dragoon Guards: "Commenced hutting on the 15th February, "completed on the 7th March." Lieutenant-Colonel Low, 4th Light Dragoons: "On "or about the 6th of February they were commenced, and all hutted by the middle of "March, 1855." Colonel Shewell, 8th Hussars: "The first hospital hut was finished "early in February, and the last of the troop huts early in April." Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, 11th Hussars: (No answer.) Lieutenant-Colonel Doherty, 13th Light Dragoons: "On or about the 10th of February, and finished about the end of March." Major Benson, 17th Lancers: "I began hutting about the beginning of February, the "men were all hutted by the middle of March." Now, taking that in connexion, let us see whether we have stated what was the case. The date at which the hutting of the cavalry commenced was in no case earlier than the end of January, or the beginning of February, and it was not completed before the middle of March. If the Board refer to that they will find that is exactly what we have stated. I think the Board will agree with me, that considering the fact of those men not having the usual duties

9th April 1856.

of the trenches, and having nothing, so far as we know, to interfere with their ordinary duties, except that of carrying up the forage from Balaklava and sick from the front, it does appear strange, considering how much they suffered and how much they complained, that they could not manage within a mile of Balaklava to complete the shelter for themselves. It was also stated, at least doubt had been raised, as to whether there were not more than a fifth part of the whole occupied in this way. Upon this point I must observe that, as we had no authority to inquire into the details of duty, we were obliged to take the whole of such details in the mass out of the aggregate number, and as many as one fifth part of the whole were employed in those duties. To establish this it is only necessary to refer to a return by Colonel Hodge, and another by Colonel Mayow, for the Board will observe that we did nothing without returns, and I should not have appeared at all had it not been for the circumstance that to a great extent I feel responsible for these returns, and when any error arises in them I do think it my duty to come forward immediately to prevent the smallest doubt arising, as it is only in that way that correct conclusions can be drawn. I have nothing to conceal in the matter. Then, as to the second cavalry brigade, in page 2 of the Appendix, you will see a "Return of the number of men and horses who conveyed "sick from the front to Balaklava." Then follows Return No. 3, "showing the dates "that the light cavalry brigade were employed by the commissariat department, and "the number of horses so employed." In regard to this last return we have only the number of horses, the number of men I was obliged to estimate from the number of horses, but as the same principle was adopted as in the heavy brigade,—that is to say, where there was one man to every two horses, no difficulty arose in making the calculation. I have now to show that it was really the case that a fifth part of the whole were so employed for this purpose. In this, I did not trust to anything else but the returns. The Board will see, from the return forwarded to the War Office, that a statement is given of the strength upon a given day (the first of the month) in each of the brigades, that I have already extracted from, viz.—November, December, January, February, March, and April. December is the month, I think, which we require to refer to in this case. Now, I find that, taking all the ranks except officers, there were in the Crimea, exclusive of the sick and of the officers' servants, in the month of December, 866 men in the heavy brigade. I do not include the sick gone to Scutari; in addition to that, there were sick present in the heavy brigade, so far as could be ascertained 137, and there were 76 servants to the officers, so that the total number in that heavy brigade was 1,079 men of all ranks except officers. In the light brigade, in the month of December, there were about 560 as the total number, exclusive of sick present, of men on detached duty and officers' servants, or in all about 786, that is to say, there would thus be about 1,865 of all ranks, exclusive of officers, effective and non-effective, in the Crimea. Now, one fifth part of 1,865 is 373, and I find that the utmost number that ever was employed, as laid down in this return, was 180 between the 19th of December and the 26th in the heavy cavalry brigade, and about 60 in the light, making a total of 240. There, as again his Lordship will admit, so far from having overstated the fact, I have understated it, and I am apprehensive that in my anxiety to state as little as possible the public will now accuse me probably of having withheld the truth. These are the returns, one of them signed by his own brigade major, and upon these three documents I found my statement.

The next remark I enter upon with considerable pain, not for myself, but for the noble lord who originated it. His Lordship, with the view, apparently, of slighting the position of the Commissioners, refers to the one as a Commissioner of Poor Laws, the other as the Statistical Clerk of the War Office,—the inference intended to be drawn by the public being obviously that we could know nothing of the military subjects which we had to investigate. But for this inference I should certainly not have adverted to the remark. I should have been ashamed to do so, conceiving that it should have been sufficient for Lord Lucan that the one Commissioner originally in the army had held with honour and credit for many years the high position of Ambassador to a Foreign State, and the other, after being thirty years in the army, was now holding Her Majesty's commission as colonel, and that both had been selected by Her Majesty's Government for the performance of an arduous, a painful, and a difficult task. His Lordship, I presume, must be aware that the position I have held for the last fourteen years has been that of Military Superintendent of Pensioners with the rank of Lieut.-Colonel and Colonel, involving the command of an armed force of above 15,000 men, besides the superintendence of about four times that number who are unarmed. As his Lordship has thought proper, however, to refer to my statistical services at the War Office, it may be proper to mention that I was, some three or four years before my appointment to command the pensioner force, taken from the effective strength of my regiment as captain, after serving for several years in the East Indies, and at the Senior Department of the Royal Military College, for the purpose of assisting in carrying through numerous important changes then making by Earl Grey, the Secretary at War, in the localities for quartering the troops, particularly in tropical climates, the mode of relief, their rations, diet, and comforts and health; these changes had to be founded not on loose opinions, but on statistical information derived from a series of military returns and reports extending over a long series of years. That information was reported by me to Parliament in a series of volumes similar to the present, it encountered a similar opposition from various officers, was ultimately carried into effect, and attended with the happiest

9th April 1856.

effects. Perhaps the Board will conceive that this was no bad training for the duty which subsequently devolved on me in the Crimea, and that, though I am no Statistical Clerk of the War Office, as his Lordship has pleased to call me, my connexion with that department, and with the science in question, has, I am proud to say, been a good preparation for the strict investigations demanded and expected of me in the recent inquiry. I may add, that when the advantages attending these arrangements were fully realized, by the loss of the troops being reduced at several stations nearly one half, I was complimented by the commander-in-chief with the rank of major for my success,—an honour which thus acquired I feel prouder of than those on his Lordship's breast. Mine was obtained by the saving of the soldier's life. I hope that the present investigation will show that his Lordship's honours have been gained in a similar way, and not merely by his deeds of valour in the field. Considering the inference obviously intended to be drawn by Lord Lucan's novel designation of me, perhaps the Board will excuse my adding that my next step of rank was granted several years after for special service in Ireland, by Lord Hardinge, where, under his Lordship's direction in 1843, I had succeeded in training, clothing, arming, and equipping, during a period of great commotion, and in different parts of that country, about 7,000 pensioners, who were subsequently kept up for some time, and thereafter extended during the next two or three years to about 15,000 throughout the United Kingdom, and formed into a regularly organized force, which has since been under my command. Perhaps this may be considered also no bad training for the duties which have recently devolved on me in the Crimea. It ought, at all events, to have accustomed me to that organization of masses of men which is so essential where an officer has to inquire into facts connected with an enormous collection of supplies of every possible description, and in great confusien.

I am not aware, at this moment, that I have any further observations to make, but I am anxious, if the Board are of opinion that this is the proper time, to call as witnesses one or two officers of different regiments, and to question them shortly as to their mode of proceeding. There is one point which I have not enlarged upon. I deny altogether that there are any animadversions in the Report. I deny that there is anything of the kind. And before I proceed further on that subject, I would like to read the paragraphs which I understand are complained of. I am particularly anxious that the subject of the animadversions should be discussed, if possible, first. I did not wish to take any part in these proceedings until I saw that the report was impugned, or until circumstances arose which made it necessary for me to come to defend the authenticity of the report, and the returns upon which it was founded. I should like to have had the point settled as to whether there are any animadversions in it. It appeared to me that there were no animadversions in the strict legal acceptation of the word, and that there is no officer that has any complaint to make here.

This is one of the parts which his Lordship objects to at page 20 of the Report, "With "reference to the effect of the deficiency of forage and the other privations to which the "horses of the army were exposed, we have ascertained the loss among them from various "causes in the cavalry and artillery. A summary of the returns obtained on that head will "be found at page 193 of Appendix, which shows the loss attributable to sickness to be as "follows, for the six months from October to March, inclusive." "On referring to the "loss sustained by the commissariat animals during the same period, it will be found "rather less in the cavalry or artillery, the deaths among them having, according to a "return furnished by Deputy Commissary General Adams, amounted to about 889 out "of 2,329 originally imported into the Crimea, or in the proportion of 38 per cent.; a "result which could scarcely have been expected, considering the advantages which "cavalry horses might be supposed to have over hard worked baggage animals, to whom "little attention could be paid at such a period." Now I ask, is there any animadversion there? Does it follow that because those horses happened to die, say a little faster than the working animals, therefore this is necessarily an animadversion? I could perhaps tell Lord Lucan what was our object; it was a totally different one, and if he will look at the discussions that took place as to the commissariat, he will probably find what that was. But this is not the place to go into that. I will not tell him what were the reasons which I and my colleague had in writing this part; but this I can say, that it had no reference to the cavalry. How any such sentence as this could be laid hold of and brought as an animadversion before the Court, I cannot understand. I deny that there is any animadversion or any intention to animadvert; and I deny that any legal authority whatever could say that it has the smallest resemblance to an animadversion.

I now come to the next part. I have read it before, but it is as well perhaps to read it again, in order to show that there is no animadversion on Lord Lucan. "The date at which the hutting of the cavalry commenced was in no case earlier than "the end of January or beginning of February, and it was not completed before "the middle of March, by which time the severity of the season had so far abated that "this shelter was of comparatively little importance." I beg to call the attention of the Board to that, because it was the case that the huts were put up when the men would rather have been in tents, and when they did not care about them. "Considering that "these men were within about a mile of the store where the wood might be obtained, "that they had no work in the trenches, and that the only duties likely to interfere with "the application both of horses and men to this important object was the carrying up of

9th April 1856.

" their own forage from Balaklava, and furnishing parties occasionally to bring down sick, " and carry up provisions to the front (which seems never to have occupied more than a " fifth part of the whole), it appears strange that more rapid progress was not made in " obtaining the advantage of hut accommodation, particularly when they are described as " having suffered so much in their tents." Now, I ask again, is there any animadversion there? Lord Lucan's name is never once mentioned. There may have been many reasons why they could not have done this—reasons which I could not know, and which we were not allowed to inquire into— many military reasons. All we say is that it appeared strange, that is, when we came home, and this volume was presented to the Secretary-at-War, for we thought that this was one of the subjects that he would naturally have to direct his attention to. But there is no animadversion; and the only fact which we have stated is established by the returns, that is to say, we have said that there was a fifth part of the men only occupied in those commissariat details, but I find there were really 133 less than a fifth part, that is the difference. I think it is necessary to know whether this is an animadversion, for it is one of the points which it appears to me was the first point that we had to ascertain. I do not know what alteration may have been in the Warrant, but I clearly understood that when an officer appeared before this Board, supposing that he had been animadverted upon, the animadversion must not be an implied animadversion—not that such and such a thing was supposed, and therefore that the officer felt sore under it—but it must be an animadversion in the strict legal acceptation of the term, and any lawyer will tell us what that is. I have taken the best opinion in England on the subject, and that informs me that it is no animadversion. The same argument has been used in Parliament, without having once been questioned. There is one animadversion in the volume, and only one; but it is not upon Lord Lucan, and it is not upon any one in this country; and when the person finds fault with it, I shall be ready to defend it; but there is no animadversion here. It is all very well for Lord Lucan taking up the case for the cavalry, but the law will not permit him to step forward, without grounds, to defend a certain body of men. It may be very well for their general to be tender of the reputation of his men, and his own, in such a case; and to look into the facts and see whether such a thing was or was not the case, but he is not to consider the remarks of the Commissioners an animadversion upon him. As I read the warrant, it is only when there is a real animadversion upon Lord Lucan, or upon an officer, that he may heard. I now come to the next passage in the Report that is complained of: " Considering also the sufferings and severe loss of horses from exposure " to the weather in the commencement of the winter, there appears to have been a want of " promptitude or ingenuity in devising for them some means of temporary shelter, such as " saved the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava. Experience has now " proved, that even a very moderate degree of shelter would have been sufficient to save the " lives of many of the horses, if not to maintain them in serviceable condition; and it must " be presumed that such measures were considered practicable, for a proposal to erect, with " the assistance of his men, some sort of cover for the horses of the corps, appears to have " been made by the officer commanding the Scots Greys; but the manner in which it is " stated to have been received by the Lieutenant General commanding the cavalry, was " calculated to deter other officers from making any similar proposal." Now there is not one word here stated as to Lord Lucan in the first part of this at all. I will come to the other by-and-by. The suffering and loss of horses might not have been Lord Lucan's fault; the Quartermaster General some people would blame, but I did not enter into those distinctions, nor did I know them at all. All that I had to do was to state facts that came out, leaving it hereafter for the Government to find out who was at fault. I was there for the purpose of inquiring into the state of the supplies, and not into the conduct of the officers. And the Commissioners have stated in the report, without referring to Lord Lucan, exactly what those facts were, and I think I shall be able to show the Board a tolerably good primâ facie case for supposing that what we said was tolerably correct. The case is simply this. In the Crimea there has always been a great difficulty, I believe, in regard to stabling; and the ordinary course when stabling cannot be had, is to dig a trench about nine feet square, to the depth of three feet, and throw the earth up to a height of about between two and three feet, and that gives about five feet shelter. That five feet of shelter affords a very great protection indeed to a horse. I do not mean to say that it is the best possible protection, but it is a vast deal better than none at at all; and, judging from the results in the Crimea, I do not mean to say that I am prepared to go into statistical results, but I have every reason for saying, that when the horses stood in that shelter, that is giving them a side shelter five feet high, they did not lose a fifth part or anything like a fifth part of those that were lost, which were continually exposed and standing at pickets. I do not mean to say that I have statistical results to prove this, but it stands to reason. It is a physiological fact which nobody can deny that if horses are under the lee of a wall and sheltered, they must be infinitely healthier and infinitely less subject to mortality than when standing up to their knees in mud with a freezing wind blowing upon them. When they lie down in the mud they never get up again. But there are various other modes of shelter. It is admitted, I believe, that in some parts sail-cloth is a very great advantage; a framework made of it had the effect, in three companies of Artillery, of protecting them very well indeed. It is true that occasionally the canvas has been broken, and occasionally parts of them have been blown down, but

9th April 1856.

still they were after the winter was over standing in very good condition, which shows that a sail-cloth and a frame is, at any rate, a very valuable mode of sheltering horses. Now the first thing is, could you get sail-cloth? And in talking of ingenuity and expediency, I think one of the most probable things that would occur to anybody is this. The fleet of Her Majesty was lying at or in the vicinity of Kasatch; that fleet contained as I think upwards of 15 ships of war besides smaller vessels. On board of those vessels there was, what quantity do you think of canvas? On board an 80 gun ship, I do not take a 120 gun ship, there are 12,947 yards of ship's sails; more than an acre; and in addition to that, there are 7844 yards of spare sails to replace the others. I am not quite sure whether there is a double set of sails in addition to that or not. And will any one tell me if there had been the slightest ingenuity exercised upon this occasion, that one of the first things would not have been to have sent to the admiral lying off Sebastopol, and say, "Can you let us have, out of your hundreds of thousands of yards of spare sails, 20,000 "or 30,000 yards, if we replace them to you from Constantinople in a week?" It appears to me that that was the plain and simple mode of doing it. These are the things that I was sent out to inquire into: the state of the supplies, and whether they had been used as they ought to have been, and whether a proper degree of ingenuity had been exercised in everything, in order to meet the dreadful state in which the troops were then represented to be. I cannot exactly state the quantity, but there must have been about 100,000 yards of spare sails in the fleet. After that, I hope we shall hear no more of the difficulty of getting sail-cloth. But sail-cloth, it is said, cannot be put up in a hurry without some assistance; carpenters are also required; these were also in the fleet. It was a very large fleet, and a kinder admiral could not be found, or a man more willing to give anything to the army. Had he been told that Lord Lucan was losing at the rate of 500 horses in two months, there would not have been a carpenter or a sail that he had in his possession that would not have been sent over instantly. As to carpenters, I will just mention what there are on board a first rate man-of-war. There are sixteen, in addition to a large number of handy men who are always taking their share in carpenters' work. A second rate has fourteen, a third rate has thirteen, a fourth rate eleven, and there are eight in a fifth rate, and so forth. I have here the number at every rate in the Black Sea, and I find that there are fourteen of them above fifty guns, and not less than thirty or forty smaller vessels. Under those circumstances, what could have prevented Admiral Lyons from sending 100 out of his 200 or 300 carpenters, and an indefinite number of yards of sail-cloth. I have heard of seventeen carpenters in one place, but that is a very small number. Suppose, however, that there had been no fleet at all, there were lying in the harbour at Balaklava I know not how many vessels. I have a return of the number lying there, of steam and sailing transports, without reckoning the number of those which were employed in commerce, and which might be moving backwards and forwards and not lying at the port. I find that there were in the month of November, on the 8th of that month, fourteen sail in steamers and fifteen sail in transports, and a good number of those were lying as store ships, and never using their sails,—that is to say, when the men were perishing for the want of sail-cloth, sail-cloth was lying within a yard of them, not being used at all. On the 8th of November there were twelve steamers, and on the 13th there were thirteen sailing transports, making twenty-five. On the 8th of December there were twelve, and the average was about thirty vessels lying in the harbour of Balaklava, not including those that might have been brought round from Eupatoria. Each of those vessels had two or three sets of sails, and one set might have been obtained from her by paying for it, and it might have been replaced at Constantinople, where the arsenal contained I do not know how many thousand yards of canvas, and no vessels requiring it, owing to the destruction of the fleet.

As to the digging of trenches to shelter the horses, there apparently could be only one difficulty, for there was the soil, and all that was wanted were hands and tools to dig. The first question is to know exactly how much digging is required for a purpose of this kind. In the cavalry we all know well that the men are strong, bred up in agricultural pursuits, and they are men who can dig very well indeed when they like. The question is what quantity of soil is required to be dug out, and what time would it probably take? Upon that subject I can give the Board some calculations. I hold in my hand a very useful book, called "The Hand Book for Field Service," in which the whole of the labour of a man is very clearly detailed, and how much he can do, and that is seldom calculated at too high a rate. Under the head of "Working Parties," I find that the task to be exacted from each workman varies from the hardness of the soil, between one and two cubic yards per hour, or from four to six cubic yards per hour for each relief. Now we must ascertain what number of cubic yards there are in the space to be excavated. It is to be for two horses, and of course the smaller you make it the better, if they can turn round. The space for two horses would be about nine cubic yards, or about four and a half to each. That would require one man for a day, reckoning that he was able only to execute one cubic yard per hour. But say that it required two days. The question is whether it was not possible by any means to procure shelter, say between the 1st of December, when the horses came down, and the 13th of December, when they began to be employed on the commissariat. That is a matter of calculation. I will submit to the Board the exact number that were present, and how many men could have effected the work in question. I find that in November the total number of the heavy brigade

9th April 1856.

of all ranks, exclusive of officers, was 946; the sick of course must be left out, and the servants to officers. And of the light brigade there were somewhere about 560; that gives a total of about 1,500 men. Well, suppose that there was only a week, 1,500 men would have put up this temporary shelter in less than two or three days. That temporary shelter which I have described is nothing more than a trench dug, the earth thrown out, and an artificial wall formed. It was not until the 13th that those horses began to be employed in commissariat duties and transport of the sick. But upon all these points I shall refer by-and-by to evidence, and I shall refer more particularly to the evidence of Lord Lucan himself, and that of officers who know exactly what quantity of work the men could do, and how far this description of shelter was calculated to have preserved the horses during the emergency that occurred.

I am not aware that I need now detain the Board by any further remarks. I have gone through all those points that relate to the returns. If there is anything further I should be very glad to go into it; but I am not aware that there is. I may mention one thing with regard to the huts for the men. As a matter of course, if this temporary shelter had been procured for the horses in the way I describe, or by sail-cloth, or by any mode by which it could have been at once brought into operation, you could then have put the men upon erecting huts for themselves sooner; and when once they were erected, you could have gone back to improve still further the stabling of the horses. We have therefore stated that it is strange that more rapid progress was not made. There is very little doubt that if the horses had been put under temporary shelter by means of those pits, or by sail-cloth, the men would have had more time for their own hutting, and for getting them up long before they did. I shall not trouble the Board with any further remarks at present, but there are one or two officers whom I wish to call.

(*President.*) Have you any questions to put to Lord Lucan?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) By-and-by I have; but I should like to put some questions to some of his officers first.

(*President.*) Are they present?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Major Thompson of the Fifth Dragoon Guards is present.

(*Major Thompson.*) I have not been summoned. I should have been here in uniform if I had been summoned.

(*President.*) The Board will allow you to be examined without uniform.

---

*Major R. Thompson.*

9th April 1856.

Major RICHARD THOMPSON examined by Colonel TULLOCH.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you that it is not compulsory upon you to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

118. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) In what condition were your horses early in December 1854?—In a very bad condition.

119. In a very bad condition indeed?—Yes.

120. Did they not especially require shelter at that time, owing to their being in such a reduced condition?—Certainly they did.

121. Were the horses entirely exposed when standing at the pickets in that severe weather, without any shelter whatever, the wind freezing their bodies in December?—We did shelter them in a certain degree. We dug a trench. I had it dug myself in December. That trench was dug as you have stated. The trenches were dug so as to prevent the wet getting to the horses in a certain degree.

122. Were the trenches dug into the ground?—A trench was dug, and a certain quantity of mud was thrown up from the trench.

123. To what depth did you go?—I cannot say exactly, because we, the 5th Dragoon Guards, were on a rocky soil underneath; but as far as the mud went, it was done, and it was by way of protection.

124. Was it found to be a great advantage to the horses?—An immense advantage. It kept the rain from them.

125. Had all the regiments of cavalry the same protection?—I cannot say exactly. I can only answer for my own regiment.

126. If they had, would you have seen it?—I did not go much amongst the light cavalry, but the Greys had in a certain degree.

127. As much as they might have had?—I cannot exactly say what number of men there were. I can only answer for my own regiment. I was there from morning to night amongst my own men. I did not pay much attention to other regiments. I superintended it all myself.

128. That was a great advantage to your regiment?—Certainly it was.

129. Have you any idea how long one man was employed in putting up shelter of that description for one horse?—It was not done in that way; but all the men I had to spare worked for the whole of the horses—it was not each man doing it for his own horse. At that time, in December, there were as many as seventy-five men in the hospital, and the consequence was, that there were a great many spare horses for the men to look after, and to get up forage besides.

130. How many men had you disposable about that time?—I cannot exactly say, but there were as many as from seventy-five to eighty men in the hospital.

131. There must have been at least 100 men?—Yes, at least.

132. 150?—I cannot say exactly.

133. How long would it take 150 men to dig trenches for an equal number of horses?—I had not more men than twenty, and taking twenty men to do their work, half of those men were taken off from different other purposes, such as cooking and sending orderlies to the front, and other duties, and a certain number of horses had to be saddled and kept ready to be turned out in case the enemy came across the plain.

134. How long would it take a greater number of men—say 150 men?—I cannot exactly say how long it would take.

135. How many days would it have taken thirty men to do it?—To throw up so many feet?

136. How long would it take thirty men to throw up a sufficient quantity for 150 horses—about 75 of those widths 9 feet square would have been equivalent to the labour of about two sappers for a day, at the ordinary rate of calculation for trenching?—Upon the ground we took I should think it would have taken them at least a fortnight, for the number of men that I had.

137. That would have been about two days if you had had 150 men?—Yes.

138. At what time was this work done?—I commenced immediately after we came down from before Lord Raglan's, when we came down to Kadekoi from the upper camp.

139. You cannot say what depth you dug down to or what height of shelter there was?—Before I left it was twelve feet into the depth of the ground.

140. That was very good shelter?—Very good shelter—it was entirely through this rocky ground.

141. Had you a sufficiency of intrenching tools at that time?—No; we had not quite sufficient.

142. Was the number of men reduced so much as to have only twenty employed, in consequence of the want of intrenching tools, or because every other man was employed in some other way?—The intrenching tools were very bad; the pickaxes had no steel at all at the top, and the moment a man began to pick it bent, and was of no use whatever. There were no spades, and the shovels were infamous—they broke at the handle immediately the men commenced to work.

143. Did you get them replaced as they broke?—A few of them were replaced, but there was a great difficulty to get them, because there were so many hands to go through?

144. The difficulty was not merely the want of men, but the want of tools?—Both men and tools.

145. If you had had more tools you could have done the work in a shorter time, that is to say, 150 men would have put up a shelter for 150 horses in one day instead of two To provide such a shelter it only required plenty of tools, and 150 men would excavate the requisite description of pit or shelter for 150 horses in one day, provided you had had plenty of tools?—Yes.

146. You are quite satisfied that a very great advantage was derived from that?—Certainly.

147. You cannot tell whether any other regiment had what you had?—I was there from morning to night. I never left, except to go down to Balaklava. I never went through the other regiments at that time.

148. Supposing you had had canvas and carpenters, could you have succeeded in putting up shelter of that kind more quickly?—Of course; and it would have been much more beneficial.

149. Would such shelter have stood the wind there?—I have my doubts as to whether it would; that depended upon the manner in which it was put up.

150. Supposing it were blown down, and all the huts were blown down once or twice, you could have put it up again, could you not?—They could always have been put up again.

151. It would only have been a question of expense?—Yes.

152. Have you any idea in what time shelter could have been put up for one horse in that way, or for 150 horses?—It could have been put up immediately had we had everything at hand.

153. Suppose that plenty of canvas had been purchased down at Balaklava, and a certain number of carpenters had been hired and paid, in what time could they have put up sufficient shelter for your whole regiment?—Suppose we had had a sufficient number of men, and the canvas on the ground, it could have been put up in one day for the 5th Dragoon Guards.

154. I mean with twenty carpenters?—Yes, and the men of the regiment on the ground, certainly it could have been put up in one day.

155. Did your men exhibit much ingenuity in providing shelter for the horses; were they good hands at it?—Some of them, of course, were, that had been labourers, but men who had been brought up to different pursuits had not the same advantage.

156. As a general rule did they exhibit much ingenuity, were they good hands at that description of work?—I should say that they were.

157. They were good hands at it?—Certainly.

*Major R. Thompson.*

9th April 1856.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, I have offered no objection to the manner in which Colonel Tulloch has been examining, but I really wish to call the attention of the Court to the fact that I was very properly, according to the custom in military courts of inquiry, restricted to examining from written questions, but Colonel Tulloch has allowed himself—I know quite against the wish of the Board—not only to put questions directly, but he has actually put his own conclusions into the mouth of the witness, and I hope before Colonel Tulloch returns to this examination on Friday he will learn to conform more to the ordinary practice.

(*President to Colonel Tulloch.*) The questions must all be submitted first to the Judge Advocate General.

(*Judge Advocate General to Lord Lucan.*) I beg to inform your Lordship that a series of questions were submitted by Colonel Tulloch to me, and they were quite admissible. He then examined the witness from a paper containing those questions.

(*Earl of Lucan*). What I should still object to is this, that he put his conclusions into the mouth of the witness. If I recollect rightly, I did it in a minor degree yesterday, and it was very properly objected to.

Adjourned to Friday next, at Eleven o'clock.

## FIFTH DAY

### Friday, April 11, 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, I suggested to the Board on a former occasion that it would be well that they should provide themselves with a return of the number of transport animals on different dates in the Crimea. I have considered the matter, and I think that the return should be to this effect: it should show how many transport animals and ambulance animals landed in the Crimea with the expedition, the number that subsequently disembarked, with the dates of disembarkation, and the number of transport animals alive on the 1st of October, and on the 1st of the five subsequent months. The return must include all the government baggage horses landed, also those landed with the different regiments, and with the different branches of the army. 11th April 1856.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) In making out that return I submit that it is absolutely necessary not merely to state the number of horses alive, but also to state what has become of the horses. As an instance of that I refer the Board to page 69 of the Appendix to the Report of the Commission of Inquiry. They will there find a statement which was submitted to Lord Raglan to show what had become of 716 horses. Those horses are accounted for between the 16th day of December and the 11th day of January, a period of nearly one month. It there appears that out of the whole of that number, 716, there died in the camp nineteen. The Board yesterday heard a statement made of what number died out of a corresponding number of cavalry horses, but they will also find that in addition to this there were deficient 279. 279 of those horses upon which so much depended were missing. A correspondence arose between Lord Raglan and the commissariat department, which the Board will see recorded in pages 67, 68, and 69. His lordship very properly expressed great dissatisfaction at so vast a number being missing. The Board will observe the tenor of that return called for by Lord Lucan. The whole of these horses would be considered as dead, and those 279 would not be taken into account at all. He wants the number of animals alive upon a given date, thus giving a deficient return from which no correct deductions can be drawn. I want upon the 1st day of the month so many died. I will not take the horses that were stolen, and that sailors were riding by hundreds. I will not take those as dead.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you that if you wish to have any return made, and will specify what it is, the Board will consider of it, and if practicable, will direct it to be made. I understand you now to move that a return may be made in addition to the return moved for by Lord Lucan.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Not exactly in addition; I want to prevent erroneous information going before the public, not merely that they should have that return in a proper form, but that no improper return shall be made. I trust I am not asking for what is incorrect.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You apply to the Board to allow the return moved for by Lord Lucan to be amended?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Very well, the Board will consider that.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I understand that a return has been received, a corrected return it may be called, of the number of men employed in the various duties, particularly for the commissariat.

(*President.*) Received by whom?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I believe it is in the possession of the brigade major. I believe Lord Lucan is aware that there is a return and an amended one of this statement by Colonel Hodge in pages 1, 2, and 3 of the Appendix, the accuracy of which is questioned.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I am told that these returns are either in my possession or in the possession of the brigade major of cavalry; would it not be more convenient, Sir Alexander, if those returns were discussed when they are produced?

(*President.*) Certainly.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have not got the return; I require to call for it. I want a copy of that return in order that it may be compared with the return that I have here.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) There will be no objection on my part to allow you the perusal of any return that we have got; you are welcome to it at this moment.

(*President.*) We will call for those returns.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) It is the wish of the Board that all the witnesses who have been summoned by Colonel Tulloch should retire, except the one under examination.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I propose to call Colonel Douglas.

(*President.*) Have you finished Major Thompson's evidence.

11th April 1856.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I think I shall not require him any further.

(*President to the Earl of Lucan.*) Has your Lordship any questions to put to him?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Shall I be at liberty at a future period to examine Major Thompson?

(*President.*) Certainly.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) Do you apply to the Court that he should be retained for the purpose of your examination at some future time?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) If it is not very inconvenient to Major Thompson I should prefer it.

---

*Colonel John Douglas.*

Colonel JOHN DOUGLAS examined.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you that it is not compulsory upon you to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

158. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) In what condition were your horses immediately after their return from the vicinity of Inkermann early in December?—In a very bad condition indeed.

159. Did their condition most especially require shelter at that time owing to their being in such a reduced state?—Certainly.

160. Were they entirely exposed when standing at their pickets, without any shelter in that severe weather—the wind freezing their bodies?—They were at the commencement of December.

161. Would it have been an advantage at that time if some temporary shelter could have been put around the horses, even though there had been no means of covering it in?—Certainly it would.

162. When no wood can be obtained how is shelter generally procured? Is it not by digging pits and increasing the shelter round the horses by throwing up the earth?—It is.

163. Can you describe to the Board the way in which this is usually done, and its effects upon the health of the horses?—The French do it differently from what we do. At the commencement they dug a trench in front, and the earth that was excavated from it was thrown up and made a breastwork of, and the ground on which the horses stood was sloped back at an angle and paved, and behind that there was another trench dug, and the horses stood in this position—at least the Chasseurs d'Afrique did, and the other regiments of heavy cavalry, those that I saw, had no shelter at all, but the artillery horses on Vinois height close to us were sheltered by walls being built round them towards the end of the winter.

164. As I understand you, some were sheltered by pits surrounded by walls, and some by walls in the front and in the rear?—Yes, they were.

165. One mode was having a low wall in front and rear, and the other having it all round about?—A great deal depended upon the locality. In some places the ground was rocky, and there was plenty of materials, and you could build walls; in some instances it was the reverse, and you could dig pits.

(*President.*) You had better confine yourself to the question, and give a direct answer.

166. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) For the simplest of those modes, are you aware what quantity of earth was to be dug out and thrown up, and the time that it might be expected to take to complete the space for one horse by one man?—It is a matter of calculation; it is according to the number of hours and the material worked upon.

167. Of course there must be an average; what might that average be in either case upon a rough calculation?—I never turned my attention particularly to that; it depends upon the number of cubic feet that a man could displace in a day; it is a matter of simple calculation.

168. Are you aware of the usual quantity of cubic space which one man can displace in an hour?—I am not.

169. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Upon that point, Sir Alexander Woodford, I will put in evidence by-and-bye as to the quantity of cubic space that one man can displace in an hour, evidence taken from printed engineers statements. (*To the witness.*) When did your men arrive at Kadikoi, and when did they commence carrying Commissariat stores?—We marched from the position in the rear of Inkermann on the 2d of December. I cannot tell you now the date that they commenced carrying the Commissariat stores. The light cavalry did not commence; they foraged, I think, first for the heavy cavalry.

170. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) If the Board will refer to page 3 of the Appendix they will see that it is there stated that this duty commenced on the 13th of December. (*To the witness.*) Seeing that your men arrived at Kadikoi on the 2d of December, and that they had no onerous duties till the 13th, how came it that something of this kind was not done in the meantime?—We were not exactly certain when we first arrived that we should remain there for the winter; that was my impression. The men were very much reduced from sickness and the number of men in hospital; there was a picket to furnish, and

constant foraging, and going down to the harbour to bring provisions up for the men. We had very few men to do the necessary duties of the camp, and in very bad weather.

171. Might it not have been possible under those circumstances for men to have been hired, say sailors from the shipping?—That is not a question for me to give an opinion upon. I could not say. It would have been a great advantage if we had been able to get them; but that I know nothing about. I was merely a regimental officer, and I did not know what took place in other respects.

172. Are you aware that the harbour was full of shipping, and that many men connected with the ships were unemployed, and the seamen of many ships of the line might have been engaged if their services were paid for?—I could not answer that question; it is not exactly my province.

173. In a return sent to the War Office it appears that the total number of your regiment, excluding officers, "Sick men on detached duty and servants, was 100?"—In what month?

174. In the month of December?—Yes.

175. Do you mean to state that at the time when they had no commissariat carriage to provide that the whole of those men were so occupied that none were available for an important duty of this kind?—Every available man was immediately set to work as soon as we knew that we were going to remain in our position that we occupied afterwards. Without going into a calculation, I could not tell you how those 108 men were disposed of. So soon as I got the order from Lord Lucan, and I knew that we were to occupy that position which we subsequently held, every available man was set to work to make the best of the position that we then held, according to circumstances.

176. When did you know that you were to occupy the position which you ultimately held?—I do not recollect the exact date. I should say that it was about the middle of December when we first knew that we were permanently to occupy that position.

177. Was it the 16th of December?—I cannot recollect the date.

178. From the 3d of December till the middle of the month was nothing attempted in providing shelter of any kind?—The officers and the men dug trenches round their tents, and they endeavoured to make the horses as comfortable as possible. I think drains were cut; I am not quite sure; but the ground did not get into a very bad state until after the first week. The weather was pretty good when we first came down. It was fresh ground, and consequently it was dry.

179. From the 3d of December till the middle of the month was nothing attempted in the way of providing shelter of any kind as regards the horses?—Not so far as the troop horses were concerned, that I am aware of at this present moment. I do not recollect further than that every available man was working for himself as well as he could,

180. You state that you had a want of men; had you a sufficiency of entrenching tools?—There was a very limited supply.

181. What do you mean by a limited supply?—Not nearly sufficient for the wants of the regiment.

182. Was there sufficient for half; if not for half, was there sufficient for a third; or can you state for what proportion?—I cannot state the exact proportion certainly; they were very limited indeed; not sufficient to go on with the necessary duties of the camp. I cannot state at this distance of time what the proportion was.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, may I be permitted to read a portion of this witness's evidence taken before the commissioners, and signed by himself, upon the subject of entrenching tools? It is very difficult at such a period of time, I know, for a person to recollect; still I think it a most important matter to ascertain what was the proportion.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You are referring to evidence and statements made by Colonel Douglas to the commissioners?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, taken before me, and signed by himself, and appearing in the parliamentary volume.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Why do you propose to do this; is it to refresh the memory of the witness?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; I think it is but fair that I should do so. I should be very sorry indeed to entrap him into any statement that was contrary to anything he has stated there.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I must object:—no doubt if the evidence had been taken at the very time it would be allowable, but the examination of Colonel Douglas by the commission only took place in the month of April, five months after the event.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Is the evidence that you refer to in the published Report?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you apply to the Court to be permitted to refer to that evidence with a view to put a question upon it to the witness?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*President.*) Very well.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I will refer the Board to page 13 of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, towards the latter end of that page.

*Colonel John Douglas.*

11th April 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Are you going to put a question upon the evidence that you are about to read?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, I am; and the Board will find that instead of being in the middle of April when he was examined he was examined in the Crimea on the 20th of March, within, I think, about a week of the time that the huts for the soldiers were completed, and within about a month of the time that the stabling was completed.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Are you going to read the passage to the witness?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; regarding the entrenching tools, from his own evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You may proceed to do so.

183. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) "When the regiment landed in the Crimea, it was only allowed "three bât animals; the regulation allowance being fourteen. The officers bât horses were "also left behind. Had the whole of the bât horses been with the regiment it would have "been a great assistance in carrying the forage to the camp, and would not only have "contributed much to the comfort of the officers and men, but as no doubt it would "have been the means of saving the lives of both men and horses. For the same "reason the entrenching tools required for draining the camp, cutting wood, and other "purposes were left behind, and there was no re-issue until the regiment had moved from "the heights to their present position."

That is exactly what I mean. There was an issue when we got down; but it was a very limited issue. That evidence refers to the march from Old Fort, and while we were on the heights behind Inkermann.

184. You state that "the entrenching tools required for draining the camp, cutting "wood, and other purposes were left behind, and there was no re-issue until the regiment "had moved from the heights to their present position." Does that enable you to say that the proportion issued only amounted to a few sets of tools?—I think, as far as I can recollect, there were only a few sets of tools issued. I do not recollect there being sufficient for the regiment.

185. Did the want of entrenching tools retard your progress, and could you advance in the work with the same promptitude as you would have done with a better supply?—All our available men were employed in building stables at the depôt; our carpenters, masons, and so on; and I do not think we could have made any greater progress than we did under the circumstances that we were then in, even if we had had the tools.

186. Were they the hospital stables?—No; the depôt stables at Lord Lucan's head quarters; there might have been hospital stables also, but that was the depôt.

187. How many of your men were employed at those depôt stables?—I cannot tell you the exact number, but all our available handicraft men, good workmen, good masons, and carpenters.

188. The number of men of that description is usually known. Do you think that it was more than in other regiments; more than half a dozen?—I do not believe it was.

189. Were the remainder, amounting to about 100, disposable for this purpose, provided the supply of entrenching tools had been sufficient, and the men were not required for other duties?—The men were mostly required for other duties, and we had very few left; the days were very short, and the men had scarcely time to work at all at that particular time, and very bad weather intervened occasionally.

190. Will you now state whether you think that you had half a dozen sets of tools for all the men who were available, and state how many those were?—That I cannot possibly state now at this distance of time; but I know that from the number of men who were employed in camp guards, line guards, pickets, and foraging, and so on, there were very few men available, to the best of my recollection, for this duty; and the weather is to be taken into consideration, the men being comparatively unhealthy and harassed. I consider that every exertion was made in that respect, so far as the men were concerned, to make as much of the circumstances as possible.

191. You stated in your evidence before the commissioners in March that you commenced hutting the horses on the 1st of February. Was that correct; and if so, what was done in the way of sheltering the horses between the middle of December and that date?—That I think is correct. I mean by that, that we commenced on that day, or about that time at least, in putting on the wooden covering to the excavations that we had made. We had prepared the ground up to that period, and we were furnished then with a supply of wooden scantling to cover in those excavations. This is to the best of my recollection, but it is really so long since that it is difficult to be exact.

192. Is not the commencement of the excavation the commencement of the hutting of the horses?—The ground was not available for the horses very much until the wooden covering was put on; but we had been working up to that period in preparing the ground. It was about that time I know that the wood was given to us; that was the date at which they covered in those excavations, to the best of my recollection.

193. When did you commence to make the excavations?—I cannot tell you the precise date; but Lord Lucan's order, I should say, in the order book, would furnish that information.

194. Was it before the 1st of January or the middle of that month?—I should say that we commenced about the middle of January to prepare the ground; but I have no positive recollection.

*Colonel John Douglas.*

11th April 1856.

195. Did it take the whole period between the 1st of January and the 1st of February to prepare the ground for stabling for 116 horses?—116 horses!

196. Yes. I presume I may refer to the returns again. 116 horses was the strength in January, of which 42 died. In fact it was not for 116, for it was for 116 less 42?—It certainly took all that time. A great number of men were away on letter duties with the different divisions of the army. I think about 30 men were employed in that way out of the strength.

197. You stated that there was a great delay in consequence of the want of transport and artificers, as stated in the evidence given before the Commissioners. Do you see any difficulty in having seamen or carpenters from the shipping employed to assist you under such circumstances?—It would have been a very great advantage to us if we could have got them.

198. Did you make any suggestion to that effect; might not some temporary shelter have been put up by means of sailcloth in a day or two, even by your own men, had the materials been obtained?—If I had had materials I could have them put up, but I made no suggestion upon the subject.

199. You could have put them up even by your own men?—Give me the materials, and they could have done it.

200. In what time could such shelter have been put up?—In a very short period; if you had given them the materials it could not take long. I could not say how long; merely putting uprights, I presume, and nailing on canvas.

201. Is it your opinion that those, if put up in the same manner as for the artillery, would have lasted through the winter as theirs did?—If you had made a proper selection of the ground it would, as far as shelter is concerned.

202. Did the selection of the ground rest with the quartermaster general and the general of division, and, if so, could they have arranged it to suit the materials?—The ground was selected by the engineer officer, who consulted myself as to the best locality. I presume that the engineer officer was sent down by orders from head-quarters. However, I do not know. He arrived there, and reported himself to me. That officer was Major Hall.

203. What reason had you to suppose that there would be any difficulty in this temporary shelter, standing even in the position that you then occupied when the tents stood?—The tents are of a different construction. They are made to resist the pressure of the wind, and so on. Those being uprights, of course there was no support, and they were less liable to stand bad weather.

204. Would there have been any difficulty in strengthening the supports sufficiently to meet such a case, and could not the stables have been sheltered by earth being thrown up round them?—Certainly, I say, with proper shelter, and a proper choice of the locality, there is no difficulty in erecting constructions of that sort.

205. Do you think that the following paragraph meets your view of the case: "Considering "also the suffering and severe loss of horses from exposure to the weather in the commence- "ment of the winter, there appears to have been a want of promptitude or ingenuity in "devising for them some means of temporary shelter, such as saved the baggage horses of "the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava?"—I would rather not give an answer to that question, or give an opinion upon that subject.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Sir Alexander, I presume that I cannot ask any further question upon that, from the witness declining to answer it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you say what further question you are going to ask?

(*President.*) Will you hand it up in writing, and then you will get an answer?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) What part of your report do you refer to?

206. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Page 36; the last paragraph. (*To the witness.*) You have stated that sailcloth would have had this effect, and the Commissioners state the same; will you state your objection to answer the question?—I should be giving an opinion as to my superiors. I do not know the reasons that prevented those things being sent; I know nothing about it. I merely speak as to what I saw myself, and I could not give a fair answer to the question which you put just now.

207. Are you of opinion that shelter might have been procured for the horses in this way,—even by your men, in the course of a day,—had materials been placed at your disposal?—I think I said before that had materials been placed at my disposal I could have erected shelter.

208. In what time?—A very short time; I could not say exactly.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Having obtained this decided answer as to the advantage of using sailcloth, I do not propose to go further upon that head just now; but there is a point connected with another subject, that is, the very short allowance of barley to the horses at Inkermann. I do not know whether it would be proper to go into that now, or leave it till the case of Lord Cardigan comes on, or to confine the subject at present merely to the huts.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board are disposed now only to hear that evidence which relates to the case of Lord Lucan. Have you now concluded?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was stated by Lord Lucan yesterday that he conceived it was impossible for the forage to have been brought up to the horses at Inkermann. I wish to put a question to Colonel Douglas upon that subject.

*Colonel John Douglas.*

11th April 1856.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I wish to remind the Board that this inquiry is an inquiry only into such parts of the Report as I have objected to. I have not objected to anything with regard to the drawing of the forage at Inkermann.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) As unfortunately I have never had a written statement of what was objected to,—and that very matter I complained of yesterday,—the Board will excuse my falling into the error. I quite appreciate the objection of the noble lord.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You refer to what passed on the last day; to what fell from Lord Lucan upon the subject of the forage being taken up to Inkermann?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; I was going to call some evidence upon the point; but I quite agree with his lordship, now that he has brought the subject forward, and does not consider himself animadverted upon. I do not think that this is the time to do it; but this just shows the necessity for myself and my colleague being furnished with some information.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You are before the Board in consequence of a statement made by Lord Lucan. You applied to the Board to be allowed to reply to his statement. The Board understood you to refer to something just now that fell from Lord Lucan with regard to the forage.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, you may recollect that I confined my objections altogether to certain paragraphs in the Report of the Commissioners, and some observations contained in their letter to Lord Panmure.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Do you persevere in stating that Lord Lucan stated something on the last occasion with reference to your Report, or made some statement that seemed to affect the accuracy of your Report?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I merely stated that he had made a particular statement.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you wish to make any reply to the statement that Lord Lucan made, and if so will you now refer to it in the minutes of the last day?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I cannot at the present moment lay my hands on it; but as Lord Lucan does not consider it as forming part of the animadversions, I do not propose to go into it; therefore as regards this matter I shall not press any of the questions further.

(*President to the Earl of Lucan*). Have you any question to put to Colonel Douglas?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) If it meets with the views of the Board, I should prefer not cross-examining any witness at present, if I may be permitted to call them hereafter; it may not be necessary to examine them at all, and I would rather not examine them now, if the right is reserved to me to call them hereafter.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) It is most unusual to bring forward a witness at a future time for cross-examination.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I do not mean for cross-examination; I did not mean to say so. If I can bring them forward hereafter, previously to making my statement, I would prefer it.

(*Judge Advocate General*) Do you apply to the Board that these witnesses shall have notice to attend at future time.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I do so. I thought that the Board had already an intimation of this in the case of Major Thompson.

210. (*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Douglas.*) The Board wish this question to be addressed to you:—Did Lord Lucan frequently visit the camp of your regiment, and did he appear to be anxious for the comfort of the men and the condition of the horses?—I can answer that question if I am allowed to express an opinion about my superiors.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Might I be permitted to state that I put a very similar question to the witness, and for the same reason he declined to answer it? that was to express an opinion with regard to sailcloth.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) On my part I shall be very glad. I hope such a question can be put, and that this officer will answer.

211. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The first part of this question is as to a matter of fact; did Lord Lucan frequently visit the camp of your regiment.?—He did visit the camp of all; he was frequently in the different camps.

212. Are you prepared to state to the Board what passed on the occasion of those visits?—No, I could not exactly say; he used to look and see what was going on, and sometimes he might have been in the camp without my speaking to him. All that I can state is, that he frequently visited the camp.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You will hold yourself in readiness to be re-called on a future occasion by Lord Lucan.

213. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) There is one question which I wish to put before he goes. (*To the witness.*) If erections of sailcloth had been used for the stables, would not the men have been able to complete the huts for themselves at an earlier period,—say a month sooner?—Certainly, because it would have taken less time to erect them, provided huts could have been obtained in sufficient numbers.

214. The question is, even a month sooner, or how long?—That depends upon when the sailcloth was supplied; if we had had the materials when we came down a very few days would have sufficed to have erected them.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I now propose to call Colonel Doherty of the 13th Light Dragoons.

Colonel CHARLES DOHERTY further examined.

*Colonel Charles Doherty.*

11th April 1856.

215. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) In what condition were your horses immediately after their return from the vicinity of Inkermann early in December?—In a very bad condition.

216. Did their state most especially require shelter at that time, owing to their being in such a reduced condition?—Of course it did.

217. When no wood can be obtained, how is it that shelter is generally procured? Is it not by digging pits round the horses, and throwing up the earth?—In a great many cases.

218. Are you aware what quantity of earth is to be dug up and thrown up for this purpose, and the time that it might be expected to take to complete a space for two horses by one man?—No.

219. Seeing that your men arrived at Kadikoi on the 3d of December, and had no commissariat duties to perform till the 13th, how came it that something of this kind was not done?—The men were employed at pickets and different other things, camp duties, &c.

220. It appears that the total number of all ranks, including officers, sick, and those on detached duty and servants, amounted to 124, at this time, in December. How many of those may probably have been employed in the duties adverted to, and how many remained available for putting up shelter?—On different days there was a different number of men on duty. They varied very much.

221. Can you not state the average? It is very necessary to know that. An approximation only is required?—I never made an average.

222. Cannot you say what your regimental guard consisted of, your hospital orderlies and such other duties, so as to afford some approximation to the number of men available for erecting shelter?—The regimental guard consisted of a corporal and three, and the hospital orderlies consisted of one man for every 10 men in the hospital.

223. That was a very small number. Will you detail the other duties in the same way, so that an approximation may be obtained?—There were pickets and camp duties.

224. About what number?—Detail the other duties in the same way, so that an approximation may be obtained of the number of men on each duty?—That I cannot.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, if the witness cannot give me a statement of that kind it is impossible for me to show what number of men were available.

(*President.*) I suppose he answers to the best of his ability.

225. (*General Sir George Berkeley to the witness.*) Had you many fatigue parties out?—A great many, and different guards.

226. Every day?—Most days.

227. Did those fatigue parties vary in number?—Yes; they varied in number.

228. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Had you a sufficiency of entrenching tools, and from what date, and can you tell the number?—We had not a sufficiency. I cannot tell from what date. After our march down the country, I do not suppose that we had any left.

229. None at all?—None at all when we arrived at Balaklava first.

230. Do I understand you to say that it is of no importance what number of men you had available, as without entrenching tools you could not have provided shelter?—When first we arrived at Balaklava; afterwards we had entrenching tools.

231. I allude to the period when you first came down?—I do not know what that alludes to. We arrived first at Balaklava on the 26th of September.

232. Had you a sufficient supply of entrenching tools on the 3d of December?—No.

233. At what date were entrenching tools issued to you, and when did you obtain them in sufficient quantity to employ the available men?—I have no account as to the dates, and therefore I cannot answer that question.

234. When did you commence hutting your horses?—I cannot speak as to what day I commenced; I suppose it must have been about the latter end of January, but I am not sure.

235. What shelter had the horses between the 3d of December and the end of January? Were they standing at their pickets unprotected?—They were; they had clothing on.

236. Could not trenches have been dug, and earth thrown up around them, so as to protect them, as is common in the Crimea, in preference to their being left standing unprotected?—Not in the lines; not well.

237. Why could not this have been done?—They would have been full of water if I had dug any pits there.

238. Do you mean to say that none of the horses in any of the cavalry regiments were thus protected during that period?—Not on the same ground where we were.

239. Could not those trenches have been drained?—We had some drains; we dug some small drains to let some of the water off; it was very low and very boggy ground, and very heavy ground after wet.

240. Then as you did drain some, of course you could in that part have thrown up some shelter for the horses; why was this not done?—I do not think it would have been of any use there.

241. Will you explain why it would not have been of any use; would not an earth embankment have afforded useful shelter?—I could not have raised but a very short bank; the ground was bad. I should have dug pits to have taken this mould up, and to have

*Colonel Charles Doherty.*

11th April 1856.

made them; and I do not think that the ground would have admitted of it, or that it would have stood.

242. Could not a slight building have been constructed rapidly of sailcloth, either purchased at Balaklava or obtained from the fleet, and did no suggestion occur to you on that head?—Very likely it might; most probably.

243. Could not a slight building have been constructed rapidly of sailcloth, either purchased at Balaklava or obtained from the fleet?—I suppose so, from the fleet; I do not know whether we could have purchased any from Balaklava.

244. Within what time could shelter of this description have been put up by your regiment if the canvas had been provided for you?—I should think in about a fortnight or less. It depends entirely upon the number of men that I could get to work every day, and the tools.

245. If you had not a sufficient number of men to put up a sailcloth covering, would there have been any difficulty in obtaining assistance by getting sailors from the shipping at Balaklava, and would not that have been preferable to leaving your horses thus exposed?—I am sure I cannot tell whether we could have got sailors. I dare say by paying them one might have got them, but that was not my duty.

246. In a War Office return it is stated that in December you lost 33 horses out of 111. Would not the price of those horses have been immeasurably greater than the sum that would have been required to be paid for assistance? It is not meant that you had to provide them, but merely to suggest such measures if you thought it proper?—I should imagine that they would.

247. Why did you not make any suggestion or inquiry as to its practicability? Was it because it was not your province?—I do not understand it.

248. Why did you not make any such suggestion or inquiry as to its practicability? Was it because it was not your province or not your duty?—I certainly should have done it if I had fancied for one moment that I could have got it. I might have made a casual suggestion about it, but I made no written application to have canvas purchased.

249. Do you consider that it rested with other parties to make such a suggestion?—No; not altogether.

250. Did you deem the difficulties to be insuperable? In short, that no sailcloth could have been obtained?—No, I did not.

251. When was the shelter for the horses completed?—One stable was completed about, I suppose, the 9th or 10th of February as clearly as I can recollect, and the horses were very much crowded, and I erected another stable; that, I think I stated in my evidence before you, was about the 22d.

252. Had canvas been procurable, might the horses, instead of not being under cover to the middle of February, have been protected by means of canvas six weeks before?—Yes; if there had been canvas and scantling. We must have had scantling to have erected them.

253. There was a large supply of boarding in store, but not much scantling; for a slight weight such as sailcloth, would not the former have been sufficient? I mean the boarding?—Some of the boards would not have held the canvas; they were so very slight.

254. But others would?—But others would.

255. How many horses were left fit for duty at the date of your examination before the Commission on the 20th of March, there having arrived in the beginning of November 144?—That I cannot tell you. They were returned in the morning states every morning.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, I presume I may state from my own Rep rt, signed by Colonel Doherty himself, what the number was?

(*President.*) Yes.

256. (*Colonel Tulloch to the witness.*) You state that out of 41 horses then left alive out of the whole of your regiment, only nine were returned fit for duty?—That is correct then.

257. Is the following statement of the loss of horses in your regiment during the months of December and January tolerably accurate;—13th of November, strength 144, died 20. December, strength 111, died 33. January, strength 65, died 16;—is that correct?—Yes, if I gave it in my returns; they were taken from the morning states.

258. Do you think that this loss might to a great extent have been prevented by a judicious use of sailcloth?—Of course had we been hutted we should not have lost so many horses; that is my opinion.

259. You mean hutted with sailcloth?—If we had had protection we should have thriven better.

260. You state that you had the whole of your horses stabled towards the end of February; do you know how many horses you had then, or shall I read the number?—I should like you to read the number.

261. In the beginning of November there were 144, and in the beginning of March, that is the nearest point to the end of February that can be ascertained from the return, you had 46 left——

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) What are you reading from?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) From an abstract of a War Office return. There are 144 horses alive to be provided with stables in November, and there remained 46 horses actually to be

*Colonel Charles Doherty.*

11th April 1856.

provided with stabling in the beginning of March. (*To the witness.*) Of 144, was it only one third of the horses that were alive in November that were actually provided with shelter, and were the others dead?—The others were dead or missing; there were a great many missing.

262. Those are the deaths. Suppose the whole to have been alive, how long would it have taken to provide shelter for them all? It would have taken a long time with the men I had.

263. How long?—I think I said just now it depended upon how many men, or how many hours per day I could get them to work.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) May I be permitted to read the same part of my Report as was read by the former witness, with regard to the use of sailcloth?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Are you going to put a question?

264. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, in which I will embody this. (*To the witness.*) With reference to the last question is it your opinion from this, that some more rapid mode, such as the use of sailcloth for temporary shelter, was required?—Probably so.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I may mention with reference to the question I am about to put, that it is not the want of promptitude or ingenuity in regard to any particular person that is meant; I accuse no one; but that there was a want of promptitude and ingenuity.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you proceed with your question?

265. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Does the following paragraph express your views upon the subject of temporary shelter? "Considering also the suffering and severe loss of horses from "exposure to the weather in the commencement of the winter, there appears to have been "a want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising for them some means of temporary "shelter, such as saved the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava?"—There might have been, but I do not wish to answer that question; I cannot do it.

266. If the horses had been sheltered in this way at an earlier period would the men's huts have also been completed sooner; and the men being thereby sooner applicable for that duty, would they in your opinion have been ready for occupation a month earlier?—They might have been certainly sooner; it might have been a month, or a fortnight, or a few days, depending upon the number of men at work.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have no more questions to put to this witness.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have to request that Colonel Doherty may be informed that he may be wanted on a future day.

267. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Doherty, the Board wish the following question to be put to you:—Did Lord Lucan frequently visit the camp of your regiment?—Do you mean at Balaklava, or when we were on the hill?

268. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Where your regiment was?—I saw him several times in the camp.

269. Can you state to the Board what passed on the occasion of those visits?—On one occasion Lord Lucan found some of the horses standing out; I had only one stable erected then, and he ordered me to put all the horses in, which I did—I think in his presence, I am not sure; in a short time afterwards I erected another stable, and took the horses out, because they were very much too crowded. Shortly afterwards his lordship visited my camp as an evidence on a court-martial; that is twice that I recollect his being there.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You may be required to attend on a future day.

---

*Colonel A. Low.*

Colonel Alexander Low, examined.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you that it is not compulsory upon you to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

270. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) In what condition were your horses after they returned from the vicinity of Inkermann, early in December?—In a very deplorable condition.

271. Did their state most especially require shelter at that time, owing to their being in such a condition?—Certainly.

272. Were they entirely exposed when standing at their pickets, without any shelter, in that severe weather, the wind freezing their bodies, immediately after you came down from Inkermann?—When we came into the valley, there was a comparative shelter in the valley that we were in, from the hill side. My regiment was close to the hill, and there was a comparative shelter from the wind, but they were in the mud. I could shift the ground very often, because it was on a slope.

273. Would it have been an advantage at that time if some temporary shelter could have been put up around the horses, even had there been no means of covering it?—It might have been an advantage. I do not exactly understand what you mean by temporary shelter.

274. When no wood can be obtained, how is shelter usually procured; is it not by digging pits, and increasing the shelter around the horses by throwing up the earth?—It is the plan usually adopted. I saw it adopted by the Turks.

275. Do you think that it is a good plan?—No, I do not.

*Colonel A. Low.*

11th April 1856.

276. Can you suggest anything better when neither wood nor canvas is to be obtained?—No.

277. Then the plan of digging pits is, in your opinion, better than leaving the horses wholly unprotected?—In dry weather it certainly would be, but not in wet, because then their heels would suffer.

278. Could not the pits be drained, especially where the ground is sloping?—Yes.

279. Would not this get rid of your objection to the plan?—So far as the wet is concerned; but my objection to the plan is the amount of labour with inadequate means.

280. Have you made any calculation of the quantity of labour required to dig a pit and throw up a bank of earth for the protection of the horses?—I never did make any calculation; but, so far as I can judge of the soil of the Crimea, it takes a great deal more than in England, or in any other part of Turkey or Bulgaria that I have been in.

281. When did you arrive at Kadikoi from Inkermann?—I think on the 3d of December.

282. When did you commence putting up shelter for your horses?—It must have been the latter end of January, I think. I will not be positive upon the date, but I know that it was late in January. I mean the woodwork.

283. In the Report you stated that it was the 28th of January. What prevented your commencing sooner?—In the Report I think you will find it was a hospital hut. I had but few men to work, and few horses to send for wood. I had no baggage animals belonging to the regiment, consequently every plank had to be brought on a troop horse when not engaged either on picket or in carrying forage for the regiment. I sometimes had only three men at work, and, being on the side of a hill, the ground had to be scarped to the depth of from six to eight feet. It took an immense deal of labour, and we had very few tools.

284. How many men do you think that you had disposable, and what quantity of entrenching tools; the total number of persons, exclusive of officers, sick, detachments, and servants, being stated in the returns for December as 124?—We had a picket up at Inkermann, but the number varied according to the duties; some days I might have had fifteen or sixteen men disposable. I cannot be particular as to the number; I know that it varied from twenty to one, two, and three, when the men were detached, disposable for digging or erecting stables.

285. The question includes the quantity of entrenching tools?—I cannot give you the exact quantity; there was a very small number. We had none till the 14th of December. So far as I can recollect, up to that date I know we had none, because I had to borrow from the artillery up in the front.

286. Then, whatever the number of men that you had disposable prior to the 14th of December, they could not have been employed in providing shelter, for want of entrenching tools?—I stated that, to the best of my belief, up to the 14th of December I do not think we had any tools at all.

287. Then, to the best of your belief, whatever number of men you had disposable prior to the 14th of December, they could not have been employed in providing shelter, for want of entrenching tools?—If we had no tools they certainly could not have been employed. I cannot be positive as to the number, but to the best of my belief we had no entrenching tools at all there.

288. During the period from November till the end of January was there not a very heavy loss of horses in your corps; can you state the number, or shall I read it?—I cannot state the number; there was a great loss.

289. In November there was a strength of 143, and there were 18 deaths. In December there were 125 strength, and 38 deaths; and in January there were 87 strength, and 40 deaths; do you think that that is nearly the number?—If I gave that evidence, that is the number.

290. It is taken from the War Office Returns?—Then it is perfectly correct.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I do not wish to withhold any information from the Board, but it appears to me a most irregular proceeding that Colonel Tulloch should in the first instance allow himself to ransack the War Office, and to make extracts himself. I do not say to cook a return, but to manufacture a return, and to lay that return on the table without giving me any information of its being there, and then to be allowed to examine to that return, and telling the witnesses, where their memory fails them, that they are to rely upon the correctness of that return. It appears to me an irregular proceeding, and I wish to call the attention of the Board to it.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to say that it is quite possible to call for a return, and if that return should differ from mine the discrepancy would be at once perceived. If I am going to make a statement with regard to the loss of horses, it is absolutely necessary that I should have some returns, and I have had authority from the Government to procure any information that I required; but I do not wish the Board to place any more reliance upon this than they think proper.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) But this is not a certified return.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No; but in quoting it to the witnesses, if they conceive that it is not correct, or not nearly correct, then I will not found upon it at all; but it is necessary that I should have some data or other to go upon.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) They are your own memorandums, are they not?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) These are extracts which I made to see how far the officers were correct in their statements made to me when I was in the Crimea. I do not wish the Board to take them at all as a correct return.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Lord Lucan.*) Do you object to the accuracy of this return?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is not a certified return; that is my first objection.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Tulloch appears here as a servant of the Crown, and he says that he has had access to the War Office Returns, and he has made extracts himself. The Board understand that your Lordship has reason to object to these returns?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I think it is scarcely a fair proceeding that he should be allowed to ransack the War Office, and to take extracts from what returns he likes, and pass over what returns he likes, and that he should then examine to those returns, telling the witness that he is to consider those returns as correct. They are not certified returns, and I cannot see that Colonel Low is to be told that he is to place confidence in a return of which he knows nothing. I conceive, if Colonel Tulloch requires official information of this sort, it is his business to get the Board to call for it, and to have it regularly laid upon your table.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board wish to know whether you make any objection to this return till it has been certified?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I wish to object to nothing. I merely draw the attention of the Board to what appears to me an irregularity. I object to nothing; if it is necessary that I should make any objection, I make none.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Tulloch appears here as a servant of the Crown, having been armed with authority to have access to those returns, and he assures the Board that he has made accurate extracts.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I do not wish the Board to take any document as being one on which they are to found their opinion; they can call for any document they like, and if mine is wrong, they need not found upon it; they can get precisely the same return that I have got, taken by parties who are quite independent. But I wish to have some guide before me as to the figures, that I may not be leading the witness astray. If the witness says that this is a much greater amount or a much smaller amount, I do not wish to refer to it at all.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Lord Lucan has not objected to your adverting to the return.

*Major-General Peel.*) I wish to know by whom the averages as to the per-centages of deaths were made.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) They were made by myself.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I think I may say this, that Colonel Tulloch has not been very happy in the returns he has furnished in the Report; and if he showed himself so inaccurate on the former occasion, I do not think that the Board is justified in taking his figures as correct.

(*Major-General Peel.*) You will admit that there is a distinction between the returns,—the War Office Monthly Returns,—and a computation of the averages made by yourself?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I never referred to the averages.

(*Major-General Peel.*) But you admit that there is a distinction?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes. All that I want is to have some memorandum of my own, which I beg to be considered entirely my own, in order that I may refer to it when a question of this kind comes before the Board; otherwise how am I to go on? I cannot carry these figures in my head; it is quite impossible. I might just as well attempt to carry the whole of this volume. I do not wish the Board to consider that this is certified or in any way a document that they are bound to take as being correct. I did not want it printed at all; but I hold that I am perfectly entitled to refer to a private memorandum as to the numbers, when I am questioning a witness.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Inasmuch as the accuracy of those returns is called in question, and as they are not certified, the Board object to their being referred to without further evidence of their accuracy.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) That being the case, it will be impossible for me to go on without them. I have no document that I can refer to. It is a private document. I never wanted it printed at all, and I was surprised it was printed. It was my own private document, to refresh my memory on the subject.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board understand that you have referred the witness to these documents as returns on which he should rely.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Then I will not do so any longer. I will state that the mortality is so and so, and not state from what source.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you state to the Board that those returns cannot be certified?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) If the Board will only apply to the War Office, they will get the information, and have it in a form in which they can refer to it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you apply to the War Office to be allowed access to those returns?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) They were in my possession for the purpose of checking the information given in this Report; it was in that capacity that I made those extracts and used them.

*Colonel A. Low.*

11th April 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) These returns are signed as extracted by Colonel Tulloch from documents in the War Office?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, I did so in the War Office.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Were they extracted in the presence of any person?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) It is quite possible to have them certified, is it not?

291. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Quite possible, and I should prefer having them certified by another person. (*To the witness.*) The mortality being so great, could not slight buildings have been constructed rapidly of sailcloth purchased at Balaklava or obtained from the fleet? Did no suggestions occur to you on that head?—I cannot say whether they could have been obtained from the fleet; I am certain that they could not have been purchased at Balaklava, that is, sailcloth. As to its being got from the fleet, I cannot say. In the erection of small buildings we could not do it, because we could not erect a cook-house hardly for the men.

292. How do you know that they could not have been purchased at Balaklava?—The reason I say so is this, because I tried to purchase canvas to make corn-bags for the horses, and we could not get any. I applied to purchase canvas for the horses through the Quartermaster, and it could not be got. I allude only to the sutlers of course.

293. You allude only to the sutlers? Could not canvas have been obtained from the transports in the harbour of Balaklava, upwards of thirty in number, as well as two ships of the line? Could not a supply from those sources have been obtained?—If they had been disposed to sell it, of course it could have been obtained. I suppose so; I do not know.

294. The Government having the control of those transports, might not canvas thus have been obtained?—I should imagine so; they have the control of everything.

295. Did you ever hear of an offer having been made by the captain of a transport to cover your horses with sails for a certain sum?—For my own personal horses an offer was made to cover them with an old awning.

296. Were your horses preserved by this means?—I had it not done for my own horses.

(*President to Colonel Tulloch.*) Have you any more questions to ask this witness?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Very few, I think.

(*President.*) It is now the time of the Court's rising.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Perhaps the questions had better be postponed till to-morrow.

(*President.*) You will be ready the first thing to-morrow morning?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I wish to submit to the Board, that I think it would be necessary to have the evidence of two admirals on the station. I should be sorry if those admirals were unnecessarily inconvenienced by being brought here too early; therefore I will ask Colonel Tulloch whether he thinks he will have closed his case to-morrow.

(*President.*) How many witnesses have you, Colonel Tulloch?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I think three or four.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) What is your application, Lord Lucan? Do you apply for witnesses to be summoned to-morrow?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The two witnesses I wish to call are Sir Deans Dundas and Sir Emund Lyons.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) When do you wish to call them? At the close of Colonel Tulloch's evidence?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I wish to bring them so soon as Colonel Tulloch closes his case.

(*President.*) That will be attended to.

(*Mr. Commissary General Filder.*) I wish to be allowed an opportunity to make a few remarks with reference to an explanation given by Lord Lucan on Wednesday last.

(*President.*) That will naturally come after Colonel Tulloch's case. Shall you call any witnesses?

(*Mr. Commissary-General Filder.*) No witnesses.

(*Judge-Advocate-General to Commissary-General Filder.*) Is your application to go into any case of your own, or merely to reply to certain statements of Lord Lucan having reference to you?

(*Mr. Commissary-General Filder.*) The latter is my object.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You do not apply to be heard immediately after Colonel Tulloch?

(*Mr. Commissary-General Filder.*) No; but I think it will be convenient.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You desire only to reply to statements which have been made by Lord Lucan?

(*Mr. Commissary-General Filder.*) That is my only object.

Adjourned to To-morrow, at Eleven o'clock.

## SIXTH DAY.

### Saturday, April 12, 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to an adjournment.

Colonel ALEXANDER LOW further examined.

*Colonel A. Low.*

12th April 1856.

297. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Considering that the difficulties of sheltering your horses could have been anticipated so far back as the middle of November, do not you think that it might have been practicable if you had sent even to Constantinople for canvas and supports as well as workmen, and to have had them back in time to have erected a slight stabling a month before the wooden stabling could be completed?—I think it is perfectly possible.

298. Do not you consider that it would have been a wise precaution?—If it could have been carried out. By the word "possible" I mean I do not know what circumstances might have prevented its being carried out. It was possible probably to have been done, and if it could have been carried out it would have been a very wise measure.

299. Did your men exert much ingenuity in providing shelter for their horses?—When they had the means. Without tools or materials of course they could not.

300. Can you give me any details of the number of men available for constructing shelter during the month of December?—I said yesterday from one to twenty; it varied according to the duties. So far as my recollection goes, there were never more than that.

301. You can give no detail?—No; none from memory. In the commencement of December the site for the camp was not settled, and of course no measures could be taken. We merely remained in that place till it was decided where the cavalry camp should be. The first part of December.

302. Up to what date was the site of the cavalry camp left undetermined?—I cannot tell the precise date. As soon as it was determined upon we commenced digging out the ground for the stables and huts, and preparing the ground for the hospital hut.

303. Was it solely from this cause that nothing was done?—Partly from that, and from want of tools. Of course we could not erect any permanent habitations if the camp might have been moved at an hour's notice. We shifted the horses at every opportunity as long as the ground permitted of it.

304. Then did the want of entrenching tools retard your progress, and could you not advance in the work with the same promptitude as you would have done with a better supply?—Do you mean after the commencement of the stabling?

305. Yes.—No; I think the want of men interfered more than anything, and the want of transport for materials.

306. Do you think that carpenters might have been procured from the shipping at Balaklava to any considerable extent to assist in erecting permanent stabling, which was so long delayed for want of men?—I could not answer that question; I do not know.

307. Can you state when the stabling for your regiment was completed?—Mine was not completed till the end of February or the beginning of March.

308. Do you recollect how many horses you had in the month of November alive, and how many were alive when you completed your stables?—I cannot recollect the exact number in November, but I had 39 when I completed my stables; I gave in a return in the Crimea that would show.

309. Do you consider that the number alive in November amounted to 150?—I cannot precisely tell; I should think between 130 and 150 certainly.

310. There were 39 alive when you completed the stables?—Yes; mine I believe was the last stable completed in the cavalry; we were stopped for want of wood.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Are you going to refer to the witness's former evidence?

311. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is the last part of page 36, which I referred to on each occasion before. (*To the witness.*) Adverting to your evidence as to the advantage of sail-cloth, do you consider that the following paragraph embraces your statement on that subject: "Considering also the suffering and severe loss of horses from exposure to the "weather in the commencement of the winter there appears to have been a want of promp-"titude or ingenuity in devising for them some means of temporary shelter, such as saved "the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava."

(*Earl of Lucan.*) If it does not occur to the Board to interfere, I object to this course of proceeding; I may be wrong, and the Board will over-rule my objection, but it appears to me that it is not only a leading question and a direct question, but it is positively calling a dozen selected witnesses to over-ride the Board; it is positively giving their opinion upon the whole matter at issue. It appears to me to be an irregular question to be put.

*Colonel A. Low.*

12th April 1856.

It is not a question as to facts; it is a general question. No doubt if it was put to the witness whether he himself had shown sufficient promptitude and ingenuity I could understand it; but to put a general question as to whether there was sufficient promptitude on the part of the cavalry generally, it strikes me that it is for the Board to decide upon that, and not for the witness to speak to.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to offer this observation on the subject, that I am here for the purpose of establishing certain facts which have been contradicted. A part of the statement of Sir John M'Neill and myself is contradicted by Lord Lucan, and I bring up his officers, and I ask them one by one whether after we have heard the evidence they consider that what we have stated corresponds with their own views in regard to the sailcloth; that is the main point.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The question now before the Board is the correctness of a passage in the Report of Colonel Tulloch, and of which Lord Lucan has complained, and Colonel Tulloch has called witnesses, cavalry officers, who were on the spot, and competent to express an opinion as to what could have been done or not done for the cavalry, and he asks them whether their views coincide with those that he has expressed, and which are in question, and has asked them whether his view of what might have been done at the time is correct.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I object because I think it is not right that those officers should give an opinion. At all events, I think that it is right that those officers should suspend their judgment until they have heard my case.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Lord Lucan then does not object to Colonel Tulloch calling witnesses to establish the correctness of his Report.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Colonel Tulloch calls witnesses to establish his own view of the case. I say that he does not call upon his witnesses to speak to facts, but he calls upon those who have no knowledge of what might or might not have been done to give a general opinion, which I say it is for the Board, and not for the witness, to pronounce.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) It is for you to test the credit of the witnesses called by Colonel Tulloch. If you claim the right to cross examine the witness you will be at liberty to do so.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The Board are better judges than me; it is for the Board to decide.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I have not yet collected precisely your lordship's objection to this witness, or to his evidence.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have not the least objection to this or any other witness. The more witnesses Colonel Tulloch calls the better I shall be satisfied. The question is one which the Judge Advocate General should be more capable to deal with than me, and every member of this Board is more capable to deal with it than I am, and I ask them whether it is right or wrong that those words should be put into the witness's mouth, and whether he should be called on to pronounce an opinion which I think is in the province of the Court, and not in the province of the witnesses, to pronounce.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) The witness is not bound to answer this question; he may decline it if he thinks proper; if he thinks that the words "want of promptitude and ingenuity" reflects either upon himself or his superior he is not bound to answer the question; but if he does not answer that question, I and the Board know exactly what construction to place upon it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) This question, or one to the same effect, has already been allowed to be put to other witnesses.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Decidedly to two witnesses.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I think Colonel Tulloch may put the question to this witness.

312. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Both of those witnesses decline to answer that question. (*To the witness.*) Adverting to your evidence as to the advantage of sailcloth, do you consider that the following paragraph embraces your statement upon that subject?—Before I answer that will you let me refer to my evidence?

[The same was handed to the witness.]

I understand that the evidence you allude to is with regard to canvas for my own personal horses. I perceive that I said that I did not know whether it could be got from the fleet.

(*President to Colonel Tulloch.*) Will you repeat the question to the witness?

313. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Adverting to your evidence as to the advantage of sailcloth, do you consider that the following paragraph embraces your statement upon the subject?—I do not remember your having put the question to me about the advantage of sailcloth. I think not. The allusion is to the purchase of canvas merely.

314. Provided sailcloth could have been obtained from the fleet or from Constantinople, would that have been an advantageous mode of getting the horses rapidly under shelter, which might have saved them till a more convenient structure could be put off?—So far as my own opinion goes, provided such a thing could have taken place, it would have been advantageous.

315. Adverting to your evidence as to the advantage of sailcloth, do you consider that the following paragraph embraces your statement on that subject: "Considering also the "suffering and severe loss of horses from exposure to the weather in the commencement

*Colonel A. Low.*
12th April 1856.

" of the winter, there appears to have been a want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising " for them some means of temporary shelter, such as saved the baggage horses of the " Sappers and Miners at Balaklava "?—I never saw the horses of the Sappers and Miners, and I decline forming any opinion with regard to that; I have never considered it.

316. Adverting to your evidence as to the advantage of sailcloth, do you consider that the paragraph which I have just read embraces your statement on that subject?

(*President.*) He has already answered that.

317. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Did you mean to say that you declined expressing your opinion?—I neither formed nor expressed any opinion. That statement of course is with regard to the paragraph read out from the book.

318. The paragraph that I propose to read is at the bottom of page 132 of the evidence. If I read the paragraph regarding the Sappers and Miners, will that enable you to answer the question more decidedly?—No; I said that I declined forming or expressing an opinion upon the paragraph that you alluded to.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) I think you must be satisfied with that answer.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Very well; I do not purpose to ask any more questions of this witness.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have to request the Board to warn Colonel Low that he may be wanted hereafter. I do not wish to cross-examine him now.

318 *a.* (*Judge Advocate General to the witness.*) You hear that Lord Lucan may require you to attend at a future day. I am requested by the Board to put this question to you. Did Lord Lucan frequently visit the camp of your regiment?—Yes.

319. What passed on those occasions?—He inquired about the state of the horses and the men, and he looked at the work that had been done. Do you allude to any particular period, or generally when I was under his command?

320. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Generally during the time that you were under his command?—He was frequently, I may say constantly, through the camp.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) With regard to the question as to whether Lord Lucan was constantly in the camp, when I come to my reply I will state that it is a question to which no commanding officer can speak, for unless I found something to complain of, in the middle of the winter, with the snow on the ground, I never called the commanding officers out of their tents when I was riding through the camps. I will explain all that when I come to it.

---

General William Ferguson Beatson examined.

*General W. F. Beatson.*

(*Judge Advocate General.*) General Beatson, the Board wish you to understand that it is not compulsory upon you to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

321. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Were you resident in the Crimea during any part of the winter of 1854?—I landed in the Crimea with the heavy brigade and General Scarlett, and I remained until the end of November.

322. Do you recollect the day on which General Scarlett and the heavy brigade landed?—I do not exactly, but I think it must have been as near as possible about the 1st of October. I do not exactly recollect the day.

323. Did you observe the condition of the horses, particularly of the heavy brigade, when quartered on the plateau near Lord Raglan's, from the 29th of October to the 17th of November at one station, and from the 17th of November to the 5th of December at another?—I have already stated that I left the Crimea at the end of November; the part that refers to the beginning of December I cannot answer. I can answer the question from the time I landed in the Crimea, that the horses were in a bad condition.

324. Were they under any description of covering during that period, or were they merely picketted in the open air?—In the open air.

325. Do you conceive that it would have been practicable to have placed them under any description of temporary cover while on the plateau?—Not in the state of uncertainty in which they were kept, as it was never known that they might have moved at any hour from the position in which they were, particularly as there was a much better position three or four hundred yards in rear of the position they then occupied, and to which I had always understood that Lord Lucan and General Scarlett were anxious to move them. That was not done; but still that state of uncertainty, I think, prevented anything being put up in the shape of cover for them.

326. Am I to understand you that this state of uncertainty was the reason for not getting the horses speedily under cover?—I think so.

327. What description of cover is likely to have answered best for the purpose?—I am afraid that I can scarcely give an opinion upon that subject without knowing the materials that were available. I am not aware what material was available.

328. What is likely to have answered best for the purpose, seeing that no wood was available, but there appears to have been canvas?—You must have walls of wood of some kind to support that canvas, and if the wood and the canvas were available, and the cavalry

*General W. F. Beatson.*

12th April 1856.

had been told that they were to remain for a month or any particular time in the position in the rear of where they then were, I have no doubt that cover might have been provided.

329. Is it not usual in the Crimea when, no wood can be obtained, or canvas, and supports available, to shelter the horses, to dig trenches, and throw up the earth around them; and would not this mode have been practicable?—I never saw any of those trenches when I was in the Crimea; but if they put canvas do you mean the trenches to be covered over with canvas.

330. This is simply digging and throwing up a covering for the bodies of the horses; digging three feet deep, and throwing up the earth two feet more?—How would you support it? There must be a pole.

331. There would be no canvas?

(*President to Colonel Tulloch.*) You had better repeat the question?

332. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Is it not usual in the Crimea, when no wood can be obtained, or canvas and supports available, to shelter the horses by digging trenches, and throwing up the earth round them; would not this mode have been practicable?—The answer which I have already given was that I never saw any of those trenches while I was in the Crimea.

333. Was it the practice to construct temporary shelter among the Bashi Bazouks that you commanded, whenever they remained for any time at one time at one place, and if so of what description?—In a country where there was wood, where there were trees, they constructed a kind of shelter from the branches of trees.

334. But where there were no trees, how was it done?—They did not construct any shelter at all where there were no trees.

335. Do you consider that horses should be left without some temporary shelter for so long a period as a fortnight, particularly English horses, at that season of the year?—Certainly not, if you can find shelter for them.

336. The horses are about that time described as being up to their knees in the mud, with no drainage, and the water standing in pools, and where the horses lay down they were frozen to the ground in the frosty weather. Do you think that there was no remedy for that state of things?—I have already stated that the state of uncertainty prevented a cover being put up. I think the same state of uncertainty prevented trenches being dug, which was rather a laborious thing, and it required tools, and a number of men to dig trenches round so many horses.

337. Is it consistent with your knowledge that the men had no entrenching tools?—No; I am not aware whether they had or not.

338. Did you not reside for some time in wattled huts constructed by the Turks, adjacent to the cavalry lines?—No, I did not; I left before that took place. I have heard of the purchase of those huts; but I left before that took place. I lived always in tents in the Crimea.

339. In tents upon that plateau?—On the plateau.

[A written question was handed to the Judge Advocate General.]

(*Judge Advocate to Colonel Tulloch.*) Do you refer to any evidence that has been given here in the expressions contained in your question?

340. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is the last paragraph of the proceedings before the board of general officers, on page 36, which I propose to read to the witness previously to putting the question. It is a statement by Lord Lucan: "Though I have heard in the course of this "day that the horses might have had shelter at that time from canvas, I certainly at "that moment did not know that there was any canvas to be had; and this I can "state, and defy contradiction, that on that plateau it would not have been safe to have "placed any horse under canvas. On the 14th, as everybody knows, there was not a "single tent that was not blown down, and no one but a madman would have thought "of placing a horse under canvas on that plateau." (*To the witness.*) Do you conceive that the proposition to erect any cover of sailcloth there was so unreasonable that no man but a madman would have thought of placing a horse under canvas on that plateau, merely because the whole of the tents had been blown down on the 14th of November; one solitary instance in the whole winter?—I certainly would not have placed my own horses under canvas on that plateau.

341. For what reason?—Because I should have looked upon it that the first gale of wind that came the canvas would have been blown down, and would most likely injure the horses a good deal more than standing out in the open air would have done.

342. As framework for sailcloth only requires to be very light, and scantling 2½ inches square being the largest procurable, was this likely to have done any serious injury to the horses if blown down?—I think it was; a horse would get entangled in the canvas, and injure himself, in all probability.

343. Did our men show much infirmity in constructing covers for themselves and the horses, similar to those formed by the Turks, and sold to General Scarlett?—I have stated already that there was no cover formed while I was there.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I do not wish to put any further questions to the witness.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) With the leave of the Court, I should like to cross-examine this witness.

(*President.*) Very well.

344. (*Earl of Lucan.*) You were, I believe, in the Crimea from the beginning of October?—From the time that the heavy cavalry were there.

345. You took part in the battle of Balaklava, did you not, with the heavy brigade?—Yes.

*General W. F. Beatson.*

12th April 1856.

346. Cannot you state more precisely the time that you left General Scarlett's camp?—It was very shortly after the storm of the 14th of November; it was after that, but I cannot say the exact day. I went down to Balaklava, and remained there several days before I got a passage. I said that I left Balaklava in the end of November; but I left the camp after the storm of the 14th of November.

347. Did any officer, to your knowledge, place his own horses under canvas whilst they were on the plateau?—Not that I am aware of; certainly not.

348. As an old cavalry officer of experience, are you of opinion that it would have been wise to have hutted the cavalry on the plateau, so far from their supplies, in the then state of the roads, and when they would have had to transport the whole of their building materials from such long distances?—I do not think that it would have been judicious in the position in which they then were.

349. Did it appear to you that there was on the part of the heavy brigade with whom you lived any want of promptitude or ingenuity in providing shelter, or in the care of their horses?—I think that every officer in the heavy brigade was most anxious to take all possible care of his horses.

350. What was the condition of the horses when the heavy brigade landed in the Crimea?—Bad; they were in a bad condition.

351. To what cause do you attribute their low condition at that time?—From proper arrangements not having been made for their forage before they left Varna, and of course they got worse on the voyage; they were in a bad condition when they left Varna, and of course they arrived in the Crimea worse.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have no other question to put to the witness.

352. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) At what date did you leave the heavy brigade?—I have answered that question; after the storm of the 14th of November.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I wish now to call Mr. Rawlinson, a civil engineer. He was in attendance yesterday, and I presumed that he would be in attendance to-day.

[Mr. Rawlinson was called, but did not answer.]

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I propose to call Colonel Griffiths in the meantime.

---

Colonel Darby Griffiths further examined.

*Colonel D. Griffiths.*

353. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) In what condition were your horses immediately after they came down from the plateau near Lord Raglan's to Kadikoi, on the 5th of December?—They were, generally speaking, in pretty good order, but there were some very weakly.

354. How long did the horses stand at their pickets after they came down before any kind of shelter was provided, or any other steps were taken for their protection?—It was about the 3d of January before any of them were under cover.

355. Had you no cover from the middle of November till the beginning of January?—None whatever.

356. Can you explain the reason of delay in providing it?—We did not receive the order till the 16th of December, I think. I think that no order was given till the 16th of December, or about that period.

357. What caused the delay after that date?—Want of men and want of tools.

358. Can you state what quantity of entrenching tools you had then?—I cannot exactly say the amount, but there were very few.

359. Can you state about the number? Was it a dozen, or was it 20?—I cannot state about the number. I remember that there were very few.

360. What number of men was available for putting up shelter, temporary or permanent, after deducting the ordinary camp duties?—Some days there were more than others, according to the number that were employed on the commissariat duty.

361. But before your regiment were carrying commissariat stores, how many were there available? Can you state on the average? I do not expect particulars?—So far as my recollection will allow me, perhaps there were 70 or 75.

362. Were those 70 men unemployed up to the 1st of January, either from want of tools or from what other cause?—They were employed in the commissariat from the 13th. I think the last question was, before we commenced the commissariat.

363.—Could not slight buildings have been constructed of sailcloth, purchased at Balaklava or obtained from the fleet; and did no suggestions occur to you on that head?—I think covering might have been put up.

364. The question related to covering constructed of sailcloth?—I think if sailcloth had been there it could have been put up.

365. In what time do you think such covering could have been put up, if the materials had been provided?—If the spars and canvas had been in our camp, I think it might have been put up in four days.

366. Considering the lightness of the sailcloth, would not a heavier boarding, about an inch and a half thick, have been sufficient to have supported covering for the horses, with the aid of the earth thrown up from the trench?—No; I do not think that an inch and a half would have been sufficiently strong.

*Colonel D. Griffiths.*

12th April 1856.

367. Do you recollect how many horses died in your regiment in December and January, and out of what strength?—May I be allowed to refresh my memory by looking to the returns and the statement I gave? or else I should plead ignorance. I cannot recollect the exact number after a year and a half. I know I lost a great many. I think in the month of January I may have lost 51 or 52. I will not be positive as to December; I almost forget. I know there was a very large number.

368. You lost 51 out of how many? Was it 100, or 150, or 160, or what number?—My last answer I did not mean to give as an answer. I was asking the President if I might be allowed to refresh my memory by the blue book. It was no answer my saying 51.

369. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you wish to refer to any return?—I wish to refer to my own return of the deaths of the horses.

370. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) A return was called for from every officer in the Crimea showing exactly what number of horses he had lost in every month, which forms part of the evidence in the Report and Appendix; it is at page 193?—I see in December by my own return I lost 28 horses, and in January 51.

371. 51 and 28 make 79?—Yes.

372. Was the number you have stated to have died in two months about half the number of your horses, that is to say, in those two months?—It was about a third of the horses that left England.

373. The question is, was the number you have stated to have died in two months about a half of your horses, that is to say, about half the number of horses living in the beginning of December, the strength being about 158?—No, it was not half.

374. Was it nearly half?—It was a good way towards it.

375. How did you ultimately procure shelter for your horses?—There was planking and uprights supplied by the Government in Balaklava, and the troop horses brought up every board and upright on their backs, the men walking by their sides.

376. But who erected the shelter; was it done by your own men solely, or had they any assistance, and how was that assistance paid?—Having no carpenters with the regiment at the time, and having borrowed some Zouaves to build my own hut and stables, I lent those men for the good of the troop stables, and as far as I can recollect the first lot of horses was got under cover about the 3d of January.

377. Then they were got under cover by hired assistance. Might not such assistance have been procured earlier and to a greater extent if the Government had paid for it?—I could not get any more assistance, for I tried. Finding that the men of the Greys were so employed, I called the captains of the regiment together, and proposed to them to pay a certain sum towards the troop stables if they would pay the remainder. I tried in every way to get French soldiers, but failed. Therefore our arrangements failed; but I have no doubt, if any one had thought of it, that such a thing as large pay, and a request from, as Colonel Tulloch says, the Government, the French army might have put them at the disposal of whosoever requested it.

378. Do you think that carpenters could have been got from the shipping at Balaklava or from the fleet off Sebastopol, considering there was on board each vessel a large carpenter's crew; for payment of course?—I knew nothing of the carpenters of the fleet. Some of the captains of transports told me that if I applied for the carpenters of their ships that there were plenty in Balaklava harbour. I did apply to General Scarlett to make application. All I know is that I did not get them; that is all that I know about it.

379. I am permitted by the Board to call your attention to the following paragraph in the Report made by Sir John M'Neill and myself: "Considering also the suffering "and severe loss of horses from exposure to the weather in the commencement of the "winter, there appears to have been a want of promtpitude or ingenuity in devising for "them some means of temporary shelter, such as saved the baggage horses of the Sappers "and Miners at Balaklava." Adverting to your evidence as to the advantage of sailcloth, are you of opinion that there was "a want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising for "them some means of temporary shelter, such as saved the baggage horses of the Sappers "and Miners?"—From my experience I think that the cavalry did their best, under the circumstances, but should they be called on for another campaign I have no doubt that from their past experience they would improve upon their previous information.

380. That is not exactly an answer to the question. I will put the latter part of it again; but you are not bound to answer it. Are you of opinion that there was "a want of "promptitude and ingenuity in devising some means of temporary shelter, such as saved "the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners." You have stated the advantage of sailcloth?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The witness has never stated that he saw the horses of the Sappers and Miners.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I will put that question to him, if you please.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is putting into his mouth that he has seen those horses which he has never yet stated to the Court that he had seen.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) That of course I take for granted.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I never saw them, nor did I ever hear of them till I read the Report.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) You can put that question to the witness.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) You had better put the question whether he ever saw the Sappers and Miners stables.

*Colonel D. Griffiths.*

12th April 1856.

381. (*Colonel Tulloch to the witness.*) Did you ever see the stabling of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava?—I never went into it.

382. Have you seen it?—At the time I was in the Crimea I did not know that it belonged to the Sappers and Miners. I have discovered since I saw the Report that it did belong to the Sappers and Miners, but I did not know it at the time.

383. You knew that there was a stable of sailcloth and you saw it, but you were not aware that it belonged to the Sappers and Miners. Is that your answer?—My answer is this, that when I was in the Crimea I saw a canvas covering, but I never took any notice of what it was. Since I have seen your Report I have discovered that it did belong to the Sappers and Miners, but I took no notice of it at the time.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have no more questions to ask the witness.

(*Colonel Griffiths.*) I wish to be allowed to refer to my evidence in the Report, and to read a part of it.

384. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Is it in reference to a question that has been put to you to-day?

(*Colonel Griffiths.*) Yes. I wish to amend the answer, and extend it if I may be allowed.

385. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you remember the question?

(*Colonel Griffiths.*) Yes; but I wish to make an explanation.

386. Can you state what the question was?

(*Colonel Griffiths.*) It was that I employed some French soldiers,—it was about the erection of a stable. In my evidence it says "the first of them, the third of January, "having employed at his own expense five French soldiers to erect them, had them "completed by about the middle of January." I wish to explain that it was up to the third of January that I employed the French soldiers to build the stables, and that after that the men of my own regiment were able to finish them, and the soldiers of the Greys finished them about the middle of January. That is all I wish to state.

387. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Are you reading from the appendix, or from the evidence?

(*Colonel Griffiths.*) The evidence, page 10; that is in the evidence.

388. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you anything further to say?

(*Colonel Griffiths.*) Nothing further.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I shall not cross-examine this witness.

389. (*Judge Advocate General to the witness.*) The Board wish this question to be put to you. You have stated in your former evidence "I would have dug if it had been only half a foot "of drain in front of the horses heads and in the rear of the horses." Why did you not cause such a drain to be dug if you thought that it would have been of service to the horses?—Because I had not time if I were going to move to-morrow to finish it; had I been certain of remaining any little time I would have dug a drain; it was the uncertainty of our position that prevented my doing so.

390. (*Major General Peel.*) Do you consider that there is any comparison between the facilities afforded to the Sappers and Miners to erect a covering of sailcloth in Balaklava and the cavalry adopting the same means in their camp without any assistance?—The Sappers and Miners had every facility being in Balaklava, and having no horses and no duty to perform barring the duty that they enlisted for.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) The duty of the Sappers and Miners during a siege is well known to be a laborious one, and one that was very much in request at that time. I do not know how to frame the question, but perhaps the Board will see the object I have in view.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Dou you make any application to the Board?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is merely to bring out the fact that the Sappers and Miners had other duties to perform of a most laborious nature in addition to providing this stabling, and there is nothing to show that any large body of Sappers and Miners were so employed.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) If you have any observations to make on this subject afterwards you will have an opportunity.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Colonel Tulloch wants to cross-examine his own witness.

---

General William Ferguson Beatson further examined.

*General W. F. Beatson.*

391. (*President.*) Do you wish to correct a statement you have made?—Merely to say that when I stated that the heavy brigade was in a bad condition at Varna, and landed in the Crimea in bad condition, I did not include the Greys. I did not recollect that they were not at Varna at all, but that they had gone direct from Constantinople; it might be supposed that I included the Greys, but they were not in Bulgaria at all; but they went direct from Constantinople. I merely wished to correct that.

---

*Major R. Thompson.*

12th April 1856.

MAJOR RICHARD THOMPSON further examined.

392. (*Judge Advocate General.*) General Peel wishes to put this question to you. You have stated that immediately after your regiment went down to Kadikoi, about the 3d of December, you had a trench dug which you consider was an immense advantage to the horses, and that you have no means of ascertaining whether other regiments adopted the same plan. If then the subsequent mortality among your horses from December to March was greater than in any other regiment, as is shown by the return laid before the Board by Colonel Tulloch, do you mean the Board to understand either that other regiments had adopted a more effectual means of shelter, or that there was no advantage in this trench which you dug?—I think that the 5th Dragoon Guards were worse off than any other regiment from want of men. We had fewer men and more horses in proportion, and the consequence was that the men had sometimes two and three and four spare horses. I cannot say whether this drain was of so very much advantage after all; but the reason why we lost more horses was on account of having so many spare horses and fewer men.

393. The Board are right then in considering that you are not aware what means of shelter were adopted by other regiments?—I am not aware. I did not enter into any inquiry. I entirely confined myself to my own regiment. I superintended it. I did not go amongst other regiments.

394. You allow the fact that there was a greater mortality in your regiment that in others?—I did not look over the reports that were sent in through General Scarlett to Lord Lucan; I merely speak as to my own regiment.

395. Have you seen the return laid before the Board by Colonel Tulloch?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) May I call the attention of the Judge Advocate General to page 2 of the letter of Sir John M'Neill and myself to Lord Panmure relative to the loss in that regiment, giving Lord Panmure explanations in relation to the particular mortality in that regiment?

*Earl of Lucan.* )Where is that?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is in the correspondence; it is in the proceedings of the Fourth Day.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have no such correspondence; I have never seen it.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is the letter, and the only letter, addressed to Lord Panmure, giving explanations in regard to your letter.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) This witness has stated that he has not seen your Report.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is not a part of my Report, but a part of a letter addressed by Sir John M'Neill and myself, giving explanations to Lord Panmure in relation to the mortality in that regiment being more than in any other.

(*Judge Advocate General to the witness.*) Have you seen a letter addressed by Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch to Lord Panmure, giving the reasons for the greater mortality in your regiment?—I have not.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Do you wish to read out a part of this letter to the witness, and to ask him a question upon it?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Certainly.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You may do so.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg pardon; it is a letter that Sir John M'Neill and myself wrote to Lord Panmure in answer to Lord Cardigan's letter.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have never seen that letter.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is before the Board. In that letter, dated the 21st of February, I state "his Lordship has obviously committed the mistake of comparing merely the "total number of deaths in the two brigades, without adverting to the great difference in "the strength of these months. It should also be kept in view that the mortality in one "or two of the heavy cavalry corps in December was much increased by an infectious "disorder, for which many of the horses, particularly of the 5th Dragoon Guards had to "be destroyed." I shall put in, if the Board wish, the returns calling attention to the fact that nasal gleet prevailed to a very great extent in that regiment, and great loss occurred in consequence.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You have referred to an infectious disease; are you going to put a question upon that to the witness?

396. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes. (*To the witness.*) Was there not an infectious disease among the horses of your regiment, and to a greater extent than in any other cavalry regiment?—I cannot say as to a greater extent than any other cavalry regiment, but there was a disease.

397. What was it?—The mange, with a suspicious running at the nose, and symptoms of glanders.

398. Did you command the regiment at that time, and did you make a note in the returns to the effect that there was nasal gleet in the regiment?—I did to the best of my belief. Yes, I did. I did command the regiment at that time, and I did report it to General Scarlett. I think I also stated it in a report, to the best of my belief, as I am obliged to be so particular in what I say.

399. (*Judge Advocate General.*) General Peel desires this question to be put to you. If you dig a trench and throw up the earth to form a bank, must not you give the earth so thrown out an inclination of 45 degrees, and would not that form a slope which would

*Major R. Thompson.*

12th April 1856.

cause the trenches to be filled with water?—With regard to the trench that I dug, in the first instance I threw the earth up from a small drain that I made; after that we dug into the earth so as to put the roofing on; that is what I did.

400. (*Major General Peel.*) I understood you to say that you dug into the earth 12 feet deep?—Afterwards we dug fully 12 feet deep.

401. What did you do with the earth that you threw up; did you make a bank?—A bank both at the rear and in front, so that the bank that was thrown up in front made the water that came down the hill go away, and prevented it from getting into the place.

402. That bank would not stand perpendicularly; you must give it a slope?—So we did.

403. Would not the slope throw the water into your trench?—No, it did not.

404. It had not the effect of throwing the water into the trench?—The water did not get in in that way. It can be very easily explained the way we did it.

405. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Was it a parapet that you threw up?—Yes; we threw the earth from the ditch up in the front and in the rear, and what was put in front prevented the rain from going into the trench that we had dug.

406. You had a parapet or wall both in the front and in the rear?—Yes.

407. And the horses stood in the ditch between?—Yes. We had to dig into a quarry; after getting a foot deep it was a quarry, and of the stones that we took out of the hole we made a wall in front. I beg to put in a rough sketch, to elucidate my evidence.

408. (*President.*) You wish to hand that sketch in to the Board?—Yes; it will explain the position that we were in, and show the drain for the land water, so as to prevent it getting in.

[The same was handed in.]

409. (*Major General Peel.*) This sketch includes a roof; but I do not think that in your first evidence you made any mention of the roof?—No, I did not; but the sketch will, I think, explain the matter.

410. What was the roof made of?—Of wood procured at Balaklava.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Whom do you intend to call next?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Mr. Rawlinson, a civil engineer in the Crimea.

---

ROBERT RAWLINSON Esquire examined.

*R. Rawlinson, Esq.*

411. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) In what capacity were you employed in the Crimea?—I went out as one of the members of the sanitary commission; the engineering member in that commission.

412. Was it your duty in that capacity to make yourself acquainted with the character and the capabilities of the soil for the location of troops?—It was.

413. How long were you so employed?—We (the Sanitary Commissioners) landed at Constantinople on the 6th of March; we went over the hospitals at Scutari and Kulalee, and having ordered such improvements and alterations as we considered necessary, I, with my colleagues, proceeded to the Crimea, and we landed in the Crimea on the 5th of April. I was wounded on the 10th of June, and I believe I left the Crimea on the 19th of June.

414. Are you well acquainted with the whole of Kadekoi and the plateau above it, as far as Lord Raglan's house, and its geological formation?—I consider that I am well acquainted with the geology of the Crimea on which the allied troops were encamped, as I made it my especial study, having reference not only to the drainage of huts and the camp generally, but also having reference to the water supply. There was a doubt as to the water supply being sufficient, and I examined most minutely the whole of the ground occupied by the allied armies.

415. Was there anything in the character of that valley or the plateau above it that would prevent a temporary shelter being procured for horses?—Speaking as a civilian,—and I can only speak as a civilian,—if I had 50 men at my command, with appropriate tools, I should have had no difficulty in providing shelter on any portion of the ground occupied by the allied camps.

416. Even temporary shelter?—I mean temporary shelter.

417. What do you conceive to be the best mode of providing shelter of a temporary character for horses, having had extensive experience in sheltering horses in a part of the country where temporary erections are required?—The answer to the question would depend entirely upon the position that the cavalry might for the time be in. The ground varied very materially. It was a rich loamy soil in the valleys, working very rapidly into mud during rain; no person not acquainted with the effect of the treading of horses and men can conceive of a firm surface so rapidly becoming a fearful pool of mud. There were other portions of the ground that all the armies in the world could not have made mud of; immense areas were of that character that it was almost impossible to work them into mud. Those persons who are acquainted with the district of England about Malton in Yorkshire, for instance, may, by comparison, form an idea of the plateau and ground above the valley of Kadekoi, which resembled very much that district of Yorkshire from Malton down to the sea. You might choose sites where, from the ground being a strong

*R. Rawlinson, Esq.*

12th April 1856.

oolitic rock,—a strong limestone rock,—it would require quarry tools to get it; but you could take other sites where ordinary spades would enable you to throw up a bank.

418. Was there plenty of soil in which to have dug trenches, and have thrown up banks, for the protection of the horses, in the valley of Kadikoi, and in the plateau above it?—The valley of Kadikoi, the flat portions of it, were of the character I have described, rich loam running into a fine thin clay shale, in which earthworks could be very easily made. I saw the stables that were made in the valley; I did not examine them minutely, but I saw them, and such as they were I think a couple of men per horse ought to have provided that shelter in a couple of days, if they had the materials to cover with; they might have done the actual work if they had had the means to cover with. A couple of men to a horse,—a couple of civilians, I think,—could have done so under a railway contractor.

419. How was it upon the plateau near Lord Raglan?—There the ground varied, and within the distance of a quarter of a mile you could choose almost any sort of site you wished. In the valleys running down towards Kameish you might have chosen sites in which you could have hutted a regiment of horse, I conceive, very rapidly.

420. And well sheltered?—Yes.

421. Do you know the place where the heavy brigade was located near Lord Raglan, upon the side nearest Kadikoi?—I did not know anything connected with the cavalry camp previous to the 1st of May.

422. You are aware of the vast quantity of shipping usually in the harbour of Balaklava. Is it your opinion that there would have been any difficulty in obtaining sailcloth to any extent that might have been required?—It was part of my duty to make an inspection of the transports, as fitted up for the conveyance of the sick from the Crimea down to the British hospitals on the Bosphorus, and in conversations I had with some of the transport captains I understood that they had both sailcloth and sailmakers to spare.

423. Those that were in Balaklava harbour?—Some of them told me so. I recollect mentioning it, on this account: I was myself hutted above the mule camp at the head of Balaklava harbour, and for days and weeks I saw those wretched animals standing knee deep in mud; the forage that was given to them (they had no nose bags) was thrown down into this mud, and I do not believe the animals could eat or ever did get one tenth of it; it was rolled and trodden into the mud before they could eat it.

424. Supposing you had had sailcloth in abundance, in what time could accommodation be put up for, say 100 horses, and with what number of men?—As I said before, I think that if there could have been two good working men, with proper tools, spared to a horse, they might have put up decent accommodation certainly within a week.

425. What I allude to is temporary accommodation, merely for the purposes of sheltering the horses till the wooden structures could be completed; how long would it have taken?—That I think might have been done in one or two days; a mere temporary protection. But it would depend upon circumstances. If the horses were standing on a bare hard rock, that could only be done by proper tools. If they were standing as they were when I saw them in the valley of Kadikoi, that earth might have been dealt with as I said in one or two days; that is, protection from the wind.

426. What I allude to is the valley of Kadikoi, in which the cavalry were stationed on the 5th of December; what time would that require?—In the valley of Kadikoi, as I saw it, a temporary shelter there might have been very easily thrown up.

427. In what time, with the assistance of sailcloth?—To have made a covered shelter?

428. Yes, of sailcloth?—I think it would have taken, speaking without sitting down to make an estimate, a cavalry man a week per horse.

429. On a former occasion you stated, "What I allude to is temporary accommodation, "merely for the purpose of sheltering horses till the wooden structure could be com- "pleted." How long would it have taken?—For temporary shelter, merely trenching the ground, and throwing up earthwork to prevent the wet running in, might have been done, I should say, the very day the horses took the ground. I can illustrate what I mean. I saw the 10th come into the Crimea from India, the 10th of May, I think. I went up the day after, or the day but one after, and saw the colonel. I had no power to interfere as to the picketing of the horses, but I saw the colonel as to the position of the hospital marquees, and remonstrated with him about the ground they had taken up for those horses. I think it rained continuously for a week, and those horses were belly deep in mud. They were shifted after the rain ceased on to the hill-side where they could not make mud. There was no draining done there. I rode over that ground afterwards, after the sun had dried it, and it was at the risk of being thrown every yard, the cracks were so wide in the ground from the drying of the mud the horses had worked up within a week. Now that ground might have been trenched on the very day, and I conceive the rain-water might have been prevented coming from the hills above, under where the horses lay, immediately.

430. With respect to the plateau near Lord Raglan, I will read to you the following statement: "Though I have heard in the course of this day that the horses might have "had shelter at that time from canvas, I certainly at that moment did not knowthat "there was any canvas to be had; and this I can state, and defy contradiction, that on "that plateau it would not have been safe to have placed any horse under canvas. On

" the 14th, as everybody knows, there was not a single tent that was not blown down ; " and no man but a madman would have thought of placing a horse under canvas on that " plateau." Do you conceive that that paragraph is warranted by the facts?—Certainly not ; and for the very reason, that on that very plateau tents, which I conceive are more difficult to make stand, that is to say, the wind has a much greater hold upon a tent than it would have upon a canvas covering stretched horizontally, and properly secured,—the tents stood, and many of those tents, I understand, were so rotten that if they once struck them they would never go up again.

431. Do you conceive the erection of canvas stabling to be a rapid mode of applying labour to covering in the horses?—Covering for the roof?

432. Or for the sides altogether; roof and sides, if necessary?—It would require something very strong to support canvas if you made the sides as well as the roof of it; it would require very strong uprights, because the power of the wind would be as the area of the face presented to it.

433. But for roofs?—For roofs placed horizontally, I do not see any difficulty if you had got earthen banks or rubble walls, which could have been got up certainly with considerable facility, I conceive.

434. Do you consider that, as compared with the other troops serving in the Crimea, equal ingenuity was shown by our soldiers in preparing shelter for the horses as by those of other nations?—I do not think that I can answer that question, simply because I did not pay attention to the sheltering of the horses; but I did pay attention to the sheltering of the men, and most unquestionably our army did not appear to have paid the same attention to works of that description as the French had at the same period, and as the Sardinians did immediately on coming into the Crimea.

435. Will you pay attention to this paragraph from the Report of Sir John M'Neill and myself: " Considering also the suffering and severe loss of horses from exposure " to the weather in the commencement of the winter, there appears to have been a want " of promptitude or ingenuity in devising for them some means of temporary shelter, " such as saved the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava."

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) You have not put any question to Mr. Rawlinson about the Sappers and Miners.

436. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Did you ever see the stabling of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava; the engineers' stables?—I dare say I have seen them, but if I did I was not aware that they were the Sappers and Miners stables; riding so continually through Balaklava I may have seen them, but I paid no attention to them.

437. Did you see any other stables formed of sailcloth?—I did not,—formed of sailcloth, —but I saw stables roofed with it.

438. Did you see those of the artillery?—I saw some of the artillery in front, and I saw some temporary erections that the officers had made for themselves.

(*Colonel Tulloch to the Judge Advocate General.*) Might I not, for the words " Sappers and Miners," substitute the words " sailcloth."

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you wish to alter the question?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes. Then the paragraph would run thus: " Considering also the " suffering and severe loss of horses from exposure to the weather in the commencement " of the winter, there appears to have been a want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising " for them some means of temporary shelter, such as stables roofed with sailcloth."

(*Judge Advocate General.*) That is not a part of the paragraph?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No; that is the alteration that I propose to make.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) There is another point. The witness was not there at the early part of the winter, and how can he possibly tell what shelter there was at that moment?

(*President.*) When did Mr. Rawlinson arrive?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) He was there at the same time that we were there; he saw the same stables, and no person can give a better idea, I should say, as to how far we were correct in what we stated than he can; he was there at the same time. The question is, whether from the evidence before us this was a proper and correct statement or not.

(*Judge Advocate Geeneral.*) You propose to read a passage, as I understand, out of your report, and then to put a question to the witness upon it.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; that was my original intention, but finding that the witness had not the necessary knowledge of the Sappers and Miners, it required some variation.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You cannot then read the amended paragraph as the one in the report; you can put any other question to the witness.

439. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Adverting to your evidence as to the advantages of sailcloth, are you of opinion that there was a want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising for them some means of temporary shelter in that way, supposing always that sailcloth could be procured?—I must again say that I cannot answer the question, excepting as a civilian. I do not know what may interfere with military men on service before the enemy. I can only say that no railway contractor, or any person having to do with horses, would have lost one twentieth part, under the same conditions, if they had been stuck on that very ground, from the same causes that those horses were lost from.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I do not desire to put any more questions to this witness.

*R. Rawlinson, Esq.*

2th April 1856.

Cross-examined by the Earl of Lucan.

440. Will you be good enough to answer this question,—Did you see any cavalry horses of our allies under cover?—I am not aware that I did. I did not inspect them.

441. You did not see them?—No, I did not see them; I paid no attention to them.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I wish to remind the Board that the witness distinctly drew a line between hutting the horses and the men.

441*a*. (*Earl of Lucan.*) When this Sardinian army came into the Crimea had they any field duties to perform at that moment, and at what season of the year did the Sardinian army arrive there?—I do not recollect the date of the arrival of the Sardinian army. I have it in my diary, but I have not made a note of it. I saw them arrive; every division marched past my hut. I saw the ground that they occupied; and I believe two days after they had taken it up, after the reconnaissance, I think, in May, when Kamara was occupied, and the ground from Kamara across Balaklava down to Trakhtir Bridge, I rode over that ground and through it, and took particular notice of what the Sardinians had set themselves to do. I also noticed going out of Balaklava that the very week upon which they had taken up the ground they had masons at work mending the road that we had never meddled with, they were draining and opening out springs, and breaking macadam to form a road; and within that week, so far as I could judge, the whole of the Sardinian army were comfortably tented, the officers in their small bell-tents, and the soldiers with their tents d'abri: they had put up temporary erections, "*gourbies*," made of the brush timber of the district, and they had thrown a protection of the same description round their horses. As to field duties I cannot tell; I know that they were supposed to be in the face of the enemy; I saw the Sardinian riflemen in front crouching down, and we thought the Russians were in front. As to other field duties I do not know; I saw them putting up erections, making roads, and setting themselves to work to put their camp in order, and that they certainly did with marvellous rapidity.

442. In your evidence you stated that railway horses would have suffered in a far less degree than did the cavalry horses under the same circumstances. I ask you whether, when you made that statement, you had taken into your consideration what had been the feeding of those cavalry horses?—No, I did not. I think I qualified the statement by saying that I did not judge, excepting as a civilian. I do not pretend to set up my judgment as to what the soldiers had to do besides looking after their horses. I simply say that the railway contractor, or any persons in an analogous position, civilians sent out to that very ground with the same number of men, or with a tenth part of the men, and with the same number of horses—always providing, of course, that the man who sent them sent provisions to feed them—would not have suffered as those horses appear to have suffered from exposure to cold and frost.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I will now, with the permission of the Board, call Mr. Bracebridge.

---

*C. H. Bracebridge. Esq.*

Charles Holte Bracebridge, Esq., examined.

443. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) You have been in connection with the army of the East for a particular period at Scutari and Balaklava; will you state how long at each place?—Ten months from England. Nine months at the two places, and five weeks in the Crimea out of the nine months.

444. Did you, during your stay at Balaklava, visit occasionally the cavalry lines at Kadikoi?—Yes; the five weeks terminating on the 5th of June. That was the period that I was there.

445. Did you also visit occasionally the plateau in front of Lord Raglan's?—Frequently.

446. Was either of those localities extremely exposed?—The plateau was, certainly.

447. Was it, in your opinion, so exposed as to have created a difficulty in the construction of temporary shelter for the horses?—Not at the time I saw it, certainly. At the previous time, in the months of November and December as described, and during a partial storm which I did see in May, which lasted five days, it might be so.

448. From your long previous knowledge of the East, both summer and winter, do you think that useful shelter for horses might, with the aid of a few spars, have been constructed from sailcloth at Kadikoi?—I think that they would have been easily constructed with the aid of spars in the valley of Kadikoi, and without on the plateau, but if the question is confined to Kadikoi, it is simply yes.

449. Having had considerable experience of horses in foreign countries, is there any simple cover that you could set up for horses with the aid of sailcloth, and if so, describe it?—Having seen in some parts of the camp the cuttings that were made, I would describe those coverings by saying, that at that period, even at the worst of the weather, cuttings might have been made in the earth, as they were afterwards, taking advantage of the very undulating ground. If the question turns upon that particular plateau, taking more especial advantage of the lower ground or open valley, which lay about the eighth of a mile to the left going to head quarters, I conceive that cuttings could have been made, as they were afterwards made, for perhaps three horses together. The calculation with regard to one of those cuttings I apprehend to be this, that a horse could be placed

*C. H. Bracebridge, Esq.*

12th April 1856.

in a hollow four feet deep by four feet wide and nine feet long; that would require the removal of 144 cubic feet of ground. If the acclivity was at a right angle, of course there would be only a half—72 feet; and to remove seventy-two cubic feet I apprehend that each workman, such as may be found in the ranks, would take five minutes to remove one foot; that would be in that case six hours to make such a cutting. If that was double on account of the imperfection of the tools, and that I do not see, or the imperfection of the workmen, that would give 12 hours. If that was again doubled, one man would effect the placing of a horse in this cutting in twelve hours; and if that was doubled it would be two days. With regard to the question, I would answer it in this way:—I apprehend from the horses that I saw so placed, that if they were covered without tents, but with clothing of sailcloth, and if they had in the front, to protect their heads, upon the ground where the heads were, sailcloth pegged to the ground 2 feet 6 inches high, and supported upon such little sticks as could be found in the brushwood, and pegged down on the other side, that the horses would be very greatly covered without the erection of any buildings. The question applying to sailcloth, I have just cast up this rough memorandum:—An ordinary topsail of an average vessel, such as we saw at Balaklava in the winter and which I saw go to Scutari, taking from 600 to 800 tons, would afford a topsail of 40 to 30 feet, which would give 1,200 feet in the topsail. Now, assuming that a horse would require six yards, four for his body and two for a hood round the neck, and one for a front screen, that would give seven yards a horse; that would be sixty-three feet, requiring 126,000 feet. Now, dividing this sum by the quantity of topsails, we get 105 topsails on the 2,000 horses. I apprehend, therefore, that 105 topsails so used would cover 2,000 horses. It is not within my knowledge how many ships there were; but assuming that there were twice that number in the harbour, that makes 210 ships, and the spare topsails of those ships would suffice for that quantity of canvas clothing for the horses.

450. (*Major General Peel.*) You mean clothing?—Simply clothing with a screen.

451. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) You mean instead of putting up a cover over the horses you would put this sailcloth over their bodies so as completely to cover them?—Yes.

452. Instead of putting up a regular roof?—Yes, the sides being protected by the earth.

453. Were there not great facilities of intercourse between Constantinople and Balaklava?—When I was at Scutari I had a great opportunity of observing, from crossing the Bosphorus very frequently; and I should say there were on the average three vessels up and three down in the day, in twenty-four hours, at the time that we are speaking of—in the month of May; certainly not less.

454. You have resided long at different periods at Constantinople; do you think that there would be any difficulty in procuring sailcloth to almost any extent there that may be required?—We are speaking of the 210 topsails as the extreme quantity required for 2,000 horses. Certainly there would be no difficulty; a simple order any day could accomplish it; but as the largest part of the Turkish fleet was destroyed, or in a non-active state in the harbour, almost any amount of canvas could have been obtained in the Turkish arsenal.

455. Within what time could it have been, in your opinion, sent over to the Crimea after being ordered?—Ninety hours; thirty hours' voyage each way, and thirty hours to load the ship.

456. You could have got what you would require?—Double. What I should require would be 210 topsails.

457. That you conceive to be a very moderate quantity, and might be obtained from Constantinople?—Certainly.

458. Do you think that carpenters' nails, and everything necessary, might have been procured also, and sent over in a few days from Constantinople, almost to an unlimited extent?—Undoubtedly; but the question is not confined to a period. Undoubtedly, if after the beginning of November we had had any demonstration; because, in consequence of the repairs necessary for Scutari hospital, arising out of the sick who came down after the battle of Inkermann, and otherwise—that is to say, arising about the 10th of November—we had eighty or ninety carpenters immediately set on; there were, more or less, carpenters more or less skilled. The town of Constantinople being built of wood affords a large supply, though they are certainly not very skilful.

459. You are Her Majesty's Deputy Lieutenant of the county of Warwick, are you not?—Of Leicester.

460. You have been in the habit of keeping hunters and hunting, have you not?—For about thirty years. I have kept horses in Greece, about twenty, at different periods.

461. Is there any produce of the Black Sea that you think might have been particularly useful for horses under circumstances of great exposure such as the cavalry in the Crimea were exposed to, suffering also from want of hay; and if so, will you state it, and the price, and where it could be obtained?—My attention was called early in the year to the feeding of horses at Scutari. I found that any quantity of linseed could be obtained at Constantinople, which is a depôt for linseed. Looking at the Reports of the House of Lords, I find that in February Lord Albemarle stated in his speech in the House of Lords a statistic that was derived from the British Custom House, showing the immense quantity of linseed, many thousands of quarters, exported from the Black Sea and Constantinople, and brought into England, subsequently to the commencement of the war. Having been in the habit of using linseed all my life in my stables, here and abroad, and being aware of

*C. H. Bracebridge, Esq.*

12th April 1856.

the extremely injurious effect of feeding horses upon barley alone, more or less for twenty years, and knowing the habit of the country, both Greece and Turkey, giving them green food in the spring, I instituted an inquiry at Scutari, and I mentioned the subject to several officers, whom I will name afterwards; amongst others Colonel Kennedy, who commanded the artillery at Galata-Serai, in the spring at Constantinople, having, I think, about 200 or 250 horses; and Captain Seager and Major Morris, but Captain Seager commanded the horses that were left of the light cavalry at Scutari, their number being about 60 or 70—I am allowed to use the names of those gentlemen; and I made a trial, mixing the linseed with the barley. Of course it would not be used as it could be in England, by being boiled to a jelly; I therefore ordered the serjeants in charge to soak it simply, and it was found by being soaked and mixed with the food in such a proportion that it did not produce greasiness, that the horses took to it, and it took away all that scorbutic effect of the extremely hard barley of that country, an effect which is very much the same as feeding men upon salt provisions, and which was neutralized by the oily matter of the linseed. Colonel Kennedy and Captain Seager were convinced by that experiment, and they applied to the Commissariat at Constantinople for an issue of linseed; and the Commissariat, who have allowed me to mention it, for I desired that they should, refused, upon the ground that they had issued all their contracts for forage, and that they would not effect new contracts for linseed. I mentioned this to Mr. Filder and to Mr. Curzon, one of the aide-de-camps to General Scarlett, and to General Paulet, at the time. My answer, then, is, that any quantity of this linseed could have been got, and it was extremely useful and expedient to prevent the exciting quality of the barley.

462. Can you state at what price it could have been obtained?—Five shillings per bushel, I got the price from Mr. Hanson; I bought about 20*l.* worth, and gave it to several. My answer, of course, is dependent upon the truth of Mr. Hanson's statement, who is one of the great merchants at Constantinople. I wish to add, that in the General Orders of General Codrington about three weeks ago, there is one expression—to give oilcake, which is composed of linseed, to the mules.

463. In your opinion, was much ingenuity exercised by the cavalry in the construction of stables or temporary shelter for their horses, as compared with the cavalry of other nations, in the Crimea?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It appears to me a most extraordinary thing to examine a witness as to what occurred five months before he was in that country. The next question is, how did this gentleman inform himself of what had happened five months before he visited the Crimea. He is asked whether ingenuity was shown by the cavalry in the month of November from what he saw in the month of May following. The question might be equally put to any gentleman in this Court who never left London at all.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to say that the cavalry were not completely covered in till the middle of February, and the men not till March. Mr. Bracebridge was in the Crimea about the 2d of May, so that the period is absolutely close upon it; he was there at the very time the huts were completed, and the stables completed; and within a month or two, I think, after the losses occurred.

464. (*Judge Advocate General to the witness.*) Are you prepared to give any opinion with respect to the cavalry of our army, in comparison with the cavalry of our allies, before you arrived in the Crimea?—No; after the 3d of May I can speak from what I saw.

465. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) I am sorry that I am obliged to put the question, but as the word "ingenuity" is commented upon by those who object to the Report, of course I must put it in some shape or other. (*To the witness.*) From what you saw of our cavalry after you arrived in the Crimea, can you form an opinion whether as much ingenuity was exercised by the cavalry in the construction of stables or temporary shelter for their horses as was shown by the cavalry of other nations in the Crimea?—I can only answer that question in a very restricted form. The only ingenuity that I had an opportunity of observing in other nations, with regard to the horses that arrived, was certain trenches and small dams, I may say, put up when the Sardinian horses were placed in their lines; and comparing that with the two regiments that I saw arrive, the 10th and 12th, from India, I did not observe any such dams or trenches where they were picketted. Just after they were picketted, unfortunately a series of rainy days happened in May,—I think the second week, probably from the 8th to the 16th, and a great deal of mud was created; and I do not think it would have been possible to have erected over the 10th and 12th regiments, in those few days, huts or stabling. As to the ingenuity of one nation and another, I saw no ingenuity in picketting those horses; but I saw that small ingenuity of the trench and the dam in the case of the Sardinians. I must limit it to that; what the causes were, whether it was the weather or anything else, I cannot speak to.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The Board will observe that Colonel Tulloch examines Mr. Bracebridge as to that part of the report which says that in the early part of the winter there was not much ingenuity, and Mr. Bracebridge's answer refers to what occurred afterwards in the summer.

(*Major-General Peel to the Earl of Lucan.*) You were not in the Crimea at that time?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I was gone two months previously.

Cross-examined by the Earl of Lucan.

*C. H. Bracebridge, Esq.*

12th April 1856.

466. You stated in one of your answers that any number of carpenters could have been found at Constantinople?— Eighty.

467. I ask you, is not this true, that there were English carpenters sent out from England to Constantinople by the Minister of War to assist in the construction or in the repairs of the Scutari hospitals?—It is undoubtedly true, and the first of them, I think, arrived about February; I could almost give the number. I think there were about sixteen.

---

Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B., further examined.

*Major-Gen. Sir R. Airey, K.C.B.*

468. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) I understand that upon the 8th of November you issued an order to Lord Lucan to provide shelter for his horses, and upon the 12th you renewed that order?—I think it was about those dates. I had not been warned at all that you were going to examine me to-day, and therefore I cannot state, but I will admit that they were about those dates, with Lord Lucan's permission.

469. I presume that when an order is received emanating from so high an authority, it is understood that the officer to whom it is addressed has the means of obeying it?—Generally.

470. When you issued such an order, I presume that you knew or had the means of knowing what number of men Lord Lucan was likely to have available for those purposes; in short, that you satisfied yourself of the practicability of carrying the order into effect before you issued it?—To the greatest possible extent certainly, of course always being aware that a cavalry regiment has remarkably few available men. I am obliged, with the permission of the Board, to amplify a little upon all those questions, because I think I may assume that the object of the Board and of the public is to get information—not a mere categorical answer to a question, but to get information. When Lord Raglan desired me to convey those orders to Lord Lucan, the cavalry had just got on their new ground shortly before, and as we had written to Constantinople, and were in the expectation of receiving the materials for sheltering the horses, a memorandum or a letter—I am not quite sure which it was, or whether it was a verbal instruction, but presume it was a written instruction—was sent to the officer commanding the cavalry to make such preparation as he could for the shelter of his horses. In my mind it was quite evident that the only preparation that the cavalry could make was to trace out the ground, to make use of such labour and such entrenching tools as they had at their disposal, to excavate it a little, and to get it level to be prepared for the uprights and the wood that was expected every day from Constantinople.

471. At that time had the ultimate site of the cavalry camp been fixed upon,—on the 8th or 12th of November?—Yes; they had marched down then to their ground.

472. To Kadikoi?—To Kadikoi. Lord Lucan will correct me if I am wrong.

(*Lord Lucan.*) We went to Kadikoi on the 2d and 5th of December.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) On the 8th and 12th of November it appears by the documents produced to us in the Quartermaster General's office, that orders were given for Lord Lucan to provide temporary shelter as he best could.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) We were in our first position on the hill then.

473. (*Colonel Tulloch to the Witness.*) At that time had the ultimate site of the camp been fixed upon?—No.

474. Then of course the men could neither have been digging the ground nor preparing the uprights, seeing that the site of the camp was not fixed?—There is a good deal to say, Sir Alexander Woodford, upon all these subjects. When I say that the cavalry were not established upon their ultimate ground, it was not at all sure at that moment that it might not have been their ultimate ground. I am placed in rather a peculiar position here. I occupied a particular character in that army. I was in close conference with the Commander-in-Chief of that army, and I therefore knew everything that was going on between the Commander-in-Chief of our own army and the Commander-in-Chief of the allied army. There were various transactions between those two personages which it would be anything but expedient or convenient that I should here mention. I shall only say, therefore, that those conferences were continual, and that there was a particular reason, which I will not mention here at this moment, why the cavalry were upon the ground which Colonel Tulloch now alludes to. It appears that Lord Lucan was written to and desired to make temporary protection as well as he could for his horses. Probably it might have meant at that moment merely embanking a little the earth and so forth for the time; and as I have before said, it was by no means certain then, although we know now that circumstances changed, and that the cavalry were marched down from that ground to the other; but when they got that order it was not positively settled or known whether they would eventually remain there or not. It would depend upon a variety of contingencies connected with the reinforcement of our army, both from France and from Varna by Omer Pasha.

475. Will you describe what you mean by a direction to Lord Lucan to make temporary shelter, as best he could, till the timber arrived; how could he make it, for want

*Major-Gen. Sir. R. Airey, K.C.B.*

12th April 1856.

of materials?—I think I have almost answered that question before. I mean this, that as it was not quite sure whether they would be there or not, and they might be there, it was perhaps only to throw up an embankment and to level the ground in case of their having to remain there.

476. Was not it more especially your province to know whether Lord Lucan's men had or had not a sufficient quantity of entrenching tools to enable them to work with?—Certainly it was my province to know, and certainly I did know, and I will here state that they were very badly off for entrenching tools of all descriptions, and the reasons that they were badly off for entrenching tools are also very apparent. We were breaking ground for a siege of the most enormous magnitude, for which we were not well prepared, and it was with the utmost difficulty that we could get the Royal Engineers to spare us the necessary entrenching tools for the regiments. Colonel Tulloch is very well aware of the extremely limited regulation upon this subject. I think it is five pickaxes for a whole regiment. I had issued as many, I think, as forty-six pickaxes to each battalion of the army in the course of five or six weeks. The entrenching tools of the British army are notoriously bad. The English soldier does not pay for them, unless he is found actually in the wanton act of destroying them, but they use them extremely badly. I have even heard of gentlemen upon their estates finding it necessary to come to an understanding with their labourers to find their own pickaxes, and they give them an additional rate of weekly wages to compensate for it. At all events, the English soldier notoriously uses them so ill that in a very short time they become useless; and all the regiments in that army, till very late indeed, were extremely badly off for entrenching tools.

477. If Lord Lucan had no materials and no entrenching tools, how could he provide shelter as you directed him?—You have mistaken me in saying that he had no entrenching tools. If I said no entrenching tools, I desire to correct that. They were very badly off for them; they were in an extremely bad condition, and they were very badly off for tools.

478. (*President.*) The Board understood you to say that there were very few?—That is what I intended to imply.

479. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) It having been stated to Sir John M'Neill and myself in the evidence of Colonel Gordon that Lord Lucan had been ordered to make temporary stables on the 8th and 12th of November, had we not good reason to point out that there was a want of promptitude when we found those stables only completed in the month of February?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, I must object to that question. It is a question for the Court, and not for the witness; it is overriding that Court.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I do submit that it is a most important question for me, and a most important question for the Board, and an important question for the country.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It cannot affect me in the least, but it is for the Board to decide.

(*Judge Advocate.*) Do you, Lord Lucan, object to Sir Richard Airey answering that question?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I object to his being called upon to form an opinion upon a matter which I think is exclusively within the province of the Board. I consider that the whole matter before the Board is to decide whether that Report is well or ill founded, and therefore it is not within the province of a witness to pronounce a general opinion of that nature.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to submit that Sir Richard Airey is my witness, and a most important one in this particular.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have no objection to his answering it, but I think it is irregular.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) As this objection has been taken, and as it is now past four o'clock, the Board will not decide this question until they reassemble.

Adjourned to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.

## SEVENTH DAY.

### Monday, April 14, 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea, pursuant to adjournment.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to be permitted to state that as there were some objections made to a question which I put just before the Court rose on Saturday that I will withdraw that question.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you proceed with the examination of General Airey?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) If you please.

Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B., further examined.

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

481. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Were not written queries addressed to you by the Commissioners after leaving Balaklava, calling for explanations as to what was done regarding the shelter for the cavalry, and is not this your answer to one of them, at page 188 of the Report of the Commissioners:—"I, however, obtained all the planking and timber necessary from "Sinope and Constantinople, and procured the assistance of 200 Turkish troops from "Roostum-Pasha, which encamped within the cavalry lines, for the purpose of con- "structing huts for the men and horses of the cavalry, and an engineer officer was placed "at the disposal of the Earl of Lucan, on the 12th November 1854, to superintend the "work"?—Yes; that is the answer to the question that was put to me. Before the next question is put to me I should like to say that I have answered that question of Colonel Tulloch's specifically. The question, I think, was, whether that was the answer which I gave to a question put by the Commissioners. It was, and it is so recorded; but of course that answer is very easily explained. It refers not to that particular date of the 12th of November; it refers to the general measures that were adopted for the shelter of the cavalry when it was known that we were going to winter in the Crimea, and therefore to a certain extent it refers to different periods; for instance, the arrival of the material, and the Turks who were desired to be and supposed to be 200, but who afterwards, it appears, did not come up to that number, and the engineer officer,—all this refers to the general question of sheltering the cavalry when it was known that we were going to winter; that whole period is not embraced in that single date of the 12th of November.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) With regard to General Airey's statement, Sir John M'Neill and I had no information except as stated in our report. Those queries were sent to General Airey, for the information of Sir John M'Neill and myself, and we possess no information or explanation but what is given in the report, and upon that alone does our report rest; and if there is anything wrong in that report ——

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You had better proceed with the examination.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Am I to understand that what was subsequently stated by General Airey is to be cancelled?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) General Airey has answered your question.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) But is the subsequent explanation to be cancelled?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You had better take the examination in order. Have you now another question to put?

482. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, which will elicit the facts. (*To the witness.*) Are then the following matters to be understood as having been communicated by you to the Commissioners, that by the 12th November at least the site had been fixed upon, that an engineer officer was available, the Turks ready to assist, the tools at hand, and nothing likely to interfere with the future application of the labour of the men to the preparation of the ground?—The answer that I have just stated was given in reply to a query as to what were the Quartermaster General's duties, or whether it was his duty to provide shelter for the cavalry. So far as we knew, on the 12th of November the cavalry were on their ground. Everybody knows that in war it is perfectly impossible to say what the next move may be; but at that moment they were on their ground. The weather was beginning to a certain extent to break, and it was desirable to do as much as could be done in advance of the materials that were expected, and so forth, and therefore that order was sent to Lord Lucan to prepare for the shelter of his horses, in anticipation of the materials that were expected to arrive. As I have just said, in that part of my explanation of my former answer which was not to be received, at that time the circumstances stated in my reply go over the whole period, after it was ascertained that the cavalry were to winter in the Crimea; therefore, in my reply to the Commissioners, I stated generally what was done

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

for the shelter of the cavalry horses after it was so decided by the general officers. If the Board will look a little further down, to the very last answer that I gave to the Commissioners, they will see that I express my regret that their indisposition prevented them from examining me personally. I was obliged, in great stress of business as Quartermaster General of that great army, to make the most of my time, and answer as rapidly as I could general questions, and I expressed my regret that the indisposition of the Commissioners prevented them from examinining me personally, when a great many erroneous impressions and conclusions might have been avoided.

483. Will you state why you did not explain this most important circumstance to the Commissioners?—I really did not imagine that the object of the Commissioners was anything beyond gathering information upon general subjects. As I have said before, I have quoted, I see, in my very answer, that the time of the Quartermaster General of an army in the field is not his own for five minutes in the day or night. I was extremely pressed; and, as I say, not imagining that this inquiry was to take any particular direction beyond eliciting general information, I gave a general answer.

484. In the absence of such information, could the Commissioners know that your answer did not refer to the period specified, namely, the 12th of November?—It is almost impossible for me to answer that question, as to what means the Commissioners had of making up their own opinions and decisions. Had they thought that it would have been better to have referred to me, I was always within reach, and I could have answered categorically any questions, or enlarged upon it, if it had been so desired.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to say that we were not within reach at that time. Those queries were forwarded to Sir Richard Airey at Constantinople, and sent to England two or three weeks afterwards, and there was no opportunity of communicating with him.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Are you making any application to the Board with respect to questions that you are about to put?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No; it was in explanation of the statement made by General Airey just now.

485. At page 179 of the evidence in the Report of the Commissioners will be found, in the 4th paragraph from the bottom, these words—"On the same day Lord Lucan was "directed to make temporary stables as he best could till timber arrived, and on the "12th November an engineer officer was placed at his disposal for the purpose of assisting." Can you explain that statement made by Colonel Gordon?—I think that the paragraph at the bottom of page 178 does explain it. Colonel Gordon says, "In illustration "of the frequent communications which took place between the Quartermaster General "and the various departments relative to supplies of different kinds, Colonel Gordon "submits the following extracts from entries in the office register of correspondence on "such subjects from the beginning of October to the middle of December, in addition to "what has been already noticed." In bringing forward those illustrations, amongst them appears this one that you allude to; it is a part of that same answer.

486. Do you know whether any explanation was afforded by Colonel Gordon, in submitting those extracts from the office register, to lead the Commissioners to believe that there was a doubt of everything being ready except the timber?—It is impossible for me to answer for the examination of Colonel Gordon; but I am quite persuaded that Colonel Gordon's desire and his object was to afford the Commissioners every degree of information in his power, and if anything had been left unexplained I am quite sure that he would have been prepared to have gone further into it, if it had been wished.

[Another written question having been submitted to the Judge Advocate General:]

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you intend to call Colonel Gordon?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I do not conceive that it is necessary, because the chief of the Quartermaster General's Department is now before the Board, and everything that we require to refer to is actually in the volume before me.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) If you refer to General Airey's last answer, perhaps you will consider whether you will not call Colonel Gordon.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It may perhaps be necessary; but if you will return my question I will consider of it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) If you consider that you have put a question that has not been answered, you have a right to state that to General Airey.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I was anxious to establish the fact, that not only by General Airey but also by his subordinates was no further information given to us.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is your objection this, that you have not got an answer to a question?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) If you wish to suggest to General Airey that he has not given an answer to your question, you have an opportunity of doing it, and the better course will be to have the question repeated.

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

487. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Do you know whether any explanation was afforded by Colonel Gordon in submitting these extracts from the office register to lead the Commissioners to believe that there was a doubt of everything being ready except the timber?—I cannot answer at all for Colonel Gordon's answer to any question that may have been put to him.

488. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Then I will put it in another form. (*To the witness.*) Do you know whether there was any such explanation as you have given to the Board, or any explanation whatever, in the office register, that was submitted to us?—It is really almost impossible for me to answer that question, and I particularly wish to avoid the appearance of trying to evade giving answers. I would give any answers that I could possibly give. I was not present when Colonel Gordon was examined. I think I may say that Colonel Gordon put into my hands a rough copy, to the best of his ability, but I could not positively state so; he gave me a sort of analysis of his examination, but knowing that my own was to follow I did not very much care about Colonel Gordon's examination, for I felt persuaded that anything that would be incomplete or unsatisfactory to the Commissioners would be afterwards referred to me, and I should have an opportunity of enlarging upon it or amplifying it. I am anxious to answer that question in any way I can, and I do not impute in the slightest degree antagonism on the part of the Commissioners to us, but I dislike very much to sit here with an appearance of evading to give a direct answer which I should be very glad to give if it was in my power. I repeat that I was not present at Colonel Gordon's examination and I cannot say.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Is there any order of General Airey's before the Board.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I refer to extracts.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you refer to the order from the Quartermaster General's department.

489. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is this order: "Lord Lucan was directed to make temporary "stables, as he best could, till the timber arrived, and on the 12th of November an engineer "was placed at his disposal," being an extract from the office register of the Quartermaster General. (*To the witness.*) If anything had occurred to change completely the nature of your order, ought not such circumstances to have been entered in your office register?—In carrying on the business of that great war a great deal was done verbally; but I would at once denounce coming to conclusions as to what can only be proved by documentary evidence. But the whole thing had changed. I probably should have met Lord Lucan somewhere, possibly. I rode up to his own tent, or met him on the road, and said, "The whole thing is changed, and will not go on; you will have to move in a day or "two." There would be no documentary evidence or office register to show whether that had been done. I have before me Lord Lucan's letter to myself of the 17th of November, in which he calls to my notice the circumstance that he cannot get on in doing anything towards protecting his horses with any rapidity or advantage without the assistance of an engineer officer. I think I stated that reference was immediately made to the commanding officer of the Royal Engineers for an engineer officer, and that engineer officer was sent to him, and he gave as much of his time to him as he could.

490. Do you admit then that under those circumstances your office register cannot be relied upon as evidence of everything that was done?—It can be relied upon, certainly, so far as it goes; but there was a great deal more done than appears in my office register.

491. How can this be, when it is stated that on the 12th of November an engineer officer was placed at Lord Lucan's disposal, and yet no such officer was, according to Lord Lucan's evidence, given to him at that date?—Lord Lucan, I think, was written to, to say that an engineer officer would be placed at his disposal. I really cannot say the date; I have not the papers with me to show.

492. Is this a document, or is it not a document? Can it be relied upon, or can it not? Shall I shut it out of the evidence entirely, or not?—I suppose there is a letter; it was written to Lord Lucan on the 12th of November, saying that an engineer officer was placed at his disposal, and that I presume was simultaneous with the communication that was made to the Chief Engineer to send an officer; or it might have been a verbal communication that I had with Colonel Gordon, to beg that he would do so, and he said that he would. Therefore we assumed that the whole thing was in train; and whether it was on that particular day or the day after, all I wish to establish is that at that time, under those circumstances, we did everything that was possible, by sending an engineer officer to assist in the way that Lord Lucan wished.

493. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) I shall defer this portion of the examination till after I have had an opportunity of calling Colonel Gordon. (*To the witness.*) Did you peruse the evidence of Colonel Gordon, as corrected by him a few days after his examination in the Crimea, when that evidence was returned to him by the Commissioners for the purpose of being corrected?—I have no recollection of that.

494. Did not the Commissioners call at your office three several times after the examination of Colonel Gordon for four days, and were you not unable to see them on each of those occasions, though they attended specially for the purpose of examining you?—Yes; the Commissioners came up to head quarters either two or three times. On the first occasion I think they went so far as taking their places at the table. I was called peremptorily away, and the same thing occurred each time. If the Board will allow me to make an observation,—my rough register book has been just sent

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

to me, and I see that on the 12th of November, the date that Colonel Tulloch alludes to, Captain Gordon, who was the Commanding Engineer for the operative part, was written to on that date, by order of the Commander of the Forces, to place an engineer officer at the disposal of Lord Lucan, and on the same day Lord Lucan was informed of it. It spoke for itself. When the Commander of the Forces desired the Commanding Royal Engineer to send an officer to Lord Lucan, it was as a matter of course that he would go; however long or however short a time he might stay was another question. Therefore it was a reasonable assumption, having written to the Commanding Royal Engineer that he was to go, and therefore the communication was made to Lord Lucan. Whether he did not go that day, or was not there on the 17th, that was a matter depending upon the exigency of the service. It possibly may have been so. I was not living in the cavalry camp. I do not know whether he went that day, or what the engineer officer's name was. I see by the register that on that same day we wrote to Lord Lucan and to the Commanding Engineer.

495. Was it not the more necessary, as you knew the anxiety of the Commissioners to obtain information on those points, that you should have explained every circumstance, to show the reason why the cavalry was not sooner placed under cover, when you had an opportunity?—I am obliged to refer again to the last three lines of my evidence, in which I say that "The actual current business of the day amply occupies many hours, and many "others devoted to lengthy extraneous matters necessarily forces a neglect of what may "be of real importance to the service." Therefore my answers were really as short and as rapidly given as I could give them under great pressure of time; but there is this circumstance, that my impression was that the Commissioners were solely looking to the commissariat supplies; I had no idea that there was anything with regard to my own matters, and it was merely that they were eliciting information with regard to the commissariat supplies; therefore, with regard to giving any information upon extraneous matters connected with the Quartermaster General's department, it did not come within my own idea.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to refer to the second page of my instructions; the last letter of my instructions on that head, and which were communicated to Lord Raglan. "War "Department, February 22d, 1855. Gentlemen,—Referring to my instructions of the "19th instant, I have further to desire that you will make it your business to ascertain "what may have been the sources of supply of provisions, forage, and other articles sup-"plied to the troops in the Crimea. You will make further inquiry into the alleged "delay in unshipping and distributing the clothing and other stores."

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you state that that was communicated to Lord Raglan?

496. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, it was. With the Board's permission, I will now refer to another inquiry that was made of General Airey, at page 188 of the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry, and his answer. I am particularly anxious to call the attention of Lord Lucan to the dates here specified in our letter of instructions. The query addressed to the Quartermarter General was in these terms: "It appears that the first shelter of "this kind procured was about the 5th January, and that in most of the corps it was the "end of January or the beginning of February before the horses were under cover, during "which most of them perished. Can you explain the cause of this delay? The cause of "delay in sheltering the horses was the impossibility of obtaining labour. The English "army itself was already overworked in conducting the operations of the siege, and not "a fatigue party was to be obtained. The native labour was of the worst possible "description; indolent and lazy naturally, every half dozen men required a superinten-"dent to look after them, in order to prevent their sitting down to smoke and gamble; "and nothing short of the fear of the lash would induce them to come out of their tents "in the cold weather, and therefore their actual labour was tantamount to nil. Even "the Turkish soldiers' labour, what with difference of language and national character-"istics, was very poor." (*To the witness.*) Having reference to this paragraph which I have just read, ought you not to have stated in reply to the Commissioners to the query on page 188 that the reason of the delay was not merely the impossibility of finding labour, but that it was because nothing whatever was or could be done between the 12th of November and the 16th and 17th of December?—My answer, I think, embraced the whole spirit of your question. I think you asked me what the cause of the delay was, and I then stated the cause of the delay to the best of my ability.

497. Had there been labour would not the want of tools have been another cause of delay?—Possibly it might.

498. Do you also ascribe the delay to the want of an engineer officer?—Most certainly; if Lord Lucan had had the constant attendance of an engineer officer with him his works would have been expedited.

499. I asked you whether you ascribed the delay in your answer to us to the want of an engineer officer?—Is there any mention of any engineer officer in that answer?

500. No.—No, I do not think there is.

501. I refer to your answer to the question of the Commissioners?—The great and the primary cause of the delay was the want of labour. If we had had a sufficiency of labour and no restriction in point of labour, we could have done almost any thing.

502. Could you have used the labour without the site having been fixed upon?—The site was fixed upon, wherever the camp was was their site; it was not permanently fixed;

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

it might have been changed every day; wherever the cavalry was any day that was the site of the cavalry.

503. Do you admit that it was the 16th of December before the site on which the cavalry was ultimately placed was determined upon?—I really cannot say the date exactly when it was fixed, without reference to the correspondence in my department; not the precise day.

504. You have stated to the Board that you knew that the men had no tools, or very few?—I stated that the army altogether was badly off for tools; and it is a curious circumstance that, sitting here, I see a letter to Captain Gordon, the Commanding Engineer of the attack, and who had the authority over those tools, and the distribution of them. This letter is dated on the 14th of November; and then I write a letter to Captain Gordon, to ask him if he can spare a few pickaxes and spades for the use of the permanent pickets, so that those men at all events who knew where they were to be permanently stationed before the enemy might throw up a little breastwork or cover for themselves. That has just come before my observation, that for that part of the army that was not positively engaged in the trenches I was obliged to write to the Commanding Royal Engineer on the 14th to know whether he could spare a few pickaxes and spades for the use of the permanent pickets, so that the men might be able to throw up cover for themselves. Therefore I presume that it is correct, that which Colonel Tulloch states, that my impression was that they were badly off.

505. Were you present when Colonel Gordon and Lord Lucan gave their evidence to the Board, and did you hear them state that there was no engineer officer available?—I cannot call to my mind that particular evidence. I have been here every day since the commencement of the sitting of the Board, but I have no doubt that it is correct.

506. And that no site was fixed upon, and that an engineer officer would have been of no use had he been there?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I must call the attention of the Board to this; I never said one word of the kind.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is, I think, in the proceedings of the Board. I may be mistaken; but I think that his lordship gives a long description of the difficulties that he had to contend with with regard to an engineer. It was stated by Lord Lucan, "I shall show, I believe, "to the satisfaction of this Board, that at that time there had been no engineer officer "given to me at all when we were on the hill."

(*Lord Lucan.*) That is quite correct.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was stated by Lord Lucan and Colonel Gordon that no site was fixed, consequently an engineer officer would not have been of any use if he had been there. That is not an expression of Lord Lucan's; that is the inference which I am calling upon the witness to draw.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) If Colonel Tulloch will examine me I will explain the whole thing.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) You had better put your question to General Airey, who is the witness.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Lord Lucan states in his evidence to the Board that no assistance from the Turks was given to him till after the 12th of November, and then only for a week, and that the ground for the stables was only marked out on the 16th. He says, "I think I have brought the Board down from the 2d to the 10th. I see nothing about "the 9th. Roostum Pasha was induced to give a few Turks, to the best of my recol-"lection; I know nothing very positive, but I think he did give something like 100 "Turks or 150."

(*Earl of Lucan.*) That is not all.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) His Lordship says at page 13, "I gave out an order on December "the 16th to this effect: 'It is quite evident, from the difficulty of getting a sufficient "number of Turks, and the little work that can be got out of them, that unless we make "stabling for ourselves we shall be without, which cannot fail to be attended by the "fearful consequence of our becoming altogether dismounted. The ground for the "stabling is already marked out, the regiments are in possession of a certain number of "entrenching tools, and, if required, more shall be given them.'" That appears to be on the 16th.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It "is already marked out." That might be any time previous.

(*Major General Peel.*) You read the order dated the 16th of December, in which it says that the "ground is already marked out."

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is also in the evidence of another officer that that was the date at which this order was given out, and I presume it would not be marked out before.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) If you refer to any evidence that has been given before the Board, you had bettter read it from the minutes.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I did read it, with regard to the Turks.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) My correspondence will show all this, if it is of any use to Colonel Tulloch.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Will Lord Lucan tell me the date of the site being marked out?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) If Colonel Tulloch will examine me I will answer that or any other question.

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

507. (*Colonel Tulloch to the witness.*) Then it appears that you have stated nothing in explanation of the delay, except in regard to the impossibility of procuring labour, omitting all mention of the tools of the Turkish soldiers not being available, and the ground not being marked out. Was it not your duty to acquaint the Commissioners with all the circumstances as affecting the question of the delay in a most important degree?—I answered the question of the Commissioners in the most general way; putting the most prominent circumstance forward, which was the want of labour, and in fact that answer embraced the other two.

508. How many weeks were the written questions by the Commissioners left with you to be answered?—I really cannot say. The Commissioners went away some time early in June. I really cannot say, but a very considerable time; it was a very long time before I could give my attention at all to them. I do not think that I was able to take them up till I got a telegraphic message from Lord Panmure to say that he wanted my answers to be sent by the next mail. I was so employed at the time. It was just when the different attacks upon Sebastopol were going on, and all the arrangements making, so that I positively could not give my attention to them at all. When I got the telegraphic message from Lord Panmure, to say that he wanted my answers to be sent by the next mail, I just took them up, and answered them as categorically as I could, under the circumstances; but it was a considerable time,—several weeks.

509. Am I from all this to infer that you gave two orders of that date when they could not be executed?—I should say, certainly not. But what two orders do you allude to?

510. The 8th and 12th of November.—Regarding what?

511. On the 8th of November "Lord Lucan was directed to make temporary shelters "as he best could till the timber arrived, and on the 12th of November an engineer was "placed at his disposal for the purpose of assisting him?"—Those two communications are quite correct. Lord Lucan was requested to do the best he could, and the Commanding Royal Engineer was requested to send him an engineer officer.

512. And that those orders were entered in your office book, and then quoted by you to the Commissioners, to account for the delay, without stating that they had virtually been annulled?—I beg not to admit any part of what Colonel Tulloch has last said about certain orders being annulled.

513. I will put the question again. Am I from all this to infer that you gave two orders of that date, when they could not be executed?—I should say certainly that I will not admit that inference.

514. And that those orders were entered in your office book, and then quoted by you to the Commissioners, to account for the delay, without stating that they had virtually been annulled?—Most certainly not. I will not admit that inference in any degree.

515. Do you consider that the orders given could have been executed?—To the extent stated in the order, certainly, which was to do the best he could.

516. Do you consider that Lord Lucan could construct shelter without materials, without labour, and without tools, and at that time, the 12th of November, without a fixed site?—I have stated already that the site of the cavalry was wherever those troops happened to be at the moment. With regard to the shelter to be constructed, it was such shelter as the circumstances admitted of. That shelter might have been merely throwing up an embankment for a night, or any temporary shelter, as I think it is stated in the memorandum, that Lord Lucan could construct, under the circumstances in which his troops then were.

517. Was not the site which you allude to that upon the plateau?—On the 11th of November the site was upon the plateau.

518. You stated in your evidence on Saturday last, at page 87, that it was not at all sure at that moment that the ground on which the cavalry then were might not have been the ultimate ground. "When I say that the cavalry were not established upon their ultimate "ground, it was not at all sure at that moment that it might not have been their ultimate "ground. That was the plateau, I presume?—Certainly.

519. I will call your attention to Lord Lucan's opinion of that ground. It is at page 36 of the proceedings. "I should perhaps have given my answer at greater length, and have "said that there was nothing in the world on that plateau that afforded materials for "hutting. Though I have heard in the course of this day that the horses might have had "shelter at that time from canvas, I certainly at that moment did not know that there was "any canvas to be had; and this I can state, and defy contradiction, that on that plateau it "would not have been safe to have placed any horse under canvas. On the 14th, as "every body knows, there was not a single tent that was not blown down, and no man "but a madman would have thought of placing a horse under canvas on that plateau." Do you concur in that opinion?—It was impossible to say where the cavalry might be stationed.

520. Do you concur in that opinion as to the character of that site?—That is, that that site was on the top of a bleak hill,—not a plateau, but a sort of a hill; and I do not think there was the vestige of a shrub, or a tree, or a habitation upon it, with the exception of the head quarter building, a sort of farm-house. There was nothing on that plateau, as Lord Lucan has expressed in his evidence. With regard to the question of the canvas shelter, I confess myself that I would not have put my horses (it is a matter of opinion) under a

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

canvas shelter at that time, because every one knows what canvas shelter must be, unless you have the positive framework of a building to support every part of that canvas, both vertically and laterally. The weight of the water and the effect of the wind on canvas, unless very strongly supported indeed, would blow the whole machinery down, and therefore be a source of very great danger to the horses. From the very circumstances of the horses becoming frightened, and nervous as they are, they might do each other as much injury as the actual falling down of this temporary edifice over their heads. The only place where I could have put canvas was where I could have scarped on the side of the hill, and been able to extend it laterally over them; and the rain falling upon it and the canvas holding it, the weight of it would have brought the whole thing down.

521. The Commissioners having received no other information than what your office and yourself afforded as to the date when the cavalry was directed to construct stables, namely, the 8th and 12th November, and as those were not completed till the middle of February, a period of three months afterwards, was it not necessary that some further information should have been afforded to the Commissioners, to prevent their attributing the delay to want of promptitude in the execution of your orders?—Yes; and I think it was a great pity that the Commissioners came to that conclusion, without taking further evidence.

522. From whom but yourself and Colonel Gordon was such evidence to be obtained?—I think very much from me, and I think that one ride between Balaklava and the camp, where we might have discoursed freely, honestly, and openly, upon all these matters, would have set the whole thing clear and right.

523. Did not the Commissioners give you an opportunity, in writing to yourself, and by four days examination of your senior assistant?—My own examination in writing, I have already stated two or three times, was merely general and superficial answers to general questions. I had no indication whatever of the leaning of the Commissioners, or that they implicated anybody, or thought that there was blame attached to anybody. If I had had the slightest idea of that I should have been able to explain things perfectly. I think myself, and I cannot help believing, that they would have come to different conclusions.

524. Besides attending in person at your head quarters to see you on three successive days, did not the Commissioners give you an opportunity, in writing to yourself, and by four days' examination of your senior assistant?—The attending in person, as no examination of me whatever took place, of course must be null and void. I am only answering the last part of your question just now, which refers to your coming to me three times. I say that as no examination took place that naturally is null and void.

525. Do you consider that the Commissioners could suppose that no blame attached to any one when they found that two thirds of the cavalry horses were dead?—I think it is quite possible that the Commissioners might by their inquiries have found that under the peculiar circumstances in which that army was placed there was no blame. It is my impression now that there was no blame to the people in the Crimea.

526. I shall again read the query at page 188 of the Report of the Commissioners, and the answer, preparatory to putting another question. "It appears that the first shelter of "this kind procured was about the 5th of January, and that in most of the corps it was "the end of January or beginning of February during which most of them perished. "Can you explain the cause of this delay?" Would it not have been easy to have explained the whole matter in the answer to this inquiry, by stating that the Commissioners were mistaken in supposing that anything of importance was done or could have been done before the 12th of November and the middle of December, about which time the troops appear to have commenced the execution of your orders?—I think if I had had any idea that there was to be a subsequent examination upon this very subject that they were then examining into on the spot, I should have been prepared to have enlarged very much, and to have gone into much greater detail, and to have entered into a greater variety of subjects than I then thought was sufficient for the general information of the Commissioners.

527. If the Commissioners had to report to the Secretary of State for War, and ultimately to Parliament, could they have omitted so important a circumstance as the dates when the shelter was ordered and when it was completed, and should not your information therefore have been of the most specific description?—I cannot at all answer for the instructions that were given to the Commissioners by the Government. As I said before, their instructions appeared to embrace the subject of the commissariat supplies. I did not know what report they were called upon to make upon other subjects at all.

528. Could they in any report have omitted so important a circumstance as the dates when the shelter was ordered, and when it was completed, and should not your information therefore have been of the most specific description?—I did not intend to make any difficulty at all with regard to either the question or the answer; but really, with regard to "any report," it is so very vague and indefinite that I do not know how to answer it.

529. Did it not occur to you that in any report made by the Commissioners it must necessarily appear, in the absence of such information, that the Quartermaster General's department had done its duty by ordering the shelter at so early a period, while the cavalry neglected theirs by not complying with such orders?—I do not admit the inference that is drawn there. I do not admit the inference that the cavalry omitted to do their duty.

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

My impression is, that the cavalry, under the circumstances in which they were placed, did all they could, therefore I cannot answer that question in any other way.

530. When the order was given to provide shelter on the 12th of November, and it was not completed till the middle of February, without any explanation afforded to the Commissioners as to the cause of the delay, could the delay arise from any other circumstances than want of promptitude in carrying out the orders, particularly as the mortality among the horses was so very high?—I think that is an error which the Commissioners have committed in not going far enough into the evidence on the spot.

531. How could the Commissioners do more than examine your office records, your senior assistant, and yourself?—I think the greatest proof of that is that we are every moment eliciting additional information here, and, as I have before said two or three times, my own examination, considering it was not undertaken on the spot at all, was very incomplete.

532. If you supposed that the inquiry of the Commissioners was confined to the Commissariat, why should they have come to the Quartermaster General's department at all?—Because those reasons were best known to the Commissioners themselves why they chose to examine me. I presume it was because I was in constant communication with the Commissary General.

533. Why did you not at once reply by denying our authority in regard to the matter relating to the shelter for the horses?—I was desired by the Commander of the Forces to appear before the Commissioners and give them every information that they wished to obtain.

534. Why under any circumstances did you give incomplete information, which must of necessity lead to erroneous conclusions?—It appears to me really that I have answered that question in spirit several times. I gave all the general information at the moment that appeared to be embraced in their questions, and I had no reason to suppose that they required any more specific information, because it was known where I was. I also came back to England, and it was known that I was in London, and if they found that more information was required from me, as I have said before, I was within reach and ready to give it.

535. Are you not aware that in a public inquiry such as was conducted by the Commissioners in the Crimea it is usual to close the proceedings after taking evidence, and that the Commissioners must not assume that the statements are either erroneous or insufficient in what has been deliberately stated to them and signed by the witness. In short, if any witnesses conceive that their statement has been insufficient or may be misunderstood, is it not their duty to apply to the Commissioners to allow them to complete it?—I do not concur in the inference that has been drawn by Colonel Tulloch that they are to consider the first gloss of evidence that they receive as final and complete. This is merely a matter of opinion that Colonel Tulloch has called upon me to express, I think. When the Commissioners came out to an army like that in the Crimea to obtain information they ought to have left no stone unturned to obtain complete and full information upon every point, and after getting the evidence of the officers, on going over it, if there were any parts of it which did not elicit all the information that was advantageous or desirable to obtain, they ought again to have applied to those individuals for further information; and I go so far as to say that far from having received all that information, mine was not really given. It was during a time certainly of great illness and great alarm in the camp, for there was a great deal of alarm at that time and a great deal of cholera; people were well at eleven in the day and corpses in the afternoon, and the Commissioners themselves were indisposed, and were obliged to go away, and they went to Constantinople; a great many went, and I was recommended to go myself, but I did not go, but they got well there, they were well again at Constantinople, the sea voyage and change of residence re-established their health. I say that there was no reason why they should not have come back to the Crimea and have gone further into the evidence, which I do very conscientiously and very honestly say I believe would have had the effect of preventing this investigation which is now going on in so far as concerns the Quartermaster General's department.

536. Were not the Commissioners in the Crimea for three months, and did they not examine the commanding officers, surgeons, and quartermasters of every regiment, and how could they have known or assumed that their information was incomplete?—I really cannot answer that question. It depends entirely upon the characteristics of the Commissioners, how far they were able to get at a right understanding, and the object of the evidence.

537. That part of the question which I wished an answer to particularly was, how could the Commissioners have known or assumed that their information was incomplete? —I cannot give any other answer. It is impossible for me to judge of the characteristics or abilities or mental acquirements of the Commissioners. That depends entirely upon how far they can put evidence and conclusions together. I do not think I can answer that question.

538. When did you return home?—I think it was the first week in December 1855.

539. That was, I believe, before the publication of the Report?—I never saw the Report till January 1856.

540. The date of publication was the 27th of January?

541. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) When did you see the Report?—I saw it some time in January.

542. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Did it not occur to you that even at that late period you might put right any matter which was liable to have led the Commissioners astray, and did you attempt to do so?—Most certainly I did. At that time it had become a public document. It was printed in a Blue Book, in the same form in which it is now before the Board. I happened, from circumstances connected with a particular service, to be present with certain members of the Government, and directly I saw and was acquainted with that Report I said that I thought it was very inexpedient that I should proceed on that particular service for which I had been selected, as although I might have passed it over, yet circumstances had given a certain complexion to the expressions that had been used and the conclusions come to in that Report, and in fact they were considered as animadverting to a certain extent on me as the Quartermaster General of that army, and I therefore mentioned it to the Commander in Chief that I thought it desirable that I should remain in England in order to give explanations upon those parts of the Report, therefore I took the earliest possible time for so doing.

543. I first asked, "When did you return home?" and it appeared that it was before the publication of the Report by about three weeks. Then I asked you, "Did it not appear to "you, even at that late period, you might have put right any omission that there was in the "evidence which may have led the Commissioners astray, and did you attempt to do so?" That is, if you knew that in the Report there was anything which you wished to alter, you had an opportunity to alter it. I will put the question again. Did it not occur to you that even at that late period you might have put right any omission that there was in your evidence which may have led the Commissioners astray, and did you attempt to do so?—I think it will appear quite evident to this Board that I could not well have attempted to put right a subject that I was in perfect ignorance of. By Colonel Tulloch's own showing the Report did not come out for three weeks afterwards. I did not know anything of it, and therefore I had nothing to put right.

544. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Did you see the Report; was it printed when you saw it?—The first time that I saw the Report it was exactly in the same state that it is now in, in your hands, printed as a Blue Book.

545. It was not brought before you officially in any way?—It is rather a curious thing, that I am not sure that it has ever been brought before me officially till this day.

546. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) But you knew the evidence that you had given, and the evidence given by Colonel Gordon, and if there was anything in that evidence which you wished to alter or thought insufficient, why did you not ask the Commissioners to amend it?—I had no wish to alter any part of my evidence. I considered my evidence complete. It was for the Commissioners,—they came out with a specific object, and had specific instructions, and specific facts to elicit and bring out,—and it was for them, not for me, to state what additional information they wanted. I had no idea that my information was not complete.

547. In accordance with that evidence given by you and Colonel Gordon, namely, that you ordered shelter to be provided on the 12th of November, and the evidence of the cavalry officers that it was not completed till the middle of February, the Commissioners assumed that there was a want of promptitude in providing shelter. Have you any observation to make upon that subject?—I have more than once during my examination this day felt inclined to appeal to the Board, to represent that I have come here loyally, honestly, and frankly to answer questions; but it appears to me that it has been rather sought to entangle me into an admission of inferences which I most totally and entirely disclaim. I have nothing really to say to that question. The Commissioners had their own objects, and they had their own instructions, and they have carried them out, I have no doubt, to the best of their ability; but I must decline being brought into any inferential matter.

548. After the publication of the Report was your attention called to the want of promptitude and ingenuity attributed in the Report to some part of your department?—Certainly it was.

549. If so, did you ever communicate with the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief upon the subject?—I expressed to the Commander in Chief my wish that I should have an opportunity afforded me to make explanations on any part of that Report; not that in particular, but on any part of the Report as to which I might afford any explanation.

550. Did you explain to him that all this apparent delay between the 12th of November and the 16th or 17th of December was really the fault of your own department?—Do you mean that I was to tell the Commander in Chief that all the fault that occurred or the delay in the shelter of the cavalry was owing to myself?

551. I will put the succeeding part of the question:—that you issued orders that could not be carried into effect, and if not, why did you not make some representation?—I certainly did not ever tell the Commander in Chief any such thing as that the fault or delay in sheltering the horses was attributable to the Quartermaster General's department; but really I do not recollect what conversation I had with the Commander in Chief. I do not think that it would be very proper that I should here state what conversations may have taken place between me and the Commander in Chief

*Major General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

552. I will read this paragraph, which occurs at page 32 of the third day's proceedings before this Board. You are asked this question: "May the Board suppose, from "all that passed within your knowledge upon the subject, that there was no want of "promptitude or ingenuity in providing shelter for the cavalry horses, but on the contrary?" Your answer is: "I should say, certainly, that every exertion was made by "your lordship in forwarding the sheltering of your horses, but from the actual duties "of the cavalry, from the circumstance that every sick man who goes into hospital "renders two men inefficient, and throws all the extra labour upon those men who are "still efficient, the excessive duties that the cavalry had to perform, in the maintenance of their appointments, and their equipments and their saddlery, independently "of the horses, it would be utterly extraordinary that a cavalry soldier of himself could "do anything in the way of constructing stables." With reference to that paragraph, how do you account for directing the stables to be constructed by the very men as to whom you now declare it would be utterly extraordinary if they could accomplish any work of the kind?—I can only explain it by saying that it is extraordinary, and out of the ordinary course of what a cavalry soldier would have time to do. I do not know any other term. It is out of the ordinary course of what a cavalry soldier can have time to do, with the very great duties which he has to perform; also considering the few men that a regiment of cavalry has. Colonel Douglas is here, who commands a cavalry regiment, and I should be very glad if the Board would call upon him to state the number of men that appear upon paper as effective men, and let him explain how those men, whatever they are, whether 100 or 200, are employed, what duties they have to do, and how many men he can positively take and make use of in doing anything out of the ordinary course; then it will be ascertained whether the word "extraordinary" is an improper term or not.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) My reason for putting the question is with reference to what follows.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I shall have an opportunity of laying before this Board a return that I happen to happen to have with me by accident. It is a nominal return of every man belonging to the ten regiments, and how they were employed, on the 16th of December. I think that will give the Board a very fair idea of what were the occupations of the cavalry at that time.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to say that on the 16th of December there were 122 horses employed in conveying commissariat stores to the front from the 2d Cavalry Brigade. The 16th of December is not an average period.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You have a witness under examination; will you go on?

(*Witness.*) By the word "extraordinary" I meant to imply, out of the ordinary course of what can be expected from cavalry soldiers, with the heavy duties which they had to perform.

553. My question was—"How do you account for directing stables to be constructed by "the very men whom you now declare it would be utterly extraordinary if they could "accomplish any work of the kind?"—I did not consider the impossibilities; but I considered that Lord Lucan was instructed by that memorandum, that those hours which, under common circumstances, would have been considered leisure hours, would have been appropriated to the execution of those extraordinary works, and therefore out of the ordinary course.

554. What was the strength of the cavalry present at head quarters in November and December 1854; how many were constantly on duty, and what were those duties?—I must leave the commanding officer of cavalry to answer that question; it is an Adjutant General's question, and not a Quartermaster General's question, therefore Lord Lucan will be prepared to answer that question.

555. Were not a very considerable number of men and horses employed in carrying up provisions to the front, and bringing down sick, from the 13th of December?—Yes; about that period the cavalry horses were employed in carrying down the sick, and carrying provisions; in fact, they were put to every sort of use for which they could possibly be made available; they were hardly pressed for want of transport at that moment, and the cavalry were obliged to be put to those duties. This was exceedingly remonstrated against by Lord Lucan; but it was imperative, and Lord Raglan, with great regret, was compelled to do it. There was an accumulation of difficulties, and it was a question with regard to starving the men by the want of food and the want of clothing, and therefore we were obliged to take the least of the evils; that was the only alternative at that time.

556. Can you say how many were so employed?—No, I cannot say at present, without reference. I recollect making a communication to Lord Lucan to afford 500, I think, and he very nearly accomplished it, but with a very strong remonstrance. I think Lord Lucan can speak to that.

557. Was all this number available previously to the 13th of December for the construction of stabling, had they been so employed, or could this duty have been undertaken in addition?—No. It is a fallacy to suppose that because even 500 were ordered on a particular duty, that if they had not been on that duty they would have been available for other services; they would have had all sorts of other duties to perform; and in fact they neglected other duties in performing this novel service that was put upon them. It is by no means to be supposed that because the cavalry are ordered on a particular service that if they had not that duty to perform they would have been all idle men; it is no such thing.

*Major General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

558. Can you state whether the total number of cavalry in December was not about 1,400 men, exclusive of sick present, servants, and men on detached duty?—I suppose that nobody knows the distinctions and attributes of the different parts of the army better than Colonel Tulloch does. The question refers to the Adjutant General's department, and not to the Quartermaster General's department. I have nothing to do with the establishments, the efficiency, or the details of effective men, or anything of that sort, as Quartermaster General. I have no doubt that what Colonel Tulloch states is correct, but it does not come within my functions as Quartermaster General; it is an Adjutant General's question, but I have no doubt they were about that number.

559. Had you not just given orders to provide shelter, and ought you not to have known what number of men there were available for the duty you had ordered?—Lord Lucan was desired to do the best he could. His means, such as he had, were at his own disposal. I have the greatest disinclination to evade or not to answer a question; but, as I said before, Lord Lucan was desired, under the circumstances, without reference to number, and without reference to anything, to do the best he could.

560. You have heard what has been stated to the Board by Mr. Rawlinson and other witnesses in regard to the advantages of sailcloth as a rapid mode of constructing covering for the horses; do you concur in that opinion?—I do not concur with Mr. Rawlinson at all. I think Mr. Rawlinson, not being a military man, has entered into questions which from his experience, and with every sort of advantage, and with every sort of facility in perfectly quiet times, has induced him to come to conclusions which in time of war, with soldiers, are quite erroneous. I may as well observe, so far as my recollection serves me, that Mr. Rawlinson did so far qualify his own opinions as to state that, not being a soldier, and not knowing what soldiers had to do, and not taking any military considerations into account, he only stated generally what might be done by other people, having none of those contingencies bearing upon them.

561. Opinions have been expressed in your presence as to the advantage of sailcloth by Colonel Griffiths, Colonel Low, and Colonel Douglas; do you concur with them in the opinion that it might have been usefully applied in providing rapid covering for the horses?—I think there can be no sort of doubt, if we had had workmen, and all the materials necessary for a framework, which is absolutely essential before sailcloth can be made of any use at all, and if the material was of a substantial nature sufficient to bear the weight of the sailcloth, and the effect of wind and rain upon it, and we had had spare time and hands, there can be no sort of doubt in any reasonable mind that shelter for the horses would have been advantageous.

562. Would not the use of sailcloth have saved time in providing shelter?—If we had had it on the spot; but not the sailcloth alone; you want all the other materials that I have just mentioned; you want hands, you want implements, you want wood, to make a sufficiently substantial framework to support it, and to bear the wear and tear of the weather.

563. Did not a large supply of wood arrive on the 25th of November; scantling and everything of that kind?—Quantities of wood arrived about that time; I do know exactly.

564. Could not sailcloth in any quantity have been had in Constantinople, either from the arsenal, where, owing to the destruction of the fleet, there could be no demand for it, or from the mercantile stores?—It is extremely difficult to say. Anybody who has had any communication with Turkish officials well knows that their working is not extremely rapid. From the delays and puttings off, and lies, and shifting, it is impossible to know where you are with any of them. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was fully aware of our position, and was in constant communication with Lord Raglan, and was as energetic as any man could be; and whatever was forthcoming from Constantinople would have been sent by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Lord Raglan's communications to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe were private notes; and, as I said before, I am quite persuaded that everything which Constantinople yielded, and that we could afford transport for, under the great pressure of the other services, and that was required, was sent off from Constantinople. At this time we had already made application to the Transport Service, and had got from them all the sails and spars and tarpaulins, and everything that we could get from them; and my correspondence with Captain Christy will show that. With regard to other circumstances connected with the sailcloth, I heard Lord Lucan say yesterday or the day before that he intended to ask for the attendance of Admirals Dundas and Lyons. I do not think that Admiral Lyons, who was always on the spot,—always riding through the camps, always coming up to Lord Raglan, and constantly in Balaklava,—was the man to see all this going on before him, and to have all the means of remedying it, and not to have come forward himself and have proposed it.

565. You have heard the statement made by Mr. Bracebridge, who was on the spot, that canvas could have been procured. Had you sent over instructions by the first steamer after the 8th of November, would there have been any difficulty in receiving a sufficient supply to commence with, at least within eight or ten days?—With regard to Mr. Bracebridge I should wish really, with the utmost respect to that gentleman, to say that I do not consider that his evidence is worth having. I wish to use as delicate language as I can, but I really do not consider that his evidence is worth having. He came out, I think, to the Crimea in the month of May; that is perfect summer there; the most beautiful and

*Major General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

charming weather that can be imagined. He came out in May, and he gave in evidence what might have been done in the month of December of the previous year. I appeal to any officer who was there at those two periods to say whether any man can form the slightest idea of what could have been done or could not have been done, or what was the state of the country, or could give any opinion upon the question, coming out in the month of May, and having reference to the previous December, and the state of distress in which that army was. Really, as I said before, in my own opinion I do not think that Mr. Bracebridge's evidence is worth having; and not only that, I did not consider myself, yesterday or the day before, when he gave his evidence, inculpated. I did not like to get up; I thought it would have been indecorous to have interrupted the Board; but I felt inclined to say that the evidence of a gentleman who comes out to the Crimea in the month of May, the most beautiful season possible, remains there for five weeks, and then gives long elaborate evidence as to what ought to have been done in the December previous in the army, he not being a military man, but having kept hunters in Leicestershire, I say I really do not think his evidence worth having.

566. Mr. Bracebridge's opinion was expressed as to the possibility of procuring sailcloth at Constantinople, where he had resided for many years, was it not?—I really believe that it was; but in the same spirit that I have just spoken with, I paid very little attention to Mr. Bracebridge's evidence; I did not think much of it.

567. You stated the other day that you did apply to the Agent for Transports to collect all the sails and awning that could be obtained, but that the supply was so small, and the demand so great for covering, that it was exhausted before it reached the cavalry lines. Was not that a proof of its usefulness, and a sufficient reason for sending to the Admiral or to Constantinople for a larger supply, and did you do so, and with what effect?—That was the very time that the timber was arriving; large quantities were expected every day; the Commissary General was exerting himself in all directions, and he expected ships every day with it; the timber was infinitely more useful than all this sailcloth, and that sailcloth could only be considered temporary. In the state that we were in, even that temporary labour it was desirable to spare the men from as much as possible. In fact a great deal of the timber was in the harbour at Balaklava, and the only difficulty was in getting it up. It was of no use to send to Constantinople for an article which was not so good as that which it might be said we had actually in hand.

568. Taking into account the large number of cattle slaughtered for the use of the troops, and the number of horses that died, might not the skins of those animals have been made available for affording shelter, particularly for roofs; did you adopt any measure with that view?—That question is just one of those which shows that it is unfortunate that the Commissioners did not go further substantially into the subject of their inquiry on the spot, because Mr Commissary General Filder knows that he was directed and did save all the hides of all the slaughtered animals; he had an order from me. I do not know whether Lord Raglan told me personally, but that order is upon record, to give directions that the hides of all slaughtered animals were to be saved, to serve as roofs for the stables; and therefore that is one of those questions as to which it is unfortunate that the examination did not proceed a little further upon the spot. At all events that one question would have been saved.

569. It appears that so early as November there arrived in the harbour 11,500 palliasse covers, intended to be stuffed with straw and used by the men, but which were never used for that purpose, because, as was alleged, straw could not be got; might not those palliasses, being made of strong ticking, and affording upwards of 100,000 feet of cover, have been applied with great advantage, even if used double, to form the sides and tops of buildings, and if so, why were they not so used when the men did not get them?—I believe they were of the common canvas that you see the palliasses in barrack rooms made of; and I am prepared to say, though not as an engineer, that they would have been perfectly useless as covering for horses, except tying them round their bodies; but as Lord Lucan had long before that asked for horse clothing to be sent for, and it was sent for, with a certain number of hoods, 2,000 sets of horse clothing, there was no necessity for using the palliasse covers in that way. And as to their being used as shelter for horses, and nailed to timber, my opinion is that they would have been perfectly useless.

570. Would it not have been better to have used them double than not to have used them at all, either for man or beast?—There were various considerations. At that time the first question was with regard to their utility, and I do not think that they would have been of any use to be applied in that way; but the great difficulty that we had in every respect there was in regard to transport; we were obliged to apply it in the best way that we could, both horse transport and men's transport; and it would have been throwing away labour that would have been much more usefully employed than in gettting cavalry soldiers to convey those palliasse covers to make a shelter which I think would not have lasted one night.

571. Were not those lying at Kadikoi, close to the cavalry camp, and therefore requiring no transport?—To the best of my recollection, these palliasse covers were sent into the purveyor's store-room. I really am not sure about that; but we were very much pressed indeed for space. The space that was able to be given to what were called the Quartermaster General's stores was in the town of Balaklava, when they became so crowded and full of bales,—not unpacked, not assorted,—but bales one on the top of the other,—that the

*Major General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

14th April 1856.

issuer represented to me that he could not issue the things when the fatigue parties came down to him; he could not get at the things that were wanted and were there; he could not find out exactly where they were; and Commissary General Filder pressed me to give additional store-room. It was impossible to find any more space in Balaklava; but there was a set of soldiers' huts which had been just erected,—nine, I think,—a little way out of the town of Balaklava, and the stores were transported, those that were thought not to be immediately wanted, from the more general stores, to those huts, with a guard over them. Those palliasses came out to us more, I believe, as medical stores, and were supposed to be for the use of the hospitals; and they were either sent into those huts a little out of Balaklava, or they were sent to the purveyor's stores; I am not quite sure which. I do not think it is very important; but they were sent to one of those two stores.

(*Major General Peel to Colonel Tulloch.*) Have you done with Sir Richard Airey.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I may have one or two more questions to put to him.

Adjourned to Wednesday, Eleven o'clock.

## EIGHTH DAY.

### Wednesday, April 16, 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea, pursuant to adjournment.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Before the proceedings commence, I wish to ask the Board whether they have succeeded in obtaining from the proper office the monthly returns of the baggage animals in the Crimea?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) An application was made, but the reply was that there were no returns in the War Office or in the Adjutant General's office.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is to be regretted, but I will do the best I can without them.

(*President to the Earl of Lucan.*) Mr. Commissary-General Filder was asked if he had those returns, and he said that they existed in the Crimea only.

*Major General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

16th April 1856.

Major General Sir RICHARD AIREY, K.C.B. further examined.

572. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) You stated that you gave an order for all the skins of horses and slaughtered animals to be preserved for coverings for stables. Are you aware whether that order was obeyed and acted upon?—It was the custom in that army to obey all orders that Lord Raglan issued, and I presume that this was acted upon like the others, so long as it was necessary. A time ensued, when from other materials arriving, those skins of animals were no longer necessary; and then, I believe, it fell into disuse.

573. If the loss of cavalry, artillery, and baggage horses in the two months after the 14th of November was about 1,000, and the quantity of cattle slaughtered about 2,000, in all there must have been 3,000 skins, which would have gone a long way towards covering the cavalry stables. Can you say whether there were 100 of those applied to that use?—I saw them all over the camp in all directions. The commissary general was not instructed to see that those hides were prepared for the use of any particular part of that army, particularly for the cavalry or particularly for the artillery. They were for general use, and they were used so long as they could be useful all over the camp. I have seen a great many more than 100.

574. Applied to stabling?—A great many more, and they were all over the camp.

575. (*Lieut. General Rowan.*) Perhaps you will read the two general orders upon that subject upon the 19th of November 1854, and the 4th of December, at page 69?—The commissioners were informed of that circumstance under the examination in the Crimea. They were informed that it took place.

576. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, they were.—This is the general order that the Board have called upon me to read, dated the 19th of November 1854. It was comparatively early:—"The commissary general is requested to be so good as to give directions "that all sheepskins and hides of slaughtered animals may be preserved (that is, "stretched in the air, with a little salt thrown over them,) for the use of the army." Therefore, it was for the use of the army generally. They were applied for roofing, and that was the only thing that they could be usefully used for—for the roofing of kitchens and houses, and general shelter. I see that the next order is on the 4th of December 1854, No. 3.:—"The skins of dead horses are to be preserved." There was a little doubt with regard to the word "animals," whether it was the mere slaughtered animals for the use of the troops as food, or all animals; and in consequence of that, a subsequent order was issued, which directs that "the skins of dead horses are to be preserved. Commis-"saries of divisions will pay 2*s.* 6*d.* for each skin properly cleaned and cured."

577. You have expressed the opinion that the Commissioners should have sought for further information in regard to orders for hutting the cavalry before making their Report. Are you aware that this Report has been approved by Her Majesty's Government in every particular, and consequently that the information which the Commissioners obtained on that head has been considered by them sufficient?—I have not the slightest desire to cast any censure upon the Report of the Government Commissioners in any way. I was examined generally as to matters in my own department, and I answered those questions having reference to my own department as fully as possible; but as in the questions that were given to me to answer there were a great number which did not refer to my department in any degree—they referred to the head of the medical department, they referred to the commissary-general, and they referred to the adjutant general, and the other departments generally of the service—I indicated in my answer to the Commissioners that it did not come within my province to answer as to the details of those departments; and I therefore referred them and indicated to them where they could get such information as would be deficient in my evidence. I was, of course, aware that to obtain this additional information it would be necessary for the Commissioners to return

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

16th April 1856.

to the Crimea. This Board must be aware that the answers to the queries put to me were sent after the Commissioners, after they had left the Crimea in consequence of the sickness that existed in the camp at that moment; but as I had indicated the directions in which they could have got the additional information, if they had returned to the Crimea they would have been enabled to obtain it on the spot.

578. Were not the Commissioners then in England, and did they not telegraph to you to send in your answers to their queries, to enable them to complete their Report?—To the best of my recollection my first series of answers was given in the Crimea; I think to those questions that Sir John M'Neill put to me. I think the first series was inclosed to him on board ship. I am not positive about that. The second series was represented to me to be Colonel Tulloch's questions, for there seemed to be a separation with regard to the questions which were Sir John M'Neill's and Colonel Tulloch's; those were left with me the first time I was examined, and I was not able for a very considerable time to take the subject up at all. It was during the very height of the siege, and when the assault might have taken place any day. It was a long time before I could attend to it, and I should not have attended to it even then had I not received a most peremptory telegraphic message from Lord Panmure desiring that I would send my answers by the next mail. I could not do that, but I set to work, and answered them within the next few days.

579. Did you give the Commissioners any reason to know after the receipt of your answers to their queries that any information was withheld, or was not as complete as you could make it?—I have already stated that I had not the slightest wish in any way to withhold any information; quite the contrary. But with regard to information on other matters connected with other departments, that was information which I could not give; and I must repeat again that I never considered that this examination on the part of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch had reference to anything else but what the Blue Book indicates—which was, to inquire into the supplies to the army, which was entirely commissariat business; and also I will venture to say that Lord Raglan had no other idea.

580. It appears to me that that is not an answer to the question. I will repeat the question. Did you give the Commissioners any reason to know after the receipt of your answer to their queries that the information was not as complete as you could make it?—I considered the answers that I gave as perfectly complete and sufficient, so far as my department went; for other departments I could not answer.

581. Will you refer to the date on which the huts arrived from England? The first appears to have been on the 16th of December, the next on the 25th, and four more vessels had arrived before the end of December. Was it not so?—I will take those dates for granted. I do not recollect them; but I see no objection to them.

(*Lieut. General Rowan.*) If you will refer to Major Keane's letter, at page 192 of the evidence, you will see the date of the arrival.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) At page 126 of the Appendix there is a list of the ships, and the date of arrival. Those marked with an asterisk are not referred to. The first is the "Tamar."

582. Your department was charged with the distribution of those huts, was it not?—Yes.

583. Did not those huts form a portion of the stores supplied for the use of the army as to the delay in the unshipping and distributing of which we were directed by Lord Panmure to make inquiry? I will read from the further instructions, "Additional Instructions addressed to the Commissioners. War Department, 22d "February 1855. Gentlemen: Referring to my instructions of the 19th instant, I have "further to desire that you will make it your business to ascertain what may have "been the source of supply of provisions, forage, and other articles supplied to the "troops in the Crimea. You will further make inquiry into the alleged delay in "unshipping and distributing the clothing and other stores supplied for the use of the "troops; and having obtained all the information in your power, you will transmit to me "a full report on the subject."—The huts that were sent out to the army decidedly formed a part of the stores of that army; but I do not consider that that circumstance in the slightest degree removed them from being still a commissariat question. I suppose this was not the first instance upon record of regular wooden houses having been sent to any army; in fact it was hutting material in a different shape; under other circumstances planking and boards, and scantling, and so forth, would have been sent. In this instance the hutting was sent out in the shape of wooden houses. I will read an article or two taken from the Code of the Regulations and Instructions to the Commissariat Department, merely to show that those stores are no departure from the general character of all stores. It is under the head of "General Duties, the nature and description of them." At page 30 of the "Code of Regulations and Instructions for conducting the duties "of the Commissariat Department," published in 1852. The commissary general is "To purchase or contract for all supplies and stores required to be provided on the "spot for the use of the several departments of the army abroad, and, when called

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey K.C.B.*

16th April 1856.

"upon to do so, those also for the naval service." The next paragraph is, that it is part of his duty "To provide all necessary transport by land and inland navigation, including "boat hire in port and on the coast, for the use of all the departments of the army abroad, "and, in the absence of a duly authorized naval agent, to engage passages in sea-going "vessels, and take up and enter into agreements for the hire of such vessels." I merely meant to show by this that until the stores are actually what may be called warehoused or deposited in some place that the distribution can commence, they are still within the premises of the commissariat department, to get them out of the ship in which they come, to put them in boats, and carry them from the ships to the shore, and put them in some place of deposit on the shore. It is not till then that the quartermaster general's functions commence, but even then they are of an extremely indirect nature with regard either to the custody or charge or responsibility of those stores. At the proper time I shall enter rather largely upon this question to show what are the particular functions of the quartermaster general with regard to the stores, because the quartermaster general's duty is only to divide those stores, and to see that they are properly and fairly divided amongst the troops, so that one regiment or one division may not get an accumulation of all the good things that may be in store to the exclusion of other divisions of the army; that is the sole control that the quartermaster general has over them.

584. Was not the timber that arrived on the 21st of November also a part of the stores of the army, and were not both of them intended for the shelter of the army?—Most certainly they were.

585. As you admit that you had the distribution of those stores, could the Commissioners know whether they were applied to the shelter of the army without examining the officers and records of your department, and were they wrong in trusting to the records of your department as to the dates when shelter was directed to be provided; was not that the proper source of information?—I am very far from thinking that it was wrong on the part of the Commissioners to examine into all the details of my department, but it would have been far better if they had gone a little further, because there was an officer of Royal Engineers, Captain Keane, who was sent out in charge of all that particular hutting; he was sent out on that special duty, and it was entirely within his province. He was there during the whole time, and I am persuaded if that officer had been examined,—I am not sure whether he was examined, but if he had been examined,—he would have given all that particular information much better than I could have done; it was his particular and special duty.

586. At page 192 of the evidence there is a letter from Captain Keane, which he stated to me was all the information he could give me?—That information is very meagre, I observe.

587. The examination of Major Hall, who seems to have had it more particularly under his charge, is also given at pages 190 and 191.

(*General Peel.*) Is there any copy of your letter to Captain Keane?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I am not quite certain, but it was enclosimg him this memorandum of Major Hall's, and asking him if he could give me any information, and that was his answer.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I think Major Hall's evidence will be irrelevant on this question. His second answer is with regard to what capacity he was employed in. He says he was employed in taking charge of all the timber, excepting the wooden houses sent from England and Trieste.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Major Hall was first applied to, then Captain Keane was applied to.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) He excepts those very huts you are speaking of.

588. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) I will read to you a paragraph from page 20 of the proceedings before the Board of General Officers,—a statement of Lord Lucan. "Now I wish to observe "that the Commissioners complain that the huts were not put up earlier; the huts were "not given to me to put up; I had huts given to me for the hospitals on an application "which I made on the 25th of January. There was a great difficulty in consequence of "a great quantity of saddlery belonging to the horses that had died, for which there was "no possibility of finding storage in Balaklava, therefore I thought the best thing to do "was to get leave from the quartermaster general that I should put up a depôt for each "brigade, one of those huts as a store for the saddlery, therefore I think in the absence of "any other proof that the Commissioners will bear with me that up to the 25th of January "there was not one of them. I was told distinctly that those huts were not to be taken "at that time, that we could not take them because they were wanted for the army "in the front, and it was only late in January or the beginning of February "that we were ordered to put up as many huts as we could." Were any orders given to prevent Lord Lucan having huts for his cavalry in January, and was it only late in January or in the beginning of February that the cavalry was ordered to put them up?—Without reference to my departmental papers, I cannot answer that question specifically, but I can answer to the general spirit of it. I think that it is extremely probable that that statement of Lord Lucan's is perfectly accurate. At that time, the great pressure was in front; the hardships were upon the men who were

*Major General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

16th April 1856.

in the front, fighting day and night, and were much worse sheltered than those down below, and much further from their supplies, and therefore Lord Raglan's desire was that everything should be done, first, for the sick in the front, and then for the infantry divisions in front; and as our transport was unhappily at an extremely low ebb, the planking and the materials and even parts of the hutting being carried up actually by manual labour, and the unfortunate men up to their knees in mud, I can quite believe that instructions were given at that time, that until the hutting of the infantry divisions had arrived at a certain degree of progress the cavalry were not to be supplied with huts, except probably for hospital purposes.

589. If Lord Lucan could not get huts to put up when he applied for them, could the blame of any delay be attributable to him or to the cavalry?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I never said that I had applied. I object to Colonel Tulloch putting words into my mouth. He said that I had applied. I never said anything of the sort.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Your lordship says, "I was told distinctly that those huts were not to "taken at that time; that we could not take them because they were wanted for the "army in the front; and it was only late in January or the beginning of February that "we were ordered to put up as many huts as we could."

(*Earl of Lucan*) That is no application from me. It is only a statement of fact.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) What is your question?

590. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) If Lord Lucan could not get huts to put up, could the blame of any delay be attributable to him or to the cavalry?

(*Witness.*) I am very far from thinking that there is any blame attributable to the cavalry, and I have always stated directly the reverse.

591. Might, therefore, the circumstance of more rapid progress not having been made in obtaining the advantage of hut accommodation be ascribed as well to your department as to the cavalry, or Lord Lucan, in not supplying the huts when wanted?—I do think that if there was a doubt in the mind of the Commissioners as to whom to cast blame upon they might just as well have cast it upon one department or upon another department, certainly.

592. What did you conceive to be the tenor of the instructions of the Commissioners; was it to avoid inquiring into the conduct of the officers, and merely to indicate in what quarters the apparent defects lay, that they might be made the subject of future inquiry?—This is a mere question of individual opinion. My own opinion and my own belief was, that the Commissioners came out to inquire into the arrangements for supplying the army, and really more for the future. I did not conceive it possible that they could take any retrospective view with advantage to those supplies, but that it was for the future system of supplying the army in the field.

593. But will you answer, whether we had a right to inquire into the conduct of the officers?—It certainly never entered into my head that the Commissioners in fact intended to enter into the conduct of military officers.

594. If the Commissioners were instructed not to name officers, but merely to point out what they considered to be defective in the arrangements, might not this circumstance have given rise to a misapprehension of some passages in their Report, so as to make what was intended for one department be understood to apply to another?—I have great difficulty in answering that question. I think that the Commissioners ought to have been and I have no doubt, that they were very particular indeed not to make allusions that could hardly be borne out.

595. If the Commissioners were instructed not to name officers, but merely to point out what they considered to be defective in the arrangements, might not this circumstance have given rise to the misapprehension of some passages in their Report, so as to make what was intended for one department be understood to apply to another?—Upon my word I do not understand the question. I do not understand the character of it exactly.

596. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Then I will not trouble you with it?—There is a passage in the Report here, at the bottom of page 3,—"It may be right here to state, that in doubtful "cases we have preferred running the risk of pushing our inquiries beyond what might "have been contemplated, to incurring the hazard of falling short of what was intended." I think it would appear from this that circumstances induced the Commissioners afterwards, in their Report and also in their inquiries, to overstep the boundaries that were originally contained in the letter of instruction to the Commissioners from the Secretary for War, which confined them, I think, within certain limits.

597. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) I will read the following two lines:—"At the same time we have "not pursued our investigations into matters unconnected with the supply of the army." Do you recollect a conversation with you and Sir John M'Neill and myself, in which we mentioned the reasons why we did not feel ourselves called upon to examine Lord Raglan?—I cannot say that I have a recollection of that conversation. I had several very friendly conversations with Sir John M'Neill, who always spoke in the very highest possible terms of Lord Raglan to the very last. We separated, I might say, on the most friendly terms, Sir John M'Neill and myself; and I conscientiously do believe that Sir John M'Neill or the Commissioners had not any intention of casting any reflection either upon Lord Raglan, or myself, or anybody else.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have no further questions to ask Sir Richard Airey?

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.*

16th April 1856

598. (*General Peel.*) You stated that the Commissioners never intimated to you that one of the objects of their inquiry was to ascertain whether any want of promptitude or ingenuity had been exhibited in erecting temporary stables for the cavalry?—I never received any question or allusion of the kind at all.

599. Would not such information have enabled you to give more specific answers than you gave to the general questions which they submitted to you?—I think so, most certainly, and I think it would have entirely removed the impressions which appear now to exist or to have existed in the minds of the Commissioners.

600. (*General Rowan.*) Number 3 of the General Orders, dated the 15th of January 1855, alludes to certain ship carpenters who were employed under Major Hall at Balaklava. Where were those carpenters obtained from?—I wrote to Captain Christie; he was the naval agent for transports. I had previously had several personal interviews with him. The great object was to get help, and in fact one pair of hands was of great value at that time. I wrote to him, after having frequently spoken to him, though there was a good deal of difficulty upon the subject, to afford me all the hands and assistants and artificers, or any of the crews of the merchantmen, that were disposable in Balaklava. But there was a good deal of difficulty in it. At the same time that I wish to speak with a great deal of respect and consideration for all that branch of the service that was attached to our army at that time, because really, both individually and collectively, I do not suppose it was possible to find a set of men who were more anxious or willing to render us all the assistance in their power, there is something to be said on that subject. Some officer has stated here that the captains of ships spoke to him and said, what a pity it is that you do not employ our crews and take our ships artificers; and without wishing to make the slightest reflection upon that body of men, there was a consideration suggested to me by Captain Christie and by Admiral Boxer on that subject, which was this:—The service upon which they were employed was of the most disagreeable nature possible; they were thrashing up and down the Black Sea, going backwards and forwards to Marseilles and to the different parts of Asia Minor, and Varna and Scutari, and a most unpleasant service it was. Now what I wish to say, with the greatest delicacy, with regard to that body of men, is this, that had their crews and artificers been taken away from them to go on with the public works of the army, their vessels, instead of doing this arduous and disagreeable service of going up and down the Black Sea would have been safely anchored at Balaklava harbour. They would have lived in their ships very comfortably, and would have got demurrage. The money would have been paid for the detention of their vessels, and other vessels would have been knocking about in the Black Sea. It is only a question of human nature; and perhaps to some one captain or two it may have suggested itself to his mind to remain quietly in Balaklava harbour, and give his crew for the service of the army, rather than performing the other service. That was the difficulty we had to contend with, and those were the considerations represented to me by Admiral Boxer and Captain Christie as to the employments of those crews.

601. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Sir Richard Airey,—The Board wish these questions to be put to you:—You have stated in evidence that from circumstances connected with the allies nothing could be settled with regard to the position of the cavalry. Is the Board to understand that the cavalry could not be moved to Kadakoi till December in consequence of those military considerations?—Certainly.

602. Will you be so good as to say whether you think it would have been consistent with safety, and security from surprise, to have erected wooden sheds or canvas coverings for the horses in the advanced position of Inkerman?—If we could have carried the material up there, I do not think it would have militated against that principle, as to the surprise, if there had been shelter for the horses on the heights.

603. Will you inform the Board whether at that period, in November, any of the French cavalry horses were under cover?—I do not think any of the French cavalry were under cover till really almost shortly before I came away myself; none of the French cavalry were under cover, to the best of my recollection, till quite past this time,—long afterwards,—not till the following summer, and then their shelter was extremely scanty; it was by no means so good as ours at the time it was accomplished, but it was quite past the period we have alluded to. I remember an instance of my riding with Lord Raglan, about this period or a little later. We came upon a French squadron that were picketted; we had a conversation with the chef d'escadron about the malheurs of that time, and what was going forward, and this officer, who was commanding the troops that had come from Algeria, and were considered perfectly à guerri and accustomed to war and to all its difficulties and vicissitudes, and more perfectly unprotected in any way, informed Lord Raglan and myself that he had lost 70 horses in two nights (I have a record of that in my own private memorandum book), at that time, out of 120.

604. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Can you state to the Board the time at which your answers to the queries of the Commissioners left the Crimea?—I am not able to answer that without reference to my books. I really forget whether it was after the assault, after the place had been captured, or not, but it was very late, when General Simpson had the command of the army, but I can get the date.

605. It was some time subsequently to the return of the Commissioners to England?—Yes; the Commissioners were in England when I was written to. It was about a month after.

(*Colonel Tulloch*). I propose now to call Colonel Gordon.
(*Judge Advocate General.*) You have given him notice to attend to-day?
(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

*Major General Sir Richard Airey K.C.B.*

16th April 1856.

*Colonel Gordon, C.B.*

Colonel the Honourable ALEXANDER GORDON, C.B., further examined.

606. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Do you recollect my attending for several days with Sir John M'Neill at the quartermaster general's office, for the purpose of informing ourselves of the course pursued by the quartermaster general's department in the application of the various stores sent to the Crimea for the use of the troops?—I remember your examining me for three days at the quartermaster general's office, and for one day at a hut put up for the purpose in the camp.

607. Did you, in illustration of what had been done, read to us certain extracts from your office register, and which were noted down by me in your presence?—Yes, I did.

608. Among those was there the following paragraph: "On the same day Lord Lucan "was directed to make temporary stables, as he best could, till timber arrived, and on the "12th November an engineer officer was placed at his disposal for the purpose of "assisting"?—Yes; that is in the evidence.

609. Was any explanation given to us by you, that though this notice had been inserted it had not been and could not be acted upon?—No information was given to you with regard to what was done upon this, because you did not ask for it at all.

610. Was any explanation subsequently given to us at any time by you, that though this order was issued on the 8th and 12th November, the ground was not broken till about the middle of the following month, owing to the want of tools, of engineers, of Turks, of materials, and a fixed permanent site?—I think it was explained to the Board that those notes were given after my evidence was finished, and merely, as I stated, in illustration of certain acts of the department; there was no question asked upon them, and therefore no explanation could have been given.

611. Did we not express ourselves very much satisfied with the facility afforded by those extracts for obtaining the information required, always supposing that they represented the real state of the matter?—I have no recollection of that expression by the Commissioners, but I recollect that you rather objected, or thought it unnecessary for me to give these extracts, but that Sir John M'Neill said that he quite understood the reason with which I gave them, and appreciated it, and he begged me to go on with them. I have no recollection as to anything that was said on the part of the Commissioners as to the advantage or disadvantage of them, except what I have mentioned.

612. Did we not examine you again by written interrogatories after you had returned, to afford us further information on certain subjects, and might you not then have had an opportunity of giving any explanation that you might wish with regard to the above statement?—After I returned to England I saw Sir John M'Neill two or three times, and he then told me that there were some questions with regard to the clothing which you wished to put. I understood him to say that he did not care about it, that he was satisfied; but his words were, "Colonel Tulloch wishes to put some further questions to you, and "perhaps you will have the goodness to answer them." Those questions were regarding forage and clothing which I had given evidence upon; but as the Commissioners did not ask me a single question with regard to the hutting in the Crimea, it never occurred to me that they wished to have any information upon the subject. I know that information about clothing and forage was asked of me in the supplementary questions, but it never occurred to me to enter into the subject of the hutting.

613. I believe you had a further opportunity when revising the proof sheets of your evidence and General Airey's, which you were allowed to have up to a very late date, to add anything that might be wanting?—I had an opportunity of revising anything in my own evidence when it was sent to me for correction; but I have stated, as I had never been asked any single question about the hutting, I had not the least knowledge in the world that the Commissioners had made any inquiry about the hutting. I particularly asked them whether they wished me to go into the question of hutting, in order that I might prepare the subject from a mass of papers; but as they did not ask me anything about it I concluded that they did not wish for any information. I beg to add that General Airey's evidence was not sent to me for the purpose of correction.

614. Upon what occasion did you ask the Commissioners that question as to the hutting?—During the course of my examination, but on which day it was I have no recollection, the least in the world.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have no more questions to put to this witness. Before proceeding to call the next witness I wish to address a few words to the Board. Their protection has upon several occasions been called for by Lord Lucan in regard to paragraphs which have appeared in the newspapers on various occasions. I am not going to find fault with the paper in which this paragraph appears, but I find fault, and I think the Board will also, with the officer who signs his name to it:—"To the Editor of the Times. Sir, Colonel "Tulloch is very incorrect in stating that the 1st Dragoon Guards were in the Crimea on "the 1st of October 1854, as that regiment did not leave England until 1855, several "months afterwards." I say that I never mentioned the 1st Dragoons at all.

*Colonel Gordon, C.B.*

16th April 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board understand you to bring before it a comment that has been made by some officer upon what has been stated before the Board since the inquiry began?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) For what purpose do you bring this comment before the Board?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) For this purpose: I propose to call the officer, and put into his hands the return which he disputes, and ask him whether it bears his signature, and what explanation he can give after having stated what is not the fact.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you summoned that officer?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) He is here; I refer to Colonel Yorke.

---

*Colonel John Yorke.*

Colonel JOHN YORKE examined.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you, that it is not compulsory upon you to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you. (*To Colonel Tulloch.*) Have you the return in your hand?

615. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes. (*To the witness.*) Is that your signature?

[The return was handed to the witness.]

Yes.

616. Will you be so good as to read the date there?—Yes; but I did not sign it on that day; it was made up from the 1st of October; it is the monthly return for October.

617. Will you read the date?—The 1st of October 1854.

618. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Is that your signature?—Yes.

619. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Will you read the date of the return, and the station of the 1st Dragoons as given in that return?—There was a portion of the regiment at Balaklava on the 1st of October, but the head quarters did not arrive till the 5th.

620. Will you read the date of the return, and the station of the 1st Dragoons as given in that return?—A portion of the regiment was there on the 1st, but the remaining part of the regiment did not land till the 5th, I assure you.

621. How does that appear from the return sent to the War Office? It is the head quarters return, is it not?—Yes, it is; during the month of October.

622. The 1st of October is the date?—Yes.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) There is a return as to the 6th Enniskillen Dragoons.

623. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Is that signed by you?—No, by Colonel White.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Where do you produce the return from that you have just shown to the witness?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) From the War Office.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) It is an official return produced from the War Office?

624. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes. (*To the witness.*) Will you read from the return its date, and the station of the regiment at that date?—The 1st of October the head quarters were in the Crimea, but one troop was on board the "War Cloud."

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The witness has already stated that he himself was not in the Crimea till the 5th of October. Then he is asked where the Enniskillens were at that date. I do not see how he can speak to the Enniskillens being in the Crimea on the 1st of October when he was in the middle of the Black Sea on that day.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I asked him to read what was in the return of the Enniskillen Dragoons, and I call upon him to answer for this return.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You have put an official return into the hands of the witness, and have requested him to read a portion of it. Is that return certified from the War Office?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is a return of the War Office itself. It is an original document.

(*Major General Peel.*) Have you moved through the Board for the production of those returns from the War Office?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No.

(*Major General Peel.*) By what authority do you produce them?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have authority from the Minister of War for all papers and documents that I may require to produce for my defence here.

(*Major General Peel.*) Will you have the goodness to put in that authority?

625. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) I will do so. (*To the witness.*) Is there any better mode of ascertaining the station of the regiment than by referring to the returns signed by the commanding officer of the regiment?—This return states that one troop was on board the "War Cloud,"—the Enniskillens.

626. The remainder were in the Crimea?—Yes.

627. Have you lately made any statement inconsistent with the return signed by yourself, and which is now before you?—I wrote a letter in consequence of finding that my regiment was not in the Crimea, by an article in "The Times" newspaper.

628. (*Judge Advocate General.*) A printed letter has been placed in your hand. Is that the letter of which you say you are the author?—Yes.

*Colonel John Yorke.*

16th April 1856.

629. It is correctly given, is it?—With the exception of the word "Varna" it is perfectly correct.

630. You have been asked whether you have written anything inconsistent with the return signed by yourself, and which is now before you?—No, I have not.

631. You consider that the letter and the return are consistent with each other?—Yes.

632. Have you any observation to make to the Board upon the subject?—The return was kept open for my landing before I signed it.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Do you call upon the witness to read the letter that has been placed in his hand?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, I do.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you intend to put a question upon it?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, I do.

633. (*Judge Advocate General to the witness.*) Will you read to the Board the letter which is now in your hand?—Yes. "Colonel Tulloch is very incorrect in stating that the 1st "Dragoon Guards were in the Crimea on the 1st of October 1854, as that regiment did "not leave England until 1855, several months afterwards. Lord Lucan is perfectly "correct in stating a portion of the heavy brigade had not landed in the Crimea from "Bulgaria on the 1st of October 1854. His lordship alludes to the Royal Dragoons and "the Enniskillen Dragoons. I embarked in command of the former regiment for the "Crimea on the 26th of September 1854, and experienced a sad calamity on that disas-"trous voyage (losing 175 of the best horses of my regiment during the gale). I did not "reach Balaklava until the 4th of October, on which day I reported my arrival (by letter) "to Lord Lucan, and disembarked with the remnant of the head quarters of my regiment "on the 5th. I beg to add I have no personal motive whatever for making this state-"ment, but merely a desire to correct an error on a subject which appears to have assumed "some importance."

634. What was the inaccuracy that you referred to in that letter?—That my regiment was not mentioned as being in the Crimea at all. I said in my letter that I embarked at Varna for the Crimea, and the word "Varna" was left out.

635. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Will you explain the discrepancy between your official return and the letter now in your hand?—It was kept open for my landing, I think.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You have not read the return.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) The witness has read it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) No; but for the information of the Board; the return signed by Colonel Yorke.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) "Monthly return from the head quarters of the 1st Dragoons. Head "quarters at Balaklava, 1st October 1854. Signed, John Yorke. Embarked at Varna "for service in the Crimea on the 24th September 1854."

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you just inform the Board the purport of that return?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It states the number fit for duty present at head quarters, number in military confinement, custody of civil power, and so forth. It is the regular monthly return. The other return is going into various details that are customary in the monthly return. "Monthly return of the 6th Enniskillen regiment of Dragoons. Head quarters at "Balaklava, Crimea, 1st October 1854. Regiment embarked at Varna Bay for the "Crimea on the 25th September, one portion arrived at Balaklava on the 30th of "September 1854." I presume that that portion was the head quarters from being signed.

(*Witness.*) One troop remained on board ship.

636. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Then the authorities at the War Office must not understand when a return is received from you dated "Head quarters, Balaklava, 1st October," that your regiment was actually there?—It was under peculiar circumstances kept open for me as there was nobody else to sign it. The head quarters was detained at sea.

637. The first part of your letter I will call the Board's attention to: "Sir, Colonel "Tulloch is very incorrect in stating that the 1st Dragoon Guards were in the Crimea "on the 1st of October 1854, as that regiment did not leave England until 1855, several "months afterwards."

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Are you going to put a question?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No; I was addressing the President to show that this statement as to the 1st Dragoon Guards did not emanate from me. My statement was as to the 1st regiment of Dragoons. I have no further questions to put.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Whom do you call next, Colonel Tulloch?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Colonel Pottinger, who will not be here till two o'clock, therefore I will put some questions to Lord Lucan.

(*President to Colonel Yorke.*) The Board having already expressed the opinion that they do not approve of observations being made upon anything coming before them regret that you should have put anything into the newspaper?—It was with regard to the leading article, and not to the Board, I assure you; not with regard to anything that occurred here. It was with regard to a leading article that appeared several days afterwards that I noticed.

*Earl of Lucan.*

The Right Honourable the Earl of Lucan examined.

16th April 1856.

638. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is alleged in the Royal Warrant that the conduct of certain officers has been animadverted upon in the report of Sir John M'Neill and myself. Will you point out the particular animadversions of which you complain? Take, for instance, that on pages 20 and 21 of the report: "With reference to the effect of the "deficiency of forage, and the other privations to which the horses of the army were "exposed, we have ascertained the loss among them from various causes in the cavalry "and artillery. A summary of the returns obtained on that head will be found at "page 193 of Appendix, which shows the loss attributable to sickness to be as follows "for the six months from October to March inclusive: heavy cavalry, strength 1,055, "died by sickness 493, ratio per cent. of deaths 47; light cavalry, strength 1,161, "died by sickness 439, ratio per cent. of deaths 38; artillery, strength 2,832, died "by sickness 1,190, ratio per cent. of deaths 42; total, strength 5,048; died by "sickness 2,122, ratio per cent. of deaths 42. On referring to the loss sustained "by the commissariat animals during the same period it will be found rather less than "in the cavalry or artillery; the deaths among them having according to a return "furnished by Deputy Commissary General Adams amounted to about 889 out of "2,329 originally imported into the Crimea, or in the proportion of 38 per cent., a "result which could scarcely have been expected considering the advantages which "cavalry horses might be supposed to have over hard-worked baggage animals to "whom little attention could be paid at such a period." As to animadversion, is there any mention of you by name?—There appears to be no mention of my name at all.

639. Are you, or any of your officers, referred to either by designation, or in any professional character whatever?—My object in referring to this particular part of the Report was to show that it is incorrect, and I am prepared to establish it at this moment, if called upon to do so.

640. My question referred to any animadversion?—The reference to that part in page 20 is certainly no animadversion, for it makes the per-centage far less than what the losses really were.

641. Your Lordship has accused me of malignity against the cavalry, yet you now allege I have much understated the loss of the cavalry in this comparison; how do you reconcile those two statements?—When I made use of the word "malignity" and ill-disposition of the Commissioners towards the cavalry I did not refer to this part of the Report; it was only when I observed that there was, as it appeared to me, a total want of correctness in the figures and in everything stated by the Commissioners.

642. I will next refer to the case of Colonel Griffiths; does that contain any animadversion, and if so, in what respect; (page 37). I will read it: "It must be presumed, "that such measures were considered practicable, for a proposal to erect, with the "assistance of his men, some sort of cover for the horses of the troops, appears to have "been made by the officer commanding the Scots Greys, but the manner in which it is "stated to have been received by the lieutenant general commanding in the cavalry "was calculated to deter other officers from making any similar proposal"?—A very severe animadversion indeed. I cannot well understand how any animadversion could be more severe than that animadversion; if I understand the object of bringing it forward here, it is to show, or to allow it to be supposed, that not only Colonel Griffiths himself, but that other officers commanding the cavalry regiments, were deterred from doing their duty in consequence of some violence on my part.

643. Does the statement of one officer threatening to put another under arrest necessarily imply animadversion on the officer making such a threat?—The Commissioners in their report charge the cavalry with tardiness in erecting huts for the horses, and they then allow themselves to observe, "but the manner in which it is stated to have been received "by the lieutenant general commanding the cavalry was calculated to deter other officers "from making any similar proposal." If that is English, I cannot read it otherwise than that it is intended to convey an impression that the delay that is imputed in the hutting of the cavalry was partly attributable to what passed between Colonel Griffiths and myself.

644. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board wish to ask your Lordship this question: whether upon the occasion referred to in the Report which you have now pointed to, and in which you are supposed to have made some observations to Colonel Griffiths that deterred other officers from making suggestions to you, do you recollect whether Colonel Hodge and Lord William Paulet were present?—I am inclined to think so, but I really cannot positively state. I am inclined to think that they were. Until Colonel Griffiths gave his evidence here I could not bring to recollection the exact date that it took place. I cannot speak positively, but I am quite inclined to think that they were.

645. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) It may have been necessary, may it not, to place him under arrest?—Unquestionably it might have been necessary.

646. Is there any statement on the part of the Commissioners to the effect that it was not so?—I do not consider that an animadversion rests upon a recital of what passed, but it is in the unfair inference that is drawn from it.

647. Is not the circumstance of an officer having been threatened with arrest when

making a proposal calculated to deter other officers from making a similar one?—I believe I have answered that question.

648. Is not the circumstance of an officer having been threatened with arrest when making a proposal calculated to deter other officers from making a similar one?—First of all I am answering an hypothetical question as I consider it. I deny the truth of the statement that any officer was threatened with arrest on that account. I am quite prepared with regard to everything that passed between me and Colonel Griffiths on that occasion to meet it with the flattest and most direct contradiction of that officer's evidence. As an hypothetical question I am quite prepared to answer.

649. Then I will put the question as an hypothetical question. Is not the circumstance of an officer having been threatened with arrest when making a proposal calculated to deter other officers from making a similar one?—If Colonel Tulloch means to say that sufficient fell from Colonel Griffiths to justify that part of the Report I am quite prepared to answer it. I say by no means; for if the Commissioners attached that importance to what fell from Colonel Griffiths it was their business to have had that statement supported by Lord William Paulet, by Colonel Hodge, and by one of those others to whom they allude, but whom they cannot name; and I have no hesitation in saying that my great complaint against the Commissioners is that they received as a fact the statement of an officer when they had an opportunity of examining other parties as to the truth of that statement.

650. Now I refer to the first part of the paragraph at page 36, from the words "Considering also the suffering and severe loss of horses from exposure to the weather "in the commencement of the winter there appears to have been a want of promptitude "or ingenuity in devising for them some means of temporary shelter, such as saved the "baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava. Experience has now proved "that even a very moderate degree of shelter would have been sufficient to save the lives "of many of the horses, if not to maintain them in serviceable condition." Will you now point out any part in which you are animadverted upon there?—As the officer commanding the cavalry it would have been and was undoubtedly my duty to have devised any possible means of alleviating the sufferings of the cavalry, therefore I conceive that imputing a want of promptitude or ingenuity was an animadversion upon me.

651. May not the paragraph be understood to refer to a want of promptitude on the part of Lord Raglan in not issuing an order for fixing the camp?—Then I perhaps have a right to complain of the Commissioners; if they wished to impute this fault to Lord Raglan, and not to me, they should have stated it more clearly in their Report.

652. Might not "a want of promptitude" have referred to a want of promptitude on the part of the quartermaster general in not making arrangements with regard to the camp, and not providing tools and materials?—I can only answer this as an hypothetical question also, for I am not prepared to say that there was any want of promptitude or ingenuity on the part of the quartermaster general in finding either tools or materials.

653. Might not the remark have reference to a want of promptitude on the part of the quartermaster general in not making arrangements with regard to the camp, or not providing tools and materials, just as much as it would do to you? "Considering also "the suffering and severe loss of horses from exposure to the weather in the commence-"ment of the winter there appears to have been a want of promptitude or ingenuity in "devising for them some means of temporary shelter, such as saved the baggage horses "of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava."

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I think that the question cannot be repeated now. Lord Lucan says he does not admit the want of promptitude.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Are you calling upon Lord Lucan to explain your own Report?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No, not at all.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) The Commissioners ought to know to whom they alluded in saying that there seemed "to have been a want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising "for them some means of temporary shelter." They must have had somebody in view.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Certainly, but we had no right to name them. My question was, might not those words "want of promptitude" have referred to a want of promptitude on the part of the quartermaster general, instead of being a want of promptitude on the part of the person who now thinks he is animadverted upon, though he is never named. I presume that any one officer is not entitled to assume that it is an animadversion upon himself. I have never had any specific statement of what the animadversions are as yet.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) The Board understand you to mean that you want Lord Lucan to point out what part of this passage indicates any malice on your part towards him or towards the cavalry.

654. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, that is my object. (*To the witness.*) The question is, might it not have been a want of promptitude on the part of the officers commanding regiments in not carrying out the orders of their general, or a want of promptitude on the part of the quartermaster general in supplying materials; will you explain how you assume that this is an animadversion on yourself when you are not named. The observation would apply to other persons as well as to yourself?—I have already said to this question that I consider that it conveyed a reflection against me as commander of the cavalry when any part

*Earl of Lucan.*

16th April 1856.

of that cavalry was charged with want of promptitude or ingenuity in the care of their horses.

655. Might not the want of ingenuity have been on the part of the men or of the commanding officers, or of the quartermaster general, or even of Lord Raglan, in not adapting supplies to the peculiar circumstances of the troops? Do you consider that an animadversion upon yourself?—To a certain extent, yes; if on the part of the troops, certainly.

656. Not if it applied to others?—I do not conceive that it would be an animadversion upon me if the fault lay with Lord Raglan or those superior to me, but I do think it is to a certain extent an animadversion upon me if it is intended to refer to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men under my command.

657. Do you find in any part of the Report that the remark as to the want of promptitude or ingenuity is applied either to you or to your officers?—I think it is impossible to read so much of the Report as begins with "considering also," to the end "from making any similar "proposal," without seeing that that part of the report conveys a very serious animadversion upon the cavalry, and I believe that I may state that it has been so considered universally by the public.

658. My question was, do you find in any part of the Report that the remark as to the want of promptitude and ingenuity is applied either to you or to your officers?—I believe I have answered that question.

659. I will read this paragraph: "The date at which the hutting of the cavalry com-"menced was in no case earlier than the end of January or beginning of February, and "it was not completed before the middle of March, by which time the severity of the season "had so far abated that this shelter was of comparatively little importance. Considering "that these men were within about a mile of the store where the word might be obtained, "that they had no work in the trenches, and that the only duties likely to interfere with "the application both of horses and men to this important object was the carrying up of "their own forage from Balaklava, and furnishing parties occasionally to bring down sick "and carry up provisions to the front (which seems never to have occupied more than "about a fifth part of the whole), it appears strange that more rapid progress was not "made in obtaining the advantage of hut accommodation, particularly when they are "described as having suffered so much in their tents." A statement is made in regard to the number of men employed in bringing down the sick and carrying up provisions to the front, that they amounted to not more than about a fifth part of the whole number of the men; is that correct?—I suppose this paragraph to convey that there was one fifth only employed on those duties, and that there were four fifths disposable.

660. One-fifth part of the whole number of men was what we stated as being so employed. Is it not so stated in the Report, and is not that statement correct?—I am quite unable to answer that question. I cannot possibly state the exact number of men on any particular day; but if this question is to convey the impression that there was a large body of men available for this duty, I am quite prepared to tell this Court that there was at no time but a very small proportion of men indeed for the purpose, and in some regiments very often not a man at all.

661. That duty lasted in its extreme severity only for about twelve days,—from the 19th of December; was not that so?—That duty commenced on the 13th December; and if the Board refer to my letter to the quartermaster general of the 17th of January they will there see that up to that date that duty continued in the whole of its severity, indeed for two days afterwards, up to the 19th.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) With the permission of the Board I will read the number certified by Colonel Hodge and Colonel Mayow, who were employed on this duty of the 13th of December.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I may save the Board some trouble by stating this: I would say that Colonel Hodge, on seeing that return in the Report, has written to state that it is altogether incorrect, and with regard to Colonel Mayow's return I am prepared to show that it is equally incorrect. I may state that the Commissioners were unfortunate in nearly always applying to the wrong officer for the returns, instead of calling upon the adjutant general to give them a return of the duties.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Tulloch has applied to read a document for the purpose of founding a question upon it. Your Lordship is now under examination

662. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) My return runs thus: "From the 13th December up to the "18th of December there are 62 men, then on the 19th begins a very considerable "increase up to 180, on the 20th of December the number is reduced to 112, after that "it drops to 95. In the second cavalry regiment the number on the 25th of December, "which seems to have been the highest, is 140 men; then it runs on from the 10th of "January up to the 30th of January, the number varying from 53 to 38. In the light "cavalry brigade there are no numbers stated, but they have been assumed as one half "the number of horses, the same as in the heavy cavalry brigade, having about 60 men "from the light brigade up to the 27th of December, and thereafter falling down "to 40 and 30, and so on during the month of January, till at last it ended in nil." (*To the witness.*) Did the number gradually fall off to half the original proportion, and at the end of January had you almost dwindled to nothing?—I must begin by stating that those two returns are altogether incorrect; first, in the light cavalry returns they

talk of horses being sent on this duty on the 13th of December; there was no horse of the light cavalry so employed until the 18th or the 19th of December. The return from the heavy brigade is equally incorrect.

663. Can you produce accurate returns?—My correspondence will show the inaccuracy of those returns. It is rather extravagant to call upon me in London to make an accurate return of the disposition of every man of the cavalry under me 14 months ago in the Crimea. My correspondence will show that those returns are totally inaccurate. I think I ought to be allowed to observe that the quartermaster general is not the officer to give a return of the duties. Again, with regard to Colonel Hodge, I do not believe he had been in command of that brigade a week when he was examined. He was a regimental officer, and therefore was quite incapable of furnishing any returns with regard to the duties of his brigade for the months preceding.

664. If the Commissioners say nothing about this gradual reduction, does that show on their part a disposition to state matters in a way prejudicial to the cavalry? They state "that the number employed seems never to have occupied a fifth part of the "whole"?—I suppose the present object of this examination to be to show that there was none of that malignity that I was disposed to impute; and I am very glad that the opportunity is given to me of saying that I am ready to express regret, if necessary, that I have said anything of that sort; but I must say this, that I was led to conceive it from the extraordinary ambiguity that those gentlemen indulged in in drawing up that Report, and the extraordinary incorrectness of all their returns, calculations, and conclusions.

665. Do you consider the Commissioners to be answerable for the accuracy of the returns furnished to them, and signed by the officer commanding a brigade, the assistant quartermaster general of the brigade?—I do not wish to charge the Commissioners with anything. I think they have been exceedingly unfortunate. I think that they have applied to the wrong officer, and that they certainly failed in eliciting correct returns. I cannot help thinking that there was a mode of getting correct returns and correct information; but I think the Commissioners have unfortunately failed in accomplishing that object.

666. Have you any returns to produce showing the inaccuracy complained of, or is it only on your own statement?—My correspondence will give a positive contradiction to both of those returns.

667. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) What is the date of your Lordship's correspondence?—I have the originals of those letters. In my letter of the 12th of December to the quartermaster general I explain how I propose dividing the 500 horses; the first letter explains the disposition of the first 500 horses. In page 115 there is another letter, of December the 25th, showing that the cavalry still furnished 500 horses on that duty.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to say that in this return it appears that Lord Lucan furnished 522 horses. I give him credit on the 25th of December for 400 horses in the heavy brigade, and 122 in the light brigade. I have given him credit for 22 horses more.

(*Major General Peel to Colonel Tulloch.*) Do you know what those returns are made up from? I see that Colonel Hodge was not examined till April the 7th, and Colonel Mayow till April the 11th. That was a long time after these returns?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) We called upon the officer that we thought most likely to give us the information. Colonel Hodge commanded the one brigade, and Colonel Mayow was the assistant quartermaster general for the other. I do not think that there is any real difference, and that if we were to call over the number I have given credit for more than were supplied. At pages 2 and 3 I think it will appear that on the 25th day of December we state that there were 400 horses employed in the heavy brigade, and on the 25th of December in the light brigade 122, being 522.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) There never were 522 on that duty.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is so stated, at any rate. I have not furnished the statement.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I state that the return is valueless; it is incorrect; it appears occasionally to give too many horses on duty, and at other times too few.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I cannot admit the error till I have other returns of a better description. Perhaps the Board will be pleased to call for returns on the subject.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Will you give in a list of the returns that you wish to be called for?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, I will do so.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you state where those returns are to be procured from?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) From the Crimea, I believe; and until it can be proved that these returns are wrong, surely I may assume that they are right.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The Board will probably agree that it is one thing to pronounce a thing wrong, and another thing to make it right.

668. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) You state, at page 20 of the proceedings before the Board of General Officers, "I was told distinctly that those huts were not to be taken at that time; "that we could not take them because they were wanted for the army in the front; and "it was only late in January or the begining of February that we were ordered to put up "as many huts as we could. Therefore, I say, even if we could have done it, the huts "were not given to us to construct till quite the end of January if not the beginning of

*Earl of Lucan.*

6th April 1856.

" February." Will you now refer to the whole of the paragraph on page 36, from the words "The date" down to the word "tents."

669. Do you now complain of that paragraph as an animadversion?—It is right that I should begin by observing, that until I was favoured with Colonel Tulloch's explanation I always read it that this paragraph referred more or less to the hutting of the horses, and I believe so it was considered by others. I do not now see much ground of objection to the paragraph——though, by the bye, it is incorrect, for although there were not huts erected for the men before near the end of January or the beginning of February, there were a considerable number of huts already erected for hospitals, and it would convey the idea that there were no huts at all erected before the end of January—every regiment at this time I believe had one hospital hut erected, and some more. Again it is incorrect to state that the distance was a mile from the stores. Again it is incorrect to state that the carrying up of the provisions to the front occupied only one fifth part of the whole. I object to all those parts of that paragraph. I cannot speak to the completion, because it only took place a month subsequently to my leaving the Crimea.

670. Will you refer in explanation of the first part of the paragraph to the dates given by your officers of the period when the hutting of the men was completed, and which I will now read from the Report, at page 287 of the evidence. I may state to the Board that in order to ascertain those points precisely a question was circulated to this effect: " At what date did you commence to hut your corps, and when were they all hutted?" And these are the answers which I received:—" Major Wardlaw, 1st Royal Dragoons. " —Commenced at the latter end of January, and completed the hutting by the 1st of " March. Lieutenant Colonel Griffith, 2d Dragoons.—I made requisitions for huts, and " got some of them early in February, and the regiment was hutted partially (the issue " not being enough for the whole regiment) on or about the middle of March last. Lieu- " tenant Colonel Forrest, 4th Dragoon Guards.—First hut for hospital completed upon " 28th January. The duty men hutted in course of February and March. Lieu- " tenant Colonel White, 6th Dragoons.—In February. There are now five huts for the " men, and two for the hospital. Major Thompson, 5th Dragoon Guards.—Commenced " hutting on the 15th February, completed on the 7th March. Lieutenant Colonel Low, " 4th Light Dragoons.—On or about the 6th February they were commenced, and all " hutted by the middle of March 1855. Colonel Shewell, 8th Hussars. The first hospital " hut was finished early in February, and the last of the troop huts early in April. Lieu- " tenant Colonel Douglas, 11th Hussars.—Blank. Lieutenant Colonel Doherty, 13th " Light Dragoons.—On or about the 10th February, and finished about the end " of March. Major Benson, 17th Lancers.—I began hutting about the begin- " ning of February. The men were all hutted by the middle of March." Will you now state, Lord Lucan, whether this reference to the evidence of your own officers removes your objection to that part of the Report?—In the first instance those officers when they answered this question, many of them, could not have considered that it had reference to the hospital huts, for I am prepared to show that the hospital huts of each regiment were constructed before those dates.

671. The question that was put was, " At what date did you commence to hut your " corps, and when were they all hutted?" I see that two or three expressly refer to the hospital huts,—that is Lieutenant Colonel White and Colonel Shewell?—There was an order given on the 27th of January at page 45. It does not speak very pointedly to it, but it says, " The lieutenant general directs that when a hospital hut has been carried for " each regiment, the whole attention of commanding officers may be devoted to the " drawing of timber for completing the hutting for the horses, which Lord Lucan con- " siders should be done within a few days." I think the fair inference is, that I must have considered that the hospital huts were already drawn and completed, or I should not have given out that order.

672. We state that it was "in no case earlier than the end of January or beginning of February?"—This is beginning, not completing, on the 27th of January. I should observe to the Board that I withdraw very much of my objection to that paragraph, now that it is declared to refer solely to the hutting of the men.

673. Will you refer to page 188 of the evidence in order to show that it refers solely to the hutting of the men. In the query addressed to General Airey, at page 188, we state, " It appears that the first shelter of this kind procured,"—that is for the cavalry,— " was about the 5th of January, and that in most of the corps it was the end of January " or beginning of February before the horses were under cover, during which most of " them perished. Can you explain the cause of this delay?" That would show clearly that it was our impression that those were the dates?—I suppose that the Commissioners, or one of them, had the correction of the proofs, and if they had not allowed that unfortunate displacement of the marginal note, unquestionably I and others should not have been deceived by it.

674. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to state that the running margin is no part of the Report; it is the business of the printer. (*To the witness.*) Are you aware that the Commissioners had no power to inquire into the conduct of officers, but merely into facts which were likely to have affected the distribution of the supplies?—Having read the instructions most carefully and repeatedly, I have no hesitation in saying that I believe the object

of those instructions was to confine your inquiry to the commissariat supplies, and that you very much exceeded your duties when you went beyond it.

675. I will read again a part of a paragraph in our instructions: "You will further make "inquiry into the alleged delay in unshipping and distributing the clothing and other "stores supplied for the use of the troops, and having obtained all the information in "your power you will transmit to me a full report upon the subject." The question I put was with regard to the conduct of officers; it is the latter part of the additional instructions that were sent afterwards?—I know of no additional instructions that can possibly justify the Commissioners in my opinion in referring to the transaction that occurred between Colonel Griffiths and myself; that can have had nothing whatever to do with the supplies.

676. I must repeat the former question to bring the last into connection with it. Are you aware that the Commissioners have no power to inquire into the conduct of officers, but merely into facts which were likely to have affected the distribution of supplies, yet that it was necessary to indicate any quarter in which further inquiries should be made, if such inquiries appeared necessary?—I differ entirely with this view of the case. I say that it was not necessary to indicate any quarter beyond the commissariat of the army.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) The Board wish you to point out what passage it is in your instructions which precludes you from inquiring into the conduct of officers.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I say that we had no power to do it, to bring them up, and inquire into their conduct in any particular case, and I believe on reading over our instructions the Board will see that there is nothing that will justify it.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) But you allude to the conduct of the officers.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Not in this particular instance.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Though you say you were not authorized to inquire into the conduct of officers.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) We refer to such matters as would render further inquiry as to the promptitude necessary, and the Government would afterwards determine who were to blame, and when they should accuse Lord Lucan of want of promptitude it would then be for him to call it an animadversion.

(*Major General Peel.*) I understand then that the Government were not to conclude upon your Report without further inquiry?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; and no steps that I am aware of have been taken upon it. I do not say that there are grounds against any particular person, but that there are points which would form grounds for an inquiry; and then whenever Lord Lucan should be fixed upon as being a person who was animadverted upon, and called upon to give an answer, he might then conceive himself to be animadverted upon, but not till then.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) As I understand you, you did not mean to cast any reflection upon Lord Lucan?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Not at all, and not upon anyone. It was merely that there was a want of promptitude in some quarter or other, and it would be for Her Majesty's Government to decide where that was.

(*Major General Peel.*) Do you consider that that inquiry ought to have been made before your Report was published?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I do not say that; for the very advantage of it is, that it does not fix upon any individual, at least neither of those four officers who conceive themselves affected by it; no one can say I am the person who is decidedly named. When the Government find fault with Lord Lucan I presume it will be then only that he is to bring forward any statements in defence. I am particularly anxious to call attention to that.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board understand you to say that you considered that you were precluded by the nature of your instructions from inquiring into the conduct of any officer, and your question to Lord Lucan has been whether he does not know that those were your instructions?

677. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, from a perusal of the instructions here that they did not extend to that. (*To the witness.*) Are you aware that the Report has been approved by Her Majesty's Government from whom our instructions emanated, and do you still allege that we exceeded our instructions?—Of course I can know nothing of any approbation or disapprobation that may have been expressed by any member of Her Majesty's Government or by Her Majesty's Government towards the Commissioners, but I can state this that I think if they have expressed approbation they have done it very inconsiderately and very hastily.

678. Whom do you consider responsible for providing shelter or cover for cavalry horses in the field?—The commander-in-chief of the army if it is possible to do so.

(*Major General Peel to Colonel Tulloch.*) In what shape or on what occasion was the approbation of the Government expressed to the Commissioners?

678 *a.* (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Their approbation of the Report was expressed by Lord Panmure to myself and to Sir John M'Neill at the time when he perused the Report. It was then printed, and the Report being subsequently laid upon the table of the House of Commons involves, I think, the approval of that Report. In addition to that, Lord Palmerston also

*Earl of Lucan.*

16th April 1856.

expressed his full approval of it in the House. I am not aware that there was any other act but the printing of the Report, and the laying it upon the table of the House, which involves, I believe, the approval of it. (*To the witness.*) It is stated by General Airey, at page 187 of the evidence, "Where there are towns and villages it is the duty of the "quartermaster general to provide shelter for the cavalry horses in winter quarters. "Here there was not any such shelter." Do you conceive that that circumstance relieved that department from responsibility in the matter?—I conceive it to be the duty of the quartermaster general of the army, having previously obtained the sanction of the commander-in-chief, to provide, so far as he can, shelter for the horses under any and every circumstance. The only thing with regard to this answer of Sir Richard Airey's is, that I cannot agree in the distinction which he draws. I think that it is equally the duty of the quartermaster general to provide for the shelter of the horses, whether in villages or in towns, or whether at a distance from villages and towns, provided he has the means of doing so.

679. Then am I to understand that if there was a want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising such shelter that applies to the quartermaster general, whose duty you say it is to provide it, rather than to the cavalry?—It might apply to either or all; it is impossible to tell. Unquestionably it might apply to the quartermaster general, it might apply to the divisional general, it might apply to the brigadier general, or it might apply to any individual belonging to that force.

679 *a.* Then I am not to understand that if there was a want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising such shelter that applies to the quartermaster general rather than to the cavalry?—Not at all. The quartermaster general might have done his duty, and still there might have been a want of promptitude and ingenuity on the part of the divisional officers.

680. In a letter addressed to Lord Panmure, dated the 7th of February 1856, you stated that you knew that the cavalry were to be permanently stationed in winter quarters at Kadikoi about ten days after your interview with Colonel Griffiths, namely, about the 26th instant; was that the first information that you received that you might provide shelter for them?—I am now speaking from recollection, but I doubt whether I ever in any letter talked about ten days after seeing Colonel Griffiths, for until Colonel Griffiths spoke in this hall I was not aware on what day that altercation to which he alluded took place.

681. I will read it. "At the moment that Colonel Griffiths referred to the stabling of "his horses we were only occupying a temporary camp, and it was undecided whether "we were to shift to another position, still on the heights, but a little removed, or were "to take up a permanent winter camp in the neighbourhood of Kadikoi, and this last was "at the end of ten days decided upon."—Perhaps I have expressed myself obscurely, I did not at the moment know on what date this altercation with Colonel Griffiths had occurred. As it turns out it was not for 16 days after.

682. Was not the loss of horses very considerable about that time? What did it amount to in December?—That time would be in November.

683. But in December?—The loss of horses was not very great for the first week in December, or the first ten days. So little was there that if the Board will refer to Colonel Hodge's evidence they will see that he states that during the twelve days that followed their marching down to Kadikoi the 4th Dragoon Guards did not lose a single horse, and there was very little mortality among the horses until the cavalry commenced giving transport duties.

684. Take the month of December altogether; I will mention what appears to be the loss?—First of all a reference to my correspondence with the quartermaster general on the subject of the transport duties will show that between the 12th of December and the 17th of January there was a loss of no less than 405 or 407 horses, and that I attributed the loss of all those horses to the commissariat transport, and not to want of shelter.

685. At that rate the whole force would have been annihilated in about four months?—In my letter of the 17th I told Lord Raglan that if those transport duties continued a few days longer the force would cease to exist.

686. Was not there consequently the greater need of acting with promptitude?—No promptitude on earth would have saved the horses, but they died from the transport duties, and there was no promptitude in sheltering them that could possibly have saved them.

687. Might not the public money have been well applied in hiring seamen or getting labourers from Constantinople, and thus hastening the period when the horses were placed under cover?—Unquestionably if there were any means of getting seamen or any other persons it should have been a very great object, and I dare say was a very great object, to have saved the cavalry.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have no more questions to ask his Lordship.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) There is a question which the Board wish to be put to you with reference to a passage in the Report, at page 37, relating to the evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Griffiths. Whether it would not in a question between an officer and his commanding officer have been in the power of the Commissioners to have obtained more distinct evidence upon the subject by the examination of

Lord William Paulett or Colonel Hodge, the latter of whom had been before the Commissioners on April the 7th, about three weeks after they examined Colonel Griffiths?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Had we done so we should have been inquiring into an officer's conduct, we should then have been taking up a specific charge against Lord Lucan, and calling a witness upon the subject, but in what we have stated there is no animadversion intended, but we merely state the fact that he did threaten to put Colonel Griffiths under arrest, as appears in the evidence, upon his making a suggestion, and that threat was calculated to deter other officers from making any similar suggestion, but we did not bear out the officer by stating that he had actually done so, but we say "the manner in "which it was stated to have been received by the lieutenant general commanding the "cavalry was calculated to deter other officers from making any similar proposal." Had we called witnesses before us upon that point we should have been holding a court martial upon Lord Lucan.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You state that in that passage you did not intend to refer to the conduct of any officer.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) In that passage all that we meant was this: that it was stated to us by Colonel Griffiths that he had been threatened to be placed under arrest for having made some proposition, therefore we thought it our duty to state that, according as he stated it to us, it was not calculated to induce others to make any similar proposal.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board is to understand that you did not verify the statement of Colonel Griffiths by the examination of Colonel Hodge or Lord William Paulett?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Most assuredly not, nor do we put it forward as a statement of an individual for the veracity of which we vouch. It would have been quite beyond our instructions to have gone into an inquiry of that kind.

Adjourned to to-morrow at Eleven o'clock.

## NINTH DAY.

### Thursday, April 17th, 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

(*Judge Advocate General to Lord Lucan.*) Colonel Tulloch wishes to put some further questions to you.

*Earl of Lucan.*

17th April 1856.

The Right Honourable the EARL OF LUCAN further examined:

688. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Was it the case that in the arrangement for carrying up the commissariat supplies on the cavalry horses every soldier rode one horse and led another?—In carrying up the commissariat supplies there were two horses, one was ridden by a man and the other carried the supplies.

689. Did not this cause the employment of a double number of horses than would have been otherwise necessary; that is they carried men instead of provisions?—Unquestionably, the only object in a man riding the other horse was to lead the one carrying the provisions; there is no doubt about that.

690. Were not the infantry fatigue parties coming down daily from the camp about this time and returning with heavy loads of provisions and clothing on their backs; and might not the dragoons have walked instead of riding when it was so great an object to save the labour of the horses?—It would have been most improper, and I so stated it to Lord Raglan at the time, to have allowed any dragoon to walk to those distances in the state of the roads at that time.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have no more questions to ask.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I wish to observe that I think there must be a desire on the part of the Court for an explanation as to those monthly returns; and I propose at any time, or at present, if it pleases the Board, to examine Major Conolly, who will explain that matter perfectly.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Does Colonel Yorke know that you intended to make this application?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is no application; it is only to inform the Court that at some future time an explanation as to those returns will be given by Major Conolly; not only as to Colonel Yorke, but all of them.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I submit if any explanation is to be received from an officer who signed a return of a different date from that which it ought to have borne, it ought to be given by himself, particularly as it involves a very heavy penalty, in fact approaching to a false muster.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board will consider what evidence they require. (*To Colonel Tulloch.*) Have you any other witness to call?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No other witness is now present, one will probably arrive about the 20th of this month, the captain of a vessel who offered sailcloth and offered to put it up; if he comes I may examine him, and Colonel Pottinger I may afterwards have to examine; but there is no reason, I apprehend, why Lord Lucan should be delayed in proceeding with any witnesses he has to call.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you summoned the witness that you expect from the Crimea, or can you state that you have reason to believe that he will arrive in a short time?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have reason to believe that he will arrive this month; he is the captain of the Ava, and he is expected home. I applied to the owners of the vessel, and they stated that he would probably arrive about the 20th. I only wish to keep the matter open. Colonel Pottinger was unexpectedly called away this morning; he was here yesterday.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you know that this captain of the transport will attend?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I wrote to the owners, and they said he would arrive at Southampton about the 20th.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) He is not in the service?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No; I have every reason to believe that he will attend. If he should not arrive by that time I can close without his evidence.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It appears to me desirable that Colonel Tulloch should tell the Board to what this officer can depose. He has said that he offered some sailcloth. I do not suppose he offered sailcloth to shelter 2,000 horses. Perhaps Colonel Tulloch can tell us when this was offered; it is very probable it was offered after they were sheltered by boards.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You state to the Board that you believe this witness to be necessary to the defence of your Report?

17th April 1856.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; if he should not arrive I will not delay the Board after the 20th on his account; it is not a very important matter, still it will be as well, if he come, to examine him.

(*Judge Advocate General to Commissary General Filder.*) I believe you made an application to the Board to be heard or to put in some evidence in consequence of statements that had been made by Lord Lucan?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes; that is my wish.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you propose now to make a statement or call witnesses?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Not to call witnesses; merely to make a statement in reply to the observations made by Lord Lucan on Wednesday the 9th instant.

(*Major General Peel.*) What page do you refer to?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) I refer to pages 41, 43, 45, and 47. On that occasion Lord Lucan read several letters which had been addressed by him either to the adjutant general, the quartermaster general, or myself, respecting the foraging of the cavalry, but in no instance did his lordship read the answers to those letters. My present object in addressing the Board is respectfully to protest against incomplete correspondence being admitted as evidence to my prejudice. I feel persuaded that Lord Lucan has no wish to prejudice my case, but such must inevitably be the consequence if the answers are omitted, and the evidence is allowed to stand as it does now.

(*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Those letters were addressed to the quartermaster general, were they not?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Some to me, and some to the quartermaster general. At page 47, I think, the Board will find some. On some occasions, I think, Lord Lucan addressed the adjutant general. I would, therefore, submit for the consideration of the Board either that those letters be rejected as evidence, or that Lord Lucan be required to put in the answers to them. I have been obliged by the rules of the service to leave my official papers in the Crimea to enable my successor to carry on the business of the department, otherwise I could lay before the Board at a future opportunity the answers to the letters quoted by Lord Lucan. Lord Lucan, no doubt, has all his papers in England. It may be deemed more convenient by the Board that he should furnish this information at the present stage of the proceedings.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Any answer that I may have shall be given to the Board. I do not think that there are more than two. I am not sure whether there is more than one.

(*Major General Peel.*) Would not the quartermaster general of the department have the answers?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I think in every instance they were forwarded to me by the quartermaster general; there may have been one letter direct between me and the commissary general, but I do not think more than one.

(*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Will you hand in a list of the letters you wish to be called for?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) My chief object in addressing the Board now is to make——

(*Major-General Peel.*) Your application to the Board is, that copies of the answers to the letters may be produced.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes. My chief object in addressing the Board is to make this protest; and perhaps the Board may think it convenient that I should make any further observations that I have to offer, otherwise it might be necessary to detain Lord Lucan till the close of the proceedings. Not having, as I said before, my papers with me, I am unable to follow Lord Lucan's observations in all their details, therefore I must confine myself for the most part to general remarks. Lord Lucan, no doubt, made frequent representations at different stages of the military operations to Lord Raglan respecting the foraging of the cavalry, but in none of those cases which appeared to Lord Raglan to be of a nature to call for inquiry, and in which explanations were submitted to his Lordship, was he of opinion that, under the circumstances in which the irregularities or deficiencies complained of had taken place, blame could be attributed to the commissariat, and his Lordship was the proper authority to decide in the matter. Let Lord Lucan state in what instance in answer to his representations Lord Raglan decided that blame attached to the commissariat. With regard to the foraging of that part of the heavy cavalry, amounting to about 900, which was more immediately under Lord Lucan's command whilst in Bulgaria, his Lordship's communications to me related chiefly not to a deficiency of forage, but to the inexperience of the commissariat officers, and to his desire to have a divisional commissariat officer appointed to the cavalry. I was therefore very much surprised to hear his Lordship state that his own baggage animals were never allowed any rations at all, or very short ones, at this period. I have since obtained from the Audit Office the ration returns for Lord Lucan's head quarters, cavalry staff. I beg to lay it before the Board, and an inspection of them will show that full rations of forage were issued for his chargers and baggage animals belonging to himself and his staff throughout the entire month of August, that is the period more immediately referred to by Lord Lucan, that having been the month in which the great fire at Varna occurred, by which we lost a vast amount of corn we had

17th April 1856

in store, and it then became necessary to have recourse a little more to the standing crops in the country. The returns are signed by one of his lordship's staff.

[The returns were handed in.]

(*Lieut. General Sir W. Rowan.*) A receipt is signed for the full quantity; but was that the full allowance that he was entitled to?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes; the full allowance.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) What are they?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Your ration returns, signed by one of your staff, for your chargers and baggage animals, showing that you got full rations all through August.

(*Lieut. General Sir W. Rowan.*) It is signed by Major M'Mahon. Were they all at Varna?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) All at Varna, in the month of August, when the fire occurred.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Full rations were issued to the cavalry always at Varna?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Always, at that time.

(*Lieut. General Sir W. Rowan.*) Are these vouchers?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes, those are vouchers belonging to attested accounts. With respect to Lord Lucan's representations about the commissariat officers, I had no others to give him. I was really unable to meet his wishes. He complains of their inexperience and incompetency. His lordship, therefore, says very truly, that on the occasions of his communications with me, which were almost always on this subject, he left me dissatisfied, but dissatisfied on grounds which it was quite impossible for me to remove. It would have been no fault of mine had the commissariat officers been without experience; but in fact the cavalry was better off in this respect than other corps. I will here read an extract of a letter written by me to the quartermaster general, in answer to a representation which had been made by Lord Lucan at a subsequent period on this subject: "With reference to the Earl of Lucan's "remarks on my departmental arrangements, I would observe that it has never been "customary to have a divisional commissariat officer for the cavalry, owing to the "difficulty of his superintending the supplies of a body of troops acting so widely "apart; nevertheless, in compliance with Lord Lucan's wishes, I have twice attempted "to carry out this arrangement, but have on each occasion been thwarted by cir-"cumstances beyond my control, and I have now no disposable officer to appoint to "the duty."—Both of the officers that I appointed fell sick, one with cholera, and the other was seriously ill, and was never fit again to take the field.—"And with "respect to the qualifications of the two commissariat officers at present serving with the "light brigade, I can only observe that one of them, Mr. Crookshank, has been ten years "in the service, and has had much experience in every branch of commissariat duty; "and the other, Mr. Sutherland, six years; nor are there any commissariat officers with "this army better suited by their activity and intelligence to act as cavalry commis-"saries. I am indeed enabled by personal observation to bear testimony to their "exertions since the entrance of the army into the Crimea, having seen them late and "early, making every effort to bring up their transport, or to procure forage in the "villages. I may add, that they supplied the brigade, when at Yeni Bazaar and its "neighbourhood, without any assistance from the depôt, much to the satisfaction, I have "understood, of Lord Cardigan."

(*Earl of Lucan.*) What is the date of that letter?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) The 4th of October. Lord Cardigan, speaking of the same officers in his evidence before the Sebastopol Committee, in answer to question 5745, says, "The commissariat officers exerted themselves to the utmost, and did everything "that they possibly could; indeed I never saw more zealous officers in my life." What I have now said relates to the light brigade. The commissariat officer attached to that part of the heavy brigade which was more immediately under Lord Lucan's orders had also had several years' experience in commissariat duties.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) This is a question that arises in consequence of a statement made by Lord Lucan before the Board. You apply to the Board to be allowed to meet that statement. You will confine yourself, if you please, to whatever applies to what Lord Lucan said. If you wish for Lord Cardigan's opinion you can call him.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Those officers were serving under Lord Cardigan's orders.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You can call Lord Cardigan as a witness, if you wish it.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) I have no wish to examine Lord Cardigan.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) Do you object to Commissary General Filder's reading Lord Cardigan's opinion of those commissariat officers.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) No; but this has all a reference to Yenna Bazaar. The Board will recollect that I have already said that Lord Cardigan was satisfied with the commissariat officers; I have already so stated; but I confined my evidence in Bulgaria to what happened under my own eye. I have not the least objection.

(*Judge Advocate General to Commissary General Filder.*) If you still think it is

necessary to have Lord Cardigan's opinion as to your officers you may refer the Board to that part of the evidence ; Lord Lucan does not object to it.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) I think it is of importance to show the qualifications of the officers that I attached to the light cavalry, of whom Lord Lucan was complaining.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It will make it necessary for me to refer to my evidence before the Sebastopol Committee; but that does not signify.

(*Judge Advocate General to Commissary General Filder.*) The Board have before them the evidence that was given before the Sebastopol Committee, and they will look at that evidence, if you will refer them to the passage; they will not require you to read it.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) It is the answer to the question 5745. The commissariat officer attached to that part of the heavy cavalry more immediately under Lord Lucan's orders had also had several years experience in the commissariat duties.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) What is his name?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Mr Murray. Lord Lucan alludes to one of his own aides-de-camp having been appointed to assist in obtaining forage; but I had attached to the commissariat officer for this purpose Captain Rhodes of the 94th Regiment, who was very efficient, and spoke Turkish fluently, so that there were two officers for 900 cavalry horses. When the army came crowding into Varna, and encamped in its neighbourhood, preparatory to embarking for the Crimea, there may have been, as stated by Lord Lucan, some collision amongst the several commissariat officers, and in searching for forage they may have for a few days interfered with the district which up to that time had been foraged by the cavalry ; but as to their galloping over the country, which his lordship makes matter of complaint, I should have considered it as a proof of their zeal and activity rather than of their incompetency. Lord Lucan certainly proposed to me, as he states, that a maximum price should be fixed for supplies ; but I did not agree with his lordship on that point. I have never known a maximum price to be fixed but that it has been evaded in some way or other ; besides, the commissariat officers attached to the troops whilst in the neighbourhood of Varna made no purchases of any other article than forage. As Lord Lucan has included the light cavalry in his observations, I think I may proceed to quote Lord Cardigan's opinion of the way in which they had been foraged.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Where?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) All through, I think.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The Board will recollect I distinctly said I could not speak to any other troops in Bulgaria than those that were quartered with me in Varna. I studiously avoided giving any opinion.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) I will read what I have to say, and if it is objectionable the Board can reject it. I may refer to what Lord Cardigan's evidence was. If it is found objectionable it can be rejected as evidence ; but I do not think that what I am now about to say is out of order.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You have heard what Lord Lucan has just said.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) With respect to foraging the light cavalry brigade. Lord Cardigan, on his arrival at Varna to embark for the Crimea, reported to Lord Raglan that he was satisfied with the manner in which the commissariat duties had been performed whilst the light brigade had been in the front which, in fact, embraced the whole of the time it had been in Bulgaria. I happened to be present when Lord Cardigan made this report to Lord Raglan, and I must suppose he made the same report to Lord Lucan.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I said that Lord Raglan had expressed himself satisfied. It is in my evidence.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) The horses, indeed, with the exception of that proportion of them which had been employed in the reconnaissance to the Dobrudscha, were considered by military men to be in high condition ; and Lord Lucan now states that there was not much difference between the condition of the light cavalry (excluding from the comparison the Dobrudscha horses) and that of the heavy cavalry, which had been under his immediate command ; the inference is, therefore, that the latter could not have been badly foraged. Lord Lucan says that the horses were badly foraged in Bulgaria. He admits that they were not in a worse condition than the light cavalry brigade ; therefore the inference is that they could not have been badly foraged. I shall have no other opportunity of replying as to the condition of the cavalry but the present, and therefore I am rather desirous of stating what I have to state now. The authorized ration may, as stated by Lord Lucan, have been an insufficient one, but then his lordship was the president of the board which recommended it. There now remains only to be noticed the two heavy regiments which had been stationed at Devna under the command of General Scarlett, and Lord Lucan allows that General Scarlett was not dissatisfied with the manner in which they had been foraged.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I said the contrary; I said that General Scarlett had expressed himself dissatisfied.

(*Major General Peel.*) Lord Lucan says, "It is fair that I should state that Lord "Cardigan, when he was asked about the commissariat before the Sebastopol Committee,

17th April 1856.

" stated that the light cavalry were well foraged when the light cavalry were at " Devna. General Scarlett, who had two regiments with him, certainly was not very " much dissatisfied."

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I meant "very well satisfied," and I can produce evidence to show that he was desperately dissatisfied. I think it is a misprint.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) As there is a doubt about it, I may add, that Lord Raglan, when he saw those two regiments, and found one in excellent condition and one in bad condition, though they had been both foraged alike, attributed the difference of condition to one of the regiments having lost several officers by cholera, and amongst others, their veterinary surgeon, and not to any deficiency of forage.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I gave no opinion. I was only expressing General Scarlett's opinion.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) I wish to mention the state of all the cavalry whilst in Bulgaria until it embarked for the Crimea. Lord Lucan seems to attribute to me the deficiency of forage which he says was experienced during that voyage.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) No, not at all.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) It was no duty of mine to feed either the men or horses whilst on board ship, nor did I ever interfere with the reserve of six weeks' supply of forage, which Lord Raglan had ordered to be retained on board the horse transports for the number of horses they were capable of conveying. I did not therefore cause the deficiency that was experienced by the cavalry on the voyage. At a subsequent period, that is, after our loss by the storm of the 14th of November, I certainly got that order rescinded; but when I sent for the hay to Eupatoria, where the horse transports were lying, it was found that they had been ordered, in common with all other sailing transports, to Constantinople, so that I did not get the hay. I think Lord Lucan's evidence goes to the effect that I had interfered with this supply of hay on board the ships.

(*President.*) You had better refer to that part of the evidence.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) It is in page 39, and it leaves it to be inferred, I think, that I had been the cause of the deficiency.

(*President.*) Will you read that part of the evidence?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) "We embarked, as the board knows, on the 30th of " August, and during the 1st and 2d of September we embarked about 1,100 horses of " the light brigade only. I am called upon now to make a statement, and of course I " must withhold nothing. I say that perhaps the thing which showed the greatest " absence of all forethought, and the greatest mismanagement of all, was what occurred " now. The board will recollect that of course some of the regiments had been on " board two or three days before we sailed,—not more than three,—perhaps four some of " them, and that we remained two days, I think, at Baltschick, and then we sailed until " we came to anchor in the Black Sea whilst Lord Raglan was reconnoitering. On the " Sunday after our embarkation,—we had not been one week at sea before the officer of " the "Simla" came to me, and told me that they had not forage on board for our " cavalry. Now, if the Board will refer, I think, to Mr. Filder's evidence, Mr. Filder " states to those commissioners, that there had been an order from Lord Raglan that no " horse transport was at any time to have less than six weeks' provisions on board. On " that Sunday, the eighth day after I had embarked myself, the seventh day after some " of the cavalry had embarked, there was a deficiency of water and hay, and I rather think of oats."

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I did not say one word about Commissary General Filder.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) I think it is further on where his lordship attributes it to my having interfered with the six weeks' supply.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Will you read it? Where is it?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) I do not immediately see it; but I considered that my name was coupled with it so much that I thought it might be inferred that I had interfered with it. I am certain that in some part of the evidence his lordship does allude to this six weeks' supply. After landing in the Crimea there was some irregularity and deficiency in the issues of forage during the march, and the representation which Lord Lucan made to Lord Raglan on the subject was referred to me, and the explanations of the commissariat officers attached to the cavalry, showing the quantity of corn that had been issued by them, and the cause of the deficiency, having been laid before Lord Raglan, his lordship did not attribute blame to the commissariat, under the circumstances. My reply was, I understood, communicated to Lord Lucan, and his lordship did not, so far as I am aware, question the correctness of the explanation. It was not possible indeed to invade the territory of a powerful enemy, and in the presence, it may be said, of a large army, without experiencing inconveniences and difficulties with respect to supplies, especially in regard to so bulky an article as forage. The cause of the deficiency at the Alma, to which Lord Lucan more particularly adverts, was, that a sufficient quantity of corn had not been landed at the time the cavalry came down to the beach for the whole of them to receive three days' rations, as had been intended. We were of course dependent upon the navy for landing stores on an enemy's coast. It was only surprising that they landed the quantity of supplies they did; but it was not always practicable, in the haste and hurry

17th April 1856.

attending such a service, to arrange the disembarkation of the different articles in the proportions in which we required them. Another cause of irregularity in the issues, both of provisions and forage, to the cavalry, during the march, was the lateness of the hour at which that force in particular took up its ground for the night, which depended, not on previous arrangement which could be communicated to the commissariat officers, but on the movements of the enemy. The troops also sometimes preferred relying on the commissariat reaching the camp in time, rather than take their rations in advance, according to the usage of the service. This was stated in the explanations which were submitted to Lord Raglan. The Board will perceive from this how prejudicial it might be to me if Lord Lucan were not to be required to produce the answers to the several letters that he has quoted. Lord Lucan, in his great anxiety to have the cavalry in good condition, did not make allowances for other people's difficulties; he only saw his own; but Lord Raglan was in a position to know the difficulties on both sides, and that is why his Lordship's decisions were sometimes different from what Lord Lucan may have expected. Lord Lucan allows that after the termination of the march, that is, from about the 26th or 27th of September up to the 28th of October, the horses of the cavalry were sufficiently foraged, and that at the battle of Balaklava, on the 25th of October, they were in better condition than they had been at any former time. Therefore, whatever they may have suffered before, the horses were in good condition at the commencement of the winter. In the meanwhile a cargo of hay had arrived from England, but it was not allowed to be issued so long as forage could be found in the villages, excepting to that proportion of the artillery which was employed in dragging up the guns, and could not therefore forage for themselves. Lord Lucan says, referring to this period, that I, of my own authority, reduced the ration which had been fixed by general orders. A memorandum which I submitted to Lord Raglan, and which, with the permission of the Board, I will now read, will show that Lord Lucan is under a misapprehension on the subject. But before reading it I should observe that this was a portion of a larger quantity which I had applied for long before it was known that the army would proceed to the Crimea. I am not now certain what object I had in view in writing for it, but it arrived very opportunely. This is the memorandum which I submitted to Lord Raglan:—"Memorandum.—A portion of the hay forwarded from England "on my requisition having arrived, it would appear to be desirable, under the circum- "stances of uncertainty in which the army is placed with respect to our obtaining any "further supply of forage, that the ration should be reduced, and the part of the force "to which the hay is to be issued should be restricted. The whole quantity, when "received, will amount to nearly 1,500,000 lbs., or 150,000 full rations of 10 lbs. each, "or 250,000 rations at 6 lbs. each, or 300,000 rations at 5 lbs. each. The number of "animals for which rations of forage will have to be provided cannot at present be "ascertained, as they are daily arriving from Varna; but at the present time there are "about 7,000 with the army. If full rations were to be issued to that number the hay "would only last twenty days. It is for consideration, also, whether a portion of the "hay may not be required for the horse transports, some of which have now, I believe, "very little forage on board."

(*Earl of Lucan.*) What is the date of that?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Commissariat, Balaklava, 9th of October 1854. This is Lord Raglan's answer:—"I do not know to what extent the horse transports are still "provided with forage. Captain Christie will probably be able to afford the required "information upon this point. Horses are apt to lose their condition when changing "their coats in the autumn, and then they require plenty of food. The horses of the "artillery, the cavalry, and the staff should have the hay that has arrived. Six pounds "are very insufficient, but until more is received from England or Constantinople it "will be prudent to limit the ration to that quantity. (Signed) RAGLAN."

The ration was for a few days, therefore, 6lbs., and afterwards increased, as further quantities arrived, to 8lbs for the cavalry and 10lbs. for the artillery, the latter quantity being the full ration as fixed by the board of which Lord Lucan was president, and it so continued up to the time of the storm. For the chargers of infantry officers, the ration was continued at 6lbs.; but the commissariat officers were ordered by me to offer to the infantry officers the option of a full ration of chopped straw or this diminished ration of pressed hay; but they always chose the latter, that is, the pressed hay. Lord Lucan has stated that at this period his baggage animals had no rations at all; but his lordship is again under a misapprehension on this point. I now hold in my hand his ration returns, signed by an officer of his staff, which show that up to the 28th of October both chargers and baggage animals had full rations of corn. Of hay up to that time the cavalry foraged for themselves, and took pretty much what they pleased. The commissariat officers not having paid for the hay, it is not included in the ration receipts. These returns also show that from that time, that is, from the 28th of October up to the period of the storm, both chargers and baggage animals had full rations of corn, and, as authorized by Lord Raglan, diminished rations of hay. These are the ration returns (*the same being handed in*). The baggage animals of the army were at that time doing nothing; they did not then carry up their own forage, or any fuel; and Lord Raglan having ordered that the commissariat transport animals which were in depôt not working should have reduced rations, I considered the order equally applicable to other baggage animals not working. When, at a later period, Lord Raglan ordered full rations to be issued for baggage animals,

17th April 1856.

they were carrying up their own rations and fuel besides. On the occurrence of the storm, by which we lost 20 days' supply of hay for cavalry, artillery, and chargers, nearly all we possessed, General Canrobert made an offer to Lord Raglan of a large quantity of hay (but not to the extent of 30 days' supply, as stated by Lord Lucan), upon condition that I should replace it within a certain period. I could not accept it with any probability of being able to keep faith in that respect. Nevertheless I rode over immediately to the intendant general at the French head quarters, when I learnt from him that it was not hay, but chopped straw, that he could lend me, and I accepted it immediately to the extent of three cargoes. I left the vessels, however, at Kamiesch until the straw should be wanted, in order not to further crowd the already overcrowded harbour of Balaklava. Eventually, when I did claim the forage, the French could not, without inconvenience to themselves, spare me more than one cargo, which was repaid to them within a short time. For a period of about ten days after the hurricane that is, about the 20th to 30th November, there was a serious deficiency of forage; but although I had represented in writing to Lord Raglan that in consequence of the losses sustained on that occasion the army was placed in a critical position, particularly with respect to its supplies of forage, I nevertheless received complaints of deficiencies as though no such calamity had occurred. An instance of the kind will be found at page 86 of the Appendix to the Commissioners' Report. My reply will be found at page 9. It relates to Captain Morris's battery of artillery. Notwithstanding this deficiency, we never were without a supply of chopped straw; but it was quite impossible to land and to issue sufficient quantities of that description of forage for the consumption of a large army. I will here read a memorandum from Mr. Drake, the depôt commissariat officer, which will show what state we were in at that time. This relates to an issue of another kind; but it will show the difficulties we had at that time to contend with. "While I greatly regret that the "valuable time of the field marshal commanding should be occupied by a recurrence of "such complaints, I beg respectfully to state that I make every possible endeavour to "prevent them, and that no exertion is wanting on my part, not only barely to perform "my duty, but to afford every possible accommodation and assistance to every rank in "Her Majesty's service. But I would also request to be permitted to submit to his lord-"ship's consideration the want of magazine accommodation, the great confusion which "prevails from the number of persons sent for the supplies necessary to maintain this "large army being crowded into the inconveniently limited space of a very small portion "of the village of Balaklava, when the whole of its area would only suffice for our "proper accommodation; while we also experience great delay and difficulty from "the crowded state of the harbour, the frequent impossibility of approaching the "vessels laden with our supplies, and the further delay of getting boats ashore, from "the numerous warps and cables obstructing their passage, and getting them "discharged from the very limited wharves. I may also add, that for some weeks "past all the difficulties have been materially increased by the arrival and landing "of very large cargoes of clothing, huts, and timber, which in many cases have "monopolized the large boats, and much narrowed our wharves and roads." Up to this time we had only about 25 yards of wharfage accommodation for landing the supplies for the whole of the army. All stores, excepting guns and ammunition, shot and shell;—I mean wharfage at which boats could approach to be unladen; and this consisted of three or four small jetties which had been hastily and imperfectly constructed by the commissariat. From this state of things it was inevitable that there should be delays in the issues; and both horses and men must have suffered from waiting in the wet and the mud till the deliveries could be completed. There was no doubt a deficiency of forage throughout the winter; but if Lord Lucan should lay before the Board the correspondence and papers relating to the subject, as I have suggested, it will be seen that the deficiencies in the issues of forage to the cavalry division were not so great as might be inferred from his Lordship's statement. The deficiency was experienced in a greater degree by the infantry divisions in front. I will not trouble the Board with any further observations.

(*Lieut-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Whose duty was it to supply the transports with forage?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) It was the duty of the Admiralty.

(*Major General Peel.*) To whom was Lord Raglan's order addressed, to which you referred when you stated to the Commissioners that there had been an order by Lord Raglan that a reserve of six weeks supply of forage should be retained on board; to whom was that order addressed?

(*Commissary General Filder to Admiral Boxer.*) I have a memorandum here, showing that I was permitted to take all excepting six weeks supply, which he ordered Admiral Boxer to retain on board. To feed horses and men on board ship is a duty belonging to the Admiralty.

(*Lieutenant General Sir William Rowan.*) Was the order issued to the agent for transports?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Lord Raglan, at the time the order was given, was at Constantinople. Admiral Boxer was at the head of the transport service at that time, and the order was addressed to him.

(*General Sir George Berkeley.*) Then the commissariat had nothing to do with it?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Nothing whatever.

17th April 1856

(*Lieutenant General Sir William Rowan.*) Was there any excess of forage over the six weeks? Did you obtain any?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) I had some. Lord Raglan, when I made arrangements for the depôts, said that that might be done, and I counted upon that in my arrangements; but I did not touch the six weeks reserve. Admiral Boxer had orders not to do so. The hay which I spoke of as arriving was meant to supply back again what I had taken beyond the six weeks reserve.

(*Major General Peel.*) If there was any deficiency of forage in the passage how could there be any excess afterwards?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Some of the horse transports might have been so worked that the six weeks' supply may have been consumed whilst others might have had an excess; but when the vessels were at Eupatoria, and I got the order rescinded, it was that I might take out of them the six weeks' supply. I lost everything by the storm; and I got the order rescinded, thinking that there was this six weeks supply on board. However, the transports had been ordered down to Constantinople.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Do the Board wish me to reply to Commissary General Filder?

(*President.*) Just as your lordship pleases.

(*Judge Advocate General to Commissary General Filder.*) Have you finished your statement?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you give in the letters you have read, and also a list of those which you require to be procured from any of the departments?

691. (*President to Earl of Lucan.*) Will your lordship make any reply now?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) As it really does not concern the real question before the Board perhaps it will be better to do so in a very few words. In the first place, I must say that so far from saying anything to the disadvantage of the commissariat in the foraging of the troops in the neighbourhood of Devna I have already said that Lord Cardigan, who should be the best judge of that matter, had expressed his approbation. When Commissary General Filder infers that those horses came up in perfectly good condition because they were in the same condition with the horses of the heavy cavalry, I wish to mention to the Board that I happened to see Lord Raglan on the very day I inspected the light cavalry, and I told him in reply to a question that I considered the state of the horses of the light cavalry brigade to be much about equal to that of the heavy cavalry brigade, but that I was not satisfied with the condition of any of them. When Mr. Filder supposed that I wished to attach blame to him in consequence of the insufficiency of forage on board the transports, I beg to say that I never alluded to him, and I only made use of his name at all to refer to his evidence showing that there had been an order that there was always to be at least six weeks provisions on board, but it was only to make use of the information he conveyed by that answer, and not to hold him in any way liable for a deficiency of forage on board the transports. I really am surprised that Commissary General Filder should allow himself to produce what I believe to be about the most worthless documents that officers of the army are called upon to sign; they are called forage returns; and there is not one member of this Board I believe who is not aware that the most extraordinary custom prevails as to them; it is that the returns are generally filled up before you get the forage; and if the Board wish to know the opinion of Colonel Gordon on that subject, I should like to refer the Board to his answer to a question put by the Commissioners in the Appendix, page 19. It is a memorandum by Colonel Gordon relative to ration receipts. My reason for reading it is this, that I perfectly concur with him. He says, "The system relative to the receipts given for the rations issued appears to be very "defective, and to invite irregularity, if not fraud, because the receipt for the articles "issued is given on the same paper and at the same time as the 'demand' for them. "This would not much signify if the rations were always forthcoming, but it frequently "happens otherwise, especially with forage, and when this is the case the receipts are of "course incorrect. But as they are the vouchers for the correctness of the commissary's "monthly abstract of issues, I expect it will be found that in many instances they are "inserted in the abstract as they are signed for, and not according to the actual issues." I am ready to affirm in the most positive manner that that is the fact, and that those forage returns are not correct returns of the forage received whilst the army was in Bulgaria. "In out quarters, where forage is often scarce, and purchased in the neigh- "bourhood by the divisional commissary, the amount for which the receipt is given is "generally very much in excess of that actually delivered, the horses being frequently sent to "graze. In such cases what security has the public that the amount charged for is the "amount purchased and issued, for the commissariat officer has in his possession receipts "in full for the whole quantity demanded, which are also the vouchers for the correctness "of his abstract, and I presume his abstract is intended to account for or have some "reference to the stores placed under his charge, including forage and provisions purchased "in the neighbourhood of his camp." I do not wish to say more upon that subject, except that, if necessary, I will prove by evidence that every one of those forage returns is incorrect, and leave a very false impression of the forage issued. Mr. Commissary General Filder states that there could have been no great cause of complaint during the time that

17th April 1856.

the army was in Bulgaria. I wish to refer the Board to page 15 of my divisional orders, order No. 3., dated August the 22d. "It will be the business of the deputy assistant "quartermaster general to make the foraging of the cavalry corps within reach of the "head quarters of the division his first study and duty. He will daily personally wait "upon the brigadier general and officers commanding corps, and from them inform himself "of the quantity and quality of the forage issued. He will be in constant communication "with the commissariat of the division, will assist those officers by every means in his power, "and will keep the major general informed of the result of these highly important duties." I think that the Board will be of opinion that the business could not have been proceeding very smoothly to require such an order at the moment; and if they will be good enough to turn over the page they will find in No. 4. "The forage ration of the cavalry at head "quarters of the division will be 14 lbs. per horse for the present, in consequence of the "very short allowance of forage lately issued and the large quantity therefore owing." This 14 lbs. was 2 lbs. in excess of the ration, and Mr. Commissary General Filder instantly disallowed that 2 lbs., saying that it was contrary to the rules of the service. I think those two orders will show that there was not that regularity, and not that sufficient forage, that Mr. Commissary General Filder's evidence would lead the Board to suppose. It certainly appears now that the reduced quantity of hay did receive the sanction of Lord Raglan, for we have it in the memorandum now read by Mr. Filder. All I can state is, that Lord Raglan to myself personally said that the amount of the ration had been reduced by Mr. Commissary General Filder without his sanction or knowledge. And I think if the Board will be good enough to refer to page 105 they will find a letter of mine to the quartermaster general, dated December the 13th, in which I state, "Sir, In general orders No. 4., "December 7th, it is stated that in future all bât and ammunition horses are to receive full "rations of forage. I wish you will be good enough to inform me whether it is not the "intention of the field marshal that the cavalry horses should equally receive full rations; "they are now only allowed 8lbs. of hay; at other times they were only allowed 6lbs. "I cannot doubt but that his excellency will be of opinion that for large troop horses 8lbs. "of hay, and still more 6lbs., is a quantity totally inadequate for the nourishment of "such animals. The French allow 10lbs. French to their smallest animals. A troop horse "in condition in England never receives less than 12lbs., and work horses 16, 20, and some"times more. Although the troop horses have improved since they have left the hill in these "very few days to an extent which is really incredible, still I fear that unless the "quantity of hay is increased, their condition will not be improved to such an "extent as I anxiously desire, and as will give the field marshal satisfaction." In consequence of this representation I think a general order came out desiring the commissariat officers to give us the full ration. Mr. Commissary General Filder immediately waited upon the field marshal, and there is this order at page 106: "Having represented to the field marshal commanding, that in the present state "of the supply of hay in the commissaraiat not more than 8lbs. could be issued "to the cavalry, his lordship has directed that issues are to be continued at that "rate for the present, but that the deficiency should be made up with chopped "straw." The application to General Canrobert originated with me, that he should lend us a supply of 30 days' straw. What Commissary General Filder says with regard to the difficulty in landing the forage I am quite prepared to admit; and in one of my letters, dated February the 7th, at page 111, I say, "I find it necessary to request that you will "be good enough to submit to the field marshal this letter with its three inclosures, "though one is three and the other two days old. The total absence of all fodder "for the horses continues, and still there have been two ships with hay in harbour "since Monday, during the whole of which time it can scarcely be urged that the "landing was prevented by bad weather. His excellency will, I am sure, agree that "no cargo can be deemed more important, or deserve a precedence over a cargo of "hay, when all the horses of the army are suffering from a want of it, as has been the "case now for many days; it is to the naval authorities and not to the commissariat "that the blame, if any, and of which I cannot doubt, attaches." I have answered, I believe, all the points touched upon by Mr. Commissary General Filder; and I propose before I enter upon my statement to lay before the Board or put in as evidence all the correspondence that I have had on the subject of forage, and I think it will more than bear out everything that I have said.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) The memorandum which Lord Lucan has read, and which was given in by Colonel Gordon to the Commissioners, relates to a very different state of things from that which existed in Bulgaria. At the time Colonel Gordon gave that in, the officers' private horses were sent down to the depôt to get forage by checks given by the commissariat officer in the camp. The commissariat officer never could know exactly what would be delivered on them, and there did exist that which Colonel Gordon speaks of, a difference between the receipt given and the deliveries, but that was a very unusual state of things; but in Bulgaria, if I produce the accounts of the commissariat officers they will show that no such system could have existed, but that deficiencies are shown on the vouchers. There were no deficiencies in Lord Lucan's vouchers; but those for the regiments will show that there were occasionally deficiencies; yet according to the system that Lord Lucan says prevailed there would be no deficiencies shown.

17th April 1856.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) If it is necessary, I can produce witness after witness to prove that there were deficiencies throughout the whole time. My letters show that. I state it, and therefore I wished the ration to be increased by 2 lbs.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) But the vouchers show those deficiencies.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have nothing to do but to support what I have said.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) When they give a receipt for the full rations, therefore it possesses validity.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you concluded your statement, Mr. Filder?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes. Might I examine Mr. Crookshank, who is here, who will prove that the forage for which receipts were given was issued?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Mr. Crookshank was not in Bulgaria with me.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) I have the same objection to make to your statement with reference to the Crimea, when he was with you. You have said that at Balaklava the baggage animals had no forage.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is Mr. Crookshank here?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you call him?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes.

---

Mr. Alexander Crookshank, Assistant Commissary General, examined.

*Mr. A. Crookshank.*

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you that it is not compulsory upon you to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

692. (*Commissary General Filder.*) You were attached to the cavalry?—Yes.

693. State what the practice was with respect to the manner of filling up the ration returns and charging the issues in your accounts?—The front of the ration return showed the strength of the staff or of the regiment, the back of it showed what was due to the regiment and what it received. If a deficiency in that issue occurred it was noted upon it, and only the quantity issued was charged in the accounts.

694. Was not the practice of making issues at Balaklava different from what it usually is in consequence of the deliveries being made from a general depôt instead of by brigade commissaries?—The issues from Balaklava (I refer to the forage) were made at one period by checks upon the depôt, and those checks were given to the regimental quartermaster who took them to the depôt store and received either such quantities as he was entitled to or a portion of it, the deficiency being marked on the back of the check, which was subsequently made good to him.

695. (*Cross-examined by the Earl of Lucan.*) Is it not true that you were unable to furnish the Commissioners of Inquiry with the amount of the deficiencies of forage to the cavalry for a period ending with the beginning of January?—I was unable to do it; but I may add the reason, that at the period when I was examined I no longer had possession of the accounts which would have enabled me to give that. It is usual, as soon after the close of the month as possible, to transmit one's accounts to head quarters, thence to be forwarded to England. I had them no more, and consequently could not furnish that statement.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have no other question to put. If it were useful to the Board, I could examine Lord de Ros as to the reports made to him about the deficiencies of forage in Bulgaria.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) I do not mean to say that there were never any deficiencies of forage at all; but Lord Raglan did not, under the circumstances put before him, attribute any blame. In page 19 of the Report the Commissioners state: "During the "great scarcity of hay and straw, between the 14th of November and 1st of January, the "commissariat seem to have been in nearly the same difficulty as the quartermasters in "regard to furnishing any accurate statements of their issues."

696. (*Judge Advocate General to Commissary General Filder.*) The Board wish this question to be put to you,—What is the commissariat rule about the issue of back rations?—The rule is, not to issue back rations at all; but if you make a return for three days, it is usual to make good any deficiencies that may occur within the period of the return, but at the time Lord Lucan gave the order to issue 14 lbs. of corn, it was not given to make good any specific quantity deficient, but simply to increase the ration. As Lord Raglan was within easy reach of Lord Lucan I could not recognize such an order; the proper authority was for Lord Raglan to have given that order, if he thought there were such circumstances attending the issues that arrears should be made good.

697. Do you object to issue back rations when not issued by your department on account of scarcity?—No; it is a rule of the army, however full our magazines are, not to issue back rations; it is a regulation of the Treasury.

698. (*General Sir George Berkeley.*) Do you recollect during the peninsular war, that at one time there was an issue of money to the troops to make up for the loss of back rations, which were very considerable then?—Yes. We could not supply the troops with their rations. They had not received them properly, and Lord Wellington gave an order

*Mr. A. Crookshank.*

17th April 1856.

that we should make up the value of what the men had been paying, namely, a stoppage for which they had not received the rations.

(*General Sir George Berkeley.*) Sixpence a day.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes; they merely got their stoppages back. I do not think that circumstance is applicable to the present. They had been paying for a ration they had never received, and they got back their payment.

(*General Sir George Berkeley.*) Are stoppages made in the Crimea for rations?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes; and if the arrears went to any extent the stoppages would be returned.

(*General Sir George Berkeley.*) The stoppages vary, do they not?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes, according to what has been issued at the time.

(*General Sir George Berkeley.*) It varied from 3*d.* up to 5*d.*, I think?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) Yes; and it does now vary.

(*General Sir George Berkeley.*) The soldier loses that if he does not get his rations.

(*Commissary General Filder.*) He does, certainly.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you any other witness?

(*Commissary General Filder.*) No other.

(*Judge Advocate General to Lord Lucan.*) Have you any witness to call?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Not upon this question, but upon the general question. I shall be glad to know what course the Board intends to take. The case differs now, in consequence of the line taken by Colonel Tulloch. My anxiety is to know, if I now produce any witnesses, what will follow.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board understood you to state, after Colonel Tulloch had been heard, that you would require to call certain witnesses, and you named Admiral Dundas and Sir Edmund Lyons.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) That is true; but I wish to know whether the case will close with a statement from me or from Colonel Tulloch. I think it would be desirable to know exactly what course is to be pursued.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you any application to make to the Board?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have no application to make, but to inquire whether Colonel Tulloch will make another statement.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Tulloch has intimated that to the Board.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) That I was not aware of. Then I suppose if I go into my evidence now it will be followed by Colonel Tulloch?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is your application to the Board now to be allowed to address the Board after Colonel Tulloch has finished his case?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Certainly.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I would rather, if the Board would permit it, that Lord Lucan should state whatever he has to state after his own witnesses have been brought forward, and then I should be able after that to sum up the whole. I say so, for this reason; he attacks my figures. As yet, he has given me no statement upon which I can act. He may reserve all that till the last; and if so, then I shall have no opportunity of answering. He founds his complaint upon there being a great number of figures in error, without showing it; there is nothing but his own statement. He says there are a number of wrong calculations, without showing them; and we shall have all that probably brought forward in the concluding part; and if so, I shall have no opportunity of making any statement in reply.

[The Board retired to deliberate, and after a short time returned.]

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) I am directed by the Board to state that they intend to adhere to the course that they first laid down, namely, to hear Lord Lucan's case, and to hear his witnesses, then to hear Colonel Tulloch in defence of his Report, and any witnesses that Colonel Tulloch might call; but in consequence of new matter having been brought forward by Colonel Tulloch, they are willing to hear further evidence on the part of Lord Lucan, then hear Colonel Tulloch's observations on such evidence, and then hear Lord Lucan in reply upon the whole case.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) May I be permitted to read a few words in regard to errors in figures and various matters which are alleged by Lord Lucan, in order to explain in what manner I think it will be necessary to get those facts investigated before I have to address the Board in summing up?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I think you will have an opportunity of making that statement when you address the Board; but the Board wish me to state that they do not consider themselves precluded by anything that has been said from calling for any further information that they may require.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I wish to examine Colonel Tulloch.

---

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

Colonel ALEXANDER MURRAY TULLOCH examined.

699. (*Lord Lucan.*) Will you state to the Court on what days you commenced and terminated your examination of witnesses in the Crimea?—For that purpose I must refer to my

Report. The first day was the 16th March, and the last day upon which any witnesses attended was, I think, the 30th day of May. After that we were two or three days at the commander-in-chief's, waiting to examine General Airey; or it must have been very closely about that period. I think the last time we attended was about the 2d or 3d of June, when Sir John M'Neill and myself were taken ill with the prevailing epidemic, cholera, and we left, I think, on the 6th of June.

700. Will you be good enough to state whether you examined witnesses at Constantinople?—There were no witnesses examined at Constantinople whose evidence appears in this Report. In going from Constantinople to the Crimea we examined one or two witnesses at Scutari, and afterwards, when we made out our Report, Sir John M'Neill conceived with me that it was not necessary to include any examination taken there, in consequence of our instructions being confined to the Crimea. The period I refer to was when we were proceeding to the Crimea, that is to say, about the 12th of March. We examined one or two witnesses merely as to the state of the hospitals at Scutari, and Sir John M'Neill made many inquiries there with regard to Commissariat matters and the supplies for the troops, but there was no examination of witnesses in form.

701. You left the Crimea on account of illness, did you not?—Yes.

702. Why did you not return to the Crimea after your recovery?—One of the reasons for not returning to the Crimea was that Sir John M'Neill was not in as good health as myself. I had recovered, but he had not; and he had written for the purpose of his family joining him at Trieste. Besides, we considered that our inquiry had very nearly terminated, and that all the further information we required was some information from General Airey, for which purpose we sent written inquiries. I believe Sir John M'Neill had also communicated with Lord Panmure, and he conceived that the information we had got was nearly sufficient. Sir John M'Neill had communicated to Lord Panmure exactly what he had intended to do; as also, that he was not likely to remain in the Crimea beyond the middle of June at the utmost.

703. Was it then by the desire of Lord Panmure that you did not pursue your inquiry further?—Sir John M'Neill, as I have already said, had communicated to Lord Panmure that it was his intention to leave about the middle of June, as his family was to join him at Trieste or at Vienna, and he did not intend continuing out any longer. The inquiry was completed in every respect, so far as we could see, with the exception of the information which he had to obtain from General Airey. General Brown was another officer whom we should have been glad to examine, but he was round at Kertch. Sir John M'Neill, with myself, drew up certain questions for General Airey, which will be found in the volume, and we forwarded them to him, in order to get replies in regard to certain points on which we required information.

704. On what days did you leave Constantinople and arrive in England?—It would be rather difficult to say exactly, but to the best of my recollection it was about the 13th or 14th of June that we left Constantinople, and I think I arrived in England about three weeks afterwards, or very nearly so. Sir John M'Neill did not arrive in England for a month after that.

(*Judge Advocate General to Lord Lucan.*) The Board wish to know whether you intend to connect these questions with the Report?

705. (*Earl of Lucan.*) I do, certainly. (*To the witness.*) How soon did you see the Minister of War after your arrival in England?—I think it may probably have been a week; I cannot be certain; I do not think it was more than that. He was, I think, out of town for a few days. It was within a week after I arrived, I think, that I saw him. I reported my arrival to him the very day I came, so that he might have an opportunity of sending for me whenever he thought proper.

706. Can you state at what date the Minister of War desired Sir Richard Airey by telegraph to reply to those questions which had been submitted by you to him?—I think that was delayed till the arrival of Sir John M'Neill; it was only when he came we could wait no longer, as he wished if possible to get the answers of General Airey while he was in London, if they could be obtained, and therefore he requested the War Department to telegraph for them. I think that must have been about five weeks after I arrived. We were expecting them daily in London.

707. Between the period of your return to London from the Crimea to the time of your presenting your Second Report of January did you communicate on the subject of your Report, officially or privately, with any officer or officers who belonged or had belonged to the army in the East?—Privately I may have made some communication in writing. I could not be certain. So far as I can recollect, there was no official communication. I am not certain whether some communication was not sent to Dr. Hall in regard to returns. I do not recollect any other official communication. In communicating to officers that I knew I might have casually adverted to circumstances in the Report, but nothing more.

708. Had you any communication on the subject of your Report with Colonel Gordon subsequently to your return to England?—Colonel Gordon's examination is here, if that is what you allude to. If you allude to the examination of him by the queries which are submitted here, of course I did.

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

17th April 1856.

709. I had better put my question again. Had you any communication on this subject with Colonel Gordon subsequent to your arrival in England?—Many communications with Colonel Gordon; he frequently called over at my office; he revised his own evidence. I saw him repeatedly, and it was my seeing him which led to my having him examined the second time, or rather the fifth time, in order to make clear one or two points in his previous evidence which did not appear to be quite regular, or which might have been misunderstood; that was the reason I had him examined. I consulted with Sir John M'Neill about it, and he seemed to be of opinion that he should be examined again. We had great doubts as to opening up anything connected with the Crimea, but seeing that it was explanatory of his previous evidence we conceived that we might venture upon doing it.

710. (*Major General Peel.*) What is the date of that fifth examination?—It is "Additional "queries addressed to Colonel the Honourable A. Gordon, assistant quartermaster general "in the Crimea, on 1st August 1855," which will be found in page 199 of the evidence. That was principally with reference to details connected with the clothing.

711. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Had you great doubts then as to opening the inquiry in England, and, if so, what were those doubts?—Sir John M'Neill and myself were sent to the Crimea for the purpose of reporting on certain circumstances which had occurred in the Crimea, and we certainly would not have been disposed to examine new witnesses or open any fresh case in this country, because we had no power; but to Colonel Gordon we gave the opportunity of making certain statements in explanation of a number of other statements made in the Crimea in regard to his being in possession, or the quartermaster general's department, of very large stores which they had never issued. That involved a very serious charge indeed. There was a good deal of dubiety in the way in which he expressed himself in one or two parts, and after consulting with Sir John M'Neill we thought it but just, as he had been examined in the Crimea, that he should have an opportunity of replying to some queries before we completed our Report, and I think he was the only one that was examined in this country. We conceived that we should have had no right to open new inquiries or call new witnesses; it might have been doubtful whether we had a right to examine him; we expressed a doubt upon it at the time we presented our Report, still we thought it was useful to have that information.

712. Is it then true that your inquiry was closed in the Crimea, when you appear to have had a communication with General Airey and other officers relating to that inquiry subsequently to your first inquiry, and subsequently to your return to England?—Clearly the inquiry was closed in the Crimea, there is no doubt whatever of that. The queries sent to General Airey were sent from Constantinople; we were obliged to adopt that course in consequence of my illness and the illness of Sir John M'Neill. I am not sure that there is any irregularity whatever in an examination by written queries, when you cannot accomplish it by a personal attendance. In addition to four times to see Colonel Gordon, we had attended three times to see General Airey, and not seeing him we had no other course than either to do without his evidence, or adopt this plan of sending him written queries and getting written answers. As to Colonel Gordon, it was very necessary, for his own justification, and for an explanation of what appeared very extraordinary in retaining all those supplies, that he should have an opportunity of self-vindication, and therefore we gave it to him. I am not quite prepared to say that we were entitled to do it, but we thought it the best course. If Her Majesty's Government thought we had done wrong I presume they would not have included this in the Report, but would have taken it out as other matters had been taken out. I do not mean to say matters of evidence.

713. Do you not think that other witnesses and persons concerned besides General Airey and Colonel Gordon were entitled to the same opportunity?—Certainly, I had no power; if Her Majesty's Government had thought that I ought to have examined witnesses in this country in elucidation of any facts in the Report, I have no doubt they would have directed me to do so. I am no judge of those matters; I merely get instructions, and act accordingly. Perhaps the Board will let me make an explanation of a statement I previously made. There were one or two letters which I wrote officially, not to the Crimea but to Constantinople, making inquiry about certain articles that were missing. I merely want to make that explanation. I did not communicate with the Crimea officially, but there are one, two, or three letters in the Appendix that I wrote, making inquiries as to certain stores that were missing, and that we could not account for; they were merely communications, as the Board will see, asking for returns, or asking for information about stores that were missing.

714. Are the Court to consider that it was at the suggestion and by the desire of Her Majesty's Government that the examinations of General Airey and Colonel Gordon were continued after the close of the inquiry in the Crimea?—Certainly not; we did not consult Her Majesty's Government upon the subject at all. As I said before, we conceived it perfectly within our power to send written queries to General Airey, and that we were merely carrying out the object of our inquiry. I spoke of their being written from Constantinople; I am not sure whether they were not written from Balaklava; that certainly made no difference whatever; we did not require to consult the Government for that. It was merely following out our course of instructions. In the case of Colonel Gordon I am sure that the Board will agree with me, when they

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

17th April 1856.

read the nature of the queries that we put, heavy charges being involved against his department,—very serious charges indeed,—that we were right in endeavouring to obtain every explanation of that description which we could. Before completing our Report, we wished to leave no doubt of the facts there stated. They involve very heavy charges as to enormous quantities of stores having gone to the quartermaster general's department, and not being issued by the quartermaster general's department; and had Her Majesty's Government conceived that the matter ought not to be contained in the Report I have no doubt they would have taken it out.

715. Did you in the Crimea examine any general officer connected with the cavalry?—We examined Colonel Hodge, who was then the brigadier. We had got a return of all the officers in the Crimea commanding regiments, or general officers, and we took the whole of them; first the officers commanding regiments, with their adjutant and quartermaster, who usually attended, and then the general officers. I think that General Scarlett went away at that time; therefore we did not see him; it was no fault of ours; but we saw Colonel Hodge, then acting as brigadier general. I think General Scarlett went away at that time. I think he was called away very suddenly, in consequence of the illness of his wife. He left, and when that was the case we had no one else to examine. Lord George Paget, I think, commanded one of the brigades. I am not sure whether he commanded the division or not, but we examined him.

716. Did you examine any general officer connected with the cavalry?—Colonel Hodge was then the senior officer, I presume, or was the general officer. I think he was the brigadier, and we examined him. We examined, so far as I can recollect, every general officer whose name was stated in the list given to us by the orders of Lord Raglan. We omitted none, so far as I am aware.

717. Was Colonel Hodge the brigadier general, or only the senior regimental officer with the cavalry?—Colonel Hodge is stated at that time to have been commanding the heavy cavalry brigade. If there were no general officers there of course I could not examine them.

718. If General Scarlett and other general officers were all absent at this time, why could you not have transmitted to them queries of examination, as easily as you did to Sir Richard Airey?—Simply because we did not consider it necessary; it was not at all necessary; we had got the evidence of all the officers there. Any one who turns over this volume, and sees all the officers that we examined, must be satisfied that we have done our duty pretty well in that respect. We could not follow every officer who happened to go away.

719. Did you not think that I was likely to furnish you with some information upon the subject of your inquiry?—I know of no information that we required particularly from you; none whatever. We were directed to examine certain officers in the Crimea, and we applied to Lord Raglan for a list of those officers, and we examined them. Lord Lucan was not in the Crimea. General Airey was in the Crimea, and therefore came within the scope of our inquiry. He was one of the officers whose names were contained in the list, and therefore we sent queries to him; but, so far as I recollect, we sent none to any one who was not in the Crimea at the time that we were going on with our investigation.

720. By whom were you directed as to the persons that you were to examine?—The person that I was principally directed by was my senior, Sir John M'Neill. I was greatly guided by a person of his experience as to who should be examined, and I perfectly concurred with him. When we arrived, and had written a letter to Lord Raglan, pointing out the course intended to be adopted, he furnished to us a list of the parties who ought to be examined. Our instructions, so far as we understood then, were certainly not to go beyond the Crimea, and that was one reason why we did not put into the Report the inquiries we made in Scutari. We took evidence there upon our way out, but we did not insert it in our Report, merely because we were instructed to take it only with regard to the Crimea. There was a good deal of evidence given by officers with regard to what took place at Varna, the deficiencies of medicine and deficiencies of forage, but we did not put that in because it did not refer to the Crimea. Our inquiries were strictly as regarded the Crimea.

721. Did you inform Lord Raglan that you were about to inquire into the conduct of any officers other than commissariat officers?—We did not inform Lord Raglan that we were going to inquire into any officer's conduct. We sent a copy of our instructions to Lord Raglan, and he issued orders to each of the general officers commanding divisions to give instructions that every information should be afforded to us within the scope of the inquiries which the Government directed us to make, and as Her Majesty's Government have expressed themselves satisfied with the inquiries that we did make, I submit that it is in fact not a subject for discussion on the present occasion. If they are satisfied that we have not exceeded our instructions, I presume that no one is entitled to make any question upon the subject.

722. Have you received any written approbation of your inquiry and the Report from Her Majesty's Government?—The approbation of the Report is its being presented to Parliament. The Report was submitted to the Secretary for War, and the Secretary at War went over it carefully,—at least as regards the Report itself, I know, because I not

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

17th April 1856.

only had his remarks verbally, but I have seen them in writing. That Report was then submitted to Her Majesty's Government in the form which he approved, and the approval of Her Majesty's Government is expressed by laying it on the table of the House; that is, such portion of it as is laid on the table of the House is approved by Her Majesty's Government; and if you wish to see letters to that effect I can show them, stating that if the Report, which Her Majesty's Government have approved of, and I believe I may add think so highly of, is impugned, we shall have the support of the Government if we require it.

723. (*Major General Peel.*) Will you read the paragraph from that letter?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I can produce the letter, but I must require authority for it. I have a letter from Lord Panmure.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Would it be improper for me to ask for the production of the letter? May I have access to it?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) If I might suggest, perhaps one of the first points would be to ascertain from the Board's legal adviser whether the presentation to Parliament of a report by command of Her Majesty does not imply the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I only wish to ask the Board whether I may have access to that letter.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Tulloch has referred to a letter that he has received, and you want to know whether you can ask Colonel Tulloch if he will consent to produce that letter: it will be in his discretion to produce a letter that he considers private or privileged.

724. (*Earl of Lucan to Colonel Tulloch.*) Can you produce that letter?—I can, but whether I will do so or not, depends upon whether the person who wrote it to me is satisfied that I should do so. Lord Palmerston in his place in the House stated that the Government had approved of the Report; and he expressed himself, I believe, highly satisfied with it.

725. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The question was, whether you had ever received any written approbation of your Inquiry and Report from Her Majesty's Government?—I shall be able to produce such. I have received, or rather Sir John M'Neill has received it.

726. (*Major General Peel.*) Then that is not the letter that you placed before the Board this morning?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have letters myself which would be sufficient, and Sir John M'Neill has them, though the approval is expressed in stronger terms to Sir John M'Neill than to myself, most distinctly; but whether I will produce them depends upon whether I have the consent of the parties who sent them.

727. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you, in the course of the evidence which you have submitted to the Board, produced this letter?—No, I have not produced it. There is a letter much to the same effect, which you have; but there are other letters from which it can be shown, if necessary. If you wish to see the letter I produced this morning, I have it here; it may be useful to read, if the Board will permit me.

728. That is not the letter that you produced before, is it?—Yes; that I produced to General Peel to-day.

729. Do you consent to read it now in answer to Lord Lucan's question?—Yes.

730. It is a letter from Lord Panmure to you, conveying approbation to you of your Report?—Yes. It is dated the 7th of April 1856,—"Sir, Having laid before Lord "Panmure your letter of the 5th instant, inquiring whether, in the event of your "attending the meeting of the Board of General Officers now assembled at the Royal "Hospital, Chelsea, you will have the right to call for or cross-examine witnesses, or to "request the production of any papers, I am directed to acquaint you, in reply to your "first inquiry, that the Board of General Officers must decide upon whether Sir John "M'Neill and yourself should have the right to cross-examine and call witnesses; and "with regard to papers and documents, if by this you mean papers and documents in "the possession of the Government, I am to state that you are fully at liberty to apply "for any that you may require, and every readiness will be manifested to furnish you "with them, when possible. I am to add, that although Her Majesty's Government "wish to leave the conduct of the inquiry to the Board, they are prepared in all respects "to support the Commissioners should their conduct be impugned." Perhaps after that it may be considered unnecessary for me to produce any private letters.

731. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Why did you not ask for my examination in England, or put yourself in communication with me, when you were about to animadvert upon my conduct, or upon that of the cavalry for which I was responsible?—I deny most expressly that I animadverted upon Lord Lucan's conduct at all; that is the very point under discussion. I deny that there is one single word bearing reference to Lord Lucan in any part of the Report, except that part where it is stated that Colonel Griffiths alleged to us that he had been threatened with arrest in consequence of having made a certain suggestion to Lord Lucan. That is no animadversion, or anything of the kind; that is the very point that I deny expressly. If there is any use in referring again to the paragraph I will do so.

(*President.*) It is not at all necessary; the Board are quite aware of it.

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch*
17th April 1856.

732. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Will you be good enough to read the last paragraph of your First Report, and tell the Board how far, after writing such a paragraph, you could have considered your inquiry so closed as to preclude your examination of a witness, not only most essential for the proper carrying out of the inquiry, but one whom common justice should have suggested to you had a right to be given an opportunity for explanation?—The First Report is dated on the 10th of June. "The evidence in regard to some of the "subjects of our inquiry has not yet been corrected by the officers last examined, to "whom it was sent for that purpose only the day before our departure from Balaklava, "and certain written queries were transmitted at the same time, the answers to which "will be forwarded to us. When we have received those papers, and have had an "opportunity of examining in a collected form the whole of the evidence and other "documents, we shall proceed to report upon the matters to which they relate, so far "as they may fall within the limits assigned to our inquiry by the instructions "received." That is the paragraph, and I can see nothing there. I do not see that that leads to any claim on the part of Lord Lucan for examination. I have already said why we could not extend our inquiries to this country. I state again, that I did not conceive him to have been at all injured. He is founding upon certain assumed statements as affecting him when really they do not so; for instance, as to the paragraph stated here, with regard to promptitude and ingenuity, we took express care that it should not refer to any one. I do not see how he can apply it to himself. It might have been, as I said yesterday, the quartermaster general, or it might have been any person, or it might have been Lord Raglan, just as likely as himself; and why he should lay hold of it, and suppose that he was the party meant, I cannot tell, particularly after the Report had been adopted by Her Majesty's Government, who of course would have considered whether this paragraph was likely to affect him or any other person. The Report is expressed, I believe, in plain English, and I do not understand how any general officer, or any officer whatever, has a right to assume, when a Report of this kind comes out, that he must necessarily be the party referred to, especially when, in his lordship's evidence yesterday, he said that it was the quartermaster general who was bound to devise and provide shelter for his horses; yet he now takes upon himself the blame of not having done it, and supposes that we must refer to him, instead of the quartermaster general. I do not say that it is the quartermaster general; I do not say that it is Lord Raglan; I do not say that it is Lord Lucan; and I do not say that it was the engineer officers. But it is for Her Majesty's Government to institute such inquiries as they think proper, to ascertain who the parties were who really were guilty of this want of promptitude and ingenuity. All that we do say is, that there appears to have been a want of promptitude and ingenuity. We do not say even that there was a want of promptitude and ingenuity.

733. Irrespective of the supposed animadversion on me, would it not have been only justice that I should have had the same opportunity of examination which had been already given to the infantry generals, when the great loss of horses made the examination of the cavalry generals perhaps more important than that of any other general officer?—It was no reason for our affording that which we could not afford. But I should think it is very probable that an inquiry may take place hereafter into the very circumstances that Lord Lucan now refers to. I fancy that Her Majesty's Government would like to know which of their officers have been guilty of want of promptitude and ingenuity, and he may have an opportunity of bringing forward anything that he chose to show that he is not the individual; but he could not expect that I was to open a new court, and to go into that question, when I had no authority. I was sent out to inquire into certain events in the Crimea, and we examined officers that were in the Crimea; every officer, with the single exception of General Airey; and to him we sent written queries, as you have heard. I could do no more. I would have been very glad that Lord Lucan should have an opportuity to be heard, but I could not afford it to him.

734. Do you now consider that your inquiry was complete without my examination?—Certainly, as complete as we required to make it; as complete in every respect, so far as we could make it in the Crimea. I cannot say what further examinations might have suggested themselves to us if we had been allowed to examine all the officers who had come home from the Crimea; it might have introduced many new features into it; but we had no right to do that, we were bound to furnish our Report upon certain evidence taken in the Crimea.

735. Did you or Sir John M'Neill draft the First Report?—That is a question which I do not think is perhaps a fair one; it is our joint Report.

736. Then you would object to answer that question with regard to the second one, equally?—Yes. I may state, merely voluntarily, that occasionally we both drafted the Report, in order to see what one another's ideas were, and we compared them together, to see if they corresponded, and then we brought out the Report in unison together.

737. At what date was your Second Report drafted?—That would be a very difficult question indeed to answer. After I came home I was employed immediately in taking up the duties of my own department. I had various inspections to make all over the country. I myself superintend the pensioners, and have to go over half the kingdom in one year, and the other half in another year. I had to inspect about 15,000 men, and when I returned I proceeded upon that duty. Occasionally I drafted, some-

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

17th April 1856.

times one week and sometimes another, two, three, or half a dozen pages, and sent them to Sir John M'Neill. He is a Poor Law Commissioner, and he travelled in like manner, and when he could find a spare hour he drafted part of the Report, and sent it to me. It is certainly quite impossible for me to say when it was drafted.

738. Was not your Second Report submitted to the Minister for War in manuscript?—No, I do not think it was, because we do not usually submit those documents in manuscript. We have a printer, and it is much easier for the Minister for War to read anything in print than in manuscript. Any long paper we usually send to the printer, and that facilitates the work of the Minister for War very much indeed; even papers of a much smaller size than this are sent to the printer, and the types are of course kept up, so that afterwards they can be used to print the Report permanently from.

739. Was your Report laid before the Minister for War in whole or in parts?—I think it was in two parts, but very closely following upon one another. It was laid before the Minister for War at the time when he was confined to the house, and he took that opportunity of reading it, and I believe he devoted a good deal of attention to it. I may mention that I cannot be quite certain whether it was in two or three parts, but my impression is that it was in two parts or more.

740. Were you and Sir John M'Neill in London on the two occasions on which those two parts were so submitted?—Yes. Sir John M'Neill himself took both of them to the Secretary for War upon the first occasion. I afterwards saw Lord Panmure again on the subject, with Sir John M'Neill. Sir John M'Neill received the papers from me, and took them to the Minister for War.

741. Have you not stated to the Board that certain parts of the Report had been omitted at the suggestion and by the desire of the Minister for War?—Those were not parts of the Report; not parts of this Report. It was part of a report made to him by Sir John and myself, which is a very different thing. This is a report submitted by the Secretary for War to Parliament, placing before Parliament so much of the information which we brought home as he thinks proper. He may, upon some points, have considered that we exceeded our inquiries, and did more than was wanted. If it was so, he said, I have looked over your instructions, and I do not think that those were matters you should have meddled with; it is very well your getting information of this kind that may be useful by-and-bye, but I do not think proper to place it before the public. There were two subjects. It is no secret. The question has been asked in Parliament, and repeated applications have been made in Parliament to bring forward that evidence. One of them was an inquiry, and a very strict inquiry indeed, into the mortality of regiments in the Crimea. Now for that we had no authority from the Secretary at War,—and if the Board will read the instructions they will see that there were no orders given to inquire about the mortality,—but I thought it very necessary, for my own information, in following up this inquiry, and Sir John M'Neill also thought so, that we should be well informed on that point; and I think that the remarks and the attacks made by Lord Lucan upon the Reports will show how very necessary it was to be careful in this matter, in order to get such information accurately. We called upon each medical officer for a return, showing not only the exact number of men who died in each month, but the prevailing diseases, the admissions into hospital, the number of sick daily in hospital, and everything that could well be required. That information we knew might be very useful in the event of any subsequent inquiries, and therefore we obtained it; but it was no part of our orders to obtain it; therefore when we gave it to the Secretary at War he said, "I do not want it; it is not called for by anything contained in your orders; therefore we "shall keep it for other purposes. It is not a part of your inquiry that I require to sub- "mit to the public, except merely what the amount of the mortality was."

742. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The question was whether you were directed to omit certain passages in this Report?—Not in this Report.

743. Was it not then in reference to the Reports before the Board that you observed that some parts had been omitted by the desire of the Minister for War?—It was with reference to the Report to the Secretary for War. It consisted of this Report, with certain other parts, which parts it was conceived expedient not to put into this Report.

744. (*Major General Peel.*) I understand you to assume that the approval of the Government of the Report was expressed by their laying it on the table of the House of Commons?—That is to say, this was the Report that they laid upon the table and approved of. Whatever other information I brought home for the Secretary at War the Government were not called upon to approve, and it is not approved. It remains in my possession. There were one or two parts of the Report to the Secretary at War which are not in this Report. When it was placed before him he thought proper to say that those related to points which did not require to go into the Report to be laid before Parliament, and he therefore only laid before Parliament such parts as he thought might be required, and the other parts to which I have referred did not form a part of this Report. This is the Report which is approved of by Parliament, and the other documents are merely in my own possession, and merely for my own private information.

745. (*Judge Advocate General.*) With reference to the answer you gave to Lord Lucan, you produced a letter, and you referred to a passage in it in which the Government assure you that you will be supported in all respects, if your conduct is impugned. Have you any letter or any other document to show that they ever said that they would

approve or had approved of your Report?—I have; but I would rather look over my letters, and I will give a more specific answer to that question when we next meet. I have the letters, or Sir John M'Neill has them.

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

17th April 1856.

746. Are you aware of any letter addressed by the Board to the Minister for War in consequence of that letter which you produced?—No, I am not aware of that.

Adjourned to to-morrow, Eleven o'clock.

## TENTH DAY.

### 18th April 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) As it has been found impossible to furnish the return that I asked for the other day, perhaps there will be less difficulty in furnishing a return showing the number of baggage animals purchased from the time that the army arrived at Scutari up to January the 16th.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) If any deductions are to be drawn from such a return as to the loss, I would submit that a return be added to the one suggested by Lord Lucan, stating how many of those arrived in the Crimea.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) The Board will thank you to write down what return you wish for.

---

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

18th April 1856.

Colonel ALEXANDER M. TULLOCH further examined.

747. (*Earl of Lucan.*) In one of your answers you state that the Report was submitted to the Secretary for War, and the Secretary-at-War went over it carefully, and, further, you stated that you had seen his remarks in writing; whom did you mean when you spoke of the Secretary-at-War?—I have been so long accustomed to call him the Secretary-at-War, it is very probable that I may have addressed him in that way by mistake. I meant Lord Panmure, the Secretary for War, and who was so long Secretary-at-War.

748. In answer to a question on page 142 of the manuscript minutes you say, "But "I should think it is very probable that an inquiry may take place hereafter into the "very circumstances that Lord Lucan now refers to. I fancy that Her Majesty's Govern- "ment would like to know which of their officers have been guilty of want of promptitude "and ingenuity." My question is, Have you any reason to suppose that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to institute any further inquiry than the present?—Nothing more than a mere matter of opinion; I have no other reason for supposing it than that.

749. You have stated that there were two subjects omitted from your Report, of which one was the mortality in a few regiments. What was that other subject?

(*Judge Advocate General to the witness.*) The Board wish me to intimate to you that you are left to your own discretion in answering that question?—There is nothing omitted. That Report contains every thing that was directed to be laid on the table of the House of Commons, and the report to Lord Panmure is a different thing from that. There were two subjects, which we had perhaps no right to enter upon at all, and therefore those two subjects were left out. The one related to the mortality, upon which we obtained a great deal of information for our own use; the other related to questions of details of duty performed among the infantry; that is to say, how many men had been employed in the course of the month upon certain duties, to see how it bore upon the force generally; that was a point that we were not at all directed to take any information upon, and therefore it remains our own private property.

750. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Where did you affix your signature to your Second Report; at what date?—As nearly as I can recollect, it was the 26th of January; it was a few days, I know, before the sitting of Parliament, and that was upon the 2d of February, I think.

751. Can you tell the Board why in the Report of the Commissioners presented to Parliament no date is given for the signature?—None whatever; at least there is no reason that I can assign, except that, probably, when it was printed, it was left blank; we did not know what day it would be, and when printed the date was not inserted. I have no other reason for it than that. I am not aware that we were bound to affix any particular date to it. It was dated to within a day of the 26th or 27th of January.

752. Then was the signature to the Report affixed some months subsequently to your interviews and discussions with the Minister of War on the subject?—No, certainly not subsequent to our interviews and discussions with the Minister of War; I could not exactly state what date it was, but I think he was ill about three weeks before the sitting of Parliament; when he was confined to his house he went over it; I think it was about that time; it was not months or any period of that kind at all; I think probably it might have been three weeks before the publication of the Report.

753. Whilst in the Crimea were you supplied with copies of the evidence given before the Sebastopol Committee?—No, we were not.

754. Are the Board then to understand that you had no knowledge of this report during your stay in the Crimea?—Our knowledge arose from what the knowledge of most of the officers did, that is, through the public papers. No official communications

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

18th April 1856.

were made to us as to the Sebastopol committee. I saw them all when I returned, and I had the papers by me during the time that our Report was preparing, but we had no official copies sent to us at the Crimea.

755. At what date did you first see an official copy of this committee's report, and where were you at that time?—The first official copy which I saw of it was upon my return to the War Office, where all those documents are among the books in my office; that was the first time that I saw it officially. When I saw it in the newspaper I really could not tell.

756. When the evidence taken by you in the Crimea differed so materially from that given by me at home, instead of ignoring altogether, as you appear to have done, my evidence, would it not have been more convenient and more proper that you should have endeavoured to reconcile evidence so much at variance?—I am not aware that I ever saw his lordship's evidence in the Crimea; sometimes I got a newspaper, and sometimes I did not; sometimes I saw it. I cannot burden my memory to say that I saw his evidence at all in the Crimea.

757. Have you not stated that you saw an official copy of the evidence on your return to England, and was not that previously to your drawing up your Report?—When I returned I found an official copy of the report in my office, and I read a part of it, and extracts from it, I think, are in my Report; but I cannot burden my memory to say whether I read Lord Lucan's evidence or not. If there is any very great discrepancy between it and my own Report, it is very possible that I did not. I am not aware of any great difference, or of anything that would have required me to go further into the subject. As I said before, I had no power to have done so, certainly.

758. Is the Board to understand that you did not think it necessary to read my evidence before you drew up a report immediately upon me?—When a report is drawn up it is drawn up on the evidence of that report, and not upon the evidence of another report.

759. Where and how did you examine your witnesses in the Crimea?—We examined our witnesses at Balaklava on board a vessel specially appointed for that purpose; as to how we examined them, it was generally in the presence of two or three. We generally assembled two or three officers belonging to the same regiment, and they were examined in the cabin of the vessel. We had a secretary, to take down what they stated. Unfortunately we had no shorthand writer, in consequence of which we were obliged to condense greatly what was said; and in order that there might be no question as to our having taken down the most important parts, they were sent to the officers for correction and signature, and the whole of the evidence that you have here is signed by the officers own hands, after being carefully examined and weighed, and sometimes altered by themselves, and retained in many instances for three or four weeks.

760. Did no more on those occasions fall from the witnesses than is given in the evidence attached to the Report?—It is quite possible that a great deal more may have fallen from them, as it is easy to be seen from the evidence in the Report; for instance, on the fourth day, although we occupied the whole day in inquiring into matters, there are only recorded, I think, about four pages of printing; but the most important part of everything relating to what was of importance was taken down on the spot, and it was sent then to the officer, telling him, "Add anything you choose, take out anything you "choose, put in any alterations you think proper, and send it back to us, and then we "shall have a true and correct revise." That was the only course that we could adopt, as we had no shorthand writer. If we had had it would have been a very great advantage indeed.

761. May the Court believe that the evidence contained in this book is only so much of what passed as the Commissioners thought it right to record?—As the Commissioners and the officers thought right to record. The officers had been told to add anything that they thought proper.

762. Have you your original minutes?—Certainly, signed by the officers, with their corrections. Every part of it can be sent to this Board,—either the whole or any part of the officers' evidence,—when they choose, with their remarks and annotations.

763. I do not know whether the Board consider them original minutes, but if I understand Colonel Tulloch he alludes to those parts of the Report which he thought it necessary to send to the officers for their signature. My question refers to the original minutes of the examination?—I do not know what is meant by the original minutes of the examination. There were none, except what was written down in the presence of the officers. I took it down, in some instances, and in other instances it was done by the secretary. We took down everything that we could take down in a fair time; and, as I said, the evidence was sent to each officer for his revision and alteration and correction, and whatever he thought proper; and he was to add anything that he thought proper. Those minutes, signed by themselves, are in my possession. They are exactly, word for word, what you see in this volume; and I think if Lord Lucan had referred to the paragraph in our Report he would have avoided the necessity of that question. I will read it; it is in page 2 of the First Report. "The notes of the examinations taken down "in the presence of the witnesses, without the assistance of a shorthand writer, were in "all cases subsequently sent to them for correction and signature. Printed queries

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

18th April 1856.

" were also addressed to the commanding officer and to the surgeon of each corps, " and the answers returned were signed by them. These documents have not been " subjected by us to any correction, beyond what was necessary to rectify mere " verbal errors or omissions obviously arising from inadvertence. It would have been " easy to relieve them of many repetitions, and otherwise to dress and polish them, with- " out materially altering their import, but we have thought it better to submit them " without erasing the rough original stamp of authenticity, than to change in any respect " the form in which they were returned to us, corrected and signed by the witnesses." There is also, I may mention, on the first page of the evidence not numbered, a memorandum which explains the course which we took in correcting the evidence, and with reference to this subject, which, if the Board please, I will read :—" Our inquiries for the " first fortnight were confined almost exclusively to the corps at or in the immediate " vicinity of Balaklava, and were conducted by personal examination ; but when they " extended to the corps which had been before Sebastopol during the greater part of the " winter, and when we took into consideration the number to be examined, it soon " became apparent, that unless our labours were facilitated by drawing the attention of " commanding officers, and those in medical charge of corps, to certain specific questions " which were likely to exhaust most of the information they had to give, there was a pro- " bability of our examinations being too much prolonged. Having, therefore, in the course " of the first fortnight, determined those queries which were most likely to elicit the infor- " mation required, we printed a series of them at the head quarter press, and circulated " them to each of the commanding and senior medical officers of the force before Sebasto- " pol. Their replies will be found from page 203 to page 432 of the evidence annexed. " In addition to this, however, we thought it our duty, by calling each of the officers " before us, to afford them an opportunity of stating personally whatever they thought " fit, in addition to or in explanation of the information contained in their replies. " Many availed themselves of this opportunity to enlarge their statements ; some merely " repeated them in other words; while the majority referred to their written replies as " containing all they had to state on the subject. As the necessity for arranging the " replies from each corps under their respective heads became apparent, it was found " expedient to call for information in a similar form from the officers examined at the " commencement. In any case the result of their examination must have been condensed " into the same form as the others, and we considered it better that they should do so " by replying to the same queries, than that we should attempt to form an abstract of " their previous statements. This will account for occasional repetitions in the evidence " of these officers; but these appeared of less consequence than the omission of anything " of importance, which might have occurred had any other course been adopted." We thought it necessary to give this memorandum, in order that the course we had taken might be clearly understood.

764. You state that the witnesses signed their evidence ; did they do so immediately on the close of their examination, or how long afterwards ?—They signed their evidence after they had read it. I took it down myself in very many instances, and the secretary in others took down the substance of what they stated, and it is here recorded. When it was sent to them, it was returned to us signed, with any corrections that they had made. In some instances we sent the copies back a second time, where they wished it ; and in some instances, I may say, that the evidence was re-written; that I think was the case with Colonel Gordon, and the case with Dr. Hall. They were sent back by us in consequence of there being a considerable number of alterations.

765. Then the minutes as printed are not a faithful report of all that occurred, and all that was said by the examiners and the witnesses ?—It is, with very few exceptions, such as their own alterations, and the alterations that the officers thought proper to make. I am not aware that the examinations could have been taken in a better form than we did it, or one by which it was possible to have ensured greater correctness. I may add, that in many instances the officers brought back the corrected statements to us themselves, and explained the reasons for the alterations, though I will not say that that was done in every case.

766. Will you be good enough to refer to page 299 of the evidence ? In the answer of Lieutenant Colonel Lysons of the 23d Regiment, the word "stocks" is in italics; can you state whether that word was underlined in the original manuscript ?—I think that would be rather a question for the printer; but I presume it must have been underlined, otherwise it would not have been put in italics.

767. It says, " Lieutenant Colonel Lysons, 23d Regiment. On the 22d of February " Sir George Brown took command of the Light Division. He ordered me forthwith to " supply men with stocks ;" and the word "stocks" is in italics ?—I have no doubt it is so marked in the original. I have not referred to it ; it never caught my eye. It seems to have attracted Lord Lucan's ; but I have no doubt that it is in the original as it is here in italics.

768. Is the Board to understand that you received no other instructions from the Minister of War than those given with your Report ?—That would rather be a question for the senior Commissioner, for Sir John M'Neill, than for myself. Sir John M'Neill was in confidential communication with Lord Panmure. I was not, as the junior member.

769. Were you not in the confidence of Sir John M'Neill?—Certainly, I was; so far as can be expected between two persons employed on the same duty; but Sir John M'Neill is a much older servant of the Crown than I am. He was ambassador to a foreign state, and was in confidential communication with Lord Panmure on many matters connected with the inquiry, some of which may very probably not have come to me; that is to say, there may have been some communications pass between him and Lord Panmure which he did not think it necessary to communicate to me.

770. Had it been intended to inquire into the conduct of generals and other military officers, do you consider that Sir John M'Neill, however distinguished as a civilian, would have been qualified to hold such an inquiry?—That is a question that I think I cannot well be called upon to answer. There were many expressions of opinion in which I was checked by Lord Lucan himself, and this I think is about the very last one he would expect me to answer.

771. Do you consider that if it was intended to inquire into the conduct of generals and other military officers that your antecedents, your experience, and your position would have sufficiently qualified you for such an inquiry, or would you have undertaken it at all?—Certainly not, for I expressed great doubts at the time I was sent out as to whether it was not an undertaking for which, perhaps, an officer of higher rank ought not to have been employed.

(*Judge Advocate General to Lord Lucan.*) The Board wish, if possible, you would discontinue this course of inquiry.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) That is the opinion of the Board?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Yes; unless you connect it any way with what you think is essential for your own defence.

772. (*Earl of Lucan to the witness.*) Why did you not examine Lord Raglan himself?—Upon that subject Sir John M'Neill and myself had a conversation with General Airey, and I put the question to him the other day as to whether he recollected it; but he replied he did not. The tenor of that conversation was to this effect, that, considering the high position of Lord Raglan, it would not become a person, particularly of my rank, to put any questions to him. Another reason was, that there had been not one word breathed about Lord Raglan by any person whom we had examined; not a single person in the whole course of these examinations ever stated one word against Lord Raglan. Under those circumstances both Sir John M'Neill and myself conceived that we were not called upon to examine Lord Raglan at all; and certainly had Sir John M'Neill been of a different opinion I should have been disposed to have written home to Lord Panmure, to request that some general officer might be associated with the Commission, and that I might be taken out of it, in order that an officer of my rank might not appear to question a person of the high rank of Lord Raglan. I do not think such a thing ever occurred as any commissioner inquiring into the conduct of a general commanding an army in the field.

773. Late as was your visit to the Crimea, did you ever there see any of the cavalry horses of our Allies under cover?—I did not; and the reason, I understood, was this: that they were most of them stallions, and had always been in the habit from birth of being kept in the open air; that was the explanation I received of it; there were some under cover, but the majority were not.

774. Did you inquire whether the Russian horses in the valley of Inkermann during the month of November were under cover?—I did not inquire whether they were under cover at that time; but I have every reason to believe that they were not under cover. I have been told by those who were there in November that even during the very coldest weather they were able to do without cover; but a Russian horse is a very different animal indeed to an English horse, and accustomed to a very different mode of treatment.

775. Do you conceive that more promptitude and ingenuity in giving shelter to horses were displayed by those nations than by ourselves?—I cannot answer that question. Before I answer that question, I should require to have the same information as to that as I had in regard to ours. It is a matter of opinion; and that very question of opinion has been objected to repeatedly by Lord Lucan.

776. Are you aware that during the wet season it was often necessary to change the standing of the horses every two or three days?—Yes; and if it had been changed even oftener I think it would have been an advantage, that is to say, if some temporary shelter had not been established.

777. Was it possible under those circumstances to have our horses standing before trenches or in pits?—Certainly; in that case you would have thrown up the trenches round the horses, to have protected them from the cold; you would have effected a drainage behind, and then the ground would not have been broken up in the same way that it was. The great complaint was, that the horses were knee-deep in mud, and that they laid down in that mud, and the mud froze upon them, in many instances, and they died at their pickets.

778. Are you now speaking from what you saw or what you know?—It is from what I heard from the officers there. I also saw that they were not picketed at the time I was there. They had all got into stables. It was merely from what I was told by the officers.

779. When in your letter to Lord Panmure of the 16th of February you annexed

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

18th April 1856.

extracts from the evidence of General Airey and Colonel Gordon, to show that I was directed to provide shelter for the horses so early as the 8th of November, and that an engineer officer was placed at my disposal on the 12th of November to assist in that work, and when you proceeded further to say, that no stabling was however commenced till very much later, do you not consider that to be a reflection that there had been a want of promptitude and ingenuity, which cannot be considered otherwise than as an animadversion upon me?—I prefer reading over the question, as it is so very long; but I beg to state before I do so that it would not be an animadversion in the Report, which is the question to be inquired into. I believe this Board has assembled to inquire into certain animadversions in the Report, and this is not an animadversion in that Report.

780. (*Earl of Lucan.*) I believe that the letter was submitted by the Minister of War to this Board, for the purpose of explaining the Report.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was for the purpose of answering Lord Lucan's statement. I have no objection to the question; but it requires consideration. I think it is right just to mention to the Board, that on referring to the warrant I do not think that they will find it includes any subsequent correspondence with Lord Panmure.

781. (*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Do you object to answer the question?—I think it is better not, as it is a question not relating to the Report. If it related to the Report, I should be perfectly ready to answer it; but I think that we would be entering upon another field altogether, that is to say, the subsequent correspondence between Sir John M'Neill, Lord Lucan, and Lord Panmure.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) Your question referred to the letter, and not to anything in the Report.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) When I object to that paragraph in the Report, it is referred by the Minister of War to the Commissioners, and they try to establish that part of the Report by referring the Minister of War to the evidence of those two officers; and it really appears to be quite clear that that letter is only an explanation by the Commissioners themselves of their own Report, and should be so received and considered.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) The Board are of opinion that your letter was an explanation of that passage in the Report.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) If the Board are of that opinion, I will give an answer to the question as soon as I have read it over and considered it.

(*Judge Advocate General to Earl of Lucan.*) Will you allow Colonel Tulloch to read your question?

[The question was handed to Colonel Tulloch.]

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Perhaps the Board will permit me to read the paragraph referred to, because it is almost necessary to take in the context with any answer that I may make. Otherwise I should say that I do not see here any reflection whatever upon Lord Lucan, as I do not see that it is expressed here that he was the person bound to provide the shelter. His lordship stated himself only yesterday or the day before that it was the quartermaster general whom he considered bound to provide the shelter. The reflection here is upon whoever the person was who ought to have provided the shelter. We merely express our opinion that temporary shelter might have been provided. "The "question on which his lordship is at issue with us appears to be, whether between the "24th November, when he admits that it had been decided to take up a permanent "winter camp at Kadikoi, or between the 8th of November, when he was first directed "to provide temporary shelter, and the middle of February, at which date the whole of "the horses were, according to his statement, finally placed under cover, temporary "shelter of any kind could not have been provided for them," (it is not stated "by "Lord Lucan") "to prevent the very serious loss which occurred in the interval, amounting, "as appeared by the War Office Return, to 664, or about two-thirds of the total loss by "sickness between October 1854 and April 1855." The question is left open as to who was the party that was bound to provide the shelter. Upon that point I believe many military men differ. I do not see that there is any reflection necessarily implied, or which Lord Lucan can take up, in this paragraph.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you mean that there is no reference to Lord Lucan in that passage which has just been read?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Merely the words "the question on which his lordship is at issue "with us."

(*Lieut. General Sir W. Rowan.*) Will you read the following paragraph?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) "On this point we may indeed have come to a different conclusion "from his lordship, but having formed our opinion, after careful investigation, and an "impartial consideration of the circumstances and evidence, we see no reason to alter it." That is to say, that temporary shelter of any kind could have been provided for them; leaving the question still open. We were obliged to write those reports with very great caution. It is not the first that I have written. I have written five reports to Parliament, and I was required to be equally cautious in each of them. I am sure the Board will not find fault with me for being cautious. In my opinion any blame that might be attributable would be to those who were bound to provide the shelter.

(*Judge Advocate General to Earl of Lucan.*) The witness distinctly states that he does not refer to you.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) There is no special reference.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I am satisfied with any answer, provided the Board is satisfied. If the Board think that that is an answer to the question, I am satified with it; but it appears to me most extraordinary why those extracts from Colonel Gordon and General Airey's evidence were to be produced in the letter to Lord Panmure, when that letter was an answer to a letter from me, in which I deny the justice of being charged with any want of promptitude and ingenuity. Nothing can be more satisfactory to me if the witness can be brought to say that he relieves me of all blame whatever. I might as well then withdraw, and save all further trouble.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) My duty was to point out whether there was any want of promptitude and ingenuity, and to leave it to the Government to find out the parties who had been guilty of that want of promptitude and ingenuity. It is not the ordinary course for any Commissioners appointed by the Crown upon a duty of this kind to do more than draw the attention of the Government to anything that appears to have been out of the way, leaving it to them to find out the parties; and there is no part of what may be supposed to be animadversions that I cannot explain, I trust, satisfactorily upon that principle.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) Your question proceeds upon the assumption that a specific reference was made to you. The witness denies that he ever made a specific reference to you. He made a general statement of what he thought might have been done, without fixing the blame upon any person in particular.

784. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Then I have to consider that explanation as if it was never given. (*To Colonel Tulloch.*) Did you examine the engineer officer, who, you say, you were led to suppose was assisting me after the 12th of November?—The statement made to us was merely that an engineer officer, upon the authority of Colonel Gordon, had been appointed to assist you. I will refer to the paragraph, because it is necessary, it is an extract, at page 179, from the quartermaster general's department. "On the "same day Lord Lucan was directed to make temporary stables, as he best could, till "timber arrived; and on the 12th November an engineer officer was placed at his dis- "posal, for the purpose of assisting." I had no more doubt than of my own existence that this was actually the case as stated to me, and I therefore did not examine the engineer officer. When it was told me so expressly by extracts from the quartermaster general's department, I had no question whatever in my own mind that it was the fact, this having been stated to me by Colonel Gordon, in the extracts taken from the books of the quartermaster general's department, and noted down by myself, and that subsequently confirmed, I may add, by General Airey.

785. In the Appendix annexed to the Report it is stated that the timber ships only arrived late in November of 1854, and that the timber was only issued in December. When you spoke of want of promptitude in giving shelter to the horses, did it not occur to you that materials were fully as necessary as an engineer officer?—I have already mentioned that there was one mode by which it appeared to me that shelter could be given; that was by digging trenches, precisely in the same way as you see all over the camp in the Crimea; and throwing up a little earth at the side so as to keep the bodies of the horses from the wind. In regard to wood, the first wood arrived, I think, on the 25th of November; but I would rather refer to the precise date. In the Appendix, at page 123, I see that on the 25th of November there arrived the "Cottingham" with 14,431 boards and planks, a good number of those, I believe, an inch and a half thick or two inches thick, and 1,699 pieces of scantling. The date of the order to Lord Lucan was about the 12th of November, and I thought it was very possible that he might have dug, or the quartermaster general or whoever had the charge of it, might have dug trenches, and have had everything in readiness for putting up temporary accommodation by the 25th of November, when the "Cottingham" arrived. At any rate there could not have been, for more than a day or two, any want of wood for the purpose. In December the huts began to arrive.

786. Had you any experience in trenches as a shelter for horses before you visited the Crimea in the spring?—I had seen somewhat of the same used in the Highlands. You see small trenches thrown up there, and also in Switzerland, to contain four or five cattle, to shelter them from the wind. It is a little trench dug out, and a little earth thrown up. I have heard that the same is used to a very great extent on the Pampas and the Andes, where I believe the practice originated.

787. Instead of the examination of Mr. Rawlinson, a gentleman, a total stranger to military affairs, and who only arrived in the Crimea after all the difficulties of the winter had passed, why have you not examined a military engineer who witnessed those difficulties, and who could easily be found in this country?—I examined him because he was sent out by the Government of this country for the purpose of ascertaining the capabilities of the country for the formation of military establishments, for stabling, for barracks, and for everything that could possibly be required, where it was best to place the horses, and where it was best to have temporary shelter, and being the person so employed I thought that I could not do better than bring him before the Board. As to any military engineer, the Board can call for any one that they think proper, and so can Lord Lucan, if he wishes to have such an opinion. I have called comparatively few.

788. As Major Hall had the charge of the distribution of all the building materials, why did you not examine him personally, instead of contenting yourself with putting a

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

18th April 1856.

few written questions to him?—The reason that I did not examine him was, that he was otherwise employed. I think he was going to Kertch; I am not certain: but he was employed in some matters connected with that expedition which prevented my seeing him. If I had begun with Major Hall I could have had him easily enough but it was towards the end when he was otherwise occupied, and he stated that he could give the Commissioners his evidence infinitely better when he had all his books before him than if we examined him vivâ voce. I am not aware of any information that he could have given us better than he did. I might add, that we were not at all required to examine every one personally. There was no obligation; it was quite optional with us to do so.

789. When you remarked upon the fearful loss of horses, why did you never allude to the commissariat transport duties? Are you of opinion that those duties occasioned no loss of horses?—I have no doubt that they did occasion a loss of horses, but I do not think to anything like the great extent of loss that was sustained; and from all the evidence before me the extent of those duties seemed to have been very much over rated. I find upon the 19th of December they begin with a large number of horses; there were 360 horses, and they continued at that rate to the 28th, when they fell to 224; then they fell to 190 by the 4th of January; yet the mortality continued enormously high. The commissariat duties might account for the killing of horses in December, but not for the deaths in January and February. In February there were scarcely any duties of that kind; only about eight days altogether in February; but the number of horses that died was very considerable, and they were not so employed every day in January.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The return referred to I pronounce to be altogether incorrect and valueless, and I shall be prepared to produce Major Conolly to establish that to the satisfaction of the Board.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) On the only single day pointed out by Lord Lucan it was shown that I have given credit for 522 horses, when he said there were only 500 employed. That shows clearly that I have not understated it; and whenever Lord Lucan does produce a return which can be better relied upon than this I shall have an opportunity of comparing it, and if there are any errors of course this part of the return must be altered; but I am not responsible for those errors. The returns must be taken as furnished to the Commissioners, and they cannot be responsible for the errors, unless they be some very apparent ones.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) My correspondence, which will be put in as evidence, will refute every line of them.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I only say that I cannot be responsible for the returns received from officers who ought to have known whether they were correct, and who gave those returns to the Commissioners, who received them in perfect confidence, and acted upon them. There is not one return in the whole that might not be questioned in the same way; but we are not responsible for them.

790. (*Earl of Lucan to Colonel Tulloch.*) Is the Board to understand that Major Hall was not at Balaklava till late in the month of June?—As a matter of course, we could not select officers particularly, and I know of no reason for taking Major Hall before any one else, therefore we examined the whole of the regimental officers every day in succession, and towards the last we came to Major Hall, and it was at the time that the Kertch expedition was about starting; he was either going there or was very much occupied with it; he stated that he could give answers much better by reference to his books in writing than he could verbally; and I should state that it was not at all imperative upon us to examine personally, particularly upon subjects of that kind; we were never told to do so. My impression is that he was not at Balaklava in June; he was either not there or he was employed in some way connected with the Kertch expedition which occupied him very much; embarkations, at any rate. That was the reason, if it be necessary to give any, why we examined him as we did.

791. (*Earl of Lucan.*) I wish to observe that it is not my examination so much as the prolixity of the witness's answers that prolongs this inquiry. (*To the witness.*) Were you not much consulted, and did you not take the principal part, in the organization of the ambulance corps?—Yes, I did; but it is necessary to add, that I had nothing to do with the terms on which they were selected; and I cautioned the Government that they were not likely to get proper men for the purpose; that they offered them a sum for which they were not likely to get good men; and that remains upon record.

792. In your inquiry did you receive evidence as to the existence of an ambulance corps at that time?—I not only received evidence in reference to the existence of that corps, but I was frequently in communication with the officers and with the men too.

793. Then you did consider that corps to form part of your inquiry?—There was nothing connected with the corps that required particular inquiry. On some occasions, where there was a matter of discipline, I went down and saw the men, and put it to rights, as far as I could. I was not aware that there was anything which required any particular inquiry connected with that subject that I was directed to make.

794. Were you not during the months of November and December 1854 in constant communication with the Minister of War?—To a certain extent I was always in communication with him, being in the same office or the same department; I was in communication with him frequently.

795. Were you able to foresee the difficulties which would have to be contended with

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*
18th April 1856.

by the cavalry if obliged to winter in that country?—I beg to say that the difficulties as to the cavalry formed no part of my duties in the War Department. I never was consulted about it. The only point I had to do with it was as to sending out the huts; that was one part. I also had something to do with the formation of the ambulance corps, under orders received from the Minister of War; but I had nothing to do with the difficulties of the cavalry.

796. If canvas sheltering was, as you seem to suppose, that shelter which offered most advantages under the circumstances, would it not have been the duty of the civil authorities at home to have placed the proper materials at our disposal?—It is a question of opinion again, certainly; but I cannot fancy why the authorities at home should have been written to for canvas when canvas is exported in large quantities from Constantinople; that would certainly have been a most remarkable course.

797. If it was found possible and proper to send huts out for the men, ought not the authorities at home to have equally considered the horses?—I believe there was material sent out for the erection of stabling too; but that did not devolve upon me. There was a certain quantity of huts, a thousand, sent for the men, and I understood there was some accommodation sent for the horses too.

798. If, as you seem to suppose, canvas on a wooden frame would have been sufficient to have hutted all the horses, could not one or two steamers have brought sufficient canvas, spars, and carpenters for the whole operation?—I think this would have been much easier;—you might have got spars, carpenters, and canvas from Constantinople, merely by writing for them; it would have been most unusual to send to this country for those materials when Constantinople is built of wood, and canvas is exported from thence which might have been brought in 90 hours to Balaklava.

799. Are you not aware that without pavement it is not possible, in a wet season, to place a horse in any pit, unless that pit is roofed?—There were materials for paving, and many of those pits were paved in the front where they had them. Many of the French pits were paved. There was no particular reason why they could not have got them paved at once; but you might have got them paved in the course of a few days.

800. On the plateau could pavement have been found for 2,000 horses?—I cannot answer that; but I am sure there was plenty of stone in various places not far from where the horses were. Of course it would have required to be blasted; but there was a great deal of loose stone also.

801. Did you see the large sheds constructed for the cavalry close to Kadikoi?—Yes, I did. I saw them repeatedly. I passed them almost every day.

802. Did you never inquire how they were occupied, and when and by whom they were constructed?—I understood they were occupied as hospital stables, and that they were constructed by some of the cavalry, with the assistance of Sappers and Miners, and some carpenters or other persons that were got from other quarters; that was all the information I obtained in regard to them.

803. How came you in your examination and in your Report to pass over all mention of those stables, when they contained no less than between 200 and 300 horses, and were completed so long before all the other stables?—The statement in regard to the period of hutting the cavalry was taken from the examination of the officers, and if you refer to it you will find that none of them particularly allude to those stables. I did not refer to any hospital stables, simply because the officers did not do so in their examination.

804. Did you satisfy yourself that we had labour, tools, and materials wherewith to erect shelter for horses in the month of November, before you wrote the passage as to the want of promptitude and ingenuity to which I take exception?—I had satisfied myself, by the answers given by the quartermaster general, that there was no difficulty, so far as I could see mentioned, except that of labour, and that want of labour seems to have referred principally to the Turkish soldiers not being good workmen. I certainly anticipated that there was a certain proportion of the cavalry who would have been available for the construction of their own huts. As to the tools, I learn now from the quartermaster general that there was a very great deficiency of tools. I knew before that there was a deficiency of tools in one or two regiments, but no more. As to the materials, you are aware, and I know, that on the 25th of November wood sufficient had arrived to hut, at any rate, a part of the cavalry; and if sailcloth had been used, that would have enabled them to hut a great deal more.

805. Had you found on inquiry, that at the period referred to we had neither labour, implements, nor materials, would the knowledge of those facts have induced you to frame your Report differently?—I am not aware that it would, because I think you will find that there is nothing stated with regard to any blame being attachable to the cavalry. It is probable if we had known it to a greater extent, that Sir John M'Neill and myself might have been more particular in pointing out that probably another department was in fault; but as we did not allude to the cavalry specially as showing a want of promptitude and ingenuity, I do not see that we should have required to have made any material alteration.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I shall not examine this witness any further.

806. (*Major General Peel.*) I called your attention on the fifth day of these proceedings to the per-centage of deaths given in the return that you placed before the Board, which

*Colonel A. M. Tulloch.*

18th April 1856.

were computed by you, and I pointed out the distinction between the authority of copies of official returns and such computations. You stated that you had never referred to the averages. Will you have the kindness to refer to page 52, where your statement is, "Since I returned to the War Office I have gone into these matters more minutely; and "I am able from those returns to make an abstract of what the mortality was—the "maximum mortality—which is the point at which I understand Lord Lucan aims, "thinking that still it will be considerably lower than in the case of the transport "animals. Now I have got it, and I may mention that the loss in five months has been "frightful. In the heavy brigade I find that out of an average strength of 727, there "died in the months of November, December, January, February, and March, 501. I "have not the returns of the other month, or rather they are intermixed; and be it "recollected that not one was killed in action. All these I have taken out from the "returns, yet positively 501 died out of 727, making a mortality of 69 per cent. His "lordship can see from that, whether in the original statement I had wished to injure "the cavalry. To the light brigade I will refer in the same way. There the strength "of every month, and the deaths in the same month are taken out; and I am almost "afraid to say what the mortality is. His lordship was very anxious to learn it; and I "can tell him; out of the average strength of 427,—394 died; this is from authentic "returns, signed, if not by his lordship, by his lordship's officers. Now, as to that "mortality, I must make it up as his lordship wishes; that is to say, taking month "after month, removing those that arrive, taking out those that go away, it is 92 per "cent. of the horses; for out of 427 horses, 394 died. I am very glad to be able to bring "this statement before the Board." That is a part of your statement?—Yes, but it is not referring to that; it refers to something that had been going on on that particular day.

807. Is that the correct way of taking per-centages of deaths?—I took it upon the original number, and Lord Lucan was not satisfied with that.

808. If you had taken six months instead of five months, would you not have absolutely made the number of deaths exceed the number of horses?—The answer to that unquestionably has occurred over and over again in many calculations. For instance, with regard to Western Africa upon one or two occasions; it will be seen in the Reports which I presented to Parliament that the mortality was actually double the original number of persons; in one year it was 200 per cent., I think, in the Gambia. It is many years since I prepared those Reports; but they created a very great noise at the time, for the number of men who died in the course of a year was actually greater than the original number. And it would have been precisely the same if we had gone on with the horses; it would have been 150 per cent. or 200.

809. Do you mean to say that the method of taking the average is perfectly deceptive, and that, in point of fact, the real average of the deaths was in the heavy cavalry brigade about 50 per cent. and in the light cavalry brigade about 60 per cent., the total being 53 per cent., and not, as stated in this return, in the heavy brigade 69 per cent., and in the light brigade 92 per cent.; on the whole 77 per cent.?—That depends entirely upon whether the calculation is what is called the average mortality or the aggregate mortality. All calculations in regard to mortality are taken either upon the one or the other principle. Either you take the strength at the commencement of the year, and the loss that has taken place in that year, and do not enter into the changes backwards and forwards, and merely calculate what the total loss is upon the original number—that is the aggregate mortality; or you take it every month, viz.:—On the 1st of April you take the strength, and the deaths in the month of March, and so on. In the April return you cannot get the deaths, because it is only dated the 1st of April; therefore you must take the deaths that occurred in the previous month. In the mortality return originally attached to the report that very difficulty was pointed out in the 46th Regiment, where the deaths amounted to more than 100 per cent. owing to that circumstance; but every one who knows anything about statistics knows what that means; they know that it is taken upon the average strength, and that such a thing may happen.

810. When you mention to the Board this mortality which I have read, and dwell upon the frightful mortality, and say, "I am very glad to be able to bring this state-"ment before the Board," do not you think that that method of taking averages is very likely to deceive the Board and the public?—I have given them both modes. First of all I gave the lowest rates, without shifting backwards and forwards the number, and that is the mode to which his lordship objected; but there is another course which is even still better, that is, to take the number alive on the 1st of April and the 2d of April; and so on during thirty days; then add up the total, and divide it by the days in the month, that gives the average number alive for the whole of that month. Then you want, opposite to that, the deaths, afterwards take the same for the following months, and so on; the Board had the highest average rate of mortality before; that is the lowest average rate. When so great a mortality occurs it is always difficult to hit upon the medium that you ought to take, and I took the lowest, as there was a great anxiety on my part not to exaggerate. Therefore you find that I originally stated the mortality at the very lowest rate. If the Board will refer to page 20, and take in connexion with that the return at page 193 of the Appendix, they will there find the strength of

the heavy brigade stated as 1,055. Died from disease 493; ratio per cent. 47. If the Board will refer to the abstract of the returns from which that is taken they will see the groundwork of it.

811. That is exactly the same return as I have just quoted?—That was the first upon which the statement was made up. In the return before you, you get the maximum mortality. If I take the strength every day, or take the strength upon the 1st of March, or upon the 1st of April, and add the two together and divide it by two, that would give the medium mortality. There are three ways of doing it; in the one case it gives the minimum mortality upon the aggregate strength, and in the other the highest mortality, such as I have now stated; the third mode of taking it, by the strength every day, would give a medium result.

812. None of them appear to give the exact mortality?—That depends entirely upon what principle you take the strength upon; any one reading it knows exactly what is meant by it.

813. I think that anybody reading your statement would think that the mortality in the light brigade had been 92 per cent.?—Of course, calculated in that way; that is the highest you can make it.

814. But you will admit, will you not, that if you had gone on another month the number of deaths would have exceeded the number of horses?—That is very often the case. In my reports on the sickness and mortality in the army, under the head of "Gambia," that very circumstance appears, and it very much attracted the attention of Parliament in consequence of the frightful mortality. Reliefs were kept on board ship, and as fast as those on shore died they were landed; a fresh supply happened to arrive, and they were also landed, till at last the mortality came up to 150 or 160 per cent. I may mention that for many years it has been my duty to report to Parliament everything that takes place in the mortality of the troops every ten years, or at certain periods, and I do not think that I should be likely to commit such an error as Lord Lucan points out. I may also say that there was a great wish that the mortality should not be exaggerated, or made to appear very high.

815. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) If the horses had been shifted as often as you seem to think they ought to have been, how would you have kept them under cover, which you consider so necessary? I think you say that they should have been shifted every two or three days?—It was not under cover; they were picketed at that time.

816. You spoke of cover just before?—I understood the question meant that they were at their pickets and were in deep mud, which they very often were there; and it would be a much greater advantage to shift them oftener than every two or three days.

817. But you could not have had cover?—No, certainly not at that time, if they required to be shifted so often.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) My question was, whether it would have been possible with trenches to have moved the horses sufficiently often.

818. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You could not in that soil have constantly renewed those trenches every three or four days?—A trench might have been cut in front and in the rear to have carried off the water. It would not probably have taken one man half a day per horse or anything like it, by the calculations usually made. If you refer to the quantity of earth which a man can throw out with a spade, it is about a cubic yard per hour.

819. That must depend upon the soil?—That is in a very bad soil; and it is two cubic yards in an easy soil, in the calculations on that subject by engineers; and there would be no difficulty in a man in half a day, at any rate, clearing the front and rear of his own horse.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I shall show to the Board, by and bye, that the French, who did adopt those trenches as the only shelter for their horses, always paved the ground, and they never thought of putting a horse behind a trench without paving it.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) There are two points in my evidence which I wish to correct, to prevent any mistake. The first is, where I stated that there were cavalry horses employed in February in carrying provisions. I find that there were no cavalry horses; therefore that was a mistake—it was merely some sick that were carried down. The other point was in answer to one of the earlier questions of to-day. It will be found that I stated that a part of the Report connected with duty was kept out. I may mention, that with regard to that part, Sir John M'Neill did not concur with me in thinking that it ought to form a part of our Report to the Secretary for War. I thought that it should; but he thought that it should not. I do not want it to be supposed that any part of the Report with which he was concerned was kept out; that part was simply prepared by myself.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It was my intention to have examined Major Conolly, but he has written to say that he is taken unwell, and cannot appear to-day. Then I should have preferred examining Admiral Lyons, but he informs me that it will be very inconvenient for him to be examined before Monday; and therefore I propose to call General Scarlett.

*Major General J. Y. Scarlett.*

18th April 1856.

Major General J. YORKE SCARLETT examined.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you that it is not compulsory upon you to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

820. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Were you ever, by any act of mine, deterred from or discouraged in giving shelter to the horses of your brigade, or did I not, on the contrary, encourage and urge you and all the other officers as far as possible to do so?—You never discouraged us in any way. On the contrary, you were very anxious that the cavalry should be got under shelter.

821. Do you consider that there might have been on the part of myself, or of the officers commanding brigades and regiments, more promptitude or ingenuity in sheltering their horses than were displayed under the circumstances in which we were placed?—I am not aware that more could have been done. If I had been aware of it I certainly should have thought it my duty at the moment to state that fact to your lordship. I believe it was done as quickly as our means admitted.

822. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board wish to ask you to what cause you attribute the loss of your horses not killed in action?—I attribute it to the want of supplies, and to the weather. I conceive that they were deteriorated before they landed in the Crimea, from exposure to heat, from want of water, and from short forage after they came to the Crimea. They rallied somewhat in October, but subsequently to that the forage was very short, and the weather became excessively severe; and also when they were in this low condition they carried forage for themselves, they carried biscuits to the front, and they carried the sick from the hospitals; and to those circumstances I attribute the loss of the horses.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have no more questions to put to the witness.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Have you any questions to put to General Scarlett?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No.

---

*Colonel John Douglas.*

Colonel JOHN DOUGLAS further examined.

823. (*Earl of Lucan.*) I believe you commanded the 11th Hussars?—Yes.

824. Were you ever, by any act of mine, deterred from or discouraged in giving shelter to the horses of your brigade; or did I not, on the contrary, encourage and urge you and all the other officers as far as possible to do so?—I received every encouragement from your lordship to shelter the horses; and, in fact, in every respect.

825. Do you consider that there might have been, on the part of myself or of the officers commanding brigades and regiments, more promptitude or ingenuity in sheltering their horses than were displayed under the circumstances in which we were placed?—Under the circumstances in which we were placed I think that all ranks did their duty in every respect, as far as sheltering the horses was concerned.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Before putting a question to the witness, I beg to observe that I believe it is not the practice and that my witnesses will not be allowed to be examined by the opposite party after the lapse of several days. There are good reasons for that; and if such is the case, I think they ought to be taken into account upon the present occasion. The objection I make is, that my witnesses being cross-examined several days afterwards, instead of cross-examining them at the time they were here.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) To whom do you allude?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) To Colonel Douglas.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You called him to support some part of your Report?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I did.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Lord Lucan called him for another purpose.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) After the lapse of several days. Is it not a sort of cross-examination?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Lord Lucan had leave from the Board to call witnesses, and Colonel Douglas is one of them.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I would rather object now, than at a later time, and I think it is evident that Colonel Tulloch should not, in his cross-examination, go beyond matters which have now been brought forward.

826. (*Colonel Tulloch to the witness.*) I will read to you a portion of your evidence at page 65, question 197.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You will connect that with the answers that he has just given?

827. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes. (*To the witness.*) At question 197 you are asked, "You "stated that there was a great delay in consequence of the want of transport and "artificers, as stated in the evidence given before the Commissioners. Do you see any "difficulty in having seamen or carpenters from the shipping employed to assist you "under such circumstances?" The answer is, "It would have been a very great "advantage to us if we could have got them." Then at question 198 you are asked,

*Colonel John Douglas.*

18th April 1856.

"Did you make any suggestion to that effect? Might not some temporary shelter have "been put up by means of sailcloth in a day or two even by your own men, had the "material been obtained?" The answer is, "If I had had materials I could have them "put up, but I made no suggestion upon the subject." Then at question 199 you are asked, "You could have put them up even by your own men?" Your answer is, "Give "me the materials, and they could have done it." And at question 200 you are asked, "In what time could such shelter have been put up?" to which you replied, "In a very "short period; if you had given them the materials it could not take long; I could not "say how long; merely putting uprights, I presume, and nailing on canvas." Upon those two cases why did you not make such a suggestion? Was not it your duty as commanding officer to have done so?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The witness has stated that all ranks did their duty under the circumstances. You have referred to his evidence given on a former day.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; and I put to you the question at page 198, in reply to which he stated, "If I had had materials I could have had them put up, but I made no sugges-"tion upon the subject." Why did you not make such a suggestion? Was not it your duty as commanding officer to have done so?—It was certainly my duty as commanding officer to act according to circumstances; at that time I did not think it necessary to make any suggestion at all. I considered that everybody was doing their duty as far as circumstances admitted; we had no materials to work with.

828. My question refers to sailcloth; you made no suggestion with regard to temporary shelter by means of sailcloth?—I did make no suggestion.

829. Does not the omission to make such a suggestion imply a want of ingenuity on your part?—No; I do not think it does. I did not command the cavalry.

830. But you have admitted that the use of sailcloth would have been valuable, and it might have been easily put up; would not, therefore, a suggestion on your part have been likely to have called the attention of the officer commanding the cavalry to an apparently useful remedy for the sufferings of the horses?—As a regimental officer I did not consider it my duty particularly to suggest at that time those sort of things. I considered that the officer commanding the division or brigade, or Lord Raglan himself, was the proper person to consider all those things, and not I, as the lieutenant colonel commanding a regiment at that particular moment.

831. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board wish this question to be put to you—To what do you attribute the loss of your horses not killed in action?—In a great measure to the want of supplies, so far as my own regiment was concerned, while in position behind Inkermann, and being very much reduced in that position, and constant exposure, as well as being required to carry the commissariat supplies to the front in that reduced state. That had a great deal to do with it. If the horses had been properly fed and well supplied, they would have been much more able to resist the weather than they were at the time.

832. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You mean to say that had you had a sufficiency of forage, cover would not have been necessary?—I think with the shelter that we might have erected, that is to say, from digging trenches and throwing up a breastwork, and paving, which was perfectly necessary, as well as proper drainage behind that, those horses had they been properly fed could have stood out during the whole of that winter; that is to say, well fed—perhaps better fed than they otherwise would have been in barracks, to resist the extra exposure to the weather.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I propose to call Colonel Low, Colonel Doherty, and Major Thompson, but I do not think that any one of those three officers is here; therefore I have no other witness to examine to-day; but perhaps the Board will allow me to read a letter which I have received from Sir Deans Dundas in reply to some queries that I addressed to that Admiral.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to say that if that letter is read, I presume I shall be able to read any letter of a corresponding description in regard to the same facts.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) You had better state the circumstances under which you sent the queries.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I will. I had not the honour of a personal acquaintance with Sir Deans Dundas at all, and when I heard that he was unable to attend here in consequence of the loss of his son, I thought that the best way of getting his evidence was to send him certain queries, and to those queries he has replied in this letter. It will rest with the Board whether this letter can be read or not.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I think the queries must be given to the Board.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I will produce them.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) That will place me in such a position that I shall have no opportunity of cross-examining upon any one of the facts there stated; and I shall consider myself at liberty to put in any information of a similar nature, either a return though not official, but a statement of what there ought to have been on board each ship.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) Do you state that you cannot get evidence of this kind except in the same way you have stated?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I do not attach any importance to it; the Board will obtain all the information from Admiral Lyons on Monday; but as Sir Deans Dundas really was in command of the fleet, had any application been made for canvas it must have been made

*Colonel John Douglas.*

18th April 1856.

to him; and I thought, therefore, that it would have been better to have his evidence than that of any other officer.

(*Major General Peel.*) Sir Edmund Lyons was there at that time, was he not?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) He was. Sir Edmund Lyons will be here on Monday.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board will not receive the evidence you have submitted to-day. Do you intend to call those witnesses you have named to-day? Are they summoned?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) With the exception of Colonel Low they are all in London; but I do not propose going any further than putting the two questions which I have already put to the officers who have been called to-day.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you expect they will attend the next meeting of the Board?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Yes. I, of course, attach very much value to the evidence of Major Conolly; he was the brigade major of the heavy brigade, and I think he will be able to explain anything connected with the returns, and give information of importance.

(*President.*) Probably he will be recovered by Monday.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I should hope so.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) In consequence of the necessary absence of one of the Board, I wish to inform you that the next meeting will be on Monday. They will assemble on Monday at 11 o'clock, and proceed with the rest of your witnesses.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Might I make a statement to the Board before they retire? I trust the Board will excuse my trespassing for a few minutes on their time, in consequence of the decision arrived at yesterday in regard to the order in which the future proceedings of Lord Lucan and myself are to be conducted, and from which I am sorry to find that I am regarded here in the light of a prosecutor. I beg to state most distinctly that I am no prosecutor, and that I should have in all probability never appeared before this Board at all but for the attack made upon the accuracy of the Report by Lord Lucan. Nothing can be more invidious than to attempt to place me in that position, or to regulate the proceedings of this Board as if I were so employed. So far from that, I never attended any of the meetings of this Board till late on the fourth day; and as well might Mr. Filder be considered as prosecutor because yesterday he occupied a portion of the time of this Board in giving an explanation and examining witnesses in consequence of statements which fell from Lord Lucan. My position is sufficiently painful in having to appear here at all before this Board to defend a Report presented to parliament with the full approbation of the Government; but if this Board is to hold or to disseminate the impression that I am here in any respect as a prosecutor, I must consult with my colleague as to the expediency of withdrawing entirely whenever the proceedings in regard to Lord Lucan are terminated; for I must have it clearly and distinctly understood by this Board, the army, and the public, that I am here not to accuse or bring home charges against any man, but merely to give such explanations as may be required, and to establish the correctness of such parts of my Report as may be disputed. Keeping those considerations in view, I trust that an alteration will be made in that part of the proceedings as arranged, and that, as is usual in cases where persons are defending themselves, the order of the proceedings may be that Lord Lucan shall, after his own witnesses have finished, sum up what he has to say, and that I should have an opportunity of replying, as is usual in such cases. The matter stands thus: Lord Lucan makes certain assertions against me; I defend myself, and bring forward my evidence, and he brings forward his, and then Lord Lucan states whatever he has to state, as is usual in the case of a prosecutor; and I claim the privilege that I trust will be granted me, of concluding with whatever I have to say.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board do not see any reason to change their decision; there has been no reference to you as a prosecutor. On the contrary, Lord Lucan has appeared here as opening a case, which he was given an opportunity of doing. You were not summoned here; you came here of your own accord, and appeared rather as a defendant than as a prosecutor. You have referred to proceedings of a similar nature to this; it will probably be difficult to point to such; but as the Board intend to be guided by the practice in analogous inquiries, they have decided that you should be allowed to make any observations upon the evidence that has been called either by you or by Lord Lucan; but that Lord Lucan, having opened the case as it were as plaintiff, shall be allowed to reply upon the whole.

Adjourned to Monday at Eleven o'clock.

## ELEVENTH DAY.

### 21st April 1856.

21st April 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Sir Alexander Woodford,—I propose now to examine Sir Edmund Lyons; but I would wish, before I commence his examination, to ask the permission of the Court to put one question to Colonel Tulloch which I forgot to put on the last day. On the previous day the Judge Advocate General put a question to Colonel Tulloch to this effect:—"With reference to the answer you gave to Lord Lucan, you produced a letter, "and you referred to a passage in it in which the Government assure you that you will "be supported in all respects if your conduct is impugned. Have you any letter or any "other document to show that they ever said that they would approve or had approved "of your report?" Colonel Tulloch's answer was then, "But I would rather look over "my letters, and I will give a more specific answer to that question when we next meet. "I have the letter, or Sir John M'Neill has them." With the permission of the Board, I wish to ask the witness whether he is now prepared to produce any such letters?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I may say that I produced a letter to the Judge Advocate General from Sir John M'Neill.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) If you consent to do what is asked, you can refer to that. You showed me a private letter; not a letter that has been produced before the Board. You will use your own discretion as to whether you will produce any private letter now.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It will be necessary to consult Sir John M'Neill first before I produce a private letter. There is also a public letter.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I wish to be allowed to put this question to Colonel Tulloch: On a former occasion you stated that you were in possession of several letters from Lord Panmure expressing his approval of the Report, and that you would consider whether or not you would produce them. I wish to ask you whether you are now prepared to do so?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Those letters are from Lord Panmure to Sir John M'Neill, of course, as the senior member through whom all correspondence takes place. I have in my hand a letter which has been shown to the Judge Advocate General in full. I do not feel at liberty to communicate the whole of the contents of that private letter; but I shall read two extracts, to which I am sure Sir John M'Neill can have no objection, in relation to to this part:—"When I next saw Lord Panmure, he told me that he had read every "word of it; "that is, the Report;" that he considered it temperate and moderate in its "tone, and intimated no objection to any part of it, except that he considered the "mortality returns out of place in that Report, and that they would more properly form "part of the military statistics which you were in the habit of laying before Parliament. "This opinion I communicate to you by his lordship's desire."

(*Major General Peel.*) What was the date of that?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is dated the 26th of February. I believe there is now in the possession of the Board an official letter intimating also the approval of the government, which was expressed by Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, and the statement of Lord Palmerston's, as it appeared in Hansard, I considered to be sufficient.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) We have no letter of that nature.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Then I will give a copy of it to the Board this day. I have a letter to that effect.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) In answer to Lord Lucan's question, you have read an extract from a private letter of Sir John M'Neill's to yourself?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; and the official one will follow in the course of the day. I have it at home.

---

Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, K.C.B., G.C.H., examined.

*Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, K.C.B., G.C.H.*

833. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Were you not second in command of the English fleet in the early part of the winter 1854, and did you not afterwards succeed to its command?—Yes.

834. Were you ever applied to for sails or canvas to shelter the cavalry horses?—Certainly not; I never heard of any such opinion being entertained until it was mentioned in this room, although I had ample opportunities of knowing it if it had been entertained, for at that critical moment, when the wants of the army were so urgent and their privations so great, I was in the habit of riding through the camp almost every day, accompanied by Captain Drummond of Her Majesty's Ship "Retribution," and the principal object of those visits was, not only to ascertain from Lord Raglan whether he had any request to make, but also to suggest anything that might occur to me in which I thought the resources of the fleet might be useful. When unavoidable circumstances prevented my going to the camp Captain Drummond generally went alone, and I certainly

*Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, K.C.B., G.C.H.*

21st April 1856.

could not have had a better coadjutor, for he has a mind fertile of resource, and he is no less distinguished for kind-heartedness and active benevolence than for his gallantry and ability as an officer; and, moreover, he had a very large and extensive acquaintance in the camp, and yet we never heard a syllable about ships' sails being applied for for the sheltering of the troops. I was anxious to ascertain, in speaking of Captain Drummond, whether his opinions entirely accorded with mine, and I have his answer in these words:—"To have put up canvas on the plateau would have been totally useless, "even if we had had means, which we had not, and it was consequently never thought "of." I am quite certain that if such an idea had ever crossed Lord Raglan's mind, he would have mentioned it to me, for he spoke to me on all occasions without reserve. I was in continual intercourse with him, and it will ever be one of the proudest reflections of my life that throughout a long and continuous interchange of sentiments on very important matters, and under very trying circumstances, with Lord Raglan, he honoured me with his entire confidence. It cannot be otherwise than a source of proud reflection to have had the entire confidence and friendship of such a man as Lord Raglan, so high-minded and so noble a creature as he was.

835. Had such an application been made to you in the month of November and December 1854, could you have given a sufficient quantity of canvas to shelter 2,000 cavalry horses.—Such an application must have come through Lord Raglan, and I cannot admit the possibility of Lord Raglan, who attached so much importance to the efficiency of the fleet, making any such application. I of course have no difficulty in answering the question categorically, and which I certainly will do. Lord Raglan knew perfectly well that the fleet had already landed about 4,000 seamen and marines, and a very large quantity of guns and ammunition of every sort, about 50 or 60 carpenters, and as much sailcloth as possibly could be spared, which was given to the naval brigade. Lord Raglan also knew the ships were lying off an enemy's coast, in a very tempestuous sea, and at the very worst season of the year, and that there were several wrecks of English transports on the beach close to us; and he certainly was not the man to have asked the Commander-in-Chief of the navy at such a moment, under such cirumstances, to have given his sails.

836. Had you at that time 15 sail of the line at Kamiesch?—Certainly not; we never had anything in Kamiesch larger than a small steam frigate.

837. Had you fifteen sail of the line in any contiguous bay or bays?—No; we had two sail of the line in the contiguous bay of Kazatch, but although Kazatch and Kamiesch are contiguous they are totally different in character. In Kamiesch I have seen seven or eight French sail of the line and 300 merchantmen. I should add that at Kamiesch the ships could always communicate with each other and with the shore, but in Kazatch Bay it was quite different; we never could get more than two sail of the line there, and very few merchant ships, and so little was it sheltered that vessels were wrecked on more than one occasion close to the "Royal Albert."

838. What is the largest number of line-of-battle ships that you have ever had in the Black Sea?—Eleven, and that only for a very short time—for only a few days.

839. What was the average number, to the best of your recollection?—Seven.

840. Where were they stationed?—Five were stationed on the coast at that time, in December, a little to the northward of Sebastopol, and two were stationed in Kazatch Bay, principally as depôts for supplying the army.

841. Could you have spared carpenters in sufficient numbers from the fleet to have constructed shelter for the whole of the cavalry?—No; we had already thirty carpenters attached to the naval brigade under Sir Stephen Lushington. There were about 30 more at Balaklava, and they were always employed on service connected with the army. Colonel Tulloch seems to be under the impression that we had 15 sail of the line, whereas we had only half that number, and not quite that; he seems also to have looked at the establishment, and to have concluded that the complements of carpenters of every ship was complete, whereas we had hardly half the complement; and it results, therefore, as far as the line of battle ships were concerned, that we had only a quarter of the number of carpenters that Colonel Tulloch imagines. But then Colonel Tulloch is also under the impression that we had 30 or 40 steam vessels, whose carpenters might, or a portion of them, have been employed for the service of the army; but those steam vessels were employed in various duties, going backwards and forwards to Constantinople for supplies, in blockading 1,000 miles of coast, including the coast of Circassia, Kertch, the coasts of the Crimea, the Dnieper, Odessa, and the mouths of the Danube; and whenever those vessels rejoined the fleet, instead of being able to spare carpenters for the army, we were obliged to give them carpenters from the fleet to made good their repairs, so that they might go again to relieve those ships that had taken their places; therefore we had no one man that could under any possible circumstances be given to the army from those vessels. Colonel Tulloch also, as I said before, is under the impression that the ships were in a very snug harbour—that 15 sail of the line were in a very snug harbour. Now, what was the fact? Colonel Tulloch was not there; of course he believes it, but he has been mis-informed. The ships were at anchor in 40 fathoms water, within a mile of the rocks, and only just out of gunshot of the batteries of Sebastopol, so much so indeed that upon one occasion the "Royal Albert" drove within gunshot; and I should say that the state of the weather was such as to render it absolutely necessary to be prepared for every emergency. The Board may

*Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, K.C.B., G.C.H.*

21st April 1856.

judge of the state of the weather when I say that the "Royal Albert" in one of those gales lost her rudder; it broke in two, and she was 31 days at anchor off Sebastopol without her rudder; the rudder of the "Algiers" was also very much damaged; and therefore, as I see by a note I have here from Sir Thomas Pasley, all the shipwrights of the fleet were employed in those 31 days to make good those defects. I was, however anxious I felt upon the subject, extremely unwilling to diminish the force by sending the ships either to Constantinople or to Malta. As a proof of the suddenness with which the gales came on there, it occurred more than once that the second in command, and the captains who came on board my ship for a short time, were overtaken by a gale, and obliged to remain on board for several days and nights. Under those circumstances it must be apparent to everybody that the boats of the fleet, upon which the supplies of the army were very much dependent, were constantly getting out of repair, and therefore requiring all the carpenters that we could afford. Colonel Tulloch asks what was to have prevented Sir Edmund Lyons from sending on shore carpenters out of his 200 or 300 carpenters? Now, speaking from memory, I do not believe that we ever had more than 50 or 60 carpenters available for the service of the fleet; and it may not be irrelevant to remark, that I had the supplies of my own fleet to think of. The fleet had been a distance from all its resources for a very long time, and we had a variety of difficulties to overcome, and the only reason probably why it was never publicly known was because they were overcome, and nothing was said about it.

842. Even under different circumstances from those which you have stated, should you have considered yourself justified in parting with a large portion of the equipment, the artificers and crews of your vessels, on the application of a divisional and subordinate general?—Certainly not. Lord Raglan was extremely particular upon that point, and seldom or never even made an official request without accompanying it with an explanatory private letter.

Cross-examined by Colonel TULLOCH.

843. Had you not a large quantity of spare sails and reserve canvas on board each ship in addition to those required for immediate use?—Each ship under ordinary circumstances has a spare suit of sails; but do not imagine they are not required under ordinary circumstances, or under every circumstance; they are always required.

844. In addition to the ships sails there are a large quantity of reserve sails, are there not?—No.

845. Do you recollect what quantity of reserve canvas or spare sails there ought to be on board a man-of-war; take a 120-gun ship, or an 80-gun ship?—I do not believe there is an officer in the service that can answer that question, put as it is to me. Will you read it again?

846. Do you know a work by Edye on the equipment of ships of war, published in London in 1832, and whether in that work he correctly states the quantity of canvas or spare sails in reserve?—I certainly have heard of that work, but I cannot possibly answer for its being correct in all its particulars; and I think if you took that to the Admiralty, or asked the same questions there that you are now asking me, they would immediately send to the office, and refer to the books; no man could carry it in his head.

847. It is stated in this work that on board an 80-gun ship there are 7,844 yards of canvas in spare sails. Have you any reason to doubt that that is about the quantity?—None whatever. I dare say it is. Do you mean in those spare sails?

848. Yes, in those spare sails?—I do not know, but I will say yes; it does not signify.

849. Had you not, in addition to that, old canvas on board most of the ships, which, on an emergency, might have been used for such a purpose as temporary shelter?—Of course we had; but I think I have already stated that all the spare sails we had we sent ashore to the naval brigade. When you talk of spare sails, it must not be supposed that spare sails are over and above what are required for the safety and efficiency of the ships. It is not at all the case, for they are to replace the sails that are liable to be split at every moment; and a ship without those spare sails is not in the slightest degree efficient, not under any circumstances, and particularly on the coast where we were.

850. Could not a supply of canvas have been obtained from Constantinople in a very short period?—There are other people that can answer that question much better than I can. We never had any occasion to send for any.

851. Would it not have been possible to procure a number of carpenters also from Constantinople?—I can answer that very distinctly. We were so very badly off for carpenters in the fleet, not only in my squadron but at Balaklava and Constantinople, that I was obliged to write to the Admiralty to state that Admiral Grey in the Bosphorus and Admiral Boxer at Balaklava were constantly applying for carpenters, and I entreated the Admiralty to send more, proving to them that we had not by any means enough to keep the fleet and the boats efficient. The Admiralty replied that the application was a very reasonable one, and that they were surprised we had done so much with the means we had; but that they could not possibly send any more, for there were none to be got. With respect to Constantinople, instead of being able to get carpenters from Constantinople, Admiral Grey was obliged to send to Malta, and to offer very tempting wages

*Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, K.C.B., G.C.H.*

21st April 1856.

to the Maltese to come and perform the indispensable duties of the fleet there. Therefore we could not have got one carpenter from Constantinople for the fleet.

852. I did not mean ships' carpenters. Do you think that, as Constantinople is built of wood, carpenters capable of putting up framework might not have been obtained?—I do not quite understand how the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet should know what was the state of the carpenters at Constantinople. I only know this,—I am quite sure that under the straits we were put to, Admiral Grey would have got carpenters from Constantinople or anywhere else, and put them to the best account, if he could have got them, but he could not get them. It must be recollected, although Constantinople is built of wood and there are a certain number of carpenters there, with the large number of French and English troops constantly passing by having temporary hospitals, temporary barracks, and stables, and all sorts of things erected, there was a very unusual demand for carpenters; and therefore the impression on my mind is, although I do not speak from my own knowledge, that it would have been extremely difficult if not impossible to have got carpenters.

853. Were there not many sailing transports and merchant vessels at Balaklava from which carpenters could have been procured for a few days for payment?—It is quite impossible for me to answer that; the Admiral at Balaklava was responsible for that; and I shall produce before I sit down ample proof to this Board that everything was done by the Admirals and senior officers there that could possibly be done by carpenters, and everything else to assist the army, and I believe those carpenters were constantly employed for the army.

854. I hold in my hand an extract from the Navy List showing the ships of war stationed in the Black Sea in November 1854, from which it appears that there were 15 of or above 50 guns and not less than between 30 and 40 other ships; do you consider the number so stated correct, and were not some of them occasionally off Sebastopol in addition to the number permanently stationed there?—There is no necessity to refer to the Navy List at all, because I have in my own mind a perfect recollection of all the ships that were in the Black Sea, and I could give you the number and the names if you like. As I said before, we never had more than eleven sail of the line at any one time, and that only for a very short time, nor had we ever more than eleven of above 50 guns. As to the rest of the question I do not understand it; there were no ships permanently stationed anywhere.

855. I allude to the number off Sebastopol?—I am perfectly prepared to give you from my own recollection almost the position of every vessel in the Black Sea at any day you choose to name. (*A list was handed to Sir Edmund Lyons.*) These are the ships not only in the Black Sea but ordered to the Black Sea. There appear to be 13 ships of above 50 guns. I think I said that eleven were the greatest number that we ever had, and that only for a very short time. Here there are 13 of above 50 guns, but two of them, the "Royal Albert" and the "Hannibal," were on their way out, and before they came others had gone.

856. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) I make it 15 above 50 guns?—No, I think not.

857. The "Arethusa" and the "Leander" were there, were they not?—The "Arethusa" and the "Leander" are not above 50 guns; they are 50 guns.

858. The question was, of or above 50 guns?—I adhere to what I said before; we never had more than eleven sail of the line, and that list proves it. That is an exact corroboration of my statement.

859. I have here the number of every rate in the Black Sea, and I find that there are 14 of them above 50 guns, and not fewer than 30 or 40 smaller vessels. In part of my evidence given before the Board, at page 56, you refer to my having stated, that there were 15 sail of the line off Sebastopol; you now see, from the extract, that I stated, a few lines below, that there were only 14 ships above 50 guns in the Black Sea altogether. Is it not, therefore, obvious that the former is a mistake for 15 ships of war?—I confess that I took my account from the newspapers, which I found perfectly to accord with what I have in my hand. There you state that we had 15 sail of the line lying at Kamiesh; not off Sebastopol. There is all the distinction in the world in that. I say that we never had any ships in Kamiesch, and that in the contiguous port or bay of Kazatch (which I admit you may very easily have mistaken for Kamiesch, though they are totally different in character, for one is a bay and the other is a harbour,) we had only two in that bay instead of having 15 sail of the line in a snug harbour, with very little wear and tear. If the ships had been there, some of the sails might have been landed without any danger, and the carpenters would not have had half the work to do; but I have proved that the average number of ships we had were seven, and not 15, and only two were lying in this contiguous bay of Kazatch, one entirely in use for the army, and the other for refitting, and in order that her artificers might be at hand to do the repairs. I do not admit the correctness of your observation about men-of-war; you spoke of 30 or 40 other ships of war.

860. Are you aware that the evidence to which you refer has not been corrected by me?—No; I know nothing about that; but I find that it is substantially the same as I found in all the newspapers.

*Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, K.C.B., G.C.H.*

21st April 1856.

861. I might say that the words "off Kamiesch" were intended to be "off Sebastopol;" but I have not as yet corrected my evidence. I complained to the Deputy Judge Advocate General that there were a considerable number of mistakes in it, and that certainly is one of them. I am perfectly well aware that Kamiesch was the French harbour.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Has not your evidence been sent to you to correct?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; but it has not been returned; I have not had time.

(*Witness.*) I do not admit that there were 15 sail of the line off Sebastopol. If you come to vessels-of-war, we had 40 or 50.

862. How many ships of war were lying off Sebastopol, I mean?—Do you mean line of battle ships, or what do you mean?

863. Vessels of war?—I quite understand that you as a military man should not understand the exact distinction.

864. Ships of war, or vessels of war?—Do you mean of all kinds?

865. Except very small ones, down to six guns or thereabouts?—What period do you allude to?

866. November 1854?—There were only a few; two or three steam frigates lying off Sebastopol; the others were spread about.

867. From Kazatch up to Sebastopol, or to the entrance of it?—In the beginning of November the "Bellerophon" was at Eupatoria, that is one; then there were seven off the Katscha river, that makes eight (I am talking of the eleven); the "Sanspareil" at Balaklava, that is nine; the "Agamemmon" off Sevastopol, that makes ten; and the "Albion" in the Bosphorous, thus making eleven; that is at the period when we had the most ships for a few days.

868. How many other vessels of war were there?—They varied; there were generally with the admiral (I was not commander-in-chief at that time) half a dozen steam boats, and they varied in number half a dozen times in a day

869. That is to say, then there were 15 at least?—I really wish to give you all the information which you require. Perhaps I had better read you the names?—At the end of November and the beginning of December we had the "Agamemnon," the "Algiers," the "Vengeance," and the "Rodney," off Katcha, which is about a third of the way from Sebastopol to Eupatoria. Then we had the "Bellerophon" at Eupatoria. We had the "Sanspareil" at Balaklava, and the "Hannibal" off Sebastopol. Thus you see there were seven altogether, spread about.

870. There was the "Tribune," was there not?—She is not a line of battle ship. However, I believe she was cruising on the coast of Circassia.

871. And the "Curaçoa?"—She was at Eupatoria.

872. The "Diamond," where was she?—She was at Balaklava.

873. Where was the "Retribution?"—She was, I believe, at Trebizond, or some of those places. I think so; I am not quite sure.

874. The "Terrible?"—She was at that time off Odessa.

875. Where was the "Valorous?"—I think she went down to Constantinople with a despatch, after the gale?

876. The "Miranda," where was she?—She was the steam frigate which I mentioned as the only vessel in Kamiesch harbour.

877. And the "Swallow?"—She was a miserable little vessel. I beg her Captain's pardon. She was off the Danube, blockading the Danube.

878. Those you call ships of war?—No; I think after you come below frigates like the "Tribune" you call them vessels of war. There are line of battle ships, frigates, and corvettes. After that you call them vessels of war.

879. How low do you reckon them?—I should say that ships of the line are called what they are, ships of the line; after that, there are frigates; after that, corvettes. If you want to know how many of Her Majesty's vessels of all sorts and descriptions were off the place, you have a perfect right to call them vessels of war.

880. Then was I right in stating that there were fifteen vessels of war of about fifty guns off Sebastopol, besides smaller vessels, in November 1854?—No; off Sebastopol, certainly not.

881. Not off Sebastopol? Then betwen Balaklava and the Katcha?—There were frequently 30 vessels in the Black sea, but not 15 sail of the line in Kamiesch, as you have stated. Most people who have read your statement, would suppose that, over and above 15 line of battle ships, there were 15 vessels above 50 guns; and any sailor reading that would suppose that independently of 15 line of battle ships there were other 15 ships above 50 guns, not line of battle ships.

882. I took the precaution of obtaining the naval list for that month of November in order to ascertain how many were stationed in the Black Sea in and about Sebastopol? (*A list was handed in.*)—The thing is perfectly clear. You were not there yourself; you have been misinformed; and that is the beginning and the end of it.

883. Do you consider that sailcloth would not have been suitable for the plateau, and might it not have been used with advantage in the valley of Kadikoi?—I really do not like to give a decided opinion upon military matters; there must be so many persons here much more competent to answer that question than I am. I would rather decline giving an opinion about it. I have a very decided opinion that sailcloth on the plateau would

*Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, K.C.B., G.C.H.*

21st April 1856.

have been as Captain Drummond says, worse than useless. As to Kadikoi, it is a military question upon which I should not like to give an opinion without very certain grounds.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have no further questions to put to Sir Edmund Lyons.

884. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Sir George Berkeley wishes to have this question put to you: You said you were constantly in the habit of riding through the camp and lines; did it strike you that any want of promptitude and ingenuity existed in not having the cavalry horses more under shelter?—Certainly not; I saw a great many officers occupied in sheltering their horses, their own and the horses of their regiment, in a way that appeared to be the most efficacious, and it was by throwing up an embankment of a certain height in the direction of the prevalent and piercing north-east wind; and I think that the result justified the opinion that I formed. My friend Sir George Brown's horses never had any other shelter from first to last, although they were often dug out of the snow; they were without any covering; and I believe that Colonel David Wood of the Artillery, who saved all or most of his horses, treated them in exactly the same way. I perfectly remember Lord Raglan expressing to him in my presence the great satisfaction he felt at the care he had taken of his horses, and he had no shelter. Perhaps the most direct answer to the question is that everybody appeared to me to be hard at work doing their best.

885. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Were you aware that the order to provide temporary shelter was on the 12th of November, and that it was only completed by the middle of February, being a period of three months?—No; I do not pretend to be cognisant of the orders that were given.

886. Might not this lapse of time during one month of which nothing was done imply want of promptitude on the part of some one?—Really I cannot constitute myself a judge of what ought to have been done in the camp; but I do not admit that I was ever at the camp for a month and saw nothing done, for they were always doing—they were very hard at work.

887. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board wish to know whether you consider yourself competent to speak further on these matters, particularly as to the promptitude and ingenuity displayed on the part of the cavalry?—No.

888. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) I did not understand you to express an opinion to this Board that there was no want of promptitude?—Yes, that is my opinion, as far as my observation goes; but I do not constitute myself a judge.

(*President to Sir Edmund Lyons.*) The Board will not trouble you with any further questions.

(*Sir Edmund Lyons.*) Before I withdraw I will, with the permission of the Board, state a few facts which appear to me to bear very closely upon the question, and which I think it very desirable the Board should be acquainted with.

889. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you state to the Board to what question you are referring?—The matter upon which I have been principally examined was the assistance afforded by the fleet to the army, and I wish to show what occurred.

890*. You are referring to the possibility of affording assistance by the fleet to the army?—Yes.

891*. (*Major General Peel.*) Will you have the kindness to acquaint the Board with any additional information as to any assistance that could have been afforded by the fleet to the army?—On looking back on the Crimean expedition, there is nothing in which I rejoice so much, next to the glory of our arms, as the good understanding and perfect harmony that always subsisted between the two services, and I think it would be a very lamentable thing indeed if anything arising out of the proceedings before this Board were to weaken that impression. I am very far from supposing that Colonel Tulloch intended or intends to throw any blame upon the navy for not giving assistance to the army; on the contrary, what he seems to regret is, that the assistance was not asked for; nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the effect of the course which he has felt it his duty to pursue has raised the question generally in the minds of the country whether there were not things on board the fleet which might have been spared to the army if they had been asked for or offered. Now, with the permission of the Board, I will give as succinct an account as I can of what the relations between the two services really were; and I will not go further back than the landing of the army in the Crimea, that gallant army which was destined to perform deeds of matchless valour, and to undergo unparalleled hardships. Lord Raglan in his despatch describing the operation of landing was pleased to say that the conduct of the navy was beyond all praise; and I am quite sure that there is not a survivor of that army who can forget, and who will not readily admit, the assistance that they received from the navy; they will recollect that the seamen were up to their middles in water the whole day, in order that the troops and their ammunition might be landed dry; and I feel, as I felt at the time, that the reciprocal cheer which was given on that occasion, when the troops marched from the beach, and when the seamen returned to the water to bring more on shore, was an earnest of that harmony, good understanding, and goodwill which has happily prevailed ever since. Still less can the army forget, and still less will they be disinclined to admit, for they always do admit it, the assistance they derived from the navy after the battle of the Alma, when their sick and wounded were carried down to the beach, the

*Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, K.C.B., G.C.H.*

21st April 1856.

distance from the beach to the camp was four miles; it was a burning sun, and the cholera was very rife, indeed the fleet was still smarting under a most severe visitation of it. Under those circumstances the sick and wounded were carried down in cots and hammocks prepared on board ship and suspended upon the seamen's shoulders; and no one who witnessed as I did the gratitude of those poor fellows when they were carefully lifted into the boats could doubt that then and there on that beach took root a holy and kindly feeling between the two professions which cannot fail to bring forth good fruits. Many of those men, some of them at least, died in the boats on their way to the ships; more died on the passage to Sebastopol, and yet more in the hospital at Scutari; but it is not unreasonable to hope that, through the blessing of God, some may return to their country and their families, and thus hand down to posterity the way in which the navy cared for the soldier in the hour of need. I may add, that I seldom pass a day in London without meeting some officer of the army who reminds me of the services performed by Lieutenant Goss of the navy in superintending, with the care, skill, ability, and anxiety which he did, the embarkation of many thousand sick and wounded. In like manner I am reminded of the valuable assistance rendered by Lieutenant Hawkins of the navy, in forwarding at the most critical moment ammunition to the front, under difficulties which ordinary men would have considered insurmountable. There is a letter from myself to the Admiralty, which I think will show that when the labour and materials of the fleet could really be of any use to the army, they were neither sparingly nor tardily given. Lord Raglan made a request to me to furnish a few cots to take the sick down to Constantinople, because the transports that were then in Balaklava were not fitted for that purpose. He at the same time requested me, if it were possible, to make a certain number of cartridges, not only for the English but for the French army. This letter will show that from Thursday afternoon to Sunday we made on board those 5 ships off Sebastopol 720 cots and frames, and sent them to Balaklava, and 20,000 flannel cartridges for 32 and 68 pounders. I mention that as a proof that where we could be of use we were, and everybody must recollect the great anxiety that was felt.—"'Royal Albert,' off Sebastopol, 7th April 1855. Sir Edmund Lyons to the Secretary of "the Admiralty. Sir,—Field Marshal Lord Raglan having transmitted to me the copy "of a despatch from the Minister of War, directing him to have vessels fitted for the "reception of 500 or 600 wounded as soon as possible, several sailing transports were "immediately selected for that purpose; but it was found that with the limited means "at our disposal it would take too much time to fit these vessels up, I therefore "directed,"—It appears that it was not a request from Lord Raglan, but my own offer,"—"I therefore directed that cots and cot-frames should be made on board the ships of the "fleet under my command; and it is worthy of being mentioned to their lordships that "from Sunday evening to Thursday evening 742 cots and cot-frames were made and sent "to Balaklava, and that at the same time 20,000 flannel cartridges were made on board "Her Majesty's ships for the British and French batteries before Sebastopol." It must be in the recollection of the Board no doubt that the sufferings of the army were very considerably increased by their having no means of roasting the coffee, and that was an object of the greatest possible anxiety to every person in the army, from the commander-in-chief downwards. At that time Captain Heath of the navy, a most excellent officer, whose exertions for the assistance of the army were really beyond all praise, commanded the "Sanspareil" in Balaklava Harbour, and knowing the anxiety that was felt in the camp for the means of roasting the coffee, and having perfectly satisfied himself that there were no means of roasting the coffee to be found there, he set his wits to work to devise the means of overcoming that difficulty from the resources of his own ship; and I will now read to the Board a letter which he wrote to Lord Raglan. "Her "Majesty's Ship, 'Sanspareil,' Balaklava, December 6th, 1854."—You see that this was at the very worst time of the year.—"My Lord, amongst the many discomforts which "the army must necessarily suffer, and more especially under the present deficiency of "land transport, the scarcity of fuel seems to me one of the greatest. It has struck me "that if the coffee now issued to the troops in a raw state could be roasted down "here, a great saving of fuel would be effected, and that the comfort of the "soldiers would be still more increased by the saving of time and trouble "which so tedious a process, carried on in detail, must necessarily entail. I think "I could make on board this ship roasting machines, sufficient in size and number "for roasting the daily allowance of your army; but I should wish to know, before "beginning the work, whether you approve of the attempt, and think it worth making, "and also whether orders have been already issued for sending future supplies of roasted "instead of green coffee, because I think it will take ten days or a fortnight to get the "machines I propose in operation, and it would not be worth while beginning on them "if roasted coffee is already ordered. I at first thought of cutting off lengths of a small "steamer's funnel for monster machines, but I now think that ten or twelve much smaller "ones would be better. I am quite aware that this proposal does not come exactly within "the limits of a naval officer's duty; but I believe your lordship is willing to listen to and "weigh suggestions from any quarter, if they are prompted by a wish for the good of "the army." I was with Lord Raglan when he received that letter, and I never can forget the joy that was depicted on his countenance when he read it. He put his hand on mine, and pressed it, and said, "What wonderful fellows you sailors are? What should

*Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, K.C.B., G.C.H.*

21st April 1856.

" we do without you? But do not suppose that I am going to give the sailors " superiority over the army; it arises from your having responsibility thrown upon " you, more or less, from 13 years of age." The offer was accepted; and I have here a letter from Sir Richard Airey, I believe, expressing the very warmest thanks on the part of Lord Raglan for the offer, and begging that Captain Heath would carry it into effect as soon as possible, as there was no subject on which the commander of the forces felt more anxious than that the troops should have the coffee roasted. The same Captain Heath on hearing that about 300 fine mules were expected from Spain, and having seen with his own eyes that for the want of shelter of some sort they died very soon after their arrival, proposed to Lord Raglan to build, with the resources of his ship, which was lying in the safe harbour of Balaklava, stabling for those mules; and I have his letter here in which he says, " As all our skilled carpenters are " already employed for the army I did not like to withdraw one of them, but I put " about 30 or 40 seamen under direction of a boatswain, and they erected those stables." Which lasted through the winter, and certainly they were very good, and I believe a great many of those mules are still alive; but this does not imply in the slightest degree that the other ships of the fleet or the army could have done the same thing, because Captain Heath told me that the reason he offered to do it was because he had a conviction that it was impossible for them to do it; the army had so many other things to do. It was with the greatest possible difficulty that they could get their provisions and ammunition to the front. As another proof of the desire of the navy to assist the army, I may mention that Captain Lushington, with the carpenters who I have already stated were at his disposal, built at least 200 huts for the army. I may add, besides, that it would have been very difficult to have carried on the siege if it had not been for the promptitude and ingenuity of our engineers, who, when the touch-holes of the guns, from the constant firing, ran, remedied the difficulty by a very ingenious device. Then, again, one of the great difficulties which the army had to contend with was the want of landing places in Balaklava, and that difficulty appeared to be insurmountable; but Admiral Boxer built wharfs, which still bear his name, alongside of which our largest steamers, such as the " Himalaya," were able to come and land everything,—men, horses, and provisions,—without any trouble, and that was entirely done, as it ought to have been done, by the navy; and I am far from taking credit to the navy for it, for it was their bounden duty to do what they did. I am only proving that they did it, and that they did it cheerfully. I could adduce a great many other proofs of this kind, but I think that the Board must be already satisfied that the navy did everything in its power to assist the army. I can say with great truth that the navy, while they gloried in the deeds of the army, also sympathized in their sufferings, and rendered them every assistance in their power. The army, on their part, were never slow to acknowledge it. On the contrary, the army always expressed the greatest gratitude for it; and thus was fostered a kindly feeling of mutual confidence and goodwill between the two professions, which is materially conducive to the honour and happiness of both, as well as to their efficiency, and consequently highly advantageous to the country.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I did not in any way mean to imply that there was any want of cordiality or goodwill on the part of the navy. A kinder admiral could not be found, nor one more willing to afford every assistance in his power, but I have been endeavouring to show that there was a want of resource on the part of the military in not applying to those that were so well able to help them.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I wish now to call Major Conolly.

---

*Major James Conolly.*

Major JAMES CONOLLY examined.

890. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Are you the deputy assistant quartermaster general of the army in the East, and were you not brigade major of the heavy cavalry brigade in the autumn and the winter 1854–55?—I am; and I was the brigade major during that time.

891. Is this a return or morning state showing how many of the cavalry horses of the heavy brigade were landed on or before the 3d of October (*a paper being handed to the witness*)?—It is.

892. This shows that at that date of the heavy brigade there had been only 782 horses already landed?

893. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Is that an official return?

(*Witness.*) Yes; signed by General Scarlett; and I can answer for General Scarlett's signature, which is to it.

894. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Have you seen annexed to the Report, in the Appendix, returns of duties signed by Colonel Hodge and by Colonel Mayow, and can you state whether those are correct returns of the duties?—Since my return to England General Scarlett sent me a return of the heavy brigade,—it professed to be a return of what they sent for sick and commissariat during that time,—to ask me whether I thought it was correct; I am ready to prove out of the original orders that we issued in the Crimea that it is totally incorrect. I have nothing to do with Colonel Mayow. I can answer for the heavy brigade. I have the original orders that were issued in the Crimea here; that I issued myself.

895. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you give the reference to the Appendix?

(*Witness.*) Page 1 and page 2 of the Appendix, both of them signed by Colonel Hodge.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is that the return which you state is incorrect?—Yes, it is.

897. (*Earl of Lucan.*) To whom would you best apply for information respecting a return of the duties of the brigade?—For the detail, to the brigade major.

898. To whom would you apply for the same information respecting a division?—To the assistant adjutant general.

899. From the quartermaster general of the division would it be difficult to obtain accurate returns of the detailed duties?—He would have to go to the assistant adjutant general for them.

900. From a commanding officer of a regiment, only in temporary command of a brigade, would it be easy to obtain returns of the brigade duties, without reference to the brigade major?—I should think not.

901. Was it your duty to attend as brigade major at my quarters daily to receive my divisional orders?—It was.

902. Was I in the habit of communicating through the brigade major with the officers commanding brigades and regiments on all matters relating to the cavalry?—Yes.

903. Was it not my practice to be constantly calling together the officers commanding both brigades and regiments, to consult with them as to how we could best act for the welfare of the men and the horses of the division?—I recollect several occasions; I cannot say how many, but I recollect several occasions.

904. Will you read that divisional order at page 40?—"There never was a time when "it was more necessary for all regimental officers to give the strictest attention to their "stable duties, and the management and care of their troop horses. The difficulties are "so numerous and so serious that they require constant vigilance and zeal from all. The "lieutenant general does hope that regimental officers will not allow it to be said or "supposed in any quarter that to them at least can be attached blame on account of the "unhappy losses which have occurred and are still occurring. He wishes all officers to "bear in mind that their own professional characters are and must be involved in the "efficiency of the brigades, regiments, and troops under their care; and he feels assured "that he will receive from all that support without which he must despair of retaining "even that very reduced efficiency which unhappily exists, and which he hopes and "believes cannot be charged upon them."

905. Can you recollect at any of those meetings of the officers commanding brigades and regiments that I repeated that caution to those officers?—I remember your saying that we had all better take very good care and do our utmost, for sooner or later the blame for the calamity that was sure to arrive to the cavalry division would be attempted to be thrown upon us.

906. Did you hear that on more than one occasion?—I think I did. I can speak to having heard it on one occasion.

907. Is it your opinion that any of the commanding officers of brigades or regiments by any act of mine were ever deterred from or discouraged in giving shelter to their horses?—No, certainly not.

908. Did I not, on the contrary, encourage and urge them as far as possible to do so?—Yes.

909. Is it your opinion that there might have been, on the part of myself or of officers commanding brigades and regiments, more promptitude and ingenuity in sheltering the horses than were displayed under the circumstances in which we were placed?—Under the circumstances in which we were placed, I do not think, in my humble opinion, that we could have done more.

910. Were you present in the Crimea whilst the Commissioners were holding their inquiries?—I was sent on duty down to Scutari to inquire into the cases of a lot of missing men belonging to the cavalry division. I was absent from the 14th of March till the 5th of April. I do not know when the Commissioners opened their inquiry. Those were the only days that I was absent. I was present the rest of the time with the exception of those days when I was absent on duty at Scutari.

911. (*Judge Advocate General.*) You did not meet the Commissioners?—I saw them when I came back from Scutari.

912. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Did you meet the Commissioners; and if so, where?—I met both Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch at Colonel Griffiths's one evening; that was the only time that I ever saw them.

913. To the best of your recollection, how often did the Greys change their encampment after their arrival at Balaklava previously to the 14th of November 1854?—I think I can recollect about seven times, but they may have been changed oftener; the horses may have been changed oftener, but the regiment itself was changed about seven times. Previously to the 14th, you say?

914. Up to the 14th?—Yes. The regiment itself bodily was changed, I should think, about seven times; the ground for the horses may have been shifted much oftener.

915. Would it then be correct to state that that regiment had up to that time changed its ground twenty-seven times, or twenty times?—I do not think that it could have moved as often as that before the 14th.

*Major James Conolly.*

21st April 1856.

916. Would it be correct or not?—I should say not, but it is merely a matter of recollection.

917. Did you endeavour to get canvas from the shipping to make nosebags for the cavalry?—I went with General Scarlett myself to Balaklava harbour on several occasions about it; and after a great many endeavours from one captain we got the promise of one sail, which he said he could spare us; but he afterwards found that he was not able to keep his promise, and we were not able to get any at all.

918. Were there any peculiar circumstances connected with the artillery which enabled them to shelter their horses more easily than the cavalry could do, and can any correct inference be drawn to the prejudice of the cavalry as compared with the artillery in respect to sheltering their horses?—I should say not; the artillery have always got carts and tools at their disposal that a cavalry regiment has not. They have, moreover, got artificers always attached to each battery of the artillery which we have not; therefore their advantages must be much greater than ours.

919. Did you in the Crimea associate with the French officers more generally than other English officers?—With the French cavalry especially. I was on terms of intimacy with the four French generals who were all through the campaign with us. I was attached on duty for two months on one occasion at Eupatoria, and for a fortnight on another at Baidar, to two of their generals, on duty.

920. Did you ever see any of their horses hutted?—There never was one of their troop horses hutted the whole time I was in the Crimea.

921. Do you know whether the horses belonging to the French cavalry, that part of it that were mounted from France, whether they lost many of their horses?—I know they did; but the French are not very fond of publishing their unavoidable misfortunes. I know that, and I therefore would be excused mentioning the names of the regiments. I can give them in writing to the Board; but I must say that one regiment, at the end of the winter, was so completely dismounted that the few horses it possessed were given over to another to fill it up, and that regiment was entirely remounted from France at the end of April. Another regiment in the month of January alone lost eighty horses; that I know.

922. Have the French cavalry any commissariat transport duties to perform, or were they made to do any other duties than their own?—Certainly not; and they never found what we did, pickets all through the winter; they never had an outlying picket the whole of the winter.

923. Did you ever see any of the French horses standing behind trenches without pavement?—No; they were always paved.

924. Do you think that a horse can with advantage be placed behind a trench unless pavement can be made for him?—The pavement of course would be a great advantage; the principal advantage in their way of sheltering their horses was the pavement.

925. Without pavement would it not be necessary to be digging new trenches daily?—Certainly. The horses would tread the mud down from behind them into the trench, and soon fill it up.

926. Are you aware that the French artillery horses were employed in drawing paving stones for their cavalry?—No, I am not.

927. Can you give any information as to the dates borne by the monthly returns of October 1854?—Yes, I can. The muster of course took place on the 30th of September; we were all then at sea, and the whole convoy which was carrying the heavy brigade had been dispersed by a gale of wind on the 27th and 28th; in fact on board the ship in which I was, the "Jason," the men were being mustered when we came in sight of Sebastopol the first time. On the 1st and 2d of October the disembarcation took place at Balaklava, of the whole of the 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards, and a part of the 1st Royal Dragoons, and the Enniskillens; the last detachment of those two regiments did not arrive till the 5th. I think the head quarters of the Royal Dragoons came, and then they completed the regiment, and then the Enniskillens a day or two afterwards. The monthly returns only account for the men up to the night of the 30th of September; consequently if the officers had dated their monthly returns on the 5th or 7th of October they would have been obliged to include in them any casualties in men and horses that occurred between the night of the 30th of September and the day on which they signed them, which would have made those returns vary from those of the whole of the rest of the army. When the two commanding officers of those regiments arrived they were at Balaklava, and consequently they dated their returns at Balaklava as the place at which they signed them.

928. (*General Sir George Berkeley.*) Were the cavalry regiments provided with entrenching tools, and were they good?—They had very few, and there were always complaints of them.

929. Were applications made for fresh tools, and if so, were they complied with?—There were perpetual applications being made for them through the assistant quartermaster general of the brigade. I had to collect the requisitions and give them to the assistant quartermaster general of the cavalry division, and he whenever there were any told us of it, but very often the requisition came back to say there were none for us, and then he used to give us notice when there were any to be drawn.

930. Had you no regular supply of them?—We arrived with a very small supply from

Bulgaria when we first took the field, and it was some time after that before we could get any more.

931. How did they become unserviceable? Were they bad steel?—The men complained that the ends of the shovels and picks turned up when they came against any hard substance, and became useless, and also the handles broke perpetually.

932. Who supplied those tools?—We took a requisition for them to the assistant quartermaster general of the division, and he was answerable for the getting of them.

933. (*Major General Peel.*) You have stated that none of the French cavalry troop horses were hutted during the winter of 1854 and 1855. Can you say whether they employed canvass as a means of temporary shelter?—Certainly not.

934. Although they had the means of procuring it, and nearer?—I cannot answer for their means of procuring anything, but I know that the horses were not under canvass.

Cross-examined by Colonel TULLOCH.

935. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) You have given in a return of the horses landed in the Crimea on the 3d of October; do you know whether any were left on shipboard in the harbour at that date?—It is only the morning state (I will look it over again, if you please,) of the horses that there were on the 3d of October, but it can only account for those which were absolutely landed; the others are reckoned as on board ship; whether they were in the harbour or at sea it is impossible for me to tell until they join us.

936. Then there may have been a difference between the whole force of the heavy cavalry and the number as given in the morning state on ship board, or a considerable portion of them, and those would not appear in the state referred to?—I must see the state to answer this. (*The state was handed to the witness.*) But they do appear here; they are returned as absent on board ship, and the difference between the horses that we had absolutely on the plain of Balaklava at that time and the whole strength of the brigade is accounted for by "on board ship."

937. In the harbour?—No; on board ship.

938. May they not have been in the harbour?—They may have, but they were not reported to us if they were.

939. The officers of those regiments having signed their returns at Balaklava on the 5th and 6th of October, as you state?—I never stated so. I said subsequently to that. I did not say that it was on the 5th or 6th, for I do not believe that it was till some time after even that.

940. The officers having signed their returns at Balaklava subsequently to the 5th and 6th of October, and having dated them the 1st of October, was not that a false return?—I do not think so; it is a matter of opinion.

941. The returns so dated, signed, and forwarded to the War Office contained no explanations such as you have given. Was I not entitled from them to state that the regiments in question were in Balaklava on that date, as given by the commanding officer?—I say that you were undoubtedly entitled to infer that, but that does not prove that your inference was true.

942. I will now read to you a statement from the evidence of Lord Lucan:—"Taking "the six months from October to March inclusive, they say such was the strength of "the cavalry, and they talk about the 1st of October, but no heavy cavalry were there "on that date." That is, in the Crimea. Is that statement correct?—The disembarkation commenced on the 1st of October at Balaklava.

943. Then of course they were there?—I cannot remember what parts were disembarked on the 1st of October and what on the 2d; the disembarkation was going on from three or four ships at the same time; it is impossible to remember what parts were landed.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I did not mean to attach any importance to that. I merely meant to say, in passing, that it was not correct; but I do not attach the least importance to it.

944. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Were not the Scots Greys there before that date?—Certainly.

945. Before the 1st of October?—Yes.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) They had landed a fortnight previously, and they were never included at all.

946. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Had not the whole of the heavy brigade arrived on the 1st of October, except a portion of one or two regiments?—They were in Balaklava Bay, but they were not landed; and an inconsiderable portion, as you seem to think, was the head quarters of one regiment and the half of another.

947. One regiment?—Two regiments, I believe.

948. Is not the officer commanding a brigade the proper person to order a return to be prepared relating to his brigade?—Certainly.

949. If then an officer commanding a brigade sends in a return signed by himself am I not entitled to believe that he has obtained his information from the officer in that brigade who is best qualified to furnish it, and am I not therefore justified in considering it correct?—Certainly.

950. When Return No. 1. of the Appendix was made out, was not Colonel Hodge

*Major James Conolly.*

21st April 1856.

commanding the 2d cavalry brigade?—I really do not know when it was made out; if you can tell me, I can answer you. I have no doubt he was.

951. It must have been some time after the 30th of March. Was not Colonel Hodge commanding the 2d cavalry brigade?—I have no doubt that he was, but I cannot say that he was.

952. Are you aware that Lieutenant Colonel Mayow was brigade major of the light cavalry in the middle of December, at the time when the transport duty alluded to in this return was going on?—I do not think he was. I think he was promoted about that time to be assistant quartermaster general of the division, but I cannot remember the date; he was promoted in the winter I know, but at what date I cannot tell you.

953. Under those circumstances was not Lieutenant Colonel Mayow the proper officer to have furnished a return, and could any reasonable objection be stated to a return furnished by him?—I do not know whether it is correct or not. I do not make any objection to it at all. I cannot answer for Colonel Mayow at all.

954. You have stated that returns Nos. 1 and 2 of the Appendix are incorrect. Can you produce any return to prove this; and from what source is it to be obtained?—I can produce the original orders of the heavy brigade issued in the Crimea, which will account for every man and every horse that went during that time. I have made an extract from them myself, of which I can give you a copy, and I can prove every figure in them, for the figures are in my own handwriting, out of the order actually issued in the Crimea.

955. The return is not of men who were ordered to convey, but those who actually conveyed stores. Have you any return to show that?—I paraded all those parties myself. It was my duty to parade them, and to see them marched off. I had to see that; that was according to the orders that were issued with my signature every day. Here are the orders, and I am ready to answer for them. (*To Sir Alexander Woodford.*) Sir, I am anxious to state that Colonel Hodge is very much grieved at finding that he has by mistake put his name to what is totally incorrect, and he has written to request that I or somebody else may explain to the Board how this happened, and I hope that I may have an opportunity on his behalf of doing so.

956. Will you now refer to reports Nos. 1 and 2, and state in what respects they differ from your own?—Yes.

957. (*Earl Beauchamp.*) What is the first day in your return?—The first day that we carried any forage or sick was the 13th of December.

958. State the number of men?—We had 248 men and 491 horses.

959. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Was that heavy cavalry?—Yes. I do not answer for any but the heavy cavalry.

960. How long did that continue?—The next day we had 248 men and 496 horses, and 496 the following day, down to the 18th. On the 18th we had 248 men and 496 horses.

961. Including the 18th?—Yes, the 18th inclusive. On the 19th the horses began to knock up, and a reduction was obliged to be made. We only sent 190 men and 370 horses.

962. How long did they continue at the same rate?—It lasted till the 25th inclusive.

963. On the 26th how many?—Instead of going for the commissariat duty we went to fetch the sick from the infantry divisions. On that day we sent 102 men and 306 horses. Then on the 27th we went back to commissariat work, and sent 156 men and 302 horses. The next day, the 28th, we sent for the sick 77 men and 231 horses.

964. It will be necessary to hand in a return?—Yes.

965. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Were those horses at that time conveying commissariat stores to the front only, or were they on any other employment?—It was a whole day's work for any man employed, going to Balaklava to load the horses, then taking them to the front, and coming back again; it never, I believe, was less than seven hours' good work.

966. Is that return which you have in your hand a return of the number of men and horses who were conveying commissariat stores to the front?—This is taken out of my own orders. This is a list of the men who were actually employed, whom I marched out and paraded myself, to do this duty.

967. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg that it may be clearly understood that we can be in no way responsible for those returns being incorrect.

(*To the witness.*) The examination of the cavalry officers by the Commissioners having finished before you returned from Scutari, did you intimate to any one your wish to be examined?—Certainly not.

968. Are you aware that your name was not included in the list of officers furnished to us from head quarters as being a list of those who could give useful evidence before the Commissioners, in consequence of your absence?—I never heard of any such list at all.

969. In regard to that part of your evidence which relates to the use of pits for sheltering the horses, did you never know of horses standing in them longer than a day or two without the pits being paved?—It was not the system that we pursued; we, I think, did better when we were on the heights; we shifted the horses directly; the ground was too much cut up, and when we got below, between the 6th of December and

*Major James Conolly.*

21st April 1856.

up to the time the covering came, we scarped into the side of the hill in the basin of Kadikoi, where the heavy brigade was stationed; therefore gaining, I think, much more protection than we could have done by digging pits for the horses.

970. But how long, on the average, would pits have answered without paving, by having such drainage as could be obtained?—I can give you an instance of how short a time they would. I had a tent in the month of June, and it was sunk into the ground with every improvement that the hardness of the winter had suggested; a sudden storm came on, and in two minutes it was completely washed away, and I was up to my breast in water in it, and it was not worth anything afterwards.

971. The case that you have quoted was that of a storm; was there any drainage from the tent?—Yes; one all round it, leading down into the bottom of the valley; there were eleven or twelve others carried away on the same occasion.

972. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have no more questions to put to this witness; but I have to request of the Board that Major Conolly may be directed to submit a return in the form I will hand in, and also to furnish such information as he possesses in regard to the employment of the men in that brigade?

(*Major Conolly.*) I can only give a return of the brigade duties, not a return of the regimental duties as well.

973. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) Then of the brigade duties?

(*Major Conolly.*) I can give a return of the pickets and of the brigade duties.

974. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Does the number of men appear in the brigade detail of duties?

(*Major Conolly.*) Certainly; I am quite ready to account for them.

975. (*President.*) As far as you are able, will you be so good as to make the return called for?

(*Major Conolly.*) I will, Sir.

976. (*President.*) You wish, I think, to make a statement?

(*Major Conolly.*) Yes. Colonel Hodge has written a private letter to express his great regret at finding his name appended to a return which he has since discovered to be incorrect. I, who was brigade major, and consequently answerable for all those returns, was absent on duty at the time. Colonel Hodge applied to a soldier who acted as my clerk, and who I am sorry to say did not turn out very well, and he very carelessly gave him this return, and Colonel Hodge gave it in to the Commissioners; and he begs to express his great regret at having so unintentionally misled them.

Re-examined by the Earl of LUCAN.

977. Will you be good enough to read the first line of the return at page 3 of the Appendix?—"A return showing the dates that the light cavalry brigade were employed "by the commissariat department, and the number of horses so employed. Date 1854, "December 13th, 122 horses."

978. Did not the heavy cavalry brigade perform the whole of the commissariat duties on that day?—They did; and the light brigade fetched the forage for both brigades.

979. Is this return therefore correct?—So far as that line goes, incorrect, certainly.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) This is not a fresh return, is it, that you are examining Major Conolly to?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is a return that Colonel Tulloch has been examining to.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to call attention to this circumstance, that this return, which is now impugned, was furnished by the brigade major of the light cavalry brigade, showing the number of horses then employed in that brigade.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is my business to falsify the return, if I find it incorrect, and that I am about to do.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You cannot examine the witness again in chief.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I was re-examining to a matter which he has been examined to for the first time, and I believe upon the strictest law of evidence that that is allowable.

980. (*Judge Advocate General to Major Conolly.*) Have you been examined before upon this return?

(*Major Conolly.*) Not till this afternoon.

981. Have you been examined before Lord Lucan examined you now upon this return?—Upon this of Colonel Mayow's? No.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) You cannot call this witness again to examine him in chief. If your lordship will send up any questions to the Board they will put them; but for form's sake I think you had better not put any further questions.

982. (*To the witness.*) What was the state of the health of the men during the months of November, December, and January. Were they capable of much duty in addition to their ordinary duties?—They had been suffering since August. We had never been free from cholera, and there was a great deal of fever and dysentery amongst the men; and I will venture to say, that out of the men that were nominally fit for duty, if it had been in a time of peace one half of them or more would have been in the hospital. The dragoon's duties we all know in a short day of nine hours' daylight will not admit of his being employed at anything else more than three hours at the utmost, and it would

*Major James Conolly.*

21st April 1856.

have been worse than cruelty to have expected more from the men in the state in which ours were.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) Have you any other witness to call?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Yes; Colonel Low.

---

*Colonel Alexander Low.*

Colonel ALEXANDER LOW further examined.

983. (*Earl of Lucan.*) Did the light cavalry brigade perform any of the commissariat transport duties so early as the 13th of December?—I do not recollect.

984. Did the heavy cavalry brigade perform the whole of the commissariat transport duties for the first few days that the cavalry were employed on this duty?—As well as I can recollect, they did. The light brigade brought forage from Balaklava for the heavy brigade and themselves.

985. Will you be good enough to read the first line of that return. (*The same being handed to the witness*)? "A return showing the dates that the light cavalry brigade were "employed by the commissariat department, and the number of horses so employed, "December 13th, 1854, number 122 horses."

986. You have read that; is that a correct return, that shows the light cavalry brigade to have performed any part of the commissariat transport duties on this first day of their duty?—I stated before, that so far as I recollect, for the first week or so, the Commissariat duties were performed by the heavy cavalry brigade, and the light cavalry brigade carried the forage and took the pickets; but about this return I cannot be positive; my impression is, and indeed I know for certain, that the heavy cavalry brigade performed that duty at first, and the light brigade foraged them. About this return I cannot speak.

987. Are you aware that the French artillery horses were employed in carrying paving stones for the use of their cavalry?—I believe they were. I was at the camp of the French Chasseurs d'Afrique, and I saw the artillery waggons bringing stones there to pave the stables of the French Chasseurs d'Afrique.

988. (*Major General Peel.*) At what date was that?—It was after we came down to Kadikoi, between December and January, at the time that we were almost at the worst.

989. (*Lord Lucan.*) Did you at the time or for long afterwards hear of any altercations between Colonel Griffiths and myself?—I did not.

990. Do you consider that you would properly discharge your duty as a commanding officer of a regiment should you allow yourself to be deterred from promoting the welfare of your men and horses by any alleged altercation between another commanding officer and his divisional general?—I do not think that anything would interfere with my looking after my men and horses.

991. Were you ever by any act of mine deterred from or discouraged in making shelter for your horses, or did I not encourage and urge you as far as possible to do so?—In answer to the first part of the question you certainly did not, in answer to the second you encouraged every officer to look after his men and horses and shelter them.

992. Do you consider that there might have been, on the part of myself or the officers commanding brigades and regiments, more promptitude or ingenuity in sheltering their horses than were displayed under the circumstances in which we were placed?—Under the circumstances in which we were placed, certainly not; every man and officer tried his best to shelter his men and horses.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have no more questions to put to the witness.

Cross-examined by Colonel Tulloch.

993. Do you not consider that horses when carrying forage for the cavalry are employed for the commissariat department. I hold in my hand a return showing the dates when the light cavalry brigade were employed by the commissariat department, and the number of horses so employed, in contradistinction to the previous return, the heavy brigade of return showing the number of men and horses who conveyed commissariat stores to the front?—As a cavalry man, certainly not; and I will explain why I say so, because, until we were settled down in camp, the cavalry were always obliged to carry their own forage, therefore I can never consider the foraging a commissariat duty; we call a commissariat duty the carrying provisions to the front for the infantry, or the conveyance of the sick; the foraging for the cavalry we looked upon as part of our business.

994. I will read the title of the two returns, one of the heavy cavalry brigade:—"Return of the number of men and horses who conveyed commissariat stores to the front," and another, "A return showing the dates that the light cavalry brigade were employed "by the commissariat department, and the number of horses so employed." With reference to the titles of those two returns, and to the error that is stated to be in them, I put this question to you, Do you not consider that horses when carrying forage for another cavalry brigade are employed by the commissariat department?—No; and partly from the same explanation that I gave before; if we had not carried forage for the heavy brigade we must have found a proportion of the horses to perform the commissariat duties. We also took the pickets for the heavy brigade, which, if I recollect rightly, gave an entire lot of horses for the commissariat duties; and we performed the regimental duties that they would have otherwise have performed themselves, but I draw the

distinction which I believe is commonly drawn by cavalry officers, that we do not call foraging a commissariat duty.

995. If you heard that a suggestion had been unfavourably received when made by an officer commanding a cavalry regiment, would not that have prevented you offering any similar suggestion?—A suggestion, certainly.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have no more questions to ask this witness.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Are you prepared now to proceed with your observations?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No; I must communicate everything that has passed to Sir John M'Neill, and get his opinion upon everything that has passed, before I can sum up. But could not the proceedings with regard to Lord Cardigan be gone on with?

(*President.*) No; the Board has decided not to do so.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It requires a considerable time to prepare for a thing of this kind, and I have to communicate with Sir John M'Neill, who is in Edinburgh.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board stated on the first day that they would consider each case upon its own merits. You have now an opportunity of commenting upon the evidence given in Lord Lucan's case, but you state that you are not ready.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I must ask for time till Monday next, for I must be away from London for a couple of days. There is a witness that I expected to be here about this time, Colonel Pottinger; I expect him to-morrow.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You have not stated any sufficient reason to the Board for so great a delay as that.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) One reason is, that I have to communicate with Sir John M'Neill, who is in Edinburgh. I only wrote to him yesterday, and have not received his answer; and I wish to go over all this evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board cannot take any more evidence in this case.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) There are one or two points upon which I should wish to recall a witness, that is General Airey, and I shall be prepared to-morrow morning for that.

(*Judge Advocate General*) You cannot call evidence yourself, that has been settled; but if there are questions which you require to put, the Board may consent to put them. Have you any other reason for asking for so long a delay?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I think one of the best possible reasons is that I have had no legal assistance whatever, and I have had to communicate with Sir John M'Neill, and I now wait for his answer to the last letter which I only sent last night, and I think, considering the great amount of evidence, and also that I have other duties to attend to, that it will be reasonable to give me a few days at any rate.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You do not expect any fresh evidence from Sir John M'Neill, do you?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I expect to get information from him upon certain points; for instance, the letter that I quoted to you this morning. I may mention that there is a return which I think of some importance, particularly with regard to the evidence given to-day, which I would move for from the Admiralty; it is a statement showing the number of spare sails and the quantity of sailcloth supplied to the under-mentioned ships, &c., each ship, &c. I would have obtained this before if it had been practicable. I went to the Admiralty, and I was informed that it might be granted to this Board, but that it could not be granted to me.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you wish that return to be applied for?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, I do.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Would you not be prepared by Thursday morning?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I do not think it is possible. I will endeavour to be so by Friday.

(*President.*) We will adjourn for a short time.

The Board retired to deliberate, and after a short time they returned.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) The Board wish you distinctly to state whether you cannot do justice to yourself, and to the vindication of your Report, unless you have till Friday to prepare.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Certainly, I could not; it is quite impossible that I should be able to do so, looking at the length of the proceedings, and the circumstance of my having had no legal adviser.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Under the circumstances, the Board, while regretting this loss of time, and putting themselves to inconvenience, will concede to your application, that you shall have till Friday to prepare your observations; but they hope that you will be prepared the first thing on Friday morning to proceed.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I shall be prepared by that time; but if the witness arrives that I expect, I presume that there will be no objection to my examining him.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) What witness do you refer to?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) To the captain of one of the steamers who offered sailcloth at Balaklava. Perhaps I may also require to have Colonel Pottinger, and their evidence might be taken probably before I read what I shall have to say

*Colonel Alexander Low.*

21st April 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You will understand distinctly that on Friday the Board will hear your observations?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Major General Peel.*) Will you conclude on Friday with your observations?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*General Sir W. Rowan to the Earl of Lucan.*) When will you be able to sum up?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) When will it suit the Board?

(*General Sir W. Rowan.*) Could you do so on Saturday?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Yes; but if it were quite the same to the Board I would prefer Monday, of course.

(*President.*) Then we will adjourn to Friday, at 11 o'clock. Could Lord Lucan go on on Saturday?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Saturday will do very well for me if it suits the Board equally well.

Adjourned to Friday, at Eleven o'clock.

## TWELFTH DAY.

### 25th April 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

*Colonel Tulloch.*

25th April 1856.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, On a former occasion I proposed to put in the answers from Admiral Dundas to different queries which I had submitted to him, and I believe it was left open to the Board to determine whether those papers were to be received, or not. I repeat that application now, and I am desirous to know what the decision of the Board is.

(*Judge Advocate General to Earl of Lucan.*) The Board are of opinion that at this stage of the proceedings sufficient reason has not been shown for receiving the evidence, which you admit is of an inferior kind, namely, secondary evidence. If they should deem it necessary to receive further information upon the point on which you intended to call Admiral Dundas, they will consider the nature of the evidence they will receive from him.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, I am desirous of putting in a very important letter as part of the proceedings, and, if the Board will permit me, I will read the question with respect to which I propose to submit this letter, and also read the letter itself. It is with reference to a statement of General Airey in answer to Question 523, at page 95 of the proceedings of the Board.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) You are not proceeding now with your address? This is an application which you make previously to that?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, which I intimated to you on Saturday.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) As I understood you, your object was to induce the Board to look at an official document?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; to receive as an official document a letter which I mentioned to you on Saturday last; it is an official paper.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) From whom does it come?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) From Colonel Gordon. Question 523 to General Airey is to this effect, "Did not the Commissioners give you an opportunity, in writing to yourself and by "four days examination of your senior assistant?" His answer is, "My own examination "in writing, I have already stated two or three times, was merely general and superfi- "cial answers to general questions. I had no indication whatever of the leaning of the "Commissioners, or that they implicated anybody, or thought that there was blame "attached to anybody; if I had had the slightest idea of that, I should have been able "to explain things perfectly. I think myself, and I cannot help believing, that they "would have come to different conclusions." Now with reference to this paragraph I beg to read a letter, and to make it part of the proceedings of the Board. The letter is from Colonel Gordon.

(*President.*) What is the date of it?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is dated "Quartermaster General's Office, before Sebastopol, "June the 4th, 1855," addressed to Sir John M'Neill: "Sir, I have the honour to "acknowledge the receipt of Colonel Tulloch's note dated this day, forwarding a copy of "my evidence for correction, and requesting that it may be completed with copies of the "necessary documents alluded to, and returned to him at Kazatch by to-morrow morning "a few hours before the mail starts; and requesting, also, that answers to the questions "put to General Airey may be sent at the same time. As those questions to General "Airey are 52 in number, nearly every one of which contains an implied accusation of "neglect or carelessness, he begs me to say that he cannot consent to answer them in "this off-hand way, but will examine each question and prepare his replies as rapidly as "the other duties of his department will permit, which you must be aware from the "evidence you have taken are of a very extensive and varied nature." I wish to put in this important letter, which I only recovered on Saturday, for the purpose of showing that those very questions which General Airey alluded to as being general and superficial, and therefore not requiring to be answered in a particular way, contained imputed accusations of neglect or carelessness in almost every one of them.

(*Major General Peel.*) Those were the questions which appear in the evidence?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Will you read the whole of the letter?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) "I will endeavour to have my own evidence corrected and completed "by to-morrow morning; but as I find it occupies 40 pages, the result of 4 days' exami- "nation, with a great number of papers to be annexed, I fear I shall be unable to have "it ready by that time, being much occupied with other duties which cannot be entirely "set aside for those inquiries. I may mention as an instance that only yesterday I was "on horseback for 17 hours on a reconnaissance of some importance with reference to our "future operations in the field, and this morning has again brought us a great amount "of urgent business. If not ready to-morrow, my evidence as well as General Airey's replies "will be forwarded to you at the War Office in London. I much regret that sickness has

*Colonel Tulloch.*

25th April 1856.

" obliged you to bring your inquiries to so sudden a termination." The part that I particularly refer to is this part relative to General Airey in which he asks time to answer those very questions in consequence of almost every one of them containing implied accusations of neglect or carelessness.

(*President to Colonel Gordon.*) You admit that that is your letter?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Will you hand it in?

[The same was handed in.]

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I may also mention that I sent to the Judge Advocate General a letter addressed by myself to Dr. Farr, the Superintendent General of the Statistical Department in the Registrar General's office, and a copy of his answer, in order to show what his view was as to the method in which the calculations ought to have been made in regard to the mortality of the cavalry horses; and I trust that that also will be received by the Board, to be made any use of that they think proper.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You cannot make that a part of the proceedings now; if the Board require any information of that kind they may call Dr. Farr. At present you cannot put in a letter written by somebody in answer to your question.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I may refer to it, I presume, myself?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You must keep to the point as much as you can. You may make any observations as long as they have reference to what is before the Board.

(*President to Colonel Tulloch.*) Will you now proceed?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, Before submitting any remarks upon the evidence which has been adduced in the course of this investigation, I trust that I shall be excused for adverting to the very difficult position in which I am placed, by having to establish by the evidence of persons in England the correctness of the conclusions arrived at by Sir John M'Neill and myself upon evidence taken in the Crimea. Perhaps no instance has ever before occurred of any one appearing before a public court under similar disadvantages; and, but for my fixed resolve to allow no consideration to interfere with the duty of maintaining the integrity of the Report, nothing would have induced me, even in self-defence, to undertake such a task. Had this inquiry been conducted in the Crimea, witnesses might have been found at every step,—not a shipmaster of the many lying in the harbour but could have borne testimony to the supplies of sailcloth which might have been purchased, and to the facility with which carpenters or seamen might have been obtained from the shipping. In several cases the same vessels had been trading between Balaklava and different points of the coast since the first arrival of our army, and many on board of those could have spoken to the apparently inexplicable delay in providing some kind of shelter for our cavalry; but here all such evidence is unattainable. A witness of that description, whom I expected to-day, and whose evidence might have been most useful, is still out of the country; and Mr. Bracebridge and Mr. Rawlinson are the only civil witnesses that I could obtain in support of facts to which in the Crimea hundreds could have borne testimony. Had the inquiry been on the spot, how differently also should I have been situated in regard to the military witnesses! Most of those whom I should have selected are with their corps, and my witnesses have necessarily been restricted to a few commanding officers who had previously been examined at Balaklava, and from whom I could only obtain an answer in the affirmative, to the points which it was necessary to establish, by exposing them to the risk of being charged with a dereliction of duty for not having suggested officially any measures which their evidence showed to be necessary. Another and not the least of the difficulties consequent upon the investigation in this country has been the absence of all returns tending to show the employment of the cavalry during the period that no shelter was provided. Upon this subject the Commissioners had originally the daily states to guide them, which they called for from each regiment, as the officers were examined; but when details of duty were directed to be excluded from the Report these were destroyed, though they might have afforded a useful approximation to the information which is now so necessary in regard to the employment of the cavalry soldier.

Had the present inquiry taken place in the Crimea instead of in this country there would have been no difficulty, for I should have had evidence of the employment of the soldier on each day to refer to. I had, however, only the choice of two evils, either to expose myself to all these disadvantages, or to leave the Report to the mercy of those who were disposed, not merely to challenge the calculations, but to question the returns, and distort the facts. Had the accuracy of the conclusions alone been matter of dispute I should have considered the Report in safety, under the guardianship of the Board, and have sought no other protection for it. The course pursued, however, in the opening address by Lord Lucan seemed to indicate a plan of operation under which it was impossible for me to remain passive. Had his broad assertions been left unanswered, Lord Cardigan might have adopted a similar course; the allegation of error in calculations and returns only requires to be freely made, to receive credence when no one is present to contradict it. The two officers of the quartermaster-general's department might then have followed Lord Cardigan, each attacking his share, till the few remaining leaves

*Colonel Tulloch.*

25th April 1856.

of the Report would have offered only a scanty meal to Mr. Commissary General Filder. It could not have been expected that the Board would determine or indeed inquire into the accuracy of such details when no one appeared to afford explanation; and there seemed, therefore, no alternative but to appear in person. I have done so, however, under a strong feeling of the hardship of being compelled to adopt such a course, considering all the disadvantages to which I am exposed by having to establish in this country, and before officers without the advantage of local knowledge, the groundwork of a Report, proceeding as it does upon facts and evidence collected in the Crimea. The course adopted in collecting and recording the information upon which the Report is founded having already been given in my own evidence in answer to question 763, it appears unnecessary to make further reference to that, except to repeat that the absence of a short-hand writer led to considerably more being stated by the witnesses than could be taken down, and which information it has, therefore, been requisite in the present case to supply by the re-examination of such officers as could be found in this country. This, however, is not likely to be required in any of the other proceedings, as all the animadversions, if they may be so called, are so fully supported by recorded evidence that I hope it will not be necessary for me to do more than hand over to the Board the signed evidence of the witnesses or the authenticated returns, leaving it to the Board to decide as to the credibility of the former or whether the latter are sufficient to warrant the deductions drawn from them.

In all the steps that I have taken in this matter, I again wish it to be distinctly understood, that I am acting for myself alone, so that nothing I may say or do should affect any course which my absent colleague may think proper to adopt. With reference to this matter my communications with him have been merely what were necessary in conquence of the peculiarity of my position, and he is in no respect bound by the course which in my military capacity I have considered it necessary to adopt, on finding that my statements have been impugned. It is not the least of the difficulties which I have had to contend with in this inquiry that military officers do not readily comprehend the guarded terms in which persons employed in the duty of reporting to the Government have to express themselves. Accustomed in the army to find specific charges made whenever there is reason to apprehend any dereliction of duty, officers do not apparently see any good reason why the persons who may be supposed to be inculpated should not at once be pointed out by name, in order that they may be able to stand on the defensive; but before public commissioners could take so decided a course they would require full power to investigate into the conduct of all the officers and departments whom they might consider to be implicated, and they might even have to extend that inquiry to the whole conduct of the war itself.

Caution in those matters may be less necessary, where a department has, or assumes to have, an independent action, as in the case of the commissariat or the medical departments; but in the other administrative and executive branches of the army, whose duties approximate so closely that it is difficult to say where the responsibility of the one begins, and that of the other terminates,—when it seems still a disputed point whether the devising proper means of shelter for cavalry when in the field, rests on the general officer commanding that army or on the quartermaster-general and his subordinates,—when the adjutant-general might be inculpated for having omitted to issue orders, or the general commanding-in-chief for not having given instructions in proper time, it may readily be conceived in what difficulties any expression of opinion on the part of the commission as to blame attachable to particular individuals or departments must involve the Government, particularly if it stands under the implied obligation of placing before the public the results of the investigation whatever they may be. The inquiries of the Commissioners, however, could have been of little use had this consideration induced them to abstain from all indications which might turn the attention of Her Majesty's Government in that direction where something had apparently been wrong; they felt assured that more was required of them than a mere record of the disasters under which our army had suffered; and remedies could, of course, neither be suggested nor applied unless some remote indication were given of the quarter in which the existing arrangements had been defective. Keeping those considerations in view, this Board will not be surprised that the Commissioners should have acted with caution when they found it necessary to call attention to any of the occurrences under their notice; and I believe the Board must now be well satisfied that no animadversions were passed in the Report upon any one; but merely opinions expressed that something had been wrong, leaving it to Her Majesty's Government to determine who were the parties responsible, and to make the further inquiries which might be deemed necessary. If I am asked why it should be supposed that something was wrong in the arrangements respecting the shelter of the cavalry, the answer is not a difficult one. The Commissioners arrived early in March, a period at which the winter of the Crimea might almost be considered over. The harbour was crowded with vessels containing huts and building stores of every description, and some of these vessels had been lying there for months, at a most enormous cost to the public. We passed to the valley of Kadikoi, and there saw a considerable number of the cavalry still in tents, and the ground strewed with the half-buried carcases of the cavalry horses. We subsequently learnt in the course of the inquiry that stabling had only been erected for the remains of this force by the middle or end of February, although it appeared from the quarter-

*Colonel Tulloch.*

25th April 1856.

master-general's books that orders to provide shelter for the horses had been issued so early as the 12th of November, more than three months before that object was finally accomplished. On renewing the inquiry by written queries the quarter master general repeated the statement as to the date of the original order in a still more precise form, but said nothing of the want of tools and materials, and the promise of the assistance of the Turks, nor of the want of an engineer and of a fixed site, which during upwards of a month had prevented any progress being made. Here I must call specially to the notice of the Board the answers by General Airey to questions 483 and 495 and 507, and first 483 :— "Will you state why you did not explain this most important circumstance to the Com- "missioners ?—I really did not imagine that the object of the Commissioners was "anything beyond getting information upon general subjects." Question 495. "Was it "not the more necessary, as you knew the anxiety of the Commissioners to obtain "information upon these points, that you should have explained every circumstance "to show the reason why the cavalry was not sooner placed under cover, when you had "an opportunity ?—I am obliged to refer again to the last three lines of my evidence, "in which I say, the actual current business of the day amply occupy many hours, and "many others devoted to lengthy extraneous matter necessarily enforces a neglect of what "may be of real importance to the service. Therefore my answers were really as short "and as rapidly given as I could give them under the great pressure of time ; but there "is this circumstance, that my impression was that the Commissioners were solely looking "to the commissariat supplies. I had no idea that there was anything with regard to "my own matters, and it was merely that they were eliciting information with regard "to the commissariat supplies. Therefore, with regard to giving any informption upon "extraneous matters connected with the quartermaster general's department, it did not "come within my own idea." Then at question 507 he is asked, "Then it appears that "you have stated nothing in explanation of the delay, except in regard to the impos- "sibility of procuring labour, omitting all mention of the tools, of the Turkish soldiers "not being available, and the ground not being marked out. Was it not your duty to "acquaint the Commissioners with all the circumstances as affecting the question of "delay in a most important degree ?—I answered the question of the Commissioners in "the most general way, putting the most prominent circumstance forward, which was "the want of labour, and in fact that answer embraced the other two." Then again I must specially call to the notice of the Board that they will find in this answer of General Airey which I have just read that he considered the questions of the Commissioners merely as general ones, not requiring him to enter into any specific details on such matters. And in reply to question 523, "Did not the Commissioners give an opportunity in writing to "yourself, and by four days' examination of your senior assistant ?—My own examination "in writing I have already stated, two or three times, was merely general and superficial "answers to general questions. I had no indication whatever of the leaning of the "Commissioners, or that they implicated anybody, or thought that there was blame "attached to anybody. If I had the slightest idea of that I should have been able to "explain things perfectly. I think myself, and I cannot help believing, that they would "have come to different conclusions." In reply to this question the quartermaster general goes so far as to state that he had no intimation whatever of the leaning of the Commissioners, or that they implicated anybody, or thought that blame attached to anybody ; and he adds, "If I had the slightest idea of that I should have been able to "explain things perfectly." But in the letter which I have just recovered, and which forms a part of the evidence submitted this day to the Board, Colonel Gordon, in acknowledging the receipt of those queries, states, by the desire of General Airey, and as an excuse for not forwarding them at once, that "as those queries to General Airey are 52 in number, "nearly every one of which contains an implied accusation of neglect or carelessness, he "begs me to say that he cannot consent to answer them in this off-hand way, but will "examine each question and prepare his replies as rapidly as the other duties of his "department will permit." It remains for General Airey to show how he can reconcile those two statements, and, assuredly, in accordance with his reply to question 523, he must now be prepared to take upon himself the blame of not having given the Commissioners that full explanation in regard to the cause of delay in providing shelter which they had a right to expect, and in the absence of which they were entitled to assume that there had been a want of promptitude or ingenuity somewhere, otherwise three months could not have elapsed between the ordering the shelter for the horses and its being finally obtained.

It will no doubt be apparent to the Board that General Airey has thus taken credit for his department having given the necessary orders in time, while he left the cavalry to bear the onus of not having executed them. I shall forbear making any comment upon his not having at once admitted the fact, on which I felt so much anxiety, knowing that it would have relieved me and my colleague from the painful charge of having made an important statement without sufficient inquiry. It now appears that we did all that could be expected of us to bring out full information, even to the extent of putting our inquiries in a tone which necessarily induced care and circumspection in answering them. The whole question between the Commissioners and whoever may be held accountable for the want of promptitude or ingenuity complained of resolves itself simply into this :—The military authorities knew from the middle of November at least the difficulties in which they were likely to be placed by the want of shelter for

*Colonel Tulloch.*

25th April 1856.

the cavalry. Week after week passed, and yet the shelter was not provided. The severity of winter was fast setting in, and a vast number of horses dying daily. Under those circumstances it was natural to consider what facilities could be given for the cavalry getting under shelter before the dead of the winter. Timber was expected, but it seemed doubtful whether soldiers, who had so little time to spare, could use that heavy description of material without deferring the work until it was too late. Lord Lucan conceives that all the horses were sheltered by the middle of February; other officers say towards the end of that month,—but how was this accomplished? Only because more than half of them did not require shelter, having died in the interim. Had the proportion remained alive which might have been expected under ordinary circumstances, the whole could not have been under cover till the middle of March, by which time the winter would have been over, and the permanent shelter of comparatively little use. Keeping those calculations in view, and it is presumed that every general does make such calculations in advance, the necessity was most urgent that the measures requisite for the preservation of the cavalry should not be delayed till the arrival of wood for permanent stables; and, of course, the less that these soldiers could do for themselves, the greater was the necessity, when weeks had passed and no progress had been made, that other aid, and materials more readily applicable to such a purpose, should have been asked for and obtained without reference to expense.

The testimony of the witnesses examined has been almost unanimous in favour of the suggestions of the Commissioners that sailcloth properly applied was the best material to meet this emergency. To show their concurrence in this respect I must here trouble the Board to refer to the following evidence of Major Thompson at Question 148. of the proceedings: "Supposing you had had canvas and carpenters, could you have succeeded "in putting up shelter of that kind more quickly?—Of course; and it would have been "much more beneficial. 149. Would such shelter have stood the wind there?—I have my "doubts as to whether it would; that depended upon the manner in which it was put "up. 150. Supposing it were blown down, and all the huts were blown down once "or twice, you could have put it up again, could you not?—They could always have been "put up again. 151. It would only have been a question of expense?—Yes. 152. Have "you any idea in what time shelter could have been put up for one horse in that way, or "for 150 horses?—It could have been put up immediately had we had everything at hand. "153. Suppose that plenty of canvas had been purchased down at Balaklava, and a "certain number of carpenters had been hired and paid, in what time could they have "put up sufficient shelter for your whole regiment?—Suppose we had had a suffi-"cient number of men, and the canvas on the ground, it could have been put in one "day for the 5th Dragoon Guards. 154. I mean with twenty carpenters?—Yes, and "the men of the regiment on the ground certainly it could have been put up in "one day."

I must request the Board will now refer to the evidence of Colonel Doherty at Question 242: "Could not a slight building have been constructed rapidly of sailcloth either "purchased at Balaklava or obtained from the fleet, and did no suggestion occur to you "on that head?—Very likely it might; most probably. 243. Could not a slight building "have been constructed rapidly of sailcloth either purchased at Balaklava or obtained "from the fleet?—I suppose so from the fleet. I do not know whether we could have "purchased any from Balaklava. 244. Within what time could shelter of this descrip-"tion have been put up by your regiment if the canvas had been provided for "you?—I should think in about a fortnight, or less; it depends entirely upon the "number of men that I could get to work every day, and the tools. 245. If you had "not a sufficient number of men to put up a sailcloth covering, would there have "been any difficulty in obtaining assistance by getting sailors from the shipping "at Balaklava, and would not that have been preferable to leaving your horses "thus exposed?—I am sure I cannot tell whether we could have got sailors; I dare "say by paying them one might have got them, but that was not my duty. 246. In "a War Office return it is stated that in December you lost 33 horses out of "111. Would not the price of those horses have been immeasurably greater than "the sum that would have been required to be paid for assistance? It is not meant that "you had to provide them, but merely to suggest such measures if you thought it "proper?—I should imagine that they would. 247. Why did you not make any sug-"gestion or inquiry as to its practicability? Was it because it was not your province?— "I do not understand it. 248. Why did you not make any such suggestion or inquiry "as to its practicability? Was it because it was not your province or not your duty? "—I certainly should have done it if I had fancied for one moment that I could have "got it. I might have made a casual suggestion about it; but I made no written "application to have canvas purchased. 249. Do you consider that it rested with other "parties to make such a suggestion?—No; not altogether. 250. Did you deem the "difficulties to be insuperable; in short, that no sailcloth could be obtained?—No, I did "not. 251. When was the shelter for the horses completed?—One stable was completed "about, I suppose, the 9th or 10th of February as clearly as I can recollect, and the "horses were very much crowded, and I erected another stable, that, I think I stated in "my evidence before you, was about the 22d. 252. Had canvas been procurable, might "the horses instead of not being under cover till the middle of February have been pro-

*Colonel Tulloch.*

25th April 1856.

" tected by means of canvas six weeks before?—Yes, if there had been canvas and " scantling. We must have had scantling to have erected them. 258. Do you think " that this loss might to a great extent have been prevented by a judicious use of sail- " cloth?—Of course had we been hutted we should not have lost so many horses; that " is my opinion. 259. You mean hutted with sailcloth?—If we had had protection we " should have thriven better."—(I will next refer to the evidence of Colonel Douglas, at Question 198: " Did you make any suggestion to that effect? Might not some " temporary shelter have been put up by means of sailcloth in a day or two, even by " your own men, had the materials been obtained?—If I had had materials I could have " them put up but I made no suggestion on the subject. 199. You could have put " them up even by your own men?—Give me the materials, and they could have done " it. 250. In what time could such shelter have been put up?—In a very short period. " If you had given them the materials it could not take long. I could not say how long. " Merely putting uprights, I presume, and nailing on canvas. Is it your opinion that " those if put up in the same manner as for the artillery would have lasted through the " winter as theirs did?—If you had made a proper selection of the ground it would, as " far as shelter is concerned. 206. You have stated that sailcloth would have had " this effect, and the Commissioners state the same. Will you state your objection to " answer the question?—I should be giving an opinion as to my superiors. I do not " know the reasons that prevented those things being sent. I know nothing about it. " I merely speak as to what I saw myself, and I could not give a fair answer to " the question which you put just now."

I shall next refer to the evidence of Colonel Griffiths on the same point, Questions 363, 364, 365, and 366: " Could not slight buildings have been constructed of sailcloth " purchased at Balaklava or obtained from the fleet, and did no suggestions occur to you " on that head?—I think covering might have been put up. 364. The question related to " covering constructed of sailcloth?—I think if sailcloth had been there, it could have " been put up. 365. In what time do you think such covering could have been put up if " the materials had been provided?—If the spars and canvas had been in our camp, I think " it might have been put up in four days. 366. Considering the lightness of the sail- " cloth, would not a heavier boarding, about an inch and a half thick, have been sufficient " to have supported covering for the horses, with the aid of the earth thrown up from the " trench?—No, I do not think an inch and a half would have been sufficiently strong." " 378. Do you think that carpenters could have been got from the shipping at Balaklava or " from the fleet off Sebastopol, considering there was on board each vessel a large carpenter's " crew; for payment, of course?—I know nothing of the carpenters of the fleet; some of the " captains of transports told me that if I applied for the carpenters of their ships, that " there were plenty in Balaklava harbour. I did apply to General Scarlett to make " application; all I know is that I did not get them; that is all that I know about it."

I will next refer to the evidence of Mr. Bracebridge at Question 448: " From your " long previous knowledge of the east, both summer and winter, do you think that useful " shelter for horses might with the aid of a few spars have been constructed from sail- " cloth at Kadikoi?—I think they would have been easily constructed with the aid of " spars in the valley of Kadikoi, and without on the plateau; but if the question is " confined to Kadikoi, it is simply, yes. 449. Having had considerable experience of " horses in foreign countries, is there any simple cover that you could set up for horses " with the aid of sailcoth; and if so, describe it?—Having seen in some parts of the camp " the cuttings that were made, I would describe those coverings by saying that at that " period, even at the worst of the weather, cuttings might have been made in the earth, " as they were afterwards, taking advantage of the very undulating ground. If the " question turns upon that particular plateau, taking more especial advantage of the " lower ground or open valley which lay about the eighth of a mile to the left, going to " head quarters, I conceive that cuttings could have been made, as they were afterwards " made, for perhaps three horses together."—Then follows a long calculation, and then Question 451: " You mean instead of putting up a cover over the horses you would put " this sailcloth over their bodies, so as completely to cover them?—Yes. 452. Instead " of putting up a regular roof?—Yes, the sides being protected by the earth. 453. Were " there not great facilities of intercourse between Constantinople and Balaklava?—When " I was at Scutari I had a great opportunity of observing, from crossing the Bosphorus " very frequently, and I should say there were on the average three vessels up and three " down in the day, in twenty-four hours, at the time we are speaking of, in the month " of May, certainly not less. 454. You have resided long, at different periods, at Con- " stantinople; do you think that there would be any difficulty in procuring sailcloth to " almost any extent there that may be required; we are speaking of the 210 topsails " as the extreme quantity required for 2,000 horses?—Certainly there would be no " difficulty; a simple order any day could accomplish it; but as the largest part of the " Turkish fleet was destroyed or in a non-active state in the harbour, almost any amount " of canvas could have been obtained in the Turkish arsenal. 455. Within what time " could it have been, in your opinion, sent over to the Crimea after being ordered?— " Ninety hours; thirty hours' voyage each way, and thirty hours to load the ship. " 456. You could have got what you require?—Double; what I should require would be " 210 topsails."

I shall next quote the evidence of Mr. Rawlinson, Question 424: "Supposing you had "had sailcloth in abundance, in what time could accommodation be put up for say 100 "horses, and with what number of men?—As I said before, I think that if there could "have been two good working men, with proper tools, spared to a horse, they might "have put up decent accommodation certainly within a week. 425. What I allude to is "temporary accommodation, merely for the purposes of sheltering the horses till the "wooden structures could be completed; how long would it have taken?—That I think "might have been done in one or two days, a mere temporary protection. That would "depend upon circumstances; if the horses were standing on a bare hard rock, that could "only be done by proper tools. If they were standing as they were when I saw them "in the valley of Kadikoi, that earth might have been dealt with, as I said, in one or two "days; that is, protection from the wind. 427. In what time with the assistance of sail- "cloth?—To have made a covered shelter? 428. Yes; of sailcloth?—I think it would "have taken, speaking without sitting down to make an estimate, a calvary man a week "per horse. 431. Do you conceive the erection of canvas stabling to be a rapid mode "of applying labour to covering in the horses?—Covering for the roof? 432. Or for the "sides altogether; roof and sides, if necessary?—It would require something very strong "to support canvas; if you made the sides as well as the roof of it, it would require very "strong uprights, because the power of the wind would be as the area of the face presented "to it. 439. Adverting to your evidence as to the advantages of sailcloth, are you of "opinion that there was a want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising for them some "means of temporary shelter in that way, supposing always that sailcloth could be pro- "cured?—I must again say that I cannot answer the question excepting as a civilian. I "do not know what may interfere with military men on service before the enemy. I "can only say that no railway contractor, or any person having to do with horses, would "have lost one twentieth part under the same conditions, if they had been struck on that "very ground, from the same causes that those horses were lost from."

I will refer now to the evidence of Colonel Low, Question 297: "Considering that the "difficulty of sheltering your horses could have been anticipated so far back as the mid- "dle of November, do not you think that it might have been practicable if you had "sent even to Constantinople for canvas and supports as well as workmen to have "had them back in time to have erected a slight stabling a month before the wooden "stabling could be completed?—I think it is perfectly possible. 298. Do not you "consider that it would have been a wise precaution?—If it could have been carried "out. By the word "possible," I mean I do not know what circumstances might have "prevented its being carried out. It was possible probably to have been done, and if "it could have been carried out it would have been a very wise measure. 314. "Provided sailcloth could have been obtained from the fleet or from Constantinople, "could that have been an advantageous mode of getting the horses rapidly under shelter, "which might have saved them till a more convenient structure could be put up?—So "far as my own opinion goes, provided such a thing could have taken place it would "have been advantageous." I must apologise to the Board for occupying their time in thus adducing evidence upon evidence, all equally strong, in confirmation of this point; but it is essential to show that there was scarcely a dissentient voice in regard to the preference for this description of shelter for the emergency among all who were examined upon the subject, particularly after the cavalry came to the sheltered valley of Kadikoi, early in December. Even Sir Richard Airey himself can say a few words in its favour; at Question 561: "Opinions have been expressed in your presence as to the advantage of "sailcloth by Colonel Griffiths, Colonel Low, and Colonel Douglas; do you concur with "them in the opinion that it might have been usefully applied in providing rapid "covering for the horses?—I think there can be no sort of doubt, if we had had "workmen and all the materials necessary for a framework, which is absolutely essential "before sailcloth can be made of any use at all; and if the material was of a substantial "nature, sufficient to bear the weight of the sailcloth and the effect of wind and rain "upon it, and we had spare time and hands, there can be no sort of doubt in any reason- "able mind that shelter for the horses would have been advantageous. 564. Could "not sailcloth in any quantity have been had in Constantinople, either from the arsenal "where, owing to the destruction of the fleet, there could be no demand for it, or from "the mercantile stores?—It is extremely difficult to say. Anybody who has had any "communication with Turkish officials well knows that their working is not extremely "rapid. From the delays and puttings off, and lies and shifting, it is impossible to "know where you are with any of them. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was fully aware "of our position, and was in constant communication with Lord Raglan, and was as "energetic as any man could be; and whatever was forthcoming from Constantinople "would have been sent by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Lord Raglan's communications "to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe were private notes; and, as I said before, I am quite "persuaded that everything which Constantinople yielded, and that we could afford "transport for under the great pressure of the other services, and that was required, was "sent off from Constantinople. At this time we had already made application to the "transport service, and had got from them all the sails, and spars, and tarpaulins, "and everything that we could get from them; and my correspondence with "Captain Christie will show that. With regard to other circumstances connected

*Colonel Tulloch*

25th April 1856.

" with the sailcloth, I heard Lord Lucan say yesterday or the day before that he intended " to ask for the attendance of Admirals Dundas and Lyons ; I do not think that Admiral " Lyons, who was always on the spot, always riding through the camps, always coming " up to Lord Raglan, and constantly in Balaklava, was the man to see all this going on " before him, and to have all the means of remedying it, and not have to come forward " himself and have proposed it."—Yet because the Commissioners, backed by all this evidence, have thought proper to point out that there was a want of promptitude or ingenuity (not, be it observed, on the part of the cavalry themselves, for nothing of that kind is alleged,) in devising for them some temporary shelter of this description, their Report has been rudely assailed. Lord Lucan apparently has a fancy for nothing but permanent wooden buildings, even at the risk of leaving the horses for a month or two longer uncovered, and, perhaps, finding when he has built the stables that there are no horses to put into them. The Commissioners have a preference for temporary stables of however slight a construction, and in this it would appear that their ideas are not singular, as nearly every officer that has been examined concurs with them. Though in common with many others I must confess myself surprised at the statement of Admiral Lyons in regard to the apparent want of sailcloth in the British fleet, I would beg the Board to suspend all conclusions upon that subject till the production of the return which I have suggested should be called for of the reserve supply on board each ship-of-war lying at or in the vicinity of Kazatch or Balaklava in the month of December 1854. If it cannot be had in any other way, I have no doubt that some member will assist in obtaining it through Parliament. But I would beg leave to call attention to the fact that sailcloth was never asked for ; no suggestion was made for it to Lord Raglan, and none by his lordship to the admiral. It may be also assumed that no attempt was made to procure it on an extensive scale among the shipping at Balaklava beyond the collection of a few old sails by Captain Heath, and which were so much in demand that the whole were exhausted before they reached the cavalry lines. Sir Edmund Lyons has explained that the spare sails are required for safety and efficiency, to replace those which are liable to be split every moment ; but he does not surely include in those, on such a coast and in the middle of winter, studding-sails and light gear of that description, which are only used in fine weather, and which afford so great a spread of canvas that they would probably have gone a long way to meet the difficulty. It was by no means necessary that enough should have been obtained for the whole of the cavalry ; nor did the cavalry then consist of 2,000 horses, as in the question put by Lord Lucan, but it more nearly approximated to half that number. Supposing, however, that no supply could have been obtained, even from those sources, was there anything to prevent an officer being sent to Constantinople to purchase all the canvas required for the purpose? About 20,000 yards would have been sufficient, or half that quantity had the ground been previously scarped to the depth of three feet. The officer might have been back in less than a week with sufficient to commence with ; and in a town built of wood, and containing 800,000 inhabitants, it would be a waste of your time to prove that there must be abundance of carpenters who might have been brought over capable at least of putting together the framework of such stabling. By the middle or end of December an abundance of hut scantling had been received which might have been converted to this purpose, and all the horses thus placed under cover nearly two months earlier than ultimately was the case, which would have saved nearly half their number. The evidence of Admiral Lyons, however defective on the subject of sailcloth, affords useful information as to the value of the shelter to be obtained by throwing up embankments of a certain height in the direction of the prevalent and piercing north-east winds. I refer to page 156, Question 882 : "Sir George Berkeley wishes to have this question put to " you, You said you were constantly in the habit of riding through the camp and lines ; did " it strike you that anywant of promptitude and ingenuity existed in not having the cavalry " horses more under shelter ? Certainly not ; I saw a great many officers occupied in shel- " tering their horses, their own and the horses of their regiment, in a way that appeared " to be the most efficicious, and it was by throwing up an embankment of a certain height " in the direction of the prevalent and piercing north-east wind ; and I think that the " result justified the opinion that I formed. My friend Sir George Brown's horses never " had any other shelter from first to last, although they were often dug out of the snow ; " they were without any covering whatsoever on their backs ; and I believe that Colonel " David Wood of the Artillery, who saved all or most of his horses, treated them in " exactly the same way. I perfectly remember Lord Raglan expressing to him in my " presence the great satisfaction he felt at the care he had taken of his horses, and he " had no shelter. Perhaps the most direct answer to the question is, that everybody " appeared to me to be hard at work doing their best."—This precaution has on many occasions been adverted to in the course of this evidence, and objections stated to it ; but if it was so useful in the case of the horses of Sir George Brown and Colonel Wood, there appears no reason why it should not have been used on a more extensive scale for the cavalry. The admiral also shows this in the case of Captain Heath, at Question 889: " Captain Heath, on hearing that about 300 fine mules were expected from Spain, " and having seen with his own eyes that for the want of shelter of some sort they " died very soon after their arrival, proposed to Lord Raglan to build with the re- " sources of the fleet stabling for those mules ; I have his letter here in which he says,

*Colonel Tulloch.*

25th April 1856.

" ' As all our skilled carpenters are already employed for the army, I did not like to " ' withdraw one of them, but I put about 30 or 40 seamen under direction of a boatswain, " ' and they erected those stables;' which lasted through and certainly they were very " good, and I believe a great many of those mules are still alive."—And thus it appears that it did not require regular carpenters to erect stabling when 30 or 40 seamen under the direction of a boatswain could accomplish it. There were many such seamen and boatswains in Balaklava harbour, and there can be little doubt that proper inducement in the shape of pay would have brought them forward to assist in the erection of temporary stablings for the cavalry horses just as readily as the others were obtained to provide shelter for 300 mules. While on this subject, I beg leave to direct attention to a statement by General Airey, page 107 of the proceedings, in answer to Question 600, where he states: "Some officer has stated here that the captains of ships spoke to him " and said, What a pity it is that you do not employ our crews, and take our ships' " artificers; and without wishing to make the slightest reflection upon that body of " men, there was a consideration suggested to me by Captain Christie and by Admiral " Boxer on that subject, which was this: The service upon which they were " employed was of the most disagreeable nature possible; they were thrashing up " and down the Black Sea, going backwards and forwards, to Marseilles and to the " different ports of Asia Minor, and Varna and Scutari, and a most unpleasant " service it was. Now what I wish to say, with the greatest delicacy, with regard " to that body of men, is this, that had these crews and artificers been taken away " from them to go on with the public works of the army, their vessels, instead " of doing this arduous and disagreeable service of going up and down the Black " Sea, would have been safely anchored at Balaklava harbour. They would have lived " in their ships very comfortably, and would have got demurrage. The money would have " been paid for the detention of their vessels, and other vessels would have been knocking " about in the Black Sea. It is only a question of human nature; and, perhaps, to " some one captain or two it may have suggested itself to his mind to remain quietly in " Balaklava harbour, and give his crew for the service of the army rather than performing " the other service. That was the difficulty we had to contend with, and those were the " considerations represented to me by Admiral Boxer and Captain Christie as to the " employment of these crews."—Now this objection might hold good if it referred only to vessels for which there was constant employment of this description; but it is well known that there were several vessels lying in Balaklava harbour employed only as store ships, and there were the horse transports and vessels that came with the huts, and which could not be discharged, owing to the difficulties of carrying huts to the front. If reference be made to the return at volume 4, page 347, of the Report upon the Army before Sebastopol (the Parliamentary Report), it will be seen that some of those vessels lay in the harbour from one to two months; there were also the crews of many of the ships waiting to dispose of their cargoes, and the crews of the contract ships waiting to discharge, in all there would probably not have been fewer than 500 men; and if those could have been induced for an adequate consideration to exert themselves in the same manner as the 20 or 30 employed by Captain Heath it will readily be seen how rapidly the question of cavalry stables would have been disposed of. But can it be shown that any attempt was made to turn the services of all these men to account? Can it be shown what offers of payment were made? what inducements held out in a measure of so much importance? And if such opportunities were neglected, was not this a want of ingenuity, though I do not infer that it was attributable to the cavalry?

Although I take into account the possibility that it might have been necessary to handymen or carpenters to assist in putting up the sailcloth when obtained, I do not concur in its being so very difficult as the quartermaster general supposes for cavalry soldiers to do anything beyond attending to themselves and their horses, particularly at a time when war was shorn of all its pomp, and the soldier had little more than the soiled and tattered clothing he stood in. At that time too the cavalry horses were decreasing in a much larger proportion than the men, and no extra labour could have arisen in consequence of the excess of the former over the latter. But even had the men been able to do little or nothing, there was of course the greater necessity for using sailcloth, as involving less trouble in the erection than wood, and being lighter to carry.

Lord Lucan and the Quartermaster-general have, qunfortunately for themselves, proved too much with regard to the difficulty of the cavalry soldier assisting in such work; as the less time they had for this purpose, the greater must have been the necessity for their work being facilitated by the employment of light materials, and for the Commissioners pointing out that there appeared to have been a want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising some means of temporary shelter by the use of sailcloth.

With reference to that part of the evidence which relates to the number of men available for the construction of stables, I would beg to call attention to the fact that though it has been admitted that about 1,400 men were present in December and January, exclusive of the sick, officers' servants, and detached parties, none of the military witnesses have yet done me the favour of pointing out how they were employed, so as to leave few or none available for the duty of providing shelter even when the task of carrying commissariat stores to the front had in a great measure ceased. I do not wish to pry unnecessarily into those matters; but I trust the Board will bear in mind how studiously

*Colonel Tulloch.*

25th April 1856.

every reply to my question on that subject has been avoided, though it was only from such information that I could show to what extent shelter could have been provided by the numbers available. I was anxious to have done this, in order to show that the means at the disposal of Lord Lucan for this purpose were not quite so limited as he seemed to consider in his explanatory letter to Lord Panmure; but not because that information was in any way required to account for the expression he complains of in the Report, which referred only to the want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising, (not in erecting or completing) some means of temporary shelter. In leaving this topic, on which the information obtainable from the witnesses is so defective, without any further comment, I feel confident that the Board must see that if the inference be drawn that there was no want of promptitude on the part of any person or department in turning the labour of so large a body of cavalry soldiers to account in providing temporary shelter, such a conclusion must involve the apparent anomaly that many hundreds of cavalry soldiers must, in that case, have been labouring for more than six weeks, between the 12th November and the beginning of January, without producing any visible results, in the erection of temporary shelter, and this when the labour of one man for a week ought even upon a liberal calculation have sufficed to shelter his horses.

It will be observed that in the report not one of the officers alludes to any erection for the cover of the horses having been commenced in December, and it was upon that evidence the Commissioners had to frame their Report. The only reference to depôt stables erected under Lord Lucan's superintendence is in the evidence of Major Benson of the 17th Lancers (see the Report of the Commissioners, at page 6 of the evidence), who merely states that his regiment was covered in from the 13th of January, and that stables were erected for them by Lord Lucan. It was not, therefore, surprising that the Commissioners should not have noticed those specially as part of the labour of the cavalry, seeing that the officers took no credit to themselves for the work, and all that the Commissioners could learn respecting them was that some of the artificers of each regiment, but a very limited number, were employed in their construction, with a few Sappers and Miners and a portion of the Turkish troops to assist. In considering the extent of labour which might have been expected from the cavalry at this period, it must be kept in view that they were exempt from the siege operations which then pressed so heavily on the other troops, that the mortality among them was little more than one half of the average amongst the infantry corps in front, the sickness much less, and that they were not exposed to the same harassing fatigue parties between the front and Balaklava, and that while the infantry had to bring up supplies on their backs, the cavalry, even when conveying provisions to the front rode one horse and led another. It is not for me to question the policy of this arrangement as a means of preserving the health and energies of the men; but that very circumstance of course must, by diminishing their fatigue, have increased their capability of labouring to provide shelter for their horses. We have heard a great deal of the duties of the cavalry soldier preventing him from doing anything towards erecting the stabling; but what were those fatigues contrasted with those of the infantry soldiers in the front, which are thus described by some of the medical officers:—At page 158 of the Appendix to the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Dr Alexander states as follows, "In the 7th Fusileers men were in the "trenches 24 hours without relief, up to or about the 17th November. On the 14th "two companies were kept in piquet for 36 hours, when of course no cooking took "place. In the 19th regiment, taking the total number of hours for November, viz., "720, 304 have been passed by the men either on duty in the trenches, or on picket, "which is 10 hours daily for each man, the remaining 14 being passed in bringing water, "seeking for fuel, cooking, and other duties, &c. &c. In the 23d Fusileers the average "return gives to each man one night in camp and one on duty; many men, however, "had to go on duty with their companies two or three nights running, doing 24 hours' "duty to 12 in camp. In the 33d regiment the men on an average were something "less than one night in their tents, with water and fuel fatigues when off duty; they are "in consequence, weak and wasted from the incessant and severe duty. In the 77th regi-"ment the men were either in the trenches or outlying piquet every second night; on the "intervening days guards, besides water and fuel, fatigues, &c. In the 88th regiment no "man has ever more than one night in his tent; has 12 hours in the trenches and 24 "hours on piquet; then to look after wood for cooking, water, &c. In the Rifle Brigade "(2d battalion) the right wing, consisting of four companies, furnished during 27 days "in November 19 duties, 16 of which were night duties, extending over a period of 408 "hours, and, on an average of two and a half companies on duty daily, of 15 hours, dura-"tion for the 27 days, or twenty-one and a half hours' on each duty; thus showing an "average of nine hours daily off duty; the company was five out of six nights on duty; "three companies, seven out of nine. From the above it will be observed what "harassing duties the men have had to perform, and when not on duty most of their "time that ought to have been devoted to rest was spent in collecting brushwood for "cooking, carrying water, &c. &c."—This refers merely to one of the divisions, the light division; but if the duty of the cavalry soldier was such as to render it extraordinary that he should be able to do anything towards erecting temporary stabling, the necessity for assistance should have been foreseen long before, unless the risk of the horses perishing were deemed a minor consideration to the expense of bringing over sailcloth and

*Colonel Tulloch.*
25th April 1856.

carpenters from Constantinople if not procurable at Balaklava. The absence of such measures cannot, I apprehend, be considered other than a want of promptitude or ingenuity, and in no point of view can this conclusion be averted; for if the duties were sufficiently light the men should have done the work at an earlier period themselves; if they were too severe, they should have had assistance obtained in proper time, to a sufficient extent, and at any price.

Permit me next to refer to such parts of the evidence as relate to the case of Colonel Griffiths. Lord Lucan has now had ample opportunities of satisfying himself whether the statements made by the Commissioners on that head were consistent with the evidence of that officer; but I must observe that they considered themselves in no way responsible for his accuracy; they merely gave the facts as narrated to them. It is but just, however, to Colonel Griffiths to observe, that his statement was given, not voluntarily or extraneously, but after repeated questions by the Commissioners why the ample stores at hand for the erection of sheds had not been sooner applied to sheltering the horses. After the perusal of the evidence of Colonel Griffiths I feel convinced that no member of this Board can entertain a doubt that the Commissioners have been more than borne out in their assertions on that subject. With regard to the inference drawn from the statement, that such a reception was calculated to deter other officers from making a similar proposal, that appears so obvious as scarcely to require evidence; but that there might be no doubt upon the matter, I put question 995 to Colonel Low, by whom it was answered in the affirmative; and if it were necessary to offer any explanation why reference should have been made to the subject at all in the Report, I would point out that when Colonel Griffiths was, in common with other officers, examined by the Commissioners, and had after some hesitation made the statement referred to, the Commissioners would not probably have been disposed to take any further notice of it, as being rather out of their course; but when they found by the replies of the quartermaster-general that the period at which this suggestion had been made and rejected in so summary a manner was only two days after his order of the 12th of November directing temporary shelter to be provided, the case assumed a very different aspect, as I have no doubt it will to the Board; it was then no longer the rejection of the suggestion of Colonel Griffiths, which might or might not be an expedient one, but it appeared tantamount to a refusal to carry into effect the previous order of the quartermaster-general, even when a junior officer volunteered to provide the shelter. This seemed to bear materially on the question of delay into which the Commissioners were inquiring, and as such it seemed to be their duty to bring it to notice, but in terms which were least likely to be offensive to the party implicated.

Keeping in view that I am here to defend myself and the Report, and not to attack or prosecute others, it appears to me that the further observations I have to make need not long occupy the attention of the Board.

Lord Lucan in his address first accused me of publishing erroneous returns and calculations from a feeling of malignity towards the cavalry; but that accusation he has since withdrawn. He next asserted that there had been no cavalry brigade in the Crimea on the 1st of October, an assertion which, from a return recently submitted to the Board, I presume he is now willing to disavow. He then attacked the comparison that I had made between the loss of cavalry horses and of transport animals; which I have answered by explaining to the Board the difference between what is termed an aggregate mortality and an average mortality, and showing that had I adopted any other mode of calculation the result would have appeared more unfavourable to the cavalry than I had made it. To put at rest all questions in respect to such calculations, I have submitted to the Board a letter from Dr. Farr, the Superintendent of the Statistical Department at Somerset House, the highest authority, I believe, on such questions in the kingdom, explaining his views as to the manner in which those calculations should be made, and which corresponds exactly with the course which I have adopted. I have, in question 670, also shown the Board that the dates given in the Report as those at which the cavalry soldiers were hutted are as correct an abstract as can be made from the replies of the officers commanding the cavalry to the queries of the Commissioners on that head; and at question 672 I understand Lord Lucan to express himself satisfied on that point. In regard to all those minor objections it therefore appears unnecessary for me to take up your time longer.

The next question of any importance relates to the Returns of Colonel Hodge and Lieutenant Colonel Mayow, alleged by Lord Lucan to be incorrect. Of this, however, there is yet no further proof that I am aware of before the Board than what appears from the evidence of Major Conolly. It is not, I believe, usual to set aside a return deliberately drawn up and signed by a superior officer on the mere allegation by a junior that that officer has admitted it to be incorrect. Supposing, however, it were so, the Commissioners are in no respect responsible; they applied to the proper persons for information, the one being the officer commanding the heavy brigade; the other the brigade major of the light brigade at the time that the duty in question was in operation; the Commissioners were bound to accept those returns as correct on such authority, and entitled to draw their conclusions from them. Fortunately, these conclusions are not of such a nature as to be affected materially by the alleged

*Colonel Tulloch.*

25th April 1856.

errors: for it will be found even on the basis of Colonel Conolly's returns, that the number of men employed in carrying commissariat stores and sick was still only equal to about a fifth part of the whole. With regard to the concluding part of that paragraph, where it is stated that the Commissioners considered it strange that more rapid progress was not made in obtaining the advantage of hut accommodation for the men, Lord Lucan has at page 20 of the proceedings explained that he could not get huts earlier than the end of January or beginning of February; and as General Airey in answer to Question 588 makes the admission that he thinks it very probable that huts could not have been given, because they were wanted for the men in the front, it would appear that this part of the delay may not have been the fault of the cavalry; but the allegation that the huts were wanted for the men in front affords no satisfactory explanation for refusing them to Lord Lucan, as it will be seen by reference to the dates of their arrival from England, and of the sailing of the vessels after being unladen (see page 347 of the fourth Report of the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol); that four of those vessels which arrived in the end of December or the beginning of January were from 46 to 70 days in the harbour, and that the greater part of those which arrived in December and in the early part of January were still there unladen in the month of February. To whatever, cause, therefore the refusal may be attributable, it certainly cannot have been the want of huts; and though the cavalry may be acquitted of all blame for the delay, that acquittal must necessarily implicate some other department; and affords an additional proof of the necessity on the part of the Commissioners for indicating what they conceived to have been wrong, instead of determining who was to be responsible for it.

The last though not the least of Lord Lucan's objections refers to the Commissioners having exceeded their instructions, which he understands to have had reference only to commissariat matters. I can but attribute his lordship's error, as well as that of General Airey on the same subject, to the circumstance of their having, perhaps, merely perused the first letter of instructions, and not being aware that the second, written a couple of days afterwards, was intended to give the Commissioners more general and ample power of inquiring into the delay in the distribution of all the stores, which had then begun to attract public attention at home. Any question, however, on this head must, it is submitted, be completely set at rest by the approval expressed by the head of Her Majesty's Government of the conduct of the Commissioners throughout those investigations. Some parts of the Report originally made to the Secretary for War having been excluded from that laid before parliament on the ground that the Commissioners had no authority for going into such points, it follows as a natural inference that the Government had satisfied themselves that the remaining portions came within the scope of their instructions For my own part I can assure the Board, that could I honourably have interpreted our instructions in this restricted sense, I should most gladly have done so, as I was well aware that it would have saved us the pain of being brought into antagonism with several departments, instead of one only. In every indication as to where blame appeared to rest, the Commissioners endeavoured to frame the Report in the most guarded manner. This precaution, however, I am sorry to find has raised up enemies in various quarters, when a more decided opinion would, perhaps, have involved the hostility of one only. But for this there is no remedy. It is one of the painful consequences in which the honest discharge of my duty to the Government and the country has involved me. Care and toil, injustice and ill-will form, as has been truly said, a part of the burthen that must be borne by every man who serves the state.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) The Board wish to know whether you can conveniently proceed with your reply to-morrow.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I would prefer, if it were equally convenient to the Board, that it should be postponed till Monday. I think it is necessary that I should see the printed minutes of what has fallen from Colonel Tulloch. I do not think that I should do myself or the case justice if I were not allowed till Monday, to refer to the printed minutes of the statement made by Colonel Tulloch.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board regret that there should be a postponement till Monday. They expected that you would have been able to proceed to-morrow; but for the reason you have assigned, and conceding that to you which was conceded to Colonel Tulloch, they assent to postpone your reply till Monday.

(*Lieutenant General Rowan to Lord Lucan.*) Is it likely that you will conclude on Monday?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Certainly.

(*Lieutenant General Rowan.*) You will not require the whole day?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I should think not. I should think I shall occupy about three hours.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) The Board will hear your reply at 11 on Monday; and if you should conclude in time, the Board will then proceed with the case of Lord Cardigan.

Adjourned to Monday, at Eleven o'clock.

## THIRTEENTH DAY.

### 28th April 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, my Lord and Gentlemen,—Although in Colonel Tulloch's summing up but little reached my ear which I thought would require much comment or notice, I still felt that it would be safer that I should be given an opportunity carefully to peruse a copy of his statement. This I have now done, and it appears to me to have only two objects, the one, and the principal one, not to uphold the Report, but to excuse the Commissioners for having made it, and, whilst claiming credit for the most generous and charitable intentions and the strictest honesty of purpose, to secure the sympathy of this Board and of the public for all those difficulties which he laments as having drawn him into so much miscalculation and error, and as having occasioned so many false inferences and false conclusions. Colonel Tulloch's second object appears to be entirely to exonerate me and the cavalry from blame, and to have it inferred that the charge of want of promptitude and ingenuity no longer applies to us but to others. I am ready to acknowledge that I have little to take exception to in the tone, manner, and spirit of his address; but I might complain that in reference to the evidence he ingeniously enough quoted such parts only as he considered favourable to his own views, whilst he passed by those of a different complexion; and that he assumed that I had abandoned or was prepared to abandon many of the objections which I made in my opening; and Colonel Tulloch will, I think, see the fallacy of this assumption before my reply is concluded; for, on the contrary, I am ready to show that every part of my original statement is now established truth, and that the unvarying incorrectness of the figures and the facts contained in the Report are as great as I have stated them to be, and as unpardonable as from the gravity of the occasion they must be considered. Colonel Tulloch, whilst in the opening of his address he complains of the difficult position in which he is placed by having to establish by evidence in England the correctness of the conclusions arrived at by Sir John M'Neill and himself upon evidence taken in the Crimea, concludes by representing himself as the victim of prejudice and misrepresentation, and laments the enemies he has raised up in various quarters, by the honest discharge of his duty to the Government and to the country. But only contrast his position with mine. In the Crimea, as Government Commissioner, every source of information was laid open to him, and he carried on his inquiries, as we shall see in the sequel, in the way in which he chose. Here he has taken pains to inform the Board how warmly and zealously it is supported, aye, and is to be supported, by the Government and the War Office. In addition to which, he has the popular prejudice on his side, and is vehemently, eagerly, and clamorously supported by the press. All his witnesses are applauded, whilst each witness who appears on my side is run down; for when the clear and manly evidence of Sir Edmund Lyons cannot escape ridicule and misrepresentation, who can hope to be safe? I do not require to be assured that this Board is not to be influenced by such means, but can any human being doubt that the cause of justice is thereby impeded and perverted? or can it be supposed that witnesses will come forward as readily when they are sure to be calumniated as when they are sure to be held up to admiration? It is not Colonel Tulloch, I think, who has to claim the indulgence of this Court and the charitable consideration of his countrymen. For myself, I ask for nothing but to have justice at your hands. I feel, my conscience tells me, that I have done my duty; and let this most painful, and, for a general officer, most extraordinary and humiliating inquiry, end how it may, I shall never fear being haunted by the reproach of having in any one respect neglected the comfort and efficiency of the gallant troops confided to my care. I have, I think, now noticed, as far as is at present necessary, Colonel Tulloch's address, and will proceed with my reply.

Although Colonel Tulloch has not in his examination of any witness, not even of Colonel Griffiths himself, attempted to establish that that officer or other officers was or were in the remotest degree discouraged or deterred in the exercise of their ingenuity to give all the shelter possible to their horses which may have suggested itself to them, or which, under circumstances of perhaps unparalleled difficulty, they might have found practicable, I have, on the contrary, not failed to show by the evidence of the general commanding the heavy brigade, and of other commanding officers, that, so far from being discouraged or deterred by me in anything or in any way, I did, so far as lay in my power, encourage and urge every one to make every possible exertion. I might therefore consider the inference so unfairly drawn by the Commissioners from the altercation between me and Colonel Griffiths as purely gratuitous and groundless, and pass by that paragraph of the Report as altogether beside the question for the consideration and decision of this Board. I will not, however, allow this the first opportunity which has been yet offered me escape by without stating what, to the best of my recollection and belief, passed between Colonel Griffiths and myself on the

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

occasion referred to. Colonel Griffiths has told the Board that this matter occurred on the morning of the 16th of November, and that Lord William Paulett, Colonel Hodge, and others were present, but who those others were he was unable to recollect. I have no positive recollection of this part of the question; but I do recollect that Colonel Griffiths visited me one morning, as was usual with the field officer of the day, to take my orders about the pickets, and I recollect well complimenting him familiarly upon a greyish white great coat which he told me he had provided himself with from Constantinople. He subsequently said something about the future permanence of the camp, to which I most probably replied, as stated by him, "How can I tell you "what we are about to do?" He then continued, and in a tone of reproach. My reply I am quite unable to recollect; but I have no doubt, and I believe that I received with a sneer, some extravagant suggestion on a matter which I had uppermost in my mind, and was discussing at the time with the commander-in-chief and the quartermaster-general of the army, as can be shown by my correspondence. To my amazement Colonel Griffiths threw himself back on his horse, and said, "You are not speaking to me like a "gentleman," or "treating me like a gentleman," I do not remember which; but I told him to be quiet, or I would place him under arrest. He continued that he was only saying what one gentleman might say to another, when I desired him to hold his tongue, and to join his picket. I have now given to the Board the whole of my present recollection of this incident; and I do declare, upon my honour as an officer and a gentleman, that I have, without the slightest reserve or qualification, stated the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. If the Board consider, as they must, that this recital differs materially from that given by Colonel Griffiths, I ask them to weigh which is the most probable. Do you general officers of great experience think it likely, that immediately after a familiar conversation with an officer on a matter so trifling as his coat, I should threaten with immediate arrest that officer if he only suggested a matter connected with the welfare of his regiment. I speak in the presence of many officers who were equally under my command in the army of the East; my words will probably reach the ears of many officers who served under me during the eleven years that I commanded a regiment of lancers. I ask them one and all whether such was my mode of conducting myself or treating them when they approached me on business, and more particularly when they displayed zeal and anxiety in the promotion of the service. Colonel Griffiths has stated that gross words passed between us. I altogether deny having given expression to one single gross word, nor can I recollect any such expression from him. I hope that, had he so further committed himself, I should not have been so wanting in my duty, and what was due to my position, as not to have at once and very seriously noticed it. If the veracity of our statements is to be taken upon the superior excellence of our memories, I say that in no part of this inquiry have I shown my memory to be very faulty or defective, and I confidently ask the Board to test the value of Colonel Griffiths' memory by the evidence and the statements which he has made to this Board. He could recollect but very little, and what he did recollect was not very accurate. He mentioned that his regiment had changed its encampment from its arrival at Balaklava up to the 14th of November twenty-seven or at least twenty times; whereas Major Conolly has told you, and I can confirm it, that the regiment only changed its encampment seven times. It would be difficult to explain how Colonel Griffiths should have deceived himself so far in this matter; but I can well understand that the change of encampment must have occasioned to him an extent of trouble and inconvenience so far exceeding that of any other officer, from the necessity which it imposed upon him of removing his well regulated domestic and culinary establishment, that it must have left, as it appears to have done, impressions exaggerated and unfounded. Indeed Colonel Griffiths' memory does not seem to have been very accurate when speaking of events then recent, for he appears in his evidence before the Commissioners to have allowed them to understand that the stabling of his regiment had been constructed at his own expense by five French soldiers, when, by the explanations which he has thought it necessary to volunteer to this Board, it appears that a few Zouaves only assisted for a day or two previously to the 3rd of January, and that subsequently and entirely from that time the Scots Greys constructed the whole of their stabling themselves; in which again he is not perfectly correct, inasmuch as they were assisted on some occasions by Turks sent to them by me for that purpose. To Colonel Griffiths it must be best known what induced him after the lapse of many months so gratuitously to seize such an opportunity of bringing before the Commissioners an altercation which had taken place between him and myself, and which he does not pretend, for he cannot, to have in the slightest degree influenced him or others in the discharge of their duty. I will not suppose that he was actuated by ill-will or malevolence, so inconsistent would that be with his professions of sympathy and regret on my being recalled from my command. I am more inclined to suppose that he was actuated by that anxious desire, which can be traced in every line of his evidence, to dwell upon his own superior merits. I shall now leave this part of the subject, it being, as I have already said, become immaterial, and beside the question, in consequence of Colonel Tulloch never having by any one witness attempted to prop up his reflections upon me by proof. Colonel Tulloch was

asked by my last question, in the printed Minutes, at question 805,—"Had you found on "inquiry that at the period referred to we had neither labour, implements, nor materials, "would the knowledge of those facts have induced you to frame your Report "differently?" And his answer is, "I am not aware that it would, because I "think you will find that it is not stated; there is nothing stated with regard to any "blame being attachable particularly to the cavalry. It is probable if I had known it "to a greater extent, that Sir John M'Neill and myself might have been more par-"ticular in pointing out that probably another department would have been in fault: "it is quite possible; but as we did not allude to the cavalry as to showing a want of "promptitude and ingenuity, I do not see that we should have required to have made "any material alteration in it."

Were this an ordinary charge brought in one of the ordinary courts of law, after such an answer, supported as it has been by his subsequent statement, I might save this Court and myself any further trouble in this tedious inquiry, by at once closing my case, which indeed might, after such an admission from the prosecutor, well be considered as abandoned by him; but as such a course would be as little satisfactory to myself as it would be to the public, I am compelled to address this Court, and to call their attention to, and to comment upon what has been given in evidence before them. I propose commencing with that part of the Report at page 20, which gives the per-centage of the deaths of the horses. Colonel Tulloch has attached, I think, very undue importance to a remark which fell from me on a former occasion, when I observed on his return of the 1st of October, that the heavy cavalry did not happen to be in the country at that time. It will be remembered by this Court that I did not attach any importance whatever to the incorrectness of this return; but as I undertook, and as I still undertake, to show that every return and every figure in the Report affecting the cavalry and myself are incorrect, I considered it necessary not even to pass this by, but to show its incorrectness, which I still maintain. I have established that of the heavy cavalry there were not 1,055 horses in the Crimea on the 1st of October. I knew at the time, and I know it now, that excepting the Scots Greys, which had landed on the Katcha a week or ten days previously, on the morning of the 1st of October, there was not one single man of the heavy brigade landed; and it was only on the 5th or 6th of the month, by the arrival of the Enniskilling Dragoons and the Royal Dragoons, that the heavy brigade, mentioned as consisting of 1,055 horses, became complete. Therefore, all I can say with regard to that is, that I made no statement at all incorrect, and therefore I must disappoint Colonel Tulloch if he expects that I am prepared to admit any error on my part.

With regard to the calculations, I am not going to trouble the Court with any abstruse statistical calculations, which I question very much whether they are more competent than I am to understand; therefore, my calculations will be simply arithmetical, and I hope within reach of the understanding of the meanest intellect. They will not pretend to show that the horses died more than once; nor will they in the least resemble that mass of rubbish and stuff which has been given to us, and than which I never heard anything more unintelligible.

The circumstances with regard to the losses in the light brigade and the heavy brigade are these—I am taking as correct Colonel Tulloch's figures, a very handsome proceeding on my part I think, as whenever I have had an opportunity of sifting them, they have always been wrong:—In the heavy brigade, putting them at 1,055 horses, and deducting 83 as killed, there remained 972; died 493, survived 479; loss as near as possible of horses by sickness or casualties other than killed in action, according to the above table, 50 per cent. With regard to the light brigade, taking again Colonel Tulloch's numbers, 1161; killed or transferred 489; leaving 672; died 439; survived 233; loss, 65 per cent.

Now, I did not on a former occasion allude to the last line of the return before me; and perhaps the Board will be good enough to revert to page 193 of the Appendix; but it has become necessary, in consequence of what fell from Colonel Tulloch in his statement. Colonel Tulloch, I suppose, finding that he had accidentally overlooked an opportunity of making a disadvantageous comparison between the artillery and the cavalry, did so in his reply, and he then told you how excessively successful Colonel Wood was. I think he went so far as to say that he lost no horses at all. Now with regard to Colonel Wood, before I go into this case, I beg to say that he is a friend of mine. I knew him long before he went to the Crimea; and I saw perhaps more of him than of other artillery officers in the Crimea, and there is nobody more ready to do justice to him than myself. I believe there was no officer in that army more anxious for his men and horses, and I believe he was as successful as any other. But let us see what happened to him, who is supposed to have lost no horses; and to show that I must begin by showing the inconsistency of the Appendix at page 193 with the account in the Report at page 20. Here Colonel Tulloch states that the artillery lost 42 per cent. Now what did they lose? If I am found speaking of Colonel Tulloch instead of the Commissioners, I really do not mean more than that Colonel Tulloch has alone come forward here to uphold the Report; I owe him the greatest thanks, for I say that my defence would have been most incomplete had he not done so. I think that the whole army ought to feel gratitude to Colonel

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

Tulloch for coming forward in the manly way he has done, and for the pertinacity he has displayed in his determination to uphold this hopeless Report; and I think if Sir John M'Neill had shown the same nerve he would have taken a course more creditable to him. Under these circumstances, I am sorry to be obliged to expose what I really do think is one of the most extraordinary mistakes I ever heard of. Colonel Tulloch told you at one time that 42 per cent. of the artillery horses died; he has since told you that Colonel Wood was so successful with his battery that he lost no horses. The adjutant general of artillery states that the proportion in which the loss fell on each of the batteries, according to their locality, was as follows: Seven batteries stationed at the front—Colonel Wood's was one of them—lost four-fifths of each battery; these were exposed all the winter, and had to fetch their own forage daily from Balaklava. W. battery"—that is Captain Barker's battery, for I knew it well—lost one-sixth of their horses; these were stationed at Balaklava all the winter,—C. and I. troop." Two troops attached to me, and I suppose therefore that had there been much cause for blame it would not have escaped the Commissioners. Lost one half of these; were a part of the winter at Balaklava. What is the result? That the seven batteries in front lost 80 per cent. of their horses, that W. battery lost 17 per cent. of their horses, and that C. and I. troops lost one-half. A loss throughout the artillery 67 per cent., exceeding that of the light cavalry brigade by two per cent., that of the heavy brigade by 17 per cent., and exceeding the number stated in this return by no less than 25 per cent. Therefore, notwithstanding all the exertions of Colonel Wood, and all the success which attended those exertions, although he is said to have lost no horses at all, he appears to have lost 80 per cent.; and throughout the whole of the artillery, the losses are 25 per cent. greater than Colonel Tulloch has stated them to be. W. battery, which lost so small a proportion of horses, was peculiarly favoured, as they were placed in stationary winter quarters close to Balaklava so early as the middle of October, had little to do but to take care of their horses, and because they were attached to Sir Colin Campbell's division got every assistance he could give them. So much was this the case, that when no Turks could be found for the cavalry, 100 Turks were given to Captain Barker during two or three months to assist in the construction of his stabling. Captain Barker looked as zealously after his battery as possible; but, with all these advantages, and perhaps the still greater one of being allowed to draw his forage with the rest of the artillery in the morning, when the cavalry had to content themselves with what they found left in the afternoon, his smaller loss of horses tells with no disparagement to the cavalry or the remainder of the artillery. I have not seen the return which the Board were good enough at my suggestion to call for. A return of the number of baggage animals——

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to interrupt your Lordship. I have the permission of the Judge Advocate General to point out that it was not I who stated that the horses of Colonel Wood were saved; it was your own witness, Sir Edmund Lyons.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I do not deny that; I only say that in your summing up you said so. I say this, and I think my recollection does not deceive me, that in the summing up on Friday Colonel Tulloch did state. I quite admit, on the strength of what had fallen from Sir Edmund Lyons, that Colonel Wood had been most successful and had not lost any horses.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to say that I stated nothing of the kind, and I will, with the permission of the Board, read what was stated.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) Do you refer to any particular passage?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) No; I speak from recollection.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to be permitted to read the evidence of Admiral Lyons. However defective on the subject of sailcloth, it affords useful information as to the value of the shelter to be obtained by throwing up embankments of a certain height in the direction of the prevalent and piercing north-east winds. I refer to question 882 :—

" (*Judge Advocate General.*) Sir George Berkeley wishes to have this question put to
" you. You said you were constantly in the habit of riding through the camp and lines;
" did it strike you that any want of promptitude and ingenuity existed in not having
" the cavalry horses more under shelter?—Certainly not. I saw a great many
" officers occupied in sheltering their horses—their own and the horses of their
" regiments—in a way that appeared to be the most efficacious, and it was by throwing
" up an embankment of a certain height in the direction of the prevalent and piercing
" north-east wind, and I think that the result justified the opinion that I formed. My
" friend Sir George Brown's horses never had any other shelter from first to last, although
" they were often dug out of the snow; they were without any covering whatsoever on
" their backs; and I believe that Colonel David Wood of the artillery, who saved all or
" most of his horses, treated them in exactly the same way. I perfectly remember Lord
" Raglan expressing to him in my presence the great satisfaction he felt at the care he
" had taken of his horses, and he had no shelter. Perhaps the most direct answer to the
" question is, that everybody appeared to me to be hard at work doing their best. This
" precaution has on many occasions been adverted to in the course of this evidence,
" and objecti ons stated to it, but if it was so useful in the care of the horses of Sir George

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

" Brown and Colonel Wood, there appears no reason why it should not have been used " on a most extensive scale for the cavalry." I beg to state that it is the evidence of Admiral Lyons himself, and not anything that I stated.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I did not say that that was given as evidence by Colonel Tulloch, but on the contrary that it had been stated by Sir Edmund Lyons, but adopted by Colonel Tulloch when he referred to it and read it at length to the Board in his statement.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I did not adopt it. I could not have stated it so, with the contrary evidence before me; and I beg that in future the facts may be referred to.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I do not know whether the Board has ever got that return of the baggage animals which was ordered by them—a return of the number of baggage animals at different times in the Crimea.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) It has been applied for, but it has not yet been supplied.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) If it cannot be produced it is most discreditable to the War Department. I think when the authorities in the field are so much found fault with, it is worthy of remark that the business is so well done at home that it is not possible at the end of three weeks to ascertain what the transport of the army in the East ever consisted of; how many animals were provided; how many there were efficient or non-efficient at any time; or what had become of them: when the conduct of an officer in the field is so closely scanned, this is not very creditable to the department at home. In the absence of all official information I must make the best I can of it. The paragraph that I am particularly alluding to is: " On referring to the loss sustained by the commissariat animals during the " same period, it will be found rather less than in the cavalry or artillery—the deaths among " them having, according to a return furnished by Deputy Commissariat-General Adams, " amounted to about 889 out of 2,329 originally imported into the Crimea, or in the " proportion of 38 per cent.—a result which could scarcely have been expected, considering " the advantages which cavalry horses might be supposed to have over hard-worked " baggage animals, to whom little attention could be paid at such a period." Will the Board be good enough to refer to Appendix IX., pages 66 and 69? Now Commissary-General Filder in his evidence states that there were seventy mules landed in the Crimea with the army, that within a fortnight subsequent to the arrival of the army in the Crimea, the gross number amounted to 492. At page 60 he was asked, " Was the " transport you had then collected sufficient for the wants of the army before Sebastopol?" And his answer was, " Yes, including the seventy mules' carts before mentioned, I had " imported in about a fortnight into the Crimea 226 mules and carts complete, besides 266 pack animals." Then there appear to have been within the first fortnight 492 animals. At pages 66 and 69 of the Appendix, it is stated that there were landed between December 10th and January 11th a number of animals from different places, 716. I believe this to be incorrect, as it states that from Eupatoria there were only 281, when Mr. Stockley, the veterinary surgeon who purchased them, told me that there were above 500: but let that pass; I will still take the number as given in the return, as 716, making altogether 1,208 animals at that time; therefore up to January 11th,—there is no mistake about it,—there were 1,208 confessedly landed. In addition to these there were not a very large number at first, but later there were many more animals landed with the departments and with the regiments. Of those there is no account. Subsequently there was an ambulance corps; of that there is no account, but it consisted of a considerable number of mules. When the heavy brigade joined us, and the horses which had been left behind in Bulgaria landed in the Crimea, they brought with them a considerable number of baggage animals belonging to different corps; of these there is no account, but it is clear there were very many baggage animals landed which were unaccounted for, because Commissary-General Filder tells you, or rather told the Commissioners, that independently of having sufficient baggage animals in the month of October for the transport of all the provisions and the forage of the army, that he still could spare 150 to assist in the siege operations. In consequence of the absence of returns which I called for, I cannot state what additional numbers I should take credit for on account of the different services; I must therefore pass them all by, and treat of the 1,208 animals only officially returned; and on January the 16th, by another return, which you will find in page 66 of the Appendix, of effectives and non-effectives there were only living at that date 505: therefore 773, of which we have positive account, had died, independently of all those animals of which there is no account, showing a loss of 60 per cent. up to that time, the 16th of January. Therefore I think it is not unfair to presume that if 60 per cent. are shown to have died of those accounted for, it is no exaggerated conclusion to suppose that were the rest included the loss would not fall short of 80 per cent. But there is another mode of forming a conclusion upon this subject. Commissary-General Filder in his evidence states that whilst in Turkey he purchased 5,300 baggage animals; at Eupatoria 281; in the Crimea 150, and in Spain 247; making a total of 5,978 baggage animals provided for the use of the army previously to January the 16th, on which day there were only 1,576 living—505 living in the Crimea, 1,071 living at Constantinople;

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

therefore there were living of all animals purchased up to the 16th of January, only 1,576 out of 5,978; 4,402 animals having either strayed, been stolen, or perished in some way or other; making an average of from 73 to 74 per cent. Now I must show you a calculation of the losses of the cavalry up to the same date; and I wish the Board to observe that I could not take a period more disadvantageous for the cavalry, because a very large proportion of our horses had perished by the transport duties, and these may be said to have ceased at that very time; but still I will, under every disadvantage, show the Board what the losses of the cavalry were. There had landed in Bulgaria about 2,450 horses; deduct killed 472, lost in the heavy cavalry brigade on their passage to the Crimea 226; remaining 1,752; living on the 16th of January 905; losses 847, or 48 per cent. only. Now it is right that I should state that between Varna and the Crimea, particularly at the landing at Kalameta Bay, there were a great many casualties; and that there were many horses lost by glanders and infectious diseases: I hope I have satisfied the Board that the comparison to the disadvantage of the cavalry which has been attempted on the part of the Commissioners is as little founded in fact or justified by truth as any part of their statements.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I wish to state that the horses in the Crimea were those only referred to by the Commissioners, and that the horses at Varna, to the extent of 3,000 or 4,000, were stolen. Some were brought down to Constantinople, and were stolen; of those there was no account whatever, but still they are included by Lord Lucan in his evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Are you referring to the evidence that is before the Board?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; in our volume we have only referred to those horses that were in the Crimea. Lord Lucan is referring to the horses that were at Varna and at Constantinople of which three-fourths were stolen, and the Government got no account of them.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I do not undertake to say how those 3,000 or 4,000 horses were disposed of. I care not whether they died from want of forage, or whether they died from ill-treatment, or whether they were allowed to be stolen by neglect; all I say is this, that when it is attempted to be shown that the cavalry were less careful with their horses than the commissariat the accounts show a totally different state of things.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) The Report refers only to events in the Crimea.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I never should have referred to those other animals, which I knew never came into the Crimea, but I am obliged to make some calculation; and in the absence of all the returns which I have called for, I am obliged to show that of the number of horses belonging to the cavalry at a certain date or during a certain time, and of the transport animals during the same period, the losses in the former were 48, and in the latter 74 per cent.

I come now to the paragraph with regard to the shelter for the horses; and I was told by Colonel Tulloch that I had been disengenuous in having argued as to the incorrectness of this paragraph when, from his letter to Lord Panmure, he had already shown that it was a misconception, arising from the displacement of a marginal note. Well, I am unfortunate; whether it is my density and stupidity, or whether it is the obscurity with which the Commissioners write, I did not so read their letter; and it is very questionable whether anybody else could read it so. And let me say with regard to that displacement,—what were the consequences to me?—was it not to that displacement of words that a great part of that obloquy which has been heaped upon me is attributable? How long is it since that book has been before the public? I say that if there was any displacement of words which occasioned so much misapprehension on the part of the public, it was the business of Colonel Tulloch, or the Commissioners, to set that displacement right. They did not do it. No; there was not one word said upon the subject. I will admit that in their reply, after 10 days, to my letter, there was some explanation offered; but what happened to that reply? It was locked up in Lord Panmure's desk for weeks till within two or three days of the meeting of this Board; leaving me, therefore, under the obloquy which was occasioned by this displacement of words which the Commissioners had not thought fit publicly to rectify. Then Colonel Tulloch says, and it is one of his assumptions, in his answer, that Lord Lucan has now given up his objection to that paragraph. I deny it altogether. I admit that I have not the same extent of objection which I had at first; but I am far from being satisfied with it even after Colonel Tulloch's explanation. Colonel Tulloch would have it inferred that there were no huts at all erected up to the end of January, which is not the fact. There was no regiment at that time that had not at least one hospital hut erected; and with regard to the rest of that paragraph, it is as inaccurate as everything else. It states that the cavalry were within a mile of the store, which is not the fact, for they were at two miles distance; and as to the error respecting one-fifth of the men only being employed, I shall leave my observations to a future period. The next paragraph is: "Considering also the suffering, and severe loss of horses from exposure to the weather

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

" in the commencement of the winter, there appears to have been a want of promptitude " or ingenuity in devising for them some means of temporary shelter, such as saved the " baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners of Balaklava. Experience has now proved " that even a very moderate degree of shelter would have been sufficient to save the " lives of many of the horses, if not to maintain them in serviceable condition; and it " must be presumed that such measures were considered practicable, for a proposal to " erect, with the assistance of his men, some sort of cover for the horses of the corps, " appears to have been made by the officer commanding the Scots Greys." Colonel Tulloch has, and at much trouble, but, in my opinion, with very little success, endeavoured to show that he intended in this paragraph no animadversion upon me. Now I should really be glad to know how that is consistent with what has fallen from Colonel Tulloch in his summing up, and to which I request the particular attention of the Board. Colonel Tulloch, when referring to the altercation between me and Colonel Griffiths, says, in his address, " I would point out that when Colonel Griffiths was, in common with other officers, " examined by the Commissioners they would not probably have been disposed to take any " further notice of it, as being rather out of their course, but when they found by the replies " of the quartermaster general that the period at which this suggestion had been made, " and rejected in so summary a manner, was only two days after his order of the " 12th of November directing temporary shelter to be provided, the case assumed a very " different aspect, as I have no doubt it will to the Board; it was then no longer the " rejection of the suggestion of Colonel Griffiths, which might or might not be an expedient " one, but it appeared tantamount to a refusal to carry into effect the previous order " of the quartermaster general, even when a junior officer volunteered to procure the " shelter; and this seemed to bear materially on the question of delay into which the " Commissioners were inquiring, and as such it seemed to be their duty to bring it " to notice, but in terms which were least likely to be offensive to the party implicated." Now again my English does not appear to be Colonel Tulloch's English; for I have no hesitation in saying that that no animadversion could possibly be fastened upon me more strongly than this is by Colonel Tulloch in that statement; and I suspect that all the sophistry possible will not exonerate the Commissioners from having made an animadversion, and a severe one, upon me; and in not mentioning me of having attempted to evade a responsibility which they should have been ready to accept. Now they say in their Report, " It must be presumed that such measures were considered practicable, for a " proposal to erect, with the assistance of his men, some sort of cover for the horses of " the corps, appears to have been made by the officer commanding the Scots Greys." Where does that appear? In no evidence of Colonel Griffiths; he has been examined here two or three times, and I defy Colonel Griffiths or anybody else to put his finger on any part of his evidence which would bear such a construction. The Board will well recollect when Colonel Griffiths was asked what he would have done, he did not go beyond saying that if he had known that the camp was to be a permanent camp, he would then have been induced to cut a drain six inches or eight inches deep. That was the whole of what Colonel Griffiths was ready to do if I had had, which I had not, the power of assuring him that his regiment was to remain in permanent camp. So it appears as to Colonel Griffiths, who is supposed to have suggested so much, and by my rudeness of manner to have been deterred from doing so much, that all he proposed was, if the camp were made permanent, to cut an 8-inch drain. When asked by the Board about generally draining his camp, he scouted the idea of it. He said, " Drain the camp! " That is no part of regimental duty; that should be done by the engineer corps." So this active, enterprising, and zealous officer at the time when the whole of the engineers of the army were pressed, and worked, and distressed with the labours of a siege perhaps one of the most severe on record, would still have looked to those unfortunate men to carry on the common surface drainage of his own camp! I think I may well say of Colonel Griffiths that, however prompt he showed himself before the Commissioners, in his different examinations before this Board he actually was prepared to suggest nothing in the way of erections for shelter so long as we were on the plateau. With regard to the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners, I am speaking within the recollection of this Board, but I believe those marvellous constructions which received so much admiration on the part of the Commissioners were totally unknown to anybody except them; but I know more of them now than I did before: those buildings, which are to be brought forward to make an invidious comparison between the cavalry and the Sappers and Miners, consisted of shelter for 20 baggage ponies, which, as I am informed, were placed in some enclosed yards in the town of Balaklava, requiring nothing but a little covering of canvas, which was carried by the walls; and therefore the case is as little analogous to the situation of the cavalry as if the position of these were compared with that of a regiment of Life Guards in London.

But now comes the most serious part of the question; the charge of want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising for the horses some means of temporary shelter. Here again Colonel Tulloch has most industriously attempted to show that this could not be taken as any animadversion reflecting upon me or the cavalry; but I must bring to the recollection of this Board that this animadversion is fastened upon me as directly as

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

in a former instance. A reference to the letter of the Commissioners to Lord Panmure will show the Board that they justify that charge of want of promptitude and want of ingenuity by a reference to the evidence of Sir Richard Airey and Colonel Gordon, where they say that I was ordered on the 8th of the month to make shelter for the horses, and that on the 12th an engineer officer was sent to assist in that work. It is therefore evident by that letter to Lord Panmure, that though it may have been intended in the Report solely to throw out an insinuation, but one which could not be mistaken, the Commissioners have, inadvertently no doubt, fastened that animadversion upon me.

This charge of want of promptitude or ingenuity, I think the Board will admit, resolves itself into two questions, and two questions only ; one is the canvas question, and the other is the pit or trench question. With regard to the canvas question, I wish, when I find myself charged with want of ingenuity, first of all to call the recollection of the Board to the fact, as stated by Sir Richard Airey, that it was from me that he first heard of canvas at all. I believe Sir Richard Airey mentioned, that in October, speaking upon what was likely to happen to the cavalry, I then threw out the suggestion whether canvas might or might not be useful for affording shelter. I do not recollect the circumstance ; but, if I mistake not, it must have happened on the Sunday before the battle of Balaklava, when I had the pleasure of riding with Sir Richard Airey to the outposts. That, I think, would be the Sunday before the 25th of October. Now the weather was still warm and fine ; therefore I certainly did not wait for severe weather to think and to provide for what was likely to happen. Did Colonel Tulloch show the same forethought?—did he show the same ingenuity? The Board will recollect that Colonel Tulloch has informed them that during this autumn he was in daily and constant intercourse with the Minister of War. He has told you that he was very much engaged in the preparation of the huts for the use of the army ; but he did not, although in the confidence of the Minister of War——

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I was only engaged in such matters as the Minister of War placed before me ; being at the War Office, I was sent to with regard to the huts ; but I had nothing else to do whatever. He did not place the matter of the sailcloth before me. I had nothing to do with anything but with what he placed before me.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) As I stated, though in daily intercourse with the Minister of War, although consulted by him, and deputed by him to assist in the hutting of the men, Colonel Tulloch does not appear to have had the sagacity or the ingenuity to have thought of the care of the horses, or to make any recommendation on that head.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I must ask for the protection of the Court in this matter. I had nothing to do with anything but what the Minister of War thought proper to employ me upon. The Duke of Newcastle and Lord Hardinge sent for me one evening to make arrangements as to the huts, and I made those arrangements ; but I had nothing whatever to do with anything else. It was not for me to suggest to either.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you state to the Board that you were employed by the War Office?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, and nothing else. With regard to the hutting, I was sent for first by Lord Hardinge, and then by the Duke of Newcastle, to see whether I could assist in getting the hutting.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is there any report or evidence of what you did?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) The question was put to me in regard to the huts, but I had nothing to do with regard to the cavalry ; and I do beg the protection of the Court in this matter, in order that nothing may be stated by Lord Lucan that may refer to anything that I had no power to do.

(*Judge Advocate General, to the Earl of Lucan.*) I think there is no evidence before the Board that Colonel Tulloch was responsible.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I only say that when he was in constant intercourse with the Minister of War he suggested nothing on the score of hutting the horses ; but he tells the Board that he discharged his duty, and I have no doubt that he did, and received the thanks of the Minister of War.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I really did nothing but what the Minister of War employed me to do; and that was taking me out of the usual course of my duty.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I suppose Colonel Tulloch will not object to this statement, that he does not appear to have interrogated as to canvas any officer in the Crimea. In his Report he does not refer to it. Now I cannot help thinking that this question of canvas must have suggested itself, and I should be inclined to think for the first time, to the Commissioners when they found themselves called upon to explain what on earth they could mean by their charge of want of promptitude or ingenuity. Then they had the ingenuity to think of the canvas. In short, I really cannot believe that the same importance was attached to the canvas by the Commissioners in the Crimea that has been attached to it by Colonel Tulloch in the proceedings before this Board. I believe it to be simply a clumsy after-thought, to justify an animadversion which cannot be justified by any such device or by any sophistry or argument that Colonel Tulloch can adduce.

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) May I refer the Board to page 132 of the evidence of Major Chapman with regard to sailcloth?—and there is other evidence.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I am talking about cavalry officers' evidence; I do not mean Major Chapman. With regard to the canvas on the plateau——

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) At page 8 of the evidence there is a cavalry officer's evidence; that of Major Wardlaw.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) With regard to canvas on the plateau, I think that the use of any canvas shelter, so long as the troops remained in front of Sebastopol, is condemned by every one of the witnesses. When the question was put to me I pronounced that none but a madman would have used canvas for such a purpose after the 14th of November. General Scarlett gave it as his opinion that it would have been improper to have used canvas, and General Beatson told you that he would not have put his own horses under canvas on the plateau. Mr. Bracebridge, who only knows of the winter gales of the Crimea by what he was told in the month of June, tells you that he is of opinion that it would not have been proper to have used canvas on the plateau in the autumn of the year. In short, I believe I may say and dispose of this part of the question as to canvas, that if canvas could have been used at any time it most undoubtedly could not have been used with safety to the horses on the plateau in the month of November. Mr. Rawlinson gave a very general opinion, and said, that under the same circumstances he did not believe that a railway contractor would have lost half as many horses; but I think that Mr. Rawlinson would have shown more discretion had he hesitated before giving such an opinion, ignorant as he was of the condition of things five months before he visited that country, and not only of the condition of things, and the condition of the weather, but of the condition of the horses, and of all the circumstances, every one of which he should have known before he allowed himself to pronounce a decided opinion. When he was asked what would have been the condition of the horses, he said, of course every horse would have been in good condition, and everything properly provided. I shall refer later to what Mr. Rawlinson said about excavations. But I may observe, that he told you that places might have been selected in a village leading to Kamiesch, where the horses might have been sheltered well. But for the duties of that time it was necessary, for the safety of the rear of the army before Sebastopol, that the cavalry should not be placed where they could find the most shelter. If that had been the object they would not have remained on the plateau at all; but the object was to keep them as near the coline as possible. Sir Richard Airey will bear me out when I say, that in the discussion I had with Lord Raglan on this subject he positively objected to my moving one quarter of a mile, because he said that it would defeat the object of having the cavalry on the plateau, and that they must remain as near the coline as possible, for the purpose of filling up the intervals between the other troops. Now with regard to the use of canvas, subsequently, when in the valley of Kadikoi, Colonel Tulloch has told you, and with much apparent satisfaction, that every witness admired the idea of canvas, and that they all approved of it; in short, he supposed that they very much regretted that they had been allowed to use canvas. Now I cannot say that I read the evidence of those witnesses in the same way. After an endless examination some were induced to say, yes, no doubt if canvas had been there,—if this, and if that, and if the other,—if everything most improbable to arise—then, under those most improbable circumstances—all ifs,—if nothing better offered, perhaps canvas might have been useful. Now I will make an admission to Colonel Tulloch, which is, that I think if there had been nothing else, canvas might have been used to a certain extent for certain purposes. I will agree with him, that so far as the roofing of the stables that canvas might have been made to answer the purpose; but I say that even had there not been better materials at the moment, which I will show presently there were, canvas positively would have imposed more difficulties upon us than the use of timber, and for this reason: What were our difficulties? The want of men, and the want of proper scantling of timber. So far as excavating went and scarping went, it would have been necessary to have scarped more and have excavated more for canvas than for wood. Then again, as to the scantling. What delayed us in the erection of those stables? It was not the boards for the roof, of which we had abundance, but it was the want of proper scantling to form the roof and to carry the roof. Now it must be evident to this Board, and it has been already stated by Mr. Rawlinson, that it would not have been safe to have used the same light scantling for canvas which might have been used for timber. Everybody knows that every board, to a certain extent, as a tie, adds to the strength of the frame; when, in the use of canvas, you must not only carry the canvas, but you must make the scantling and the frame sufficiently strong to bear the wind and the wet, besides the concussions on the part of the horses. Therefore, to have given those buildings sufficient strength, it would have been necessary to have had scantling of a much larger description than was necessary with boards. Now Colonel Tulloch asks, why not use the canvas? Because we had not arrived in the valley of Kadikoi before there were boards in abundance, and there was never a deficiency. I had, before the boards arrived, called upon Sir Richard Airey, and I asked him to keep the whole of the timber whichwas coming for the sheltering of the horses of the artillery and ourselves. To this he agreed, and for a long time I believe it was so retained; and, I repeat, there was no deficiency of boards,

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

but there was a deficiency of scantling. Colonel Tulloch said, "Lord Lucan prefers permanent buildings; the "Commissioners"—I do not know whether he said, prefer them, or not—"are favourable to temporary buildings." Now, Colonel Tulloch quite mistakes me, for I can assure him if I had thought there could have been at that season of the year fourteen days saved, or ten days, or seven, or less, by the erection of sufficient temporary buildings, so anxious was I to see my horses under cover that I should have preferred a temporary building to a permanent building, but I deny that the use of the canvas at the moment when we had boards would have hastened the construction of that shelter at all. It can scarcely be a question whether canvas or timber would have been the most useful for our purpose. But granted, as an hypothesis, that canvas was preferable to timber; was the canvas to be got? I think that the evidence of Sir Edmund Lyons has shown pretty clearly that from the men-of-war there was not canvas to be got; and I will state, in passing, that every word that fell from Sir Edmund Lyons would have been confirmed by Admiral Dundas, if I had been allowed to read to this Board his replies to my queries. Therefore we have the opinions of the two admirals of the station.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I think not. You have not the evidence of both before the Board.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) As it is I must rely upon Sir Edmund Lyons. I think he spoke positively enough for two, and he told you that with regard to the whole of Colonel Tulloch's suppositions and expectations and calculations, whether in regard to the number of ships, to the equipment of the ships, to the number of carpenters, spars and sails, or anything else, Colonel Tulloch was labouring under a most extraordinary delusion, and that he had already, or that the fleet had already supplied, all the canvas that could possibly be spared for the accommodation of the 4,000 or 5,000 seamen and marines who had been landed to assist in the operations of the siege. He told you that all the spars that might have been spared under ordinary circumstances had also been given for that purpose. With regard to carpenters, he told you that as many carpenters as could be spared had been already given, and that Colonel Tulloch's calculation wth regard to the carpenters was exceedingly erroneous, because the fleet had not half their complement, and therefore had none to spare.

Now I come to Mr. Bracebridge, who told you that because Constantinople is built of wood, and had a population of 800,000, therefore you might have brought from Constantinople an unlimited number of carpenters. The Board will recollect that in answer to a question put by me Mr. Bracebridge showed that the Government at home were as ill-informed upon that extraordinary fact as we were, inasmuch as to carry on or to make some very ordinary and trifling repairs in Scutari hospital they shipped in England and landed at Constantinople sixteen carpenters for this small job. I recollect the fact perfectly, and hearing at the time that the Minister of War had sent out a clerk of the works upon 500*l.* a year, and that the Board of Ordnance at the same time, not knowing what was going on with the Minister of War, had sent out another clerk of the works, also at a salary of 500*l.* a year, to look after those sixteen carpenters. But Mr. Bracebridge took a totally different view of the use of canvas from Colonel Tulloch. He doubtless would have required no carpenters, for he was to have to cut up those topsails into horse clothing without other shelter whatever. Now Mr. Bracebridge has gained much information in hospitals, and is, I have no doubt, well versed in pathology, but he must be, I should think, a disciple of the hydropathic system, for he was for wrapping up those horses in wet clothes, and, to make the thing rather more ridiculous, if necessary, those wet cloths must have been used in substitution of woollen cloths, because we had already provided ourselves with the very best horse clothing from Constantinople; and I doubt whether Mr. Bracebridge, of whose hunters in Warwickshire you have heard so much, ever covered his horses with better clothing than the troop horses were covered with at that time. I know that it was particularly good clothing—it was provided by Lord Raglan at my suggestion so early as December. I hope now that I have shown that the canvas question has not much to recommend it. We come next to the trenches and pits of Mr. Rawlinson. He has the advantage of being a geologist as well as an engineer; he tells you of the quality of the different soils, and how many cubic feet and yards a navvy will excavate within a certain time. Now, really, I cannot understand how Colonel Tulloch should have been, not in the camp, for I do not believe he was, but even on board a ship at Balaklava, without hearing what is pretty generally complained of, and which is, that soldiers, and English soldiers in particular, do not excavate and are not as handy in removing earth as ordinary labourers. I think if he had examined a military engineer, he would have told him, that so far from being able to remove within the same given time the same number of cubic yards as an ordinary navvy would, soldiers in general, particularly in trench work, positively would not remove one fifth part of what the same number of navvies would. He would have told you, I have no doubt, that no soldier, whether French, Russian, or any other, would work, equally with their other duties and with their other avocations, as ordinary labourers; but he would have said beyond that, that with all the good qualities of the English soldiers (which I believe in many respects surpass those perhaps of any other nation), still they do not excel in what is called spade work; and it can be easily

explained. The army is differently recruited; men who come into the army are generally men that do not like hard labour. The army is not recruited, as in other countries, by conscription, which takes men of all habits and qualifications. Therefore I set it aside as being a foolish argument, that because a navvy, under ordinary and more favourable circumstances, can remove a certain quantity of earth, that therefore a soldier, and more particularly a dragoon of all others, should be able to do as much.

With regard to pits and trenches I am asked, Why, if you had no other covering, did you not scarp away and make pits for your horses? Now I say, in that country, with that soil, a soil that puddles after three or four hours' rain, consisting chiefly, as it did on the plateau, of a strong brick clay,—I say that, without a roof, or unless you could have paved such a trench as is talked of, it would have been totally useless, and it would have been mischievous, because it would very much have obstructed you in what is far more essential, namely, the constant removal of your horses. When you talk of a pit, a pit is not only useless, but it is perhaps the most mischievous thing into which a horse can possibly be put. It has been tried,—and there is an officer in this court now who could establish the truth of what I say if he were examined upon the subject; he belongs to the Land Transport service;—they did make pits for their horses, and those pits were dug on the side of hills. Still it was found impossible to drain them sufficiently; and the horses suffered so much that the Turks who had charge of them could not be got to use the pits after they were dug. In short a pit that is neither roofed in nor paved would be more appropriately called a grave than a pit.

Mr. Rawlinson wishes to compare the Sardinian troops with the 10th Hussars, and he told you that in the spring of the year he found the Sardinians with a trench before their horses, when the 10th Hussars had taken no such precaution, and he told you there was great industry shown on the part of the Sardinians, and that there was none shown on the part of the 10th Hussars. Now this was in the spring of the year. Doubtless there would be occasional storms; but I say that the Sardinians, at that time novices as campaigners, did not only a very unnecessary but a very foolish thing when they dug that trench. The 10th Hussars showed far more judgment when they allowed their horses to stand in the open air; and I think there are no troops so well accustomed to the sort of warfare of the Crimea as the Chasseurs d'Afrique; and that till the winter came on, and unless they could pave, never thought of putting their horses behind a trench. And again, in regard to the Russians, the Russians never allowed their horses to stand behind trenches. I served a campaign with the Russian army, and I can state positively that they never thought of putting their picket lines behind trenches, and for the best of all reasons:—The great object in all camps, particularly in the spring and summer of the year, is to change the ground as frequently as possible; it is necessary to do so if you wish to preserve the health of the men and the horses. How can that be done if horses stand behind trenches? You would destroy your ground, unless you could be scattered all over the country. Then, again, I ask the Board to consider with what amount of labour would those trenches be made, at a time too when the most trifling and unnecessary exposure to the sun must be avoided? I have no hesitation in saying that in fruitlessly endeavouring to benefit your horses you would sacrifice the greater part of your men Then, again, if it is to be the established rule, that the cavalry through the summer, and at all times, are always to stand behind trenches, how is it to be done? For even if the men could find time, which I deny, to dig trenches, it would require that every dragoon should carry a pick, or a shovel, or a spade; and how is it possible for cavalry soldiers to march through a country, when before the enemy, with so cumbersome an equipment. The fact is, that in theory it is very specious, but in practice exceedingly absurd.

There was one point with regard to the canvas which I allowed to escape me. Colonel Tulloch told you that if you could not get this amount of canvas from the fleet, it could have been given by the transport service. Now it has not appeared in evidence that there was any direct proposal on the part of any transport captains to lend canvas, or to give it. Colonel Griffiths told you that he thought or believed or heard that to some other officer such a proposition was made by some man or other. I believe nothing beyond that was established by anybody as to the disposition of the transport captains to supply canvas. Had there been such a disposition, and had they had spare sails on board, I am assured that it is very questionable whether those captains could have parted with their spare sails. I am assured that if a captain of a transport or the captain of any vessel was to part with the necessary part of his equipment, he would most probably forfeit his policy of insurance. I think that if that is the fact, and I am given to suppose that it is, it very nearly disposes of the question of the possibility of supply of canvas from that quarter. From what fell from Sir Richard Airey, there may have been some *arrière-pensée* in the minds of some of the captains, that when you took their sails they would be saved going to sea.

With reference to the horses, whether in the Report or from what has fallen from Colonel Tulloch here, he, I must say, has shown himself to a certain extent guilty of what he charged me with, namely, being a little disingenuous. He will not allow, or he did not wish it to appear, that the cavalry suffered at all from their transport duties; and he seems to wish to pass that over altogether, and to attribute the whole of the loss of the

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

troop horses to the want of shelter alone. My opinion is sufficiently given in my correspondence. Letter after letter will be seen in my book addressed to Lord Raglan and the quartermaster general, informing them every two or three days of the number of horses that were being sacrificed by the transport duty. I believe that Lord Raglan himself never disputed that it was to those transport duties, when the horses were in a state of debility and emaciation, that such losses were to be attributed. I never heard that he questioned it; nor did I ever hear that it was to the want of shelter alone that such losses were in any quarter attributed.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) May I again quote the Report as to the transport horses? It is quite differently represented now to the manner in which I have stated it at page 143 of the proceedings before the Board of General Officers. "When you remarked upon the "fearful loss of horses, why did you never allude to the commissariat transport duties? "Are you of opinion that those duties occasioned no loss of horses?—I have no doubt "that they did occasion a loss of horses, but I do not think to anything like the great "extent of loss that was sustained."

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I do not see that that is at variance with what I said. I did not say that you took upon yourself to say so; but I do say that you did wish, and that you attempted, in your Report and in the whole course of these proceedings, to attribute the great loss of horses that took place during the months of December and January to the want of shelter, and not to the transport duties, to which I will show that the loss is fairly attributable. What is General Scarlett's opinion? He tells you distinctly that he attributes it to the transport duties. Colonel Tulloch put one question to me; and perhaps as it was put at the end of twenty-four hours' consideration he considered it of some importance. He asked me, why, because some of the infantry were sent occasionally to Balaklava for provisions, I thought it necessary that the cavalry should ride. I cannot conceive two cases much less analogous than these. That some of the infantry did for a short time come from the front to Balaklava for provisions is perfectly true, but they selected their own route; they had particular passes; they had short cuts; it was not necessary for them to traverse places up to their knees in mud. I say boldly that had I been so incautious, and shown myself so indifferent to the welfare of my men, as to have allowed those men to walk on foot at that time, in the bad state of their boots,—if I had allowed them at that season of the year, in the then state of the roads, to go first into Balaklava, and to be trapesing about that town up to their knees in mud, to have proceeded seven or eight miles on foot, leading horses through all the slush and wet of that country, and then to have returned in the evening,—unquestionably I should have relieved some of those horses of some of their work, but I should have sacrificed twice the number of men, ay, three times the number of men, for every horse I saved. Colonel Tulloch must not suppose that it is to him alone that those things suggested themselves. There was necessity for what was done, and I am prepared to show it. And then, again, I am told that the horses suffered because I sent an unnecessary number of them. That is not true. I was not told to carry a certain number of bags of biscuits. I was told to send a certain number of horses. The only question was, whether 500 horses were to carry 500 bags of biscuit, or 500 horses were to carry 250 men and 250 bags of biscuit; and as I had to decide upon what was best for my horses and men, I think I decided properly, and for the advantage of both.

Before I leave this part of the question, I think Colonel Tulloch has complained that the officers had not assisted him by saying what number of men were disposable or how the men were employed. Now I cannot see any fair ground of complaint here, as I really thought from the course of examination which Colonel Tulloch took that he seemed studiously to avoid anything like positive knowledge or information upon the subject. He had me under examination, and he could not have had a better opportunity of asking any question; but what is most striking with regard to his examination of me, although he gave the Board to understand that he had many questions to put to me, was this, that he never put one single question upon a matter of fact during the whole of my examination. He unquestionably put a few questions of opinion, whether I considered this an animadversion or whether I did not; whether I thought that this was an animadversion or that; but he studiously, and I think wisely, never asked me a question upon a matter of fact, and I think it is unfair for him to say that either myself or any other officer has withheld information. But he shall have the information without asking for it. Though the paper which I hold in my hand is not a very perfect return, still I think it is sufficiently clear to give this Board a tolerable idea of what men were available in the regiments on a certain day. The history of the return the Board will perhaps recollect. I was afraid that the regiments were not exerting themselves sufficiently, and this so recently as the 16th of December; and I called upon the officers of the ten regiments to supply me with a nominal return, showing how every man of their regiments had been occupied the day before. I know that Colonel Tulloch will say, the 16th of December, that will not satisfy me! I do not expect to satisfy Colonel Tulloch; that is not my object. My object is to show as far as I can to this Board, that when he talks of there having been 1,100 or 1,400 men disposable,—I do not recollect how many,—I can tell him that on the 16th of December, by the returns on that day, the Royal Dragoons had ten men; the 4th Dragoon Guards not a man at all; the 5th Dragoon Guards 16 men; the Scots Greys,

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

that regiment which was prepared to hut their own horses in a few days, and was always prepared for any very great exertion, had five men disposable; the 4th Light Dragoons had six; the 8th Hussars, not a man at all; the 11th Hussars, I could not exactly understand the return, but it is not many more than the other regiments; the 13th Light Dragoons, not a single man; and the 17th Lancers 30 or 40 men, in this last case, however, inclusive of those engaged in regimental duties. As Colonel Tulloch has expressed himself anxious to know what the duties of a dragoon are when supposed to be off duty and available—

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) This is not in evidence, I beg to say.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I am not putting in evidence; I am making a statement.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Those returns are not in evidence.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I am not putting in any return. I have referred to the return repeatedly, and I have said that I was ready to put it in.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It has not been put in.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I offered to Colonel Tulloch this return, and that return, and every other return, and I said I was at all times ready to give him any information that he liked.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have the only return that has been given in.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The object of the Board, I suppose, is to ascertain whether there were available men, or whether there were not; and I suppose there is no objection to my stating what the duties of a dragoon are.

(*Colonel Tulloch*). I have one return here, which I am perfectly prepared to comment upon, which is before the Board, but I do not think the other is in evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) Will you state precisely what the authority of the return is.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The authority of it is, that it is a return from the commanding officers, which the Board may have if they wish. Returns were called for by me on the 16th of December, and in my original statement I said that I had them, if they were of any use to the Board.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is it an official document?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Certainly. I call official documents regimental returns which are signed by the commanding officers and handed to their divisional general.

(*General Sir George Berkeley to the Earl of Lucan.*) Have you the daily returns?

(*Earl of Lucan.* This is a nominal return called for by me when I felt there was not sufficient energy shown in the construction of stables.

(*Judge Advocate General to Colonel Tulloch.*) Do you object to this being received as evidence?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Decidedly. I have a return here, which I am prepared to make a comment upon by and by to the Board; but this return I have never seen.

(*Judge Advocate General to Earl of Lucan.*) You cannot refer to it as evidence.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Very well; it is a solitary return; I mentioned it before, and this Board know that it is not a very usual thing for a divisional general to receive a nominal return of the employment of every man in a regiment. If the Board can properly receive it, here is the return; if they cannot, there is an end of it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You cannot carry it further.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Very well. Colonel Tulloch, who is anxious for information at one moment, is anxious to shut it out at another. The duties of an available dragoon are these:—He has to clean his own horse, appointments, arms, and clothing; he has to clean the horses and the horse appointments of the sick, and all men on dismounted duties, such as camp guards, hospital orderlies, cooks, prisoners, butchers, &c.; to attend three stable hours; to water the horses twice daily, a labour in those countries sometimes of extraordinary difficulty, and at very great distances; he has to scrape and shovel away and remove to a distance all the dung, mud, &c. from the picket lines. In the winter in bad weather he is constantly repitching tents and changing the ground for the picket lines. He has to attend his own or any spare horse when at the forge. He has to go upon divisional, brigade, regimental, and troop fatigues; to clean out the camp, draw provisions, fetch water and wood for the cooks, and carry out all requisitions, sometimes at great distances, for the different supplies for the use of the regiments, such as camp equipage, clothing, arms, and ammunition required for the equipment of man and horse, to bury dead horses of his own regiment and others found near his camp, which in the winter is sometimes a duty of extreme labour, and to attend funerals, &c., &c. To do all this, besides the stable hours, in the short days, he cannot be said to have more than three hours. Therefore those men, few as I have shown them to be, that were available to do the extra duties with only three hours for the purpose, were still to have leisure to dig and build stables for the horses; and it has been shown in evidence that you could not exact from those unfortunate men, either sick, or partly sick, or convalescent, the same extreme duty that you would from men in their best health.

With regard to how much the horses suffered not from want of shelter at this time, as has been pretended, but from the transport duties, I should wish to draw attention to

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

the evidence given before the Commissioners by Colonel Hodge, where he states that such was the improvement in the condition of the horses for the twelve days subsequent to their arrival in the Valley of Kadikoi, that the 4th Dragoon Regiment did not lose a single horse. A reference to my correspondence, including as it does General Scarlett's letters to me, would confirm this, and show that the improvement of the horses between the time of their arrival at Kadikoi until they got the transport duties was wonderfully great, so great that we were very sanguine that with proper care we should after that save the greater part of them.

It is necessary I should recite as shortly as I can what was done for the cavalry by myself. So early as the 2nd of November I applied to Lord Raglan for clothing for the horses, which was immediately conceded,—on the 9th of November. I waited on Lord Raglan to ascertain what was decided for the wintering of the army, and it was then that I heard for the first time that we might endeavour to shelter the horses. On this occasion, when discussing how to proceed, Lord Raglan supposed that the Chasseurs d'Afrique were already sheltered. But this was a mistake, as I made a staff officer visit the whole of the French camps, and he reported, what was true, that no troop horse was under cover of any sort. I at once wrote and informed Lord Raglan. With reference to what was said about the engineer officer, I hold my letter dated the 11th, asking that one should be given me. This was conceded so far that an order for one was given on the following day. Several days, however, passed without his appearance at my camp, when at last Lieutenant Stokes arrived. This officer informed me that he had only come to report himself, and that unless the commanding officer of engineers consented to his remaining for a few days he could not be of much use in the construction of stabling. On that I wrote to Sir Richard Airey, asking that he might be allowed to remain for a fortnight. Captain Chapman then called upon me, and we went over the ground together, (all this happened within a day or two); and we agreed upon what would be the best course to take. I then applied to Captain Chapman for tools. He promised me 200 sets; and at this time I may say there were not half-a-dozen picks or spades in the whole camp. I found it hopeless to get an engineer officer for any such extent of time as a fortnight. I then called upon Sir Richard Airey, and I begged that he would get me an engineer officer, if only for three days, for if I had him for that time I thought I could get the work completed without him. Upon that other orders were sent by Sir Richard Airey to the engineering department; but Captain Gordon, who then commanded the engineers, found himself unable to comply with them. I then, on the 23d of the month, rode over to Captain Gordon myself, and asked him whether I could hope that the orders that had been issued by the quartermaster general so long back as the 12th, would be attended to. Captain Gordon told me that I need expect nothing of the sort, for that the engineer officers were only in two reliefs, and that it was quite impossible to spare one from the trenches. We then had a conversation, and I spoke to him very seriously upon the subject, and told him I only required the assistance of an officer for a few hours, during a very few days, but it was a question of such urgency and moment that I did hope he would find it possible to comply with the orders of the quartermaster general, for he must bear the responsibility of his refusal. He ended by saying that he would send me back Mr. Stokes. We then discussed the subject of the tools, which, though Captain Chapman had promised long since, I had failed in obtaining. Notwithstanding the order of the quartermaster general, and the consent of the engineer officer, my divisional quartermaster was sent backwards and forwards between the store at Balaklava and the engineer camp, repeatedly to no purpose; and I was obliged at last to accept 50 picks and 50 spades, one half the number previously promised, and for the entire use of the whole division. This was on the 25th, and our removal to Kadikoi was already in contemplation. Therefore I think I have shown that so long as we remained on the plateau I had not the assistance of an engineer officer, nor had I the requisite tools, if it had been otherwise possible to have sheltered the horses in that position. Lieutenant Stokes, it will be observed, only came one morning, and no more was heard of an engineer officer until the 4th of December. Then Lieutenant Lennox presented himself, but, like Lieutenant Stokes, never returned, and no engineer officer was sent till the 10th or the 12th of the month, when Major Hale was appointed to that duty.

With regard to the hutting, I think I have shown the Board by my correspondence that so early as the 5th, the very day that the heavy brigade marched down, I had already provided to send horses into the town of Balaklava for the purpose of drawing the timber. The timber had not been landed, and it was not found possible to get it before the 12th of the month. In the meantime all the mechanics, masons, and every sort of artificer from the whole of the regiments were working hard at the construction of the depôt stabling. I have a letter here from Major Hall, dated the 23d of December, in which he laments that from some delay in the arrival of a transport there were no nails, and that he had in consequence been prevented roofing the stables. This was on the 23d of December. I must go back a little now, to the 10th. Colonel Griffiths has told you that there were no orders issued for sheltering the horses before the 16th of December. I really am not prepared to say that there were an written orders, but there

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856

had been verbal orders, and it was thoroughly well understood, that so soon as the engineer officer and the commanding officers themselves had selected the most convenient spots for their regiments, they were to commence operations with all possible expedition; and on the 10th of the month I had assembled the whole of the commanding officers of the regiments with their brigadiers behind Colonel Griffiths' tent. They met there for two objects; one, to discuss the hutting; and the other, to discuss the best method of providing the troops with necessaries. I then asked the commanding officers whether they would prefer occupying the ground they were then on, and when they expressed their preference to do so, I desired that they should consider the ground for their winter encampment as decided upon, and I said I hoped they would make every exertion possible to shelter their horses. My order of the 16th of December speaks for itself. It is quite clear that that is no original order; that is an order to show that in consequence of this new transport duty having been imposed upon us we should have to contend with difficulties we had not foreseen, and that the horses upon which we depended for the drawing of the timber were for the future to draw commissariat stores, that the men who were expected to be digging would be riding or leading those horses, and any casual reading of that order will show that it was an order only to stimulate the officers to more exertion, and to provide for the fresh difficulties that had occurred. I tell the officers in this order, "It is quite evident from the "difficulty of getting a sufficient number of Turks, and the little work that can "be got out of them, that unless we can make stabling for ourselves we shall be "without, which cannot fail to be attended by the fearful consequence of our becoming "altogether dismounted. The ground for the stabling is already marked out; the "regiments are in possession; a certain number of entrenching tools, and, if required, "more shall be given them. The lieutenant general does entreat commanding officers "to endeavour by every means in their power to give shelter to their horses. Lord "Lucan conceives that they could readily scarp away in their front, and pave under "their horses' feet, and he will anxiously watch the progress of the work." Nobody reading this order can suppose for one moment that it was the first order which Colonel Griffiths had received. It only instructed them that in consequence of other duties being imposed it was incumbent upon them to make greater exertion, and expressed my hope that under any circumstances they would scarp away and pave under their horses' feet. I have already said, that so far as the quartermaster general was concerned, and as Lord Raglan was concerned, they were always anxious to give me all the assistance in their power. I never applied for an engineer officer that I did not get an order for one; I never applied for Turks that I did not get an order for them; and I never applied for tools that they were not also ordered; but, unquestionably, from the great difficulties of the moment, though I had the orders, I did not succeed in getting what was essentially necessary and indispensable for the construction of the stabling. I on no occasion applied for assistance in the stabling of my horses, whether to Lord Raglan or the quartermaster general, that I did not from those officers receive all the assistance which I believe it was in their power to afford me, though I was not assisted to the extent that they desired. I think that has already been shown to the Board. I do not blame Colonel Tulloch, when he allowed himself to suppose, from the answers given both by Colonel Gordon and by General Airey, that an engineer officer ordered for me on the 12th instant was at my disposal. I do not however know that had he carried on his inquiries further he might not possibly have ascertained that it was not the case; but I wish to attach no blame to Colonel Tulloch on that point. I think I have already shown to the Board on a former occasion that I did everything that a man could do to get the assistance of the Turks, by sending daily to Sir Colin Campbell, by sending to Omar Pasha and Roustum Pasha, communicating with them myself personally, and scarcely allowing a single day to pass that I did not (as I believe it was properly expressed by Sir Richard Airey) importune the quartermaster general and the commander-in-chief to give me assistance. I have no hesitation in saying that if the English cavalry had had no other duties to perform than their own, and had in that respect been circumstanced as favourably as the French cavalry, that in the course of two or three weeks, had the materials been forthcoming, I should have succeeded in hutting the horses; and any delay that occurred subseqently to the arrival of the materials must be attributed to the commissariat transport duties, and the want of proper scantling for the buildings. When Colonel Tulloch attaches importance to the fact that only half the number of men to horses were employed in commissariat transport, I wish to observe, that the other men had to take to and groom their own horses, both leaving the camp and on their return. I do not see any necessity for dilating at much length upon what happened from this time till the stabling was completed. I stated in my opening that every horse was under cover on the 11th of February, and I mentioned, to show the accuracy of that statement, that Major Shute had congratulated me, on my leaving the army, upon my having completed the object which I had so much at heart. I may again mention, with regard to the 13th Dragoon Guards, whose stabling, by Colonel Doherty's statement, was not completed before the 23d of the month, that I showed by reference to the order that all the horses of that regiment were under cover on the 6th of the month. The

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

only way of explaining the apparent discrepancy between my statement and that made by Colonel Low and by Colonel Doherty, is this,—Colonel Doherty says that he found his horses too crowded, and therefore he built another stable. That does not at all impugn the accuracy of my statement, because the horses might equally have been under cover but too crowded. With regard to Colonel Low, who says that they were not completed quite as early as that, I do not see anything at all to complain of in the accuracy of Colonel Low, for this reason,—as the Board is aware, the stabling called the depôt stabling held above 200 horses, and I have no doubt, because it was the case always, that those horses of the 4th Light Dragoons, where the stabling was not already completed, were sheltered at the depôt stables. Of this I am quite confident and certain, that on the 11th of February every horse of the cavalry was under cover. It should be observed that these works were carried on in the very depth of winter, when frequently for three or four days together the ground was covered with six, ten, or twelve inches of snow and more; and it would have been most unreasonable and most improper to have required men unnecessarily to have exposed themselves to the weather. I might say a good deal more upon this subject, but I think the Board must be by this time pretty well informed of all that occurred and all that I did in reference to the stabling of the horses. I will now pass on to another part of my reply.

I undertook to this Board, and indeed before the meeting of this Board, that I would so soon as an opportunity were given me rebut every charge and every insinuation that might be supposed in the slightest degree to reflect upon the cavalry or myself. I trust that I have without much difficulty fulfilled this undertaking. I further undertook to show that every figure in every account referring to this part of the Report was a fallacy, and I believe it will not be denied me that in this again I have succeeded. Unfortunately for Colonel Tulloch, who grounds his special qualification for this particular duty on his proficiency in the science of statistics, and who appears to be exceedingly sensitive on this point, the blundering is so unceasing throughout that it is indeed difficult to account for it. With the fatality which appears to have attended the Commission, all the returns furnished appear to be as incorrect as the calculations are unfounded; indeed, how could it be otherwise, when it was from the wrong office that the returns were asked for, or the information obtained? When the adjutant general should have been applied to, the quartermaster general was the quarter to which the Commission referred; and when the application should have been made to the brigade major it was made to some officer in temporary command, and therefore wholly uninformed. When information was accessible, as in my case, in the case of General Scarlett, in the case of Major Shute, the Assistant Adjutant-General, and the two brigade majors of cavalry, if not purposely yet with the fatality which attended the Commissioners they deprived themselves of the only evidence upon which they should have relied. It would really appear as if a conspiracy had been formed against this unfortunate Commission, and that instead of supplying the Commissioners with the information they required, it had been agreed to delude and deceive them. But was the mode taken likely to elicit the truth?—was it expedient or proper for the Commissioners to examine witnesses in private, with the power of putting what questions they pleased, and only to record so many of those questions and so much of the answers as suited them, and having made a digest of such examination, to submit it at some future time for the witnesses' signature? Was it decorous or respectful to commence the inquiry with the examination of the regimental quartermasters, and only conclude with that of the general officers? Why commence with such feelings of suspicion and distrust, and why, instead of thus crowding their Report with the evidence of hundreds of witnesses of very limited information, did they not leave themselves time to examine more important witnesses, such as Lord Raglan and his staff, before they were induced, from the state of their health, to quit the country?

If their inquiry was, as they admitted, incomplete, why did they allow any matters of personal and domestic convenience to interfere with their return to the Crimea to resume their inquiry? Why, again, did they not on their return to England examine me—for it is not the fact, as has been shown, that the inquiry was closed in the Crimea; on the contrary, in the cases of Colonel Gordon and General Airey, it was continued subsequently, and up to the latest moment.

In respect to the Report, much curious information has, I think, been elicited in the course of this inquiry. The time of its gestation appears to have extended from September to the end of January, a period of between four and five months, during which it appears that constant conferences and communications were going on between the Minister of War and the Commissioners. On one occasion his lordship is said to have had the gout, a complaint from which the military branch of the army may be said to be exempt. Scurvy from bad living, and scurvy treatment, are more their lot and infliction. It has been proved that a first Report, or private Report, was sent to Lord Panmure, and that a second Report was subsequently sent in pieces, or as it was in print, more probably in slips for correction; and after a great deal of manipulation received first his lordship's sanction and approval, and then and lastly the signature of the Commissioners. Such was the caution used in the execution of this Report by the Commissioners, for the purpose, it

may be presumed, of allowing of the latest improvements, that this last formal act is said to have taken place only on the 26th of January. Now it is the custom, as it should be the desire, to attach much respect to a report emanating from commissioners appointed in the name of Her Majesty by a responsible minister of the Crown. In this instance, indeed, some have been inclined, for reasons perhaps not very difficult to divine, to hold it as positive heresy to doubt the veracity of this Report, and as sacrilege to meddle with it. Constituted as was this Commission, conducted as was this inquiry, and manufactured as has been this Report, can it be urged that the Report of this Commission is entitled to much reverence, or to any respect whatever? In the first instance, Colonel Tulloch, from his long connection with the War Office and civil departments of the army, was not and could not be the unbiased and independent Commissioner fitted for a delicate inquiry into the military branch of the service. The Report of these Commissioners should have been drawn up without communication with the Minister of War, should have been completed without his interference, and only handed to him after signature.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to say there was no interference on the part of the Minister-at-War—Lord Lucan is altogether assuming a great many points that are not absolutely the fact.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is now the joint production of Lord Panmure and the two Commissioners, and therefore cannot claim that respect which a report differently circumstanced would be entitled to.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I think it is but just to Lord Panmure to state that this is not the fact. It is not the production of Lord Panmure in any way. He obtained the Report from us containing the whole of what is in this Report with the exception of two parts which he took out because he gave no authority for having them inquired into.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I call it a joint production when there is any interference.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) There was no interference whatever.

(*Earl of Lucan,*) I call it a joint production when there is the interference of a third party.

(*Judge Advocate General to Earl Lucan.*) What do you refer to?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I refer to the evidence of Colonel Tulloch, who tells you that he arrived in England, I think in the middle of July, and that he was in constant conference with the Minister of War.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Not upon that subject, but being attached to his office he is in communication with me on various matters.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I think a reference to Colonel Tulloch's evidence will show that he was from the month of July up to the end of January in constant communication with the Minister of War, and that the Report was given in two or three different parts, and that he had a long communication upon the subject of this Report with the Minister of War when he was laid up with the gout; that there were two Reports, a private one before the publication of the second one, and that the second Report only received the signature of the Commissioners on the 26th of January.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I trust before Lord Lucan goes further that my evidence may be read.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Tulloch denies most particularly that Lord Panmure ever altered the Report.

(*Lord Lucan.*) I am ready to attach the most implicit faith to Colonel Tulloch's evidence, and I draw these inferences from his evidence. It will be for the Board and the public to decide whether my inference is a fair one, or whether any denial on the part of Colonel Tulloch at this moment will remove the truth of the inference that I have drawn.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg that my evidence may be read before his lordship proceeds any further. Will Lord Lucan be so good as to refer to the part containing that statement?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I think it cannot be denied (and I do not think that Colonel Tulloch would wish it) that during those four or five months he was in constant communication with the Minister of War; and I do not expect that Colonel Tulloch would wish the Board to believe that none of those interviews with the Minister of War referred to this Report.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Not one of them. I most expressly deny that, till within a few days before the publication of the Report.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I am quite satisfied, provided it preceded the signature. I am quite satisfied, and am very thankful for that admission.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I saw the Secretary-at-War when I returned from Constantinople, and then I spoke to him on the subject; and I saw him again a few days before the Report was published.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I am quite content to know that there were conferences on the subject of this Report before its signature; therefore upon that admission I am now more confirmed than I ever was, that it is the joint production of Lord Panmure and the two Commissioners.

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I do not think that is justified by the evidence, or by anything stated by Colonel Tulloch.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) That is my opinion; I am not asking the Board to adopt that opinion.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Tulloch states distinctly that Lord Panmure never made any alteration in the Report, and that he made none at his suggestion.

(*Major General Peel.*) Here is an answer of Colonel Tulloch: "In one of your answers "you state that the Report was submitted to the Secretary for War, and the Secretary-"at-War went over it carefully; and further, you stated that you had seen his remarks "in writing. Whom did you mean when you spoke of the Secretary-at-War?—I have "been so long accustomed to call him the Secretary-at-War, it is very probable that I "may have addressed him in that way from mistake. I meant Lord Panmure, the "Secretary for War, and who was so long the Secretary-at-War."

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) That is the Report of Sir John M'Neill and myself, submitted to the Secretary of War a few days before publication. It was in print as it is now, and it was the whole of this Report, with the exception of the two parts taken out. There was no alteration whatever, with the exception of taking out those two parts; so that Lord Panmure had nothing whatever to do with it.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Will the Board allow me to read this part of it? It is my examination of Colonel Tulloch. After stating when he and Sir John M'Neill returned to England, I asked him, "Was not your second Report submitted to the Minister for War "in manuscript?—No, I do not think it was, because we do not usually submit those "things in manuscript. We have a printer, and it is much easier for the Minister for "War to read anything in print than it is in manuscript. Any long paper we usually "send to the printer, and that facilitates the work of the Minister for War very much "indeed; even papers of a much smaller size than this are sent to the printer, and the "types are of course kept up, so that afterwards they can be used to print the Report "permanently from. 739. Was your Report laid before the Minister for War in whole "or in part?—I think it was in two parts, but very closely following upon one another. "It was laid before the Minister for War at the time when he was confined to the house, "and he took that opportunity of reading it, and I believe he devoted a good deal of "attention to it. I may mention that I cannot be quite certain whether it was in "two or three parts, but my impression is that it was in two parts, or more. "740. Were you and Sir John M'Neill in London on the two occasions on which "those two parts were so submitted?—Yes; Sir John M'Neill himself took both "of them to the Secretary for War upon the first occasion. I afterwards saw Lord "Panmure again on the subject, with Sir John M'Neill, and Sir John M'Neill received "them from me, and took them to the Minister for War. 741. Have you not stated "to the Board that certain parts of the Report had been omitted at the suggestion "and by the desire of the Minister for War?—Those were not parts of the Report;—"not parts of this Report. It was part of a report made to him by me. That "is a very different thing. This is a Report submitted by the Secretary for War to "Parliament, placing before Parliament so much of the information which I brought "home as he thinks proper. He may, upon some points, have considered that I exceeded "my inquiries, and did more than was wanted. If it was so, he said, 'I have looked "'over your instructions, and I do not think that those were matters that you should "'have meddled with; it is very well for you getting information of this kind; that "'may be useful by-and-by; but I do not think proper to place it before the public.' "There were two subjects. It is no secret. The question has been asked in Parliament, "and repeated applications have been made to Parliament to bring forward that "evidence. One of them was an inquiry, and a very strict inquiry indeed, into "the mortality of a few regiments. Now, for that I had no authority from the "Secretary-at-War. And if the Board will read the instructions, they will see that "there were no orders given to inquire about the mortality, but I thought it very "necessary for my own information, in following up this inquiry, and Sir John M'Neill "also thought so, that we should be well informed as to the mortality; and I think that "the remarks, and the attacks made by Lord Lucan, upon the reports will show how "very necessary it was to be careful in this matter, in order to get that information "accurately; and we called upon each medical officer for a return, showing not only the "exact number of men who died in each month, but the prevailing diseases, the "admissions into hospital, the number of sick daily in hospital, and everything that "could well be required. That information I knew might be very useful in the event "of any subsequent inquiries, and therefore I obtained it; but it was no part of my "orders to obtain it; therefore when I gave it to the Secretary-at-War he said, "'I do not want it, it is not called for by anything contained in your orders, therefore "'we shall keep it for other purposes. It is not a part of your inquiry that I require to "'submit to the public, except merely what the amount of the mortality was.'" Then he says "The question was whether you were directed to omit certain passages in this "'Report?—Not in this Report. 743. Was it not then in reference to the reports before "'the Board that you observed that some parts had been omitted by the desire of the "Minister for War?—It was with reference to my Report to the Secretary for War. It

" consisted of this Report, with certain other parts, which parts it was conceived expe- *Earl of Lucan.*
" dient not to put into this Report."

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have already stated that those two parts were the parts relating 28th April 1856.
to the mortality and the duty, and with those two that Report could be made complete; but the Secretary-at-War directed those two parts to be left out, as we had had no instructions from the Government to go into those two points; with that exception not one single line was altered by the Secretary-at-War; those two things in their entirety were taken out that is all.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) There was constant intercourse between the Minister of War and the Commissioners.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Not upon that subject.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) From the month of August to the end of January the Report was given piecemeal and in parts at different periods for the consideration of the Minister of War, and the Commissioners were in the constant habit of conferring with him.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg again to say that it was not so as to the Report.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Colonel Tulloch states in one case that Lord Panmure had given the Report his best attention; that the drawing up of it continued to the 26th of January, it having been in his possession in parts at first, and in the whole at least for a considerable time.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg that it may be clearly understood that during the period to which Lord Lucan alludes, from the 14th of August till the beginning of January, I had no intercourse with Lord Panmure, nor do I believe that Sir John M'Neill had, on the subject of the Report, nor until the time of the Report coming out, when we presented it to Lord Panmure, as is usual in such cases, when he reads it over and says that is in accordance with the orders; if it is not, he strikes out those parts, but he does not interfere with the phraseology or any part of it. I cannot allow the names of the Secretary-at-War to be mixed up with mine in a matter of this kind. I trust that the Board will excuse the trouble I have put them to in this matter.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Notwithstanding all the explanations from Colonel Tolloch I entertain the same opinion of the character of this Report, and therefore I state that it is now the joint production of Lord Panmure and the two Commissioners, and therefore it cannot claim that respect which a report differently circumstanced would be entitled to. Indeed it may be said, after all that has been revealed, that it is not worth the paper on which it is written.

The object of this Commission is now perfectly known and understood, namely, to secure temporary ease for the Government, to lull the just indignation of the public, and to absolve the Government from the charge of sacrificing the finest army that ever left England, through their apathy, negligence, and real want of ingenuity and promptitude. If it can be questioned that this was at the moment the great object of the Government, the extraordinary success with which the Report removed every vestige of culpability from the Civil Departments at home to the unhappy army in the field renders it too apparent. But should the result in the end be disappointing, it can only be attributed to the excessive zeal of the Commissioners; probably, from the absence of that wise caution which a minister of more experience than the Minister of War would not have failed to have given to his agent on such an occasion. On no occasion would the caution of "No zeal" have been more useful. Am I doing the Commissioners or the Government any injustice? Let me refer this Board to the Report, and call their attention the fact, that whilst it teems with inuendoes, reproaches, reflections, animadversions, and perhaps charges against, to a more or less degree, the officers generally, whether military or departmental of course prudently excepting the Commander-in-Chief, it in no one instance attributes the smallest want of forethought or prevision, miscalculation, error, or neglect to the Government at home; this cannot be more distinctly shown than when, although the calamities which befel the army, and the cavalry in particular, were so clearly traceable, chiefly, if not entirely, to the want of transport and the want of forage,—two wants which should have been supplied by the authorities at home,—those insufficiencies are charged exclusively upon the unhappy scapegoats in the field, and totally in contradiction to the evidence, where it was shown by Commissary General Filder that his applications for supplies of forage were unattended to, and it was by this very want of forage that he was prevented increasing his transport from the animals he had at Constantinople in reserve. Again, the very absence of those transport animals drove Lord Raglan to impose upon the cavalry horses duties for which their condition totally unfitted them, and however much it may suit the Commissioners to pass over the fact, it is not the less true that those duties occasioned the loss of considerably above 400 troop horses; and I can with the most positive conviction of truth state, that not only those horses, but the others, were equally sacrificed by that insufficiency of supply which unfitted them to undergo any labour or any exposure to the weather. If Mr. Commissary General Filder's evidence is to be believed, that deficiency of forage cannot be traced to any want of forethought or caution on his part, but to a want of promptitude on the

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

part of the Government at home in supplying those wants which had been so formally represented to them; and when it is considered that three or four vessels of 1,200 tons each per month could have supplied compressed hay for between 7,000 and 8,000 horses at the rate of ten pounds per day per horse, I say that there should have been no difficulty in providing a sufficiency of hay for the army, and by hay land transport would have become available. I think I have now shown that the calamities consequent on the want of hay can be fairly attributed to want of promptitude and to positive negligence on the part of the Minister of War, and that officer of the Treasury who at this time at least directed the commissariat both at home and abroad; and that when the Commissioners did not scruple to level the whole of their animadversions of want of promptitude and ingenuity against the military branch of the army, and to impute a want of comprehensive views, and, therefore, of capacity to Commissary General Filder,—whose defence I never thought would have fallen upon me, and who will be, perhaps, as much surprised at it as I am, and, I hope, not the less grateful,—I say they were only consistently carrying out the unmistakeable object of the Commission, namely, not to spare the military branch of the army in their mission to exonerate the really culpable at home.

The Board have to several witnesses put the question What occasioned the death of the horses? I believe in every instance it has been attributed to insufficiency of food, which unfitted them to undergo great exposure and to the severity of the commissariat transport duty in their then low condition. I think the next question should be Who killed the horses? If the losses can be thus fairly explained, unquestionably the Minister of War and the Secretary of the Treasury who managed the Commissariat Department were chiefly, if not entirely, responsible; and if from what fell from Colonel Tulloch, a further inquiry may be expected, it is to be hoped that more justice will be done, and that the real culprits, the civil officers at home, will be placed in the situation in which I have found myself for the last three weeks, and that the officers of the army, in return for their services, and in full discharge of all that they have done and undergone, will not again be made scapegoats for the shortcomings, mismanagement, and delinquencies of the civil department at home. Although undoubtedly neither of the letters of instructions to the Commissioners give the slightest authority for inquiring into the conduct of generals and other military officers, those gentlemen have thus far extended their inquiry and have even included it in their Report; and drawn up as was that Report under the eye, and with the assistance, of the Minister of War, it cannot be denied, that whether originally intended or not, this inquiry into the conduct of the military officers of the army by the Commissioners has received the approval of Lord Panmure. A civil inquiry into the conduct of generals and other officers in the field, is I believe, without precedent, unless it is to be found in the annals of the worst period of the French Revolution, when civil commissioners were sent to watch the conduct of the generals. Their instructions were more just, for instead of passing by the Commander-in-Chief as inconvenient to assail, they confined their duties chiefly to his surveillance, and more to his fidelity than to the military discharge of his duties. I am unwilling to offer much observation upon the extraordinary character of the letter from the Minister of War to Colonel Tulloch which lies on your table, and which has been read to the Court at my instance. Whatever may have been its object, sure I am that this honourable Court will show its entire independence, and by its decision do the most perfect justice; but it will be beyond its power to remove from the army the ridicule, from the country the scandal, and from our institutions the reproach which the Crimean Inquiry will have occasioned throughout Europe.

I feel that I may rest my case of care and diligence on the evidence of General Scarlett and other officers, upon my divisional orders, and upon my correspondence. How many divisional generals, in past times or the present, could during so short a period, by their orders, show more promptitude and ingenuity? and to meet the case of Colonel Griffith's coarse words, can one sentence of these orders or the correspondence be pointed out as harsh or offensive? I might, I think, have fully met every charge or insinuation by simply laying these orders and this correspondence on your table, and relying for my justification on documents issued daily, and when it could have been little expected that I should have to rely upon such evidence to meet animadversions from public officers on my professional conduct. The Court questioned two or three of the witnesses as to whether I was in the habit of visiting the camp frequently. To this I may say, that from the commencement, until we reached Kadikoi, I lived in a common bell-tent close to and amongst the regiments, and only restricted my visits to the lines from scruples of creating the jealousy of my brigadiers, and that in addition to my divisional orders, I was in daily communication with the brigades through the brigade majors who attended at the orderly hour; that I was always accessible to every officer, and glad to confer upon any point of duty; and that I was in the habit of convening that brigadiers and commanding officers of regiments, to confer with them on all matters of urgency. After our arrival at Kadikoi, I rode nearly daily to the camp of one or more regiments to see the progress made in the hutting. I had it superintended by my deputy assistant quartermaster-general; and the corporal of Sappers, who more particularly directed the works, saw me every day, and at times frequently during the day.

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

A letter which I hold in my hand has been sent to me by an uncle of Mr. Blunt, to whom it was addressed. Mr. Blunt is now in the consular service of this country, and served during this campaign as my interpreter. That gentlemen feeling the injustice that was being done me at home, wrote to his uncle to endeavour to correct it, and to show that, so far from my being fairly chargeable with anything like neglect, the whole of my time was occupied in attention to the comfort of my men and my horses. Again, as he was the person I always employed to superintend the Turks, sent extracts from his journal which show how he performed that duty.

To those who would wish to make it appear that the English cavalry, if not altogether neglectful of care of their horses, showed a want of resource, and were inferior to other cavalry in the field, I say, and I hope it will appear, with the concurrence of this Board, that the English cavalry, under a pressure from the want of forage, and of duties most distressing and quite foreign to their profession, were, nevertheless, far more successful in sheltering their horses than were our allies or the enemy, and sustained losses infinitely smaller. I have no hesitation in saying that if after the battle of Inkerman the cavalry had been removed to the neighbourhood of Kadikoi, and had had to perform no other duties than their own, 600 or 700 horses would have been saved, and the cavalry would have been hutted long before Christmas, and even earlier, had the materials been available sooner.

I have already said that I believed that I might meet the charge of the want of promptitude and ingenuity, and the insinuation that such a charge conveys of apathy and indifference in the care and welfare of the troop horses, by my divisional order book, a copy of which is in your hands, and in which you will find no less than seventy-two orders on the management and care of horses alone. If this order book would suffice, as in my opinion it would, to meet the case now brought against me, I say with equal confidence that those orders would, with any board of soldiers, clear me of any and every reflection which might be made against my professional character, and the economical management and command of my division. To those who, like Colonel Griffiths, would impute to me gross words in my communications with my officers, I give this book as my answer, and I defy them to point out a harsh word. To those who would impute to me a spirit of tyranny and annoyance, I say that this book is a reply. To those who would charge me with ignorance or incapacity, I say that I defy any soldier to point his finger to one line that is at variance with the rules of the service, or with what must be considered as the practice of all well-regulated armies in the field, and that would not conduce to the advantage of the service. In fine, I am only too glad to have the opportunity afforded me of meeting the present animadversions against my professional character. I only complain, and I shall ever complain, that that inquiry which I so earnestly requested, and to which common justice entitled me to, was withheld, when I was so capriciously and so unjustly snatched from my command; but such an inquiry was a *political inconvenience*, and therefore the professional interest and character of a subordinate general were not to be weighed in the balance, but carelessly sacrificed. Before I leave this personal part of the question, I must add, that I only held the command of a divisional and a subordinate general; and though ready to take upon myself the responsibility of that position or any other responsibility which circumstances would have justified, or which my commander-in-chief might have allowed, I was not prepared to arrogate to myself an assumption of authority which, whilst it would have been disrespectful to the general officer to whom it was my first object to pay the greatest deference and respect, it would have been vain for me, in my secondary position, to attempt to carry out As a divisional general, I had only to superintend the discipline and the economical management of my division; to promote its efficiency by the preservation of the health of both men and horses in every way that the means placed at my disposal would conduce to that object; to keep my chief thoroughly and constantly informed of their condition and requirements; and, so far as possible, to forewarn him and prepare him for the exigencies and difficulties likely to occur, to the extent that my limited knowledge of the stratagetical operations of the army enabled me to do. In no one of those duties can it be said that I was found wanting. During the whole time that I held my command, without the intermission of a single hour, I was to be found at my post and amongst my men; and I will not deny myself the satisfaction of adding, and for the truth of which I would appeal to Sir Colin Campbell (with whom I co-operated for four months), to the officers of my division, to all other officers, whether English or French, whether in an army as devoted to its country as any army that ever left England there was one individual officer more devoted to his duty, and to the promotion of its interest and honour, than myself. I was responsible to, and not responsible for, the commander-in-chief; and it is as unjust as it is absurd to hold me accountable for what neither my authority nor my position enabled me to effect or to control.

Colonel Tulloch concluded by observing, that care and toil, injustice and illwill, formed a part of the burden that must be borne by every man who served the State. If such be the fate of the civil servants of the public, how much greater is the reproach, when soldiers like myself, and the gallant men I commanded, find themselves objects of obloquy and animadversion; and, instead of being considered deserving of their country's

*Earl of Lucan.*

28th April 1856.

acknowledgment and gratitude, for their self-devotion and their endurance of every peril and suffering, are forced upon their trial for the vindication of their professional character and honour. And why are English soldiers less deserving of the acknowledgment from their country than French, Sardinian, or Russian, all of whom, on their return home, are received with ovation and triumph, whilst the English are made the objects of contumely and reproach? If it is pretended that all this injustice is intended for the officers alone, the English private soldier, so generous and so brave, little desires an undue share of that credit and those honours which with affection and pride he acknowledges to have been as well earned by his officers as by himself.

Adjourned to To-morrow, at Eleven o'Clock.

## FOURTEENTH DAY.

### 29th April 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

*Earl of Cardigan.*

29th April 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General to Earl of Cardigan.*) It has been officially communicated to the Board that you are one of the officers who have considered that they have reason to complain of certain allusions or statements in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into matters connected with the British army in the Crimea, and that you have called upon the Secretary of State for War to offer you an opportunity to give some explanation of those statements. That opportunity is now offered to you; and the Board request that you will point out to them what are the passages in that Report of which you complain?

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) I beg to state that I did not apply for any inquiry; but by the permission of the Board I will read the statement which I hold in my hand.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Will your statement point out to the Board the precise passages in the Report to which you object?

(*Earl of Cardigan*) Precisely.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Could you read those passages first, and then proceed?

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) The passages are all quoted in this statement; all numbered and quoted; and before I read any quotation from the evidence I will pause to give time to the Board to refer to the passages.

Mr. President, and Gentlemen,

Before I address myself to that portion of the Commissioners' Report which has connexion with the command I had the honour to hold, I beg to make one observation with reference to the Royal Warrant by which this Court is constituted.

The warrant states "that certain officers have demanded a full inquiry." So far as I am concerned, it has been already stated in Parliament, and I desire here to repeat, that I have not demanded an inquiry. Upon the publication of the Report I addressed a letter to the Secretary of State for War containing such remarks as occurred to me upon a first perusal of the Report itself and of the evidence appended to it. My letter was subsequently laid upon the table of both Houses of Parliament, and I was content to await with confidence the result of a deliberate consideration of the facts.

It having, however, been deemed expedient that the Royal Warrant should issue, I beg to state that I most cordially accept the opportunity of going more fully into the circumstances than the limits of my letter permitted, and that I shrink from no inquiry into any part of my conduct.

With these preliminary observations, Sir, which I have made in order to define with accuracy the precise circumstances under which I individually appear before the Court, I proceed at once to deal with those remarks of the Commissioners which refer to my command in the Crimea.

It may be a convenience to state, that when I quote the Commons' Evidence I shall give the number of the question, and when I refer to the Commissioners' Report, the number of the page.

If the Court will do me the favour to turn to page 18 of the Commissioners' Report, they will find that it is there dealing with the question of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the means of transport to the front. From the last paragraph of that page it proceeds to the question of deficiency of forage.

I may have occasion to refer presently to this portion of the Report, but for the moment I proceed to the close of the second paragraph of the 19th page, which, and the paragraph immediately following it, I shall read at length, as they specially refer to the condition of the light cavalry brigade, which I commanded, and contain, in fact, the statement upon which my exercise of discretion as to the horses has been impugned. It commences thus:—"There is one case, however, from which such serious consequences have arisen "that it requires some special notice." This is on the 19th page. "The light cavalry "brigade, which had for some time previously been stationed in the valley adjacent to "Balaklava, was removed, first, to the vicinity of head quarters for two or three days, "and thereafter, on the 1st or 2d of November, to Inkermann, where it was stationed "near the windmill, a distance of at least from seven or eight miles from Balaklava. "This change, at a time when the roads were in an extremely bad state, and when there "was great difficulty in obtaining the means of transport, created very serious obstacles "to a proper supply of forage being obtained.

"It is alleged by Deputy Assistant Commissariat General Crookshank, that there "was a certain quantity of hay at Balaklava, but not the means of carrying it to the "front. Occasionally he managed to bring up a little, till the 14th of November, when "the supply failed entirely. After that date the want of transport affected the "supply of barley also, which on several days did not exceed from 1½ lbs. to 2lbs. daily "per horse, being all that they had to keep them alive. The returns of one of the

*Earl of Cardigan.*

29th April 1856.

"regiments show, that for the last four days they were on the ground the average "was only about 2½ lbs. for each horse, previously exhausted as they had been by the "want of hay or straw during the early part of the month.

"When the supply began to fail, the commissariat officer referred to, who appears "to have done everything in his power to meet the difficulties of the case, proposed, as he "knew there was plenty of barley at Balaklava, that if a detachment of the horses were "allowed to go down daily he would engage to bring up enough for the rest of the brigade. "This proposition appears to have been brought specially under the notice of Lord Cardigan "by Lieutenant-Colonel Mayow, assistant quartermaster general of cavalry, who states "that his lordship declined to accede to it, as he had previously done when a similar "proposition was made to him to send the horses down for hay before that supply "failed.

"The whole brigade remained in this state till the 2d of December, when it was "directed to return to its previous position; but by that time the horses were reduced "to such a state from starvation that they could no longer bear the weight of their "riders; they had to be led down; many were left on the ground in a dying state, "and of the remainder, 17 died on the road before they could reach their former station, "a distance of only about six miles.

"It is no part of our duty to enter into the military reasons which may have led to "the detention of this brigade on a spot where the horses could not be foraged by the "Commissariat, or which may have induced a refusal to adopt the only measure by which "apparently they could be subsisted; we merely call attention to the fact, as one of the "instances of a deficiency of supply which formed the special subject of our inquiry."

Colonel Tulloch in the last case desired to be informed at once what portion of the Report was complained of. I beg to refer him to these paragraphs in which I am personally named.

You will observe that the Commissioners in this Report decline to express any opinion upon the policy or impolicy of my refusal, and that they declare themselves equally unwilling to enter upon the military reasons which led to placing the light brigade in the position they occupied at this time, or to its continuance there.

This portion of the Report, and the evidence upon which it is supposed to rest, has however been elsewhere animadverted upon, and, as I understand the matter, I am charged with having contributed to the subsequent inefficiency of the light brigade by my refusal to adopt a suggestion, calculated, in their opinion, to improve its condition, viz., the sending the troop horses down to Balaklava for forage. I feel certain that a careful reference to evidence given about the same period, and to statements made prior to the issue of the Commission before the committee of the House of Commons, coupled with a full knowledge of all the facts, will convince you that in not supporting that suggestion I exercised a sound and necessary discretion, best calculated to effect my only object, that the brigade should, so far as the difficulties permitted, continue to discharge its various duties. It will be my desire, in laying my case before you, to confine myself simply to the vindication of my own conduct, refraining equally from topics irrelevant to this issue, or with which I have no personal concern; and you may rely upon it that, while I adopt no responsibility which does not belong to me, I will evade none that I ought fairly to assume.

As I proceed, you will observe that I occasionally repeat either documents or statements which have already been noticed before you. As, however, such instances are not frequent, and will occupy but a short time, I ask you not to disturb the connected order of my narrative.

I believe that I shall in the end save the time of the Court if I at once supply you with dates, which define the service of the light cavalry brigade, and indicate the condition it was in at the respective periods. This done, in the briefest possible manner, will enable the Court distinctly to understand the period up to which the efficiency of the brigade continued, and from which its privations commenced. With this object, I shortly mention that I landed, and joined the 17th Lancers and part of the 8th Hussars, at Scutari, on the 23d May 1854; that we proceeded to Varna on the 3d June; that, after two days' encampment, we went to Deona, and remained there about three weeks; that I proceeded, by Lord Raglan's orders, with 200 horses, and a regiment of Turkish cavalry, on a reconnoissance in Bulgaria, which lasted seventeen days; that we returned to Deona on the 11th July, and the brigade shortly after went to Yanibazar, near Shumla.

E. 5668.
R. 5688.

During a time of extreme sickness, the light cavalry brigade was fortunate in its comparatively small loss from cholera, which was limited to 10 men. We then received an order to proceed to Varna to embark for the Crimea.

Should it appear to the Court material to ascertain the condition of the light cavalry brigade at that period of time, I am enabled, if necessary, to lay before you in evidence the opinions formed by competent officers:—Colonel Wetherall, assistant adjutant general, who twice visited the camp at Yanibazar; General Cannon, who accompanied me in my inspection of the camp at Yanibazar; and Colonel Steele, military secretary to Lord Raglan, who was present at an inspection at Varna shortly before we embarked for the Crimea, and who would speak to the fine condition of the horses at that time. We disembarked on Friday, September 14th, at Old Fort, in the Crimea. The command of the

cavalry (at this time confined to the light brigade) had devolved upon the lieutenant-general of the division, Lord Lucan. *Earl of Cardigan.*

A part of the light cavalry brigade, accompanied by a small force of infantry and artillery under my immediate command, were sent by Lord Raglan the next morning to search for some Russian cavalry. We returned at eleven o'clock at night, started early the following day, and arrived with the army on the 20th at the Alma. After that battle, the flank march brought us to Balaklava on September 26th. 29th April 1856.

Our first encampment was at the entrance to Balaklava; we then moved forward about a mile; remained there a short time, and I then moved up to join the 4th Light Dragoons and 11th Hussars on the heights above Sebastopol.

During the time of this encampment we were sufficiently supplied with corn by the commissariat; and the local supplies not being yet consumed or destroyed, foraging parties found and brought in a stock of hay.

The two regiments were brought back to the same camp as the rest of the cavalry, near Balaklava, and remained there till the battle of the 25th October. After the battle of Balaklava, the light cavalry brigade, reduced by a loss of 397 horses put hors de combât in the charge against the Russian batteries, was ordered four miles further to the heights of Inkerman, and encamped close to the second division, commanded by Sir De Lacy Evans. It arrived there November 2d, and was so stationed on November 5th, the day of the battle of Inkerman.

Up to this last period the Court will understand that forage had reached us in tolerably sufficient quantities, the supply existing, and the transport service being adequate to the less distance which separated us from it.

But our removal to the more advanced position on the heights not only increased the distance between us and the depôts, but, as I shall show you, was followed by a decreased supply, and a daily increasing difficulty of transport, both on account of the roads breaking up and the failure of the transport animals.

Having placed this brief summary before you, I recur to the Report of the Commissioners, which refers to the state of the brigade during the month of November; and I shall endeavour to enable the Court clearly to appreciate the military position occupied by the brigade, into which the authority of the Commissioners did not permit them to enter.

It is also essential that the Court should fully understand the difficulties which from various causes attended that position, as well as the precise date of the commencement of the time of serious deficiency with respect to forage, and of the suggestions which were made by the commissariat officer which I declined to support. For the present inquiry, sir, the Court is in possession of very complete documentary evidence, not only that which was taken in the Crimea by the Commissioners, but also that of the witnesses who were examined before a committee of the House of Commons which sat about the same time with the inquiry of the Commissioners. These witnesses consisted of many officers who had been upon the spot, in positions of high command, at the period in question, but had then returned to England; and the committee had this great advantage over the Commission, that they were able to enter upon military questions as well as upon those which related only to the supplies of the army. I shall make free use of their evidence, which I consider as especially valuable, because it was given before any question arose upon the matter at issue to-day; and it will be necessary for me to trouble the Court with scarcely any witnesses. The first point is the position of the troops on the heights of Inkerman.

Shortly after the arrival of the brigade at that position, General Canrobert did me the honour to point out to me in detail the importance of the presence of the brigade, in the event of a sudden attack by the Russians from the Valley of Inkermann in the rear of our position.

Subsequently, on my suggesting privately to Lord Raglan that the severity of the exposure and other difficulties made it almost impossible for the brigade to sustain itself there, I gathered from his answer that he was privately bound to the French to keep us in that position. Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan, who commanded the cavalry of the English army, stated in his evidence before the Sebastopol Committee as follows:

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Are you sure that you cannot make your statement upon this point without referring to this evidence, because the evidence that you are now referring to was not taken before the Board?

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) It was taken before a committee of the House of Commons. They are all official documents, and are published as official documents in the blue book.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you state that you cannot make this point intelligible without referring to that evidence?

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) I can certainly make it much clearer by referring to the evidence that has been already given before another tribunal, and it will be impossible to make it clear without. At "Question 6706. You stated, did you not, that on the 8th November, "or about that time, you inquired of Lord Raglan whether you should make prepara-"tions for wintering the cavalry in the Crimea?—Yes. 6707. What preparations "did you then make for the wintering of the horses?—Before it was possible to make "any preparation for the wintering of the horses it was necessary to fix on a permanent

*Earl of Cardigan.*

29th April 1856.

" winter camp. Lord Raglan at that time was most unwilling that we should have the " colline; that line of hill; and I believe he had entered into some arrangement, or I " might say even an engagement with the French, that the cavalry were to defend the " rear of the position; and it became exceedingly difficult to select any spot as a winter " encampment upon that colline. It never became very urgent till after the 14th of " November. Some time after that I went to Lord Raglan, and laid before him the " state of the horses. I told him that a great many of them had died, both of the horse " artillery attached to me, and of my own division, since the gale of the 14th November, " and that those that had not died were in a state of debility, and that they were perfectly " useless and unserviceable, and that if he kept us upon the colline for the purpose of " assisting in the defence of the colline it was my duty to tell him that the horses were in " that state that they could not carry their riders. Lord Raglan said to me, 'Do you " mean to tell me that your cavalry are hors de combat?' I said, 'I am grieved to " tell you that they are hors de combat, and, unless something is done to remove them " from where they stand, they will every one of them die.' Lord Raglan said, 'Well, I " cannot decide anything until I speak to the French.' It is right that I should state " to the committee that on my way to Lord Raglan that day I met Mr. Commis- " sary General Filder, and he said, 'I have been telling Lord Raglan that if the " cavalry are kept where they are they will all starve and must all die;' and " therefore my representation to Lord Raglan was only a confirmation of what he had " already heard from Mr. Commissary General Filder. Lord Raglan had told me that he " would talk the subject over with the French general; but I heard no more for four or " five days. I was at Lord Raglan's house the next day, hoping that he would give me an " answer, and I asked him if he had anything to say to me; but he said he had nothing to " say to me. Four or five days after that I received an order, conveying to me that Lord " Raglan would be willing to allow me to increase my depôt of horses at Balaklava; that " I might increase them to 200. I had already, without authority, ever since the month of " October, established a depôt or a hospital for sick horses in Balaklava; but he said he " could do no more than this,—to allow me to increase that depôt to 200 horses; and most " unexpectedly, after the lapse of three or four more days, I got an order from Lord Raglan " to take the whole of the cavalry down to Kadikoi, which I did." Lord Lucan also, at question 6687, states, " Before the light brigade were detached, I rode over the ground, " and I went to the quartermaster general, and begged that the light brigade might not " be sent to the right of our position, stating at the same time that I thought it would " be impossible to forage them there; and he promised that he would lay the thing " before Lord Raglan, and I got a letter, which is here, stating that Lord Raglan still " wished them to march." Sir Richard Airey, the quartermaster general, in his evidence before the Commissioners, page 186, also states, " The light brigade of cavalry was kept " on the heights of Inkermann, near the Woronzoff road, by order of Lord Raglan; a " decision come to after a conference with General Canrobert."

As regards, therefore, the position of the light brigade, the Court will see that it was taken and maintained in obedience to the exigencies of the service and the command of my superiors, over which I could have no control. Lord Lucan has already briefly given a portion of these facts; but they are so important to my case that I have deemed it my duty to give the whole, at the risk of a repetition of some part. Thus we have the light brigade posted, owing to the necessity of the case, and for military reasons, in a position where the horses were subjected to great suffering from exposure. The extent of that suffering is so fully given by Lord Lucan, Sir De Lacy Evans, General Bentinck, Sir Charles Trevelyan, and others, before the Sebastopol Committee, and by Colonel Shewell, Colonel Doherty, and others, before the Commissioners, confirmed by witnesses in this hall, that I do not propose to detain you by evidence on a point sufficiently well known.

But the position also increased the distance from the means of supply to seven miles. You have seen that Lord Lucan (question 6687) anticipated the difficulty of foraging them in that position.

That anticipation was realized. Deputy Assistant Commissary General Crookshank, the commissary attached to the brigade of light cavalry, and who therefore speaks with competent knowledge of the actual supplies, states, at page 47 of the Commissioners' Report, " Up to the first days of November, when the brigade moved to the front, the " horses had been regularly and fully foraged. From the date when the brigade moved " to the front at a greater distance from Balaklava, the roads then daily getting worse, " and the transport cattle daily diminishing in number, the supply of hay gradually " diminished." Previous even, therefore, to the storm of the 14th November, the power of the transport service was not wholly sufficient to keep the brigade fully supplied; but the storm came as a climax to the difficulties which were gradually increasing around us. Mr. Crookshank continues, " After the catastrophe of the 14th of November it became " impossible for the commissariat to supply hay to the brigade. There was then a " certain quantity of hay at Balaklava, but there were not the means of carrying it to " the front. The roads were then bad, but not impassable for pack horses; but the " commissariat had not sufficient transport to carry hay to the front."

He proceeds, with reference to a later period, " The number of pack animals required " to carry up the full rations of barley was about 60;—during the time referred to.

"Sometimes could not get more than five, and never more than 10 or 12, and it "frequently was near midnight before I got back to the camp." On looking at p. 47 you will see that I have slightly transposed the passages, so as to make them follow the order of time; but, with this exception, the evidence is as there given.

Commissary General Filder, at page 60, says, "The Land Transport Corps began to "suffer about the 14th of November, or after the storm, from bad roads, exposure, and "fatigue. The roads were bad about the 10th, but shortly after the 14th they became "absolutely impassable for carts, and I was obliged to convert all the draught animals "into pack animals, by which their transport power was at once reduced to one third "of its former amount." Captain Shakespeare, R.A., states, 4661 and 4662, "From "my camp to Balaklava, about two miles, the roads were knee deep in mud." I could, at the risk of fatiguing the Court, produce a mass of similar evidence given both before the Commons' committee and the Commissioners, as to the impassable state of the roads, and the failure of the commissariat transport.

I do not desire to obtrude my own opinions on the Court; but I may add, that I was examined myself before the Sebastopol Committee, and gave evidence on these points. I have now shown the Court the steps by which the light brigade became gradually affected by the consequence of the advance of the season and of our more exposed position, its greater distance from the supplies, and the decreased power of those whose business was to supply us, owing to the effect of the storm of the 14th of November. I now proceed, following the order of the dates, to show the Court what was the actual supply at this period.

For this purpose I begin at the 16th of November, upon which day I requested the officers commanding regiments in the light brigade to report to me officially the deficiencies which required to be remedied. Their reports, which are appended to my letter to Lord Panmure, contain no statement with regard to an insufficient supply of forage. These are the same reports which Lord Lucan has already put in, they having been forwarded to him by me.

The brigade major, Colonel Mayow, stated in his report to me of the 18th November, which, together with other reports from him, I produce to the Court—

"The horses had hay and corn yesterday, but not their full allowance. By some "mistake the artillery got some intended for us. I had spoken to Mr. Crookshank, who "is now gone to Balaklava, and said he hoped to be able to supply full rations this "evening."

I next received from Deputy Assistant Commissary General Crookshank the following letter, dated November 19th, which is at page 48:—

"My lord, "Camp, Sebastopol, 19th November 1854.

"I have the honour to report, for your lordship's information, that the late severe "weather prevented my keeping the brigade regularly supplied with forage, nor has the "state of the roads since permitted me to make good the consequent arrears. At this "moment I owe nearly one and a half day's corn and some hay to the brigade; but I am "in hopes, from the present state of the roads, to make that good. A certain quantity of "forage has been issued daily since the storm, and last night 39 sacks of 160 lbs. each "were issued, and this morning 14 sacks of like weight. More barley will be up to day, "probably upwards of 40 sacks, together with some hay. The men's rations have been "regularly issued, and I apprehend no difficulty in that respect."

"I have, &c.,

"A. CROOKSHANK,

"Deputy Assistant Commissary General,

"Light Cavalry Brigade."

It will be seen from this letter of 19th November that Deputy Commissary General Crookshank defines the extent of his arrear,—attributes that arrear to the badness of the weather and roads,—but is sanguine—too much so as the event proved—of his ability to make up the deficiency.

Of the 19th I have by some accident no report from Colonel Mayow, but on the 20th he reports, "The troops have a supply of barley, not quite the full amount. There is no hay."

On the 21st he reports, "The horses got barley last night, not quite the full quantity, "but not hay. The men had their rations."

And on the 22d November he reports, "There was as near as possible the full ration "of barley came up last night, but no hay. The men are well off for rations."

I refer to these reports, first, for the purpose of showing that, though not fully supplied, the horses were obtaining up to this date sufficient food to support them, provided they were not subjected to any undue and extra exertion, and further, to correct (if I may rely on Colonel Mayow's reports) an inaccuracy in the statement which the Commissioners give of Colonel Douglas's evidence. At p. 13 he is made to state: "For about a fortnight "after the 14th of November the horses were without hay or straw, and had only on an "average about 2½ lbs. of barley per day."

If Colonel Mayow is correct, and I have no reason to doubt his accuracy, Colonel Douglas (if his evidence is rightly given) has fallen into an error. But as I find the Commissioners refer to the Appendix, page 19, to a return made by Colonel Douglas

*Earl of Cardigan.*

29th April 1856.

himself on the subject, dated December 3d, which limits the 2½ lbs. supply to four specified days, commencing the 28th, I am inclined to believe that the Commissioners have by mistake inserted the word "for," and that it should be read, "about a fortnight "after the 14th," which would make the 28th.

This would be consistent with Colonel Douglas's own return, and not at variance with Colonel Mayow's reports. That there is an inaccuracy is obvious; whether it exists in Colonel Douglas's evidence or in the Commissioners' Report of it I must leave the Court to determine. Colonel Tulloch stated on Friday April 18th, that what was printed was the substance of the evidence.

The same remark is applicable to the report of Colonel Doherty's evidence, page 14, to the effect, that "for about a fortnight after the 12th November the horses had on an "average, only about 2½ lbs. of barley daily, without hay or straw.

On the 29th November, Sir, I was reluctantly compelled by continued ill-health to resign my command.

As I stated to the Sebastopol Committee, 5787, I had been driven by illness to sleep on board my yacht for the last five weeks.

The yacht reached Balaklava October 14th, and six or seven days after I received Lord Raglan's permission to sleep on board.

Prior to its arrival I had been reported by the chief staff surgeon as sick, and unfit for duty, and was ordered on board the ship "Star of the South." My health was in such a state that without this permission I must have resigned my command; but I clung to the hope that my health would have been restored in a short time, and Lord Raglan was most unwilling to part with general officers, in consequence of the number he had been deprived of by death, wounds, and sickness after the battle of Inkermann.

But on the 27th November I wrote privately to Lord Raglan to say, that the indulgence which he had granted to me had failed to produce the effect which I had anticipated, and that I should be compelled to appear before a medical board. Upon the 29th I sent in my official resignation, a copy of which is appended to my letter to Lord Panmure; and on the 30th Colonel Doherty, who gave evidence before the Commissioners, was put in orders as my successor in command of the light cavalry brigade.

I have now laid before the Court the position and the difficulties of the brigade during the month of November; I have substantiated by the most authentic evidence, —that of the brigade major,—that the serious deficiency of forage commenced on or about the 23d of November; and I have shown the Court that I was compelled to resign the command of the brigade on the 29th of that month.

During the time which elapsed between the 23d of November and the removal of the brigade to an encampment near Balaklava, on the 2d or 3d of December, the supply of forage became so deficient as to occasion considerable loss to the brigade. The want of nosebags, which I had done my best in vain to supply, decreased by waste the diminishing supply of barley. Colonel Mayow on this subject reported to me, November 24th: "From the want of nosebags the horses were obliged to be fed on the "ground, and the corn consequently was in a great measure wasted." And I may state that this subject has been adverted to in the reports of several other officers.

I, however, am able to produce a return given by the Commissioners themselves at page 20 of their Report which has been laid before you, which proves that, notwithstanding the additional difficulties with which the light brigade had at this time to contend, the mortality among the horses contrasts favourably with that of the heavy brigade and the artillery.

The loss per cent. from October to March inclusive by sickness is stated by the Commissioners to have been—

| | |
|---|---|
| Heavy brigade | 47 |
| Artillery | 42 |
| Light brigade | 38 |

The commissariat loss is also stated at 38 per cent.; but it must be remembered that Commissary General Filder, at p. 60, says, "The transport horses were, in preference "to all others, regularly fed." And to convince the Court that the sufferings of the horses of the light brigade, though great, did not exceed those of troops more favourably placed, I read the following extract from a memorandum addressed on the 2d of December by Lord Raglan, relative to the artillery horses, to Commissary General Filder, which will be found at p. 86 of the Appendix to the Commissioners' Report. This refers to the artillery horses:—"The horses are dying fast of starvation, first presenting the "spectacle of eating the wheels of the gun carriages and each other's tails. I am really shocked and ashamed to have to read such a recital."

I shall presently refer to a more recent letter of the Commissioners, and to the observations which have been made before this Court, in the figures I have quoted above.

I proceed now to the suggestions which were made, that the cavalry horses should be despatched to Balaklava for forage; and I think it necessary, first, shortly to advert to the evidence given upon this point by the officers of the light brigade, as the issue between myself and those gallant officers is comparatively slight, and, as I shall have the honour of presenting to you, is merged in the larger question, whether I exercised a right or wrong discretion in declining to concur with this suggestion.

The officers who supplied statements on this point are, in the light brigade,—

| | |
|---|---|
| Colonel Shewell, 8th Hussars - - - | at p. 12 |
| Colonel Douglas, 11th Hussars - - | „ 13 |
| Colonel Doherty, 13th Hussars - - - | „ 14 |
| Lieut.-Colonel Mayow, Brigade Major - - | „ 79 |

On reference to the evidence of these officers, it will be observed that they do not state that they themselves, or Colonel De Salis, who is referred to in Colonel Shewell's evidence (though not examined), communicated to me personally any such suggestion.

This view was supported on Tuesday 8th of April by Colonel Doherty's answer to a question put by one of the Court, and is indeed consistent with the fact, for I have referred the Court to the reports dated November 16th from four officers commanding regiments in the light brigade, viz., Colonel Doherty, Colonel Douglas, Colonel de Salis, Captain Morgan. There was a fifth from Colonel Low, 4th Light Dragoons, to the same effect, but which has been mislaid. These reports were sent to me in consequence of my requirement of the same date. Thus at the precise time when the commissariat officer had made the proposal to which I shall refer they are silent as to any suggestion of the kind. Confident that those officers desire only to state that which is in precise accordance with the fact, I am not surprised, on examining their respective statements, to find that none of them represent any personal communication or report on the subject to have been made to myself on this or any other occasion. I am induced, therefore, to believe that they refer to communications which undoubtedly did take place (as I have already stated in my letter to Lord Panmure) on the part of the brigade major, Colonel Mayow, at the instance of Deputy Assistant Commissary General Crookshank, which they probably did not repeat from their ascertaining that they had already been declined by me.

Without this explanation it might be conceived that there was some ground for the assumption of the Commissioners, that the officers named had made "many suggestions" to that effect.

Nor do these officers even state that they attached sufficient importance to the suggestion as to avail themselves of their many opportunities of reporting it to the lieutenant general in command of the division, who has informed you of the personal meeting which took place in my absence, on the 18th, with reference to their letters of the 16th.

I admit, as I have before admitted, that a suggestion by Deputy Assistant Commissary General Crookshank was made to me verbally through Colonel Mayow, some days after November 14th, which was renewed verbally on the 23d, and is referred to in the letter I produce to the Court of November 24th.

It must have been about the 16th, though I am not able to define the date, and have no document to prove it (from its being a verbal communication), that I received the first suggestion as to sending the horses down from Deputy Assistant Commissary General Crookshank through Colonel Mayow.

I have no doubt that I am accurate in this, as Colonel Mayow, in his evidence, page 79, speaks of it as follows:

"For some time after the 14th November no hay was supplied to the brigade, but a "full ration of barley. After some days, the issues of barley fell off, in consequence, it "was understood, of deficiency of transport. The commissariat officer applied to Lord "Cardigan to have the troop horses sent down for forage. When that application was "first made the brigade was receiving full rations of barley."

It was therefore "some day or days" after the 14th that the matter was first verbally mentioned to me, and no more was said until the 23d, when a similar proposition was made to me verbally by Colonel Mayow. This is alluded to in a report from Colonel Mayow to myself of November 24th, in which he writes, "I have seen Mr. Crookshank, "and told him you could not approve of the troop horses going down for forage. He "said he did not wish them to go down periodically, but only once, to bring up the "arrears, when, if he knew the day before, he would take care they were not kept "waiting."

Colonel Mayow obviously refers to a recent interview with Mr. Crookshank; and I was in such daily communication with Colonel Mayow that no great time can have elapsed between our conversation and his letter of the 24th.

On the renewal of the suggestion, the obstacles which on the 16th prevented my concurrence had increased rather than abated, and compelled the same refusal, the military objections remaining the same.

I beg, however, to be understood as desiring to make no point on this question of date, as it does not affect the position I assume, that the results of the storm had produced such a condition of things as rendered such a proposal untenable and impossible, consistently with the good of the service.

Since, Sir, in anticipation of being called upon to appear before this Court, I placed these remarks upon paper, I have received from the Horse Guards a copy of a letter, in reply to my observations submitted to Lord Panmure, which the Commissioners have addressed to his Lordship, dated 21st February 1856.

I desire to be permitted to make some observations upon that letter.

The Commissioners seem, by the tenor of their opening paragraphs, to assume that I had impugned the statement contained in their Report, that on "several days', the

*Earl of Cardigan.*

29th April 1856.

forage of the light brigade was insufficient. If you will refer to my letter you will find that, although I felt it to be my duty to comment upon the conflicting evidence as to the precise date of the commencement of the serious deficiency, which I have now made clear to the Court, I could and did not contest the fact.

The third paragraph of the Commissioners' letter occasions me some surprise, for it appears to assume that I had denied or was prepared to deny the statement contained in their Report, that suggestions were made to me "by the commissariat officer "attached to the brigade through Colonel Mayow," that the horses should be sent down to fetch their own forage from Balaklava. As, on the contrary, I fully admitted this to have been the case, I am at a loss to conceive upon what grounds the Commissioners think it necessary to insist upon "ample evidence" being yielded to their assertion.

The Commissioners proceed in a similar tone to take exception to my notice of the fact that the letters which were addressed to me at my request by officers commanding regiments in the light brigade on the 16th of November contained no representations of a deficiency of forage, nor any suggestion that forage should be fetched by the cavalry horses from Balaklava. I have already referred to these letters, and do not think it necessary to repeat those observations.

The next point to which the Commissioners advert is my statement that "it was "notorious that the mortality of the horses in the heavy brigade during the month of "November 1854 was greater than that of the light brigade, though they were so much "better suppled with forage."

Sir, when I wrote my letter to Lord Panmure I was in the full belief that such was the fact. At any rate I had no reason to doubt my accuracy, when I found introduced into the Commissioners' Report the table which gives the average mortality of the horses of the two brigades, and which I have already mentioned as exhibiting a difference of 9 per cent. in favour of the light cavalry brigade. But now, upon fresh figures, which I had never seen, and which the Commissioners now for the first time supply, they show a per-centage unfavourable to the light brigade with respect to November 1854, the month which I had instanced. As the difference, Sir, is only between 12 and 10 per cent., that is to say, a difference of but two per cent., I am ready to give the Commissioners the full advantage which they may claim for the importance of the fact, reminding the Court that this advantage is limited to a question of average, while the numerical loss still continues to be greater in the heavy brigade. I learn that the accuracy of the Commissioners' figures has been impugned in this hall. I am indifferent to the result of that dispute.

If their first figures are correct they support my original view; if incorrect, it lessens their claim to general accuracy.

The Commissioners, Sir, also advert to the statistics of the month of December. As I resigned my command before the first of that month, and the horses were otherwise employed, I decline following them into that calculation.

And now, Sir, I appeal to the Court whether the Commissioners, on these vague surmises, which, by examining the lieutenant general or myself, they had the power either to confirm or dispel, were justified in designating the case of the light cavalry as one "involving such serious consequences as to require special notice," when, upon their own amended and recriminatory statement, they are unable to raise the greater loss to a higher average than two per cent. during the month of November, in a position of tenfold difficulty and exposure.

I shall notice but two points more in the Commissioners' letter. They take occasion to observe, in one place, that even if the mortality of the horses of the light brigade had been less than it was in the heavy brigade, it would have afforded "no justification for "leaving the horses with so inadequate an amount of food, if there was a possibility of "providing it." To this I entirely agree. They also remark, in another place, "As to "the validity of his lordship's" (that is to say, my) "reasons for declining to send "horses down to Balaklava, it is not our province to offer an opinion; but if it was not "practicable, it is very strange that so many suggestions should have been made to "that effect by officers who were capable of knowing what work their horses could "perform."

As to the "many suggestions," I have already drawn your attention to the real facts, and I am now before a tribunal fully competent to decide upon the merits of the case.

These remarks on the reply of the Commissioners have diverted me from the main question, to which I now return,—would it have been expedient to dispatch the horses to Balaklava for forage, even if I had possessed the power to send them, which I cannot admit?

1st. Had they been sent down, would they have been certain to have obtained supplies? I direct your attention to the evidence.

Commissary General Filder says, page 64, "There were many occasions when persons "came for hay and straw, and went back without."

Deputy Commissary General Drake, page 51, states, "Delay has occasionally occurred "from deficiency of boats or stress of weather, which prevented supplies from being "landed in time."

Deputy Assistant Commissary General Webb, page 129, says, "I was often delayed "too by having to go on board ships in order to get supplies, and having no boat at my

" command, the men were consequently delayed till a late hour. The days were short, " and there was great difficulty in returning home in the dark."

Deputy Assistant Commissary General Crookshank, on November 18th, brings to Lord Lucan's notice " the great delays and hindrances we are subjected to when at Balaklava." Lord Lucan himself, at 6436 and 6437, speaking of the heavy brigade drawing their forage only 3½ miles from Balaklava, being asked whether he thought it advisable, answers, " The duty was very harassing from this fact, that when they arrived at Balak- " lava they never found any forage to fetch, and they were kept the whole of the day in " that muddy town waiting for the forage, and constantly coming back without it. They " suffered very much from being put to that work."

It will be remembered that the light brigade was posted twice the distance named by Lord Lucan.

Deputy Assistant Commissary General Crookshank also refers to this risk of their being kept waiting, in his communication to Colonel Mayow of November 24th; and the evidence might be multiplied on that point, particularly from the correspondence of Mr. Filder, given in the Appendix to the Report of the House of Commons' Committee,—the third Report.

Secondly.—Were the roads in a state possible for the transit of horses which had been subjected to the privations of the light cavalry brigade, consistently with their continuing fit for their ordinary service?

The distance, it will be remembered, was seven miles, and with the return journey fourteen. Commissary General Filder states, page 60, " The Land Transport Corps " had begun to suffer about 14th November from bad roads, exposure, and fatigue."

The roads were broken up about the 14th. Deputy Commissary General Adams, page 69, says, " When the roads became so bad that it was necessary only to use pack animals, " those which set out early in the day generally occupied about seven hours to get to " their divisions; those which set out late in the day, a much longer time, frequently not " returning till the following morning, and sometimes not till the lapse of another " day."

The same gentleman, at page 68, speaking of a time but shortly afterwards, says, " at " the worst time I should say they have sometimes been from 24 to 36 hours in " reaching their respective divisions."

Deputy Assistant Commissary General Brownrigge says, page 89, " Pack animals " during the latter half of November and the greater part of December carried average " loads of about 150 lbs., leaving camp at half past 5 A.M., and allowing an hour for " feeding and rest at Balaklava, they did not get back to the camp on many occasions " till 11 or 12 o'clock at night."

This gentleman, the Court will see, gives the time taken, with an allowance of only an hour at Balaklava; but if the probable detention had occurred it would have made it worse. Major General Buller, commanding 2d Division from 1st December, says, page 127, " The distance from the 2d Division (heights of Inkermann) to Balaklava was " about six miles, and the mud was such as I had never seen elsewhere."

Deputy Assistant Commissary General Smith, addressing Commissary General Filder, at page 67, Appendix, says, January 11th, 1855, " The difficulties which exist in loading " the daily supplies, owing to the crowded and filthy state of the wharf, prevent most " of the animals being dispatched until the afternoon, at an hour which does not admit " of their reaching their destination until very late at night, or their return to the depôt " until near morning on the following day. The delay thus occasioned, the fatigue the " men have to undergo, the wretchedness and misery they are subject to from having to " stand about all day in the cold wet mud, the distance they are obliged subsequently to " travel over a most difficult country in all weathers, render them not only still more " inefficient from exhaustion, but utterly careless and indifferent of their charge, which " they abandon, laden or otherwise, the moment they escape from the surveillance of those " placed over them, and either return to their tents or else desert. The horses suffer " equally with the men. Those which are not lost have to remain nearly the whole " day without food, and are consequently in a few days completely unserviceable. A " very material point in explanation of our disasters is the deplorable state of the roads " leading to the front. For the last two months they have been almost wholly im- " passable. They are now so thoroughly out of repair, and beset with so many obstacles, " that it is only by the greatest possible exertion on the part of man and horse that the " supplies are transported to the camps. In the attempt the men are completely worn " out, and the horses are not unfrequently left to die in the mud, from which they are " unable to extricate themselves."

On this concurrent testimony, which again might be indefinitely increased, I confidently appeal to the Court, that to send our horses, correctly described by the Commissioners as " previously exhausted by the want of hay and straw in the early part of the " month," upon such a journey as this, would have caused a greater loss of horses than actually occurred from the insufficiency of the supplies.

If the great loss of horses employed at this time by the commissariat, and which were fully and constantly foraged, is not sufficient of itself to justify this conclusion, I can refer to what occurred susequent to my departure, when it was found necessary to employ a considerable number of the horses of the cavalry in this service. At page 193 of

*Earl of Cardigan.*

29th April 1856.

the Appendix of the Commissioners' Report the Court will find a return of the deaths from disease, &c. of the cavalry horses; and it will be seen that the greatly increased mortality during the months of December and January precisely coincides with the date of the employment of the horses for commissariat purposes; and, further, Lord Lucan has given you evidence as to its result. It must be remembered that the employment of the horses of the light brigade at this period to fetch their own forage would have very seriously reduced the strength of the brigade for military purposes. I have already stated that, upon the calculation of Deputy Assistant Commissary General Crookshank, 60 horses were required to supply full rations of forage; and it would have been necessary either to have despatched an equal number of horses with mounted troopers, or to have employed the men to drive them, which would have subjected the men to all, —and, from the state of their clothing at that time, more than,—the exposure and privations which proved fatal to the drivers employed by the commissariat.

Military reasons, to which I have before referred, and the orders of the commander-in-chief, rendered the retention of the post peremptory; and I could not undertake to authorize the absence of so many horses as would have been required to convey the forage of the brigade from Balaklava, which horses might, as has been already shown in evidence, have been absent for any number of hours.

The subject of this inquiry was not overlooked by the committee of the House of Commons. I had the honour of expressing my own view before them, which I pass by. But I desire, lastly, to call the attention of the Court emphatically to an answer of Lord Lucan's to question 6708—"At the time when your horses were most disabled and in the "worst state, were they unable to carry the forage up; more particularly the light "cavalry brigade; or was it the fact that the forage was not there when they went for "it?—I have no hesitation in saying that the light cavalry brigade, after they had "been a few days at Inkermann (to which I had already objected), from the difficulty of "getting forage, were not in a condition to go to Balaklava, a distance of between six and "seven miles, and return with forage, with all the obstructions that they would have met "in Balaklava."

I ask your attention to this reply as given with the knowledge possessed by the lieutenant general of the then existing state of things. It combines in itself a complete confirmation of my views on the different points which I have previously given in detail.

Commissary General Crookshank, at an early date (November 18th) of these transactions, wrote to Lord Lucan as follows:—(*see page 47 of the Evidence*) "I would "commence by bringing to your lordship's notice that at this distance from Balaklava "I cannot be afforded any assistance in transport by the brigade (the light cavalry); I "mean the regiments cannot send the horses in for barley, and thus the whole transport "devolves upon the commissariat."

If Lord Lucan, my superior officer, had deemed it expedient to send the horses down, being thus made acquainted with the difficulty, the opportunity was offered to him of giving orders to that effect; and I think the evidence of the last few days will have convinced you that had such an order been deemed expedient or possible it would have been given.

Quartermaster General Airey, at page 187, states, "The condition of all the horses of "the cavalry was inquired into and known, and those on the heights and those in the "valley were much the same."

Being known at head quarters, the still superior authority of the commander-in-chief might have been exercised, but there is no trace of any official representation on the subject from any authority whatever, and the evidence I have adduced accounts for its absence.

The Sebastapol Committee, at page 41 of their fifth report, reported as follows, under the head of "Forage," with reference to the subject of this inquiry:—"When the army "first encamped before Sebastopol, stacks of forage were found in the neighbourhood, "but after a few weeks these were consumed, and henceforward there appears to have "been much difficulty in obtaining fodder for the horses. His Royal Highness the Duke "of Cambridge, who left the heights on the 7th November, said that his baggage animals "were frequently without food, and that on one occasion he was obliged to kill 21 "ammunition ponies which he had not the means of feeding." "The Earl of Lucan, "commanding the cavalry division, complained repeatedly, from the 29th September to "the date of his departure, of the dreadful condition to which his horses were reduced "from want of food. Lord Cardigan mentions the same difficulties, but did not find the "pressure so severe until after the 5th November, when his brigade was posted on the "heights." "After the hurricane, the supply of forage was necessarily postponed for "the sake of more urgent demands, and the cavalry ceased to exist as an effective "force."

Before making this report, they had before them a letter written by Commissary General Filder, of February 6th, referring to these deficiencies, and covering the precise period at which the Commissioners propose to fix this neglect upon me. It is at page 309 of the fourth report of the Commons, and says, "There no doubt was a deficiency of "forage from about the 22d to 30th November, but that was owing to our having lost "nearly all the hay we possessed in the hurricane of the 14th of that month, and for

*Earl of Cardigan.*

29th April 1856.

" which, therefore, the commissariat can in no degree be considered responsible. The " brigade of light cavalry experienced a deficiency of forage also on their being moved " to the front, at a time when the roads were utterly impracticable for carts, and the " cavalry horses were not allowed, either on account of the distance or some military " reason, to be sent to Balaklava to bring up their own forage."

Commissary General Filder, in this letter, it is true, is defending the commissariat, as having done its best; but you will see he sums up the three points I have put to you as the reasons for my refusal, viz., the state of the roads, the distance, and the military reason. I ask your attention to this independent testimony in support of my own view.

I have thus, Sir, at a length which I fear my desire to give authority for my statements has made tedious, explained the reasons why I declined my assent to imposing upon the broken strength of the brigade this additional and most grievous labour, which I then and still believe would have resulted in an end still more disastrous to Her Majesty's service than even that brought about by the privations to which I have referred.

Mr. President, as this question has been raised, I desire to remind you of an opinion of the Duke of Wellington (14,068, 6430, 6660 of the House of Commons' Inquiry on this subject), which limits the distance which cavalry horses should be sent to collect their forage to three miles. The distance here was more than double. I am aware that it may be said that a general rule, however defined, however high the authority for it, must be governed by discretion and subject to exceptional cases. I think I have shown the Court that, so far from this being an exceptional case, which permitted the expansion of the rule, the circumstances were such as must have limited and not extended the distance prescribed

This view received practical illustration by Lord Lucan's evidence as to the effect of such work on the heavy brigade horses for three and a half miles; and that, had it even been within the scope of my authority to give such an order, I did and still agree with what appears to have been the opinion of my superior officer (question 6708), " that the " horses were not in a condition to go to Balaklava and return with the forage, with " all the obstructions they would meet in Balaklava."

I have preferred to support my case by independent testimony, and without reference to my own evidence before the Sebastopol Committee; but I shall venture to read two answers given by me on the 14th March 1855, as they convey the impressions I entertained before I had any conception whatever that an attack would be made upon me on this ground, the Commissioners not having reported till the 10th June following: " 5976. Was it within your authority, as commanding the brigade, to despatch any portion " of the horses to bring up forage?—I had no orders to do so. It was understood at the " head quarters of the army that the commissariat were to supply the forage, and I think " that our horses in the month of November had been so exhausted from hard work by " pickets, patrols, and exposure to the weather, and all the hardships that they had " undergone, that they would not have been capable of going down six miles into Balak- " lava to be heavily laden with hay, and to bring it back again." " 5977. It was your " impression that that grievous deficiency was irremediable under the circumstances?— " Certainly."

Colonel Doherty, who gave evidence before the Commissioners, was put in orders as my successor in command of the light cavalry brigade on 30th November. That officer, on assuming the command I had held, took no steps that I am aware of that the horses should proceed to Balaklava for forage. But on December 3d the brigade was removed to Kadikoi by an order from head quarters, and Colonel Douglas stated in his evidence, page 14, "That in that march, although all the horses were led, about seventeen fell dead " on the road from sheer exhaustion."

I have now, I believe, laid before the Court every fact and date material to its information on the subject. I might have multiplied the evidence; and I refer you to the blue books to confirm my statement. I might also have referred more freely to evidence which has been given by various officers in the preceding case; but as it is recorded I have refrained from troubling you with a repetition.

I have shown you the early condition of the brigade, and the commencement, the progress, and the causes of its privations. I have shown you the period and the manner in which the proposal to remedy those privations reached me. I have given you the reasons which led me to decline it, and to refrain from recommending it to my superior officer.

Assuming that, under the circumstances, I had authority to assent, which I deny, I have proved that my opinion was identical with that of my superior officer, whose information was equal to, if it was not greater than, my own, from his always receiving the daily reports of the light brigade at an early hour, and that neither from him, nor from the still higher authority of head quarters, any such order or suggestion emanated, either then or subsequent to my resignation.

It has occurred to me, Sir, that it might have been my duty to have replied to some statements made on Wednesday April 9, page 39, by the lieutenant general, Lord Lucan. But, I consider it would be more expedient to leave the question undiscussed as to whether the 200 troop horses out of a brigade of 1000 ordered by Lord Raglan, under my command, on a reconnaissance to the Dobrudscha, did or did not bear some marks of

*Earl of Cardigan.*
29th April 1856.

the arduous service they had performed in marching 350 miles through a desert country, on their arrival at Varna, at the end of August, previous to embarkation for the Crimea, and also to leave undisputed the question of the extent of the injury sustained by the 250 horses, out of a brigade increased to 1250 by the addition of the 4th Light Dragoons, in consequence of their being unfortunately but necessarily deprived of water upon landing on an enemy's country, and being immediately ordered by the commander-in-chief of the army to perform a severe march in search of the enemy, where no water was to be got, except brackish water in the neighbourhood of the salt lakes. Sir, I will not dilate upon these subjects, which appear to me of inferior importance, further than to state that it must be a subject of congratulation that these difficulties were shortly overcome; for the lieutenant general subsequently states, in referring to the light cavalry brigade, at the period of the battle of Balaklava, five weeks after the landing in the Crimea (page 41 before the Chelsea Commission),—"The horses certainly never were "during that campaign in better condition than they were perhaps at the battle of "Balaklava. Very fortunately, they certainly were; they had improved from the fodder "which we had got."

Now, Sir, I return for a moment to the one important point referred to in the Commissioners' Report, whether the troop horses should have been sent down from the heights to Balaklava to fetch forage? And I will only repeat that, it having been at the time decidedly my own opinion that such a measure would have been most improper and inexpedient,—that, whatever may have been the degree of my responsibility, my views on that subject were in strict accordance with those of my superior officer, the lieutenant-general of the division under whom I was immediately serving, and of the commander-in-chief of the army,—Sir, on these facts and this evidence, I feel myself justified in demanding from this military Court an approval of my conduct, and a decision that there is no foundation for the charge that I neglected using any due precaution in maintaining the efficiency of the brigade; a charge, I venture to hope, inconsistent with the whole of my military career.

It is my intention now to call only one witness, unless circumstances should require it, and that witness is Mr. Commissary Crookshank.

---

*Assist. Com. Gen. J. Crookshank.*

Assistant Commissary General CROOKSHANK examined.

996. (*Earl of Cardigan.*) I will read to you this extract from the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, page 19: "When the supply began to fail, the commissariat officer referred "to, who appears to have done everything in his power to meet the difficulties of the "case, proposed, as he knew there was plenty of barley at Balaklava, that if a detach-"ment of the horses were allowed to go down daily he would engage to bring up "enough for the rest of the brigade. This proposition appears to have been brought "specially under the notice of Lord Cardigan by Lieut.-Colonel Mayow, assistant "quartermaster general of cavalry, who states that his lordship declined to accede to it, "as he had previously done when a similar proposition was made to send the horses "down for hay before that supply failed." About the period that you made those applications to me, that is to say, between the 14th and the 28th of November 1854, did you make a similar application to any authority superior to mine, and if so, to whom?—I did so, to the lieutenant general commanding the division, Lord Lucan.

997. What reply did you receive?—I received the same reply that I received from you, that the horses could not be sent down.

998. Did you apply more than once to the lieutenant general? At what dates, and what occurred on each application?—I am under the impression that I applied several times to him. The precise dates I cannot give; but within the period now under discussion. As to what occurred, I conceive, to the best of my memory (though I do not recollect the conversation), the horses were refused. It was not my province to inquire why or wherefore they were refused to me.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) I have no further question to put to this witness, nor do I wish to call any other witness. I leave the question in the hands of the Board. I am prepared to answer any questions that the Board may wish to put to me.

999. (*Judge Advocate General to Mr. Crookshank.*) The Board wish me to put to you this question:—Who were the commanding officers of the regiments that proposed to you to send a certain number of their horses down to Balaklava to bring up forage?—I do not precisely recollect my evidence; but I am under the impression that no commanding officer proposed it to me.

1000. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You say, "At this time the commanding officers "of some of the regiments proposed to him to send down so many horses per troop to "bring out forage, if he would undertake to supply it?"—Is that my evidence?

1001. Yes; that is your evidence before the Crimean Commissioners?—It was in a conversation with, I believe, the commanding officer of each regiment, and they agreed to send down a certain number of horses, a number which I had calculated was sufficient to bring up the forage. That they agreed to do; and upon that agreement I made a representation to Lord Cardigan.

*Assist. Com. Gen. Crookshank.*

29th April 1856.

1002. Did you know the state of the roads at that time?—Perfectly. I travelled them daily. They were bad, but they were not, on the occasion of my first proposing it to Lord Cardigan,—the roads were not in that very bad state in which they subsequently were.

1003. At what time was it, can you recollect?—I think the time was about the 15th or 16th of November, of the first proposal, I think.

1004. (*Judge Advocate General.*) You cannot state who the commanding officers were?—I can name some. Colonel De Salis, Colonel Low, and Colonel Douglas. I can speak with certainty of them.

1005. (*Major General Peel.*) Did you communicate to Lord Cardigan, the officer commanding the light cavalry, that you had made application to the lieutenant general commanding the division, that the horses might be sent down to Balaklava to take up forage?—I rather think it was at Lord Cardigan's suggestion that I went to Lord Lucan.

1006. It was through Lord Cardigan that you made the application?—Pardon me. I made the application personally, but I think upon Lord Cardigan's suggestion.

1007. By his authority?—Yes; I was serving immediately under Lord Cardigan's orders.

1008. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you believe if the commissariat had carried corn half way to Inkerman with their horses, the cavalry could have carried it the other half?—I speak at variance with what has just fallen from Lord Cardigan; but I had thought, as I presume the commanding officers of regiments thought, that their horses could have gone the whole way to Balaklava, before I made this suggestion. I had communicated with Commissary General Adams, and had made arrangements that there might be no delay in loading the horses in Balaklava with their forage; and I will undertake to say that there would not have been any serious delay in Balaklava. As to their going half way, I must plead guilty to not having thought of it. I had not the experience or ingenuity then which I have now, and it did not strike me to suggest that.

1009. Is it your opinion that they could have gone the whole way?—I am of opinion that a certain number of horses *per* troop could have gone the whole way, on the occasion of my first suggesting it.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) As the Report is not impugned, I do not propose to put any questions to any witness.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) Might I be permitted to ask one question more?

(*President.*) Certainly.

1010. (*Earl of Cardigan to the witness.*) How can you be certain that there could be no delay at Balaklava for the horses going for forage, when the evidence of the commissariat officers was, that there was constantly a delay of many hours, and that they very frequently came back without any forage?—The evidence of those officers referred to their going down for forage, I presume, for staff officers' horses, in small quantities, when each officer sent for his own forage. I had communicated, as I before stated, with Commissary General Adams specially on account of the cavalry, to have a special landing of forage for the cavalry; and upon that I base my opinion, that there would have been no delay, or but little.

1011. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you mean the Board to understand that the horses of the cavalry, particularly of the heavy brigade, were not kept frequently many hours waiting for forage?—I cannot answer for the heavy brigade, but I do not know of any one instance of the light cavalry brigade, which was mine, having to wait any time for their barley at all.

1012. The Board wish to call your attention to this passage in your evidence before the Commissioners, in which you state that you "made repeated representations, both "verbal and written, of deficiency of food for the horses. Will furnish copies of "written representations to Lord Lucan, Lord Cardigan, and the Commissary General." And the Board wish to know whether you have those written representations?—No; I have not a single public document in my possession. I left, as I was bound to do, all my papers in the Crimea, with the exception of a letter book.

1013. Is it correct that you stated that you would furnish such written representations?—I presume it is so.

1014. It is stated here, in the evidence in the Report, that you did say so; and you were asked whether that is correct?—I have no doubt whatever that I said so.

1015. Did you furnish those written representations?—No, I did not.

1016. Have you not got them?—At the time I was examined I was floating backwards and forwards between Sinope, Trebizond, Samsoun, and those places, and I had probably no opportunity of furnishing them. I do not believe that I did furnish them.

1017. You know that you did not?—Yes, I think I do know that I did not.

1018. Have you no copies of them?—Certainly not with me.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) As some of the answers given by Assistant Commissary General Crookshank to questions put to him by Lord Cardigan, according to the best of my recollection, differ materially from what I believe to be accurate, I hope this Board will give me an opportunity of stating what communications passed between me and the assistant commissary general on the subject of the foraging of the light cavalry brigade whilst posted at Inkermann, and I can do it at once.

*Assist. Com. Gen. Crookshank.*

29th April 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you refer to some evidence that he has given affecting yourself?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Yes; I believe it to be exceedingly inaccurate. I therefore do wish to be allowed an opportunity of giving my version of what passed between us.

(*President.*) Is your Lordship prepared to do it now?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Yes. I understood Assistant Commissary General Crookshank to say that he had repeatedly applied to me to sanction horses being sent down from the light cavalry brigade to Balaklava to draw forage. Now, in the first instance, the rule that I prescribed for myself in the command of my division was this: never to interfere with the rationing or foraging of any part of my division that was stationed at a distance from me. I always thought that that was a responsibility which rested with the officer commanding the troops so separated. At the same time I should have been taking upon myself a liberty which I thought would have been very inconsistent with the management of those detached troops, because I could not tell whether they were not ordered upon other duties, and whether my ordering them to draw forage or to go to a distance would not interfere with other duties which they had to perform, and therefore I state most distinctly that I never was applied to by the Assistant Commissary General Crookshank to authorize any horses being sent, and that no other communications, to the best of my recollection, ever reached me from Assistant Commissary General Crookshank, except on two occasions, on both of which he objected to the light cavalry brigade being stationed at Inkermann; objections that I had already made myself to Lord Raglan; and I immediately after hearing his objections stated how fully those objections agreed with what I had made myself, and I only begged that he would be good enough to go home and put them in writing, to enable me to repeat my objections to Lord Raglan. To the best of my belief, I declare there never was an application made by Mr. Crookshank that the cavalry horses should be sent to Balaklava from Inkermann, nor can I even recollect the most trifling complaint from Assistant Commissary General Crookshank that horses were not sent. The whole of his objections were confined to the distant station at Inkermann; objections that so fully agreed with what I had already offered to Lord Raglan, that I begged that they might be placed in writing, in order that they might be turned to some account.

(*Mr. Crookshank.*) I think I must be permitted to reply, and equally distinctly to state, that I did apply to Lord Lucan to have horses sent down. Most distinctly I wish it to be understood that I applied to Lord Lucan to have the horses of the light cavalry brigade sent down from Inkermann to Balaklava.

1019. (*Earl of Lucan.*) At what date?

(*Mr. Crookshank.*) I presume between the 14th and the 28th of November.

1020. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Were those applications in writing?

(*Mr. Crookshank.*) No; they were verbal ones. I had repeated communications with Lord Lucan at that period. Whether I was under Lord Cardigan's orders and sway matters not; but I had repeated communications with Lord Lucan.

1021. Can you state when the application was made?—The application was made when the heavy cavalry, and with it Lord Lucan, were upon the colline above where the French subsequently erected barricades. I went to Lord Lucan from our camp at Inkermann, and laid this matter before him;—the advisability of sending horses down; and my impression is, that Lord Lucan went to Lord Raglan about it, consequent upon my application. Lord Lucan may correct me there.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is perfectly true. I went to Lord Raglan to explain to him the great difficulties that there were with regard to foraging, and to repeat to him the great difficulties that I had already mentioned on other occasions to him. If I understand Assistant Commissary General Crookshank, he says that it was about the 17th. It is perfectly true that it was on the 17th he met me on the road about a quarter of a mile from my encampment, in the French lines. I then asked him to put in writing his views upon the subject; and this letter of the 18th was written at my suggestion; but I did not state one word about the cavalry horses being sent down.

(*Mr. Crookshank.*) I did not refer to that at all; that is on a different subject altogether. I wish it to be distinctly understood, in order that I may not be the least mistaken, that I am now alluding to the fact of the horses being sent from Inkermann.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) You state in your letter of the 18th, "In obedience to your lordship's orders, I beg to report to you upon the subject of my yesterday's communication with regard to the foraging of this brigade during the winter."

(*Mr. Crookshank.*) If you will continue you will see what I state. "I cannot be afforded any assistance in transport by the brigade." You read half the passage only.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I will read the whole letter. "Camp, Sebastopol, November 18th, 1854. My lord, in obedience to your lordship's orders, I beg to report to you upon the subject of my yesterday's communication with regard to the foraging of this brigade during the winter. I would commence by bringing to your lordship's notice that at this distance from Balaklava I cannot be afforded any assistance in transport by the brigade; I mean regiments cannot send their horses in for barley, and thus the whole transport devolves upon the commissariat. The transport allotted to me is insufficient, and at present no more can be given me; nor do I see any prospect of a

*Assist. Com. Gen. Crookshank.*

29th April 1856.

" future increase to its strength. The mules are already showing symptoms of overwork, " and as araba after araba breaks down (I have now only 5 out of 17), so much more " labour devolves upon the mule transport. To bring up a day's supply of barley, " according to the present strength, 63 mules are required, as the sacks weigh 160lbs., " and they can only carry one each, and, owing to the distance, can make but one journey " a day. I have never yet been able to procure more than 35 mules per day (not often " that), and with the 11 mule carts and 5 arabas attached to this brigade I have just " been able to complete the requisite quantities of barley and hay. The least bad " weather prevents this exactness, and throws me in arrears, whilst such weather as we " have lately had altogether stopped the transport for one day, and has not yet allowed " me to recover ground; in fact, I owe the brigade nearly one and a half days' corn, and " some hay. Should the present weather hold, I hope to make good all arrears; but, " after due and careful deliberation, I do not hesitate in saying that I fear the ordinary " weather to be expected at this season, putting aside the possibility of any repetition of " the late severe weather, will render the roads so bad that at times the transport will " fail in bringing forage to so great a distance. I cannot conclude without further " bringing to your lordship's notice the great delay and hindrances we are subjected to, " when in Balaklava, by the slow and awkward manner the barley is landed. The first " can be remedied, but the latter, from the nature of the wharf, probably not."

1022. (*Judge Advocate General to Mr. Crookshank.*) Is that the letter you wrote by Lord Lucan's orders?—Yes.

1023. Was that in consequence of your application to him, and his direction to you on that occasion to put in writing what you have alluded to?—Not with regard to the horses; I do not admit that that letter refers to any directions as to the horses being sent down.

1024. Upon what occasion did he direct you to put what you have stated into writing?—On this occasion, the 18th.

1025. You stated you made application; that was to send the horses down to Balaklava?—Yes.

1026. Was it on that occasion that you were told to put this in writing?—No.

1027. Was the application that you say you made before that letter?—Certainly.

1028. Did you communicate what Lord Lucan stated to anybody else?—I believe I did; I cannot tell you any officer's name; but it was the subject of conversation all through the camp, the refusal of those horses being sent down.

1029. This letter is dated the 18th; what date was your application to Lord Lucan for horses?—Previous to that; I cannot tell the day; I was in daily communication with Lord Lucan.

1030. Was it a verbal application?—Yes, as it was to Lord Cardigan.

1031. (*Earl of Lucan.*) In this very letter I have read Mr. Crookshank says, "I cannot " be afforded any assistance in transport by the brigade. I mean the regiments cannot " send their horses in for barley, and thus the whole transport devolves upon me." Is that the letter asking me to give assistance?—Certainly not. I say it was a verbal application, as it was to Lord Cardigan. He will not deny that I made a verbal application to him.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Mr. Crookshank in his evidence before the Commissioners makes no allusion to me whatever.

(*Mr. Crookshank.*) Nor to Lord Cardigan; I made no allusion in my evidence to the application for horses.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Mr. Crookshank says in his evidence "he never having stated to " Lord Cardigan—"

(*Mr. Crookshank.*) I must correct myself, for I see the evidence now before me, which I have not seen for many long days.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Then Mr. Crookshank did allude to Lord Cardigan, and not to me?

1032. (*Judge Advocate General to Mr. Crookshank.*) Did anybody direct you to make that application to Lord Lucan?—I stated that I was under the impression that Lord Cardigan recommended me to do it.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It would be a most extraordinary mode of proceeding for a brigadier to communicate with his divisional general through his commissariat officer.

(*Mr. Crookshank.*) I can only say that one was compelled to perform the duty in a very extraordinary way in that division.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) I have no recollection of having given any recommendation of the sort; but I cannot think it would have been a very extraordinary thing, when the commissary of brigade came to me, and asked me for my permission to send down those troop horses,—it not being a formal official application, but a verbal one,—I say I do not think there would have been anything very extraordinary if I had said it is impossible for me to do so; I have not the power to do it; but if you want it done you had better apply to the lieutenant-general commanding the division. I do not say I did say that; but if I did there would have been nothing improper in it or extraordinary. Before I sit down I wish to ask a question. I am sorry to be obliged to ask it, or to enter upon the subject at all; but when it is stated that a brigadier general is entirely responsible for everything connected with the commissariat, and the issues from the commissariat

*Assist. Com. Gen. Crookshank.*

29th April 1856.

connected with his brigade, I want to know how the line is drawn, if that is the peculiar duty of the brigadier general, when divisional orders were given upon every other subject connected with the brigade, of which there is a report in the letter from Colonel Mayow, which I have laid before you to-day. I can further state this, with great truth, that from the moment of landing in the Crimea, when I was not in command, although nominally in command of the brigade, for there was no other brigade but the light cavalry, and they were under the immediate command of the lieutenant general,—I can only say, that from the moment I landed in the Crimea until the day I came away I never was called upon to give any order whatever with regard to commissariat supplies to my brigade, because the whole of those duties had been repeatedly regulated by the divisional officer, and therefore it was quite unnecessary for me to interfere in any way whatever.

1033. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan to Mr. Crookshank.*) Were you the only commissariat officer attached to the cavalry at that time?—No; there were several.

1034. Were you the senior?—Yes; but I should add, though I was the senior officer, I was simply the brigade officer attached to Lord Cardigan, until the month of May 1855, when I was put in charge of the whole division.

1035. You were attached to the light brigade?—Yes.

(*General Sir George Berkeley.*) Had you a commissariat clerk in each regiment?—No; there was an officer to each brigade.

1037. You were the commissariat officer of the light brigade?—I was.

1038. Each regiment of cavalry generally has a commissariat officer also?—Yes; but that was not the case in this late war. There was not an officer to each regiment, but to each brigade.

1039. Had you a commissariat clerk to each regiment?—No; there was a department attached to each brigade; an officer in charge, a subaltern officer, and one or two clerks; two or three issuers and storekeepers; subordinates, in fact.

1040. Under you?—Yes, under me, and under each brigade officer.

1041. (*To the Earl of Cardigan.*) Did you ever apply for any assistance to the light brigade commissariat?

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) I did not see any necessity for that, and I did not apply. Mr. Crookshank was always with my brigade from the moment we landed in the East, and he was with the brigade when the brigade was under my command for the first three or four months in Bulgaria, and, as I said before the committee of the House of Commons, I always found him very attentive to his duties, and I therefore had no necessity to apply for anybody else. He was attached to the light cavalry brigade when I came away, at the end of November, and I really saw no necessity for applying for anybody else. I do not think that what we wanted was a commissariat officer, but we wanted the means of transport.

1042. (*Judge Advocate General to Mr. Crookshank.*) Did you consider, when those applications were made for the horses to come to Balaklava, that the transport was so insufficient that there was no other means of conveying food to the horses?—On the occasion of my first applying for those horses we had a sufficiency of transport.

1043. When was the first application made?—When I first spoke about it to Colonel Mayow,—the date I cannot give,—but before the storm I think it was when I first spoke, contemplating that our transport would break up, and that there would be a necessity of sending horses down.

1044. You actually had sufficient transport at one time?—Yes, when I first applied in November, before the storm.

1045. It was early in November that you applied?—Yes; about the 8th or 9th, I should think; but I speak without certainty.

1046. What was the state of the transport when you made the next application?—Considerably reduced; fearfully reduced. Instead of the sixty animals that I required, I only had about thirty-five or forty. Later still it was reduced to ten.

1047. Did you then consider it a matter of necessity that the horses should go down for the forage?—I did indeed.

1048. Did you receive any answer from Lord Lucan when you addressed to him that letter dated the 18th of November?—To the best of my recollection, I never received an answer to any letter that I ever wrote. Certainly not to this one.

1049. What was the purpose of writing this letter?—By his lordship's directions.

1050. Was it merely to put on record the facts that you have stated?—Yes; and to put on record my strong opposition to the cavalry being stationed where they were, out of reach of their supplies.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I should state that Assistant Commissary General Crookshank writes to me again on November the 21st. It appears in the Report in my hand to be a letter addressed to Lord Cardigan. That was a mistake; it was addressed to me, for I have the letter, and I had it in Court with me yesterday.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) That is a mistake in the Report; it should be Lord Lucan.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Not only did he write to me on the 10th, but he also wrote to me three days afterwards; and I pray the attention of the Board while I read a short letter. This is perhaps the second, to the best of my recollection, of the only two letters

*Assist. Com. Gen. Crookshank.*

29th April 1856.

that I ever got :—" My lord, I must again bring to your lordship's notice the state of the " light cavalry brigade with regard to forage. In my last letter I informed your lord- " ship that 1½ days' corn and some hay was due to the brigade ; but instead of my " having been able to make good any part of that, I have fallen into further arrears. " The weather is in part the cause, but it is chiefly to be attributed to the want of " transport. On the 19th I had only 10 extra mule carts afforded me. Yesterday, the " 20th, none whatever, until so late an hour (and then only 15 pack animals) as to be of " no use. It is now mid-day ; and as the transport has not yet come in to Balaklava " from its own camp, I have only been able to despatch 30 sacks of barley on my own " carts, each only carrying three sacks, on the present roads. I would wish further to " bring to your lordship's notice that the light brigade suffers in another respect. Even " when I have transport on the beach, and a boatload of barley arrives, a dozen or " more heavy dragoons or as many artillerymen jump in, carry out the sacks, and load " their transport, my few wretched Turks or Maltese having a very poor chance in the " melée. Whilst writing this, Deputy Assistant Commissary General Goold, the officer " in charge of the depôt transport, has come in, and assures me the mules are nearly " done up,—almost incapable of further work." Now I do confidently ask this question, is there one word in that letter which can be read as an application to me for foraging parties from the light cavalry brigade ?

1051. (*Judge Advocate General to Mr. Crookshank.*) You admit the correctness of that letter as it appears in the evidence ?—Assuredly.

1052. Did you not state just now that if the horses of the light cavalry brigade had been sent there would have been no delay ?—There would not have been, I believe.

1053. Have you not described a state of things that is hardly consistent with that ?—That is as things were. Had the fatigue parties been given me, by an arrangement made with Commissary General Adams, such things as this would not have occurred. I should not have had wretched Turks and Maltese, but English dragoons. The artillery and heavy cavalry jumped in and got theirs, and I presume the light dragoons would have done the same.

1054. This was the state of things when you had the means of transport ?—Yes ; the limited transport which I described.

1055. (*Lieutenant General Sir W. Rowan.*) Can you account for not having mentioned in either of those letters the necessity for sending the cavalry horses down ?—I cannot account for not having recorded that ; I very much regret that I did not. Those letters were written (or at all events one of them, the first,) at Lord Lucan's desire, to record what I had been talking of.

1056. (*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Cardigan.*) The Board wish these questions to be put to you. The first is : Would you have thought yourself justified in detaching any portion of the force under your command for any purpose whatever, without obtaining the sanction of the lieutenant general commanding the division ?—Certainly not any body of troops ; not any number.

1057 What was the strength of your outlying pickets ?—I had no outlying picket at that time.

1058. Had you any special order with respect to the post which you occupied ?—I had an order to take up an encampment by the windmill, and I had afterwards an order to shift the ground to about 300 or 400 yards off, both of which were done under my own personal superintendence.

1059. With respect to the removal of the cavalry, had you any official order ?—The order was delivered to me in the usual way, through the adjutant general and the assistant adjutant general, and no doubt it was put in the divisional orders. I have no recollection of it now. I will add to that, that there could be no sort of doubt about the brigade being posted there by the order of Lord Raglan, because after the battle of Inkermann Lord Raglan rode up to me, and told me that I might take the light cavalry brigade to their encampment, and we were within 500 yards of it at the time.

1060. Did you refer in your statement to any special reason why the cavalry were not to be moved ?—I did. I referred to it being Lord Raglan's order that they were to remain.

1061. Did you make any reference to an understanding with the French general ?—I did. I understood from General Canrobert personally that he considered it a great object to have the light cavalry brigade there, and he pointed out what he thought ought to be done in case of a sudden attack by the Russians from the valley of Inkermann ; and this I understood privately from Lord Raglan, that there had been an arrangement between him and the commander-in-chief of the French army that the light brigade was to remain there. That is also borne out and corroborated by Lord Lucan's evidence before the different commissions, and by Sir Richard Airey, who, I believe, was present at the interview between Lord Raglan and General Canrobert.

*Major General Scarlett.*

28th April 1856.

Major General SCARLETT further examined.

1062. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Were foraging parties constantly sent from the heavy brigade into Balaklava for forage?—Constantly.

1063. Can you state any of the difficulties that they met with when they were so acting as a foraging party?—They were very much delayed by the want of boats to bring the forage ashore, and by the general obstructions in the place; they were from four to five hours in Balaklava getting their forage, and perhaps more than that.

1064. Do you know what those delays were occasioned by?—The difficulty of getting the barley from the vessels; sometimes the men had to go to the vessels and fill the sacks in the vessels, and there was the delay in bringing the sacks of barley from the vessels. The hay was on one side of the bay, and the barley I think was given out on the other; but the delay was to such an extent that I was obliged to have from the officers who went down on the foraging parties a return of the number of hours that they spent in foraging.

1065. The men that you sent down were obliged to assist in landing the barley?—Constantly.

1066. There was no strength on the spot for that purpose?—Not sufficient strength.

1067. Did they ever go down without bringing back forage?—I cannot be quite certain. My impression is that they did sometimes fail in getting forage; I cannot speak with certainty upon that point.

1068. What was the distance from Balaklava?—From the light brigade, in the farthest part of the valley, it might be two miles and a half down to Balaklava.

1069. But the heavy brigade, when you sent those foraging parties, what distance had they to go?—Three miles and a half.

1070. And they were detained sometimes four and five hours?—Yes.

1071. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Had you any assistance from the sailors of the transports?—Some occasionally from them, but very little from the transports; there were very few sailors with the transports. We depended chiefly upon the commissariat for providing us with means to procure forage.

1072. (*Judge Advocate General.*) During what time was it that those troops went for the forage?—They went in November, December, and the whole of the winter.

1073. (*Major General Peel.*) It was no part of the duty of the officers commanding the transports to land the stores, was it? It would fall, would it not, upon the commissariat to land them?—Yes; it should have been the commissariat; it was their duty.

1074. The duty of the transport officer was at an end when he arrived in the harbour of Balaklava and reported himself;—it was not his duty to land the stores?—I imagine not.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have returns which were enclosed to me by General Scarlett in my possession showing that the parties were constantly seven and eight hours seeking for forage, going from our camp at Kadikoi to the town of Balaklava.

(*Earl Beauchamp.*) Can you show any order for occupying the heights of Inkerman?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) No; there is no order. I have a letter, which I propose to put in. I stated that the moment I was told they were going to Inkerman I returned and remonstrated with Colonel Gordon; I was not satisfied with that, but the next morning I wrote a letter stating all the objections; that letter I propose to put in.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) What were the orders given to Lord Cardigan at Inkerman; for they had no outlying pickets, and therefore he must have had some orders on that head?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) No; the moment that the brigade was detached from me he would receive no orders through me. The only order through me was the order to proceed according to the order issued by the quartermaster general.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Which you were not made acquainted with?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The order was sent to me that the light brigade were to march to-morrow morning to the heights of Inkerman.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) That is, the usual order given through the quartermaster general.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Yes; there were no orders given by me at all.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) There were no instructions as to what they were to look after?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) None whatever.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Whom did they receive their orders from?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) After they arrived at Inkerman I do not know at all.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) I wish to be permitted to ask what sort of orders there were. Divisional orders came every day from the head quarters of the cavalry. I do not know what other orders.

1075. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Under whose immediate orders were you when you were out there? Lord Lucan says that he got orders from the quartermaster general to send the light cavalry brigade to such a spot, and that detached you from him. You must have had orders when you got there from somebody.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) The first reports made out in the morning by the brigade major were for the lieutenant general, and then my reports afterwards were a secondary con-

*Major General Scarlett.*

28th April 1856.

sideration—they were made out as they could be afterwards; and were either given to me, and when I went down into the camp I took them down in my pocket, or they were sent down; but the reports were made out. One of those documents which I have already put in, which says, "an order has come for the daily reports to go in;" I think it says either an hour earlier, or names the hour, 9 in the morning. The reports of the brigade were sent every morning to the head quarters of the cavalry, about 3 miles or 3½ miles, or it might be 4 miles distant. Here is the very letter: "I must have the daily states half an hour earlier;" those were for the head quarters of the division.

1076. (*Lieutenant General Sir W. Rowan.*) Did you receive no special instructions for your guidance after you arrived at that position as to what you were to do, or for what purpose you occupied it?

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) I received no further instructions than that if the enemy attacked us we were to turn out and act. I received no instructions whatever except the usual divisional orders, which came, if not daily, very frequently; and those reports, which I have already given in, will show the number of orders that were given out upon different subjects—leave of absence to officers, the mode of encampment, the dress of officers even was named, with regard to wearing their boots outside the overalls instead of inside, and various other details, all narrated in those documents which I have already given in. Those orders came frequently from the head quarters of the division. I received no other orders but those. Here is another of the division orders.

[Two divisional orders were handed in.]

(*Earl of Lucan.*) May I be allowed to say, I did not mean by my answer to Sir George Berkeley that there was no communication between us. On the contrary, the morning state always passed through my hands. With regard to the divisional orders, they are all given between page 29 and page 32 in the red book on the table. With regard to the duties, I was specially directed by Lord Raglan not to interfere with the duties of that brigade. But one morning when I received notice from Sir Colin Campbell that he was threatened with an attack in our rear, whilst the heavy brigade was turning out I sent an order to the light brigade to move to approach me, but to move slowly, because I had communicated with Lord Raglan to get his authority for making use of it. I the next day got an order from Lord Raglan on no account whatever to exercise any authority over that light brigade; but the whole of the divisional orders are to be found in the book.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) May I be allowed to say one word? That order of Lord Raglan's clearly referred only to the turning out of the brigade in the event of any real or threatened attack of the enemy; but that order of Lord Raglan's did not extend to the detail of the command of the brigade, which the divisional leader can exercise if he likes to do so; and which was exercised, as those letters will show, very frequently.

1077. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Had you no communication from the quartermaster general about the ground being taken up, or how you were to occupy it?

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) So far as my recollection goes, I was desired either by Lord Raglan personally or by the quartermaster general to form the brigade in a particular way near the windmill, but not to take the encampment too near the windmill, because at that time it was filled with gunpowder; and I have some vague recollection, but I cannot exactly state what, that I had some particular orders as to where I was to encamp the brigade; and I also have a recollection that before I could obtain permission to move that brigade off the ground, which had become very deep, and put them on higher ground, there was some discussion and question about it at the head quarters of the army, at Lord Raglan's. I think it must have been also with the quartermaster general or with Lord Raglan personally, who was very particular and who expressed a great desire that the brigade should not be moved far from the original ground; and if I mistake not I was limited to 100 yards, for the ground near the windmill had been taken up after a communication and consultation with General Canrobert, and Lord Raglan would not give his consent to it being moved further than, I think, a distance of 100 yards. I think I obtained permission to remove the brigade that distance of 100 yards with some difficulty, that is my impression. I cannot at this distance of time be answerable for everything; but that is my firm conviction.

1078. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Had you any specific orders as to the direction (as you had no outposts) in which your patrols were to be sent?

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) We sent no patrols out; we sent letter parties to the different divisions of infantry, but no patrols from the light cavalry brigade.

1079. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Had you common camp guards?

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) Yes; and the hospital was so full of sick, and so many men had gone on board ship, that there was a vast number of spare horses in each regiment.

*Lieut.-Col. Charles Doherty.*

28th April 1856.

Lieutenant Colonel CHARLES DOHERTY further examined.

1080. (*Judge Advocate General.*) You have stated that about a fortnight after the 12th of November your horses were in a very bad condition, and that they had on the average about 2½ lbs. of barley a day. Is that correct?—That is correct.

1081. Did you on that account make any application for those horses to be allowed to go to Balaklava to fetch their forage?—No; I did not.

1082. Did you assign any reason to the Commissioners who have examined you in the Crimea for not doing so?—In my previous evidence I did.

1083. What reason did you assign?—Then I had heard that it had been refused to other commanding officers.

1084. Who did you hear had refused it?—I did not hear of anybody in particular. It might have been either the brigadier or the general commanding the division. I did not hear anybody particularized.

1085. Do you mean either Lord Cardigan or Lord Lucan?—I suppose so.

1086. Did you hear no reasons for their refusing?—No.

1087. Did you consider yourself that it was practicable?—It would have been at first, I think; but afterwards, certainly not.

1088. Should you have made application if you had not heard that it had been refused to other commanding officers?—I might have done so.

1089. Did you intend to do so?—No; I did not think of it at the time.

1090. Did you state to the Commissioners that your reason for not doing so was, that you had heard that it had been refused?—It was so.

1091. Why did you think that it was practicable at first, and not afterwards?—Because the horses were in a better condition to do it; but afterwards they were not able.

1092. What was the date of that?—This was shortly after the battle of Inkerman; the 6th or 7th of November.

1093. Were they so badly off for forage at that time?—They were not so badly off for forage until the time of the storm; about the 14th, I think.

1094. Were there no transport animals?—Very few, I understood.

1095. Had you heard anything about it before you thought of making this application?—Yes; I heard that the transport animals were very indifferent, and that a great many had died.

1096. Did you hear that it was possible to get forage if the horses went for it?—No, I did not.

1097. What was the particular purpose when the application was made for the horses to go for the forage?—By whom?

1098. By yourself; you contemplated an application, did you not?—I did not say so.

1099. What did you refer to in your evidence to the Commissioners, when you stated that you made no personal application to be allowed to send the troop horses for the forage, because you had heard from other commanding officers that they had been refused permission to do so?—We were talking of how we should procure forage, and how it was to be issued to the troops there, and in common conversation with other officers I understood that we were not allowed to send our horses down to Balaklava to procure the forage.

1100. What did you consider to be the difficulty in foraging the horses?—I do not know what I attributed it to at that time, whether it was the scarcity of forage there or the bad state the horses were in.

1101. Then you knew that the horses were in a bad state, but you did not know whether there was any forage for them?—I certainly did not; I never was in Balaklava myself, therefore I could not tell.

1102. When you state that you did not think it practicable afterwards, for what reason did you think so?—The horses were too weak, and they could not have performed the journey there and back and brought any forage with them.

1103. That you state from your own knowledge?—Yes; that was my opinion.

1104. What was the alternative if they did not go for the forage?—Of course the horses would have died.

1105. Were there any other means of getting forage but by going for it?—Not without it had been sent to us.

1106. Was that expected?—Of course we all expected that it would have been sent to us.

1107. How long was that expected? During the whole month of November?—I think it was brought to us I may say pretty regularly up to the 17th I dare say of the month; pretty regularly, I think; I will not be certain as to the date, but somewhere about that time; and after that, as I stated before, I think the average was about 2½ lbs. per horse per day.

1108. When was it that the horses began to deteriorate so much?—After the 14th.

1109. What is it that you mean—that enough was brought up to the 17th?—No, we had very little indeed.

1110. Have you stated how many horses died during that month?—No, I never did.

1111. When did they march down?—On the 3d of December.

1112. Were there any lost on that occasion?—I think, as clearly as I recollect now, about 17, or perhaps more.

1113. (*Lieutenant General Sir W. Rowan.*) Were they lost on the march?—Yes.

1114. (*Judge Advocate General.*) From what cause?—From exhaustion.

1115. Was that from the manner in which they had been fed in the previous month?—From the manner in which they had not been fed.

1116. Do you believe that they would have been better off if they had been sent for the forage?—At first I think they would.

1117. It was for want of being sent for the forage that they got into this condition?—In a great measure I think it was, at first.

1118. (*Major General Peel.*) You succeeded Lord Cardigan in the command of the brigade, did you not?—Yes.

1119. On what date?—I had a private letter from Lord Cardigan, I think dated the 30th, in which he said that he should not visit the camp again as he was ill, and said that I should appear in orders I think the following morning after the reports had been sent to him.

1120. You did not think it expedient at that time, after you were in command, to send the horses down?—That was on the 1st of December, and on the 2d I received an order from Lord Lucan to march the brigade down to Balaklava. It was such a wet day that I did not do it; and on arriving at Kadikoi I told Lord Lucan, and I believe he said that I was perfectly right.

1121. (*Earl of Cardigan to the witness.*) You state that it would have been advantageous to have sent down the troop horses for forage about the 7th or 8th of November; are you not aware that it has been stated by Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Crookshank that at that time the transport power was sufficient, and that the first application made to me by him was on or about November the 16th?—I heard him state that just now; but I was alluding to the condition of the horses more particularly when I say that it would have been desirable to have sent them down for the forage; the horses were able to do it then.

1122. (*Judge Advocate General.*) But the forage was deficient then?—That I do not know; I cannot speak to that.

1123. Do you say that it would have been expedient to have sent the horses so early as the 7th or 8th?—The horses would have been able to have done it then.

1124. (*Earl of Cardigan.*) I will ask the question again. You say that it would have been advantageous to have sent down the troop horses for forage about the 7th or 8th of November; are you not aware that it has been stated by Assistant Commissary-General Crookshank that at that time the transport power was sufficient, and that the first application made to me by him was on or about November the 16th?—That I only heard to day.

1125. (*Judge Advocate General.*) You have stated in your evidence that you made repeated representations of the deficiency of forage to the brigade major and the general commanding the brigade; when did you first make those representations?—Is that in my evidence that I gave before the Commissioners?

1126. Yes.—I made it to Brigade Major Colonel Mayow.

1127. Not to the general commanding?—I do not recollect having done so to Lord Cardigan.

1128. What was the answer to those representations?—That I cannot say now. I do not recollect.

1129. In your evidence you do state the reply that you received from the commissariat officer?—Yes.

1130. Which was that they had no transport?—No doubt that was the case at the time, as they told me so.

1131. Do you recollect when you made an application to the commissariat officer?—No, I do not.

1132. (*Earl of Cardigan.*) Were you not sick in your tent, and not doing duty during the whole month of November up to the 30th?—I was part of that time, but it was a few days after the battle of Inkermann; I was ill for I dare say eight days, probably, as well as I can recollect.

1133. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Is the Board to understand that you gave the Commissioners no dates when you made those representations?—As well as I could I did, about the time.

1134. Have you seen your evidence since it has been reported?—I have; it is before me now.

1135. You signed it, I believe?—Yes.

1136. It was sent to you, to be signed, by the Commissioners?—It was.

1137. When it was sent were the dates that you gave them in it?—The dates mentioned here?

1138. No, the dates that are not mentioned there?—No. I presume that this is the evidence I gave.

1139. Did you state to the Commissioners when you made these repeated representations?—No, I did not.

*Lieut.-Col. Charles Doherty.*

29th April 1856.

1140. That was not required of you?—They asked me a great many dates, and I told them that I did not recollect them: what I did say was, to the best of my recollection.

1141. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You made many repeated verbal applications?—I did.

1142. To whom?—To the brigade major, Colonel Mayow.

---

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

Major General Sir RICHARD AIREY, further examined.

1143. (*Major General Peel.*) Can you state to the Board the object of sending the light cavalry brigade to the position which they occupied on the heights, and the orders that were given to them upon the understanding that has been referred to between Lord Raglan and General Canrobert?—There was always a great apprehension of an attack on our extreme right; we were very weak on that position, and the second division under Sir De Lacy Evans was placed on the extreme right, in order to be prepared to cover an attack in that direction. We received constant applications from Sir De Lacy Evans for a reinforcement, stating that the distance was so great between him and the causeway which communicated from what was also called the Inkermann ridge, on the south side of the Tchernaya; and he was always very nervous and apprehensive of being insulted in his position. General Canrobert called repeatedly on Lord Raglan, and urged him to give a division of cavalry to be placed between the position of the light division under Sir George Brown and the second division under Sir De Lacy Evans. Lord Raglan hesitated a long time, and he was extremely anxious to avoid it, for the very reasons which have presented themselves to-day, the difficulty of feeding the horses and furnishing the commissariat supplies. However, General Canrobert was so urgent that at last Lord Raglan consented. General Canrobert explained his reasons in this way: he said, "I cannot believe that we shall not "have an attack in that direction; the ground is not only very steep, but it is covered "with brushwood; and therefore the Russians, who will attack in great force, will come "up breathless, but in such weight—for the Russians do not deploy at all, but come on "in solid masses—that they will probably break through our first line. However, the "men will come up breathless, and in such a disorganised state, that though they will "have accomplished breaking our first line, if they are immediately met by a body of "cavalry in that state, they will in every probability be repulsed. Besides that, how-"ever weak your lordship's cavalry is"—because Lord Raglan brought it forward that in reality it was more a demonstration of force than anything else—he said, "how-"ever weak your lordship's cavalry may be, still the very knowledge that the cavalry "is there, information of it will be carried to the Russians by spies; the Greeks are "known to be friends of the Russians, and the Russians will know that the cavalry "is upon the plateau, and therefore it will be a very formidable obstacle against the "Russians making an attack of this description."

1144. If they were placed there in consequence of the apprehension of an attack, how was it that they had no pickets or patrol?—I think I could explain that to the Board very easily, by a reference to the map; that they were so placed that it was not at all necessary; they were placed between infantry in every direction. In their immediate front they had the second division, who carried its pickets right down the hill towards the Tchernaya; on the left they had Sir George Brown's light division; and on the right they had a division of guards; and they were in that position that no cavalry could send out patrols.

1145. Were the orders delivered through your department to Lord Cardigan?—They were delivered through myself. I am not quite sure, without reference to a book, but they were probably communicated to the general officer commanding the cavalry division, and also they were communicated direct to the general officer of the brigade; because in those times every means were taken to facilitate the service and to avoid all undue formality. When General Canrobert and Lord Raglan had decided that they would place the cavalry on this ground, I went myself in the first instance with a French staff officer to decide where we should put the camp; after that, having communicated with Lord Lucan, I went with an officer of the cavalry divisional staff to point out the ground to that officer, and that officer went afterwards with Lord Lucan, I believe, over that ground; but he himself went over the ground, and after a little arrangement between us (I do not think that I went there with Lord Lucan himself) we decided finally whereabout it was to be placed—but it was very restricted; we could not go far in any direction, we were so encompassed by troops—and there it remained. There were no specific orders given with regard to the action of that cavalry, because it was quite unnecessary. An officer of the quartermaster general's staff, that is, my staff, was sent every morning to the extreme right before daylight. His orders were to be on the extreme right before daylight, and to put himself immediately in communication with the general officers commanding those divisions who were on the point likely to be threatened, and at the slightest indication of a move on the part of the enemy, or a noise that indicated anything like an attack, he was to gallop in. He had an orderly with him, and he was to send him in, or to come in to me, and in less time than anything could take place either Lord Raglan or myself would have been there. But,

besides that, there was a general spirit and feeling in all military positions that all subordinate officers would have received their orders from the senior officer on the spot. Sir George Brown was the senior officer; and in case of an attack being so sudden and so impetuous that they could not have communicated with Lord Raglan or myself, they would have received orders from Sir George Brown.

1146. Before Lord Cardigan detached any large portion of his force to bring up forage, would it not have been necessary to obtain the sanction of the commander-in-chief?—Certainly, he could not have detached any portion of his force without his sanction.—[*Sir Richard Airey pointed out the position that he had described on the map.*]

1147. (*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Cardigan.*) The Board wish to ask you whether you have ever considered what number of horses would have been required for bringing forage from Balaklava?—120 horses; that is to say, it would have required 60 horses to carry the forage and 60 horses to ride. It would have been quite impossible to have ordered those men, badly shod and badly clad as they were at that time, to walk down seven miles, and stand in the mud in the town of Balaklava, and walk back again. There would have been an immense loss of life amongst the men; therefore for every horse that brought up forage there must have been a man mounted to lead that horse.

1148. Can you state what the strength of the cavalry brigade was at that time?—I have not the daily returns with me, but I can tell you what it was. At the latter end of November the greatest number of horses in the encampment was about 330; and the greatest number that they could turn out daily at the morning parade, for the last week or ten days before I came away, was 286; that was the greatest number, because there were so many men sick and absent that the remainder of the horses could not be mounted. At the same time I must tell you that there was an escort of 40 horses of the 8th Hussars with Lord Raglan at his head quarters, and there were about five letter parties out, with a corporal or serjeant and four men to each, and these composed the whole of the remainder of the light cavalry brigade.

(*Mr. Crookshank.*) The Board put a question to me as to whether I had conversed about or it had been the subject of conversation that Lord Lucan had refused the horses, and whether I could name any one. I could not then name any one particular person, though it was the subject of conversation in the camp; but an officer in this court has since reminded me that I told him of it, though a very long time afterwards,—a year afterwards. General Cannon, who is here, tells me that I did tell him of the refusal of the horses.

(*President.*) Twelve months afterwards?

(*Mr. Crookshank.*) Yes. General Cannon was not on the spot at the time. That was my first interview with General Cannon.

(*President to Sir Richard Airey.*) Will you be ready to-morrow to go on?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes, I shall be ready to-morrow.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board intend to call Colonel Douglas and one or two other witnesses in the case of Lord Cardigan, and then they would propose to proceed with your case.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I should very much prefer having the whole day to begin with. My statement must necessarily be very long. I have calculated that it will take, I suppose, all the time that this Board devote to the consideration of these questions to merely read my first statement, and I shall extremely regret to have to leave off at a particular part of it; therefore I should very much prefer commencing with the whole day to myself.

(*President.*) We do not think that the examinations will last long. There will be only a few questions to put to the officers who are to be examined.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Then I will be ready, if that is the case, to-morrow morning. Of course I have received no warning till now, and I must have some time to summon my witnesses. I wish to obtain from Colonel Tulloch the original minutes taken at the time that the evidence was given by the officers in my department in the Crimea. He stated that those original minutes were in his possession, and it is very desirable that I should see those original minutes. I mean those statements that were condensed from what the witnesses stated, and which afterwards received their signature.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Every word that was taken down was given to the witnesses, and they re-copied it. I will bring all that I have in the office.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I assume that Colonel Tulloch really understands what I do want. I mean the original minutes taken upon the examination of the officers in my department in the Crimea, and then the summary of those minutes which was afterwards made, and which now appears in the blue books.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) There is no summary made. It was precisely what was taken down in the presence of the officers. There was no summary whatever. We never altered it, but it was sent back to the officer for the purpose of signing. In the quartermaster general's department they re-copied the evidence, and sent it back to us; but there is not one line wastaken but what was taken down at the moment. No condensation took place afterwards.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) What I mean is this:—The examination of those officers in many instances took several hours, during those hours of examination either the secretary of

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

29th April 1856.

the Commission, or one of the Commissioners, exerted himself to take down in writing notes and memoranda of what fell from those officers, and they afterwards made a sort of digest of what had fallen from them.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) There was no digest; it is word for word as it was taken down.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) It was condensed.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No; there was no condensation whatever; every word that is in this book was taken down at the time in the presence of the officer, and it was then forwarded to the officer in order that he might sign it. In some cases the officers preferred re-copying it, and sending it back to us, in which case we received it as their original evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you got the original depositions?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I think I have, in most instances; but I am doubtful whether I have in those cases where they were re-copied by the officers.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Those that you have got you do not object to produce?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Not at all.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Perhaps the Board will allow me to read a paragraph in page 128 of the proceedings of the Board. "We had a secretary to take down what they stated; "unfortunately we had no shorthand writer, in consequence of which we were obliged "to condense greatly what was said."

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) That was, we condensed it in the presence of the officers; the minutes were taken down there in the presence of the officer. We heard what he had to say, and we put it down in as few words as we possibly could. Then it was read over to the officer, and sent to him to sign, with instructions that he was to alter or do anything that he thought proper, but to send it back to us in a certain time. But it was no condensation of what was written. It was what was spoken; and having no shorthand writer it took a very considerable time to hear all that was to be said, and that which was written probably in the course of four or five hours did not occupy much more than four or five pages; but a great deal more would have been taken if we had had a shorthand writer.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You sent the deposition to him to sign, and then that verified what had taken place between you.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes. In some instances, in the quartermaster general's department, they thought right to keep the one containing what they had stated, and send back a copy. I am not aware whether they sent back the original or not.

(*Sir Richard Airy.*) I want to have whatever rough notes were taken down at the time, so that I shall be able so see as much as possible what those officers did say, and the difference between that and the condensed evidence which appears in the blue book.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I take it that the witnesses are not bound by anything that they did not sign. Were there any corrections made after the first minutes were taken of what they stated?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No corrections whatever.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Did they sign it after examining it?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) They did. I have got their signed evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You sent it to them for the purpose of being corrected.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) We sent it to them for the purpose of being signed.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) My reason for wishing to have this evidence in the form that I have described is this, that I have seen even enough before this Board to make very apparent to me the difference between the condensed statement of evidence given by an officer, and that which is brought out from the officer's lips by another course of examination.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Every document is signed by the officers themselves; and, in most instances, I have got the original condensation which took place in their own presence. I am not certain whether I have it in the quartermaster general's branch or not, for when it was sent to them they rewrote it, and did not always send the same back to me.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You will produce everything you can that Sir Richard Airey calls for?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Everything that I have. I wish to say a few words to the Board.

Sir Alexander Woodford,—There are two questions involved in the matter before the Board. The one is the military question as to the expediency of sending down for forage to save the lives of the horses; and the other is, the accuracy of the Commissioners' statement in regard to the deficiency of supply. It is with the latter only that I have to deal; and as Lord Cardigan does not impugn, either in that or in any other respect, the accuracy of the Report, I should not have troubled the Board with any observations whatever, but for what has fallen from his lordship in regard to the possibility of a mistake in the evidence of Colonel Doherty and Colonel Douglas, which Lord Cardigan supposed may have arisen from a misprint or a misconception. In order to show that there is no reason to apprehend any such mistake, I propose to produce before the Board the original manuscript in regard to the words "for and about," but there is further corroboration of the review; in the evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Low, who states, at

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

29th April 1856.

page 15 of the evidence, that during the last three weeks in November the horses had on the average only about one fifth of their regulated rations, and that the horses were in consequence so much reduced that many died. Colonel Shewell also makes a similar statement. He states that the mortality among the horses was owing to their having been for at least ten days in November without a blade of hay or straw, and with only three pounds of barley a day. That refers to a considerably earlier period than the latter end of November.

There is only one point on which Lord Cardigan does not seem quite in unison with the Commissioners, in so far as he assumes that because the mortality in the light brigade is shown at page 20 of the Report to have been only 38 per cent., while it was 47 per cent. in the heavy brigade, the loss from want of forage could not have been so serious as it appeared by the statement of the Commissioners. But he does not seem to have adverted to the circumstance, that this average was taken in the six months from October to March inclusive, during a great part of which the scarcity of forage was not in operation; and on referring to the months of November and December, the mortality of which has been taken separately, in order to show the probable influence of this cause on the loss of the horses, it will be found at page 1 of the letter of Sir John M'Neill and myself to Lord Panmure, dated the 21st of February 1856, that the loss in November in the light brigade was 12 per cent., as compared with 10 per cent. in the heavy brigade, and in December it was 26 per cent. in the light brigade, as compared with 20 per cent. in the heavy brigade, being quite as great a distinction as could have been expected even under the extraordinary circumstances of the case, particularly when it is taken into account that some of the horses of the heavy brigade at this time had the mortality much increased by an infectious disease of nasal gleet, then prevalent.

In conclusion, I trust the Board will see that the whole of the paragraph relative to this deficient supply in the light brigade has been given in the Report as carefully and as guardedly as possible, the Commissioners stating the facts which they were bound to notice as a matter of duty, and leaving it to others to decide the military question as to whether it was expedient to send down the horses for the forage or not.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) I only wish to remind the Court that I sent in my resignation on the 29th of November, and I can have nothing to do with and I am not answerable for anything that occurred to the light brigade in December; and I merely repeat again, that in that amended statement of the Commissioners they can only make out that there is a difference between the mortality of the horses in the heavy brigade and the light brigade, even in the month of November, which was the month particularly alluded to, when all these misfortunes took place, of between 10 and 12 per cent.; that is all, which is so small a difference that I had to observe upon it before in my statement.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I beg to call attention to the fact that there are 17 horses stated to have been left on the ground, and 15 died on the way down, making about 32 in the beginning of December alone; but I do not say whether Lord Cardigan is answerable for that or not. That is one reason to show that the mortality was very considerable in December, arising from this specific cause. If horses are starved it does not follow that they will die when the operation commences or within a few days afterwards.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) I conclude that whether those horses tumbled down dead on the march in the beginning of December, upon which so much stress has been laid, or whether they died elsewhere, they were all included in the averages for the months of November and December, therefore it matters very little where they died, whether they died in the lines from hunger and cold, or whether they died in the march down to Balaklava.

Adjourned to Thursday at Eleven o'clock.

## FIFTEENTH DAY.

### 1st May 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

*Earl of Lucan.*

1st May 1856.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Will the Board allow me to address a few observations to them? I have to apologise for not appearing in uniform; but I was asked on Tuesday for the order by which the light cavalry brigade were sent to Inkermann, and my letters; perhaps the Board will allow me to put them in (*the same were handed in*). I wish to be allowed very briefly to observe upon what fell from me on Tuesday with regard to the Inkermann detachment, and with regard to the duties. I was specially directed by Lord Raglan not to interfere with the duties of that brigade; and further on I observed, "I the next day got an order from Lord Raglan on no account whatever to exercise any "authority over that light brigade." I meant no more than this; and my divisional orders will show that, so far as the divisional management referring to discipline was concerned, I still exercised that authority; but I meant no more than this, that I had received an order from Lord Raglan on no account to interfere with their duties—that was, I was not at liberty to send for them to assist me in the repulse of any attack, or in any military operation. I meant no more than that; and to those who supposed that that order conveyed that I was deprived of exercising any divisional superintendence, I meant nothing of the sort. In consequence of what passed on Tuesday, I find myself, much to my regret, obliged to request the attention of the Board to a letter addressed to Lord Raglan by me, on the 30th of September, when I found it necessary to put the Assistant Commissary General Crookshank under arrest. I was in hopes that there would have been no necessity for referring to what had long passed. The letter is in page 104. Is it the wish of the Board that I should read it?

(*President.*) Yes, you may read it.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) "Camp near Balaklava. September 30th, 1854,"—it is addressed to the Adjutant General,—"Sir, I have the honour to report, for the information of "the Commander of the Forces, that I found it necessary to place D. A. G. C—k under "arrest yesterday:—1st, For disobedience of my orders; 2dly, For making a report to "me verbally, not founded on fact. The circumstances are: On halting on Wednesday "morning on this ground, though expecting a move, so urgent did I consider it that I "ordered him at once to commence slaughtering; and so soon in the afternoon as we "were instructed to encamp, knowing him to have meat ready, I enjoined him in the "strongest manner, and ordered him at once, to forward rations for the men of the "4th and 11th Light Dragoons, which two regiments had been moved on. I was told "that Lord Raglan had himself, as also had the quartermaster general, given in-"structions to the same effect. How great was my annoyance when Mr. S——d, "the junior D. A. C. G, informed me next morning, and no earlier than eight o'clock, "that his serjeant had failed in finding the 4th Light Dragoons, and that they "consequently had received no rations. This flimsy and tardy excuse dissatisfied me "much, and I ordered him at once to proceed himself and take this regiment their "provisions, which I supposed him to have done, having received a report from him "subsequently that the 4th Light Dragoons were rationed. So far, however, was this "from being the fact, that I have since learnt that the regiment received no rations, "whether from Mr. C——k or Mr. S——d, and considered themselves most fortunate "in getting assistance late in the evening from the commissary of the 3d division, "which they had only joined so late as 3 o'clock in the afternoon. I consider that "Mr. C——k was most neglectful in the provisioning of the 4th Light Dragoons; "that he altogether disregarded the instructions he had received from Lord Raglan, "and disobeyed the orders he had received from me. Secondly, no grain of any sort "was served out to the division on Tuesday or Wednesday last,—Mr. C——k, through-"out the latter day, always stating that it was landing. On Tuesday morning early, "he informed me that he held a quantity landed the previous evening; and which, in "reply to a question from me, he said was sufficient for one day's ration of grain for the "4th Light Dragoons and 11th Hussars. Believing these two regiments to be posi-"tively famishing, being without either corn or fodder, I ordered him, in the most "positive manner, to give them a preference over the regiments here, or the divisional "or brigade staff, and to send the grain at once to them. You may well believe that "my annoyance was very great when I was officially informed by Lord G. Paget yes-"terday that his regiment had received no corn whatever from Mr. C——k, and that "had he not succeeded in borrowing from the artillery 6 lbs. of corn per horse, his horses "must have starved. I immediately sent for Mr. C——k, and I found not only that he "had disobeyed my orders, in not supplying the 4th Light Dragoons with corn, but had "imposed upon me by making me believe the day previous that those orders had been "carried out, and that the regiment was provisioned. I considered it due to the service "to place D. A. G. C—k under arrest, there to await the decision of the commander of the

*Earl of Lucan.*

1st May 1856.

" Forces; but I have authorized him to be under arrest at large. I have the honour, &c.
" Signed, Lucan, Lieut.-General, Commanding Cavalry Division." I should observe that I have no other part of the correspondence. The Assistant Commissary General Crookshank continued, I think, under arrest for the greater part of a week. Lord Raglan expressed his disapprobation of Mr. Crookshank's conduct, and he was ordered to be released. I was instructed to return the correspondence, and therefore I have not it. It must be, I should think, with the adjutant general.

I think it also necessary to remark, that Mr. Crookshank the other day gave the Board to believe that there was no delay in the drawing of the forage at Balaklava. I stated at the time that I had a letter showing that the delay was considerable, frequently amounting to seven or eight hours. I hold a letter in my hand from General Scarlett, December the 11th, 1854.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Are you alluding to any evidence taken before the Board when General Scarlett was here?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) But you are now about to read from General Scarlett.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Yes; but if that is objectionable, I can read my own.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Are you going to contradict General Scarlett?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) No; I am going to contradict Mr. Crookshank. I stated to the Court the other day that I was prepared to do so. The Board will recollect that there was a great deal of examination on Tuesday to that very point. At question 1011, he was asked by the Judge Advocate General. "Do you mean the Board to understand " that the horses of the cavalry, particularly of the heavy brigade, were not kept " frequently many hours waiting for forage?" And his answer is, "I cannot answer for " the heavy brigade; but I do not know of any one instance of the light cavalry brigade, " which was mine, having to wait any time for their barley at all." Now I quite see that Mr. Crookshank will say, and very naturally too, that General Scarlett does not refer to the light cavalry brigade; therefore I fall back upon my own letter of December the 16th to the quartermaster general:—"Sir, I consider it incumbent upon me to state that " reports are made to me daily by the officers commanding brigades and regiments, that " the men and horses are in all weathers detained for very many hours, in consequence of " their finding neither hay nor corn landed, adding as this does very severely to the duties " of foraging; indeed the dragoons are frequently obliged to go on board ship, and there " throw it out of the holds themselves. Until the commissary general can be induced to " land some forage in advance, these difficulties must continue; but I hope, Sir, that " you will be able to make arrangements that he should do so."

(*President.*) It was the end of November that was referred to.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) The examination on Tuesday I thought embraced the two periods. One thing is quite certain, that it would apply better to an earlier than to a later period.

(*President.*) The Board are of opinion that they had better go on with Lord Cardigan's case; it is not finished yet.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I request the attention of the Board to an order of mine, that I think refers particularly to what passed on Tuesday. It is at page 15: " The major general " commanding the division requests that with all future monthly returns a special report " may be written to him by any general officer or commanding officer of a regiment " detached from the head quarters of the division, giving an account of the health and " condition of the men and the horses; also of the drills and duties performed during the " preceding month; and they will state particularly how the troops have been supplied " with food and forage. Notwithstanding these periodical reports, it will continue " incumbent, as it has always been, on a brigadier or an officer commanding troops " detached to make special reports concerning the health and condition of both men and " horses, when the necessity occurs." This order was issued in consequence of my not having been already furnished with the reports relating to forage previously to that time. It was a general standing order for the division, issued on the 22d of August, in consequence of not having, as I said, received sufficient reports relating to forage.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) May I be permitted to say a word in reference to myself with regard to that order?—that if that order is meant to apply to the light cavalry brigade when they were detached to Inkermann, it cannot apply to me, because the brigade marched thither on the 2d of November and I resigned on the 29th; therefore I could not be called upon to send in a monthly return at the end of the month, because my command had expired before the month had expired. The return would have been sent in by me on the last day of the month. I resigned on the 29th. With regard to any special reports from the brigade, I considered that having called upon the officers commanding regiments, on the 16th of the month, to state in writing every grievance, every suffering, and every deficiency with regard to their men and to their horses, for the purpose of those reports being forwarded to the lieutenant general commanding the division, and with a request on my part that they should be forwarded to Lord Raglan, I thought that a sufficient notice to take of the duty details, without taking any further order.

*Assist. Com. Gen. Crookshank.*

1st May 1856.

Assistant Commissary General ALEXANDER CROOKSHANK, examined.

1149. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board wish to put some questions to you with reference to your evidence on the last occasion you were examined. You referred in your evidence to your means of supplying forage to the light cavalry brigade; you are now asked to what extent you could have supplied forage to the light cavalry brigade on the heights, from the 16th of November, provided you had had the means of transport?—I could have provided the light cavalry brigade fully with barley.

1150. Do you confine your answer to barley?—Yes; I cannot speak with certainty as to hay or chopped straw.

1151. How many days in the week could you have undertaken with your own means to deliver forage for the light cavalry? Suppose you had had no assistance from the cavalry themselves, could you have supplied it one day in three or four?—No, I think not, for this reason,—that the transport of the army was daily allotted to the different divisions and detachments, and at no time do I suppose the officer superintending the transport, Commissary General Adams, could have afforded to me more than the proportion he did daily. I do not think he could have thrown several days into one.

1152. The question supposes you to be relieved for a certain number of days altogether; could you at the end of the third day have conveyed forage to the cavalry with your own means?—Certainly not.

1153. Your transport was so defective that you could have done nothing after the 16th?—Comparatively nothing; my previous evidence shows some 10 or 12 animals being furnished me at times only, and that was little or nothing.

1154. Have you made any calculation as to what number of animals you would have required?—Yes; at the time I applied for assistance from the cavalry, 60 horses were required.

1155. You had only 12 of your own?—At times only 10 or 12. 10 I think was the lowest I ever had, but I must explain that they were not attached to me personally; they were horses that were furnished me from the depôt at Karani, in common with all the other brigade officers.

1156. To what do you ascribe the deficiency in your transport?—To the death of the animals, I presume.

1157. Was it impossible to have procured more?—That I am not able to say; it was not in my power. I was dependent upon the officer in charge of those animals.

1158. Did you name him just now?—I did. The officer who distributed them was Commissary General Adams; the officer in charge was Assistant Commissary General Smith.

1159. Did he assign any reason for not supplying you with more?—That he had not got them.

1160. Did he state that he could not feed them if he had got them?—That I never heard him say, nor did I ask.

1161. You only heard from him that he had no means?—I daily showed to Commissary General Adams what I required, and he daily afforded me such a proportion as he was able to give me.

1162. Did you inform him of what you wanted?—Yes.

1163. That was after the 16th?—It was daily; I informed him daily of what I required.

1164. But you had had more animals before the 16th, and they died off?—Yes; the few I had with me died, and they broke away also.

1165. To what do you ascribe their deaths?—I should say, to a very great extent, overwork.

1166. Were they properly fed?—That I am not able to speak to; the few I had with me were, for I fed them whenever I took them to Balaklava.

1167. You had many more, had you not, before they died?—The transport I had of, my own—and I am speaking of the time previous to the storm—were bullock waggons, the arabas; this was in the early days of our arrival at Balaklava; but the roads became impassable for the arabas, and they were turned into fuel, and the cattle were eaten.

1168. When did you begin to lose those horses after the storm?—They began to die about the time of the storm, about that time and after.

1169. You ascribe that entirely to their being overworked?—Yes, I should say so; but on this point I cannot give thoroughly good, sound information. I had nothing to do with the animals, which were furnished to me by Commissary General Adams.

1170. But they were furnished to you for your use?—Yes, day by day.

1171. And you found them die off?—I found the numbers reduced that were afforded to me, and I believe from death.

1172. What description of horse was it you employed?—They were ponies, from 11 to 12 hands.

1173. Very much inferior in strength to the cavalry horses?—There was no comparison. The greater part of the ponies that I had afforded to me were quite small things.

1174. Do you know that you could not have procured more?—I am quite sure of it,—more ponies. I trust I may now be permitted to refer to what has fallen from Lord

*Assist. Com. Gen. Crookshank.*

1st May 1856.

Lucan. He read a letter reporting to the Commander of the Forces his having placed me under arrest. He stated that he regretted he was obliged to do so, and he may be quite sure that I equally regret it, and I ask permission to read such portion of the correspondence as Lord Lucan has not in his possession. I have it here. Lord Lucan's letter was forwarded by Lord Raglan to the commissary general, who sent it to me to make my report upon it whilst under arrest. "Light Cavalry Camp, Balaklava, 1st October "1854. I beg most respectfully to make the following statement in reply to Lord "Lucan's letter of the 30th ultimo, addressed to the quartermaster general. In obedience "to Lord Lucan's orders I caused cattle to be slaughtered, and forwarded under charge "of Issuer Tait the rations for the 4th Light Dragoons and 11th Hussars, who were in "advance. He could only find the latter regiment, to whom he gave these rations, "remaining with that regiment all night for protection; and returning the next morning "he met Mr. T. C. Callaghan, who was proceeding to the above regiments with forage. "Mr. Callaghan, on learning that the 4th could not be found, returned, leaving Issuer "Tait at a halt on the road, and reported the case to Deputy Assistant Commissary "General Sutherland (I being on the beach, procuring forage corn), who at once pro-"ceeded to inform Lord Lucan. I submit then, on Deputy Assistant Commissary "General Sutherland's part, that his report to Lord Lucan was not a flimsy or tardy "excuse. His lordship desired the rations and forage should be immediately sent on to "find the regiment, and Deputy Assistant Commissary General Sutherland personally "went. On the road he met Deputy Assistant Commissary General Bartlett, of "the 4th division, who informed him he had supplied and would continue to supply "the 4th Light Dragoons whilst attached to his division, and this Deputy Assistant "Commissary General Sutherland at once communicated to Lord Lucan. I should "observe that throughout this I acted upon Lord Lucan's orders, not having received "any, either from Lord Raglan or the quartermaster general. It was not in my power "to serve out grain to the cavalry regiments on Tuesday or Wednesday last (26th and "27th). The only opportunity I had of procuring it since the issue at the Alma was "at the Baalbec, of which I make mention in my report to you of yesterday, and of which "I now find one regiment at least has not missed one day's supply, though irregularly "issued. The 13th Light Dragoons received on the beach at Alma a full three days' ration "for the 22d, 23d, and 24th. By order, and in common with other regiments who had "drawn the same, they gave up to the 11th Hussars 9 lbs. per horse; this reduced their "three days' ration of 22d to 24th to 9 lbs. per horse per diem. On the morning of the "25th, at the Baalbec, they drew two days' rations from a farm-house you had indicated "to me. This foraged the regiment for the 25th and 26th, and on the 28th I here issued "that day's ration and one for the previous day, by Lord Lucan's order. The 11th "in like manner; but at this moment I am not able to state what quantity of forage it "drew at the Baalbec; but I am of opinion, two days' also. The other regiments were at "were at too great a distance, and marched too early, to avail themselves of the farm supply; "but on this I reported in my letter of yesterday. You are aware, Sir, that on our "arrival here on the 26th, after I had searched the village for forage corn, I went to "the beach and learnt a barley vessel was expected next day, and that the following day, "the 27th, I was the greater part of the day awaiting its arrival, and discharge of "cargo; and, as Lord Lucan says, I stated it was landing. We only got it up to camp "late at night; and the following morning, by Lord Lucan's order, I sent it on for the "4th and 11th Light Dragoons, as stated in the last part of paragraph 1 of this letter. "I can but repeat that Deputy Assistant Commissary General Sutherland returned, "telling me he had met Deputy Assistant Commissary General Bartlett, who said he had "supplied and would continue to supply the 4th Light Dragoons whilst attached to "his division; and acting on that Deputy Assistant Commissary General Sutherland gave "the provisions to the 11th and the forage to the 17th. I reported this to Lord Lucan "in the afternoon. I humbly submit, then, that I was not guilty of disobedience of orders, "and that what I reported to Lord Lucan was founded on fact. I sent off under proper "charge the provisions for the 4th Light Dragoons on the 27th, and, when asked by Lord "Lucan, did say that all the regiments were rationed for that day. The fact of my having "sent them all their rations permitted me to say so, nor did I know of the failure of "Issuer Tait in finding the 4th Light Dragoons till the following afternoon; and at the "same time that I learnt from Deputy Assistant Commissary General Sutherland that his "subsequent search for the regiment resulted in learning it was and would be supplied by "the commissariat officer of the 4th division. For persisting in having made this report I "was placed under arrest. I trust that this statement is clear and explicit. I regret "deeply that Lord Lucan should have deemed it necessary to find fault with me to the "extent of personally accusing me in unmeasured terms before other officers of a lie, and "threatening me with arrest and trial by court-martial if I repeated that lie. With "every deference, I solicit on your part a full inquiry into the matter, so conscious am I "of having acted throughout obediently, and actively, and with strict adherence to truth. "I beg to return Lord Lucan's letter. (Signed) A. CROOKSHANK."

As Lord Lucan observes, I was under arrest for about a week, at the end of which time Lord William Paulett came to me and released me from arrest. I asked him on what grounds, and he said, "I have orders to release you from arrest," and nothing more. I objected to that, and said that as I had been put under arrest, and charges

*Assist. Com. Gen. Crookshank.*

1st May 1886.

preferred against me, I was entitled to a public recognition of my innocence, and not to be quietly released in that manner. To that no answer was given; none whatever. Lord Lucan has told the board that Lord Raglan, in ordering my release from arrest, expressed his disapprobation of my conduct. I assure the Board that this is the first time that I have heard that Lord Raglan expressed disapprobation of my conduct; and with every deference to Lord Lucan, I think he is under some misapprehension. I will read two more letters that give me ground for thinking so. This letter is dated the 12th of October, so that I was under arrest from about the 30th of September until the 11th of October. "To the commissary-general. I beg to report to you that yesterday "evening Lord William Paulett, assistant adjutant general of the cavalry division, "by Lord Lucan's orders released me from arrest and returned me to duty. At "such a critical moment as this, I most willingly and cheerfully resume my duties in "the brigade; but though I individually may feel contented that his Excellency Lord "Raglan is satisfied with my report upon Lord Lucan's accusations and charges, and "consequently ordered my release, yet I feel I go abroad with the accusation of having "told a lie uncontradicted, and the insult and slur still hanging over me. I appeal, "then, to you, very respectfully to submit my case to his Excellency Lord Raglan, and "to request an opportunity of that reparation being afforded me, or a public recognition "of my innocence established, that I may in reality resume my position as an officer "of your department, and a man of honour. Signed A. Crookshank." Then the commissary general verbally informed me that he had spoken on the subject to Lord Raglan. I again write, on the 24th of October: "I beg most respectfully to solicit a "reply to my letter of the 12th instant, for although I am aware your time and attention "are fully occupied, I trust you will not overlook the claim I, as an officer of your depart- "ment, and as a man who is anxious for an unspotted reputation, make through you for "scrutiny into the subject of my application. Every day which passes without notice of "it increases the unpleasantness of my position, leaving me still labouring under the "aspersions of Lord Lucan." To that I was told that there was no official answer; no correspondence. The commissary general told me, "Lord Raglan cannot entertain your "application; it is not expedient." I cannot altogether see Lord Lucan's object in bringing forward this matter. It almost assumes the tone of a personal altercation between us, because I made a statement on Tuesday last which Lord Lucan conceived himself justified in flatly contradicting, but which I persist in; and if this is brought forward to prejudice the value of my assertions before this Board, I hope the Board will take into consideration my replies; and I would add this, that so far from expecting anything of the kind, or wishing it to come forward, on the occasion of Lord Lucan's leaving the Crimea we parted perfectly good friends, though we had at no time been on good terms before, consequent upon this circumstance, and upon many other occasions when his lordship addressed me in terms that were uncalled for.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Lord Raglan's letter, I presume, will be found in the adjutant general's office. I thought it had been read by Lord William Paulett to Mr. Crookshank.

(*Assistant Commissary General Crookshank.*) I trust really that it may come forward. If it is true that Lord Raglan expressed disapprobation of my conduct, I can only add that I conceive that I was permitted to remain without my being acquainted with it, in the most unjustifiable way, both on the part, I will say, of Lord Lucan and the Commissary General. I applied officially for an inquiry or a court-martial to clear me, and to obtain for me that reparation which I conceived due from even Lord Lucan, commanding the cavalry, who could permit himself to tell me, an officer and a gentleman, that I lied.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) Sir, I wish to correct a statement made by me on Tuesday. I referred by mistake to Colonel Douglas's evidence as to 17 horses falling down dead on the march to Kadikoi. That statement will be found in the evidence of Colonel Doherty, at page 14 of the evidence before the Sebastopol Committee.

---

Colonel JOHN DOUGLAS further examined.

*Colonel J. Douglas.*

1171. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board wish some questions to be put to you:—Referring to your evidence before the Commissioners, you stated in that evidence that for about a fortnight after the 14th of November the horses of the 11th Hussars were without hay and straw, and had only on the average 2½ lbs. of barley per day; is the Board to understand that this deficiency of forage and barley began immediately after the 14th of November?—Yes; immediately after the storm the deficiency began.

1176. You stated that you made a representation to the officer commanding the light cavalry brigade, through the brigade major, proposing that a certain number of horses should be sent down daily to bring up forage from Balaklava, and that the proposal was rejected; will you inform the Board the date of that representation, and in what manner the proposal was rejected?—I think the representation was made by me between the 20th and 25th (I could not recollect exactly) of November; and it was, I think, in writing, but I will not be certain. However an application was sent by me, either verbally or in writing, by the quartermaster of the regiment, to Colonel Mayow, suggesting the propriety

*Colonel J. Douglas.*
1st May 1856.

of sending down a proportion of troop horses to bring up forage, as the transport had failed. The answer I got was a verbal one, to the best of my recollection, from Colonel Mayow, to say that it could not be done.

1177. It was a verbal communication?—I think it was a verbal communication. I have no record left to produce. At any rate it was a communication conveyed by the quartermaster of the regiment from me to the brigade major, to be laid before the general officer commanding the light cavalry brigade.

1178. Not to Colonel Mayow directly?—It was directly from me, but the medium of communication was the quartermaster of the regiment. His name is Kauntze, and he is in the Crimea now.

1179. What is your answer to that part of the question as to the manner in which the proposal was rejected?—Merely a verbal answer, to state that it could not be done, or words to that effect. I do not know what reasons Colonel Mayow had for sending that answer. That was the answer I got; no reasons were assigned.

1180. Do you think that at that time the horses were in a fit state to be sent from the plateau to Balaklava to carry back forage and grain?—I do. I think a selection of horses might have been made that could have gone down and brought up forage.

1181. You allude now to the period after the 20th?—Yes.

1182. How many regimental bât horses had you at that time?—I do not think we had more than three. I am not sure if any then existed.

1183. Did you state in evidence before the Commissioners that in the months of November and December there was a great deficiency of nosebags, and that you purchased the materials, and made up some in the regiment; and is that correct?—I did.

1184. Where did you purchase the materials?—I think I purchased the materials at Balaklava. I got some old canvass, and I made every man in the regiment work to mend and patch his nosebag as well as he could, and I issued an order that any man that could not produce a nosebag was to stand at his horse's head and feed the horse out of a handkerchief or something, and that soon remedied the deficiency, and the men took care of the nosebags.

1185. You got sufficient material?—Yes; I managed to patch them up in some way or other.

1186. Nosebags are issued by the Government in the first instance; how are they usually supplied when worn out or lost?—By requisition through the quartermaster general of the brigade, who makes a requisition, I presume, to the quartermaster general of the army, and it goes on to head quarters.

1187. Was that requisition made?—Repeatedly I made them for those nosebags, for that was always a deficiency we laboured under.

1188. How many horses of your regiment were left fit for duty when you proposed to send down to Balaklava for forage?—I cannot tell the number fit for duty in round numbers. We had about a hundred at that time left in the regiment.

1189. How many did you propose to send to Balaklava for forage?—That is a matter of calculation. Each horse might have brought back a sack of barley, weighing between 140 and 150 lbs.

1190. How many would it have been necessary to send for forage for your regiment?—Each horse, at the rate of 10 lbs. of barley, which is less than the ration, would have brought up twelve horses' rations, and it would require another horse to be mounted and to lead him; say two horses for twelve horses' rations. They could not have brought any hay.

1191. (*Major General Peel.*) One horse would have brought up a bag of barley, and it would then require another horse to lead him?—Each horse would have brought up a bag of barley; and it would not have done to require the men to walk, and lead those horses.

1192. It would have required about one-fifth of your regiment?—Yes.

---

Colonel ALEXANDER LOW further examined.

*Colonel A. Low.*

1193. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board desires some questions to be put to you:—Do you think that after the 14th of November, when the regiment moved to Kadikoi, the horses were in a fit state to be sent for forage to Balaklava?—I do.

1194. What number could you have spared for that purpose?—The proposal made to me by Assistant Commissary General Crookshank was to have sent 25, which I could have done very well.

1195. Did you make any suggestion that they should be sent?—No suggestion. Mr. Crooksbank came to me to ask my sanction, in the event of its being obtained from the brigadier, for horses to go down to Balaklava to bring up forage. I was only too glad to accede to his proposition, so far as I was concerned.

1196. Do you think that they could have brought up hay as well as barley?—Certainly, in proportion.

*Colonel A. Low.*

1st May 1856.

1197. Were the horses generally in a good state at that time?—They were failing after the storm; they suffered very much from standing in the liquid snow and mud and exposure to it night and day.

1198. What was the distance that they would have had to go to bring forage?—I should think upwards of six miles.

1199. From where they were?—Yes; from where we moved to after the storm of the 14th.

1200. Had you ascertained that forage was available for them at Balaklava?—The commissariat officer informed me that if the horses could be sent down we should get a certain quantity of barley. I know nothing about hay. I heard that the storm had wrecked a ship with the hay.

1201. Had you heard anything of the difficulties that there were in landing the forage?—Yes.

1202. And the delay occasioned by that when the horses were sent down?—At that time I knew very little about it, being such a distance from Balaklava. Till after the storm the commissariat had supplied us with forage.

1203. I will call your attention to this part of your evidence before the Commissioners:—"During the last three weeks in November the horses had on an average only about "one-fifthof their regulated rations; the horses were in consequence so much reduced "that many died, and nearly all became unfit for duty, and most of them have so "continued."—Yes; up to the time that we moved down to the vale of Kadikoi the rations only amounted, I calculate, to about one-fifth, taking the barley at 12 lbs. a day; that would give barely 3 lbs.; about $2\frac{1}{2}$; that is the average that I take.

1204. That is a correct statement of what you stated to the Commissioners, that nearly all the horses were unfit for duty?—At the end of that time, when they moved down.

1205. You are referring to the last three weeks in November?—Yes; and of course each day they got very much worse.

(*Major General Peel.*) You say that you have to state "that even as early as the "month of October, when the regiment was encamped near the 2d division, the supply "of forage was very irregular, and the troop horses underwent great labour in bringing "up forage to so great a distance from Balaklava." What was the distance that they were from Balaklava?—They were upwards, I should think, of seven miles and a half; we were in the 2d division, with Sir De Lacy Evans; the 4th Dragoons were attached to that division; and we had to send as many as 70 or 80 troop horses to the valley of Kadikoi to bring up hay.

1207. Then you had been in the habit of foraging for yourselves previous to the 14th of November?—Yes. The 4th Dragoons went up first with Sir George Cathcart's division, and remained there till a few days before the battle of Balaklava, and then returned.

1208. This proposal of the commissary general to fetch up your own forage after the 14th of November was only asking you to do what you had done before?—Yes. After the battle of Balaklava, and after the battle of Inkermann, no horses left the plateau at all; I heard they were detained there by the orders of Sir Richard Airey. I am not aware what the reasons were.

1209. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) When you were attached to the division of infantry, that was before the btatle of Balaklava?—Yes.

1210. You were much stronger then?—We were effective then.

(*Judge Advocate General to the Earl of Lucan.*) The Board wish you to answer these questions. Where was the heavy cavalry brigade stationed on the 16th of November.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) They were stationed on the plateau near the colline.

1212. What were their duties at that time?—First of all, we were always prepared for an attack; we had a party in Balaklava for a certain time; we had, independently of that, a strong picket in the valley; we had inlying pickets, and the foraging for our own brigade.

1213. Could they not have afforded some assistance in the conveyance of foarge for the light cavalry brigade; say one day in three?—First of all, there was no application for any such assistance at all. Then, if you will refer to Mr. Crookshank's letter, you will find that up to the 21st there really was no positive deficiency; and I should say from the state of the heavy brigade after the 21st that they could not; it was quite enough for them to forage for themselves; but there was no application for assistance.

(*Earl of Cardigan.*) Before my case closes, may I be allowed to say a few words? I will not occupy more than three minutes of your time. Before my case is closed, I beg to remind the Board that the commissariat transport animals were not said to have failed before the 14th of November. I have shown that I was not applied to to send the troop horses for forage till about the 16th of the month, and that at that time the horses were receiving a fair allowance of barley, which is proved by the brigade major's returns in your possession, and that that had been the case up to the 23d of the month. It is proved by the evidence of several commissariat officers which has been laid before you, that there was no hay in Balaklava for some time after the 14th of November, therefore it would have been useless to send down horses for it, even if more cogent objections to

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1 st May 1856.

such a measure had not existed. Mr. Crookshank states positively that he applied more than once to the lieutenant general commanding the division for the troop horses to be sent down for forage, which was refused; and I think the Board will admit that if Mr. Crookshank's letter of the 18th of November, at page 47, was not a written request for troop horses to be employed, it was at any rate a pretty strong appeal on the subject. I have stated, in reply to a question from the judge advocate general, that I had no power whatever to send down troop horses, without the sanction of a superior authority; which opinion of mine was fully confirmed on Tuesday last by that of the quartermaster general of the army, Sir Richard Airey, whose answer to question 1146 was, "Certainly "he could not have detached any portion of his force without the sanction of the com- "mander-in-chief." With these few remarks, I confidently leave my case in the hands of this honourable Board.

(*Judge Advocate General to Sir Richard Airey.*) Are you ready now to proceed?

(*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*) Before commencing my statement, I should be glad to know whether I can have the original minutes of examination which I asked for on Tuesday.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have given them to the judge advocate general.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Tulloch has placed in my hands the original minutes of some evidence that has been reported. I do not know exactly whether you specified the evidence; whether you named the persons whose evidence you want. There appears to be Colonel Gordon's, Colonel Wetherall's, and your own.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) And Colonel Mackenzie's.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have not got that, but I will produce it; and I may observe, that the minutes there are in the handwriting of Colonel Gordon, and being in the handwriting of Colonel Gordon I have no doubt that he has the originals which were sent to him.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Has he the minutes of the examination of other officers as well as his own?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No; because the original of Colonel Wetherall's is there in my handwriting.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I think it will be the best that when I have examined what are handed in, if I am not quite satisfied, that I should then be allowed to state what I further require.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you wish to see them now?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Not immediately. It will take time to look at them.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) All of Colonel Gordon's is in his handwriting, and a great number of alterations were made, as compared with the original. He was quite at liberty to make any alteration that he thought proper. Colonel Wetherall's is in my handwriting.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) As these officers were subordinate officers in my department, it was natural for me to conclude that the evidence of officers in my own department would have been submitted to me, and therefore I am anxious to see what really fell from them.

General Sir Alexander Woodford, my lord and gentlemen,—Under the blame which I thought to have been inferentially cast upon me by the Report of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, I have hitherto observed strict silence, and I am thankful that Her Majesty's most gracious warrant for assembling this Board of general officers has now assigned a fitting time and a fitting place for my explanations.

I will at a future period of my address make some observations with regard to the letter which was produced in Court by Colonel Tulloch from Colonel Gordon. I do not wish to pass that letter entirely over, but merely to say it will be better to bring forward my explanation with regard to the writing of that letter, and the evidence that was subsequently given to me, after I have made the Board acquainted with certain facts which I shall have occasion to do in the course of my address.

From the 1st of September 1854 until the 17th of November 1855 I had the honour to be the quartermaster general of the forces in the East; and it is with respect to the comments of the Commissioners, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, on matters within my department, that I now address the Board. On the examination of the instructions to the Commissioners dated the 19th of February 1855, and the supplement instructions dated the 22d of that month, and by comparing those instructions with the official code issued by the Lords of the Treasury for defining the functions of the commissariat, it would seem that the duty intrusted to Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch was solely that of investigating the management of the commissariat department; and it was in strict accordance with that view as to the tone and scope of their duties that the Commissioners addressed to Lord Raglan the letter of the 13th of March 1855, which I shall now have occasion to read. But previously to reading that letter I wish to call the attention of the Board to the proceedings of the Commissioners. At page No. 3. the Board will observe that the Commissioners state themselves: "The influence of overwork and exposure on the health "of the troops might appear to be foreign to the objects of an inquiry which had reference "exclusively to the supply of the army and the arrangements of the commissariat." I call attention to that passage in the Report, because, as the Commissioners state that their intention was to be directed "exclusively," I interpret that to mean the exclusion of other matters. The letter of Sir John M'Neill to Field Marshal Lord Raglan,

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

signed John M'Neill, points to three objects, all bearing exclusively upon the commissariat. First, the inquiry was to ascertain the deficiency of supplies; secondly, the cause of any deficiency; and thirdly, the course which should be adopted to prevent such deficiency for the future; but not one word of that letter points to any inquiry of such a kind as to form a basis for animadversion on any military officer. And here I must be permitted to say, that although I should have been certainly surprised to hear that a gentleman taken from the civil service of the Crown, and an officer with the rank of colonel in the army, had been intrusted by Her Majesty's Government with the duty of investigating the conduct of general officers of the army,—of officers then actively engaged with the enemy in the field,—I can truly say that that surprise would not have been followed on my part by the smallest want of that deference to a duly constituted authority which I deem it a part of every officer's duty to pay; and perhaps I may add that if the gentleman selected for the performance of that duty was to be a civilian there is no one to whose judgment and fairness I should defer with more confidence than that of Sir John M'Neill; and in saying that the selection of a civilian to sit in judgment upon officers in the field would have given me more surprise, or a good deal of surprise, I am far from desiring to convey the expression of an opinion that because such a step is unusual it would therefore be wrong. On the contrary, I am one of those who believe that all professions are benefited by throwing upon them some light from outside. My regret is, not that civilians discuss military affairs too much, but that they know too little of them to be able to conduct the discussion with due effect; and I sincerely believe that the complaints in abundance, as applied to the business of the quartermaster general's department, have resulted, not from any want of industry or well-meaning intelligence on the part of my critics, but rather from the circumstance that there is no compendious elementary work from which they might have acquainted themselves in a rapid and easy way with the organization of the British army. This want of acquaintance with the structure of our army is not for an instant to be attributed to the Commissioners; and I repeat, and I have much pleasure in assuring Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, that no thought about the profession of the one Commissioner or the military rank of the other would have prevented me from submitting myself instantly to their judgment, if I had thought that they had been invested with competent authority, and intrusted with the duty of investigating my administration as quartermaster general of the army; it would have been enough to know that Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch came armed with Her Majesty's commission to inquire into my conduct; but that is precisely what I did not know, and what is strange to say, I do not know at this moment. My belief is that the duties intrusted to the commissioners exactly coincided with that representation of their plans which they formally addressed to Lord Raglan in the letter of the 12th of March which I have just read. I had never heard, and I do not believe, that the intention of extending the inquiry to the military departments was ever announced to the commander of the forces; and even in this hall I understood Colonel Tulloch to say that his colleague and himself were not authorized to inquire into the conduct of military officers.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Most assuredly you are giving yourself a great deal of unnecessary trouble. We went there to inquire into the supplies intrusted to military officers.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I have the honour to be on terms of kindly intercourse with Sir John M'Neill, and I am sure that if whilst in the Crimea he had known that it would have become his duty to inquire into the administration of my department he would have told me at once that I was an officer under trial, and that he was one of my judges. However, in March 1855, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch began their inquiry; but from the first they laboured under a difficulty which was sure to be fatal to the authenticity and value of any report which they might attempt to make of the evidence. They had come from England unprovided with the assistance of a shorthand writer. This error was irretrievable. No doubt the Commissioners earnestly but vainly exerted themselves to remedy the defect, but it was impossible. The course that they took, I understood, was this:—The witness would be orally examined, probably for many hours together, and the secretary, or one of the Commissioners, would make a note, as well as he could, of what was passing, and afterwards one of the Commissioners attempted to make a sketch or narrative, in the third person, of the purport of what the witness said, and the sketch so prepared was submitted to the witness for his approval and his correction also.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) The witnesses first stated what they had to say, which occupied perhaps an hour, and having been heard, I endeavoured, or the secretary of the Commissioners endeavoured, by the instruction of Sir John M'Neill and myself, to state, as nearly as possible, the important parts of what had fallen from the witness. It was then read over to him, and he was asked whether that was what he had to state on each subject, and whether he had any more to state, and then it was submitted to him for his signature, or it was afterwards——

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) The process of converting the spoken words into a written minute was so condensing that evidence which occupied three or four hours is contained in a single page. All who are accustomed to weigh well testimony know how well truth is elicited by hearing the real words which come from the lips of a straightforward witness, and how satisfactory it must be to substitute for such testimony a soldier's hasty

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

assent to a written document, which seeks, however anxiously and honestly, to represent his true meaning in words constructed by another man's mind.

Another objection to such a method of recording evidence is this, that the foregone opinion of the questioner imports itself into the minutes, and leads the reader to a grossly erroneous judgment as to the real weight and meaning of the evidence, for it is one thing to give an assenting "yes" to a question, and another and a very different thing to assert the proposition contained in the question as if it had been actually stated and originated by the witness himself.

Now, as an illustration of the delusion which would result from attributing weight to written minutes of evidence taken and recorded in this way by the Commissioners, I will refer to one of the first questions which Colonel Tulloch asked when he began to examine witnesses before this Board. It is Major Thompson's evidence, at page 59 of the proceedings before this Board. Question 145 is this: "If you had had more tools you could have "done the work in a shorter time; that is to say, 150 men would have put up a shelter "for 150 horses in one day instead of two? To provide such a shelter it only required "plenty of tools, and 150 men would excavate the requisite description of pit or shelter "for 150 horses in one day, provided you had had plenty of tools?" And the witness answered to this an assenting "yes." Now, if instead of a note by the shorthand writer, who has faithfully recorded the whole of the proceedings, we had had a minute formed upon Colonel Tulloch's plan by compounding the question and the answer, Major Thompson's evidence upon the point would have been thus recorded: "The witness "says that if he had had more tools he could have done the work in a shorter time; "that is to say, 150 men would have put up a shelter for 150 horses in one day instead "of two. To provide such a shelter, it only required plenty of tools, and 150 men would "excavacate the requisite description of pit or shelter for 150 horses in one day, pro-"vided he had had plenty of tools." Thus we should have been led to the supposition, that a cavalry officer who does not appear to have given any very special attention to calculations of this sort was seriously stating, as the product of his own mind, an elaborate conclusion from a quantity of complicated data which had never entered into his head, but had come entirely from the mind of Colonel Tulloch.

Now, is it just or fair that minutes of evidence recorded in such a way should be used a year afterwards as material for a report animadverting upon the conduct of officers? I do not make these observations in consequence of any opinion that the evidence has any unfavourable bearing upon my administration of the quartermaster general's department, for the very reverse is the case; but I nevertheless think it important to show that there is only one way of preventing these written memoranda of spoken evidence from becoming dangerous, and that is by determining to regard them as very nearly useless. No man can read the report dated Constantinople, 10th of June 1855, and the report dated London, January 1856, without detecting a wide difference in the tone and spirit of those two documents, and I think this difference may be accounted for in this way,—that the Commissioners wrote their First Report when their impressions of what they really saw and really heard in the Crimea were still vivid in their minds, whilst, on the contrary, the London report of 1856 was prepared by the aid of meagre sketches of evidence given in the previous year, and confused masses of returns and accounts, and this too at a time when both the Commissioners who had returned to their usual avocations could only now and then give a spare hour. It was stated by Colonel Tulloch that another disadvantage resulting from the want of a short hand writer was this, that the slowness of the process ultimately prevented the Commissioners from making such an inquiry into the business of the military departments as would have formed a satisfactory basis for the discussion of questions touched upon in their subsequent London report. If any such inquiry into the military departments was then intended, it is certain that the more important portion of it was never even begun in the Crimea. The announcement to Lord Raglan indicated only an inquiry into the arrangement of the commissariat; and I am sure that he had no idea that any investigation into the military departments was proposed to be made by Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch. Of course, therefore, Lord Raglan had no opportunity of aiding an inquiry which he did not even know to be on foot. The adjutant general, General Estcourt, was then living and in good health, and he was never examined at all, either orally or in writing; and this Board of General Officers, well understanding as it does the organization of the British army, will instantly perceive that any inquiry into the matters which the Commissioners have discussed in their London report must inevitably be incomplete if it omits to elicit information from the adjutant general and every officer of the general staff specially responsible, not merely for the discipline of the force, but for its clothing, equipment, and general efficiency, and whose special province it is to keep the roster, and to detail all the duties of the fatigue parties of the army. The omission was not supplied by the examination of any other officer of the adjutant general's department. Colonel Pakenham, the then assistant adjutant general, the officer intrusted with carrying out the details, was present on the spot, and his ability to give full and accurate information on the subject may be inferred from the fact, that a few weeks afterwards, when General Estcourt died, he was placed at the head of that very department, and is still adjutant general of the forces in the Crimea, and yet he was never examined. The Commissioners also left the Crimea without

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

having orally examined him. It is true that previous to their departure Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch tried to examine me. They came up, as stated, two or three times; but finding from the circumstances they could not do so, I was furnished with, I think, 14 questions by Sir John M'Neill, all of which I replied to in writing, and gave them to him; and subsequently I received 49 questions as Colonel Tulloch's queries, which I was also to answer in writing. I of course complied, and I forwarded my written answers to London. But it will be seen, as I shall presently show, that I never received any query about matters which form the principal subject of the London report, namely, the issue of clothing. And I must repeat, in consequence of the circumstances stated by the report, that from first to last I have never been examined by word of mouth. Again, the organ of communication between regiments and the quartermaster general of the forces upon departmental subjects is the assistant quartermaster general of each division; and upon looking at the London report the Board will see that the main subject embraced in that branch of the inquiry was actually the one upon which the assistant quartermaster generals of the infantry divisions could have thrown more light than almost any other officers in the army, except the quartermaster general himself, yet their examination never took place. Then, with a view to the discussion as to the hutting and erecting shelter for the horses, the matter treated of in the London report, it would seem to establish that the assistance of an engineer officer would be of primary importance, for it is upon that body that the duty of constructing works of that description would fall; but I do not understand that any engineer officer was examined on the subject. It is true that Colonel Chapman was examined, but not, as it would seem, upon the business of his department. His evidence will be found at page 132 of the Report in the blue book; but there is nothing touched upon with regard to this subject. I impute no kind of blame to the Commissioners for those omissions. Apparently they had not whilst in the Crimea formed an intention of making a report affecting military departments, or if they had they went upon the plan of taking the less material evidence first, and it was no fault of theirs that illness unavoidably interrupted them before the important part of their inquiry into the military departments had began. The Commissioners were still labouring diligently at their task when in the month of May sickness broke out in a part of the camp, and many died, and the Commissioners themselves were so seriously affected by illness that they found it imperatively necessary to quit the Crimea, and they remained at Constantinople till after the 10th of June, engaged in the preparation of their First Report. I feel sure that up to this time the Commissioners had not entertained the idea that it was their duty to make a report which could by any possiblity have the effect of casting blame upon the quartermaster general of the forces, or any other military officers on the general staff. If they had thought that any such conclusion on their part was in the smallest degree probable, they would not have hesitated to return from Constantinople to the Crimea, with the view to elicit our oral explanations; and though inferences are deducible from the Report, I continue to believe even now that the Commissioners did not intend to cast blame on my administration of the quartermaster general's department, so long as they were in the East. They did undertake the important duty of suggesting improvements, and to do this effectually it was necessary to describe defects or supposed defects in the system, but it is difficult to perform that task without using expressions which may seem to impute blame to those who had the administration of the departments. It is thus I account for the apparent animadversions contained in the London report. Be this as it may, I can say with truth that until the Report was laid before the Houses of Parliament I had no idea that an inquiry had been going on in that direction, tending to raise any question as to the manner in which I performed my duties. I beg to refer to a memorandum printed at page 166 of the evidence. I declare that I never saw or heard of this memorandum till this Report was published in London. I have since been informed by Colonel Gordon that on the second day of his examination, when he and Colonel Wetherall were about to be examined, a manuscript note to the effect of this memorandum was shown, but no copy of it was given or offered, and no suggestion made that the contents should be communicated to me. Colonel Gordon informs me that he regarded the note as a private memorandum of the Commissioners, for their own guidance, and not with a view of having it conveyed to me. I have stated that the Commissioners sent me a number of written queries. Those are printed at page 182 of the evidence. I wish very much to call attention to those queries, because it will be seen that they relate mainly to those branches of the service which are totally unconnected with the quartermaster general's department. The first query merely asks since what date I held the office of quartermaster general. The second asks a question as to the duties of the quartermaster general with regard to the supplies of the army. The third refers to the rations; and, as I have explained at the bottom of my answer, that refers to the adjutant general's department. The fourth question is upon the nature of the food of the army, and which I point out is the duty of the principal medical officer. The fifth question refers to transport, which is the duty of the commissary general. The sixth query is also with regard to the transport, which is, again, the duty of the commissary general. The seventh refers to the transport; again the duty of the commissary general. The eighth refers to the total amount of transport, which was a question

or the commissary general, and a mere matter of opinion from me. The ninth was with regard to the commissary general having been urged to increase the amount of his transport. That is a question which refers more to the commander of the forces. The next is a question of opinion with regard to the commissary general. The next is a question with regard to where the army was going to winter. That refers to the commander of the forces and the Government at home. The 12th is a question which relates to the commander of the forces or the military secretary, as is indicated in my answer. The 13th is another question which refers to the commander of the forces only, as to the wintering of the army. The 14th refers to the Treasury instructions. The 15th again refers to the rations, which refers to the commissary general. The 16th refers to the complaints of the rations, which belongs to the adjutant general. The 17th is a question of supplies, and refers to the commissary general. The 18th refers to supplies of rice to the troops; a commissary general's question again. The 19th refers to the issue of green coffee to the army, which is a commissary general's question again. The 20th is with regard to the men's rations, which refers to the commissary general. The 21st is with regard to the salt meat ration; again a question for the commissary general. The 22d, as to the insufficiency of rations, refers to the commissary general. The next question is the 23d, whether it came to my knowledge that a part of the salt ration was eaten raw; which is a mere question of opinion, but with nothing departmental in it. The next question is a medical question upon the general diet of the troops. The next is again a question which refers to the diet of the soldiers, and having no reference to the quartermaster general's functions. The next question, which is the 26th, refers to the board of officers which sat at Varna, with which the quartermaster general had nothing to do. The 29th question refers to the price of rice and the stoppages of money, which in no way refer to the quartermaster general; it refers to the adjutant-general or to the commissary general. The 28th question refers to the nature of the rations of tea, and the price. That refers to the adjutant general and the commissary general. The next question regards the price of tea, which I explained was of course never an object, but it was a question belonging to the commissary general, and not to the quartermaster general. The next question refers to the weight of tea and the facility of carriage, which refers to the transport. The next question refers to the commissary general; to know what commissary general Filder did to get tea. The next question, the 32d, refers to the commissary general, regarding fresh meat. The 33d, as to the lime-juice, refers to the medical department. The 34th, again, as to lime-juice, refers to the medical department. The 35th, again, is asto lime-juice, which refers to the principal medical officer. The 36th refers to fresh meat, which is a commissariat question. The 37th, as to fresh bread, is a commissariat question. The 38th, as to the treatment of the men in the hospital, is a medical question. The 39th, with regard to fresh bread, is a commissariat question. Then comes a question which relates to me; which is, whether I recollect any representation having been made to me with regard to the want of nosebags. That is a quartermaster general's question. The 40th is as to the want of nosebags. Then comes the deficiencies of forage, which is an adjutant general's question. Then comes a question whether it was through my orders that the light brigade of cavalry was at the end of November stationed at Inkermann. Then come questions as to the deficiency of forage of the light brigade. The 45th question also refers to reports which go to the adjutant general, and not to me. The 46th refers to the condition of the horses and the efficiency of the horses, which belongs to the adjutant general, and not to the quarter-master general. The next, the 47th, is as to the horses that died on the line of march down, which also refers to the adjutant general. The 48th question is the same. on the condition of the horses. The next refers to the commissary general. The 50th refers to what may be considered a quartermaster general's question, as referring to boats being landed from vessels. The next refers to instances in which supplies were sent from Balaklava before being landed. That refers to the commissary general, as he had the landing of all the stores. Then the 52d refers to shelter for the horses, which may be considered a quartermaster general's question, as far as regards the steps he took to provide the means of shelter. The next refers to the shortness of labour, which is a question for the commissary general or the adjutant general. The next refers to the question of obtaining ship carpenters, and is addressed to me. It should have been addressed either to the commissary general or to me. The 55th question refers to the construction of stables. The 56th refers to nosebags for the horses. The 57th to the horses eating their blankets. The 58th to visiting the cavalry lines. The next to the efficiency of the horses to perform certain duties, which does not affect the quartermaster general. The next is upon the question of wooden houses arriving from England, and referring more to the transport than to the quartermaster general. The next refers to the transport provided by the commissariat for some stores that were expected from England, and transporting them to the front. The next refers to the fuel issued as part of the rations of the men, which is a commissariat question again. The next is, finding that there was so much difficulty in the transport, what steps I took to urge upon the commissary general the necessity for increasing his means of transport, which is a question that appertains really to the commander-in-chief. I have detained the Board a long time in going through this series of questions, to show that in that great number how very few positively have anything to do with me as the quarter-

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

master general. I was going on to state, that it is true that out of those 63 questions there are three or four about the sheltering of the horses, two about huts, and two or three about nosebags, but there is not a single question respecting tents or marquees, nor upon the business as to the non-issue of the stores, which was afterwards so prominently brought forward. In short, there was nothing in the queries indicating the approach of any such discussion as was afterwards raised by the London report, or in fact regarding the discussions which have since occurred in this hall. Whilst the Commissioners were still at Constantinople, fresh from the Crimea, they made their First Report, on the 10th of June, dated Constantinople. In that report there is not a sentence which tends to impugn the administration of the quartermaster general's department; and indeed as one of those who toiled through the winter campaign in the Crimea, I feel grateful to the Commissioners for the eloquent words in which they have described the sufferings and fortitude of the British army. The Commissioners afterwards returned to England, and it was there they received the remaining answers to their written queries. With those and such other materials as London afforded they made their Second Report, dated London, January 1856. This report, whether warranted or not by the instructions of the Secretary of State for War, deserves deep attention, because it is a report prepared and signed by Her Majesty's Commissioners; but it must not be mistaken for the result of a Crimean inquiry conducted on the spot. On the contrary, it is plain from the Report itself that the conclusions therein stated had been arrived at by collating numerous intricate accounts and statements, without the advantage of oral explanation by the persons concerned. I desire to say here, that I have permission from proper authorities to use the documents I shall have occasion to put before the Board. I have stated my opinion that the Commissioners could not have intended to inculpate me, and I think I may infer from the facts I shall state that they were never intrusted with the duty of sitting in judgment upon my conduct.

On the 19th of February 1855, the very day on which the Secretary for War signed the instructions to Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, he also constituted a special tribunal charged with the duty of investigating the composition of the general staff of the army in the Crimea, and reporting as to the fitness of every officer employed therein. The judge selected to perform this duty was General Sir James Simpson, and to him, on the 19th of February, the very same day, the Secretary of State for War addressed the following written instructions,—Paragraph 4, "It will be your duty to look into the "composition of the general staff of the army, and report your opinion of any changes "which it may occur to you to think necessary to Field Marshal Lord Raglan. This "report you will make in duplicate, and instructions will be given to the field marshal "to forward one of them for the information of the Secretary of State for War. All "appointments and removal of officers from the general staff of the army will rest with "the officer in supreme command, but you will not fail, if you find any officer in "your opinion unfit, on trial, for the duties entrusted to him, to report the same "without favour or affection, to the commander-in-chief." I will lay before the Board a copy of those instructions. I have reason to believe that the Secretary of State for War took ample measures for securing my removal from the general staff, if it should turn out, on investigation, that I had been inefficient in the performance of my duties. And I do not complain if with this view Lord Panmure sought to convey to head-quarters in the Crimea an unfavourable opinion of my qualifications, which he had perhaps entertained. A minister doing his best to facilitate the removal of an officer whom he believes to be ill-fitted for his post renders a service truly valuable to an army in the field. Lord Panmure knew it would be painful to Lord Raglan to dismiss the quarter-master general with whom he had hitherto acted. He also knew that the welfare and safety of the army depended certainly upon the efficiency of the general staff. And now, looking calmly on the past, I recognize the propriety of the steps, severe and painful as they were, by which the Secretary of War determined to break down all obstacles impeding the removal of the quartermaster general, in the event of its being decided by General Simpson, the judge selected for the occasion, that the duties of the department had not been well performed. On the 16th of March General Simpson arrived at head-quarters in the Crimea, and on the 26th of April, the following month, he reported as follows:—"Head Quarters, Constantinople, 26th April 1855." The letter is directed to Lord Raglan. "My Lord, referring to the instructions "contained in paragraphs four and six of Lord Panmure's letter to me of the 19th of "February last, desiring me to report to your lordship my opinion of the composition of "the general staff of this army, and any changes which might appear to be necessary to "me, I have the honour to state that ever since my arrival in this camp it has been my "daily custom by personal intercourse to make myself acquainted with every officer "employed on the general staff of this army, and there is not one of them whom I would "wish to see removed; they are almost without exception men of very considerable "abilities, well thought of by their generals, active in their habits, zealous, willing, and "attentive to orders or to any suggestions for the good of the service. I have delayed "making this report in order that a little time might enable me to be certain of "the correctness of my opinion, and because I confess myself to have come amongst "those officers, many of them strangers to me, with some degree of prejudice "against them created in my mind by the gross misrepresentations current in

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

" England respecting them. I do not think a better selection of staff officers could " be made; therefore I have no reason to recommend any changes to your lordship." I do not believe that concurrently with this scrutiny by General Simpson, that the Secretary of State for War could have intended to intrust to Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch the duty of animadverting upon my management of the quartermaster general's department; and I repeat that I am led to the same conclusion by the wording of the instructions, which are framed apparently with the view of confining the Commissioners to a scrutiny of the commissariat business. Upon the death of Field Marshal Lord Raglan the command devolved upon General Sir James Simpson, and his course as commander of the forces was consistent with the report which I have just had the honour to read, for he retained my services as his quartermaster general, and I continued to hold the office and enjoy the confidence and support of my general until he retired from the command. Under General Sir William Codrington I held the same office, and enjoyed the like confidence and support, and I continued to do so until the month of November 1855, when I was ordered home on duty. Sir William Codrington's view of my services is given in an order of the day dated November 17th 1855, when I embarked; a copy of the order is here, but I will not read that order. This my period of service as quartermaster general of the forces lasted from the 1st of September 1854 to the 17th November 1855. The department of the Secretary of State for War must have in its archives the correspondence between the Government and the three generals successively commanding the forces under whom I had the honor to serve. If the dispatches from any of those generals contain matters tending to my disparagement, I much desire that the inculpatory passages should be made known to me, with the view of giving me an opportunity of explanation. If on the contrary it be true, as I firmly believe it is, that those dispatches contain no matter of blame against me, but rather expressions of praise and approbation, then I would be the last to ask for their production. It is a great personal comfort to me to believe as I do that Lord Raglan addressed the Government in terms expressive of his satisfaction with my conduct; and I of course know that in ordinary circumstances an officer's best and most complete justification is the approval of the general under whom he is serving; but Lord Raglan is no more, and I will not put forward my general's expressed approbation as a means of covering my responsibility.

(*President.*) The Board propose that the order to which you have referred should be read.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The general order is as follows: " Head Quarters, Sebastopol, " 17th November 1855. Lieutenant General Airey, K.C.B., being ordered home on duty " will leave his command this day. The commander of the forces cannot allow Sir Richard " Airey to quit this army without recording his knowledge of the just estimation in " which he was held by the late Field Marshal Lord Raglan and General Sir James " Simpson for his services throughout the whole campaign in the very important and " trying duties in which he was engaged. The commander of the forces can only " regret on grounds both of military estimation and private friendship that he cannot " have the benefit of assistance which he would have so highly valued."

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I propose, with the permission of the Board, in this address to render an explanation on those matters which falling within the range of the quartermaster general's department are made the subject of observation by the Commissioners. In the British service there is a special duty annexed to the office of quartermaster general in the field, namely, that of fixing the proportions in which certain articles of camp equipage are to be divided between the different regiments, and to this branch of the department I shall have to refer by and by with some minuteness; but I will here mention generally the other important functions of the quartermaster general to an army in the field naturally, namely, he directs and superintends the quartering, the encamping, the marching, the embarking, and the disembarking of troops, and he enforces all camp regulations. Moreover he must acquire the fullest information that he can as to the geography, the climate, the military and general resources of the country which is the theatre of war, the right spots for landing and embarking, and the best positions for attack and defence. He must be prepared to convey this knowledge to the commander of the forces, by laying before him the best available plans and maps which can be obtained either by his own surveys or other sources; and he must take care to have all maps and surveys carefully corrected and extended from time to time as circumstances permit of under the varying exigencies of the service; he must inform him as well as he can the strength, the position, the resources, and the contemplated operations of the enemy. Charged with duties of such a nature the quartermaster general must necessarily be more or less admitted into the councils of the general commanding the forces; and I conceive that as an officer on the general staff of the army, it is his duty to render to his general whenever he is required to do so, instant, willing, and zealous assistance in all field duties as well as in any matters connected with the administration of the army, and that he ought to render this assistance as required without raising a question as to whether the matter be or not within the strict range of his own department.

I acted so constantly upon this broad view of my duty that the Commissioners found traces of my labour in almost every department of the service, and this circumstance seems to have led to the impression that the functions of my department extended to

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

almost every kind of business connected with the army administration, including the transport, the supplies of engineering works, and even medical arrangements; but in point of fact the quartermaster general of the army has nothing to do with any of those branches of the service. I entirely agree with the Commissioners, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, in the conclusions to which they appear to have come, that is, that the sufferings of the army during the winter 1854-55 are traceable to two causes, over-work and the want of transport. It is therefore of great importance to me to remove the misapprehension which seems to have prevailed on this subject, and to show that the quartermaster general's department has nothing to do either with the apportioning of the labour of the men, or with the very important business of supplying the transport of the army, the first of these duties belonging entirely to the department of the adjutant general, and the last, that of the land transport, to the commissariat. To show this, I will refer the Board to some of the articles of the official Treasury Code which authoritatively describe and define the duties of the commissariat. This code was framed and promulgated by the Lords of the Treasury on the 1st of March 1852. What the rules of the service had been previously to that it is unnecessary to say, but the code is extremely clear and precise in its language, and I believe that the commander of the forces under whom I had the honour to serve always acted in accordance with those directions. I will refer the Board, without reading them at length, to the articles of the code numbered from 131 to 162 both inclusive. From them it will be seen that the commissariat department is minutely instructed as to the manner in which it must perform the duty of supplying transport for all the purposes of the army. I will also, with the permission of the Board, read an extract from a work of an authority, namely, Sir Randolph Routh's observations on the commissariat service. He says that "the commissary general is responsible, in all its extensive meaning, for the "supply of the army. He is to provide the money; he is to pay the troops; he is to "victual them; he is to furnish all the transport for the conveyance of all kinds of stores, "the heavy guns, the material for siege ammunition, field equipment, as well as the provi-"sions, the forage, the corn, the removal of the sick, and bringing up from the rear clothing "and other necessaries, as required. He is the sole source of all expenditure. He is the "only officer except the general in chief who is sanctioned to correspond with or to address "himself directly to the authorities of the country occupied by the army or to the "Government at home; and therefore must every military operation depend upon his "judgment and ability. The confidence of the support of the general in chief and the "Government are necessary to his success." It is plain that the due execution of the duties thus devolving upon the commissariat department is of vital importance to the success of any expedition in which the British army may be engaged, and that the head of that department must be entrusted, to some extent, with the plans and intentions of the general commanding the force. It is provided, therefore, that all the officers and men of the department shall be amenable to military law and discipline, and the commissary general holds a rank co-equal with that of brigadier general. I can say that Lord Raglan was in constant and almost daily personal communication with the commissary general; and I believe that he consulted with him unreservedly, disclosing freely as much of his intentions and plans as was necessary in order to give the commissary general the best available data for estimating the probable exigencies of the service. The commissary general in his explanatory letter laid before the Houses of Parliament has no doubt shown that from the 1st of August until after the first bombardment of Sebastopol he was in more or less uncertainty as to the situation in which the British army would have to winter, but I am sure he does not intend to convey the impression that this uncertainty was occasioned by any omission or reserve on the part of Lord Raglan. The character of the enterprise was such that, during the period in question, the commander of the forces could not possibly remove the uncertainty of the commissary general; and pending the necessary interval the best course was apparently that which Lord Raglan adopted, namely, to keep in force an order which had been issued on the 8th of the previous May for forming and maintaining a grand depôt on the Bosphorus.

Now it being clear, as I have shown, that the duty of providing transport was imposed upon the commissariat by the ordinances of the Treasury code, was this apportionment of duty in any way varied by the commander of the forces? I say on the contrary that from the commencement of the war until the formation of the Land Transport Corps, which may be said to have commenced in January 1855 by the formation of a nucleus under Major Woodford, the transport for all branches of the service was invariably supplied by the commissariat; and it will be seen by referring to the general orders from time to time issued that whenever the commander of the forces had any direction to give in relation to the transport it was never to the quartermaster general, or to any other strictly military department, but always to the commissariat that the order was addressed. In proof of that I will produce, without reading them, some extracts from the general orders to the army in the Crimea; and so entirely was the work connected with the transport considered to be distinct from military business, that when the commissariat found it necessary to require the aid of officers or soldiers for attending to the operation of the transport, the officers and men so employed received extra pay at a rate fixed by the commissary general with the approval of the commander of the forces, as will be seen

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

by a general order dated on the 1st of August 1854. Lord Raglan entertained no doubt upon the subject; and I know that at the time when General Estcourt was adjutant general and I quartermaster general of the forces, his Lordship stated to the home authorities in England that General Estcourt and General Airey had nothing to do with the transport or the supplies. Of all men then living Lord Raglan was perhaps the one least likely to form an erroneous opinion as to the division of duties in the force. The fact that the commissariat was a branch of the Treasury seems to have led to the notion that the commissariat duty is confined to such operations as are affected by the disbursements of the public money, but such a conclusion is erroneous; the supplies of all kinds seized from the enemy are just as much under the control of the commissariat as if they had been bought with money; and here is an instance of the complete control over all the means of transport which was exercised, and properly exercised, by the commissariat. I may mention an incident which occurred on the landing of the forces in the Crimea on the 14th of September. At the commencement of the operation, and when only a few battalions were landed on the beach, I had my horse, and I rode up to the high ground on the right; I perceived a large convoy of carts protected by a body of Cossacks, and I rode back to the beach and got Colonel Lysons, of the 23d, to give me a couple of companies, and with these we advanced quickly upon this convoy in skirmishing order. The Cossacks laboured hard to drive their convoy forward, urging the bullocks, and even the drivers, with their spears; but the soldiers advancing and beginning to open fire, the Cossacks retreated, and left us in possession of a great part of the convoy; I think about 70 or 80 bullock carts laden with flour and wood. Before the army moved, Mr. Commissary General Adams claimed all those carts and arabas which I had taken as falling at once under the control of his department. I confess that as I had anticipated the want of transport for the camp equipage of the army, I thought that the circumstance of my having had the good fortune to effect such a capture gave me a fair claim of preference, and I accordingly pressed that claim; and I succeeded, but with difficulty, in obtaining the use of some of the captured carts for the transport of some of the hospital tents and comforts, and entrenching tools; but even the carts that I succeeded in getting the use of fell immediately under the custody and management of the commissariat, and all the rest of the captured carts were used by the commissariat for such purposes as they thought proper. Of course this question between me and Mr. Commissary General Adams could not have occurred if the department of which I was the head had been really responsible for the supply of transport; for here was an instance in which by good fortune I obtained for the army that transport which it so much required, and I had no sooner done so than the commissariat assumed, and properly assumed, the custody and management of the carts and bullocks that I had taken. I did not understand that there was any doubt upon this subject either in Bulgaria or in the Crimea. It devolved upon me, acting either under Lord Raglan's special request or in pursuance of my general desire for the welfare of the expedition, to be constantly pressing Commissary General Filder on the subject of transport as well as on other matters; and I never knew or heard of an instance in which Mr. Commissary General Filder objected to supply transport on the ground that the duty was not within his department. Indeed nothing could be more candid or explicit than Mr. Commissary General Filder's statement upon this subject. His letter laid before the houses of parliament contains these words: "The commissariat had likewise, till it was transferred to "a separate and independent establishment, the duty of providing all the land transport required for the service of the army; and it would be erroneous to suppose that "the duty of the commissariat was confined to the operations of providing for the fixed "and definite wants of the army." As indicated by military authorities, in the great business of war it must be left to the sagacity of some public functionary to form an estimate as well as he can of the exigencies of the coming campaign; and in the British service it was to the commissariat that this very anxious and difficult duty was entrusted. In the examination of Sir Charles Trevelyan, the Secretary of the Treasury, before the Committee appointed by the House of Commons to inquire into the state of the army before Sebastopol, there will be found the following questions and answers:—Question 13,477. "In the commissariat regulations is there no scheme laid down guiding the "commissariat officers as to the amount of the land transport which ought to be provided "for a certain force in the field?" Sir Charles Trevelyan's answer is: "It forms a most "important part of the business of a commissary general to calculate the transport "requisite for the movement of an army and its different component parts." It was the business of a commissary general to calculate the transport requisite for the movement of an army.

On the same subject the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of State for War, gave the following evidence in answer to question 14,934:—The duke's answer is: "The commissary "general at that time was entirely responsible for the transport of the army." I was explaining upon whom the duties devolved of furnishing and supplying the transport to the army; but although, for the purpose of correcting the prevalent errors as to the duties of the quartermaster general, I have thus found it necessary to show the nature of the duties devolving upon another department, I think it but justice to myself, and all my brother officers on the general staff in the East, to state that there never was on the part of any of us the slightest disposition to narrow the field of our respective functions by

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

raising a discussion as to the department by which any duty should be performed. Of course in a body so complicated as that of a modern European army there must be some division of labour, and I solemnly declare for myself and my colleagues on the general staff that we were never accustomed to look at this necessary division of labour as a pretext for raising barren questions of form or etiquette, or for omitting any opportunity of contributing to the welfare and the success of the expedition. Moreover, having found it necessary to show that the duty of supplying transport was one devolving exclusively on the commissariat department, I think it only just to say that I am not one of those who underrate the enormous magnitude of the difficulties with which the commissary general had to contend. The mortal illness of Field Marshal St. Arnaud at the critical moment of the invasion, and the heavy reinforcements afterwards received by the enemy, brought the allied forces under circumstances of great difficulty, and certainly very rare in the annals of war, for after the 25th of October the allies were closely compassed and confined to a small bare and barren spot which from that time yielded no supplies of any kind. In the peninsular war, and in all former European wars conducted by this country on a scale of magnitude, the means of transport had been obtained either by purchases or requisitions made in the districts occupied by the forces; in the Peninsula the traffic being carried on by pack animals, and the inhabitants being favourable to the cause, the facilities for obtaining transport were very great. From all such means of supply in the Crimea the commissary general was debarred, and nothing could reach the army except what was supplied by importation. To effect purchases of transport animals and the whole of the forage necessary for their subsistence in countries beyond the sea, to cause this vast bulk of supplies to be shipped for the Crimea, landed, and kept disposable in the crowded village of Balaklava, to have all those operations completed in a very short compass of time, was surely a task of enormous magnitude, and I am not aware that the annals of war furnish any other instance of such an undertaking having been executed or even attempted. It was hardly to be expected that operations so vast should all proceed smoothly and without encountering obstruction, but it is right to say that the delays which actually occurred, and which occasioned the extraordinary sufferings of the British army, have now been traced to England.

The matter stands thus: the means of land transport were grievously wanted for the army; there was more than a sufficient number of pack animals at Varna, but the commissary-general could not venture to bring the animals to Balaklava because he had no forage for them. Why then was he without forage? The answer is, that the forage of the Levant being chiefly chopped straw,—an article not compressible for sea transport,—the commissary general was obliged to rest much upon England for hay. To England, therefore, he made his requisitions; he made them in due time before the landing of the expedition in the Crimea; he made a requisition to England for 2,000 tons of hay, and if that 2,000 tons of hay had been duly forwarded upon the receipt of the requisition it would have arrived at its destination, as a very small portion of it actually did arrive, in the month of November, and the grievous hardships and the losses of the winter would have been averted; but in point of fact it was not until the month of February 1855 that any large portion of the supply demanded in the early part of the previous September had reached the Bosphorus on its way to the seat of war. It was not until the month of June 1855 that the requisition was completely complied with. Great indeed were the difficulties to which I have already adverted. They were not all; the supplies on board the vessels actually lying in Balaklava Harbour, and even landed on the shore, were not yet available to the soldier, for the camp was nine miles to the northward; also it should be remembered that in the conduct of war it is the constant practice to rely upon the labour of the soldier as one of the means by which the wants of the army are supplied, for though vessels may be freighted, and hundreds of animals laden with supplies, it is the labour of the soldier applied to fatigue duty or extra work which must be more or less relied upon for achieving the last stage of the process of providing the things needed for the use of those who wanted them. This resource partly failed, and failed from stress of military events. The British infantry were so constantly employed with the vital work of defending all against the enemy that men for other duties could hardly be spared, and it is scarcely an overstrain of words to say that from the morning of the 25th of October 1854, when the battle of Balaklava began, until after the close of the winter, there was going on with the enemy in front and flank a kind of protracted engagement; for although the fire was very much more lively sometimes than at others, there was not an interval of repose, never an interval at which large fatigue parties could be supplied by withdrawing any number of men from the actual presence of the enemy whom they were thus fighting constantly by day and by night. It is certain that there was an absolute necessity for thus keeping the British force engaged with the enemy; but the fact goes far to explain much of the evils endured, and one at least of the many difficulties which Commissary General Filder had to encounter. The most obvious method of supplying the want of fatigue parties was by importing workmen from the Euxine and the Bosphorus. Commissary General Filder tried this; he imported the men by hundreds, but, as he says, at that season they died by fifties, and it became an additional but not unimportant task to get their bodies sufficiently deep in the ground. As to the survivors, their indolence and sickness at that season soon made them worse than useless.

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

And now before I proceed to state how the duties of my departments were conducted, I desire to offer a few words as to the manner in which the officers serving under me, were selected. I may say that Lord Raglan almost invariably left the nomination of officers to me. I had previously called upon the divisions of the army to send in the names of officers who might consider themselves qualified for the quartermaster general's department, with a specimen of their work in military surveying. I then saw the officers myself, and in order to judge of their general ability I pointed out to each a piece of ground of which I desired a sketch accompanied by a military report to be made. When therefore a vacancy occurred I was always prepared to recommend an officer to the commander of the forces, at the same time submitting a list of his qualifications for the quartermaster general's department. I hope I need scarcely declare that I always did this without favour or affection, and with a sincere view to the efficiency of my department, and those whom I did thus select were almost all without exception, entire strangers to me, at all events they were all officers who had brought themselves under my notice in the field. Many admirable maps and plans prepared by officers serving under me are chiefly now in the Crimea, but a few are in this country, and perhaps I may be permitted to lay some of them before the Board as specimens of care and skill brought to bear upon this particular branch of the service, and I wish them to be particularly examined; they were all done on the spot, and I believe they are very meritorious. (Some maps and plans were handed in.) Here it will be convenient to state that the quartermaster general's department consists entirely of officers, and is not supplied with workmen or artificers of any description, and has no right or power to make purchases or enter into pecuniary engagements of any kind. The department therefore cannot and does not execute any kind of army works. It is only by requisitions that the department can operate in this direction. Thus, if the army be moving, and it is wished that a bridge should be thrown over a river, the quartermaster general of the forces makes a requisition upon the officer commanding the engineers, and requests that he will cause the work to be duly executed. Again, if the quartermaster general desired to have any work done which can be performed by the unskilled strength of the men, he would make his requisition upon the adjutant general for fatigue parties. It will be seen, therefore, that so far as the quartermaster general's duties are connected with the execution of army works, he having no means of executing them in his own department can actually discharge himself from all apparent responsibility by the judicious use of a few sheets of paper. Thus, if he saw the advantage of hutting the light division, he would first obtain from the engineer department a list of materials requisite for the purpose, and would send a copy of such list to the commissariat with a requisition to this effect: "Required materials according "to accompanying list to be purchased and delivered forthwith to the camp of the light "division;" and to the engineering department another requisition to this effect: "Required to be constructed sufficient wooden huts for the light division." Having taken those steps, the quartermaster general would have exhausted all the power properly belonging to his department, and would have successfully thrown the whole responsibility upon other departments.

Although it were well known to him that the work could not be really executed, he might repose in the thought that his office contained paper proofs of his having done his part. Such a course might be safe for the quartermaster general, but would be utterly barren of all good result to the service, and vexatious at a time of heavy trial to a department already crushed by excessive demands upon its powers. It was not thus that I performed my duty; I never covered myself by signing requisitions. I was more or less in the councils of the other departments of the service, and notwithstanding their difficulties as well as my own I did not mock them by making demands which I knew they were incapable of meeting. The engineers—a small, able, and devoted body of men,—were engaged in the great works of the siege, and for our own defence of the outlines the troops were unavoidably overworked, and the commissariat was for a time so crushed for want of transport that it called upon the weary men from the trenches to carry even their food up to the camp. Certainly I did not add to all this pressure the weight and vexation that might have been occasioned by a mere formal requisition for impossibilities. I am able to declare that I never made a requisition at all, except when I had a fair reason to hope that it could or might be complied with. I request the Board to bear in mind that this was my principle of action, to apply my statements to all those matters in respect to which the quartermaster general is entitled to make requisitions on other departments. Now of the various matters adverted to by the Report of the Commissioners the following are those which legitimately fall within the range of the quartermaster general's department, the road: the camp equipment, huts, shelter for horses, and the fixing of the proportions in which certain articles of extra warm clothing were to be shared by the different corps of the army.

With regard to the road, as to which there has been a great delusion in this country, the Commissioners state as follows:—"The want of a road from Balaklava to the front "passable for commissariat carts greatly increased the difficulties of supplying the army "after the middle of November, but the officers commanding divisions who were examined "upon the subject, are unanimous in their opinion that it would have been impossible to "employ a sufficient number of men to make the road, and at the same time to carry "on the military operations in which the army was engaged." I believe that upon this

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

question there never was any doubt in the Crimea, but, as I have just said, it was much canvassed in England, and I am therefore exceedingly grateful to the Commissioners for the clear and decisive terms in which they state their conclusion. With regard to camp equipage, the Commissioners state that some of the tents were reported to be of an inferior quality, and that in many instances the army was obliged to use the bell tents for hospitals instead of a marquee, which is far more appropriate for such a purpose. The Commissioners mentioned also that they could not account for the reduction in the number of marquees which appeared to have been originally sent from England. I was appointed quartermaster general of the forces on the 1st of September 1854, after I had actually embarked on board a transport with the division to which I then belonged. Of course I could not then alter the quality or increase the supply of disposable tents and marquees, but I think it is the duty of the officer at the head of any military department to be prepared to account as far as his materials will allow for the management of that same department by his predecessor, and I am able to state my belief that all which it would be proper to do in this direction had been before done by the previous chief of this department, for I find that on the 22d of July and on the 18th of August 1854 Lord De Ros, then quartermaster general of the forces, had made representations to England for additional camp equipage, and that an arrangement had also been made with General Ferguson and Admiral Houston Stewart that camp equipage and other stores required for the army should be forwarded from Malta. I conceive that those requisitions and arrangements had been most properly made when my predecessor was at the head of the department, for it was most important, as events showed, to provide against wear and tear, but the Commissioners are accurate in stating that there was no deficiency of camp equipage when the expedition embarked. I shall presently have occasion to revert to the subject of tents.

I now propose to read passages contained in the Commissioners' London Report, which relate to the subject of hutting. I think at pages 33 and 34 of the Report, "when it "became necessary in consequence of the advanced state of the season to provide some "better shelter than tents for the troops, great difficulties presented themselves. The "whole of the country, within the narrow limits occupied by the army, had already been "denuded of wood for the sake of fuel; most of the houses of the former inhabitants had "been destroyed for the same object, and even the loose surface stones had in most places "been used up in building low walls, to afford a slight shelter for the regimental horses "or for cooking places, consequently few materials of any kind were available except "what could be imported. No scarcity of wood existed along the shores of the Black "Sea, but the difficulty was to provide it at the camp in sufficient quantities for building "purposes. Hired labour could not be obtained, and the demands for the services of the "troops in the trenches and for other military duties were such that they could not be "spared to prepare it, even had they been capable of doing so. As soon as it was decided "therefore that the army was to winter in the Crimea, vessels were despatched by Lord "Raglan to several of the ports in the Black Sea in the hope of obtaining boarding and "scantling of such dimensions as to admit of being cut into the required length to afford "shelter. Contracts were also entered into in England about the middle of November "for wooden huts, of which the parts were so fitted that, with the aid of the printed "directions and lithographed plans which accompanied them, the whole might be put "together, even by unskilled workmen. These huts were formed of the lightest "material that could with safety be used; the boards being only about three quarters "of an inch in thickness. They were 28 feet long, 16 feet wide, and from 11 to 12 feet "in height to the ridge pole, with a gradual slope to about six feet at the side, "and calculated to contain from 20 to 25 persons, though, under ordinary circum-"cumstances, they would scarcely have been considered sufficient for half that number. "The men were raised from the ground by sloping floors on each side, of inch-plank, "leaving an unfloored space of about three feet wide down the centre, in which there "was a stove for the purpose of cooking and warmth. The total weight of each hut, "including the iron-work, was about two tons and a half. Of these nearly 1,400 were "sent out. Another description of wooden hut, but less complete and formed of heavier "timber, was obtained from Trieste, to the number, it is understood, of nearly "100, consequently there can be no doubt that a sufficiency of hut accommodation "or building materials was provided for all, had it only been practicable to make it "available. The difficulties which subsequently arose in regard to land transport do "not appear to have been contemplated when these huts were ordered, otherwise it must "have occurred to the authorities that when the whole land transport of the army was "insufficient to carry to the front the supplies necessary for the subsistence of the men, "the arrival of 2,500 tons of building material was more likely to add to the confusion "of a crowded harbour and crowded wharfs than to diminish the sufferings of the "troops. Even now it is doubtful whether the labour undergone by the men in carry-"ing those huts to the heights during the months of January and February was com-"pensated by the advantages derived from them, though these were admitted to be "great. Some of the commanding officers declined to employ their men on that duty, "believing that the evils were greater than the advantages."

From those passages it appears that the duty of ordering the requisite materials for 10,000 men and 3,500 horses, the utmost possible number that we could even hope to

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

provide for, was fully performed by the quartermaster general's department, and that the commissariat had speedily succeeded in executing those orders to the extent of importing materials into the harbour at Balaklava, but from the want of land transport had for a long time failed to complete the performance of their duty by dragging the timber up to the camp. For this want of transport the quartermaster general was in no way responsible, and the only fault, if any, attributed by the Commissioners to my department seems to be that of performing those duties too completely by ordering materials beyond what the commissariat with its limited means of transport could manage to convey to the troops. Certainly I might have surmised that all the efforts of the commissary general would or might fail to obtain the requisite land transport until after the lapse of some weeks ; but I conceive that that surmise would not have justified me in omitting or postponing the performance of my own duty, that of ordering the materials requisite for the huts, and ordering them in good time. It appears that I have understated considerably the weight of the huts, for instead of being 2,500 tons they were 3,750 tons. 2,500 tons is stated in the Report.

Now, by the permission of the Board, I will give some account of the exertions which I made to give shelter to the troops, and the difficulties that I had to contend with.

In the first place, I must observe that at the time of embarkation, and from that time until the 17th of October, the day of the first bombardment, when we opened fire, there was no expectation whatever of having to winter in the Crimea, and that no final determination to do so was formed until after the battle of Inkerman. It was anticipated that during the winter the force would have the head quarters in the neighbourhood of the Bosphorus ; and I had reason to believe that in the first week of September, and after we had embarked on the expedition, that Lord Raglan was corresponding on this subject with the British ambassador at the Porte. And here I may be permitted to state my opinion that the responsibility of the general and the officers engaged in the invasion of the Crimea was not a responsibility of the same description as that which attaches to the conduct of an ordinary warfare.

Marshal St. Arnaud and General Lord Raglan, under very decisive instructions from the Government at home, determined to make a descent upon the enemy's coast, and to attempt a rapid military enterprise against the stronghold of Sebastopol. But they never proposed or intended (and certainly they were not prepared) to invade Russia by regular operations in the field ; that is, by the advance of an armed body connecting itself by a sufficient means of transport with the base of operations. In that sense the allied forces were not an army. They would be more properly called a moveable column. The difference between the two descriptions of force is well marked by the difference of the requisite amount of land transport. It was estimated that to move as an army the British force alone would require 14,000 beasts of transport, yet the force landed with only 70 transport animals for the commissariat service ; and the additional quantity obtained in the neighbourhood of Old Fort did not, I believe, smell the whole quantity of land transport animals for commissariat purposes to more than between 300 and 400. The French, I believe, landed with no transport animals at all, except for their ambulance, and they only obtained a small number in the country near the landing place. Yet they would have required, even with their then strength, as much transport as ourselves if they were to operate as a regular army. It may be said, therefore, that the transport required for the whole of the forces which landed in the Crimea would amount to 28,000 animals. The allied columns advanced through a province of Russia with their little string of a few hundred instead of their 28,000 beasts of transport. On three sides, and during the flank march on all sides, the Cossacks rode freely round us. I do not mean to say it would have been useful or practicable to employ a large quantity of land transport in such an operation as that which the allied forces were then effecting ; and I only point to the difference between a few hundreds and 28,000, as the means of indicating one of the many broad distinctions which exist between the regular operations of an army and those of a moveable column. A moveable column has certain advantages, and especially that of being rapid in its operations ; but the well-known drawbacks to the employment of such a force are these, that it is adapted only for temporary purposes, and that it is exposed to great risk, not to the ordinary risk of mere defeat, and consequent loss, but to the risk of total destruction. Certainly the expeditionary force which landed on the beach at Old Fort could not be expected or intended to enjoy that degree of security which belongs to regular operations. It is the clear right of the Government, when it thinks fit, to order the forces of the cavalry upon highly perilous service. The enterprise was, of course, well known to be hazardous ; but it was to be undertaken nevertheless. Lord Raglan, if I mistake not, so understood his instructions, and he was not the man to disobey them. In a regular war, the formation of a base of operations is the first step. It often precedes even the declaration of hostilities, and it always precedes by a long interval of months, and sometimes even of years, the opening of the campaign ; yet it was not until the month of February 1855, when the conflict had been raging for several months, that the Home Government duly formed a base of operations at Balaklava for the supply of the British army ; and it was almost inevitable that in the meantime the expeditionary force, confined during the winter to a bare hill, which had yielded nothing but water, and standing too as it did in the close presence of a powerful enemy, should endure very great privations.

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

On the 14th of September and the three following days it was my duty to superintend the disembarkation of the troops. Thanks to the admirable arrangements and zealous exertions of the British navy, the operation was effected without confusion and without the loss of a man; and I attribute this happy result in a great measure to the favourable character of the ground selected for the operation. The merit of that selection, however, entirely belongs to Lord Raglan. At first it was intended to advance without tents, but the discomfort occasioned to the troops by the dreadful night of the 14th induced Lord Raglan to order that the tents should be landed. This was done, and the tents remained on shore till the 18th. On that day the limit of the resources available for transport had been ascertained, and Lord Raglan was obliged to order that the tents should be brought together in a mass on the beach, and carried back on board ship. I will give in a copy of that order. That order was signed by me as quartermaster general. I acted under Lord Raglan's directions; but I entirely concurred in his opinion of the necessity of the measure. On the 26th of September the British army occupied Balaklava, and recovered its communication with the sea. The restoration to the army of the re-embarked tents and marquees depended of course upon naval as well as military arrangements; but it was speedily and successfully effected, and in the course of a very few days, before any disagreeable weather set in, the troops and hospitals were all under roof or canvas. Both tents and marquees—many being old when sent out—had suffered from wear and tear in Bulgaria, and from the repeated process of being landed and embarked. I considered that many more would be required; and I accordingly, on the 11th of October, gave instructions for bringing up from Malta 283 bell tents in store there; and on the 19th of October I gave another order for camp equipments. I was anxious also to be prepared for the renewal, and an increased supply, when necessary, of hospital marquees; and I succeeded in bringing up from Varna 20 of the reserve marquees which lay there in store.

On the 17th of October the first cannonade against the outworks of Sebastopol took place, and with great success on the part of the British artillery; and it was nothing but the disastrous explosion in the French batteries which I believe prevented the intended assault upon the place. In fact I know that circumstance. Lord Raglan sent to propose the assault at about four o'clock in the evening; it was still hoped that the place would be taken by assault, and indeed the day was fixed for that operation; but the probability of a long struggle was now apparent.

Up to this time most officers had, I believe, anticipated a speedy capture of Sebastopol; others, less sanguine, may have thought that the enterprise would prove to be impracticable, and that the allies would have to embark, and winter in the neighbourhood of the Bosphorus; others may have thought it probable that the forces might hold possession during the winter of a considerable portion of the enemy's territory, for instance somewhere between Eupatoria and the Baltchik; but I never heard of any one who contemplated beforehand the event which actually occurred, namely, that of encamping upon the heights before Sebastopol, and being constantly engaged during the whole winter with an enemy vastly superior in force, at a distance of some miles from our sea communication. Now, however, Lord Raglan began to prepare for the possibility of such an event. He immediately informed himself with regard to the climate of the Crimea, and the severity of the winter which his troops might have to encounter. In the early days of November the enemy received great reinforcements, and the position of the allied armies became very critical. On the 5th of November the battle of Inkerman was fought, and on the following day a protracted consultation as to the further conduct of the campaign, took place between the generals, and the result was, the determination to persevere in holding the ground then occupied by the allies, and to fortify our position on the Inkermann heights; to defend the advanced trenches; and, if possible, to carry forward the approaches. This resolution to hold the advanced trenches, and to maintain an attitude of attack, imposed upon the troops great sufferings and labour beyond their strength; but I have never yet heard a doubt that it saved the allied armies from a great disaster. Lord Raglan knew full well the import of this decision. He knew that it involved great evils; but he chose it, nevertheless, to avert a greater catastrophe. In the one alternative he saw for his troops a period of conflict by day and by night; great labor and suffering, and heavy losses. In the other alternative he saw how ruin would begin with the loss of our siege guns, and how then the enemy, ascending to the high ground of the allied camps, would take up a position on those heights, and arm his batteries with the resources of an arsenal containing 7,000 heavy pieces of artillery, then push forward with a converging fire and an overwhelming superiority of numbers upon Kamiesch and our gallant allies, and then upon the little basin of Balaklava and the devoted remnant of the British army. Lord Raglan grieved, but he did not hesitate; for there was only one of the alternatives which could consist with the honour of the British army. Now then for the first time we knew that the army were to winter on the ridge; and I immediately took measures for hutting and sheltering the troops. On the 8th of November instructions were given for the immediate purchase at Constantinople or elsewhere of the materials and implements necessary for building huts, according to a list which the officer commanding the Royal Engineers had prepared. On the same 8th of November the "Cottingham" was dispatched to Sinope to procure planking for huts, and afterwards the "Arabia" and "Sea Nymph" were dispatched for the

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

the same purpose. I sent not only to Sinope but also to Trebizonde and to Samsoon, all upon the shore of Asia Minor, and Constantinople. In the early part of November the steps regarding which the Board has already heard so much, for aiding Lord Lucan in his efforts to shelter the cavalry horses, were taken by my department. I think, after all that has been explained by Lord Lucan on the subject, it is unnecessary for me to detain the Board at present, therefore I will pass on.

In describing the result of his observations in the British camp, which he was daily visiting, Sir Edmund Lyons used one very short and very simple sentence, which, nevertheless, described the whole truth as to the exertions of the British army to meet the difficulties with which it was surrounded. He said, "Every man was doing his best." There really lay the whole truth. We were not doing the tenth or the twentieth part of what we wished, but we were all doing what we could. Officers and men alike were labouring and enduring to an extent beyond the right limit of their powers, and it is absolutely vain therefore to be suggesting operations which would have involved a vast addition to this labour. It would have been quite competent to Colonel Tulloch to show, if he could, that our labours were misdirected. That, I admit, would have been a sort of criticism deserving some attention. Thus, for instance, if it had been said that Lord Raglan should have abandoned the advanced trenches, and applied the working power which he would have thus obtained to building purposes, I should have shown, if it had fallen on me, that the holding of the advanced trenches prevented the destruction of the force. And a question so raised would have been a fit and proper one for reasonable discussion; but to recommend gravely an operation which would have involved a large amount of additional labour and transport power, without any suggestion as to what should be omitted or suspended to render the additional labour possible,—this is certainly trifling with the hardships and sufferings of the overworked troops who struggled through that winter campaign. The evil was that one man was doing the work of three; and then comes the recommendation that this one man should do the work of six; and, after all, what was it that was to be achieved with these unattainable materials on these impossible results? Apparently, the proposed structure was to be a sort of canvass booth, such as may have been seen at races or fairs on sunny days in England, but never in actual warfare. The first storm that swept over the plateau would have torn the things to atoms. It is not thus, as the Board well know, that the sufferings of a winter campaign can be mitigated —it is not by suggestions like those that the great business of war is conducted. Colonel Tulloch has thought himself able to say, that the evidence of the witnesses he had examined up to Friday last was nearly unanimous in favour of canvass shelter. Upon this matter I really think that I cannot usefully add anything to the comments made by Lord Lucan in his reply of Monday last, but I should be doing injustice to Colonel Tulloch as a commissioner, if I were to press against him too closely the conclusions deducible from the course he has taken in the presence of this Board. Colonel Tulloch came here to defend his Report, and if the process of doing so threw him into an appearance of antagonism with Lord Lucan, I will not be so unjust as to suppose myself, or wish others to suppose, that Colonel Tulloch, when labouring at the preparation of the Report, was animated by the slightest spirit of unfairness; on the contrary, I gladly appeal from Colonel Tulloch, the opponent of Lord Lucan in this Hall, to Colonel Tulloch the able and laborious colleague of Sir John M'Neill in the Crimea.

I will now read a few extracts from page 33 of the London Report of the Commissioners, and signed by Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch. At page 35 it is stated:—
"It is probable that this circumstance may have given rise to the complaints of wood "having been refused during this period, though there was abundance in store. There "was plenty certainly, but not of a suitable description for building purposes, as boards "from an inch to an inch and a half thick could not be made to serve the purpose of "uprights, particularly where tempestuous weather was to be expected. Efforts were "made by scarping the sides of hills to obtain cover with a very limited quantity of "scantling, particularly for horses and baggage animals; but this expedient only afforded "a very partial remedy. The supply obtained by the vessels before referred to was "chiefly used by the Royal Artillery, the Cavalry, the 71st, and 93rd regiments at "Balaklava, and two or three of the corps in front; but it must be borne in mind that "for the reasons before specified, comparatively few of the buildings for those regiments "could be erected till the severest part of the winter was over." "Before the first "vessel arrived, however, the troops had to be employed in carrying provisions to "the front, and so much had their strength been reduced by their sufferings, and "such was the state of the roads, that a weight of from 20 lbs. to 25 lbs. was as much "as a man could bring up from Balaklava. Indeed, it is stated in evidence, that men "could not have carried their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition from the heights to "Balaklava and back in a day, through such mud as it was necessary to traverse. It "consequently required from 250 to 300 men to carry up a single hut sufficient to "accommodate, at the utmost, 25 men; and as, at this rate, it was impossible to spare "a sufficient number from their other duties, the attempt had to be abandoned, although "that accommodation, if there had been transport, would have been of the utmost "advantage during the rest of the winter."

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

On the 12th of November I gave, in an order, another more extended list of materials required for hutting the troops. On the 14th an order was issued directing that the hides of all slaughtered animals should be preserved to be made serviceable as covering for roofs. On the 19th of November further orders were given for articles of camp equipage and tools. On the 22d an order was issued for wood adapted for hutting. By these and other means, but not including any materials for wooden houses which afterwards arrived from England, and which we knew were on their way, I succeeded in obtaining materials for huts comprising 46,345 board and planks, and 11,699 pieces of scantling. It was at my instance also, though this was not in my province, that persons were sent for charcoal and patent fuel for several weeks. Unhappily the want of land transport made it impossible for the commissariat to complete their compliance with my requisitions by dragging the timber to the heights. The want of transport could not be supplied by human labour. The men were overworked, and it was only by a great strain on their powers that a position so necessary to prevent the destruction of the force could be maintained. It was, therefore, impossible to obtain fatigue parties at such a time, and I consider that about 12,000 British infantry, though in a very weak condition of body, were then gallantly doing the work of 30,000 men. I have stated that within a very few days from the occupation of Balaklava on the 26th of September, the whole of the British troops and all the hospitals were under roof or canvas, and they continued to be thus sheltered until the 14th of November. On that day there blew a hurricane, and the whole British encampment were swept down. The tents and marquees did not merely fall and collapse with broken poles almost impossible to replace, but they were snatched from the ground, and whirled about by the blast. The Commissioners state that they could not account for the absence of several hospital marquees which were originally provided. An inquiry into the effect produced by the hurricane of the 14th would have helped to solve the difficulty. In his report, dated 20th of November, Dr. Hall, the head of the medical department, says:—" The storm of the 14th blew down all the hospital marquees, and " damaged many to such a degree that I question whether they can be repaired." This loss, up to the 29th, of hospital marquees, reported damaged, incomplete, or condemned as unserviceable, added also to the number of hospital marquees left with the numerous sick at Varna, would, I apprehend, account for the fact that the number of serviceable hospital marquees with the force in the Crimea had become reduced to thirty-seven. If the Commissioners had examined the commissariat store account books, and the commissariat vouchers, I apprehend they would have succeeded in discovering the exact periods at which the number of available marquees became reduced, and the persons responsible for that and for any loss which may have occurred. But it is right for me to state here, that the tents and marquees are never in the custody of the quartermaster-general's department. Like other articles of camp equipage, they are stored in the custody of the comsariat, and are delivered by the commissariat officers straight into the hands of the regiment requiring them.

I have reason to believe that on the day following the hurricane Lord Raglan addressed the Secretary of State for War, mentioning the fact of his sending Colonel Wetherall to Constantinople, and earnestly recommending that this should not prevent the Minister from forwarding from England a large supply of every description, and without delay. I have stated the endeavours which I had been previously making to obtain huts for the troops, but to provide for the interval which I felt would necessarily elapse. I did all that I could do to supply the losses of the 14th November by obtaining new tents

On the 16th of November Captain, now Colonel, Wetherall, the deputy assistant quartermaster-general, was despatched to Constantinople to purchase not only warm clothing of all descriptions, tarpaulings, 4,700 camp kettles, but, moreover, he had most general discretionary instructions to purchase what he could of those articles which he, in his judgment, might deem to be useful for the army under the trying circumstances in which it was placed.

I have reason to believe that on the 16th Lord Raglan addressed the British Ambassador at Constantinople, pressing him to aid Colonel Wetherall's endeavours, adding that as Colonel Wetherall's operations were of vital importance to indeed the very existence of our troops.

On the 28th of November I sent a requisition to England for 100 hospital marquees, 3,000 tents, 7,000 camp kettles, 2,500 spades, 2,500 shovels, 2,500 pickaxes, 2,500 felling axes, 2,500 saws, 6,000 nose bags, 3,000 reaping hooks, and various other articles.

I will now read copies of despatches showing the causes which, even in England, delayed all compliance with this requisition for a very long period. The despatches are addressed, by the order of the Board of Ordnance, to the Under Secretary of State for War, and by him to the Secretary of the Board of Ordnance. Those despatches were duly communicated to me as the quartermaster-general of the forces, and they were as follows:—The first is a letter from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance to the Under Secretary of State for the War Department, always bearing in mind that my requisition was dated on the 28th of November:—" Office of Ordnance, 18th April 1855. Sir,—With reference " to your letter of the 7th instant, requesting an explanation of the cause of the delay " which has arisen in the supply of tents, &c. on the requisition of the quartermaster- " general in the Crimea, made in November last, I have the honour, by command of the

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

" Board of Ordnance, to submit to you, for the consideration of Lord Panmure, the " the following reason which led to the delay in question:—The contractors for tents " were unable to finish them in sufficient numbers to meet the pressing wants of the " service; and however strongly urged by this department to increase the supplies, they " were unable to overcome the difficulties encountered in procuring the assistance of " experienced hands in carrying on the manufacture of such articles with the expedition " required,—the demands for tents previous to the war being very limited, and not " leaving sufficient skilled labour in the market to meet the additional heavy demands " consequent upon the war. 1,000 circular tents were shipped for the Crimea in the " 'William Becket' on the 28th of March, that vessel having been appointed by the " Admiralty upon an application from this department, dated 13th January. 1,000 huts " were subsequently shipped in the 'Iron Aye' steam vessel on the 28th March, both of " which vessels have sailed for Balaklava. 1,000 circular tents are still due, and for the " conveyance of them application was made by this department on the 2d instant, in anti- " cipation of their being available for shipment upon the appointment of a vessel. 500 can " be immediately shipped, and it is anticipated that in the course of the ensuing week the " additional 500 tents, remaining to complete the 3,000 required for the Crimea, will be also " ready for shipment. The blankets and camp equipage for the 2,000 tents already shipped " have been put on board the 'Gauntlet,' on the point of sailing for Balaklava. In " respect to replacing the issues from Malta, as there are 5,000 tents under orders for " Malta, and about to be shipped, the Board beg to submit, whether it will be necessary " also to replace the 400 sent from thence." "P.S.—I beg to state that a further com- " munication will be made on the other letter, received yesterday, upon this subject." The next letter is a letter from Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, dated the 5th of May, referring to the same subject.

(*Judge-Advocate General.*) By whom was the other letter signed?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) By Mr. Wood, the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance. This letter is dated the 5th of May 1855. It is written from the War Department to Lord Raglan by Lord Panmure. "Referring again to your Lordship's despatch, No. 237, of " the 31st March, and to previous correspondence, I transmit herewith, for your Lord- " ship's information, a copy of a further letter from the Ordnance Office, covering a " statement of the progress made in complying with the requisition of the quartermaster- " general of the army under your Lordship's command, dated in November last." The next letter that I will read is dated "Office of Ordnance, 23d April 1855." This is directed to the Under Secretary of State for War. "With reference to your letter of the " 18th instant, to mine of the same date 1058, and to previous correspondence respecting " the supply of camp equipage, demanded in November last for the service of Lord " Raglan's army in the Crimea, I have the honor, by command of the Board of Ordnance, " to transmit to you, for the information of Lord Panmure, a statement showing all that " has been dispatched of the demand in question, and what is now waiting for convey- " ance. The articles remaining to be supplied only now wait the appointment of a " vessel for their conveyance, and application for such conveyance was made to the " Admiralty on the 2d instant, but it has not yet been allotted. It is confidently " expected that the officers' marquees and hospital tents will be available for shipment " as soon as transport shall have been assigned for them. Eighty hospital tents were " shipped in March, at the earnest desire of Dr. Smith, on a requisition for 100 " from the Army Medical Department. The reasons for the delay in the earlier " supply of the tents and camp equipage were detailed in my former letter, dated " 18th instant, and the Board of Ordnance are not enabled to offer any additional " explanation, but have only to repeat their previous statement, that the contractors for " huts were daily pressed to hasten the supply of the whole, and more particularly of the " circular huts, which it was understood were most urgently required by Lord Raglan. " It is now that the contractors for tents have availed themselves of every possible means " of completing the supplies required, and have increased their establishment to the very " greatest extent compatible with the limited number of skilled workmen. The difficulty " in obtaining such men has alone prevented them from complying with the urgent " demands made by this department; and this difficulty, together with the necessity " which has arisen for supplying the heavy demands for tents for the service of regiments, " and for the Royal Artillery embarking from ports in the Mediterranean, as well as from " England for the Crimea, has offered insurmountable obstacles to the earlier completion " of the requisition. In conclusion, I would remark, that every regiment and detachment " embarking for the Crimea takes with it a full supply of tents and camp equipage.

" I have, &c.,

" (Signed) J. Wood."

The next that I read is an extract from a letter from Colonel Mundy, of the War Department, dated the 8th of May, to Mr. Wood, of the Ordnance, and he says, " I " am to add that Lord Panmure has interfered in this matter, in order to get the " requisition of the quartermaster general carried into execution without any more " of the very injurious procrastination which has occurred." The next letter from the Office of Ordnance to the Under Secretary of State is, " In reference to your letter of " the 8th instant, stating, that directions had been given to the directors of transport " service to provide conveyance immediately for the articles remaining due, on the

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

" requisition of Quartermaster General Airey, dated November last, I have the honor, " by command of the Board of Ordnance, to acquaint you, for the information of " the Secretary of State for War, that all the tents and blankets have been em- " barked, and the greater portion of the other stores; and as soon as it can be " accurately ascertained what articles had been left out, a further application will " be made for tonnage for them," for the purpose of sending them out. From this correspondence it will be seen that even with all the resources of London and England, an order for 3,000 tents could not be executed without a delay of several months. Seeing that such obstacles could occur in London, the greatest convenient mart in the world, the Board will, I am sure, estimate rightly the difficulties of those who were suddenly called upon to provide for a winter campaign amidst the snow and clay of Chersonesus. The tents and marquees, and other articles for which I had made my requisition to England in November 1854, did not arrive at Balaklava until the month of May, in the year 1855, and it was only a portion of them that arrived even then. In the meantime, finding that the tents from England did not arrive, Lord Raglan immediately authorized the purchase of any number of tents which could be purchased from the Turkish Government at Constantinople. For the purpose of constructing huts and shelter for the horses, I strove to obtain assistance from the ships' carpenters and seamen on board the merchant vessels lying in the harbour of Balaklava, and I succeeded in obtaining the services of 38 of those men—that is, carpenters—for a time, but that was the utmost number that I was able to obtain; for the services of those men were so urgently required, not only in the small village of Balaklava, but on board their own ships, that they could not be spared. I will just mention, while upon this subject, with regard to the crews of the ships in Balaklava harbour, as it may appear strange that with so many ships as were detailed the other day by Colonel Tulloch we could not procure the assistance of their crews, that we had the assistance of the crews of those ships. The crews of those ships were put to such service or work as was of most primary importance, and they were by no means so many as possibly Colonel Tulloch or any officer who was not there during the winter may have imagined. It is quite impossible for me to give any sort of description of the effects of the storm of the 14th of November. I do not suppose that anything like it was ever seen. That little bit of harbour of Balaklava, which the Board will see upon the map, was quite full of ships, and on the outside all those that were not allowed to come in, were anchored. The storm came on in all its fury at about 7 in the morning. It was so sudden that it is really impossible to describe the way in which it came on. I can only say, that looking out from the place where I slept, I suddenly saw the tent where Mr. Calvert, the chief interpreter, lived—the tent was perfectly stationary, as any tent you may see on any other occasion, and in an instant of time this tent was carried into the air. Away it went flying over the houses into the middle of the courtyard of the house in which Lord Raglan lived, and the unfortunate occupant of this tent, (there was a deluge of rain at the same time,) with all his bedclothes, such as he had, buffalo skins and waterproofs, was blown about head over heels through the mud up to a wall under my window, and away he went through a gap that there was there. I give that as an instance of the sudden way in which the storm came on. As I said before, the harbour of Balaklava was full of ships, and there was a regulation that only a certain number were to be allowed in the harbour. However, when the storm came on, one or two had gone on shore. The captains of the others, for it was a sort of case of sauve qui peut, thought it better to take their chance and crush into the harbour. They came full sail into the harbour, crashing in amongst the other vessels, breaking and smashing them to pieces like a set of walnut shells. Everything went to pieces, masts, bowsprits, bulwarks, and everything else, and the consequence of that was,—to return to the crews of the ships,—that all the crews of the vessels were employed for a great many weeks in repairing the damage that occurred by the storm of 14th of November. A great many of the vessels never were repaired at all, and a great many men were drowned. When things began to get to rights a little and smooth down, all the available seamen were put to construct wharfs and places for disembarking the provisions and the gunpowder, and the shot and shell that came for the batteries. It was my duty to be in Balaklava every day, and I suppose I was there six days out of the seven, independently of having officers of my own department there. There is no documentary evidence, or at least very little.—I have a letter from Captain Christie upon the subject,—but it was a subject which we were always discussing, for one pair of hands would have been of great consequence. All I wish to show is, that the crews were all employed as much as possible for ourselves. It might not have been possible to have put them on that service which Colonel Tulloch thought of a primary nature, but it was upon a service that was at that moment of most vital consequence. But there is another circumstance connected with the crews of the ships: all the ships came heavily laden with shot and shell and provisions and various things; and the ships, directly they discharged their cargoes, required ballasting, and they were obliged to go out of the harbour to ballast. There was no beach there. It is an ironbound coast, and it was a work of very great labour to break the original rock, and to put it on board boats, and embark it and carry it out to sea to ballast the ships. And when they went on another service they came back loaded, and the same thing had to be done

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

1st May 1856.

again. The watering of the ships also was another service taking a great number of men. Water was very scarce, and the ships had to go out of the harbour into a small stream that there was a little to the eastward, and also from a small stream in the town of Balaklava under the citadel. Therefore, the crews were so employed that it was impossible to get more men than we had. Every available man belonging to the ships was at our disposal, but he was put to such services as were of the most consequence to us; and, by looking at the plan, the Board will see the wharfs that were constructed by the crews of the ships in the town of Balaklava.

For the reasons above stated I could not obtain from the adjutant general fatigue parties drawn from the already overworked and suffering regiments of infantry. To conclude this branch of the inquiry, I say that so far as concerned the hutting of the troops, I might have thrown the whole of the responsibility of that operation upon the commissariat and the engineers, by requiring the one department to supply the materials and carry them up to the camp, and the other to execute the work; but well knowing the inadequacy of the means at the command of those departments, I abstained from making requisitions which I knew them to be incapable of meeting, but I took the best steps that I could to attain the object, by ordering, without the loss of a day, a full supply of the requisite materials. It was ordered; but the want of transport and human labour, wants not remedial by my department, for several weeks delayed the construction of the huts. As to the camp equipments, I say that the force at its starting was supplied with all that was then required, with a reserve in proportion to the scale and character of the expedition, but this reserve was not sufficient to counteract the effects of the hurricane, which swept to the ground the whole of the British encampment. And it is not to be wondered at that for a time the hospitals were partially under bell tents instead of a more spacious tent, which I agree with the Commissioners is decidedly preferable, namely, a marquee; but it must always be remembered that the very nature of the enterprize was such as to divide us by long distances from our ample resources. Certainly I found by sad experience, in my own department, that we had no legitimate base of operations to draw upon nearer than London; and there the source was so distant, and the difficulties even there existing so great, that, as I have already said, my November application to England could not bring the requisite tents and marquees to the Crimea until the summer of the following year.

I will lay before the Board a tabular statement showing, by a few instances, how long a time was unhappily occupied in the completion of those orders which had to be executed in England. Meanwhile we turned for aid to the nearest British ambassador, and to the colonial governors, and to consuls, and to all who could help the army in its hour of need, and I gratefully acknowledge that, in almost every one of those quarters, our demands were received with a generosity and readiness which was never checked by any narrow fear of incurring responsibility. Sir William Read, who was then Governor of Malta, no sooner heard of the battle of Inkermann, and of the vast reinforcement of the enemy, than he sent three regiments, the only troops that he had, to the scene of the struggle; and the like noble conduct was evinced by Sir Henry Ward, the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands. If I have gone beyond my province in making these applications, I would suggest to the Board that the difficulties of my department, as well as of the army generally, were occasioned in a great measure by the scantiness of our numbers. So many men were wanted day and night for defence against the enemy, that few could be spared for labour; and it follows, that I looked to our reinforcements as a means not only of relieving the army generally, but as increasing my power to do good in my own department. As I have no chance of finishing to-day, perhaps the Board will not now proceed any further.

(*President.*) The Board will now adjourn till to-morrow at 11 o'clock.

Adjourned till to-morrow at Eleven o'clock.

## SIXTEENTH DAY.

### 2d May 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

2d May 1856.

(*Assistant Commissary General Crookshank.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, I respectfully solicit that the Board will be good enough to call upon the adjutant general, or the quartermaster general, for the letter which Lord Lucan surmises exists, conveying Lord Raglan's disapprobation of my conduct on the occasion of Lord Lucan having placed me under arrest in the Crinea.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Where do you expect that letter to be?

(*Assistant Commissary General Crookshank.*) I do not believe in the existence of that letter.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Where would it be if it was in existence?

(*Assistant Commissary General Crookshank.*) The correspondence was between the Adjutant-General, Lord Lucan, and Commissary-General Filder.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I am anxious to ask Colonel Tulloch whether he is prepared to say, that the paper which I hold in my hand contains the original note of the evidence of Colonel Wetherall, taken down in the Crimea on the 28th of May?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I believe it to be so for this reason, that it is in my own handwriting; and you will see that there are some parts of it in which I have made memoranda, and which have been crossed out, obviously as if they were in error.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you take Colonel Wetherall's evidence down in your own handwriting?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; I think it was written in the office at the time, so far as I can recollect. I believe it to be so from these memoranda.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) This is the original note of the evidence, is it?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I believe so; it is in my own hand, and they are my memoranda.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Has it been in your possession ever since?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No; it has been in the possession of Colonel Gordon.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you send Colonel Wetherall's evidence to Colonel Gordon?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; when I took it down it was mixed up with Colonel Gordon's evidence, and my impression is that I in the office copied out that part so as to make it separate. It was mixed up with Colonel Gordon's evidence originally, and I sitting in the office copied it out as it is there, making it separate.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) What do you mean, in saying that it was mixed up with the evidence of Colonel Gordon?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) In the examination of Colonel Gordon, he stated that Colonel Wetherall could state certain things, and I began copying the evidence which Colonel Wetherall gave along with Colonel Gordon's, the two together. Then afterwards I thought it was better to make it separate, and in the office I copied out that portion of it which you see there in the rough. It was then separated from that which related to Colonel Gordon, so that the two were separated, whereas before it was the joint evidence both of Colonel Wetherall and of Colonel Gordon.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is not Colonel Gordon's evidence in your handwriting?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It is; Colonel Gordon has it now in his own hand. Unfortunately he got the evidence, and he re-copied it; he kept the copy of the evidence which I sent to him, and I have only his copy.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You took his evidence also in your own handwriting originally?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; and he sent it back to me. With that Colonel Wetherall's evidence was mixed, and I then saw that it would be better to take Colonel Wetherall's evidence separate, and I copied it out in the office. That is my impression; I separated it as you see there, and the evidence of Colonel Gordon was sent to him, and it was re-copied by him and sent back to me.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) What you handed in as Colonel Wetherall's evidence was taken down in your own handwriting?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) That is the original deposition?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; but the whole of that evidence was revised by Colonel Gordon, and there are his notes upon it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Are Colonel Gordon's notes in the margin?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; and that shows that it went to Colonel Gordon. Colonel Wetherall went away to the Turkish Contingent the very day, I think, after he was examined, and therefore could not sign his evidence, but the papers were sent to Colonel Gordon, and he copied out the whole in his own handwriting. He then sent me back his own evidence, in his own hand, and Colonel Wetherall's was submitted to him, with a memorandum in the margin showing a reference to the appendices.

2d May 1856.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) What was that evidence of Colonel Wetherall copied from?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) From the joint evidence of Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall; they were both taken down together, and seeing the inconvenience of that I copied it out then and there as you see it, and separated the two, and you now have them separated; Colonel Gordon has the original one, for he sent me back a copy altered by him very materially.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Who has got the original from which it was copied?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Colonel Gordon has it, I never had it back; he sent me back the copy.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Perhaps the Board will allow Colonel Gordon to explain that.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) I see here in a query put to Colonel Gordon that Major Wetherall's name is only mentioned once at page 180, that is the only query where I can find Major Wetherall's name, and that is about clothing.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I think you will find this, "witness refers to Major Wetherall," (this is Colonel Gordon's evidence), "Assistant Quartermaster General, who has been specially "charged with the distribution of these stores for further information in regard to the "details of his duty;" I did not refer to it before, it is at page 164. The fact is, that after the memoranda were taken down at first of the evidence of both Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall, it was judged more expedient to put Major Wetherall's separate, and it was copied out by me as you see, there and then; Colonel Gordon in his evidence refers to Major Wetherall, the Assistant Quartermaster General.

(*Judge Advocat General.*)—Did you send a minute of the joint examination to Colonel Gordon?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; and he sent me a copy, as you see there.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) What did he send you back with respect to Colonel Wetherall? If you had it, was that the minute of the joint examination?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No; the examination of Colonel Wetherall was taken down by me. Colonel Gordon re-copied in his own handwriting the whole of it. I sent him mine, and instead of sending me back my own, there was so much put in, that he re-wrote the whole of it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Where was the deposition of Colonel Wetherall taken that you have now handed in?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was taken in his own presence.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) That is the separate deposition of Colonel Wetherall, and not a minute of the joint examination?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Where was it taken from?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was taken from the original minute.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you make that out from the original minute?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Where is that original minute?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was sent to Colonel Gordon, and Colonel Gordon sent me back this.

(*Major General Peel.*) The original memoranda contained the joint examination of Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Major General Peel.*) You sent the original memoranda to Colonel Gordon, and he copied out his own evidence in his own handwriting, and you subsequently extracted from the original memoranda a copy of Colonel Wetherall's evidence, which is now here; therefore Colonel Gordon must have returned you the original memoranda?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No.

(*Major General Peel.*) Then how could you have extracted afterwards this copy of Colonel Wetherall's?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Here it is in my own handwriting. That is in my own handwriting, and there is the original.

(*Major General Peel.*) You mean the original memoranda contained the joint examination?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes: and I copied this out (*pointing to a paper*).

(*Major General Peel.*) You submitted this to Colonel Gordon?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) On the second day of my examination the Commissioners were going to examine Colonel Wetherall upon the clothing, with respect to which I had referred them to him, and when they began their examination, it was put down under my name as my second day's examination; and when Colonel Wetherall answered the questions put to him, his answers were added to my examination, and it all appeared under my name. In that way it was taken away by the Commissioners; and in the morning of the following day, that was the third day of my examination, the first thing Colonel Tulloch said was, that he had felt it was better to extract Colonel Wetherall's evidence from mine, and to put it down in a separate way. I quite agreed that it was better to do so. On the 4th of June I received a note from Colonel Tulloch, sending me those papers as the result of my examination, and another set of papers as the result of Colonel Wetherall's examination.

2d May 1856.

This is his note:—"Dear Colonel,—I enclose a copy of the evidence which, when "you have examined and altered as you think fit, you will please to sign at the end of "each day's work. It has been thought best to have the evidence of Major Wetherall's "put separately, as you will see." Now, the evidence that he sent me as Colonel Wetherall's in this paper, which is produced, but it is not the original joint examination of us both, which I have never seen, and I did not wish to see. The Commissioners conducted their examination with great liberality and apparent fairness, and we did not want to make any objection to the course which they adopted.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Your own examination appears to be written in your own hand?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) The papers containing the result of four days examination I found to be so incomplete, and contained so unsatisfactory a representation of what I wished to state, that I preferred, instead of giving back the paper all interlined as it was, re-writing it, and giving in the copy which has been produced.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Had you any notes sent to you to enable you to do this?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I had those sent to me which purported to be the original notes taken down in our presence, and although I knew that they did not contain precisely what was taken down in our presence, for the reason I have already stated, I was quite satisfied.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) What you had sent to you was the original deposition as Colonel Tulloch had prepared it. That was sent to you, and you copied it out in your own handwriting?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes; and it was those original minutes of the joint examination of Major Wetherall and myself, that we wish to see.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have stated already everything that I have to state. I am not aware of there being any other original notes; but if there are any, I will find them. In regard to the examination, the two were mixed up together.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is it clear that this is not the original?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Colonel Gordon says so.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) What was the object of stating this—"It has been thought best to have the evidence of Major Wetherall put separately, as you will see." I understand that perfectly, by seeing that the two evidences had been made separate?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you any recollection of seeing any other deposition but that one?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I am quite certain that I never saw any other.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you never see the minute of the joint examination?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes, when it was written down.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The paper you have seen to-day is not the same.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I am quite certain it is not. Colonel Tulloch explained the next day the reason why he had done it, namely, because Major Wetherall's evidence would have appeared under my name, which would have been wrong. And not only is the paper produced not the original notes taken down in my presence, but it is written by a man whom I never saw.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) The two evidences were taken down jointly. We found the inconvenience of that, and then we separated them, and, as it appears, a copy was then sent to Colonel Gordon; and he then re-wrote it and sent it to me. If there is any question upon the fact as to that being the evidence, Colonel Wetherall can say whether that is his evidence or not.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Application is made by General Airey for the original minutes.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I do not think that I can find them. The two were mixed up together, and it became necessary to separate them; and they would be so much in the rough, with so many alterations in them, that they would not be likely to be preserved. If Colonel Gordon has anything to say against his evidence, he can say it. Here is General Airey and Colonel Wetherall with their answers in their own handwriting, and what object can there be in what they are now stating? If Colonel Wetherall will say that that evidence is not his evidence, let him be examined.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Perhaps you will look for those original minutes.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; but the two evidences were mixed up together, and it became an object to separate them. If that was the case, they would be much more in the rough than any other; and when we got those two copies very likely the other would be torn up. I wish the Board to ascertain whether there can be any object in it, when Colonel Wetherall is here to answer for himself. Here are Colonel Gordon and General Airey with their statements in their own handwriting.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I have asked for the original minutes taken in the Crimea, and I think it will appear clear to the Board that there was a joint minute taken of the evidence of Colonel Wetherall and Colonel Gordon, that that joint minute went back again to the Commissioners, and from that joint minute of the evidence they extracted the evidence—copying it themselves—of Colonel Wetherall, and I want that original minute.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) If I have it, it will be given to you; but I do not think it is likely that it would have been kept, for this reason, that the two evidences of Colonel Gordon

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

and Colonel Wetherall were mixed up together, and as we went on it was found to be exceedingly inconvenient, and it was determined to separate them.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) It is clear that they are not here.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) As to the object of requiring it, that will appear hereafter. I will now proceed with my statement.

Sir Alexander Woodford, my Lord and Gentlemen, I wish to observe with regard to a question put to me by Major General Peel at the conclusion of the examination yesterday, that with respect to the passages which I regard as containing matters of animadversion, they are intermixed with other passages involving no animadversion; that it would be difficult to point out the exact sentence, or parts and bits of sentences, of which I complain; but I can say that it is the whole of the London report down to the end of the 6th line of the 37th page, and to that part I invite inquiry.

Before I proceed further, I wish to take this opportunity of remarking upon some observations addressed to this Board by Colonel Tulloch on Friday last. Colonel Tulloch produced a letter from Colonel Gordon, the then assistant quartermaster general of the forces, dated the 4th June 1855 (page 167 of the proceedings of the Board); and afterwards, by comparing this letter with the evidence which I gave before this Board in reference to a different period, and to a very different state of circumstances, he endeavoured to make it appear that there was an inconsistency between my statement and that of Colonel Gordon. Colonel Gordon's letter was as follows:—"Quartermaster Gene-" ral's Office, before Sebastopol, 4th June 1855," directed to Sir John M'Neill, G.C.B.,—"Sir, " I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Colonel Tulloch's note, dated this day, " forwarding a copy of my evidence for correction, and requesting that it may be " completed, with copies of the necessary documents alluded to, and returned to him at " Kazatch Bay to-morrow morning a few hours before the mail starts, and requesting " also that answers to the questions put to General Airey may be sent at the same time. " As these questions to General Airey are 52 in number, nearly every one of which " contains an implied accusation of neglect or carelessness, he begs me to say that he " cannot consent to answer them in this off-hand way, but will examine each question " and prepare his replies as rapidly as the other duties of his department will permit, " which you must be aware, from the evidence you have taken, are of a very extensive " and varied form. I will endeavour to have my own evidence corrected and completed " by to-morrow morning, but as I find it occupies 40 pages, the result of four days " examination, with a great number of papers to be annexed, I feel I shall be " unable to have it ready by that time, being much occupied with other " duties which cannot be entirely set aside for those inquiries. I may men-" tion, as an instance, that only yesterday I was on horseback for 17 hours " on a reconnaissance of some importance with reference to our future operations " in the field, and this morning has again brought us a great amount of urgent business. " If not ready by to-morrow my evidence, as well as General Airey's replies, will be for-" warded to you at the War Office, in London. I much regret that sickness has obliged " you to bring your inquiries to so sudden a termination. (Signed) Alexander Gordon."—As the Board will have observed, this letter refers to certain written queries which Colonel Tulloch left behind him on his departure from Balaklava; those queries had been sent to my office, and Colonel Gordon received a note from Colonel Tulloch, requesting that the answers might be sent to Kazatch Bay by the following morning. My first impulse would have been to comply with that request at once, but upon ascertaining the purport of the questions, I perceived they were of such a nature that my answers to them, if given in full detail, would involve a very serious assertion of my opinion, more especially as to the management of the Commissariat. I thought it would be very objectionable, even if it were possible that a detailed exposition by me of my views upon such important matters should be suddenly prepared in an off-hand way, and sent at a few hours notice to Kazatch. I therefore directed Colonel Gordon to write to that effect, and although I did not then see his letter I see it now, and I do not intend to withdraw one word of it. To return to the written queries, I declined, through Colonel Gordon, to answer such serious questions in an off-hand way, and several weeks afterwards, I think about six weeks afterwards, when pressed to send the answers to London by a telegraph order, I complied with the direction, but answered the questions in a short and general way; indicating, however, the quarter in which authentic information might be obtained. I was examined before the Board on the 14th of April here, and in order to understand the true bearing and effect of the 523d question, which is at page 95 of the seventh day's proceedings, and my answer to it, it is necessary to recall to mind the exact matter which was the subject of that examination, for a man's words must be always judged, not in an abstract way, but with reference to the business of which he is speaking, and the business was this,—my written answers to written queries had given some heads of information extracted from my Office Journal, and in these I showed, that early in November I had placed at Lord Lucan's disposal an engineer officer and a number of Turks, who were to assist in the construction of shelter for the horses. The Commissioners finding this information stated without any qualifying circumstances, thought that without any further inquiry they could so far act upon the isolated facts which I have mentioned, as to be justified in reporting that there appeared to be a want of promptitude and ingenuity in providing shelter for the horses. Lord Lucan, as he was entitled to do, met this

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

charge by showing that he had not the constant services of an engineer officer, and that the Turks actually placed at his disposal failed both in number and efficiency. Then, finding that the imperfect character of the information obtained upon this matter had led the Commissioners into the use of an animadversion, which was displaced by more complete evidence, Colonel Tulloch very naturally, and, I admit, very legitimately, turned to me to inquire why it was that I had given him those facts as to the services of the engineer officer and the Turkish workmen, without also giving him the qualifying circumstances which were elicited in the progress of this inquiry, namely, the fact that the engineer officer could not give his services continuously, and that the Turkish workmen failed in number and efficiency. That was a very proper and legitimate sort of inquiry for Colonel Tulloch to submit to me, because, if I had known that the inquiry had been going on with the view to the inculpation of Lord Lucan it would have been very wrong of me to state the means placed at his disposal, without also stating that those means were not so complete and effectual as had been hoped; but, in truth, I had not, at the time of answering those written queries, the most remote idea that Lord Lucan's conduct as an officer had been really submitted to the judgment of Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch; and when I was asked in reference to this matter, question 523, I answer, as appears in this book, "My own examination in "writing I have already stated two or three times was merely general and superficial "answers to general questions. I had no indication whatever of the leaning of the "Commissioners, or that they implicated anybody, or thought that there was blame "attached to anybody. If I had had the slightest idea of that, I should have been able "to explain things perfectly. I think myself, and I cannot help believing, that they "would have come to different conclusions." Of course, when I said that I did not understand that anybody was implicated, I must be understood as speaking in reference to the business then undergoing investigation, for obviously I did not mean that questions elaborately framed, with a view to search out defects in the Commissariat, would not, or might not implicate anybody, in the literal sense of the word; and I readily apologize to Commissary General Filder and the authorities of the Treasury for the use of a phrase which, taken too literally, might seem to mean that the inculpation of the Commissariat authorities was not in my eyes the inculpation of anybody; of course the phrase was used in reference to the matter, the subject of the inquiry, and for the purpose of showing that any omission to state the circumstances favourably to Lord Lucan, resulted simply from the fact that I had no conception that either Lord Lucan or myself was under trial before Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch. I have already stated, that my statement and Colonel Gordon's letter refer to different periods, and to a totally different state of circumstances. Colonel Gordon's letter is dated the 4th of June 1855, and it was not until several weeks afterwards that my answers were sent. Had nothing occurred in the meantime? I answer that on the 9th of June, the day before the Constantinople Report was signed, that was the 10th, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch made a preliminary report, very much to the effect of that actually laid before Parliament, but with some material differences, and the very first sentence in the preliminary report announces that the Commissioners had completed their inquiry.

(*Major General Peel.*) To whom was this preliminary report addressed?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) That preliminary report will be found in the archives of the department of the Secretary for War.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was a private report.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) That preliminary report was sent to Lord Raglan, and Lord Raglan put it into the military secretary's hands and mine. The very first sentence of the preliminary report states that the inquiry was completed, and I am only showing that my answers, written at a subsequent period to that, were entirely written in a different spirit, considering that the Commissioners had completed their work. And the document then goes on very much in the terms of the Constantinople Report, now before the Board, and without indicating any prospect of an attempt to cast blame either upon Lord Lucan or myself, or I believe upon any of the military authorities.

Now it was quite the latter end of July, if I rightly recollect, that I answered the written queries that had been left with me, I having then become acquainted with the preliminary report, which purported to be the result of the inquiry that was completed, and to be thoroughly and almost enthusiastically favourable to the military authorities. I of course looked upon the written queries then in a totally different light from that in which Colonel Gordon had regarded them some weeks previously, before the preliminary report had appeared. That preliminary report did in truth, so to speak, appear to extract all the poison from the written queries; therefore Colonel Gordon, in the month of June, and I at the end of July or the beginning of August, were both justified in the views which we successively took of the same queries at different periods. To Colonel Gordon, in June, the queries had all the aspect of a live shell. To me, in August, after the preliminary report, and after the departure of the Commissioners from Constantinople, they had of course a perfectly innocent appearance, and I accordingly answered them in a slight and superficial way, as questions which were stripped of all their practical significance by the contents of the preliminary report, and it was with an accurate memory of that impression, and in perfect accord with that, that I answered Colonel Tulloch's questions before the Board.

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

(*Major General Peel.*) Was any evidence taken subsequently to the date of that preliminary report?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) That preliminary report was dated on the 9th of June. I do not know what the Commissioners did after that; they were out of the Crimea.

With the permission of the Board I will go on with the report. The report contains some observations with regard to the separation of the men from their knapsacks on landing in the Crimea. This is a matter specially within the department of the adjutant general, but General Estcourt, who was the adjutant general, being no more, I am willing to give any information which the Board may think fit to require from me, as to the reasons which led to the adoption of the measure; and I may state that when the force recovered its communication with the sea, active measures were taken in the way detailed by Colonel Gordon in his evidence for restoring the knapsacks to the men. But at that moment it would appear that none of the generals of division wished to receive them, except His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, although as I understood his royal highness also abstained from acting upon the notification that the knapsacks had arrived in port. In fact, the general of division seemed to have arrived practically at the same conclusion, namely, that the labour of fetching the knapsacks would not be compensated for by the advantage of possessing them.

(*President.*) That was from Balaklava.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) This conclusion might have been a subject of surprise to the Commissioners, if they had been right in supposing, as they appear to have done, that the knapsacks contained a change of clothing and other articles important for the comfort of the men—but the truth of the matter is this, that the third shirt, the third pair of socks, the second towel, and the shell jacket were left in the squad-bag, which is a large valise, in which the superfluous part of a man's kit is kept, and which would make his knapsack too heavy for active field service. There is one attached to every squad of a company, and the superfluous kit is stowed away in this till the army becomes more stationary. Then the soldier had been directed to take with him, in his blanket, a spare shirt, a pair of socks, and a pair of boots—and independently of what he had on his back, he also carried his forage cap, and no doubt thought it was not specially ordered in the memorandum, he took with him his first towel, his soap and his comb;—and supposing that he did so, the sole contents of his knapsack would be the following articles: one pair of trowsers, if the second pair of trowsers were not worn out (which was the case in my own division; the others were worn out during the Bulgarian campaign) and it was probably the same, to a great extent, if not entirely, in the other divisions; therefore the knapsack would have contained possibly a pair of trowsers, a pair of mits, one small book or ledger, one hold-all containing a razor and other shaving materials, one blacking brush, a bottle of blacking, one button brush, and one button stick. As I have said, among those articles the first, if it had existed in any of the knapsacks, is the one likely to be of use, but with respect to the rest, the generals of division may be pardoned for thinking, at the opening of the siege, that razors, and blacking brushes and blacking bottles, and button brushes and button sticks, were all of less account than the precious time and precious labour of the men.

Another matter connected with the quartermaster general's department which attracts the attention of the Commissioners is what they have inaccurately called the issues of supplies from the quartermaster general's stores. It will be presently seen that I do not put forward this mistake of the Commissioners as a pretext for evading the discussion which their comments invite, but it is necessary to a clear understanding of the matter, that the error should be corrected. The quartermaster general's department has maps and telescopes, theodolites, and other instruments necessary for surveying and making plans, but it has no public stores, and of course no storekeeper or issuer, or any of the machinery requisite either for the custody or the distribution of the articles required for the Army. The Board is aware that few have been so competent to speak with conclusive weight on this subject as General Sir Willoughby Gordon, who was for many years quartermaster general of the British army. His experience was so great, and his acquaintance with the organization of the army so complete, that it was usual to refer to him as a recognized authority in military business, and in 1837, the commissioner appointed to inquire into the expediency of consolidating the different departments connected with the civil administration of the army, addressed to him the following questions—"No. 1. In whose care are the stores usually denominated quarter-" master general's stores? Are any returns made to you in England or to the officers " of the quartermaster general's staff on foreign stations? When you have occasion " to apply for any such stores, how, and to whom is the application made, and when " issued, how and to whom are they accounted for afterwards? Who regulates the " quantities deemed necessary to be kept in store, whether at home or abroad? Can " you send a return of the stores alluded to now in England, and say whether the " quantities exceed what you deemed necessary to have in reserve to meet the current " demands of the service." To these queries Sir Willoughby Gordon made the following answers:—"The quartermaster general has no public stores of any kind in his charge, " nor is he aware that any such stores are placed in the charge of any individual " of his department. I have never even heard of the term quartermaster general's stores. " It may possibly be intended to apply to the term camp stores, as all matters relating

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

" to the encampment are directed by the quartermaster general; he makes the " applications for stores of this description to whatever public office may be charged with " them to the Board of Ordnance or to the storekeeper general, if there should be such " a person, and such camp stores so applied for are delivered to the troops for whose use " they are intended, but the quartermaster general has not nor ever had the custody of " such stores, or the means necessary for taking the custody of them."

In the Crimean campaigns, as in former wars, the camp equipage included great coats, boots, and blankets, and the novel articles afterwards sent out for the comfort of the soldiers were received and stored by the commissariat; they were delivered direct by the commissariat issuer to the corps who required them, and the circumstances which led to the inaccurate use of the term quartermaster general's stores, appear to have been these, that the quartermaster general countersigns the checks which are called the requisitions by which those stores are drawn for, I have thought it necessary to correct this error at once, not because it led to uncertainty as to what the stores where which the Commissioners meant, but because a misdescription necessarily carries with it a wrong conception of the duties and powers really belonging to the quartermaster general's department. I am anxious to say that I cast no sort of blame upon the Commissioners for using the phrase: they no doubt often heard it in common parlance even from the lips of military men, and it is but justice to the Commissioners to acknowledge, as I do, that apparently they have not been themselves drawn into wrong conclusions by the mistaken use of the term; but I am sure that they will regret that an inaccuracy of expression has really misled those who are less intimately acquainted than they with the organization of the British Forces. The report states at page 30; "The arrangements " relating to the issues of the supplies from the quartermaster general's stores appear to " have been of questionable expediency," and then it is made to appear inferentially that this supposed want of ease in the working of the department may have been the occasion, not of mere inconvenience and trouble, but of some of those dreadful privations to which the soldier was subject in the winter of 1854 and 1855. The report shows that after the early part of December, and notwithstanding the loss of the "Prince" there was always a supply of warm clothing in the harbour of Balaklava. It shows too, that the articles thus lying in the port, some of the men were greviously in want of; and then the defective working of the quartermaster general's department being stated, or rather suggested, it is left to be inferred that official mismanagement or official formalities stood up as a barrier between the soldier and his supplies. To show the error involved in such a conclusion some particular statement is necessary. The Board is aware that one of the duties attached to the office of the British quartermaster general in the field, is that of fixing the proportions in which the different corps and regiments shall share those supplies of camp equipage, such as tents, great coats, blankets, and boots, which may at the time be lying in the commissariat stores. And when the peculiarity of the service in the Crimea rendered it necessary that the army should be supplied with articles of a novel description, my department readily undertook the new duty of determining the proportions in which those extra comforts should likewise be shared by the troops. And here, perhaps, I may be permitted to say, that in my evidence given a few days ago I stated, when asked as to the distribution of stores, that it was a business within the quartermaster general's department, and that answer is perfectly accurate when the word distribution is understood in the sense of an apportionment; but it must not be understood that the quartermaster general's department ever distributes stores in the sense of actually delivering them; and I would therefore prefer that the term apportionment should be used and understood instead of the word distribution. It is not accurate to say that stores of this description are issued by the quartermaster general's department; it is the divisional or regimental officer who makes the demand for those stores, and it is the commissariat which issues them. But, lest one corps should have more than its fair proportion to the injury of others, the quartermaster general's department is charged with the duty of determining how far the quantity of available stores will justify a compliance with the requisition of any particular division, regiment, or department of the army.

Now the circumstance of the quartermaster general's department having to determine the proportions in which the articles are to be shared, has led to the error corrected by Sir Willoughby Gordon's evidence of calling them quartermaster general's stores. If those stores are always in the custody of the commissariat, it is to the commissariat and not to the quartermaster general's department that belongs the duty of taking them from the storehouse and transporting them to their destination, and actually delivering them to the regiment. With the issue in that sense the quartermaster general's department has nothing to do; it is only to distinguish between right and wrong requisitions that his intervention is required, and to enable him to perform this duty the quartermaster-general receives frequent returns from the commissariat, showing from time to time what articles of camp equipage are lying in their stores, and this being premised the process by which a regiment in the Crimea would obtain articles of camp equipage for the men will be easily understood. Suppose the 49th Regiment requires 300 great coats, the assistant quartermaster general of the division comes to the issue department of the quartermaster general's office and presents the following simple requisition: Required by the 49th Regiment 300 great coats, signed by the lieutenant-colonel. Hereupon the officer attending to this branch of the quartermaster general's office looks to his account of the great coats then lying available to see whether this

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

requisition by the 49th regiment can be acceded to without injustice to other corps. The officer does not raise any question upon the fact that the great coats are really wanted; on the contrary, he assumes on seeing the requisition, signed by the lieutenant-colonel, that the want exists, and he only determines whether the supplies are such that the want can be met. This he determines instantly by the books in the office, it is recorded from day to day, and they will show at a glance the quantity of any particular store which may be available at the time. If he sees there are stores enough to warrant him in sanctioning the requisition to the full amount, he simply signs his name, and the requisition thus becomes a complete authority for the delivery of the stores in question, and the commissariat officer delivers them accordingly upon the presentation of the approved requisition. If the quantity of the supplies warrants only a partial compliance with the demand, the requisition is immediately altered, and sanction given for the reduced quantity. If the state of the supplies be such that the requisition cannot be complied with to any extent, the sanction of the department would, of course, be altogether withheld; but the whole process, whether that of allowing a reduced quantity or disapproving of the requisition, would occupy much less time than I have taken to describe it.

Such was the machinery of the department in question; and I now proceed to state how it was administered during the time it was under my control. The officer elected to have the charge of the sub-department was Colonel Wetherall, and if I forbear to speak of his ability as an officer, it is because of the distinction which his name has acquired in connexion with higher duties, makes it wholly unnecessary for me to do so; but I may be permitted to say, that I selected him for the care of this sub-department, not only on account of his general fitness for business, but also because he was an officer whose zeal and good sense made it certain that he would not fetter himself by undue adherence to formalities. I had perceived, that if the duties of this sub-department were performed with strictness, it would, from its very nature, have had a tendency to check the issue of the supplies in question. I knew also that my vocations, constantly taking me to a distance from the camp, it would be impossible to obtain my immediate decision upon a doubtful question, and a requisition substantially right might be so baffled and delayed as to occasion unnecessary difficulty. I knew, also, that in the over-worked state of every soldier the mere labour of going down from the camp to make a fruitless requisition was a great evil. Under these circumstances I took upon myself to act thus. I authorized the officer in charge of the sub-department to approve of all requisitions upon his own judgment; but I directed that no requisition should ever be refused without personal reference to me. I am not aware of any instance in which these my directions were disobeyed, and indeed the report does not state that any particular requisition was ever refused. And with the view of anticipating the wants of the men and encouraging requisitions for articles which from time to time became available, I caused to be hung up in my own office, for the information of all comers, a statement in a tabular form showing the various articles from time to time lying ready in the commissariat storehouse appropriated for the camp equipage and extra clothing. Moreover, the assistant-quartermaster generals of divisions waited upon me at a fixed hour every day; and although it came within the natural sphere of their duties to do so without orders, they were, notwithstanding, directed to go themselves to the commissariat storehouses at Balaklava, and they were themselves acquainted with what might be available for the troops. I was pressing upon this subject, because from the extremely limited space capable of being appropriated to the stores at Balaklava, and the confused manner in which they were hastily put away, owing to the shortness of labour in the commissariat department, it was not possible to know precisely what might be actually there merely by inspecting the commissariat returns; and, in point of fact, it turned out that in many instances articles which I had received no notice of from the commissariat storekeeper were found in the commissariat warehouse. Besides those measures I had posted permanently at Balaklava a most efficient staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie, assistant quartermaster general, with full discretionary power to approve of all requisitions on the spot in case of pressure independently of me, transmitting, however, an account of his proceedings on the following day, in order that I might correct my office books. When it became known in the army that clothing had been sent out from England of a description different from that which formed part of the soldiers' usual equipment there came in requisitions for all sorts of various articles which did not exist in store; and therefore to prevent disappointment arising from those mistakes, it was arranged that when the things required were not part of the ordinary equipment of the soldier a description of them should be filled in at the office; in other words, that the order for the delivery of those new articles of equipment should originate in the department which knew how to describe them, instead of originating in a requisition founded upon mere rumour. Thus, if a requisition came in for 100 mackintosh coats, the officer in charge would say there are no mackintosh coats in store, and of course you cannot have any, or whatever other articles they might be; but there are plenty of watch-cloaks, and if the regiment likes to have 100 of them, it can have them, and then a sort of substituted order would be filled in and signed. Moreover, to prevent any needless hitch about the delivery of the required articles, I intimated my wish that the requisitions for warm clothing should be complied with by issuing any stores in hand of

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

the description required, although they might not be precisely the same as the article specified in the requisition, if the applicants chose to take them in preference to waiting. I also found that from the great want of space, which constituted one of their many great difficulties, the commissariat officers could only deliver one description of goods rapidly, when other articles could not be delivered without delay. Thus Thus when the commissariat was rapidly sending out great coats, a regiment sending down for blankets might be kept waiting, simply because the store of blankets might, at that time, be lying under other stores and difficult to be got at, and I determined to remedy this cause of delay. I therefore directed the officers of my sub-department to inform themselves by communication with the commissariat at the times at which any particular article could be most readily delivered at the commissariat office. This measure greatly facilitated the deliveries by the commissariat officer, and saved the regiment from much disappointment and unnecessary labour. I think that the Board will see that by causing the sub-department to be administered in the way I have stated, I really converted that official machinary intended to operate as a check upon the issues, into a means of stimulating the demand for available stores, and quickening the distribution among the suffering troops. I am aware, that under ordinary circumstances, the facility with which I allowed this issue to take place would have been reprehensible, but I knew that during those dreadful weeks the least delay in supplying the soldiers' wants was cruelty, and I determined under special authority, and with the cordial support of Lord Raglan, that whatever suffering might result to the men from the over-strain upon their powers, and from the failure of land transport their hardships should not be increased by any ill-timed formality or strictness in the working of my department. I am happy to be able to state my belief that the sub-department in question was administered in the spirit of my general instructions, and in proof that that was the case I refer to the answers given by the regimental officers to the 19th query, in pages 277 to 283 of the Commissioners' Report. I do think that if the Board of General Officers examine the answers to the 19th question of the Commissioners, it will be found generally that there is no complaint or remark of any description tending to show that there was any obstruction in the quartermaster general's department in obtaining what they required, and that the delay was occasioned by other causes. I think it will be seen that those officers are almost unanimous in testifying to the facilities given them by the quartermaster general's department. I may observe that the exertions made by the department to anticipate the wants of the men, and to volunteer a statement to the divisions of the novel articles of clothing available for their use, seems to have led to the impression that even as to the regular articles of equipment the rule of the army had been changed, and that the requisitions ought necessarily to originate in the quartermaster general's department, but, in point of fact, it was only to novel articles of clothing that the practice of originating requisitions in the quartermaster general's department applied. There were, in fact, methods of obtaining the issues. The regiments obtained the regular articles of equipment upon their own requisitions, and they obtained the new description of clothing by orders originating in the quartermaster general's department, orders which, if I may so express myself, invited the men to go to the stores and provide themselves with the available articles. Of all the 57 officers commanding regiments who were then examined upon this point there is not one who makes it appear that his requisition for articles really existing in store was ever refused; and there seems to be only one who states specifically that he encountered the least delay in his application to the quartermaster general's department. That officer is Lieutenant-Colonel Waddy, of the 50th regiment. He states that he applied for blankets the first week in November, and that the issue was made on the 15th of the same month; but this was at a period anterior to that which the Commissioners have fixed, namely, the first week in December as the time when the supplies of clothing had arrived. It, therefore, seems to have been an instance, and apparently the only one, in which the department was obliged to suspend its sanction for a few days until there arrived a sufficient supply to justify the issue. Lieutenant-Colonel Lysons speaks of having made requisitions for different articles, and having been met by the information that he was not to make requisitions, and that when the articles arrived they would be divided among the men. This was plainly an instance in which Lieutenant-Colonel Lysons had made requisitions for articles not constituting a part of the ordinary equipment and apparently not in store. Such requisition would surely be best met in the way actually adopted, that is, by saying you cannot draw articles which are not in store, but we will keep you informed of the arrivals, and give you orders for the delivery as soon as the arrivals will enable us to do so. It appears from the answers to the 19th query that it was only particular regiments which suffered from the want of blankets. Some of the corps happily exempted from this privation were no doubt regiments stationed near Balaklava, but the fact that their proximity to the commissariat storehouse enabled them to get the benefit of the stores shows that it was the difficulty of carrying away the blankets and not any obstruction in the quartermaster general's department which kept the men in want. It was mainly in the fourth division that privations were experienced, and the reason was simply this, that the regiments of that division were without any public bât horses, and therefore they had more difficulty than other corps in fetching supplies from Balaklava. It is well known to the Board that Sir George Cathcart, with the fourth division, arrived as they were em-

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

barked. He came straight to the Crimea, and was not provided with the same bât horses that the other divisions of the army were. And here I may observe that when an army is placed in circumstances of great difficulty, scarcely any amount of vigour, either in the commissariat or any other central department, can of itself ensure the soldier against privation and hardship, but the success which attended the exertions of the regimental officers who were able to contrive some means of transport, shows that the difficulty really existing in the Crimea was simply the physical difficulty of bringing up bales of goods from the seashore to the camp pitched on the hills at a distance of several miles. It appears that in answering the questions submitted to him, the late Colonel Yea, of the 7th Fusileers, described the process by which his men were supplied, and it may be convenient therefore to refer to his evidence upon this subject. He says, at page 280 of the Report, "I never made any requisition, because I knew that as soon as a vessel arrived "with warm clothing, &c., the quartermaster general divided the whole equally among all "regiments of the army, according to their strength. The regiment therefore used to "receive these articles by driblets, as they arrived. I was aware that it was of no use "asking here for what were not in possession; the delay of supply to corps did not arise "here, but in the arrival of things at Balaklava." The 7th Fusileers were in the trenches at the period in question, and were as far off as any regiment; they were on the extreme right of the light division; they were the right regiment of the light division, and they were posted beyond the Woronzoff road as far as any, except the second division. The 7th Fusileers were, as I say, at this time in the trenches, and at a distance of seven or eight miles from Balaklava, and the regiments obtained from the quartermaster general's department the proper approval of requisitions of warm clothing. Colonel Yea was in no way favoured; he had no more facilities for obtaining issues than any other officer commanding a corps, but he had the same, and those were enough; he met with no difficulties or obstruction in the department; it was not to overcome obstacles there that he had to exert himself, but he saw, as no doubt, all the other regimental officers saw, that the whole question was one of transport; his officers had the few horses they required for their personal use; he could spare some few of his men from the small number not actually engaged in the trenches, he could also employ the public bât horses of his regiment; those were all his means, but with those he succeeded in carrying up his blankets and coats to the front, and saving his men apparently from all suffering occasioned by the want of clothing. This is in the evidence of Colonel Yea, which I should also like to read. Colonel Yea states, that he "has "answered the queries and furnished the returns required. Fatigue parties of about "sixty men each were sent to Balaklava three times to carry up provisions to the com- "missariat store in the division, but with the assistance of the officers' horses was able to "save the men fatigue parties to bring up provisions, which otherwise would have been "necessary. Fatigue parties of ten or twenty men each were sent eight or ten times to "assist in bringing up boards for the huts, but this was in fine weather, when the ground "was firm and the short track open. The warm clothing was all brought up by the "horses, a large proportion by the officers' private horses. About six or eight regimental "bât horses were brought over from Bulgaria about the end of October. The remainder "of the regimental horses, about six or eight, and the officers' bât horses, came about "the 23d January. Of the original six or eight, several were rendered unserviceable "by the commissariat, while lent to them to carry up provisions. Several of "the regimental animals died, but others were picketed up, and ultimately four- "teen were handed over to the Land Transport Corps. Many of these animals "were for a considerable time unserviceable, and but for the assistance received from "the officers' horses and chargers, the men must have been much more frequently "employed on fatigue duty. Every three days ten or eleven officers' horses were sent to "Balaklava for forage, and brought up that of the regimental bât horses, as well as their "own. Three or four officers' horses, or as many as were required, were sent immediately "whenever there was warm clothing to be issued, and brought it up at once. The "trenches during the bad weather were wet ditches, and the ammunition boot is so "flimsy, that it will not stand work in the mud. The soles separated from the upper "leather in a few days, and the men consequently got frost bitten. A large proportion "of the sick at one time were cases of frost bite, caused by the want of proper boots. "The men suffered much from want of sufficient clothing before the warm clothing "was issued. The cloth both of the coat and the trousers is very bad. The trousers "issued in December are completely worn out. The last case of scurvy was discharged "to duty on the 15th March. The men had been so long on salt meat ration "in December, that scurvy broke out; but a good supply of vegetables having "been issued from the early part of February, the disease began to decline some- "time afterwards. The first supply of lime juice (but a very trifling quantity) to the "hospital was on the 10th December 1854, and the first to the men for duty on the "7th of February 1855. Is of opinion that tea is a preferable ration to coffee, and is "much preferred by the men. When the ambulance corps could go no longer, a great "number of the sick for Scutari were carried down by the regimental bât horses, and "the officers' horses and chargers; otherwise they could not have been sent at all." There were very few men with the force in the Crimea who knew the true state and condition of things better than Mr. Romaine, the Deputy Judge Advocate

*Major General Sir Richard Airey*

2d May 1856.

General of the Forces, and when he was consulted by the managers of the Crimean Army Fund which was sent out from England, as to the best means of carrying out the object of the subscribers, he told them at once that their stores of comforts would be useless, or worse than useless, unless they came provided with the means of transport necessary for landing, storing, and moving them. Acting upon this view, the honorary agents took the most effectual measures beforehand for importing with the goods a supply of transport and human labour, so that when Lord Ellesmere's yacht, and other vessels freighted for the service, came into the harbour of Balaklava, they had on board, not only inert bales of goods, but the sinews and muscles requisite for landing, storing, and delivering them to the troops; and by these means, and by their own unceasing exertions on the spot, Mr. Egerton and Mr. Tower, succeeded in giving to the soldier the immense stores provided for his comfort; and they did this without the aid of a single fatigue party, and without the drawing of the rations of food or forage. I will produce to the Board a copy of their report, and from this it will be seen, that it was not the possession of stores, but their command of transport labour, that enabled them to achieve so much good. In short, the attention of a man endeavouring to search out the origin of the evil may, for a short time, be withdrawn to other apparent causes, but he will find that, in common with Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, he is always led back at last to this conclusion, that the mischief was occasioned by the want of human labour and the want of transport, and that exactly in proportion as those difficulties could be met the sufferings of the men were alleviated.

The Commissioners, at page 27 of their Report, state "one of the reasons assigned for "not issuing the regimental great coats was that the regulations of the service, as esta- "blished by the Queen's warrant, did not authorize such issue more frequently than once "in three years." And then the Commissioners proceed to show—as well they may—the utter folly and emptiness of any such objection. I have not found one word in the printed evidence tending in the most remote way to support the assertion that any such idea was entertained. Every officer knew that at that time a great coat or some efficient substitute for it was as needful as bread itself to the very life of the soldier; and surely no sane person can have seriously thought that an article of this prime necessity had been forwarded to the seat of war, with a view to their being distributed upon the ordinary rule of one in three years. It was not in the Crimea, but under the ordinary administration at home, that a regulation of this kind existed; and it was got rid of by Lord Raglan, in the due exercise of his dispensing power. The War Office form of requisition for obtaining a new great coat is of the most elaborate description; it has two schedules or returns annexed to it, and it must be filled up and signed in duplicate. The blanks to be filled up amount to no less than 24, which must all be filled up before one great coat can be drawn. This is a copy of the War Office paper for drawing a great coat, which I will hand in to the Board. (*The same was delivered in.*) And this is a copy of the order that was issued by Lord Raglan, dispensing with the other and substituted for it, containing only these words "Required for such a regiment" left blank, and a place for my signature. (*The same was delivered in.*) I merely show these to prove how little the regulations were adhered to, and that no warrant or regulation had any influence upon our proceedings in the Crimea.

But to return to the suggestion that there was clothing in Balaklava, and the inference that the men were prevented from getting it by official mismanagement. In the first place, it must be observed, that the accounts upon which the Commissioners rely are apparently fallacious in many respects, as will be pointed out by Colonel Wetherall. This will be apparent; but I will content myself with referring to two of the fallacies which seem to have been drawn from those accounts. One fallacy is that of supposing because the articles were in the harbour of Balaklava they were therefore instantly available; the truth being, that although goods might have arrived in the harbour, many days, and even several weeks, might and often did elapse before the commissariat authorities could find means to land them, and have them in store and ready for delivery. Vessels came out perhaps laden with some article which was not wanted of a most heavy and cumbrous nature, with the lighter articles that possibly were immediately wanted at the bottom, and our labours were so restricted that we could not either afford time or men to take off and get rid of those things which were not wanted, to get to the things that were wanted, and our space was so limited, that there was no room to put those things away that were not wanted. The other source of error is this, that the accounts on which the Commissioners formed their conclusions show articles lying in the commissariat storehouses without deductions in respect of those goods which, though not actually carried away, had been previously drawn forth by means of approved requisitions, and this correction makes a difference of very many thousands, and entirely vitiates the conclusions founded on the accounts. As there may be some little difficulty and intricacy in the matter, I should like to clear this away by an illustration from a banker's account. If I have 1,000*l.* in my banker's hands, and if I give cheques away to the amount of 900*l.*, which from absence or other causes they are not presented for payment, when I send for my banker's book it shows a full credit for 1,000*l.*, but when I look to my own cheque-book, I find my means of drawing reduced to 100*l.* by the credits I have already given. If, in such a case, I was to attend to the banker's book, and disregard my own cheque-book, I might be drawing again upon the full 1,000*l.*, and thereby taking away the

means by which the hitherto unpresented cheques could be met. Such a mistake would be exactly analogous to that which the Commissioners have inadvertently committed in assuming that the quantities of goods available was commensurate with the quantity which appeared in store, but after correcting those great errors, I agree with the Commissioners in their conclusion, that notwithstanding the enormous loss occasioned by the loss of the "Prince," there was never a period after the first week in December, when there was not at Balaklava a considerable supply of warm clothing, and I cannot doubt that at that very time there were regiments engaged in the front and in the trenches who were suffering acutely from the want of those very articles which lay in readiness for them at a distance of seven or eight miles. Why did it happen that for a time the soldier failed to obtain the clothing of which he was so greatly in want? I answer, that there never was at any moment the smallest difficulty in obtaining an approved requisition for the coats and blankets required; the difficulty, and the sole difficulty, was to carry them up to the front. This the Commissioners state very fairly, for at page 31 they say, it must be inferred that in many cases the supplies did not reach the men for a considerable time after they appear, from the quartermaster general's returns, to have been issued, but there is no reason to believe that the delay was in any degree attributable to that department. Owing to the deficiency of transport, those supplies may have remained in Balaklava for a considerable time before they could be conveyed to the front, or in any other way be made available for the use of the men. In fact, the comparison between the issues from the quartermaster general's department and the actual appropriation of the stores by the men shows clearly that that department was authorizing issues of warm clothing very much faster than the men could receive it, the truth of the matter is in this respect fully stated by Colonel Cobb in his answer to the 19th query, when he says, speaking of the approved requisitions, "I may add that those requisitions were always in advance of the means of transport at "my disposal."

There is one piece of Colonel Wetherall's evidence unintentionally omitted in the printed copies of the Report, which puts this matter in a strong and clear light, by showing, in the instance of particular regiments, how long a time might unhappily elapse between the period of obtaining the first order for the delivery of stores and the period of actually fetching them away. I produce a copy of the mislaid evidence, and the memorandum by which the Commissioners elicited it. This evidence gives a complete illustration of the cause which for a long time,—unhappily too long,—deprived the soldier of additional clothing, and which was rendered more and more necessary every day by the advance of winter. Take the case of the 57th regiment. That regiment wanted 400 blankets; it drew for them on the 2d of December, and on the same day the requisition, being duly approved, was converted into a complete and final authority for the delivery of the blankets. But the men no doubt, in consequence of their having military duties to perform, and from the want of bât horses (this was one of the regiments in the fourth division, Sir George Carthcart's division), were unable to fetch away any of those blankets until the 17th; they then fetched 300, and it was not till the 24th that the remaining blankets could be carried away, although 400 blankets had become the property of the regiment so early as the 2d of the month. The 1st Dragoons had on the 2d December a complete authority to receive 108 blankets, yet apparently the regiment did not fetch one of them till the middle of January, and before that time, namely, on the 9th of January, the regiment received an approved authority for 156 more blankets, and it was not till after it had obtained the second order that it made any use of the first. The situation of the regiment was analagous to a man with two cheques in his desk, but without the means of sending them to be cashed. So also the 2d Dragoons had an order for 100 blankets on the 1st December, and on the 10th of January an order for 187 more, yet out of those 287 the regiment up to the 11th of January had only fetched away 66.

I will now read the 15th paragraph at page 26. It is there made to appear that the blankets fell short, and that the men were kept without warm clothing because it occurred to no one to give the 8,000 rugs which were lying in store. I answer, that at this very time it will be seen by looking at the approved requisitions and deliveries, that the men were obtaining the approved requisitions for blankets faster than they could carry them away; and the reason the rugs were not drawn for was simply this, that the regiments had the option between rugs and blankets, and they preferred the latter. In the month of December alone no less than 22,740 blankets were issued by the department, though only 17,323 were carried away.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Is there any return of the requisitions that were made?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) There is a general statement of the total.

(*Major-General Peel.*) With respect to the 57th regiment, does it appear?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes; but that Colonel Wetherall will be prepared to show

(*Major-General Peel.*) What you have quoted is not in this evidence.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No; that is in the omitted evidence (*handing in the same.*)

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) That is upon a memorandum of mine, not of Colonel Wetherall's evidence, as I shall show.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) If any regiment had been refused the blankets required on the ground that there were not enough in store, it would have been very proper that the officer in charge should have told the divisions and regiments that they could not have

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2nd May 1856.

blankets, but they could have rugs. But at the time in question, no such occasion arose, because no blankets were refused. If there had been an armistice at the period, and the men had been released thereby from their severe duties in the field and in the trenches, they could have come down from the camp to apply for warm clothing, and then the blankets would have been exhausted, and an oppportunity would have occurred for offering the rugs as a substitute; but it never happened. The men wanted much, but their power of taking away what they wanted, unhappily, was so limited that after November they could never get very near the end of the store of blankets, and therefore the rugs, being only an inferior substitute, were never brought into general use for the troops, but they were issued to the Turks and other followers of the army.

With respect to great coats, I beg leave to read the 22d paragraph of the London Report, at page 27. I quote from the Blue Book now. "By the end of November, or "beginning of December, about 12,000 great coats also had arrived at Balaklava. "Of these there remained in store during the months of December and January, when they "were most urgently required by the men, upwards of 9,000, besides nearly 2,000 watch "cloaks. These numbers would have furnished one to every two men; and supposing "one-half to be on duty, would have afforded to each man a dry great coat or cloak "to put on when he returned to his tent from the trenches, instead of lying down "as he often did in one that was wet and muddy." From that paragraph it might be inferred that the men suffered from the want of great coats in consequence of some tardiness or obstruction in the process by which the quartermaster-general's department sanctioned the issue; but by comparing the approved requisitions with the actual deliveries, it is soon made to appear not merely that the issue of great coats was sanctioned as fast as the men could take them, but even much faster. The requisitions duly sanctioned by the quartermaster-general's department were thousands in advance of the deliveries. I produce a tabular statement which shows this very clearly, by the simple expedient of bringing in the quantities that were not issued, though fully sanctioned, and the quantities actually delivered, into contiguous columns. This tabular statement goes from the 2d of December, 1854 to the 20th of January 1855. It appears that the orders issued amounted to 6,577, and what was received by the regiments was 2,802; proving that they had not the means of carrying them away. (*A tabular statement was handed in.*)

In the paragraph of the Report last read, there is a sentence which makes it appear that during the months of eDcember and January there were 2,000 watch cloaks in store not drawn; but this is simply an error on the part of the Commissioners. By the 4th of January authority had been given for the issue of every watch cloak of the 3,622 that had arrived in the Crimea by the end of Jannary, and all those, except 749, appeared to have been carried away. On the 10th of January the issue of sheepskin coats commenced, and this fact accounts for any watch cloaks having remained in store at all. After the warm sheepskin coats came the demand for watch cloaks ceased. As to the palliasses, I must observe, that even if those had been useful articles, the same cause which prevented the men from appropriating the available blankets and rugs would have prevented them from carrying up the palliasses to the front, and I will take the opinion of any officer who was in the Crimea during the winter of 1854–1855, and ask him whether, in the state of that ground, a coarse linen palliasse cover to lay down upon that wet ground would have been of any use whatever, or whether any man would have taken the trouble to have walked down to Balaklava to have obtained any number of them. Any field in Northamptonshire is a macadamized, hard, summer road in comparison with what the Crimea was at that time; and I would ask whether any number of palliasse covers of coarse linen would have been of any use to the unfortunate creatures by way of protection from the wet, or as a means of warmth. There was not a man in that army who would have gone down from his tent to Balaklava to have got any number of them. And now, in concluding my explanations as to the managemenent of the sub-department in question, I may be permitted to say that the distressing interval between the time when several of the regiments were authorized to draw the warm clothing, and the time when they were able to provide means to carry it up to the camp, can never be too deeply deplored, but the calamity was occasioned, not by any departmental obstruction, but by those two causes which all the extraordinary sufferings of the army may be said to have arisen from, namely, the want of transport and the want of men. How it came to pass that the army was overworked, and that the means of transport failed, is a question which touches not my peculiar responsibility. It was for me to resist any inferences unfavourable to the quartermaster-general's department which might be drawn from the wording of the report. In this, I trust I have succeeded. I understand too well the magnitude and importance of the labour devolving upon the quartermaster-general in the field to entertain the notion that the execution of those duties by any human being could have been so thoroughly and perfectly fulfilled as to leave no room for improving the future by applying the experience of the first campaigns. But at all events I knew full well the full weight of my duties, and I strived to perform them, not in the spirit of an official person, fettered himself and fettering others by an undue adherence to forms, but rather in that of an officer high on the general staff, whose right and whose duty it was to crush every technical difficulty that tended to increase the toils of the soldier in his hour of need. If there be any matter within my department to which I have not sufficiently

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

adverted, I shall gratefully receive every request for further explanation which the Board may be pleased to make with respect to all the officers who were under my command in the Crimea. I welcome this opportunity of stating emphatically that I then cordially approved of their conduct, and I doubt whether any quartermaster general in the field was ever so zealously served by those in authority under him as I was. This being the case, I deem myself answerable for the general administration of the department during the period in which I had the honour to be the quartermaster general of the forces in the East; and, acting upon this view of my military responsibility, I request the officers who served under me to abstain, except, of course, in their character as witnesses, from any further justification of the manner in which the general business of the department was conducted; and I have no doubt that if any of those officers should think fit to address the Board, they will confine themselves to explanations arising out of the evidence which they give before the Commissioners and such other matters, if any, as may not be covered by my responsibility as the head of the department. Of course, however, those officers will be willing to give their evidence as to the matters of which they have become cognizant in the performance of their respective duties; but I am anxious before saying the last word upon the peculiar subject of the quartermaster general's department, and the services of that army, most emphatically to disclaim the possibility of any two individuals, whether they were civilians or military men, coming out to that country in the middle of the month of March, and being able to make a fair report, or form a fair opinion upon what could or could not be done by that army, placed in a position of straits and difficulties beyond human conception. It was quite impossible, I say, with every desire to do justice, to come to a fair opinion upon the subject.

General Sir Alexander Woodford, my Lord, and Gentlemen,—It would seem that the whole administration of the army during the winter of 1854-55 has been called in question, and Field Marshal Lord Raglan is not here to answer; General Estcourt, the adjutant general of the forces is no more; but the quartermaster general survives. I would willingly believe, if I might, that this chain of circumstances entitles me to come forward and answer for transactions beyond the range of my own department. But I feel that I cannot do this without presumption; it is very true, that in his courtesy and kindness, Lord Raglan would have generally consented to hear my views upon the affairs of the army, without ordering me to confine myself strictly within my special groove as quartermaster general; but those who have had the honour to take Lord Raglan's orders, whether in the office or in the field, will bear me out when I say, that in his mastery of all military business there was a completeness and precision which raised him far above the need of other men's counsel, and which, indeed, made it in very unfitting to assail him with frequent suggestions. If he were living, he assuredly would not endure that any officer serving under his command, and receiving his approval, should presume to carry the smallest share of the responsibility which he would claim for himself as the Commander of the Forces. Why it was, therefore, that an army, ever victorious against the enemy in the field, came to be so fettered in its power of aiding itself, that no efforts on the spot could entirely avert from the men a period of privation and grievous suffering, I must regard as a question beyond the power and reach of any officer who sits here to justify his own conduct and not to throw the blame upon other men; but I hold in deep reverence the memory of him who never breathed into the public ear one word of defence for himself; and perhaps I may be suffered to remark, that that very calmness and noble composure with which our chief met the pressure of adverse times, has even to this day concealed from the understanding of most men the true magnitude of the wants, trials, and dangers which beset the allied armies in the winter of the first campaign. The work of even an ordinary siege involves great sufferings and hardships, but in such operations the besieging force has always a great numerical superiority over the besieged, and is protected by a covering army against all molestation in flank and rear. In the trenches before Sebastopol the hazards and labour of a vast siege had to be borne by inferior forces as their own only means of defence against a powerful enemy, and this without the protection of a covering army. Again, a winter campaign, even though by far the greater part of the time be really passed in cantonments, is known to involve so much of hardship and suffering as scarcely to be endurable without a stringent necessity by European armies. Yet the forces before Sebastopol had to go through the winter amid the snows of a bleak promontory in Crim-Tartary, which yielded no food, no forage, no shelter; but those were only part of the trials to which the forces were exposed during the troubles of the siege and of the winter. There was put upon the allied army all the stress of active operations by the enemy in the field. In the earliest days of November, the late Emperor of Russia had succeeded in bringing the resources of his empire to bear upon the great object of crushing the invasion with a force vastly superior in number, the enemy was impregnably entrenched on both sides of a great harbour, in lines extending from the sea to the Mackenzie ridge, and again from the Mackenzie ridge along the line of the Tchernaya, with forces on the right touching the sea to the east of Balaklava. Prince Menchikoff, in the great intrenched camp of Sebastopol, rested upon one of the greatest arsenals which had ever been made by the care and warlike spirit of a vast empire. Still more valuable to him if possible than even the warlike stores were the crews of all that powerful fleet, which only a few months before had had the dominion of the

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

empire. He had besides a whole population of dock labourers, and other skilled workmen, richly provided with all the machinery, tools, and materials necessary for the rapid construction of immense military works, and those resources were so ably used under the direction of a gifted young officer of engineers, that day by day, and hour by hour, the enemy was getting fresh cover and planting new batteries. By his rear, the prince communicated by another chain of fastnesses with Simpheropol, Perekop, Odessa, St. Petersburg, and all the resources which the Emperor of Russia could bring forward. By his left, touching his right at the Mackenzie heights, he could either swell his garrison or reinforce the field army at his will and pleasure; Liprandi enjoyed the like powers of unrestricted communication with the garrison as well as with the north side of Sebastopol, and the control of the whole peninsula towards the east; and they gathered the resources of the country. Before the autumn the Russian stacks of forage were miles and miles in length. For the allies after the 25th of October there was not one load of hay, but what had to be brought with infinite delay and difficulty from distant shores, and although every conflict in the field had been invariably glorious to the arms of the allies, we were so pressed by the increasing forces of the enemy that after the battle of Balaklava we were obliged to abandon the lower road, which we had taken pains to repair and confine ourselves to the ridge. From this time the enemy's relieving army freely occupied the ground on the left bank of the Tchernaya—the ground which our brave allies the French and Sardinians afterwards made memorable by their brilliant victory, and they hung so closely upon our flank that Liprandi could keep his videttes within gun-shot of the British camp, almost within shelling distance of Balaklava itself. By this close pressure the forces of the allies were enclosed within a narrow promontory, and on all sides except the sea they were effectually invested. The troops thus shut up in the Chersonesus, besides the reinforcements which came from Varna and Scutari were the remains of the moveable column which had stormed the position of the Alma and made the flank march; those men, almost without exception, had brought with them more or less of the sickness originally contracted by the army in Bulgaria and at Varna, and the sick of the British army in the month of August amounted to 11,236, and on the 14th of August, shortly before the sailing of the expedition, it seems to have been believed that no man was so well as to be capable of his usual exertions. This condition of the troops did not cease in the Crimea, and it was not the bodily health, but the strong will and courage of the men which kept them out of the hospital. Sick and feeble as they were, they had fastened upon the enemy's territory, and would not relax their hold. Those men, in common with our gallant allies, were destined to become the nucleus of those magnificent armies which now in full power and strength are preparing to return victorious from the scene of conflict; but to effect this vast change, to convert into mighty armaments the little remnant of the column which was so gallantly standing at bay against Russia in the Chersonesus, and to supply it by sea with food and forage and means of land transport—this was one of the greatest operations ever undertaken by the resolute will of warlike nations. It was not to be achieved without some lapse of time; and meanwhile what there was of food and comfort in Balaklava could not be carried up to the camp, because, as I have said, the land transport had failed, and the men were so engaged day and night with the enemy in front and in flank, that they could not come down to the rear. Thus occurred the sufferings endured by the British soldier, with that heroic fortitude so eloquently described by the Report.

The general worthy to command such troops in the hour of danger would be one whose calm courage and high resolve could keep the feeble groups of brave men together and give them in the face of the enemy the semblance of a powerful force. In the British army we believe that such a general as this was Lord Raglan, and the gallant officers and soldiers of the French army, ever keen in their scrutiny of a general's qualities, warmly shared our devotion to our chief. They had seen how he led the attack, and how he governed the crisis of the action on the Alma—they had gallantly flown to his support when they saw him engaged on the Inkerman heights against mighty odds, and afterwards, when the enemy's superior numbers reduced him for awhile to the defensive, they saw how he stood his ground. In those times of trial he ceased to be equal with other men, for his personal ascendancy gave him a singular faculty of carrying his fixed determination into the minds of those who approached him. Without disregarding facts, he would calmly withhold his assent to all gloomy apprehensions, and mildly force attention to the special business in hand; and thus, or rather, perhaps, by a kind of power which cannot be traced or described in words, he threw upon those who conversed with him the spell of his own undaunted nature. Men went to him anxious and perturbed, but they came away firm. By the like happy ascendancy, he sheltered the home authorities from the danger of undue apprehension. He knew that their fears would rapidly spread a panic in England, and that panic in England would be injurious to the efficiency of the force. Yet he did not conceal, he carefully denoted, the wants of the army. It is singular that he could find words to do so effectually, without creating alarm. This, however, he apparently did. He abstained from complaint, but all that was needful, in the way of information, he, no doubt, communicated to the then Secretary for War, in language brilliantly clear. It is possible, that by one unaccustomed to military affairs, the true import and consequence of the facts thus conveyed would have been more com-

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

pletely understood if the narrative had been given in that tone of lamentation which can be appropriately adopted by civilians when labouring under heavy trial, but it was not well that that should be; and perhaps, too, it may be confessed that against such a way of writing and speaking Lord Raglan had a soldier's prejudice. The morning state told all with dreadful exactness, and this he regularly enclosed from time to time, and he was accustomed to say, with a touching indulgence for the difficulties of others, that it was not possible for the home authorities to do much, but he knew that they would do all they could, and then discarding vain words and regrets, he bent his vast powers of business to the subject of saving his gallant soldiers. It is not by his correspondence with London that those efforts can be known or measured. He saw in what circle of action he could labour with the best hope of speedy results. His efforts told powerfully in his own camp, and in the camp of our gallant allies in Bulgaria, and on the shores of Asia Minor, and at Constantinople; they reached to Malta, and even with great and speedy effect to Vienna, but England unhappily was distant, and demands in that direction were slow in producing their results. It was by his loyal alacrity in undertaking a great and hazardous enterprise, and afterwards by the actual stress of war, that Lord Raglan, ever victorious in the field, became surrounded by an accumulation of military difficulties for which it would be hard to find a parallel in all the annals of war: those difficulties were faced and conquered.

The sufferings and gallantry, and the splendid achievements of our allies, it is not for me to speak of; but this I may say, that for full forty days our army was in great straits and peril, and the courage of the British soldiers, sustained by Lord Raglan's unshaken firmness, was strong enough through all that dreadful time to save the force, not indeed from hardship and cruel losses, but, thank God! from a great military disaster, and to hold fast the precious ground from which the capture of the enemy's stronghold was ultimately achieved. If there was glory for the allies in the fall of Sebastopol, it will surely be remembered that that great result was prepared by the audacity of the original invasion, and the enduring heroism of the winter campaign. The more the singular history of those transactions shall become known, the greater will be the pride with which our countrymen will cherish Lord Raglan's fame.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) Do you propose to call any witnesses to day?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Some members of the Board wish to put some questions to you.

---

Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B., examined.

1214. (*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) No. 5 memorandum, dated the 31st of August 1854, in the General Orders, at page 48, having directed that the troops should land in the Crimea with their knapsacks, why was that order not carried out, and what steps subsequently were taken to obtain the knapsacks from the transports?—I have stated in my address to-day, that I did not enter upon that question, it being one that affected the adjutant-general's department, but at the same time I should be prepared to answer any question in the absence of officers from that department that the Board might think fit to put to me, and I have prepared a memorandum upon that subject. When the fleet appeared off the coast, and the orders were promulgated for the disembarkation, and the manner in which the army was to be equipped, it was decided that the men should take their knapsacks with them, but not put them on. That merely had reference to the general regulations of the army, as accidents had occurred, and men had been drowned from having a weight at their backs; they were to be laid in the bottom of the boats, and on leaving the boats they would put them on, or place them on the beach in order as they might stand, or according as they might be directed. That was an arrangement made for the army while on board ship crossing the Black Sea, but the physical state of the army was such on board ship, so many men died of cholera that we were throwing men overboard during the whole of that passage to a very fearful extent; it had always been hoped and thought that the health of the troops would improve, and that they would be invigorated by the passage, but it was not so; they fell away very fast indeed. The consequence was that when we got off the Crimean coast Lord Raglan thought that perhaps it would be better to let them land in as light marching order as possible. In Bulgaria, before we embarked we had occasionally to march short distances and change the ground, and change the camp, but not to march more than five or six miles; and the men had become so reduced from the excessive heat of the previous summer that the knapsacks were always obliged to be carried for them, they were always carried on pack animals or in the arabas of the country; they always marched without them; and, as the sickness had continued during the voyage, as I said before, Lord Raglan, at the last moment, thought that upon the whole, as this army was going to bivouac for the first time in the open air, and for the first time to be deprived of tents. Taking into consideration the physical weakness of the men, Lord Raglan thought that instead of taking the knapsack it would be better to substitute

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

the blanket containing a change of clothing instead of the knapsack. Our soldiers cannot carry their great coats, their knapsack, and the blanket, and therefore it struck Lord Raglan that as there would be a few loose articles to leave behind, and also as we could not know what might be our fate on landing, or whether we might not be obliged to retake to the boats and get on board ship again, Lord Raglan thought that the best arrangement for the men would be to land, in the first instance, with a change rolled up in each man's blanket, by which he would carry his blanket, his change of linen, and his great coat for the first few nights, and leave his knapsack on board ship, with the few articles I have named in my address. I have also mentioned certain other articles which were left in the squad bag. Perhaps the Board may imagine that the squad bags were with us, and therefore that it would have been better to have put those articles into the squad bags and carried the knapsacks; but those squad bags were left at Scutari. At Scutari in the large barracks each division had a store, and all those squad bags with those articles were left there as a means of ensuring the comfort of the men and the safety of the articles left behind; and it was considered best to leave them in the knapsacks on board ship. Of course it is very much to be deplored that the nature of the service obliged the ships by which we had landed one body of men, instantly our footing was safe, to go back to Varna and bring up others; but no sooner was our footing secured and we could hold our ground, than the ships were ordered instantly back to Varna to bring the remainder of the force to the army. It is very unfortunate that a considerable time elapsed before the return of those vessels to Balaklava, which accounted for the delay in the men not immediately getting their knapsacks; but they really did contain so little that was of any use to the men that the general officers, who also knew this, really said, "No, it is of no use, let us wait till we see what is to become "of us before we bring up those articles which encumber our tents and contain nothing."

1215. Those articles seem to have been rolled up in the blanket, and when the soldier wanted it at night to lie down, he would have to undo his blanket, and all those spare articles would be thrown about, whereas if they had had the knapsacks, they might have kept them together?—The question was not which was the best receptacle for putting the articles in, but it was, which was of the most use to a man lying out at night, a blanket or a knapsack; they could not take both. Any officer who has commanded a regiment, always knows what the feeling of the men on that subject is. I, myself, do not think that we carry our weight in the best way; it looks neat, and allows the men to lock up closely, and keep the touch, as it is called, but we carry our knapsacks in a small space but further from the back. A Frenchman carries all his articles close to his back, all piled round it to any extent of breadth and height, but it is all firm and flat against the back, and the further you remove it at a right angle from the man's back, the more irksome it is to carry.

1216. The men were physically unable to carry the weight, both of the knapsack and the blanket?—Yes.

1217. To attempt to make them carry both, would have interfered with their marching?—The army could never have marched.

1218. (*Major General Peel.*) Was it optional with the generals of division to land with their knapsacks or not?—It was only in the form of a memorandum that the colonels of regiments might use their discretion; that I am able to affirm with great accuracy, because I was employed one night in going round to the ships. It was blowing hard, and very rough, and I went round in a small steamer and hailed the different ships. I lay alongside for a little while, the steam still on, till I could get an officer to the side to tell him in what form he might land if he thought it best.

1219. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Did they have a great coat and blanket, both?—Yes; because the men had suffered so much. We never bivouacked in Bulgaria, but we always had tents; this was the first night that we bivouacked, and it is very lucky that they had that blanket. I am persuaded that if we had passed that first night, as we did, in the open air, on one of the most tremendously wet nights that ever was, the men, with only the great coat, would have suffered very much. In the usual equipment of our soldiers, they are only prepared for carrying their knapsack and great coat, or their knapsack and blanket.

1220. Colonel Gordon, in p. 177 of the Commissioners' Report, states, that a large reserve depôt of camp stores was to be formed at Malta. Did you draw on this reserve, or was it found?—I had heard that it was the intention of the Government to form a very large supply at Malta, and that it was the intention that whenever the army was to operate; with regard to the large depôt, it was to be formed at Malta. I certainly understood that that was the intention of the Government, I think, before I went out; or, at all events, I heard it. I heard that the Duke of Newcastle intended to form this large reserve for the army at Malta; and that the army, whenever it was destined to operate, either on the Danube or in Asia Minor, was to draw its supplies from that great depôt at Malta. I stated to-day, in my address, that I obtained from Malta certain tents; I did obtain them from Malta, and in this way I wrote to the Governor of Malta to say, that we were in great stress, and begging him to send all and everything he had; and he sent out 283 tents. I wrote a private letter to General Freeth, the Quartermaster General, in England at that time. I wrote my letter on the 8th of January, and as it was a private letter I had not a copy myself, but I begged him to let

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

me have a copy some time ago; and I find that I there say, "Our only real defect is "means of transport. Had we been properly provided in this respect, we should have "suffered nothing. There never was an army so well supplied. Taking the antecedents "of the Peninsula, in a perfectly different country, is a folly." In an extract, which General Freeth sends me of another letter, he says, at the same time, "The only other "part of your communication above referred to, relating to public matters, is this, the "depôt for 50,000 men at Malta is all smoke, and no such thing in existence." And General Freeth adds (this is in an extract from my letter), "All I know is, it was "ordered by the Duke of Newcastle, but whether formed or not you can judge better "than I can by the copies of the returns of the embarcation of stores sent to the "Crimea." At the time that I first received any information on the subject, we knew nothing of what was at Malta. The fact was, that there was nothing at Malta, for I was continually applying to Malta.

1221. (*Judge Advocate General.*) With reference to what you have said about the knapsacks, the president wishes to know whether your attention has been directed to that passage in the report which says, "This separation from the knapsacks not merely affected "the comfort of the soldier, but was in a great measure the cause of the wretched and "destitute state in which the sick and wounded arrived at Scutari, as referred to in the "report on the state of the hospitals of the army in the East," and whether you consider that an erroneous or an exaggerated view?—I think it was a conclusion formed in error, because, perhaps naturally, the Commissioners did not know. I dare say Colonel Tulloch, the Military Commissioner in the Peninsula, did not know, for it was quite a new thing, quite a new principle in the army, and perhaps he did not know the circumstance of the regiments having squad bags and not the clothing chests.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) There is nothing there stated whatever about that.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) In Colonel Tulloch's time the regiments had enormous cumbrous boxes, called clothing chests, for every description of article, and generally filled by the paymaster serjeant's wife. I was a regimental officer in those days, and they became so cumbersome, and added so much to the extra expense of moving the baggage, that I was one of the first officers, myself and Colonel Booth of the 43rd, to break them up and do away with them, and we substituted squad bags instead; and it was not till just before the army embarked for the Crimea that Lord Hardinge took up the principle; he liked the idea, and it became general in the service; it was only then that every regiment adopted them. It was an idea that came in, in fact, with the Minié rifle, that celerity in the movement of the troops now was everything, and if we could come to the principle of a field kit, instead of a complete barrack kit, our troops would be much more movable, and we have now adopted the principle that there should be a barrack kit and a field kit: that the field kit should comprise those very articles with which the troops actually did land in the Crimea, and that the remaining part of the kit should be left in those squad bags, and that those squad bags should be in the rear of the army in such a position as the army may venture to occupy. Therefore I fancy that Colonel Tulloch may have imagined that all the rest of the kit that completed the articles that the soldier ought to have were in his knapsack and not in his squad bag; the squad bags were at Scutari.

1222. Referring to what the Board understood you to say that the generals of divisions preferred not to recover the knapsacks having an opportunity to do so, have you observed this passage in the Report, which says, "On referring, however, to two of the officers who "commanded divisions on that occasion one of them states positively that no such offer "was made to him; another, that he has no recollection of it, though it may have been "so; the third being absent we have had no opportunity of communicating with him "on the subject?"—All that I know as to that is that I directed a memorandum to be sent round to the different general officers of divisions to let them know that the vessel containing the knapsacks which had gone round the fleet to collect them had come into Balaklava, and it was to give them an opportunity of getting their knapsacks, if they chose. It was not right in that very small port of Balaklava that we should take out the whole of those knapsacks and throw them on the beach; therefore, we gave the divisions the option of taking them or not. It was a part of the departmental business that did not devolve upon me personally to carry out, but I directed this memorandum to be written and sent to the general officers of the divisions; and, I believe, Major Hackett was the officer who wrote the memorandum to the different officers. The only one that I know who spoke to me on the subject was Sir De Lacy Evans, and I know he spoke to me on the subject, because, at a conference that took place at head quarters, he met me, and said, "By-the-bye, I do not want my knapsacks," and as I kept a memorandum book I put it down to impress it upon my memory. I just put down "Second division —a verbal communication from Sir De Lacy Evans—do not want the knapsacks."

1223. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Then he had an opportunity of getting them?—Yes, because he gave me an answer, but Major Hackett wrote a circular to the general officers.

1224. (*Major General Peel.*) Did any vessel collect the knapsacks from every transport and carry them to Balaklava?—They were collected by a vessel.

1225. It was in evidence before the Sebastopol Committee that some of the vessels took them to Liverpool?—That was because they were only collected for those officers who

*Major General Sir Richard Airey.*

2d May 1856.

said they wanted them; some regiments said they wanted them, at all events we wrote to the senior naval officers to send a vessel round to collect knapsacks.

1226. When it was decided to make the flank march, was any order given to collect the knapsacks in the various transports?—No.

1227. Then they did not arrive at Balaklava till the vessels happened to come in?—When we made that flank march we were quite at sea as to what might become of us; it was expected we might have communicated with the fleet on the Belbek, and have broken ground against the north forts and re-established our communication with the fleet; but it was found impracticable; and it was only when we were on the Belbek that we found we could not communicate with the fleet, for it came under the Russian batteries; and it was decided to change our course altogether and make the flank march to the other side.

1228. (*Lieutenant General Bell.*) You had only the ground you stood on?—Nothing more.

1229. (*Major General Peel.*) It was after the arrival of the army at Balaklava that this vessel was sent for the knapsacks?—Yes, and then many of the vessels had gone away with the knapsacks on board, because we got peremptory instructions from home to bring up the French troops immediately, and many of the vessels went at once.

1230. (*General Sir George Berkeley.*) Would it not have been better and more convenient to the men if they had kept their knapsacks with their great coats, put flat inside between the flaps of the knapsack, and rolled up their blankets outside on the top, as we very often did; then they would have had everything together?—The objection to that was this, that Lord Raglan's object was to save the weight to the men as much as possible. As I say, the army were unfit to march, and the straggling was terrible as it was.

1231. But they had a great coat and blanket, as it was?—Yes; the difference would have been only the difficulty as to the knapsack. I am free to admit that if the operation was to be gone over again, judging now from what took place, I think very likely I should say that at all hazards I would take the men's knapsacks, knowing now how we were received, and how we could march; but being then on board ship, and in ignorance of what our fate might be, because ten or twenty troops of horse artillery galloping about would have smashed our whole enterprise, I should be inclined to say, let them land in the lightest order.

1232. (*General Earl Beauchamp.*) All those things were well considered, and of the two evils you chose the least?—Yes; they were subjects of the most anxious consideration.

1233. (*Major General Knollys.*) You stated that great confusion existed in unloading vessels in the harbour of Balaklava, and in storing the various articles of clothing in the town. Had the quartermaster general's department any control over those operations, or did they rest entirely with the Commissariat?—They rested entirely between the Commissariat and the naval authorities.

1234. Was there any concert or understanding on the part of the quartermaster generals department with the naval officer in charge of the harbour of Balaklava?—Constant, I suppose. I may say I was in Balaklava five days in a week; but, besides that, I had an officer who left the head quarters every morning at daylight, he started down to Balaklava, and he remained there till all the work was over, and he kept a note of all that was going on, urging everything forward, and in constant communication with the naval authorities or the principal agent of transports, and he brought me a written report every evening, and it was laid before Lord Raglan. This officer's duty was a very arduous duty, and they took it in turns; they were out the whole day—fair weather and foul; they were daily on the road—backwards and forwards—seeing what convoys were going into the town and what were coming out, what crews and what men could be got, and the officer was in constant communication with everybody in Balaklava, and going to everybody whenever he saw anything going the least wrong; his report was laid every day before Lord Raglan. With the permission of the Board I will put in all those reports,—they are worth reading,—when I have corrected them. On the 2d of February 1854 there was a letter written from the Horse Guards regarding the management that was to take place respecting knapsacks and squad bags, and that, I think, probably, the Commissioners were not acquainted with. I arranged that the men should carry in their knapsacks one pair of trousers, one shirt, one pair of boots, one forage cap, one pair of mits, one brush, one small hook, one hold-all, one bottle of blacking, one towel, and his button-stick and brush. In the squad-bag he was to carry his shell-jacket, his other shirt, his other pair of socks, his other towel, two brushes, and such articles in the hold-all as can be immediately dispensed with. It was settled that those squad bags should not accompany the regiments on active service, but should be kept in whatever cantonments were kept for the occupation of the army after active operations had ceased.

Colonel EDWARD WETHERALL, examined.

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

2d May 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you that it is not compulsory upon you to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a Court-martial, and that any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

1235. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) You were examined, I believe, by the Commissioners on the 28th of May 1854?—I was.

1236. Can you state how long your examination lasted?—To the best of my recollection the examination commenced about 11 o'clock in the morning, and I think ended about 4 or 5 in the afternoon.

1237. Was any note made of your evidence by the Commissioners at the time of its being given by you?—Yes. I think Colonel Tulloch took down my answers in writing. But, perhaps, I may also state that the examination was carried on in a sort of conversational form. I was asked questions in a sort of conversational manner; and of such parts, I suppose, as Colonel Tulloch chose, he wrote down the answers.

1238. Was that note so made out by Colonel Tulloch of this conversational examination shown to you?—To the best of my belief I never saw any written document with regard to my examination until I saw it produced here yesterday, and I certainly never signed it, and was never asked to sign it.

1239. Is this the note of your examination? (*A paper being handed to the witness.*)—It appears to be.

1240. That was the note that was taken at the time?—I cannot say that; a great deal of this I believe I stated, but the printed evidence of mine is not the evidence which I gave before the Commissioners.

1241. When did you see that paper for the first time?—I may have seen Colonel Tulloch writing on a piece of paper in the office when I was under examination, but whether it was this or not I cannot say. I never saw my evidence in any collected form till I saw it in this room yesterday.

1242. Had you the offer of making any alterations?—To the best of my belief, not.

1243. Were any alterations made by your authority?—None that I remember.

1244. Does this evidence in the blue book fairly represent the evidence that you gave in the Crimea?—There are a great many omissions in it of statements explanatory of the alleged delays in the issue of clothing which are not stated here. With regard to the memorandum which is stated here, "having been shown a memorandum hereto annexed," this memorandum, which is printed, was not the memorandum which was shown to me or read to me at that time.

1245. Having that manuscript before you, and having the printed evidence before you in the blue book, will you point out to the Board any omissions or discrepancies between your evidence and that?—The whole of the examination referred to the alleged delay in the issue of warm clothing which belonged to a department which I had in charge. A part of that memorandum contains these questions, "If the returns supplied by the "quartermasters of each corps are correct, it would appear that larger and earlier issues "were made to some than to others. This requires explanation. For instance, in "the light division only 200 blankets are stated to gave been issued to the 23rd foot, "while 1960 were received by the 34th, of which 1230 were so early as the 8th December, "the strength of the two corps being about equal. The 77th also received 1511, and "the 90th also 1315, while the 88th with nearly the same strength received "only 568." I have a distinct recollection of those questions being put to me, and the replies noted in the margin here in Colonel Tulloch's handwriting were given by me. I recollect going into the office and getting the books, which we had not with us at the time, in order that I might answer those questions. The answer to the first is, "12th "December, 425 had been ordered for the 23rd regiment. The 34th landed with two "blankets each man from the ship, and these were charged against the quartermaster "general's store." That accounts for the discrepancy there. "The men came without "blankets. The 77th have only received by the quartermaster general's books 435, the "rest must have been made up by recruits joining with two blankets each." The 77th received very large draughts during the whole of that winter. "The 90th received "also two blankets each on landing." I considered that that disposed of all the objections in that paragraph. The next question is, "In the 4th division up to the "17th December, the 57th had received only 300, the 46th only 150, the 68th "only 185, and the 1st battalion rifle brigade only 150, while the 17th regi"ment received 1836 in that day, and the 18th regiment in the third division received "1630, so early as the 8th December." I state—"The seventeenth and eighteenth both "came out from England and received two blankets per man on landing, while the "forty-sixth, the sixty-eighth, and the first battalion Rifle Brigade, all received on "3d December an order for 400 each, and they might have had them if they chose. The "delay is presumed to have arisen from want of transport. Same answer applies to the "forty-seventh, forty-ninth, and sixty-third regiments. Same remark applies to the "Guards." Then the question is, "In the Grenadier Guards no blankets were issued till "after Christmas, and not more than half of that corps and of the Scots Fusilier Guards

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

2d May 1856.

" were completed with additional blankets till the middle of January, while in the first " Dragoons only 66 were issued up to the 11th January." To this I reply, "The first " Dragoons received an order for 108 up to 2d December, and on the 9th January 156. " The second Dragoons had 100 on 1st December, and 187 on 10th January. It was " entirely their own fault or want of transport which created the delay." That memorandum has been suppressed, and the replies have also been suppressed in the printed evidence.

1246. Then what I collect from your answer is, that the explanatory parts with regard to those blankets have been omitted?—Decidedly.

1247. Do you consider that the report which has been printed of your evidence is a fair one or not, of what you stated on the spot?—I may observe that there are other corrections in the other minute, if I may so call it, of my evidence. It is stated in the body of the Report at page 27; " Of these there remained in store, during the months of Decem- " ber and January, when they were most urgently required by the men, upwards of 9,000, " besides nearly 2,000 watch cloaks." I see in a part of my evidence, in the same handwriting which, I presume is Colonel Tulloch's, " with regard to the watch cloaks, states, " that on the 2d December about 2,000 were in store, of which 1,200 were issued early " in December, and on the 21st December 1,100 more, and in the month of Januury " 1,100." This has been altered and erased, and is finally left out altogether in my printed answers. That explanation referred to this very question of those watch cloaks being left in store.

1248. Who made those alterations and interlineations which I see in that manuscript evidence?—I did not. I never saw the paper till I saw it yesterday.

1249. Do you know who did it?—I cannot positively say who did it.

1250. Do the parts that appear to have been interlined or altered agree. Suppose them now not to be altered, do they agree with what you then stated?—Certainly this general statement which I have just read I think I must have stated; if I did not, it could not be here in the original minute, in Colonel Tulloch's handwriting.

1251. What you mean to say is, that if the paper had been left as it originally was, it would have given your evidence?—I think so, certainly. It would have explained many of those non-issues which the department had been charged with.

1252. Here is an explanation with regard to the watch cloaks on the 2d of December, that a certain number were in store; is that the correct evidence which you gave?—To the best of my belief it is what is there written.

1253. Does this appear in the report now?—No.

1254. Are you predared to say now that what appears in your evidence has been suppressed?—I am only prepared to say that, to the best of my recollection, I gave an explanation as to those watch cloaks which is not in the printed evidence published and headed with my name, and that, on looking at those original documents produced yesterday, I found that I did give a statement which has been erased.

1255. (*Judge Advocate General*). Do you adhere to the statement that is erased?—Decidedly.

1256. The parts erased are correct?—Yes; the statements that I made there I believe to be correct.

1257. Those statements are not in the printed evidence?—No.

1258. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) Will you state the general instructions that you received from me as to the manner in which you were to carry on the duties as to the issue of this clothing?—About the 11th or 12th of December 1854, I returned from Constantinople, where I had been dispatched by the order of Sir Richard Airey, to select a quantity of clothing and other stores for the use of the army, which the commissariat were to pay for, and on my return you desired that I should take the charge of, and undertake the apportionment of all those stores which I had purchased, and which the Government were sending out. You told me on that occasion, that as the supplies would arrive in very small numbers, and the strength of all the corps varied very much, you wished that all the corps should receive the stores in proportion to their strength. You also distinctly impressed upon me that there was to be no limit to the issue of those stores beyond the two Jerseys, and the proportion of clothing which the general order stated. And I remember distinctly your impressing upon me the necessity of not being bound by any forms in my duty, and telling me that Lord Seaton had told you on coming out to join in the Crimea, that the grand secret of administering the departments, or in fact of carrying on any measures during war, was to remove all barriers of etiquette or form whatever, and to meet every body half way, or something to that effect.

1259. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) I expressed Lord Seaton's words as to the act of administering a department?—Those instructions I endeavoured to carry out. The system consisted in the commanding officer of a regiment making a requisition for such things as he absolutely wanted, except the extra articles, such as the Jerseys, drawers, socks, comforters, mitts and those things that were coming out, to be given in proportion as they arrived. It consisted in the officer commanding a regiment making a requisition for what he wanted in the simple form which has been handed in to-day, which after he had signed it, went to the quartermaster general of the division to which the regiment belonged. Every day about 12 o'clock the assistant quartermaster general of the division, or his deputy, came to me and brought all those requisitions for the wants

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

2d May 1856.

of his division. Personally I looked over them, and those things which we had in store I always gave, and as to those that we had not in store or were expected, we generally filed the requisition to save him the trouble of coming backwards and forwards and sent to him the things when they arrived. I had orders from General Airey when I had occasion to refuse a requisition to bring it to him, but on all other occasions to act to the best of my discretion. This book was established called the Requisition Book: it contained in columns the names of all and the heading of all the descriptions of stores that we had available, and when I granted a requisition I entered it in my own handwriting; for instance, the Royal Artillery on the 4th of January 964 blankets; the 46th regiment 100 blankets. That was a day book of the transactions of the day, and at the end of the week they were transferred into the ledger under the heading of every regiment and division in the army, in order that when the periodical returns came in at the end of the month they might be examined with what the regiment had received, in order that the stores might be properly accounted for. When a regiment made what I considered an excessive demand, I could turn readily and see that the 62d regiment for instance had received in the month certain articles, that was the process in which we carried it on. (*The book was delivered in.*) It has been already explained by General Airey that the quartermaster general, or anybody in his department, has no control whatever over the stores of the army. They do not belong to us in any way. They are entirely and completely under the commissary general. There was a certain class of stores: tents, great coats, boots, and things of that sort, which were called camp equipment stores, over which we had the power of granting requisitions, but that was all; and the term "quartermaster general's stores," as to which so much misunderstanding has sprung up, was instituted by the commissariat entirely to designate the class of stores alluded to, for facility of reference for their own accounts, and to account for that description of stores. The only connexion which the quartermaster general's department had with those stores was, that the signature of an officer of the department was necessary for the commissariat as a voucher for the issue of those stores. They were under an officer of the commissariat, Assistant Commissary General Archer, who was not in communication with the quartermaster general's department in any way, and he states so himself in his evidence, at page 66 of the evidence in the Report. The question from the Commissioners to Assistant Commissary General Archer, appears to have been "Did you make any representations on the same "subject to the quartermaster general's department?"—His answer is, "Personally I did, "but not officially. I was not in official communication with the quartermaster general's "department." That is the answer of Assistant Commissary General Archer, who had the charge of all those stores. Mr. Archer received all his orders from the commissary general. We had no communication with Assistant Commissary General Archer, except on a very few occasions. When we had any necessity to communicate with him we wrote, through the commissary general. At the commencement of the winter, when it was extremely important, the quartermaster general and Lord Raglan were very anxious that the trooops should get all that they required, and General Airey ordered that an officer of his department should go down every day to Balaklava to facilitate the issues, and to ascertain any obstructions or difficulties that occurred, and to remove them. He was consequently in constant communication with the naval authorities, and in constant communication with the commandant at Balaklava getting fatigue parties, and whenever any corps went down to draw anything and found any obstructions they went to that officer to get it removed. The natural impression from that circumstance was that those officers had the control of that store, but they had nothing to say to it, they were merely the agents of General Airey, who gave them authority to use his name or that of Lord Raglan in removing those obstructions, and to facilitate the isues to the troops. Just before I commenced the discharge of this duty, it was arranged with the commissary general that he should send us every week a return of the stores available for the troops, and in that return which was received every Saturday night, the issues to the army were made. That return of course guided me entirely in the amount of stores which I gave out, and we had no means of challenging that return. We must accept it as correct. The quartermaster general could no more assume that a return of the clothing which the commissary general sent in as available for the troops was incorrect, than he could assume that the returns of the money in the military chest were incorrect. Those returns, as was proved subsequently, were very incorrect. A much smaller amount of stores was returned to us as being in store and available than actually appeared to be there. Assistant Commissary General Archer's return, published in the appendix, is dated the 31st of March, and upon those returns the Commissioners have apparently founded their Report. But the issues were necessarily made upon the weekly returns which we received. Our operations during November, December, and January cannot fairly be impugned because a subsequent return, dated the 31st of March, showing different results, has been put in. We can judge upon the returns which the commissary general sent to us what they have available. The quartermaster general can only be held responsible for the quantities ordered to be issued, for the quantities drawn by the troops depended upon various other circumstances, they depend upon the arrangements of the generals of divisions, whether on a certain day a certain number of men could be sent down to Balaklava for the

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

2d May 1856.

purpose of bringing up those stores. All that we had to do was when stores were available to take care that we gave the troops an opportunity of getting them. If we gave a regiment an order for 500 blankets, the quartermaster general could not order that that regiment should send down 500 men to fetch them, they might have been employed in the trenches or on picket. Nobody could know what those duties were, except the general of the division in which they were. Therefore the arrangement of sending for those things depended entirely upon the arrangements of the generals of divisions; nor can you fairly draw any comparison between the supply of an army under ordinary circumstances and the supply of an army situated as the army in the Crimea was. We had to occupy a very extended defensive as well as offensive position in the middle of December. We had not above 16,000 effective infantry to maintain a position of about 12 miles in extent. The Guards, for the trenches, in the middle of December, with working and covering parties, averaged about 4,000 or 5,000 men alone. The object was to save as much as possible the labour of the men in the front, but the troops at Balaklava could give us very little assistance; they were very weak; there were not above 4,000 or 5,000 men there, and they had also to hold one of the most important positions of the whole. There was a Russian corps, under Liprandi, encamped within 3,000 yards of it, and it was very obvious, that if Sir Colin Campbell had denuded his position to supply large working parties for the purpose of carrying stores to the fronts, the chances are that he would have sacrificed his position. The Russians only waited there to keep up that very pressure to prevent our succouring and supplying our troops in the front; and it was not till Liprandi retired, somewhere about the 8th or 9th of December, that any arrangements whatever could be made for carrying up stores, and then they were commenced.

The Commissioners state at page 28 of the Report, "We are desirous to direct attention "to the circumstance, that the preceding observations relative to the non-issue of warm "or winter clothing, which was available in the Crimea, refer exclusively to the interval "between the end of November 1854, when the first supplies of that description arrived, "and the middle of January 1855, a period of about six weeks." And they go on to say,—"But between the beginning of December and the middle of January they received "nothing except the warm under-clothing previously mentioned, and about 3,000 pairs of "trousers." Now this statement is not qualified in any way. By the return of the issues from the quartermaster general's stores, published by the Commissioners at page 100 of the Appendix, it appears that during the month of December, that is, from the 5th to the 31st part of the period mentioned by them, they received 10,329 pairs of boots, 1,404 pairs of Turkish boots, 118 pairs of long boots, 17,323 blankets, 2,626 great coats, 458 watch coats, 312 gregos, which is a Greek capote with a hood, 241 rugs, 12,153 jerseys, 15,208 pairs of mitts, 35,152 pairs of socks, 13,034 comforters, 450 paillasses, 1,144 suits of horse clothing, 198 horse hoods, horse shoes, and nails, 375 canteens, 3 havresacks, 1,136 camp kettles, 412 iron stoves, 51 Maltese stoves, 10,761 pairs of drawers, 154 tarpaulins, 909 pairs of trousers, 19 marquees, 3 officer's marquees, 21 circular tents, 50 picketing posts,—Up to the end of January, the middle of January, as stated by the Commissioners, but I have not totalled them up to the middle, but the bottom line of that return shows what they received during the month of January. They received, during the month of January, 21,304 pairs of boots, 164 pairs of long boots, 283 pairs of Turkish boots, 4 pairs of shoes, 17,012 blankets, 4,394 great coats, 18,030 sheepskin coats, 798 fur coats, 2,246 watch coats, 4,811 gregos, 1,630 rugs, 34,300 jerseys, 18,541 pairs of mitts, 14,062 pairs of socks, 13,053 comforters 4,800 paillasses, 279 suits of horse clothing, 468 pairs of English shoes and nalls, 717 pairs of Turkish shoes and nails, 231 canteens, 10 havresacks, 2,027 camp kettles, 886 iron stoves, 604 Maltese stoves, 34,217 pairs of drawers, 641 turpaulins, 847 nose bags, 1,542 pairs of militia trowsers, 55 picketing posts, 298 felling axes, 36 pairs of rifle green trowsers, 10,047 fur caps, 5,611 buffalo rolees, 6 marquees, 123 circular tents, 3 circular officer's tents, 30 serge gowns, 800 gauntlets, 5 pairs of Turkish socks, 1,000 flannel shirts, 590 waterproofs, and 291 corn sacks.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was the non-issue of warm winter clothing that was referred to in the paragraph.

(*Witness.*) Those returns published by the Commissioners only show what the troops drew. I now wish to hand in a statement of what we ordered to be drawn up to the 15th of January 1855. This statement is taken from the Requisition Book, which has been laid before the Board. By this return it will be seen that we issued orders to the regiments for 3,417 blankets, 513 rugs, 56,838 woollen packs, 4,079 pairs of trowsers, 49,720 pairs of socks, 44,852 pairs of drawers, 18,878 pairs of boots, 6,459 greatcoats, 18,227 comforters, 26,804 pairs of mitts, 2,327 suits of horse clothing, 1,844 pairs of Turkish boots, 4,127 capotes, 7,421 sheepskin coats, 588 officer's coats, 853 tarpaulins, 1,199 stoves, 580 mangals (these are Turkish braziers), and 1,145 nose bags.

(*President.*) That was at the end of January?—Yes, that return is up to the 15th of January. The Commissioners append to those two returns of the issues the remark, that "many of "those issues were merely transfers to store-ships, or to the supplementary store at Kadikoi, "as shown in Mr. Hayter's explanatory return on thrt head;" and this remark is appended to the return from the 5th to the 31st of December. By referring to Mr. Hayter's return, at page 104, it will appear that there is not a single article during the month of December

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

2d May 1856.

sent to the store at Kadikoi. The Royal Artillery appear to have received a great number of stores, and the General Hospital some stores, who naturally received stores during that month, yet the Commissioners have thought it necessary to append to the return dated the 5th to the 31st of December, that this return is inaccurate, because a great many things are stated to have been sent to the store and not to the troops. That note is erroneous, and the same note is appended to the "Return of Issues from the Quarter-" master General's Stores, Balaklava. during the month of January, 1855," at page 101. There is nothing sent to the stores at Kadikoi, by this return given by the Commissioners, till the 24th of January, which was ten days subsequently to the period at which they admit, in the extract which I have just read, that the troops were very well supplied. They were only sent on the 24th of January for that very reason, that they were not wanted by the troops. The store-ships alluded to by the Commissioners in this Report only existed in the imagination of the Commissioners. The ships were the "Europa," the "Shooting Star," and the "Thames." Those ships were hospital-ships, and the stores sent on board them during the early part of January were for the use of the sick on board; therefore I conceive that that may fairly be put down as for the use of the troops. At page 31 of the Commissioners' Report they state, "From these it must be " inferred in many cases the supplies did not reach the men for a considerable time after " they appear from the Quartermaster General's returns to have been issued. But there " is no reason to believe that the delay was in any degree attributable to that department. " Owing to the deficiency of transport, these supplies may have remained in Balaklava " for a considerable time before they could be conveyed to the front, or in any other way " be made available for the use of the men." There is a slight discrepancy, I think, between the statement of the Commissioners in referring that the non-receipt of those articles for the troops was to be attributed to neglect on the part of the Quartermaster General's department, when two or three pages further on they acquit them of it. In answer to query nineteen, there is a reference made by the Commanding Officer of the 89th to the circumstance that they did not receive their stores for some days after they were landed, and that they were marched to the trenches without any warm clothing. That refers to the 89th regiment. That regiment arrived about the 16th of December, and late in the afternoon of the 18th an attack was expected, and orders were sent down to Colonel McKenzie, at Balaklava to disembark that regiment, and march them up to the front. But I perceive by my book of issues, that on the 20th of December that regiment received all their warm clothing, that is to say, they received an order for it. Here is an order dated "Head Quarters, December 17th 1854." It is a memorandum for Sir Colin Campbell, "Should any attempt on Balak-" lava be in contemplation by the enemy, some indication of it will probably be " observed by the movement of troops, or posts this day or evening, which, though " not entirely to be depended upon, Sir Colin Campbell is requested to cause to be " observed, with more than usual vigilance, and reported immediately to Head Quar-" ters. (Signed) Richard Airey, Quartermaster-General." That shows that an attack was expected, and during those two days while that attack was impending it is evident that Sir Colin Campbell could not denude his position to send fatigue parties to Balaklava for ordinary work, or to carry stores to the front. For those days it is very evident that those regiments could not come down to fetch those stores, which accounts for their not receiving them for two or three days. I find that they disembarked on the 17th, when this letter was written to Captain McKenzie by Colonel Gordon: "Immediate.—Sir, I am directed to inform you that the Field Marshal Com-" manding finds it necessary to disembark the 17th and 89th regiments to-day, and " requests you will take immediate steps for landing them accordingly." Some of the difficulties with regard to transport, perhaps, I can place before the Board by a comparison between the transport which existed in the winter of 1854-55, and the transport which existed in the winter of 1855-56. The transport in the winter of 1854-55 consisted, according to the return published by the Commissioners at page 66 of the appendix, of 345 effective animals and 122 carts and there was no road whatever. That 345 had not only to supply the army with food, clothing, and medical stores, but they also had to carry up ammunition for the troops; a great deal was then being fired away in the trenches, and they had to supply the army with ammunition for 140 guns, and they had to carry up all the engineers' stores for the attack, which it was very evident they were not capable of doing, and the consequence was that we had to employ soldiers. It therefore became a matter of question, when we had to move up stores to the front, and when we knew the number of men available for that duty, what store was to be taken. It was a question which was of the most importance, the ammunition and shot that we had to drag up for the guns, or to take up food or clothing. It is evident that we had not enough for all, and therefore selections were made of what was most important and most needed at the time. No doubt that caused a great delay in the troops receiving their clothing; ammunition and food were the greatest wants that they had. Of the transport, now, no one can speak better than I, for I had the charge of it. It consisted, this winter, of about 8,000 animals; we worked 200 waggons and 500 carts; we had a railway which used to convey, on an average, from 200 to 300 tons of stores to the front; we had a road which had taken 299,000 men to construct; and yet, with all these advantages, and with no military operations whatever in progress, the transport

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

2d May 1856.

of the hutting of that army had to cease, and fatigue parties were ordered down to carry up the huts of the men, even when in possession of that enormous amount of transport, and nothing going on,—not a shot or a shell to be carried up. And when it is considered that that army, numerically insufficient to carry on the gigantic enterprise which it was then attempting in the presence of an enemy superior in numbers, and backed by all the resources of the country, had to maintain a position of nearly 13 miles in extent, being I may say totally devoid of transport, and yet required to keep up its supplies of food, clothing, ammunition, engineers, and medical stores by manual labour, to carry on an active seige, and to maintain a defensive position, which was constantly threatened, it is to be wondered that so much was done ; and it was only by great exertions of all ranks and all arms that the army existed at all. At page 26 of the Report it is stated :—"It will be observed that amongst the supplies received as " early as the 21st November, there were nearly 8,000 rugs, and that the number in store " or on board of ships in the harbour, on the 7th December, exceeded 10,000 irrespective " of 3,750 lost in the "Prince." These rugs were nearly as well calculated as blankets " to give protection from the cold, and were, perhaps, better suited to resist wet; yet " when the supply of blankets fell short, it does not appear to have occurred to anyone " that the rugs were available as a substitute. They continued to arrive by different " vessels during the month of January, till the number amounted to 25,000 ; but while " the men are stated to have suffered severely for want of sufficient covering, the Return " of clothing received and issued from the quartermaster general's store, shows that the " troops were supplied with only 100 out of 24,000. This circumstance is the more un- " accountable, because on the 18th November, Major Wetherall was directed to purchase "'at Constantinople 22,000 blankets 'or rugs.'" Those rugs were considered always to be a hospital store. It was a yellow half cotton and half worsted rug, and though the Commissioners state that they were nearly as well calculated to resist wet as blankets, no one else in the Crimea thought so, and that was the very reason why they were never used, because they did not resist wet. They were all handed over to the Purveyor ; that is, a notification was sent to him to say that they were there for the use of the sick. The sick and wounded then in the Crimea amounted to 4,017, and there were, therefore not sufficient in store to have warranted a general issue, considering that they were hospital stores, and only 8,000 in store. We had 4,000 sick and wounded, and we thought that those stores should be reserved for the use of the sick, for whom they were sent ; but there was no reservation ever made relative to those rugs. They were placed always under the same category as blankets, and I frequently altered requisitions when they came in for blankets, and put in the words "or rugs ;" and Colonel Mackenzie, at Balaklava, knows very well that orders were issued that whenever requisitions came down for any particular description of store, and that particular description was not in store, they were to give any corresponding sort. If a regiment asked for blankets, and they were not available, and rugs were, they had permission to take rugs, and of that permission the troops appear to have avalied themselves. The Commissioners say that I only issued 800 to the troops; but by the returns of issues made by the Commissariat, it appears that they drew very nearly 2,000 during that time, and the general hospitals drew 1,000 rugs upon the 26th of January, which I had given no orders for ; therefore proving that they knew that we had those rugs, that they were available for them, and that they availed themselves of them when they chose. " This circumstance is the more unaccountable, because on the 18th November Major " Wetherall was directed to purchase at Constantinople 22,000 blankets 'or rugs.'" Those rugs which I was ordered to purchase were not this description of rug, but a thick Turkish rug-blanket or a rug, a very much better article for the troops in their exposed state than the regulation rug. The Report says, "the only explanation that has been " offered to account for the non-issue of those rugs is the statement of Major Wetherall, " that he occasionally mentioned to the quartermasters of different corps that there were " such things in store, and that they declined taking them. We could not learn, however, " from any of the quartermasters whom we questioned on the subject, or even from their " superior officers, that they were aware of the existence of these rugs." That is a state- ment apparently impugning my veracity. I stated that to the Commissioners, and if they had reason to believe that I had stated what was not the fact, it would have been more courteous on their part to have told me so, in order that I might have produced those very quartermasters to prove what I had stated. Now, to prove that notice had been sent round, I will refer to the answer to question 9, at page 381. The question to Benjamin Marlow, M.D., surgeon 28th Regiment, is "Has the accommodation for the " sick while in camp, and the supply of blankets and bedding been sufficient, and " such as are usually supplied in the field?" The answer is, "From 14th Sep- " tember to the 7th October the hospital establishment of the 28th Regiment consisted " of a single circular tent, without bedding or utensils of any description, and at " a time when men were dying of cholera. A marquee was obtained on the 7th " October, a second at the end of December, the first but about the 10th of January. " About the end of November a few of the men received a second blanket. Notice " was given that rugs were procurable towards the end of December." The surgeon of the 4th regiment, also states at page 380 :—"Orders it is true had just been given " for the supply of 24 hospital rugs." It is not likely that I would have notified it to

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

2d May 1856.

the 4th and 28th regiments exclusively, and I think it may be inferred from the absence of any contradiction, which does not appear in the evidence in the Report, that that notice had been given, and that I did send to every regiment to say that they might have rugs if they chose it. The Commissioners further state, "And certainly it is not usual to leave "it to the quartermaster of a corps to determine what amount of covering the soldiers "shall have." As a further proof that my statement was correct, and that the quartermasters did exercise that discretion, I produce a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Woodford, who was then deputy assistant quartermaster general at Head Quarters, dated—"Head Quarters, December 29th, 1854." That was one of those Balaklava Reports, in which he states:—"The general issues at quartermaster general's stores consisted of "stores, camp kettles, rugs, blankets, horse clothing, &c. Several quartermasters of regi "ments refused to receive soiled blankets (landed from Albert), and accordingly went "without." The "Royal Albert" brought out a large draught of men, and when the troops landed the extra blankets were not required, and the quartermaster general applied for them; we got them and they were soiled, they had been used for the troops. But I think that the circumstance of the quartermaster's refusing to receive them on the 29th of December, shows that they must have been very well supplied with blankets. If the blanket was soiled it would have been useful to put on the ground, or where the soldier liked, it would have kept him warm.

Adjourned to Monday at Eleven o'clock.

## SEVENTEENTH DAY.

## 5th May 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

5th May 1856.

(*Assistant Commissary General Crookshank.*) I applied at the last meeting of this Board for permission to put certain questions to Commissary General Filder with regard to my being placed under arrest in the Crimea. It was suggested that Lord Lucan should be present. I notified it to him. His Lordship is now here, and I propose to put those questions to Commissary General Filder.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you proceed to put what questions you have to Commissary General Filder?

---

*Commissary General Filder.*

Commissary General FILDER, examined.

1260. (*Assistant Commissary General Crookshank.*) Have you read the proceedings of this Board on the 29th of April and 1st May?—Yes.

1261. As regards the subject of my arrest in the Crimea. Do you perfectly recollect the circumstances attending that arrest?—Yes.

1262. On submitting my explanation, dated the 1st October 1854, to Lord Raglan, did you receive any official reply to it, and have you that reply?—No, I never received any official reply.

1263. Had you any communication with Lord Raglan on the subject, and if so, will you state what?—I had repeated communications with me; and Lord Raglan, to the best of my recollection, said he could not do anything in the matter at the moment, and I told Mr. Crookshank that it was in his Lordship's hands, and I could do nothing more about it at the time.

1264. Did you submit my letter of the 12th of October to Lord Raglan, in which I report my release from arrest, and demand inquiry and reparation?—Yes; I submitted it to Lord Raglan.

1265. With what result?—There was no result.

1266. Did you submit my letter of the 24th of October to Lord Raglan?—Yes.

1267. With what result?—His lordship said that it was not expedient under the circumstances to cause an inquiry to be made into it.

1268. Had Lord Raglan entertained any feeling of disapproval of my conduct, would you, as my immediate commanding officer, have been made aware of it, and would you have communicated it to me?—Certainly; there having been no public trial nor any inquiry into the matter in the ordinary course, if Lord Raglan had disapproved of your conduct, it would have been notified to me as the head of the department; but I never received any expression of Lord Raglan's disapprobation.

1269. Did he ever express any disapprobation of my conduct?—Not to me.

1270. Will you state to the Board what replies you made to my repeated importunities to you in this respect?—That it was in Lord Raglan's hands. I could do nothing more in the matter, and his lordship did not consider it expedient that an inquiry should be made.

1271. Will you state what replies you made to my repeated complaints about Lord Lucan's language and manner?—I do not recollect. I know that you made several representations of the language you received from Lord Lucan. I do not recollect what reply I made at present.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, I am in total ignorance of everything that passed between Mr. Crookshank and his chief, Mr. Filder. I am also in perfect ignorance of everything that passed between Commissary General Filder and Lord Raglan. I never had a verbal communication with Lord Raglan on this subject. Two official communications are before the Board; one was on the 29th of September, written to the quartermaster general to make a complaint of the supplies furnished to the cavalry; Mr. Crookshank was already under arrest when that letter was written; the letter to the adjutant general was only written subsequently, giving Mr. Crookshank 24 hours for repentance; Mr. Crookshank was put under arrest on the 29th. I hold in my hand a letter from the adjutant general, returning me my letter, with Lord Raglan's remarks, and with the permission of the Board I will read it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You referred to a letter in the adjutant general's office, supposed to have been written by Lord Raglan as to Assistant Commissary General Crookshank.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I stated on Thursday that the letter was not in my possession, as it was returned to the adjutant general, according to his orders. I now produce a letter from the adjutant general, so ordering it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is that the letter that you referred to?

5th May 1856.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is one of the two letters I referred to. It is a letter returning me my letter, with Lord Raglan's remarks. It is an official letter in the handwriting of the adjutant general.

(*Major General Peel.*) Did you ever see Lord Raglan's letter?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I have the most perfect recollection of the letter. It was my own letter sent back to me, with Lord Raglan's remarks in the margin.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) What did you do with it?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) I did as I was desired to do. I returned it to the adjutant-general.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Has any application been made to him?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is in the Crimea. I think that an application should be made for it. This is an official letter to me on the subject of the very letter; may I read it?

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) On the subject of Assistant Commissary General Crookshank being under arrest?

(*Earl of Lucan.*) Yes.

(*President.*) You may read it.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) It is dated October the 11th, Mr. Crookshank having been under arrest on the 9th of September:—"My Lord, I have the honour to return the papers "your Lordship transmitted some days since to me, relating to Deputy Assistant Com- "missary General Crookshank. Your lordship will perceive that the commander of the "forces has made his own observations upon the papers in the margin, and that he "desires that Mr. Crookshank may be released from arrest. I have therefore to request "that that be immediately done, and that the papers may be returned to me after your "lordship's perusal of them." My assistant adjutant-general, Lord William Paulett, was desired to communicate to Mr. Crookshank Lord Raglan's remarks and to release him from arrest.

(*Assistant Commissary General Crookshank.*) That letter has been applied for—the letter that you surmised conveys Lord Raglan's disapprobation.

(*Earl of Lucan.*) That is what I state.

(*President, to Colonel Wetherall.*) The Board is ready to proceed with your evidence.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, before proceeding with my examination of Colonel Wetherall, I wish to ask whether Colonel Tulloch will be good enough to furnish me with the original minutes of Colonel M'Kenzie's evidence?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Those are the original minutes of Colonel M'Kenzie's evidence (*handing the same to Sir Richard Airey*), both the original minutes and the signed minutes.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) And the original minutes of Colonel Wetherall's evidence?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) They will be handed in presently. As soon as his evidence is before the Board I wish to address the Board.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I should like Colonel Wetherall to see those original minutes before I go on with his examination,

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I wish permission to address the Board after the examination of Colonel Wetherall (*the Minutes of Evidence were handed to Sir Richard Airey*), or may I be permitted now to address the Board?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) What do you desire to make a statement about?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) About those minutes, and the circumstances of the recopying of the evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Those minutes upon which Sir Richard Airey is now examining, with reference to what passed on the former occasion?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, they are all in the rough, and I wish to explain how it is.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You must not go into further evidence, but merely state what you have to say with respect to not having produced them before, and producing them now.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I wish to hand in my letter to Colonel Gordon, sending him the evidence of himself and Colonel Wetherall, and also the memoranda of the evidence of Colonel Wetherall and yourself.

Sir Alexander Woodford, permit me to give a few explanations in regard to the omissions in the transcripts of the memorandum and evidence of Colonel Wetherall. The memorandum was taken by me to the office of the quartermaster general, for the guidance of the Commissioners, as to the questions to be put. The evidence of Colonel Wetherall was taken down, not on that memorandum, but on a separate sheet. I marked in the margin of that memorandum some notes from him relative to discrepancies in the dates of the stores being received. Those notes were never introduced into the body of the evidence, because the marked difference between what was received in the one case and acknowledged in the other showed that the inquiry would lead to no beneficial result; and I therefore struck out the whole of the latter part of the memorandum, and in that state it was subsequently sent to Colonel Gordon for Colonel Wetherall, along with his evidence, to save the trouble of recopying it. The circumstance of the last paragraph of Colonel Wetherall's evidence, or rather of the rough notes of the evidence to be subsequently completed and signed by him, having been struck out, probably originated in the circumstance, that on referring to the return

5th May 1856.

of issues from the quartermaster general's store in December, page 100 of Appendix, instead of 2,300 watch coats being entered, there were only 458, and none of the entries were found to exceed 150, owing to which it was clear there must be some mistake, which rendered the explanation inapplicable, and which may have led to its being struck out; but I have no recollection whatever of having done so, or of any circumstances connected with it, and it was long out of my possession. The notes of Colonel Gordon's and Colonel Wetherall's intended evidence were taken down by me jointly in a very rough way, owing to constant reference to the books. There were many alterations on them, both in ink and pencil, as being intended to frame two separate evidences from at leisure, to be considered and signed by the parties. I saw and pointed out the necessity of this after I had proceeded a short way with the evidence of Colonel Wetherall, and the reference to its being kept distinct in the letter to Colonel Gordon was merely to call attention to the way in which it had been done. Indeed, my impression was that I had re-copied it in the office, and destroyed the rough draft originally taken, till the sight of my letter to Colonel Gordon showed the contrary, and caused me to search for it. It will, however, I trust, be sufficiently evident that there could have been no wrong intention on my part, otherwise I should never have sent the identical papers, leaving the alterations on the face of them, to Colonel Gordon, for himself and Major Wetherall, thereby indirectly bringing the very intention they refer to under their notice. Colonel Gordon was also requested to examine and alter the evidence as he thought fit, and ultimately did so to a very great extent, introducing much new matter. That Major Wetherall did not do so likewise is no fault of mine, but of Colonel Gordon's, in not forwarding it to him, and in sending it back to me without anything being done or any comment being made on it to draw my attention to the fact, that it had never been revised by Colonel Wetherall, and until I came into this Court I took it for granted that it had been so. To show, however, that there is a solitary instance arising out of the rough manner in which their evidence was necessarily taken, owing to the constant reference to books and documents, and that it can form no reason for affecting the evidence of any other officer, I have brought with me the whole of the evidence, authenticated by signatures, as well as the original roughs, which have fortunately been preserved, and I pray the Board before any further proceedings to satisfy themselves on a point so essential, when the accuracy of the printed evidence might otherwise be impugned.

(*Sir Richard Airey, to Colonel Tulloch.*) Am I to understand that you admit that you made those erasures in the evidence of Colonel Wetherall?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I admit the whole, and I have stated my reasons for doing so, but none of them are erasures. I wish that to be clearly understood—they bear upon the force of them exactly, the alterations which have been made—there they are— Colonel Wetherall can see everything that is there perfectly plain.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I do not admit that they are not erasures; they are not obliterations.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) They are merely crossed out because the memorandum was not referred to.

(*Sir Richard Airey*) You admit that those erasures, or those alterations, were made by you?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, before being sent to him. Those were made before they went back to him.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Was Sir John M'Neill a party to those erasures?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I have no doubt that he was, and that he knew that they were done.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Was it done conjointly with him as a joint Commissioner, or was it your own act?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was not my own act—whatever was done he was a party to; at least he was a party to that.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) He was present and it was the joint act of you both?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I will not say in regard to his being present when I copied the memorandum, but the part taken out was taken out with his consent,

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I ask whether the changes that were made in this evidence were made by the two Commissioners acting together?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No; what I copied out I have very little doubt was done by me, the other part crossed out I have no doubt was done with Sir John M'Neill's consent.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) After those erasures took place were they submitted to Colonel Wetherall, and did you intimate to him the changes you had made, and that you did not intend to put them in the evidence afterwards?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) They were sent to Colonel Gordon; two copies were sent to Colonel Gordon for Colonel Gordon to get the signature of Colonel Wetherall, and to look his evidence over.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) When were those erasures made?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Before they were sent; but they are not erasures, I beg to state; erasures are when you take out a thing that you do not wish a person to read, but they are crossed out.

5th May 1856.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) If these papers were sent to the parties who made statements, and passages were crossed out they could only understand them to be erasures. Colonel Wetherall stated that the examination took place in a conversational style, and that one of the Commissioners took down such parts of the evidence as he thought would be useful. Therefore, when an erasure of certain parts took place of what had been written down, it was considered, I presume, that they would not be useful to you?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes. As to the memorandum, that was a part that was of no use whatever after he gave the explanation, and this explanation is given in the return, and it is not written down as part of the evidence at all.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Was Colonel Wetherall given to understand that you intended to omit what is erased, or was it sent to him for his acceptance?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) The evidence was sent to Colonel Gordon of himself and Colonel Wetherall to be completed and returned to us.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) That paper was sent to Colonel Gordon in order to be given to Colonel Wetherall, was it?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) The paper that you have just referred to, and that which I had just now in my hand, were sent to Colonel Gorden; he knows that, and it was from that he made out his corrected copy.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Was Colonel Wetherall in the Crimea then?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I understood that he left the Crimea the day afterwards, and I understood that Colonel Gordon would bring the evidence before Colonel Wetherall or send it to him. I had no means of knowing where he had gone at the time.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) When was it returned to you?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was returned about a month after, or when Colonel Gordon's own evidence came; and that evidence has lain with his own for the whole time.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) It was within a week, because Colonel Gordon's evidence was returned to you when you were at Constantinople?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Colonel Wetherall was examined on the 28th May?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was the 4th of June when I sent it on.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Did you receive the evidence of Colonel Wetherall when you were at Constantinople?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I cannot be quite certain whether it was at Constantinople, or after I started for England. I cannot be quite certain, but it was about that time. It was on the 4th of June that I sent it to Colonel Gordon; and what I complain of is, that Colonel Gordon altered his own evidence as he thought proper, and that he did not at the same time send Colonel Wetherall's evidence altered and approved. It will be seen in the letter that I sent, that I told Colonel Gordon to alter his evidence, or do anything that he chose with it. It was not evidence, but merely rough notes of what was taken down at the time.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Of course Colonel Gordon could not alter the evidence of Colonel Wetherall, Colonel Wetherall being at Constantinople?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) But he did not send it to him; he never had the smallest communication. I had it back in the precise state in which it was, and I thought it was all right.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Excepting that there was no signature of Colonel Wetherall's attached to it, to say that he approved of it as his evidence.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I did not know that till just the other day. I knew nothing in regard to that. I understood that it was entirely as it came from Colonel Gordon, and that he took it and got it approved.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I think in your evidence you stated that you had examined the evidence of all the officers; that you sent their evidence back to them for correction, and that they had signed it.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) Have you elicited from Colonel Tulloch the facts which you wished to have?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You put to him certain questions as to the evidence; have you any other question to ask?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes. If the Board will refer to page 223 of the Minutes of Proceedings before the Board they will find that I state at the fourth paragraph from the bottom: "I wish to obtain from Colonel Tulloch the original minutes taken at the "time that the evidence was given by the officers in my department in the Crimea. He "stated, that those original minutes were in his possession, and it is very desirable that "I should see those original minutes; I mean those statements that were condensed from "what the witnesses stated, and which afterwards received their signature." Colonel Tulloch answers, "Every word that was taken down was given to the witnesses, and "they re-copied it; I will bring all that I have in the office." Then I say, "I assume "that Colonel Tulloch really understands what I do want. I mean the original minutes "taken upon the examination of the officers in my department in the Crimea, and then "the summary of those minutes which was afterwards made, and which now appears in "the Blue Books." To which Colonel Tulloch replies, "There is no summary made. It "was precisely what was taken down in the presence of the officers. There was no summary

5th May 1856.

" whatever. We never altered it, but it was sent back to the officer for the purpose of " signing. In the quartermaster general's department, they re-copied the evidence and " sent it back to us; but there is not one line was taken, but what was taken down " at the moment. No condensation took place afterwards." And at No. 2, page 224, Colonel Tulloch says, "There was no condensation whatever, every word that is in " this book was taken down at the time in the presence of the officer, and it was then " forwarded to the officer, in order that he might sign it. In some cases, the officers " preferred re-copying it, and sending it back to us, in which case we received it as their " original evidence."—(*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you got the original depositions? " —(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I think I have in most instances; but I am doubtful whether I have " in those cases where they were re-copied by the officers.—(*Judge Advocate General.*) " Those that you have got, you do not object to produce?—(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Not at all. " —(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Perhaps the Board will allow me to read a paragraph in page " 128 of the proceedings of the Board: 'We had a secretary to take down what they " stated, unfortunately we had no shorthand writer, in consequence of which, we were " obliged to condense greatly what was said.'—(*Colonel Tulloch.*) That was, we con- " densed it in the presence of the officers; the minutes were taken down there in the " presence of the officer. We heard what he had to say, and we put it down in as few " words as we possibly could. Then it was read over to the officer, and sent to him " to sign, with instructions that he was to alter, or do anything that he thought " proper, but to send it back to us in a certain time. But it was no condensation of " what was written. It was what was spoken; and having no shorthand writer, it took " a very considerable time to hear all that was to be said, and that which was written " probably in the course of four or five hours did not occupy much more than four or " five pages; but a great deal more would have been taken if we had had a shorthand " writer.—(*Judge Advocate General.*) You sent the deposition to him to sign, and then that " verified what had taken place between you?—(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes; in some instances, " in the quartermaster general's department, they thought right to keep the one con- " taining what they had stated, and sent back a copy. I am not aware whether they sent " back the original or not.—(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I want to have whatever rough notes " were taken down at the time, so that I shall be able to see, as much as possible, what " those officers did say, and the difference between that and the condensed evidence " which appears in the Blue Book.—(*Judge Advocate General.*) I take it that the " witnesses are not bound by anything that they did not sign. Were there any " corrections made after the first minutes were taken of what they stated?—(*Colonel* " *Tulloch.*) No corrections whatever.—(*Judge Advocate General.*) Did they sign it " after examining it?—(*Colonel Tulloch.*) They did; I have got their signed evidence. " —(*Judge Advocate General.*) You sent it to them for the purpose of being " corrected?—(*Colonel Tulloch.*) We sent it to them for the purpose of being signed.— " (*Sir Richard Airey.*) My reason for wishing to have this evidence in the form that I " have described is this, that I have seen even enough before this Board to make very " apparent to me the difference between the condensed statement of evidence given by " an officer, and that which is brought out from the officer's lips by another course of " examination.—(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Every document is signed by the officers themselves, " and in most instances I have got the original condensation which took place in their " own presence. I am not certain whether I have it in the quartermaster general's " branch or not, for when it was sent to them they re-wrote it, and did not always send " the same back to me.—(*Judge Advocate General.*) You will produce everything " you can that Sir Richard Airey calls for?—(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Everything that " I have. I wish to say a few words to the Board." If the Board will turn to page 138 of the evidence in this hall, at question 761, Colonel Tulloch is asked, "May the " Court believe that the evidence contained in this book is only so much of what " passed as the Commissioners thought it right to record?—As the Commissioners " and the officers thought right to record. The officers had been told to add anything " that they thought proper.—762. Have you your original minutes?—Certainly, " signed by the officers, with their corrections. Every part of it can be sent to this " Board, either the whole or any part of the officer's evidence, when they choose with " their remarks and annotations.—763. I do not know whether the Board consider them " original minutes, but if I understand Colonel Tulloch he alludes to those parts of the " Report which he thought it necessary to send to the Officers for their signature. My " question refers to the original minutes of the examination.—I do not know what is " meant by the original minutes of the examination. There were none except what was " written down in the presence of the officers. I took it down in some instances, and " in other instances, it was done by the secretary. We took down everything that we " could take down in a fair time, and as I said, the evidence was sent to each officer for his " revision and alteration, and correction, and whatever he thought proper, and he was to " add anything he thought proper. Those minutes, signed by themselves, are in my " possession; they are exactly word for word what you see in this volume, and I think " if Lord Lucan had referred to the paragraph in our Report he would have avoided the " necessity of that question. I will read it, it is in page 2 of the First Report, 'the notes " of the examinations taken down in the presence of the witnesses without the assistance " of a shorthand writer, were in all cases subsequently sent to them for correction and

5th May 1856.

" signature. Printed queries were also addressed to the Commanding Officer, and to the " Surgeon of each corps, and the answers returned were signed by them. These documents have not been subjected by us to any correction beyond what was necessary " to rectify mere verbal errors, or omissions obviously arising from inadvertence. It " would have been easy to relieve them of many repetitions, and otherwise to dress and " polish them without materially altering their import, but we have thought it better to " submit them without erasing the rough original stamp of authenticity than to change " in any respect the form in which they were returned to us corrected and signed by the " witnesses.' There is also, I may mention, on the first page of the evidence not " numbered, a memorandum which explains the course which we took in correcting the " evidence, and with reference to this subject, which, if the Board please, I will read. " Our inquiries for the first fortnight were confined almost exclusively to the corps at or " in the immediate vicinity of Balaklava, and were conducted by personal examination, " but when they extended to the corps which had been before Sebastopol during the " greater part of the winter, and when we took into consideration the number to be " examined, it soon became apparent, that unless our labours were facilitated by drawing " the attention of commanding officers, and those in medical charge of corps, to certain " specific questions which were likely to exhaust most of the information they had to " give, there was a probability of our examinations being too much prolonged. Having, " therefore, in the course of the first fortnight determined those queries which were most " likely to elicit the information required, we printed a series of them at the head quarter " press, and circulated them to each of the commanding and senior medical officers of the " force before Sebastopol. Their replies will be found from page 203 to page 432 of the " evidence annexed. In addition to this, however, we thought it our duty, by calling " each of the officers before us to afford them an opportunity of stating personally whatever " they thought fit in addition to or in explanation of the information contained in their " replies. Many availed themselves of this opportunity to enlarge their statements, some " merely repeated them in other words, while the majority referred to their written " replies, as containing all they had to state on the subject. As the necessity for arranging " the replies from each corps under their respective heads became apparent, it was found " expedient to call for information in a similar form from the officers examined at the " commencement. In any case the result of their examination must have been condensed " into the same form as the others, and we considered it better that they should do so by " replying to the queries, than that we should attempt to form an abstract of their previous statements. This will account for occasional repetitions in the evidence of these " officers; but these appeared of less consequence than the omission of anything of " importance which might have occurred had any other course been adopted. That we " thought it necessary to give in order that the course we had taken might be clearly " understood.—764. You state that the witnesses signed their evidence, did they do so " immediately on the close of their examination or how long afterwards?—They signed their " evidence after they had read it. I took it down myself in very many instances, and the " secretary in others took down the substance of what they stated, and it is here recorded " when it was sent to us. It was returned to us signed with any corrections that they " had made. In some instances we sent the copies back a second time, where they wished " it, and in some instances, I may say, that the evidence was rewritten; that I think was " the case with Colonel Gordon, and the case with Dr. Hall. They were sent back to us " in consequence of there being a considerable number of alterations.—765. Then the " minutes as printed are not a faithful report of all that occurred, and all that was " said by the examiners and the witnesses?—It is, with very few exceptions, such as " their own alterations, and the alterations that the officers though proper to make. I " am not aware that the examinations could have been taken in a better form than we " did it, or one by which it was possible to have ensured greater correctness. I may " add that in many instances the officers brought back the corrected statements to us themselves, and explained the reasons for the alterations, though I will not say that that was " done in every case." (*To Colonel Tulloch.*) You know what the erased evidence was?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I do not admit that there is any erased evidence. There is a part marked out, and that going to Colonel Wetherall, he could read it just as he could any any other part. There was no attempt to conceal it from him. I wish that to be distinctly understood. It would have been very different if it had been taken out so that he could not read it.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I do not think it is necessary to delay the Board in deciding upon the different interpretations of the word "erasure" by Colonel Tulloch and myself. I may be wrong, but what I mean are the parts crossed out or that the pen is run through.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Will you be kind enough to state when you took upon yourself to alter this evidence?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I do not say that I did take it upon myself, but I think it might have been done, and for this reason:—at page 100 of the Appendix you will see that the number of great coats and watch coats, which are stated to be issued, is totally different to the number which is there stated, in the paragraph at the end.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Under what column?

5th May 1856.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) "Watch coats." If you refer to what Colonel Wetherall states, you will see, probably the reason of parts being left out.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) The Board wish to know whether you feel it to be necessary for your further examination of Colonel Wetherall to examine Colonel Tulloch on these points.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No. I think perhaps it would be better to go on with the examination of Colonel Wetherall. As he was the officer who had the entire superintendence of those issues, and the returns also, perhaps it will be as well to go on with his examination.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I am particularly anxious that this question which has been put should be answered. If Sir Richard Airey will read what is stated by Colonel Wetherall——

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Instead of going into the details of the administration of the issue department, which were entirely under the superintendence of the officer at the head of it, all that I want is an answer to this one question.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) If you will read that one paragraph you will see——

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I asked why you took upon yourself to alter that evidence?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) In the first place, I am not quite certain that I did do it; but here is a reason for it, that it is totally different to what is stated in the return, if you will be so good as to read it.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Colonel Tulloch.*) Do you refer to page 100 as an answer to the question put to you?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) Yes, as showing very probably why this was left out, it being totally different to what Colonel Wetherall stated; he states that there were, I believe, about 2,300 watch-coats.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) With all the interlineations and crossings out, it is rather difficult to make out which was the original evidence or which was not. I think it runs in this way:—"With regard to the watch-cloaks, witness states that on the 2d December about "2,000 were in store, of which 1,200 were issued; about 1,200 were issued only in "December, and on 21st December 1,100 more, and in the month (4th) January "1,100. That on the 2d December about 2,000 watch-coats were in store, of which "1,200 were issued as above." Some of that is put out.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) If you will refer to page 100 as to the watch-coats, the answer to the question is, that there were 2,300 watch-coats entered, and there were only 458 issued; none of those entries were found to exceed 160,—owing to which it was clear that there must have been some mistake, which made some explanation necessary.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I am to collect from that answer that it is possible that the erasures were made in order to square the account with the evidence given elsewhere.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It appeared that the evidence there must have been wrong.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Therefore the change took place in Colonel Wetherall's evidence in order to make that tally with the evidence given by another witness?

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) No, it is crossed out altogether to draw attention to it.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) It is the same thing; it was not put in the blue book.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) It was to show that the watch-coats here being only 458, it was clear that 2,300 could not have been issued.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I think I may collect from that that it was really to make the general report tally.

(*Colonel Tulloch.*) I did not say that, nor do I say that I did that. I think it is very possible that that may have originated it.

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

Colonel EDWARD WETHERALL, further examined.

1272. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) Does the evidence printed in the Blue Book, at page 165, contain all the evidence given by you to the Commissioners in the Crimea?—No, it does not.

1273. Did you sanction the omissions from the printed evidence, of those parts of the manuscript memorandum which are crossed out in that manuscript?—I did not sanction them.

1274. Did you give evidence to the Commissioners, of the nature contained in the parts so crossed out in that memorandum?—Yes; I gave evidence relative to the watch-coats.

1275. Will you look at the manuscript, in Colonel Tulloch's handwriting, purporting to be a report of your evidence, and point out the difference between that and the printed evidence at page 166?—The evidence at page 166 is a total suppression of the last paragraph relative to the alleged non-issue of the watch-coats.

1276. You did not sanction the omissions from the printed evidence of those parts of that manuscript?—Certainly not; I never saw them.

1277. Do you consider the omitted parts important?—I certainly do.

1278. Then do you consider the printed evidence to be a faithful report of the evidence that you gave?—No.

1279. If the Board will turn to page 27 of the Commissioners' Report, in the third paragraph from the top, on the subject of great coats, it is stated, "Of these, there

"remained in store, during the months of December and January, when they were most "urgently required by the men, upwards of 9,000, besides nearly 2,000 watch-cloaks." Would that paragraph have been negatived by the evidence which has been erased?—I think, to a certain extent, it would, if the Commissioners would look at the question fairly in the face. The quartermaster general's department had nothing to say to the issue of stores. Our duty was merely their apportionment; that is the question which has naturally given rise to the whole of the animadversions of the Commissioners. Colonel Tulloch has just stated, that he erased this last paragraph of my evidence, because upon referring to page 100, he finds a return from the Commissariat, that only a much smaller number of those watch-cloaks had been issued. I stated that we ordered a much larger quantity to be issued. We had nothing to say to the troops drawing them; that was explained on Friday as a totally different question, but it appears that the Commissioners have founded their opinion upon their own reports, which are erroneous. If they had taken the trouble to compare that return of Mr. Archer's with their own returns which they published at page 116 of the report, they would find instead of 400, or whatever the number was, of watch-cloaks being drawn by the troops, that 1,061 were drawn during the month of December. It will take time for the Board to collate those articles out of the whole of those returns, what the troops actually drew during that month by those returns, 1,061. It will be necessary to take them for every regiment, in order to arrive at the total for the whole of the divisions of the army.

1280. (*Judge Advocate General.*) How many do you say appear at page 116?—I say that in the returns from 116, down to the end of those returns furnished to the Commissioners by the quartermaster of every regiment in the army, we have gone all over them, and we find that there were actually drawn 1,061. Mr. Archer's statement in the Report, at page 100, is 458. It appears that the Commissioners did not hesitate to animadvert most severely on the administration of the quartermaster general's department, but they never gave themselves the trouble of analyzing or comparing their own returns, from which they draw those conclusions. I can hand in this return to the Board. (*The same was delivered in.*)

1281. What is your inference from that?—That the Commissioners should not have animadverted upon the administration of the quartermaster general's department, without comparing the returns upon which they came to that conclusion.

1282. This return only shows, that 1,061 had been issued; it does not show that they had been drawn?—Yes, that is drawn by the troops, and received by them, as shown by their own returns.

1283. If you had seen that return of assistant commissary general Archer, would tha have induced you to consent to the erasures?—Certainly not, for the simple reason, tha the quartermaster general had nothing to say to what the troops drew; we were only responsible for what we authorized them to draw. The difference, as I explained on Friday, depended upon arrangements over which the quartermaster general had no control whatever, and which is acknowledged by the Commissioners in their Report, for they acquit the quartermaster general's department of any blame in the troops not receiving all that they were ordered.

1284. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You mean to say, that the regiments made their requisitions on the quartermaster general for what they wanted, and the quartermaster general signed those requisitions, and you were no further responsible for their issue; that belonged to the regiment alone?—Certainly, to draw them

1285. That is what you mean?—Yes, that is what I mean.

1286. (*Major General Peel.*) Did not I understand you to say that for extra issues, such as the warm clothing, there was no requisition for them?—Yes.

1287. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) We originated the issue for the extra warm clothing. (*To the witness.*) Did Colonel Tulloch ever ask you for an inspection of your books?—I think not; the books were produced during my examination to allow me to make the replies which I did; he might have seen them. I do not think that he ever examined them, or asked to examine them, to the best of my recollection.

1288. Immediately after your examination what duty did you go upon?—I was appointed quartermaster general of the Turkish Contingent. I left the Crimea, to the best of my recollection, about the 31st of May or the 1st of June. I joined the Turkish Contingent, I think, on the 2d of June. I had a remarkably quick passage down—only twenty-three hours.

1289. How long did you remain in the Bosphorus?—We were at head quarters at Constantinople, and we were at Buyukdar, twelve miles from Constantinople. I remember being there and hearing that the Commissioners were at Constantinople at the same time.

1290. There would have been no difficulty on their part in referring to you on any subject, on which they wanted further explanation?—Not the least.

1291. Will you go on now with your statement as to the carrying out of the business of the issue of clothing with which you were entrusted?—At page 26, the Commissioners state as to the rugs,—"It does not appear to have occurred to anyone that the rugs were available as a substitute" for blankets. If those rugs had arrived in greater numbers than the blankets, or prior to the blankets, or had arrived when we were short of blankets, that remark might perhaps have been justified; but the facts are totally contrary

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

5th May 1856.

to it. If the Board will compare at page 94 of the Appendix of the report the two contiguous columns of "blankets" and "rugs," they will perceive that the receipts of blankets from December the 5th to January the 9th far exceeded the rugs; therefore there was no necessity to issue rugs as a substitute for blankets when we had so many of the latter as we wanted. The only period that we suffered from the want of blankets particularly was in the early part of November. The first supply of rugs did not come until the 21st of November, and they arrived in the "Jura;" she went to Kamiesch, which is not Balaklava,—that was the French port,—and the stores could not be disembarked there, and consequently they had to be brought down to Balaklava to be disembarked. It appears by the returns that the 2d of December was the first date at which we had any rugs in store, when there were also 4,000 blankets, and we had received at that time from the transports, I should think, about 8,000 or 9,000 other blankets. Therefore, from that period forward, there was no want of blankets felt; the rugs, therefore, were not necessary to be issued as a substitute. The Commissioners also state, that "during the month of "January the number amounted to 25,000; but while the men are stated to have "suffered severely for want of sufficient covering, the return of clothing received and "issued from the quartermaster general's store shows that the troops were supplied with "only 800 out of 24,000." Now 25,000 rugs were not received in store until the last day of January; there were 18,000 that had then been received, and 7,000 in the "Jura," which made about 25,000; and the Commissioners admit that after the 15th of January there was no necessity to issue any of those articles, for the troops had more than enough. They state so in their Report. They also state that only 800 were issued to the troops out of 24,000, that is taken from page 89 of the Report; but by their own returns, both of Assistant Commissary General Archer and Mr. Hayter, it appears that the troops received nearer 3,000, therefore that statement is also erroneous. At page 26, the Commissioners state, "on the 24th and 27th December, two vessels arrived at Balaklava, bringing "25,000, a number which was more than sufficient to have given a third blanket to "every man." Those two ships, I presume, were the "Holyrood," and the "Manilla." A ship arriving at Balaklava, it by no means follows that the stores on board of her are immediately available. In the first place, the harbour is very small, and very crowded, and there was no room for all the vessels arriving every day; the ships had to anchor in the bay outside, and when there was room in the harbour they were brought in, but several days frequently elapsed between the original arrival and their coming into the harbour, and when they got in they had to be berthed and put in their places, and then commenced discharging their cargoes. It appears from delays of this sort that those two vessels did not commence discharging any part of their cargoes until the 8th of January, when the "Manilla" it appears discharged 200 blankets with various other stores. On the 8th of January there was no necessity for the issue of the third blanket, because, on the 25th of December, a few days prior, the "Charity" had arrived with buffalo robes, and another vessel with sheepskin coats; we could not carry up the blankets and buffalo robes and every other store, and it was, therefore, found necessary to make a selection, and naturally the buffalo robes had the preference. On the 9th of January I find by my Issue Book that the issue of buffalo robes commenced; therefore, it was not necessary, with the troops getting buffalo robes and sheepskin coats, to have given them a third blanket. If they had come at an earlier period, when it would have been advisable, we should have most likely issued them, but when they both arrived together we naturally gave the troops the best article, not being able to carry up both, nor would there have been enough to have given a third blanket until after the 15th of January, when the Commissioners state that the troops had more than enough of everything. Up to the 15th of January there had been only actually received into store 30,683 blankets, and at page 89 there is a return showing that there were ordered to be issued 34,236 blankets, of which there had only been received apparently by the troops about 25,000; therefore the troops evidently, even then, could not carry up all the stores that we gave them, and that being the case it would have been absurd to have given them a third blanket which they could not have carried up. Another article which the Commissioners state were not issued to the troops when they should have been were paillasses; it is a cotton bag, generally filled with straw, which the soldiers have in barracks. They say at page 26, "The vessels before referred to, which arrived about the middle and end of "November, had also brought 21,450 paillasses to protect the soldier from the moisture "of the ground." Those were never issued to them because there was no hay or straw to be got to stuff them with, and we always considered them as principally sent out for the use of the hospitals. As for their protecting the men from the moisture of the ground, I do not think that that remark could have been made by anybody who had been in the Crimea at the time alluded to, for by the evidence published at page 384, Doctor M'Kinnon, of the 21st regiment, states, "Straw nor hay were not procurable for bedding "after the 14th November, and the ground being very wet it is doubtful if it would "have been of any service under such circumstances." That was an opinion universally shared in, I suppose, by everybody in the Crimea. The mud was then in the men's tents, certainly over their shoes, and it is very difficult to see how a cotton rag trampled every day by the ingress and egress of fifteen men in a tent into that mud would have in any way added to their comfort. Had I been able to give them boarded floors, that would have been another case; the paillasse might have been of

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

5th May 1856.

use, but we could not give them boarded floors when we could not get fuel to cook our food; and it is an absurdity. The Commissioners also state in their Report, at page 27, "It was intended that they should be stuffed with hay or straw, but at that time these "were deficient in the camp, and no efforts seem to have been made to provide a substi- "tute; though wool from the opposite coast might probably have been procured if proper "measures had been taken for that purpose." It is very possible that wool might have been procured, but what would have been the state of it? It was neither dressed nor carded nor cleaned in any way whatever, and I do not think that the mass of dirt which it would speedily have become if used in the tents would have improved the condition of the soldier in any degree. But the navy could not get the vessels into the harbour with stores which we knew they had and wanted at the time; and when we could not get them up from Balaklava to the front, or even get men's provisions or forage or ammunition, I do not see how the introduction of five or six cargoes of wool, which must have rotted in Balaklava, would have helped us in any way. The advisability of the issue or non-issue of those paillasses is a matter of opinion. I certainly think that the quartermaster general, and all the generals of division and others who were on the spot, had a better opportunity of arriving at a just conclusion than the Commissioners who came out not till the March following, when the circumstances were totally different. And it appears by the evidence of Dr. Massey, at page 32, that he did have bags for beds, but could get no straw to put in them; therefore, like a sensible man, he did not use them. And if the Commissioners thought that it would have been useful for the troops in the front, certainly they would have been equally so to the sick at Balaklava; and the fact that the doctors there did not consider that putting them under the men without any stuffing was good for them is, I think, pretty conclusive that the quartermaster general's opinion was right. At page 27 it is also stated, "By the end of November, or beginning of December, about "12,000 great-coats also had arrived at Balaklava. Of these there remained in store "during the months of December and January, when they were most urgently required "by the men, upwards of 9,000, besides nearly 2,000 watch cloaks. These numbers would "have furnished one to every two men, and, supposing one-half to be on duty, would "have afforded to each man a dry great-coat or cloak to put on when he returned to his "tent from the trenches, instead of lying down, as he often did, in one that was wet and muddy;" and at page 28 it is stated, "It does not seem to have occurred to the officers "who were charged with the distribution of this clothing, that so large a quantity of "great coats could hardly have been sent at one time for the mere purpose of replacing "such as were worn out. Used only for that purpose, the number, amounting ultimately "to 37,000, would have have been sufficient for nearly five years, and the quantity "constantly arriving might have convinced them that it was not intended to assign any "other limit to the distribution than the wants of the troops." At page 89, there is a return, by which it appears that the great coats, on the last day of December, reported by the Commissioners to be in store, were 8,856, of which we issued to the troops, or ordered to be issued, 4,020. It was never notified to the quartermaster-general that any greater quantity of great coats was to be sent from England for the army than 10,234, as appears from the return at page 62 of the Appendix, and the number of 37,000, stated by the Commissioners to have been sent out never reached that number until the 6th of March, and 25,000 of that number arrived at Balaklava between the 9th of January and that period. After the 9th of January it was not necessary to issue the great coats, for we had issued then sheepskin coats to every man in the army, that is to say, the issues commenced on the 9th of January, and that prior to that period, when we had issued to the army 4,000 and odd great coats, it appears that they only drew 2,000 and some odd number; therefore, our issues then were ahead of the wants of the army. The great coats were drawn upon that simple requisition as shown by the quartermaster general on Friday. It never entered into any body's mind that the issue was limited to the replacing of the coats which had been worn any period whatever. We merely inquired what the wants of the troops were, and issued accordingly, as there were only 10,000 notified to the quartermaster general as having been sent from England; even if we had arrived at any such conclusion, which I say we had not, we should have been perfectly justified in doing so, but with regard to the coats sent out to the army in the field, it was evident that it was not intended to give every man a new coat; it would only have been half a coat a man. With regard to the 2,000 watch cloaks remaining in store, there is also a very great error in that It appears in the return of the 2d of December, that we had 2,050 watch cloaks in store; subsequently and up to the 9th of January 225 watch cloaks only were received, and up to the 15th of January 1,325; 2,050 and 1,325 will give a total received up to the 15th of January of 3,375. Now, by the Issue Book of the quartermaster-general's department, it appears that up to the 4th of January we had ordered to be issued 3,612, and that the troops had actually drawn during those three months 2,253; therefore there remained something less than 1,000 in store, some 700 or 800, and not 2,000, as stated by the Commissioners. After the 15th of January the issue of sheepskin coats rendered the issue of watch coats unnecessary. The Commissioners also remark on the non-issue of the militia coatees that were sent out to the number of 6,000 on the 28th of November. By the returns in the commissariat department, 1,500 appear to have been the only number received in store,

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

5th May 1856.

and they were not issued to the troops, because, in the first place, at the time when they arrived the regimental clothing had also arrived for the army, and it was in Balaklava, and could not be carried up to the men. On trying on some of those coatees, to see if they were adapted for the men, it was found that they were of so small a size that they were useless. They were militia coatees, and every soldier then wore, in addition to his ordinary clothing a great quantity of under-clothing, as many as two and three shirts, and the coatee would not go on over that, and they were useless. Of the 6,000 pairs of trousers also stated by the Commissioners to have arrived at Balaklava on the 28th of November, it appears that only 1,000 had been received by the commissariat; but acting upon the supposition that they had arrived until we found out the mistake, orders had been given for the issue of 4,079 pairs of trousers up to the 15th of January. They were subsequently found in a ship in the harbour of Balaklava, into which they had been transhipped by the naval authorities, without any reference to the commissariat department, and certainly not to the quartermaster-general's department; they were subsequently found on board the "Orient." After the 15th of January the remaining trousers were not necessary to be issued, because the clothing had arrived, and the regiments were then applying to the Commander-in-Chief for permission to sell the extra clothing which had been sent out to them by their regimental clothiers, and they were bought in several cases by the commissary general. In the memorandum published in page 167 of the Report, it appears that the Commissioners state, "The "ammunition boots, too, appear to have been issued very slowly, considering the "large supply on hand, and the alleged sufferings of the men for want of them. But "as there was a General Order on the 29th November, informing the officers of corps that "they might have any quantity, it appears to have been their own fault if not obtained." The Commissioners here exonerate, apparently, the quartermaster-general's department from all blame relative to the non-issue of the boots, but in the body of the Report it appears that the Commissioners considered that the quartermaster-general's department was to blame for the non-issue of those boots. The small size of those boots had a good deal to do with it. At page 29 of the Report, the Commissioners say, "On the 2d Decem- "ber, being the earliest date at which we have any return of the quartermaster-general's "stores, there were on hand 15,382 pairs of ammunition boots; from 2,000 to 3,000 "more were received into store in that month, while the number issued was only 10,329." I before stated that the quartermaster-general had nothing to say to the troops drawing the boots; and by this memorandum the Commissioners admit that a general order had been issued, acquainting them that the boots were there; and subsequently, early in January, a general order was issued by Lord Raglan, giving to every soldier a new pair of boots if they would go down to Balaklava and get them, and their not getting them was no reflection on this department. The Commissioners go on to say, "In "January, upwards of 12,000 more were received; we cannot state exactly the number "issued, owing to the difficulty of distinguishing between those sent to regiments, and "those which were merely transferred to the department at Kadikoi, though entered as "issues in the quartermaster-general's returns." Whatever was sent to the depôt at Kadikoi was not entered as issues by the quartermaster-general; we had nothing to say to the formation of that depôt,—it was entirely a commissariat affair. By a reference to their return from which this statement is taken, at page 104, it appears that there was not one pair of boots of any kind sent to the store during that month. The Commissioners never hesitate to make an assertion, and in trying to prove that assertion from their own returns we invariably find that they have made an erroneous one. At page 38 of the Commissioners' Report it is stated, "There was a great deficiency "of mattrasses, and straw or other materials to fill paillasses could not be supplied; "and even as late as the month of April many of the sick in front had no other "bedding than blankets or buffalo robes, the latter of which were not issued till "the end of January." There is no qualification there at all, and one would suppose that they had received no buffalo robes till the end of January, but by referring to their own returns at page 101, it appears that the troops began to draw their buffalo robes from the 10th of January, and they drew them from the 10th to the 31st of January, to the number of 5,611. Yet the Commissioners assert, that they did not receive them till the end of January. They were issued on the 9th. At page 30 of the Report the Commissioners state, "The arrangements relating to the issues of supplies from the "quartermaster general's stores appear to have been of questionable expediency. "The officers commanding regiments, brigades, or divisions, were not made aware what "articles were available for the use of the men, and were informed that they need not "send in requisitions for what they wanted, because whenever there were supplies for "distribution, approved requisitions would be sent to them for the proportions appro- "priated to their respective commands. The special wants of each corps were not "therefore brought to the notice of the head of the department, as they would have "been if requisitions had been sent in for what was required, and it appears that rugs, "paillasses, blankets, great coats, and uniforms remained undistributed for which "requisitions would undoubtedly have been made if the commanding officers had "known that they were in store." The arrangements here aninadverted upon, were made for the convenience of all parties at the commencement of the winter, when the stores were arriving in small quantities; the demands of the troops were very large, and

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

5th May 1856.

frequently the officers and non-commissioned officers used to come to head quarters with demands for those stores which we had no means of giving them. The second division was about four miles from head quarters, and other divisions were at shorter distances, and in order to obviate this inconvenience, and save the officers and non-commissioned officers that trouble, we agreed to adopt this mode,—that they were to make demands upon the quartermaster-general for all ordinary articles of equipment, and as to the extra articles, as they arrived we would send them requisitions approved, and they would have nothing to do but to go to Balaklava and get them. That worked excessively well, and, I believe, gave satisfaction to everybody except the Commissioners. They say, "The "special wants of each corps were not therefore brought to the notice of the head of the de- "partment." The assistant quartermaster general of each division collected every day the requisitions, that is to say, the wants of every regiment of their division, and they brought them in to head quarters to me, and they afterwards went and saw the quartermaster-general. I had orders when I had occasion to refuse a requisition to report that also to the quarter-master-general, therefore he heard from two sources what were the wants of the army. The quartermaster generals of divisions told him what they wanted, and could not get, and I told him what I could not give them. In addition to that, I drew up every week in a tabular form a statement of all the supplies on hand, and hung it up in a very conspicuous place in the office, so that everybody who came in might see it. At the end of every month a return of the field equipment was sent in, which contained a list of every article which the regiment had received during the month, and it contained the field equipment, their bât horses, and their extra clothing, and it was all accounted for. Therefore the commanding officer of every regiment had to fill into a column the description of the articles that the regiment ought to have. "It appears that rugs, paillasses, blankets, great-coats, "and uniforms remained undistributed, for which requisitions undoubtedly would have "been made if the commanding officers had known that they were in store." I have carefully searched all the evidence in this book, and I do not see one statement to support that assertion.

1292. (*President.*) How would that be notified to the commanding officers?—They sent in a monthly return of the articles that they had received during the month prior, and a form was drawn out by the quartermaster-general's department, in a tabular form, containing a heading of everything that the troops were likely to get or which they were entitled to receive; and the first of every month the commanding officer filled in what he should be entitled to receive and what he had received during the month, what was unserviceable and what was wanting; and upon that list of what was wanting, on the 1st of every month, I completed every regiment in the Army to the full complement, not only the field equipment, but the clothing and everything that they were entitled to receive.

1293. (*Major-General Peel.*) Will you refer to page 64 of the Appendix to the examination of Commissary-General Filder, where he says, "These combined causes gave rise to "numerous complaints respecting the issue of stores, although the fault lies in most "cases, particularly as regards quartermaster-general's stores, with the parties making "them, and is owing to their not being furnished with orders signed according to "the form which has been prescribed, not by the commissariat, but by the military "authorities for the protection of the Army, and without the observance of which "one regiment might be supplied with necessaries to the detriment of another." I understand from you that you sent the orders to the regiments?—Yes, for all extra articles; but there were a great number of articles which always formed a part of camp equipment stores which the regiments drew for, but a great number of the officers and quartermasters were frequenly changing; the old officers died off or were sick, and the young officers, ensigns, and lieutenants, were made acting quartermasters, who did not know the forms required, and they went to Balaklava to get what they wanted without any requisition; and I imagine that it was to that irregularity the commissary general referred; but to obviate that, the quartermaster-general, as soon as the 2d or 3d of December, directed Colonel M'Kenzie to go to Balaklava, and he was quartered there. He was the representative of the quartermaster-general there, and when any regiment or individuals went to him and stated what they wanted, he had authority to give them an order, and his signature was as good as mine.

1294. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) There was no sort of restriction put upon the issue of the articles of any description that the troops wanted?—Most decidedly; the only restriction was the state of the stores, as to which we went upon the commissary-general's report.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) With regard to the last question put to Colonel Wetherall by the Board, there were occasionally little irregularities which we were compelled to check, but which proceeded only from the zeal and anxiety of particular regiments to furnish themselves as well as they could, as they knew that my orders had been very liberal indeed. The commanding officer of a regiment, anxious to do the best that he could for his own corps, sometimes authorized his officer, whoever he might be, going down to Balaklava, whether the quartermaster of the regiment or some other officer, to run the chance of getting something; and we found from that discretionary order given to Colonel M'Kenzie who was at Balaklava, that an officer went down with a demand for certain articles, as to which he really had before been to my office at head-quarters,

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

5th May 1856.

and had been told that he could not have as it was not fair to other regiments; then perhaps that officer went down to Balaklava and tried if he could not get his requisition vouched for by Colonel M'Kenzie, and so obtain the articles. Therefore, it is possible that on one or two occasions of that sort an officer went down with a requisition and it was not granted. I think those are the only instances in which any officer did not get any article that was actually in store and available for the troops.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) That is if they applied for them?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board does not understand that Colonel Wetherall speaks to the actual receipts of those stores, but merely that they were issued.

(*Colonel Wetherall.*) They were apportioned to the troops by the quartermaster-general's department. I know nothing of their receipt; that is between the commissary general and the receiver.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I hope it has been made very intelligible to the Board that the quartermaster-general only authorizes the issues. With regard to the conveyance and delivery of those stores which the quartermaster-general has authorized, he has no control or no power whatever.

Cross-examined by Colonel TULLOCH.

1295. Referring to the return at page 89 of the Appendix, why do you make use of the term "issued?"—Because I should have thought that an officer of your standing would have known sufficiently well the duties appertaining to an officer of the quartermaster-general's staff; he is not in any way a storekeeper or issuer. They were ordered to be issued, and I explained that in my evidence of the 28th of May; in that very memorandum which is erased that question is put. The troops were ordered to receive their blankets, and their not getting them depended upon themselves.

1296. I see nothing in that question?—No, it is erased. The memorandum there is not the memorandum that was read to me. This is the memorandum which is erased, in which I state that it was entirely their own fault, or the want of transport, that created the delay.

1297. Why, in the return of the clothing in the quartermaster-general's departments, do you say "issued?"—It should have been "apportioned," if you like.

1298. That is what has led to all the errors in the return?—I think it appears, from the commissioners' own showing, that they perfectly understod the question. In the report, at page 31, it states, "With the view of procuring further information in "regard to these issues, we have obtained from officers commanding corps, a return "showing the dates on which the different articles of warm and extra clothing were "received at each corps. From these it must be inferred, that in many cases the sup-"plies did not reach the men for a considerable time after they appear from the quar-"termaster-general's returns to have been issued; but there is no reason to believe "that the delay was in any degree attributable to that department. Owing to the defi-"ciency of transport, these supplies may have remained in Balaklava for a considerable "time before they could be conveyed to the front, or in any other way be made available "for the use of the men." That is the clearest exposition of the whole question.

1299. That does not explain it; we always considered them as being issues?—"There "is a similar discrepancy between the regimental and the quartermaster-general's returns "in regard to the quantity issued to each corps, and to which we were at first disposed to "attach considerable importance, but we found that the quartermaster-general's storekeeper "entered as 'issued' everything that had been apportioned to the troops."

1300. Was Colonel Gordon examined at the same time with you?—He was.

1301. The time occupied from 11 to 5 included a part of that officer's examination as well as your own?—There was a general and rather discursive conversation carried on for five or six hours; in some cases Colonel Gordon answered, and in others I answered. The examination commenced I think about the sea transport, and as Colonel Gordon was the senior assistant, and I the second senior assistant when Colonel Gordon was employed in the field I had to carry on the duties, I therefore gave my opinion on the subject also.

1302. It was a joint examination?—Yes, as far as related to that question.

1303. Did you not leave the Crimea the morning after the examination?—No.

1304. When did you leave?—I think two or three days after the examination.

1305. Are you aware for what purpose your evidence was sent to Colonel Gordon? was it not to obtain your revise and signature, and to point out any alterations that had been made?—I never knew, till you mentioned it to-day, that my evidence had been sent to Colonel Gordon.

1306. Did he communicate with you to obtain your signature?—By the date of that letter, the 4th of June, when you sent my evidence to Colonel Gordon, I had quitted the Crimea two or three days.

1307. Did he communicate with you to obtain your signature, or to obtain any expression of your approval of the evidence?—No.

1308. Did he ever intimate to you that he had received it, or that it was in his possession for such purpose?—No.

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*
5th May 1856.

1309. The commissioners having adopted the proper course of sending your evidence to your immediate superior, that the necessary steps might be taken, is there any good ground on your part for the complaint that it is not signed by you. Does not that rest with Colonel Gordon?—No, certainly not, in my opinion; I do not admit that sending my evidence to Colonel Gordon in any way, was sending it to me. I had then left the Crimea, and was not under the command of Colonel Gordon on the 3rd of June; he had no communication with me whatever.

1310. Was not a paper forwarded with your evidence, a separate memorandum, and is it not even designated by the quartermaster-general at page 237 of the proceedings of this board as such: "I have since been informed by Colonel Gordon that on the second "day of his examination, when he and Colonel Wetherall were about to be examined, "a manuscript note to the effect of this memorandum was shown, but no copy of it was "given or offered, and no suggestion made that the contents should be communicated "with me. Colonel Gordon informs me that he regarded the note as a private memo- "randum of the commissioners for their own guidance, and not with a view of having it "conveyed to me." Now, is not that paper a separate memorandum, and is it not even so designated at page 237 of the proceedings?—A separate memorandum, certainly, but the commissioners state in the preamble of my evidence that "the accompanying memo- "randum having been shown to the witness," I state that the accompanying memorandum as printed in blue book was not the memorandum that was shown or read to me; there were some very important alterations and omissions.

1311. Has it not been represented that marginal notes, taken by myself on such a document merely for the purpose of ascertaining whether the subject referred to required further investigation, are a portion of your evidence which has been suppressed by the commissioners, and do you consider that fair?—I think that you had an opportunity of taking down my evidence as you thought proper, and if you chose to write it on the margin of a piece of paper that was your business.

1312. Do you consider that a memorandum of that kind, taken by myself as a private memorandum, not your evidence, is to be considered a portion of the evidence which has been suppressed?—Certainly; because the whole of that memorandum was the very question at issue upon which I was examined.

1313. No; it was a private memorandum?—You state in the printed book that you showed a memorandum to Colonel Gordon and myself.

1314. (*Major General Peel.*) It was supposed to be your evidence copied from the joint evidence that was taken?—Colonel Tulloch states so; but I should think not, from the very fact that the whole of this suppressed part of the memorandum refers to the non-issue of the blankets. The last paragraph of that suppressed memorandum is this: "If it be "alleged in the cases where those delays have occurred that no blankets were available, "there appears no reason why the men should not have had rugs for a substitute "till some better covering could be found for them, as there are plenty in store." If you had been satisfied, if all this explanation satisfied you, that there had been no delay, it is very strange that this very remark should have been embodied by you in your report, for at page 26 you state that "it does not appear to have occurred to any "one that the rags were available as a substitute,"—the very words.

1315. (*Colonel Tulloch.*) What I refer to is the discrepancy between the regimental and the quartermaster-general's return?—Yes; but in that suppressed return there is that remark which you have erased, and state that the explanations I had given you satisfied you that there was no necessity to remark further upon it; but you include the gist of the whole matter in your official report.

1316. I will read to you a paragraph from page 163, upon the evidence of Colonel Gordon: "There was no limitation in the issue of blankets and great coats, except the "Queen's warrant, and no instructions were received from home to suspend the operation "of that warrant, although Lord Raglan took upon himself to do so when he thought it "necessary." If there was no limitation in the supply of great coats, how do you account for Colonel Gordon's statement to that effect?—You had better ask him, not me.

1317. (*General Sir G. Berkeley to Sir Richard Airey.*) You see in page 249 of our proceedings that on the 28th of November 1854 you sent a requisition to England for hospital marquees, tents, camp kettles, spades, shovels, pickaxes, felling axes, saws, nose-bags, reaping-hooks, and an answer that you received to this letter was dated the 18th of April 1855, nearly five months after your letter. The answer accounts, certainly, for the non-transmission of the tents, but no mention is made of camp kettles, spades, or nose-bags, so necessary for the horse, or any other articles specified in the requisition. Were those articles ever supplied, and when, in consequence of your requisition of the 28th of November?—I think one of those letters embraces all the extra articles. One of the letters from England speaks of the most prominent and great articles, and then it embraces all the others in the "&c."—"the remaining stores, &c." I see in the letter of the 29th May, from Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, it says, "My Lord, With reference to "previous correspondence relative to the requisition for camp equipage and stores made "by the quartermaster-general of the army under your Lordship's command in Novem- "ber last, I transmit herewith for your Lordship's information copies of a further "correspondence which has passed between this Department and the Ordnance "Office relating to the shipment of these stores." Therefore, these words,

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

5th May 1856.

"these stores," embraces all that was in my schedule sent on the 28th of November 1854. If the Board will have the kindness to read the letter of the 9th of May from the Ordnance Department to the Under Secretary of State, signed by Mr. Poignaud, he says, "Sir, In reference to your letter of the 8th instant, stating that "directions had been given to the directors of the transport service to provide conveyance "immediately for the articles remaining due on the requisition of Quartermaster-General "Airey, dated November last, I have the honour, by command of the Board of Ordnance, "to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, that all the "tents and blankets have been embarked, and the greater portion of the other stores; "and as soon as it can be accurately ascertained what articles have been left out, a "further application will be made for tonnage for them." That is one of the letters of which I have already put in a copy. Therefore, without enumerating the great number of articles put down in my schedule, they include them in the expression, "other stores."

1318. The principal thing that I want to know about is the nosebags for the horses?—I think I shall be able to show when the nosebags came. I see, by page 84 of the Appendix to the Blue Book, that 2,000 nosebags left England on the 5th of April.

1319. That is five months after your letter?—Yes; but however, that did not create any want, because we had got them in the meantime made on board ship out of sailcloth, and also we had obtained others from Constantinople; and though we were a long time getting them from England, we were not without them.

(*President.*) Who is your next witness?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Colonel M'Kenzie.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Dr. Balfour.*) Has Colonel Tulloch retired from the Board Room?

(*Dr. Balfour.*) Colonel Tulloch has retired, in consequence of being so ill that I conceived it quite impossible that he could remain to take any further part in the proceedings at present. I may be permitted to state, that the whole of yesterday he was so ill that I found it necessary to visit him as late as half-past ten last night. He attended this morning very much against my wishes, and during the proceedings he was unable to turn his attention to any point that was brought forward, and I considered it necessary to send him home.

You are his medical attendant?—Yes, I am.

1320. (*Judge Advocate General, to Colonel Wetherall.*) The Board wish to know whether they understood you correctly about the mode of giving any notification of the extra stores to the different regiments. It was understood that you were in the habit of sending authorized requisitions, whenever any extra stores arrived, to the officers commanding regiments?—The description of store was notified in general orders. The men were to get extra articles of clothing during the winter, consisting of sheepskin coats, jerseys, comforters, mitts, drawers, and things of that sort, extra to the usual camp equipment; it was notified when those arrived in sufficient numbers to issue to the regiment, that we should send to the regiment an approved requisition for them to go down and draw them.

1321. The Board wish to be informed as to the mode in which that was made known to the different regiments?—It was made known as soon as the stores arrived, and the commissariat reported that they were ready for issue, we sent an order to all the regiments to go down and draw their proportions of them.

1322. They were apportioned in your department?—Yes; by me.

1323. Was that in reference to any notice of what their wants and requirements were?—We all knew what their wants and requirements were, because the general order limited the issue to a certain amount of clothing to be given to each regiment in the army.

1324. But as to the extra stores?—Yes; that was the object of the order, and also a circular memorandum was issued and sent round, showing the regiments the manner in which that extra clothing was to be accounted for,—it was to be marked and taken care of.

1325. As soon as they arrived they were apportioned, and notice was sent to the different regiments?—Yes; to go down and draw them as soon as the commissariat notified that they were ready to be issued.

1326. Are you aware of any delay on the part of commanding officers sending for those stores after notice had been given of their arrival?—Numerous delays, which depended the state of the regiment, whether the men were off duty in sufficient numbers on certain days so as to be able to send down a sufficient party to bring the things up. In addition to bringing those extra articles to the army, they had to bring up their food and ammunition, and to drag up the heavy guns; all that was arranged by the adjutant general of the division.

1327. Has your attention been directed to Sir Colin Campbell's evidence to the Commissioners upon this subject?—I am aware of his letter.

1328. But in the evidence that is published at page 152, he states, "Until those requi-"sitions were sent, the divisional and regimental officers were not aware what articles "were to be issued." He says further, "There was no delay on the part of commanding "officers in sending men to carry up the warm clothing when the requisitions were "received?"—No; very likely no delay took place with the troops under his command,

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

5th May 1856.

for they were stationed at Balaklava, where the stores were, but the troops in front were seven miles from there, and the troops under Sir Colin Campbell were not in the trenches at all.

1329. Do you consider that he is is only speaking of his own troops?—The troops under his own command, of course.

1330. He states that he "does not consider the commanding officer of a division or "regiment responsible for any delay that may have occurred in issuing requisitions for "warm clothing?"—Certainly not; for it emanated from the quartermaster-general's department. It is nowhere alleged that there was any delay in issuing the requisition; the delay was all in drawing those things from the store.

1331. You think that his was a peculiar case?—Evidently; because he was stationed at the spot where the stores were collected.

1332. Was it by means of a general order that the notice was received by a regiment?—Originally a general order was issued through Her Majesty's Government, that a quantity of extra clothing was to be given, and some of the articles were mentioned, and subsequently there was a return drawn up every week of everything in store, and the quartermaster-general saw that every morning when he came into the office.

1333. It was not made the subject of a general order?—No.

(*General Sir Richard Airey.*) I will, with the permission of the Board, examine Mr. Commissary-General Filder.

---

*Mr. Commissary General Filder.*

Mr. Commissary-General WILLIAM FILDER further examined.

1334. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) It became a part of the duty of your department to construct storehouses and magazines for your own stores at Balaklava, from the want of space and otherwise, did it not?—Yes.

1335. In the absence of sufficient labour and materials to be procured in Balaklava, you were obliged to send elsewhere?—Certainly.

1336. Did you find any difficulty in procuring artificers to carry on your works?—Yes, very great difficulty. I have a letter here from the commissariat officer at Constantinople, addressed to me, stating that there was great difficulty in obtaining artificers; they were chiefly Greeks, and they were prohibited from entering Balaklava; an order prohibited the admission of Greeks into Balaklava, and almost all the artificers, of certain classes in Constantinople, are Greeks. They were known to be disaffected to our cause; an incendiary might have destroyed our fleet of transports with the greatest possible ease. The commissariat officer says here, "I fear there will be a difficulty as to "masons and more carpenters. These tradesmen are mostly Greeks, who, of course, "would not be admissible at Balaklava."

1337. He was your senior commissariat officer at Constantinople?—Yes; Deputy Commissary General Smith.

1338. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Was that letter in reply to an application for artificers?—Yes, it is in reply to an application from me to send up artificers.

1339. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) What is the date of that letter?—It is dated the 24th December 1854. I have earlier ones too.

1340. How many were you able to engage?—I am unable to say what number I was able to engage, but we were always demanding artificers at that time, and we could not get enough. Here is one instance, in which he says "I had engaged the coopers, but "they refused afterwards to go, and are now in Hussein Bey's prison. I cannot find "any men for conductors at present." Those people were earning very high wages at home, and nothing could induce them to come to Balaklava.

1341. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Whose letter is that?—It is also from the officer at Constantinople.

1342. Does he say that they were Greeks?—No, not in this one; he says that after engaging to go they had refused to go, and were then in Hussein Bey's prison; that shows the difficulty of getting artificers up to Balaklava.

1343. Do you suppose that the authorities interfered to prevent them from going?—No, they were put into prison for breach of contract; they had engaged to go and they had refused, and they put them in prison for that in Turkey, but they were earning very high wages, and they could not be induced to come. Afterwards I wrote to the Consul at Trebizond for labourers, and offered, as I considered, incredibly high wages. I offered 2*s.* 6*d.* a day, but he wrote back to say that he could not get them at 2*s.* 6*d.* a day, for they were earning 4*s.* a day.

1344. You did not offer higher wages?—No, I did not go beyond 2*s.* 6*d.*; that rate was fixed by the ambassador. I was obliged to pay as high as he did.

1345. What is the date of that letter?—It is dated in January, about the coopers.

1346. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) You have earlier ones, have you not?—Yes, about the timber.

1347. If you had procured those artificers, how did you intend to house them?—I had tents for them.

1348. There was no very great inducement on the part of those people to leave their own homes, where they were getting enormously high wages, to come and live in tents at

*Mr. Commissary General Filder.*

5th May 1856.

Balaklava?—Certainly not; you could not hold out any inducement to them. I dare say that half of those who did come were forced by the authorities.

1349. Could you have obtained them at Balaklava?—None whatever. There is no better proof that all the carpenters were exhausted at Balaklava for other services, than that Captain Heath superintended the building of those stables for the mules. They were superintended by his boatswain; he had no carpenters.

1350. Could you have got any carpenters from the transport navy?—I got a few, but I could get no more.

1351. Did you get all that you could?—Yes; but when Captain Heath built those stables, the superintendent was the boatswain.

1352. With regard to the engagement of labour at Constantinople, did you engage any Turks there for the winter?—Some; the artificers were very few. They were labourers. We brought up all that we could, and that drove me to Trebizond.

1353. How did they answer?—They died rapidly, it was lamentable to see it; there might have been altogether 1,000 men, besides those who came as drivers, with the original organization of the transport. There were 200 in Bulgaria, and 800 imported into the Crimea, and of those I suppose more than half were buried imperfectly, we could not get them under the surface scarcely.

1354. How many remained, or can you give any idea of how many were useful of the 500?—We never could keep up our complement; they were constantly being imported, and were dying off and returning invalided, and a good many deserted.

1355. With regard to the timber; in compliance with my requisition of the 8th and 12th of November 1854, did you send immediately to obtain this timber to shelter the troops?—A commissariat officer went with an engineer officer, first of all, I think, to Sinope, and on the other requisition we sent to the commissariat officer at Constantinople; but owing to the demands for our own service for the French, and at the same time for the Turks, they exceeded what the market of Constantinople could supply.

1356. Do you mean for the service of the French and Turkish Governments, and our own at Scutari?—They all came together, and they exceeded what the market at Constantinople could supply. This letter is dated the 7th of December from the commissariat officer at Constantinople, and is addressed to me; "There is a great scarcity of "timber in the market, the French and Turks having recently bought up large supplies. "I could not, therefore, at first have procured much more than the 100,000 feet, which is "in course of shipment on board the "Arabia." I am, however, now in treaty for two "or three times the quantity, as some vessels with cargoes of it are daily expected. I have "some carpenters and masons engaged with a superintendent. They require immense "wages, which is not to be wondered at." There was a constant difficulty.

1357. Did the deputy commissary general at Constantinople expect to be able to comply with the whole of that requisition from the market at Constantinople, or was he obliged to go elsewhere?—He was obliged to distribute his applications for the means of hutting, and for the implements, over the whole of the Mediterranean to get them.

1358. Therefore Constantinople could not have furnished them?—It was quite unequal to meet the demand.

1359. I wish to ask you whether you coincide with this evidence that was given before the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol. It is at question 15,946.

(*Judge Advocate General to Sir Richard Airey*). Is that with reference to the examination of the witness?

1360. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes; it is an inquiry with reference to the timber. "It has "been stated that the huts that were first sent up to the Crimea could not be put up for "want of nails; was that the case?—I cannot say; I can inform the committee, that after "the occurrence of the disaster of the 14th of November, a very large demand was made "upon me for tools and materials to hut the troops, a demand so extensive, that I was "obliged to divide it into three portions; I assigned one to Constantinople, as far as I "considered the means of that capital would admit of it; I assigned another to Malta, and "the third to Corfu; and I sent urgent letters to the generals commanding at "Corfu and Malta, requesting that they would forward those supplies, that I might "meet the demand. To show the extent of the demand for tools and materials to hut the "troops, one of the items was for about 1,000,000 feet of plank at Constantinople. "15,497. Will you read the letter if you please?—I have not the one referring to "the timber, it was a separate letter; but I will read the letter in which I was desired to "purchase in Constantinople the other supplies. The demand made upon me in connexion "with these supplies was of an enormous description; this is only one of a very great many "demands for quartermaster-general's stores. It is from Commissary General Filder, "dated the 12th of November, before the hurricane, but immediately subsequent to their "ascertaining that the troops would winter in the Crimea. With regard to the "nails, was there any delay in consequence of there not being nails in the Crimea?— "There may have been; it was not officially called to my notice. I cannot give "any instance. I have heard the report. This is the letter: 'Adverting to the "quartermaster-general's letter of the 8th instant, recently transmitted to you to act "upon, I now forward to you an amended list, showing the exact numbers of the materials "and tools which will have to be purchased by you for the work of hutting the troops; "and I beg to inform you, that application has been made for an engineer officer, whose

" duty it will be to select and approve of the several articles.' List of tools and materials " required for hutting the troops, as requested by the quartermaster-general's depart- " ment:—Masons' tools: trowels, 2,000; hammers, 2,000; levels, 400; picks, 2,000; spal- " ling hammers, 200; points and chisels, 3,000. Carpenters' tools: hand-saws, 1,400; " cross-cut saws, 100; pit-saws, 20; hammers, 1,500; spike-gimlets, 1,500; bradawls, " 1,500; mortice-chisels, 500; bevels, 350; bench-screws, 100; squares of sizes, 350. These " are only a few specimens of this particular demand." Do you coincide in the difficulty there spoken of in obtaining those articles?—Yes.

1361. Do you agree with that statement of the steps taken to procure timber and tools for sheltering the troops in the Crimea?—Quite so.

1362. What difficulties occasioned the delay which occurred in the execution of those requisitions?—I have already stated that the demand exceeded what the market at Constantinople could supply. Independently of that, at no time of the war were we so much pressed for transport as in the month of December. In the appendix to the third report of the Sebastopol Committee there is a return showing the appropriation of the transports, and you will find that a number of the vessels were dismasted. I had a letter by every mail, saying that Mr. Smith could not get the transport he required, neither by native vessels, nor by government transports.

1363. In consequence of the storm of the 14th of November, the sea transport had very much diminished?—Yes. He could not hire private vessels; nothing could induce the owners after that disaster to go to Balaklava, and it was a month or two before that wore off. Independently of that, there was another difficulty: we had been in the habit of employing Austrian vessels very much, and after the termination of the negotiations at Vienna, on the 2nd of December, every obstacle was put in the way of employing Austrian vessels, so that after we had engaged them the Austrian Consuls would not grant the papers. At last we were obliged to give it up, and that narrowed our means of transport further.

1364. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Was any inducement held out to the land proprietors to crop their hay for the purpose of the army?—The first year we were too late; the next year after, 1855, I secured, by means of firmans of the Ottoman Government, all that I could in the different hay districts; and I think that at one place I had 25,000 tons accumulated. The first year we were too late for such an operation.

1365. In Cyprus and in Candia mules might have been obtained in abundance, and horses. Were you aware of this, or were any measures taken for procuring them?—Some mules we got from Candia, but we got a better class of animals from the upper parts of Bulgaria; and we got all that we required.

1366. You got some from Candia and from Cyprus?—Yes; and from Smyrna.

1367. Did you get any horses from Bosnia and Servia?—No. We got some from Bulgaria, which was nearer.

1368. (*Lord Beauchamp.*) In the month of December, what was the average voyage between Balaklava and Constantinople?—By sailing vessels, I think many vessels were upwards of 20 days; it was very uncertain, but a great number of vessels were upwards of 20 days sailing after they were clear of the Bosphorus, and they were 20 days coming from any port in the Black Sea in many instances.

1369. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Was there any Indian corn procured?—No; we had plenty of barley.

1370. But it is said that the barley killed the horses; would not a mixture of the two have been beneficial?—If they had asked for it, we could have got it, but they never asked for anything but barley; there were some questions about oil cake, and I consulted Lord Lucan. I received a letter from England, and I consulted him, but he did not approve of the specimen.

1371. Do you not think that Indian corn, where the horses eat it, is more nourishing and more strengthening for horses, provided that no water is given them for two hours after or two hours before?—Yes, with those precautions, I think it is good forage. I do not know of any large quantities being grown in Turkey. I might have got it; barley is the forage of the country.

1372. You got that in the country?—Yes.

1373. You did not get any Indian corn?—No; nor was I ever asked for any.

1374. (*Earl Beauchamp.*) You stated that the voyage was 20 days in a sailing vessel, by steam how long did the voyage take?—From 30 to 40 hours; 40 hours may be considered the general average for steam-vessels.

1375. Were your transports principally steamers or sailing vessels?—We got all the steam-vessels that we could, but they were unable to meet our demands for steam-vessels and sailing vessels. I have here a representation from the commissariat officer at Constantinople, that he could not get the vessels that he required, either steam or sailing vessels. This is dated the 23d November, from the commissariat officer, addressed to me from Constantinople: "Admiral Boxer has not received instructions to place " steam transports at my disposal. He says he has none available, and that he " cannot give me any more sailing transports for hay or straw. The 'Arabia' is loading " with charcoal and your timber. Under all these circumstances, you will perceive the " difficulty in which I am placed. I will do everything which human nature can effect " to overcome difficulties but I cannot ensure success, and I hope you will explain " matters to Lord Raglan when things may go wrong in this way."

*Mr. Commissary General Filder.*

5th May 1856.

1376. (*Major General Peel.*) Was that before or after the horse transports were placed at your disposal?—Before.

1377. After that all the horse transports were placed at your disposal, were they not?—Yes; but there were none.

1378. (*Lieutenant General Knollys.*) It has been stated that great delays and confusion existed in landing the stores from the transports in Balaklava harbour; that the quartermaster-general's department had no control in such matters, but that it rested entirely with the commissariat; was there any concert or understanding between the commissariat and the naval authorities with reference to unloading the ships?—Constant communication. The duty of unloading the ships belonged to the naval authorities; on our making a requisition that we wanted a certain vessel unladen, it was the navy that did it; we had no means of unloading the ships ourselves.

1379. (*Earl Beauchamp.*) You mean the Royal Navy?—Yes.

1380. (*Lieutenant General Knollys.*) You took measures in concert with the naval authorities?—Certainly; but the command of the boats was under the navy.

1381. Had you nothing to do with the ships being ordered in with their different cargoes?—The deputy commissary general would notify to the navy what particular ships he wanted, and they ordered them in, and attended to the unloading; we had no means whatever of unloading the ships.

1382. You knew what were the cargoes of the different vessels as they came in?—Certainly, always.

1383. As you wanted a particular kind of store, you communicated with the naval harbour officer, and that vessel was ordered in?—That was the way in which it was done.

1384. (*Lieutenant General Sir W. Rowan.*) Did the naval department do anything more than land the stores on the wharf?—Nothing more than that; we had to remove them from the wharf.

1385. (*Lieutenant General Knollys.*) Had the commissariat anything to do with the erection of magazines and storehouses in Balaklava and the neighbourhood?—I consider that the village of Balaklava as it stood was appropriated by the quartermaster-general's department. I got no storehouses but what were given up to me by the quartermaster-general, or by the order of the quartermaster-general; when I came to erect storehouses, I did it myself. It was the engineers duty by the regulation, but as we knew it was of no use making a requisition on them for artificers when they were busy with military works, I got carpenters and materials from Constantinople and built them myself, but we received no order to be prepared till the 8th of November, then came a requisition for hutting all the troops. The commissariat officers at Constantinople very naturally gave the preference to the materials required for hutting the troops, so that it was the end of December or the beginning of January before I got anything up from Constantinople.

1386. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Forage is always ordered to be on board the horse transport vessels; was it in your department to carry that into effect?—Not at all.

1387. Can you say whose duty it was?—It was the duty of the principal naval agent of transports; he would be the officer who would see to it.

1388. Then the requisition did not go through you?—Not in any way.

1389. It would go direct from the military secretary or the quartermaster-general to the agent of transport?—Yes, certainly.

1390. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Who was the agent of transports?—At the time I speak of, Captain Christie, at Balaklava, and Admiral Boxer down at Constantinople.

---

*Colonel M'Kenzie.*

Colonel M'KENZIE examined.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The board wish me to inform you, that it is not compulsory on you to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

1391. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) You were assistant quatermaster-general attached to the head quarters, and stationed at Balaklava?—Yes.

1392. When did you go down to Balaklava?—I went down to Balaklava on the 6th of December 1854.

1393. You had a deputy assistant quartermaster-general under you to assist?—Yes, Major Ross, a most able officer.

1394. Will you be good enough to explain to the board what your particular duties in Balakalava were?—My particular duties were the embarkation of the sick, and the disembarkation of all the troops arriving, and the general superintendence of the quartermaster-general's department there. I had also particular instructions from General Airey relative to the warm clothing and the camp equipment, so that if from any irregularity the regiments or divisions came to Balaklava where the store was, they should not be sent away without the things. I think I can safely say that during the whole time that I was there, there was no requisition refused from informality. I had also General Airey's instructions that no man, either arriving from Scutari convalescent, or from England or elsewhere, was to go to the front without being supplied with two blankets and extra warm clothing. I think I can safely say that

during the whole time no man ever did so; during those two months, the months of December and January, there were 10,365 men arrived at Balaklava, whom I disembarked and passed to the front all complete in that way. There were 6,972 sick and wounded embarked during those two months, and none of those sick and wounded left Balaklava without being supplied with everything that they wanted in the shape of warm clothing and blankets; that I personally attended to myself. The whole of the duties carried on at Balaklava were done personally either by me or by Major Ross; it was never deputed to any non-commissioned officer.

1395. You felt yourself completely my representative in Balaklava; did you not?—Perfectly so.

1396. You felt that you had discretionary power to allow any requisition that was put into your hands?—Yes; and I did it to the utmost extent.

1397. (*President.*) What was the particular date you are referring to?—From the 6th of December 1854 to the end of January.

1398. But you were there till you came here?—Yes, till I came home the other day; during the two months I mentioned, that number of troops were landed, and those sick were embarked, and during the whole time every man went to the front complete, and every man went away equally complete.

1399. A great deal has been said here about the availability of the crews of the merchantmen or transport service in that harbour; as you were there the whole time, will you describe to the Board how the crews of those vessels were employed; you were there every day. Will you state what they were doing, and how many available men there were?—In the first place there were always from eight to ten boats well manned and always ready to embark the sick, from nine o'clock in the morning till dark, whether they were required or not, and they were coming down at very uncertain hours. The transports arriving at Balaklava with stores generally required the boat's crew, and many others, before they could be landed, more especially when there was shot and shell and those heavy articles to be landed; and at that time all the vessels arriving had guns or shot and shell as ballast, independently of their other cargoes, and before they could go away again they had all to be ballasted, and that had to be got all outside, which was frequently interrupted by the weather and other causes; a great part of it had to be blasted. Another way in which the crews were employed was watering their vessels, and water could only be got at two small rills at Balaklava by means of boats In fact, I have known vessels go away from Balaklava much in want of water, and they have gone to Constantinople on purpose to water, and all the vessels that had come out from England or from Malta had to be re-coaled at Balaklava, which was a very tedious operation too; and what employed a number of men was the way that the vessels were loaded in England; a vessel came to Balaklava, which I knew there were certain stores in, and there was a great difficulty in getting at sometimes what we most wanted. I have actually known half of a vessel's cargo taken out and put into one of the other vessels to get immediately at what we wanted. We had no place to put it on shore at that time, for there were no wharves. In fact I think I can safely say from my own knowledge that every man belonging to the transport crews was fully employed.

1400. How were the wharves constructed?—They were almost entirely constructed by the crews from those ships; they were employed as labourers on shore in breaking stones from the heights and in building those wharves, for then no soldiers were available.

1401. The nature of the harbour was such, that at the stern of a small boat the water might be 20 or 30 fathoms deep, and the bow just touching the shore, and it was impossible to land any article without the construction of those wharves; it was the most primary service we had at that time, from November till when they were constructed it was continually going on, and when I came away it was going on. (*To the Witness.*) The crews that could be spared were employed in constructing the convalescent stables of the royal artillery horses?—Yes; a part of them were spared to construct the convalescent stables for 300 or 400 convalescent horses of the artillery. At one time the crews were so much employed, and the boats were so scarce (and it was necessary that I should go on board every vessel coming in), that I could not get a boat and two men to take me on board, and I was obliged to get a boat elsewhere, and General Airey provided two or three soldiers as a crew.

1402. The transport service could not supply you with a crew for your own boat?—No, they could not afford it.

1403. With reference to getting fatigue parties, were there not great delays in issuing and conveying stores from Balaklava, in consequence of the position of the enemy and Sir Colin Campbell being obliged continually to turn the whole force out?—Frequently. I recollect on one occasion for five days we had no fatigue party at all; that was about the 17th of December.

1404. What was the average number at the times that I used to be in Balaklava during the week?—I think there was hardly a day in the week that you were not there, and in all weathers; and not only there, but for a long time when you did come down, sometimes after dark.

1405. You are aware that a great deal of the business that was conducted there between my department and the superintendent of transport was done by my meeting

*Colonel M'Kenzie.* — 5th May 1856.

him there in the streets of Balaklava, on the wharves, and speaking to him and carrying on the service in that way?—Constantly.

(*General Sir Richard Airey.*) I do not think that I have anything else to ask the witness.

1406. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you refer to question 6114 of the Evidence before the Sebastopol Committee. The question is, "Did you observe the state of the "clothing and necessaries with which those sick and wounded arrived at Constantinople? "—The men often arrived without their shoes; they were either like those which one "sometimes sees on the feet of beggars in this country, or they were sometimes without "shoes at all, and their shirts had either been cast away in utter disgust at their filthi- "ness, or torn in shreds, or covered with dirt, and they were swarming with vermin; "their trousers were all torn about the legs, and torn in every direction; their coats were "ragged where they retained them, and sometimes they came down without coats at all, "and sometimes without great coats. Some men who appeared in great coats wore those "of their comrades, who had died on the way down. 6115. They were put on board "in the Crimea in that state, and sent down almost without necessary covering to "Constantinople?—Most certainly." Does that coincide with your observations?—Certainly not; it never did happen after I went to Balaklava.

1407. (*Major General Peel.*) That is from the 7th of November?—I went to Balaklava on the 6th of December. As for the clothes being worn out, until I went to Balaklava I never had my clothes off from the day that we landed, except to shake them.

1408. (*Judge Advocate General.*) You cannot state that this is not a correct description of the state that they were in when they got to Constantinople before that time?—No.

1409. (*Lieutenant General Sir W. Rowan.*) Who was the officer in the quartermaster-general's department before you?—Captain Hamilton.

1410. Is he in this country?—(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No; he is one of the officers that I applied for, but they thought that he was not necessary. I think I can explain this. I am sorry to say that I think that which has been read is nearly accurate; the army at that time was really without clothes. We had landed in the Crimea, and it was not known till the 8th of November that we were going to remain there; and between that time and the period that Colonel M'Kenzie speaks of the army was really without clothing; therefore the men that went down to Scutari,—the sick and wounded,—were obliged to go with what clothing they had. In many instances their coats were entirely worn out, as it is known they are issued in April, and they had had their coats in the first voyage out to the Mediterranean; they had gone through the summer in Bulgaria with them,—through the sea voyage to the Crimea; they had worked in those coats in the trenches, and fought all through with them, and they were perfectly threadbare, and in many instances did not exist. That is quite true.

1411. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Can you account for that deficiency in any way?—Merely because no clothing was sent out to them.

1412. They must have required clothing at any rate?—Yes; unfortunately, perhaps, it was a thing not foreseen at home, and they did not depart from the usual regulation which was to furnish the men with a suit every year. It is true, that in April every man went out with a new suit of clothes, and I suppose the colonels of the regiments could not supply their regiments with a double suit of clothes at their expense, and no measures were taken by the Government to supply them, and the consequence was that the men were without them for a time.

1413. Had there been no application during November for fresh clothing?—I cannot answer that, because it was of course not in my department, that belongs to the Adjutant General. I have reason to believe that General Estcourt represented it, because immediately after that an extra suit came out for every man in the army, independently of what is called the warm clothing.

1414. When?—Sometime during the winter.

1415. Before the 6th of December, for instance?—No, not till after that; I can only speak very vaguely upon that, because it is not in my department at all; I do not know.

1416. You cannot state the date of the application or of the arrival?—Not the least; I really do not know.

1417. I presume it was never contemplated that the army would return to their own country before the winter?—No; but it was contemplated that they would go the Bosphorus. The idea was that we should winter in the Mediterranean.

1418. I think you stated that all the battles had been fought at the time that they were in this condition?—Yes; the last action was on the 5th of November, with the exception of the action that was going on always.

1419. Were they not in a very bad condition in October, in consequence of what they had gone through before that time?—Yes; they were very much worn out.

1420. Were there no means of procuring clothing, excepting by sending home?—None; it was impossible. Still I am not at all sure that reference was not made upon the subject home; I cannot say. It did not come within my department, so that I do not know. I probably assumed that it had been made.

1421. But the clothing did not come up till it was too late?—No; not the regular clothing, not till the winter; all other descriptions of clothing came out; under-clothing, and pea-jackets, and sheepskin coats, and everything of that sort came out; and for some time after it came out it was of no use, for the men could not put it on over the extra clothing that had been sent out, Guernsey frocks and warm knitted jackets.

1422. They did not reach the Crimea before December, did they?—No, not till December.

1423. As I understand you, you confirm the report as to the state that the men were in when they went down to Constantinople?—I think up to the beginning of December very likely they were in that state.

1424. Wanting clothes?—They were very badly off for clothing. It was not felt much by the troops, for we had no really cold weather till December. I have a journal of the weather, and up to the end of November there was no cold weather. There was very blustering weather, and a great deal of rain.

1425. But this was a deficiency in clothing that was requisite for the season?—Yes; it is a question that I am not competent to answer myself. As to the adjutant-general's department, it is what I have stated in my address to be deplored that no officer of the adjutant-general's department was examined by the Commissioners.

1426. There was no hospital at that time in the Crimea?—There were a great many aospitals. There was a General Hospital in Balaklava—a very fine hospital—from the very day that we arrived there; a large Russian hospital we found there, with its beds—very perfect and fine hospital indeed; and there were all the different divisional hospitals established by ourselves—field hospitals.

1427. In the evidence here, it is stated that "no preparation had, in fact, been made of "any necessaries—no clothing or comforts of that description for the sick and wounded "that were expected at Constantinople from the Crimea?"—Lord Raglan was in communication with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on that subject I know, and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe wrote of the extreme difficulty that there was in getting buildings that would answer.

1428. Was it also expected that the sick and wounded would be sent to Constantinople from the Crimea?—When we first went we did not know what would become of ourselves. I think myself that the idea was, that very likely the army would have re-embarked; if we could not hold our ground, it was intended that we should re-embark again.

1429. It seems that hospitals were provided at Constantinople, but with none of the requisites for the sick and wounded?—That I cannot speak of; that depends entirely upon the medical department,—the principal officer of that department, I mean. Of course, in a great army there must necessarily be a distribution of officers and a distribution of labour. The adjutant general has particular functions attached to him, and the principal medical officer has particular functions attached to him, and these came naturally within their relative jurisdiction; it is entirely a medical business, and the principal medical officer knows tolerably accurately what the character of the campaign is to be, whether it is likely to be a mere campaign of advancing or manœuvering, or fighting battles, and he makes his arrangements accordingly. If we had been in a country where there were large towns and villages, probably the medical officers would have applied to me, to appropriate certain buildings, churches, or magazines, or large public buildings for the reception of the sick and wonnded; but otherwise he makes all his own arrangements, particularly with regard to furnishing them, or the medical comforts.

1430. How many were the sick?—6,972 in December and January. I see now, though it was not in my department, that a requisition was made by the adjutant-general for clothing in October.

1431. It was sent home for clothing for the army?—Yes.

1432. (*President.*) Was that on the representations of the commanding officers?—Yes, or of the general officers commanding divisions.

1433. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) When did it arrive?—I cannot take upon myself to say that, without reference to the adjutant general's books. I have no knowledge of it.

1434. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you the date of that requisition in October?—Yes; the 6th of October.

1435. You do not know of the answer to that requisition?—No, I cannot enter into that at all; it is merely what has been picked out of one of the books; that would not come under my knowledge.

1436. (*Earl Beauchamp.*) In consequence of that requisition was every soldier supplied with additional clothing?—Yes; in consequence of that requisition every soldier was supplied with additional clothes, without either the men or the general officer commanding the regiment being charged with it.

1437. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You do not know how soon after that application was made that this second clothing came out?—I do not know, because it is not in my department. I believe that it came out early in January, the 1st of January.

(*Lieutenant General Sir W. Rowan.*) Very probably Colonel M'Kenzie knows when it was landed at Balaklava.

*Colonel M'Kenzie.*

5th May 1856.

(*Colonel M'Kenzie.*) No; I recollect a large quantity of clothing coming towards the end of January; in fact, it came out at one time in the beginning of February in so many different ways that the 39th Regiment had two or three sets of clothing.

1438. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You do not know the date of the arrival of the first clothing from England?—No; I could not tax my memory with it; I think it was towards the end of January.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Colonel M'Kenzie would not know when this clothing came out; it would come out in large canvas bales sewed up, and they would have been taken from each ship and put into the store as the regular regimental clothing assigned to the adjutant-general's department; and Colonel M'Kenzie would not have known that clothing from any other bales, they being packed in the same way.

1439. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) They would naturally be marked outside, if they were regimental clothing, with the regiment they belonged to?—Yes; but they do not go to Colonel M'Kenzie; they would go into the general store.

1440. This was not clothing from the clothiers, but to the army generally?—I really cannot say; I had nothing to do with that, it came out for the army, and it was sent out by the Government to every regiment; the 33d Regiment got the clothing of that regiment, and so on. As the Board are aware, the clothing is only issued on the 1st of April to regiments, and it is always sent to the colonels about the 1st of January; they have about three months to make out the clothing. I believe that they expedited the manufacture of the army clothing as much as possible, and sent it out to the regiments; they sent out at the end of 1854 the clothing of the regiments that would have been due in 1855, and they manufactured an additional suit which came out in April, so that the men had two suits; one was gratuitous, and one was the regulation suit.

(*President.*) Was not there clothing at Balaklava after the 6th of December?

(*Colonel M'Kenzie.*) No regimental clothing.

1441. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you say that you are not cognizant of any such state of things as is described in the evidence that has been read?—Yes.

1442. Must not the clothing have arrived by the 6th of December to account for the soldiers being so much better off?—I do not see that at all.

1443. You have heard the description which has been read, which General Airey says was very likely to have been the case before December?—Yes.

1444. You state that after the 6th of December the men came down in a very different condition; if they were improved in their appearance, must not the additional clothing have come out?—No; because those men were all going down sick. I gave them blankets, flannel shirts, and jerseys. If the clothing had been there I should not have given the men a new red coat or a pair of trousers; it was the warm clothing that I gave to them—drawers, comforters, socks, and jerseys.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I believe the Guards went out in 1854 with the 1853 clothing on.

1445. (*General Sir G. Berkeley*) If I understand you rightly on the application of the 8th of October for clothing going home, that application was met by their sending out the clothing that would have come into wear in the April following?—I imagine so, because the clothing was sent out to the different regiments during the winter; it is not to be supposed that the clothiers of regiments keep two suits of clothes in every regiment; the probability is, that they sent out the clothing immediately which they would have had to issue the following April; then they got farther instructions to make another suit of clothes, and that came out in the course of the spring, I believe. Still, in all this, I must speak with very great reservation, for it is entirely the adjutant-general's business.

1446. In a regiment they would generally get their clothing which is issued to the men on the 1st of April, in January or February to be made up and fitted to the men?—It is always so arranged. Wherever you are, if in the West Indies or North America, they send a ship from England to reach the regiment about the month of January, so that there should be a couple of months in order to fit them to the men.

1447. (*Major General Peel.*) Here is Sir Thomas Hastings's evidence taken before the Sebastopol Committee, as to the common regimental clothing. He says, "Besides the "warm clothing as above, the regimental clothing for the ensuing year was sent out "between the 6th and the 22d of December, and would arrive between the 1st and 20th "of January?"—I suppose that was about the time they received it.

1448. Each regiment when it embarked had with it all the clothing it was entitled to?—Yes.

1449. (*Judge Advocate General, to Colonel M'Kenzie.*) Did you ever see men come down with coats ragged, and many of them without coats at all?—I never saw the men come down without coats. I have seen them a good deal worn.

1450. You never saw the regimental clothing in that condition; their coats ragged, and many of the men without coats at all?—The great coats were over their red coats when those men went down to the hospital at Scutari, and the squad bags were there, which contained the remains of the clothing which we left behind when we left Scutari first. It was the actual place that became the hospital, and it could be easily got at.

1451. Can you give the Board any information when this clothing that was applied for in October reached Balaklava, or when the men had it?—I could not say with any certainty.

1452. You never saw the men in bad clothes after the 6th of December?—Yes.

1453. But such as I have read in the evidence, ragged?—No, certainly not; we had plenty of warm clothing then, previously there was not. As I said before, I should not have given a sick man a new red coat going on board ship; it was far more to the purpose to give him a jersey.

1454. So far as your knowledge extends, you believe that the regimental clothing did not reach the Crimea till January?—Certainly not; I am quite sure it did not reach the Crimea till January, and I think it was towards the end of January; it was not my duty to know that, but there was an arrangement made which brings it to my recollection. The "Orient" transport was there,—the ship that Captain Christie lived on board of; there were very few stores in her, and to facilitate the different regiments getting their regimental clothing when it came the whole was put into that ship by regiments; this vessel was close to the shore, and if any particular regiment came down and sent the quartermaster, they could get their regimental clothing out either in bulk or in detail.

1455. (*General Sir G. Berkeley, to Sir Richard Airey.*)—There seems to have been an order from Lord Raglan that all the horse transports were to be kept provided with six weeks forage, and that was to be furnished by the navy. Can you say whom Lord Raglan would write to, because it seems to be the agent of transport was responsible for this? Do you know whom Lord Raglan would write to to have his wishes carried into effect? Can we get at Lord Raglan's letter, or would it be from the military secretary?—It would have been a communication from the military secretary to the admiral on the station, in the first instance; but the result of that would have been a communication to the Admiralty at home; it is an arrangement by the Admiralty at home.

1456. You have no knowledge that any such application was made?—No.

1457. (*Major General Peel.*) Is there not a general order as to the horse transports having a given quantity of forage on board?—Previously to embarking the army there was an order issued with regard to the forage to be on board each ship.

1458. When transport is taken up by the Admiralty as horse transport, is there not a regular understanding that it should be constantly supplied?—Yes, there is a regular schedule, showing what they shall have on board.

1459. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Do you know any reason why that order was not carried out?—No; I know that the deficiency arose because we were obliged to take forage out of the transport to supply the forage on shore.

1460. When they were not kept complete?—They were never refilled; it was impossible to do that.

1461. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board wish to hear from you what was the method precisely taken to notify to the troops the arrival of articles of extra clothing and comfort?—When it was known that extra articles were coming out, a memorandum was published stating what each man was to have, and that was communicated to the general officers of divisions.

1462. From the quartermaster-general?—Yes, in a letter. I think it intimated certain things that they were to have; but after that we got invoices of a great number of anomalous supplies that were not indicated; in the first instance, mackintosh coats, hoods, capes, leggings, mackintosh boots, and all sorts of things that were coming out, and very often we did not even know that ships had arrived with their invoice; but when it was the case, it became known throughout the camp that all sorts of things had come, and the consequence was that we every day received an enormous number of applications for every description of article that the men imagined possibly had arrived; and at last, to prevent people from imagining that there were things that did not exist, and to save the trouble of continually saying we have not got this, and scratching it out, we came to the determination of informing the general officers of divisions not to send any more requisitions for chance articles, but we would let them know whatever we had to distribute; if we had 2,000 mackintosh coats we took the divisions that were most actively engaged, and sent them an approved requisition for 200 or 300 each, so that the men might have them at once, if they went down to Balaklava and got them.

1463. That was independent of any application for an extra supply from the generals of division?—Quite independent of any extra supplies, but at the same time, though this was going on to expedite and facilitate the general issue, there was no impediment put in the way of anybody requiring anything besides, if they chose to do so. If they found out really that a thing existed in store, and the assistant-quartermaster of an infantry division came to me and said, "Required for such a division, so many articles of such a nature," perhaps they are not in my list, and I did not know that they existed, and I should say, I do not know whether we have them, and he should say Yes, I saw them there yesterday, they are there, may I have them? then it was treated like any other requisition.

1464. Did any responsibility attach to the officer for not making application for those extra stores?—None; we told them that we would originate requisitions as soon as we knew that the article had arrived.

1465. (*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) The invoices were addressed to the commissariat, who notified them to you?—Yes.

1466. (*Major General Peel.*) In the course of your address to the Board, at page 257, you referred to the preliminary report that had been presented by the commissioners, which you say was sent to Lord Raglan, and communicated by him to you. Can you

*Colonel M'Kenzie.*
5th May 1856.

produce to the Board a copy of that report?—I should prefer that the Board would ask the Secretary for War for it. I am not at liberty to produce it. I know that it exists, for I saw it.

1467. You would have no notice of any medical stores?—To save time I used to be furnished with the original memorandum that came out, and that contained all the stores of all descriptions, all the stores for the engineers' department, all the stores for the artillery, all the stores for the land transport or for the medical department, and it was sent to me to save time to pick out my own stores as shortly as I could.

1468. It was no part of your department to inform the inspector-general of medical stores having arrived?—No; it is entirely a separate department. I intended to have asked the Board to request the production of the preliminary report of the 9th of June.

(*President.*) The Board will ask for it.

1469. (*Lientenant-General Knollys.*) In the absence of any answer from the adjutant-general's department, are you acquainted with any order relative to the rations of the troops in the early part of the campaign making rice or lime juice any part of the rations of the troops?—Yes, I am generally acquainted with it, because when I was in the light division, and we were quartered in Bulgaria, the troops suffered very much from the country yielding nothing besides the men's rations, and the mere ration for a soldier is not sufficient; the principal of the ration is based in England upon the circumstance that you are near towns and villages where you can get all sorts of other things, and the soldier spends his mess-money; one man out of every mess purchases groceries and vegetables. When that could not be done in Bulgaria, a board sat, of which Sir George Brown was the President, very early, this must have been in June, and it was settled what the troops should receive. The original ration of the soldier was 1lb. of meet, and 1lb. of bread, or ¾lb. of biscuit instead, and that was found quite insufficient. The ration was established by the board to consist of 1lb. of meat, and 1½lbs. of bread, or 1lb. of buscuit; and there was to be one ounce of coffee, or a quarter of an ounce of tea, an ounce and three quarters of sugar, two ounces of rice, and one gill of rum; that was in June. With regard to the limejuice, nothing was said about that till we began to suffer from scurvy in the Crimea. Previously to that we had been always well supplied with fresh meat.

1470. But the rice was discontinued as part of the rations in the Crimea?—Yes, it was discontinued for the time; when the order was first given for that rice it was not a permanent order; it was only to go on till a certain date. It was rather doubtful whether we had sufficient rice in the commissariat stores at the expiration of the period; the working of the order ceased, and the men were without rice, but as soon as it was brought to Lord Raglan's notice that the commissariat were enabled to resume the issue, then it recommenced.

1471. Are you able to afford any information relative to the limejuice?—Only that when it was first found necessary to issue it, there was not sufficient in store for a general issue, that is for every man to have a certainq uantity every day; but atthe same time, there was a good deal of difference between the medical officers of divisions, some were opposed to it, one of them particularly, Mr. Alexander, of the light division, a man who rose afterwards to great eminence, and had been at the Cape, was opposed to the general issue, he wished to have it entirely under his control according to the spiiit of the regulations, which was, that it was to be perfectly a medical issue, only to be issued by the direction of the medical officer of division, not to be a quartermaster-general's issue as given by the commissariat, and others of the medical men differed.

1472. We understand that limejuice is a medical store, and not a commissariat store?—Yes, by the regulations it is always put down as a medical store, but directly it was wanted the commissariat would be the department to supply it like any other store.

(*President.*) What evidence will you call to-morrow.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Major Keane of the Royal Engineers, Admiral Sir Deans Dundas, and Major Hackett. I shall have three or four witnesses to-morrow. As the Board are going to apply for the original preliminary report of the 9th, I should like also to have the original manuscript of the report of the 10th, and that of the preliminary report of the 9th.

Adjourned to-morrow at Eleven o'clock.

## EIGHTEENTH DAY.

### 6th May 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

6th May 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Dr. Balfour.*) Can you inform the Board whether Colonel Tulloch will attend here to-day?

(*Dr. Balfour.*) I deeply regret to say, that Colonel Tulloch is so seriously ill, that his attendance here is quite out of the question. If the Board will permit me, I will read the certificate of Sir James Clarke and Dr. Martin. (*The certificate was read and delivered in.*)

(*President, to Sir Richard Airey.*) The Board is now ready to proceed with your evidence.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) In expressing my regret to hear of the indisposition of Colonel Tulloch, I am placed in a position of peculiar difficulty and delicacy in going on with the examination of my witnesses. In his absence it will be almost impossible for me to touch upon the particular points of examination, which I am anxious to do, on account of his not being present or Sir John M'Neill. I have examined since yesterday, certain evidence that was also taken in the Crimea, the evidence of Colonel Gordon in which I find that there are very great alterations and crossings out of the evidence, and explanations, and which Colonel Gordon is prepared to say that he never saw, until they were put into into my hands yesterday, and it is very distasteful for me to go on with the examination upon such matters in the absence of either of the Commissioners, they having made a conjoint Report, and therefore I should hope for the presence of one of them during this examination. I should be extremely sorry that the Commissioners should not have the advantage of cross-examining the witnesses that I may bring forward.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Their attendance here appears to have been perfectly optional. They were not summoned to attend here. It does not appear to have been anticipated by the Government that they were to attend here, except by their own wish.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) If neither of the Commissioners had never attended here, the case would have been so: but I think it is evident that the position taken by one of the Commissioners was that not merely of defending his report, but in a character that was antagonistic to what has been brought forward against it.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Is there not any portion of your evidence that would not apply to that?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes; and it is for the very reason that it is new matter that I am going into, that I should be glad, if Colonel Tulloch cannot attend, that Sir John M'Neil should be present.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Tulloch's medical man told me just now, that he wrote to Sir John M'Neill yesterday, informing him of the state of Colonel Tulloch's health, and leaving it to him to decide whether he would appear or not.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) I think you wish to examine Admiral Dundas principally about the canvas?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Principally upon that question, but also with regard to other questions of aid from the Navy.

(*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) The Commissioners did not take the evidence of Admiral Dundas or Captain Milne?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Certainly not.

(*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*)—Perhaps you could proceed with your examination?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I will proceed with them if the Board overrule my objection.

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) The Board wish to call your attention to the terms of the warrant under which this Board is constituted, that is, for the purpose of hearing any replies or explanations that the officers who considered themselves animadverted upon in any way by the Report may choose to offer to them, and they consider, therefore, that they would not be justified in stopping the proceedings now, assuming that you are in the course of making those explanations. At the same time, they think that in the absence of either or both Commissioners, you ought not to pursue that course you were proceeding in yesterday, which was to impugn to a certain extent the credit of the Report or the character of the Commissioners.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I have not the slightest desire to impugn the character of the Commissioners in the smallest degree, but it is impossible for me to carry out my explanations without, to a certain extent impugning the Report.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) The Board are rather of an opinion that there was something personal in the course of the examination yesterday, referring almost to the integrity of the Commissioners as to the good faith with which they had drawn up their Report.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I beg to disclaim in the most distinct and positive terms the slightest attempt at personality, or anything of the kind.

6th May 1856.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) There was a question as to whether the evidence had not been altered after it had been taken down, and whether it was submitted to the printer in the state in which it had been signed. A fresh statement, I think, has been made this morning to the same effect. An allusion was made to some evidence of Colonel Gordon, which you have discovered has been also altered; that is a personal matter as regards the Commissioners.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) It is quite impossible for me to depart from that line. When I asked for the original minutes of the evidence that was taken on the spot, I did not receive them till after I had repeated that request once or twice, and when they were given to me and were put into the hands of the officers who had given that evidence upon the spot; those officers find the evidence in the state in which it is, crossed, and what I call erased, though I think Colonel Tulloch did not seem to think so. At all events they are omissions, and those officers come to me and state, "This is what I did state; here it is; but "that is not in the printed evidence in the book." And I hardly see how I can avoid bringing that forward, but I do not wish to bring it forward in any personal spirit at all.

(*Major-General Peel.*) All that the Board wish is, that you should postpone any remarks or any evidence as that, until Colonel Tulloch shall be present; shall not examine Colonel Gordon to-day with reference to that, but go on with the other witnesses.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I shall be very glad to do that; still it must be with the distinct understanding that either Sir John M'Neill or Colonel Tulloch have the advantage of cross-examining the evidence that I shall bring forward.

(*Major-General Peel.*) They will be furnished, of course, with a verbatim copy of the evidence that is taken.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You are aware that Colonel Tulloch handed in the original depositions of all the witnesses, and he stated yesterday that Colonel Wetherall was the only exception and the only witness that had not signed his evidence.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Perhaps I may be able to rebut that.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The originals were put in yesterday.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) This is one of the originals, and I only saw it yesterday; and Colonel Gordon never saw it either, till yesterday.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) As to Colonel Gordon's evidence, Colonel Tulloch stated that he had sent in his own minute of his evidence to Colonel Gordon, and Colonel Gordon copied it out in his own handwriting.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) And it is for that very reason, namely, the delicate character of the investigation, that I am disinclined to go into it in the absence of Colonel Tulloch. In the printed report of the Commissioners at page 2, there is this paragraph: "It "would have been easy to relieve them of many repetitions, and otherwise to dress and "polish them without materially altering their import; but we have thought it better to "submit them without erasing the rough, original stamp of authenticity, than to change, "in any respect, the form in which they were returned to us, corrected and signed by the "witnesses." It is impossible for me to go into that without, to a certain extent, impugning that paragraph.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) It is very unfortunate if anything wrong has been done with the evidence, or if it was given otherwise than has been stated in the report; but the report has been laid before the Board as an official document, and, as has been stated, the Minister of War is satisfied with it. This report was laid before Parliament, and so far considered to be an official and complete document, and it was referred to this Board to hear the explanations that certain officers might make who considered themselves at all reflected upon by it; it might have been possible that neither of the Commissioners could have attended; they might have been out of the country, or not living, but still the Board would have this duty to perform, that is, to receive the explanations which any officer might choose to make.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I think that that circumstance involves a very material and a very serious question, because Colonel Tulloch has stated here that the report received the approval, and was to receive the support of the Government; and it becomes a very material question whether that Minister of State who gave that approval, and also stated that it was to have the support of the Government, was aware that there had been certain omissions and certain alterations in the evidence that was given in the Crimea.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) The Board cannot enforce the attendance of the Commissioners; their coming is perfectly optional.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Could not you arrange the examination of your witnesses to-day, so as not to touch upon the report?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I am quite in the hands of the Board.

(*President.*) The Board think that you had better continue any observations regarding your own department. They do not see very well how they can adjourn.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) May I ask the Board whether I am to be furnished with a copy of the preliminary report?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) An application has been made to the War Office, but no answer has been returned. Do you mean the one at Constantinople, dated the 9th of June?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

6th May 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You applied also for the original minutes of the report of the 10th?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes; the Constantinople report of the 10th of June, the original preliminary report of the 9th, and the original report of the 10th.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You mean the manuscript one of the 10th?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

---

Major FANE KEANE, examined.

*Major Fane Keane, Roy. Eng.*

1473. (*Judge Advocate General.*) You are not compelled to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

1474. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) When did you go to the Crimea, and in what capacity?—I went to the Crimea in the end of December 1854 in charge of the hutting for the army in the East.

1475. Did you take out with you any engineers or artificers for the construction of the huts in the Crimea?—I had one subaltern officer under my command, a corporal and four men; and the services of that officer I lost in a fortnight; he was sent to the trenches.

1476. Did that subaltern officer go out with you?—Yes.

1477. Did you receive in England any information that you were to take out a detachment of engineers with you?—I was told that I was to have some sappers with me,—a corporal and four men arrived. That was all I knew about it.

1478. What was your understanding as to having some men with you for the construction of those huts; was it that there was to be an adequate number of men?—Yes, that was my supposition.

1479. Can you explain why this arrangement was not carried out?—I cannot at all. I arrived from North America, and was immediately told that I was to go in charge of the hutting to the Crimea, and I then spent the fourteen days that I was in England at Gloucester, Portsmouth, and Southampton, collecting the huts and seeing them embarked.

1480. You expected to have gone out with a detachment of your own corps?—That was the understanding, that I was to take sappers with me, that some were to go in each ship that took out huts.

1481. Do you know why that arrangement was not carried out?—No.

1482. It was not carried out?—No, it was not.

1483. What were the causes of the delay that took place, as stated in the Report, in the construction of those huts?—Delays were caused from various reasons, which commenced from the harbour of Balaklava itself; there were difficulties regarding the disembarkation of the huts in the first place, in consequence of the very small number of boats that could be allotted for that particular duty, and the very small proportion of wharfage that could be allotted for the landing and storage of those huts, in consequence of the hay and fodder and chopped straw being there at the time, and the shot and shell, and after having got them on shore the utter want of transport to take them to the front, which for some time depended entirely on the individual exertions of the men.

1484. You have read this report of the Commissioners, have you not?—Yes.

1485. In the report, at page 33, the difficulties in hutting the troops are stated as follows, and I wish you to state whether you consider them to have been the principal causes of the delay that took place: "No scarcity of wood existed along the shores of "the Black Sea, but the difficulty was to provide it at the camp in sufficient quantities "for building purposes. Hired labour could not be obtained, and the demands for the "services of the troops in the trenches and for other military duties were such that they "could not be spared to prepare it, even had they been capable of doing so." At page 34 they state, "The difficulties which subsequently arose in regard to land transport do not "appear to have been contemplated when these huts were ordered, otherwise it must "have occurred to the authorities that when the whole land transport of the army was "insufficient to carry to the front the supplies necessary for the subsistence of the men, "the arrival of 2,500 tons of building material was more likely to add to the confusion "of a crowded harbour and crowded wharves than to diminish the sufferings of the "troops. Even now it is doubtful whether the labour undergone by the men in "carrying those huts to the heights during the months of January and February was compensated by the advantages derived from them, though these were "admitted to be great. Some of the commanding officers declined to employ "their men on that duty, believing that the evils were greater than the "advantages." And at page 36 they state, "Before the first vessel arrived, however, the "troops had to be employed in carrying provisions to the front; and so much had their "strength been reduced by their sufferings, and such was the state of the roads, that a "weight of from 20 lbs. to 25 lbs. was as much as a man could bring up from "Balaklava. Indeed, it is stated in evidence that men could not have carried their "arms, accoutrements, and ammunition from the heights to Balaklava and back in a "day, through such mud as it was necessary to traverse. It consequently required from

*Major Fane Keane.*

6th May 1856.

"250 to 300 men to carry up a single hut sufficient to accommodate at the utmost "25 men; and as at this rate it was impossible to spare a sufficient number from their "other duties, the attempt had to be abandoned, although that accommodation, if there "had been transport, would have been of the utmost advantage during the rest of the "winter." Do you consider that those difficulties were the principal causes of the delays that took place?—I do; but I do not think that the Commissioners could form any just opinion of the real difficulties that existed, though they have described them very graphically, three months before their arrival, and they have misstated the weight as 2,500 tons; it was actually 3,750 tons; there were 1,400 huts, which weighed $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons each, they have very much understated the weight.

1486. As an engineer officer, do you consider that adequate shelter could have been constructed for the cavalry horses by means of canvas?—I do not.

1487. Will you state a littlemore at length your reasons for thinking that under the circumstances in which that army was then placed, and the circumstances of the country, adequate shelter could not have been constructed for the cavalry horses by means of canvas?—The subject of canvas seems to have been very much discussed in this hall, and I think that those who have spoken so highly of it, and have thought so highly of it, did not quite understand one of its principal properties. Everybody knows who has lived under canvass for any time, even a night's dew, or any damp at all, makes the canvas shrink so much that even in sound ground it draws the tent pegs; consequently, to form any covering of canvas, the framework upon which this canvas would have to be stretched would have to be of a very elaborate form, and being so would be very heavy, and require skilful men to apply it; it could not be stretched tightly over those poles or it would tear it all to pieces. The canvas seems to have been spoken of in consequence of its lightness, I presume, and facility of transport; but I think that that would be entirely done away with by the extra weight of the scantling required to form the framework on which it would be stretched. As an illustration of that, I will mention, that the only horses that I am aware of that were covered by canvas at all in the Crimea in the winter of 1854–1855, were the horses in Captain Thomas's troop of the Royal Horse Artillery stationed close to Balaklava. There was a stable made there, I think I am right in saying, by the sailors of the "Sanspareil;" it consisted of two or three topsails, and it was stretched over a framework, the two principal supports of which were no less than the bowsprits of two of the vessels that were shipwrecked on the 14th of November; they were immense spars, so large that I afterwards took possession of them, to form piles for a large wharf that I was building at Balaklava. In addition to that, canvas is no support to the framework, rather the contrary; and if timber was used a much smaller framework will be necessary, because each plank, as it is nailed on, forms a tie to the others, and makes a mutual support; canvas has not that property at all.

1488. Then you consider that the framework for canvas must necessarily be much heavier and more elaborate than that for planking?—Heavier, in consequence of its quantity; it need not be heavier scantling—it would require more labour, and be heavier in the aggregate.

1489. As in nailing on this canvas you would be obliged to make great allowance for the skrinking of the material, would not that affect the stability of the structure very materially for resisting the wind and rain also?—Decidedly; and particularly in that country, where the wind has notoriously greater power than in most other places, and in the mountainous district in which we were then encamped. It was not only that the force of the wind was felt sweeping over the surface of the ground, but it used to come down in gusts over the tops of the mountains, that even what Mr. Rawlinson calls horizontal shelter, I look upon as being as useless as any other, and I had an illustration of that in the first hut that I built almost with my own hands, and two of Captain Thomas' mechanics; we built the first hut, and I had to leave it in the evening with a portion of the roof on only, and no part of the side, which exactly corresponds with what Mr. Rawlinson calls horizontal covering, and in the morning I found the whole of it blown down.

1490. With regard to the question of the mere labour, providing you had the planking, which would be the most onerous to the troops, the construction of canvas shelter or boarded shelter?—I think, taking the utility of both, decidedly the boarded shelter.

1491. A good deal of evidence has been given in this hall, and it was at once admitted as truth, that there was no possibility of constructing canvas shelter on the plateau; what is your opinion as to the construction of canvas shelter in the Valley of Kadikoi?—It would have been possible, and easier, but not much more likely to have stood than on the plateau, for, as I have described, the country being so mountainous, no place was protected from the wind there, and those that seemed to be the most protected corners, I have often seen suffer the most. It came down in tremendous gusts, as it always does in mountainous countries.

1492. Were you in the Crimea when the storm came on, on the 14th, when the French road was carried away under the Vinois Hill?—Yes.

1493. We were subject to inundations of that description?—Yes. I remember that it washed away the whole of the railway material at the head of the harbour at Balaklava, and several men were drowned.

*Major Fane Keane.*

6th May 1856.

1494. What would be the effect of canvas shelter under such circumstances as that?—It would have vanished altogether.

1495. Were you present when Mr. Bracebridge and Mr. Rawlinson gave their evidence in this hall?—No, but I have read their evidence.

1496. As an engineer officer, and as a military man, what is your opinion of that evidence, with regard to, not only the construction, but also with regard to the ground, and all the circumstances adverted to particularly in Mr. Rawlinson's evidence?—I do not coincide with them in their opinions at all. I do not think that they could form any notion at the time that they were there of the difficulties that we had to contend with in the winter of 1854–1855. I have the less reason to coincide, especially with Mr. Rawlinson, in his opinion upon a subject that he says that he knows nothing about, when I hold here in my hand a correspondence which I think tends to show, to a great extent, that upon the subjects which Mr. Rawlinson was sent to the East about—his particular mission, his opinions were not on all occasions correct. I should like to hand in this correspondence to the Board, or read the letters.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Perhaps the Board will permit the witness to read the letters.

1497. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you state what the correspondence is?—It was sent to me for report from the Minister of War through Sir Richard Airey—it was an opinion of Mr. Rawlinson, and I merely state that to show that I have less reason to agree with him on a point which he states he knows nothing about when I have materials here to show that upon what he was sent to the Crimea about that his opinions were not always correct.

1498. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Is that the correspondence between him and the Minister of War?—It was forwarded by Mr. Bracebridge to the Minister of War, and sent to me to the Crimea to report upon.

1499. It was sent to you?—It was sent to Sir Richard Airey, and it was forwarded to me. I will read this letter, calling for it: "War Department, 21st of September 1855, "Sir, I have the honor to enclose for your consideration the copy of a letter which has "been received from Mr. C. H. Bracebridge, relative to an alleged waste of excellent "water flowing in a streamlet past the hospital on the Genoese Heights at Balaklava, "and have the honor to request you will take such measures as you may deem expedient, "should the evil complained of not have been already remedied." This is from Lord Panmure to Sir James Simpson. "Atherstone Hall, September 3rd, 1855. My Lord, I "have the honor to call your Lordship's attention to so much of the report of Dr. Suth-"erland and Commissioners (Mr. Rawlinson, one of them now in London, Mr. ——, "Parliament Street,) as relates to the water running by and supplying the Hut Hospital, "Genoese Heights, Balaklava. This streamlet has not been preserved by dams across "the ravine (ten feet wide and four feet average height, say two of them), which would "save water for the above hospital, now running waste. It has not been entirely "enclosed, as recommended, in its course to the harbour, where it affords water to the "shipping near the cattle wharf; on the contrary, it is polluted, as Dr. Sutherland's last "letter shows, by washing, &c. This question was not only in the report of the sanitary "commissioners, but before the 1st of June last Dr. Hall, medical officer in chief of camp, "and Dr. Anderson, medical officer in chief of hospitals, and Captain ——" (It does not mention the name, but it means myself, I suppose), "the engineer officer in charge of "Balaklava, agreed it ought and should be done; since then the number in hospital has "been doubled. The marine hospital above has made an excellent tank to receive "this very stream where it passes them. A similar tank has been cleared out for "the stream by the naval hospital in Cossack Bay, on the other side of the "harbour. Further down the streamlet, now running by the Genoese Heights "Hospital, might, on an expense of some hundred pounds (say three) be taken to "the ancient water-tank, of very large size, under the castle walls,—the walls of which "are nearly perfect, and the interior only wants cleaning; and thus the ancient means of "watering ships in harbour at all times could be introduced. This too is, I believe, in "Sanitary Commission report. Your most obedient servant, C. H. Bracebridge, per "Miss Nightingale, who hopes again to be stationed at the above hospital which she "inspected, with the aid of the sanitary inspectors, engineer officers, and medical gentle-"men, and where she remained three weeks." This is addressed to the Secretary-at-War, and this was sent to me for report, as particularly referring to my district, of which I had the charge. My answer is as follows:—"Royal Engineer's Office, Balaklava, Nov. 2d, 1855," addressed to Sir Richard Airey, "Sir,—In returning the enclosed correspondence "and my report. I beg to state the latter would have been furnished at a much earlier "date had I not been obliged to refer to H. M. Sloop 'Diamond,' for confirmation of part "of the matter contained therein; that vessel having been detached to Eupatoria and the "adjacent coast has caused the delay. I beg first to quote the portion of Mr. Brace-"bridge's letter referring to the report of Dr. Sutherland and Mr. Rawlinson as relates to "water running by and supplying the hut hospital, Genoese Heights, Balaklava; this "streamlet has not been preserved by dams across the ravine. This statement is in-"correct, as in consequence of a suggestion made by Mr. Rawlinson, after, I presume, a "careful examination of the ground producing the then copious stream of water referred to. "I constructed a dam across the ravine, which was completed on or about the 1st July; a "fortnight after its completion, the stream failed entirely. The entirely enclosing a streamlet

*Major Fane Keane.*

6th May 1856.

" that does not exist, calls for no comment in my Report, and also renders superfluous any " remark on the suggested expenditure of three hundred pounds to take the water into " an ancient water tank of very large size under the castle, where on its arrival it would " be more difficult to be obtained by the shipping than by allowing it to pursue its natural " course to the sea, passing through a filtering tank constructed by me in the month of May " last. The pollution of the water on its passage, by washing, &c., is more a police than " an engineer question. The idea that the tank in question was used for shipping, I " look on as an erroneous one, its position and construction leads to the inference that " it was intended as a reservoir for the rain-water collected from the roofs of the " numerous buildings within the castle, to render the garrison to a certain extent inde- " pendent of the streamlet below, supplies from which would be difficult to obtain in the " presence of a vigilant enemy. A singular fatality seems to have attended Mr. Raw- " linson's aquaeous predictions, for at Cossack Bay, referred to in Mr. Bracebridge's letter, " Mr. Rawlinson stated, in the presence of Captain Hamilton, of Her Majesty's sloop " 'Diamond,' and Dr. Smart, the principal medical officer of the naval hospital at that " place, that the water would be ample, and would not fail if pipes were obtained to " carry it into a reservoir already constructed. Mr. Rawlinson personally superintended " the work, and reported most favourably on the site. In five weeks every drop of " water used at this hospital had to be brought from the south side of the harbour in " boats, in consequence of the stream so confidently relied on from such scientific autho- " rity having entirely failed." It failed during the summer.

1500. You were stationed the whole time at Balaklava?—Yes.

1501. You had opportunities of seeing how the crews of the ships were employed?—I had.

1502. Can you state whether there was any superfluous number of men who could have been procured for other works than those they were employed on?—I am sure there were none that could have been obtained. You stated in your address, the other day, that there were at one time 34 carpenters. Those men were particularly employed under me, but although they were called 34 carpenters, only half were carpenters, for they refused to come on shore to work unless they had a mate with them; so that the 34 carpenters actually resolved themselves into 17, and it was only by dint of great energy on the part of Commander Derriman and a lieutenant of the navy, who were continually going round to the ships to get the carpenters, that they did the work.

1503. Do you mean Lieutenant Goss?—No; they were particularly appointed by you to collect those men.

1504. How were the crews of the ships generally employed?—Disembarking, first of all, when they came into the harbour, and ballasting after having completed their discharge. So onerous did they find the act of ballasting, that they used to come to me on all occasions to know if I could find anything for them to ballast with, rather than go outside of the harbour; considering the time that it involved.

1505. It was frequently for many days, was it not, that a ship could not get down out of the harbour?—Frequently.

1506. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Did the Board understand who it was that instructed you to proceed to the Crimea to superintend the huts?—I received my orders from the adjutant-general of the engineers.

1507. What was his name?—Colonel Matson.

1508. You have been asked with respect to your taking out engineers or artificers; did anybody instruct you to do so?—I was told by Colonel Matson that I should have sappers with me to help in the erection of huts.

1509. Was there any question about your taking out carpenters?—None; except that those sappers were to be carpenters.

1510. I believe you proceeded to Gloucester before going to the Crimea?—I did.

1511. Were you there instructed as to the proper mode of putting up those huts?—Yes; I saw them erected.

1512. Was there any question there of your having carpenters?—None whatever. There was no one to make a remark; I was there alone.

1513. You went there to see the contractor who had contracted with the Government for the supply of the huts?—Yes.

1514. Did he refer you to anything that had been done in France upon the subject?—No, it was not till I left. At the time I was there, I rather think he went over to Paris.

1515. Did you feel any want when you were in the Crimea of such persons as artificers and carpenters?—Every want.

1516. For this very particular purpose of erecting the huts?—Yes? it was for only that that I went.

1517. I think you said that you did not know why that arrangement was not completed?—I do not know why.

1518. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) What was the shelter at Balaklava that was asserted to have saved the baggage horses of the sappers and miners?—The greater part of the shelter consisted in three walls; there were only from 20 to 25 bât ponies.

1519. That was done by the promptitude and ingenuity of the sappers?—The person whose ingenuity is called in question was a young officer of engineers of the name of Leaby.

*Major Fane Keane*
6th May 1856.

1520. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) What was the covering that sheltered the horses besides walls?—I think there were portions of canvas stretched, so far as I recollect, but I do not quite recollect; but the principal protection was the walls protecting them from the wind; the walls originally existed; they were permanent walls in the village.

1521. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) They were the walls of a small house?—Yes.

1522. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Were the horses covered?—I think so. I cannot remember that at this moment; there was some sort of covering, but what it was I do not know.

1523. There was no shelter except those walls?—That was the principal portion of the shelter, so far as I recollect.

1524. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Could the cavalry horses have been sheltered in the same sort of way?—No, it was impossible; there were no stones, and nothing to make the walls of, and there was no labour, if the stones had been there, to collect them.

1525. You were not examined by the Commissioners in the Crimea?—No, I was not.

1526. (*Judge Advocate General.*) That is not your letter that appears in the Report, is it?—Yes; there is a letter of mine there, in reply to a letter from Colonel Tulloch; that is the only communication, officially, that I had with him.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I request to be permitted to read a report that I have had from the assistant engineer, stationed at Balaklava, who was in charge of those animals, to show the very little analogy that exists between the protection of those baggage animals and that of the cavalry. It is from Major Raines, of the 95th regiment: "I was sent to "Balaklava, from the camp, about the latter end of December 1854, on account of ill "health, and to take charge of the stores of the Royal Engineer department, those on "hand and those that were daily arriving in large quantities. I was then an assistant "engineer." It was the practice of that army to get from the engineers officers who were considered by the commanding royal engineer competent to perform those duties to assist.

(*Major-General Peel.*) What is the date of that report?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) The 9th of March.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Does that come from any public department?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No; it comes from me as the quartermaster-general; it came from Major Raines, I called upon him for it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is he here?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No; he is in England, he is now assistant quartermaster-general under me in this country. And as I was prepared with this report from him, I wish to read it for the information of the Board; it merely explains what number of animals there were, and to show what they were principally, and that, out of those transport animals, nine of them were bullocks.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Can you call this officer, if the Board require it, to verify his own letter?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Certainly. I wish to show the distinction when it is said that cavalry horses could have been sheltered, because those animals of the engineers department were sheltered in the village of Balaklava, and their shelter, to my knowledge, was extremely partial.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Does that report refer to the temporary shelter, such as saved the baggage horses of the sappers and miners of Balaklava?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Certainly; "I also had charge of the transport animals, in all "about twenty, nine of which were bullocks, and the remainder mules," both of those animals being much more hardy, and making no comparison between the shelter that is required for those animals and that which is required for cavalry horses, which were also performing very arduous duties at a considerable distance from their forage, while those animals were close to their forage. They were at the very place, and they had nothing to do but to send one of those bullocks and get the forage when they liked. "I had "orders not to use the bullocks and hackeries." They had some of the rough carriages of the country, and "as they had been previously so overworked, they had become quite "thin and weak, and they were consequently unable to draw a load through the heavy "roads," up to the camp; "a few subsequently died, and many of the mules having sore "backs could not be used. The working mules were only employed in taking up rations,— "provisions for officers and men of the Royal Sappers and Miners,—the forage required "by the officers was taken to the camp by their own bât animals once or twice a week. "I found a difficulty in getting the public animals shod, no farrier having been told off "for the Royal Engineers." I read that to show that out of those transport animals that were so well saved of the Royal Engineers, they amounted to only twenty, and nine of them were bullocks and the rest mules; they were in the town of Balaklava, close to their forage, and they were marched into the yard of a small house, which was a real shelter, as Major Keane has mentioned, and I believe some canvas or sail-cloth or tarpauling was spread over the corner of those walls and provided a sort of temporary shelter, but quite inapplicable as proving the possibility of the cavalry doing the same.

*Vice-Admiral J. W. D. Dundas.*

6th May 1856.

Vice-Admiral J. W. Deans Dundas, examined.

1527. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) Was the fleet under your command fully employed in the various duties which devolved upon it between the sailing of the expedition to the Crimea in September 1854, to the period of your return to England at the end of that year?—It was.

1528. Was that fleet fully manned?—Yes; except the loss of some men by cholera; about 500 men out of 10,000.

1529. Otherwise there was a full establishment to each ship?—A full establishment.

1530. Previous to your departure Sir Edmund Lyons was despatched on a special service?—No, long before; the fleet was separated in three divisions; the sailing ships were with me off Sebastopol, the great majority of the steamers were with Sir Edmund Lyons at Balaklava, and Lord George Paulet was at Eupatoria.

1531. The fleet was divided?—Yes.

1532. How many seamen and marines did you land from the fleet to assist the army?—2,400 seamen, and 2,000 marines.

1533. Can you state what number of shipwrights and carpenters are amongst those men?—Fifty shipwrights.

1534. Did you supply any stores of canvas for the army?—When we found that they were not allowed tents by the army, we then landed some spare sails for tents for the seamen.

1535. Can you state what quantity of canvas material you landed?—No; it is impossible. Every ship landed what she could for the seamen.

1536. As much as she could spare?—Yes.

1537. Can you state what number of spare sails each ship had that she could have spared?—None. Every ship had a spare suit of sails, beside what she had at her yards.

1538. Were those required for service, or could they have been sent on shore?—Certainly not. Nothing.

1539. Could you, consistently with the safety and necessary equipment of your fleet, have supplied to the force on shore more shipwrights, more men, or more canvas than you actually did supply?—At what date?

1540. I mean during the winter.—No more canvas could be sent, but I will read an order that I sent to Captain Lushington: "The shipwrights attached to the Naval "Brigade are to be sent to the senior officer at Balaklava, to assist in repairing the "vessels of war and transports damaged in the late hurricane." Every man that could be sent to Balaklava was sent by him, and from our ships also. There is another memorandum to Captain Heath, the harbour-master: "I have directed Captain Lushington to "send the shipwrights attached to the naval brigade to Balaklava, to assist in repairing 'the vessels of war and transports damaged in the late gale. You are also to employ 'all the shipwrights you can collect from the transports, or otherwise, to assist in the 'same work, paying them extra, as has been customary."

1541. Am I to understand that Captain Lushington, the commander of the naval brigade, was directed to send his carpenters down into Balaklava?—He was, by me.

1542. Therefore the people on the plateau were deprived of their carpenters, who went to Balaklava, to make good the repairs or the damage that was done to the shipping?—Yes.

1543. Can you state whether those repairs were able to be entirely carried out?—I am quite sure that Captain Lushington sent them down.

1544. Are you sure that it was within the time, and before the following spring, that service could be carried out; that is, the repair of the damage that was done?—I left on the 20th of December 1854, and at that time the carpenters were employed at Balaklava in repairing the men-of-war and transports. Here is an extract from a letter to Captain Heath:—"Keep the shipwrights of the brigade as long as you can, for from this squadron "you can look for nothing of that kind. We are so reduced now, that it is difficult to "get the launch in. 'London,' 'Queen,' 'Trafalgar,' all have damaged their rudders, and "I think this ship quite as bad."

1545. Under the peculiar circumstances in which I find myself placed here, I am forced to ask you a question which my own knowledge of the invaluable services which you, and the whole navy, invariably rendered to us, would otherwise forbid my touching upon; but as there is a misconception, I am compelled to ask you this question, whether, in that time of difficulty, trial, and suffering of the army, there was any omission, or any disposition on the part of any naval authority of any description, not to offer in advance of any demand every description of service that it was in his power to afford to the army?—There was not a man in the navy who did not wish to do all that he could. I particularly wish to speak of the duties of the transport service, for they have been particularly belied. I never saw men work better, and I did not know one who did not wish to do all that he could for the army, in the state they were in.

1546. Do you consider that the transport vessels could have done more, and furnished more assistance than they did?—No, I do not think it is possible; and they were in a very bad state themselves.

1547. When a ship comes into harbour, as those transports did, laden with cargoes of stores of various descriptions, after a voyage across the Black Sea, or after a voyage from

*Vice-Admiral J. W. D. Dundas.*

6th May 1856.

England or elsewhere, are not the crews, and the artificers, carpenters, and shipwrights of that vessel, naturally required for her own immediate service before going to sea again?—In general they are.

1548. Do you consider that when a ship comes into harbour in that way, her crew is immediately available to be landed for employment on other services?—If they are so, they ought to be paid extra.

1549. Can you deprive a ship of her crew directly she comes in?—No; if they are wanted on board; but if you wanted hands, and they could be spared from the ship, I never knew them refuse to serve.

1550. The only thing I want to establish is, that because there were certain ships, and the number might always remain the same,—some coming in and others going out,—it does not at all follow that the crews of those vessels were available immediately to be landed, and to be sent off either to the cavalry or to some division in the front, to be employed on military service?—Those men are not bound, as men-of-war's men, to serve where you order them. You cannot by compulsion make a transport man leave his ship, but I never knew them refuse to do it, if they were fairly treated, and paid extra. Lord Raglan and I both said very early that they should be paid extra for all the labour that they did.

1551. Are you aware that Lord Raglan never hesitated with regard to the wages to be paid for any labour that was to be performed?—No; he agreed, in case any of those men were wounded or killed in landing or on any service under the Crown, that men belonging to the transport service should be paid as our men-of-war were.

1552. (*Judge Advocate General.*) The Board desire to put the same questions to you that Colonel Tulloch put to Admiral Lyons. I think you have stated that in each ship there is a spare suit of sails; is there, in addition to that, always a large quantity of reserve sails?—No; there was an order of the Admiralty, in the summer of 1854, to send all the sails that were unserviceable to Malta the first opportunity; and every man-of-war, whenever a sail was not worth having, sent it to Malta.

1553. Do you recollect what quantity of reserve canvas thereought to be on board a man-of-war: take a 120-gun ship, or an 80-gun ship?—The canvas is not sewn or prepared for anything like a tent, but about 1,000 yards. You are probably aware that a yard of canvas is not like a yard of this cloth; a yard of canvas is 5 square feet.

1554. Do you know a work by Edye, "On equipment of ships of war," published in London in 1832.—I have seen the work.

1555. It is stated in this work, that on board an 80-gun ship there are 7,844 yards of canvas spare sails; have you any reason to doubt that being a correct statement?—No; but those are spare sails in case the others are destroyed.

1556. Is there not, in addition to that, old canvas on board most of the ships, which, on an emergency, might be used for such a purpose as the temporary shelter referred to?—That canvas was sent on shore for the seamen; there are storm sails and studding sails, besides square sails.

1557. But there is old canvas?—Yes; but that soon goes. We had been eighteen months from Malta at the time.

1558. Do you know whether a supply of canvas could have been obtained from Constantinople?—No; I do not.

1559. Do you know whether it was possible to procure any number of carpenters from Constantinople?—Very doubtful, I should think.

1560. Either ship carpenters or others?—It is very difficult to get the Turks up from Constantinople. I should think it very difficult to get them,—almost impossible.

1561. There were many sailing transports and merchant vessels at Balaklava, were there not?—A great number.

1562. Do you suppose that carpenters could have been procured from them for a few days?—All those carpenters were repairing their own ships, and four or five men-of-war that were damaged.

1563. You believe that they were not available for any other purpose?—No; they must repair their own ships first.

1564. (*Major-General Peel.*) You stated that you landed all your spare canvas for the use of the Navy Brigade; how was that canvas used; in what manner was it put up?—With spars.

1565. Which you landed yourselves?—Yes; jib booms, studding sail booms, and all that sort of thing.

1566. Did they answer the purpose?—They made it answer the purpose; they built in the hollow of a hill.

1567. (*President.*) How many ships of the line had you in Kazatch Bay?—2 at Kazatch, 4 off Sebastopol, 1 at Balaklava, 1 at Eupatoria.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I wish now to examine the storekeeper at Balaklava.

*Mr. Samuel Boyd.*

6th May 1856.

Mr. SAMUEL BOYD, Storekeeper, examined.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You are not compelled to disclose any matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) One of our great wants in that army was a departmental storekeeper, and all the stores were in charge of the commissary-general, which was a very great addition to the onerous duties that he had also to perform; there was no department of the kind, and it was not till Captain Gordon came out, who is there now, and is the storekeeper-general, that he took the whole of the stores away from the commissary-general, and there was a distinct and separate department of the storekeeper, and a very necessary one it was.

1568. (*To the Witness.*) What situation did you fill in the Crimea?—I was the chief storekeeper in the commisaariat department, attached to the store called the quarter-master-general's store, and under Mr. Archer, the commissariat officer. I had the issuing of the stores upon your requisition, and all demands that were made for the army in the Crimea.

1569. Under Mr. Archer?—Yes; the commissariat officer.

1570. What storehouses had you in Balaklava?—The storehouses were old buildings in the most dilapidated state, witout doors or windows, and the stores were exposed to the weather. Those old buildings were soon filled up, and the stores were then piled up in the open yard, higher than the roofs of the old buildings, exposed to the rain and snow. The snow was sometimes more than a foot deep upon the clothing, which had to be cleared off to get at the clothing for issue. Vast quantities of the stores were also piled up in large heaps on the landing place for weeks together, and no means of removing them; they were consequently exposed to wet, and to plunder; the bales often cut open and the contents stolen by Maltese and others. This was the case with stores belonging to other departments and to regiments. Regimental stores were thrown on the wharf from ships, and laid there, and were totally destroyed and lost. The landing of the commissariat stores, timber for huts, also the immense quantity of iron, timber, large heavy trucks, engines, fuel, and other stores from the railway company's steamers, was all done in one small space, so that we were completely blocked up. Chains and cables made fast to anchors sunk on the wharf, so that some days there was no passage for a boat to get in with stores; and stores that were much wanted for the army (and on board of ships) at times could not be landed for the want of boats; the boats were then employed embarking sick and wounded, and disembarking troops.

1571. You spoke of the state of your stores, the places for depositing goods, under the circumstances of Balaklava at that time, were they the best that you could have obtained?—They were.

1572. The village was so crowded and so limited in space that there were no others that could have been appropriated?—Quite so. There were some kind of cellars, small places, not fit for cowhouses, that there were Turks in, and they were moved out to admit the stores.

1573. When the stores became crowded as you described, and you wanted more room, what was done to afford you additional accommodation?—An application, I believe by yourself, was made to have huts put up at Kadikoi.

1574. Outside the town?—Yes; that was, I think, the end of January.

1575. There was no other space available in Balaklava?—None whatever. I had not a passage to get the stores backwards and forwards from the wharf, or to put them anywhere.

1576. Was there difficulty in getting stores into this yard of yours from the boats, when they were in the boats, across the way into your own store?—Yes; so much so that I was actually obliged to stop entirely; the place was blocked up with horses and troop-horses coming for their rations, and drawing wood and most other stores, shot and shell, and I was obliged to cease at different times.

1577. The whole traffic went through that passage?—Yes; there was no other passage whatever between the water and the gate where those stores were.

1578. When a boat-load of stores that had been taken out of the ship arrived opposite the gangway into that place of yours, could you always get hold of those stores, and get from the boat into your stores?—No; they lay there for nights and days for want of assistance to unload them, exposed to the weather and to plunder, and got damaged.

1579. When those stores were taken out of a ship, did you take them upon your books, and were they considered as your stores after they were taken out of the ships?—Not till I got them into the store, or saw them landed on the wharf and piled up.

1580 Then they became yours?—Yes.

1581. Were those stores that were piled up on the wharf, and left there at night, always found right?—Very frequently I found the bales cut open, and the goods abstracted, such as a bundle of socks, or a bundle of mitts, or drawers, taken out by the Maltese boatmen about the place.

1582. There was a great difference in the number of articles that were lying on the wharf as your stores, and those you got afterwards to deliver to the troops?—Yes.

1583. Did you send weekly returns of the stores that you had to my office?—Every week.

1584. Had you any difficulty as a storekeeper in seeing either myself or the officers of my department whenever you wished to communicate with me on any subject?—Never; there always was some officer or other on the spot lending assistance.

1585. When requisitions were presented to you that had been approved by me, or had been approved in my office, did you make any difficulty, or offer any obstruction in delivering to the troops those articles?—By no means; we delivered them as quickly as we could get them, if they were to be got at; very glad to get the party away to go on with others, and to get room to put the stores that were lying on the wharf.

1586. It was your great object to get rid of as many stores as you could?—I was most thankful to get all that I could off my hands.

1587. You know what a requisition is?—Yes.

1588. You know what the regulations regarding the approval and the signing of those requisitions were?—Yes.

1589. In cases where a requisition was presented that did not appear to be quite according to the regulation and all right, did you still issue the stores?—I issued the stores but I made some remark.

1590. You did not hesitate about issuing the stores?—By no means.

1591. Though there might have been an informality in the requisition?—Yes; I often issued them without a requisition, sooner than cause delay; frequently.

1592. Were a certain quantity of rugs and paillasse covers in store?—Yes.

1593. Were those made over to the purveyor's department?—I think as they got room to take them they took them away.

1594. What was the purveyor's name?—Mr. Fitzgerald.

1595. As fast as he could take them away, he took them away?—Yes.

1596. In fact, they were his stores?—Yes, they were his stores.

1597. Did you consider yourself not authorized to issue the rugs, or would you have issued them to anybody?—I would have done so if they would have accepted them.

1598. Did you ever offer rugs to the quartermasters of regiments?—I have frequently.

1599. Did they decline to take them?—Yes.

1600. Why?—Because they were not of that description that they required. They were of a light, thin, cotton description, not at all suitable for the soldier in the field or in quarters; they were intended for the hospitals. They were hospital stores, properly speaking.

1601. Would you have given to those quartermasters anything that they asked for?—Anything that I could possibly get at, or had in store.

1602. Were those quartermasters of the different regiments daily in your store?—Daily, and too many of them, very often.

1603. Had they an ample opportunity of seeing what there was?—At all times; they were made acquainted of all that was in store by me. They had every information that they could possibly have.

1604. You would have given them anything that they asked for?—Yes.

1605. And you would have been obliged to them for taking anything away and making more space for you?—I always was.

1606. Did you ever refuse the issue of great coats to the troops if you were asked for them?—Never; great coats were issued whenever any application was made; a quantity was sent from Varna that had been in wear, and those coats I gave to any man who required a coat or called for one.

1607. At one time during that winter you had great coats and sheepskins in store?—Yes.

1608. At the same time?—Yes.

1609. When you were issuing those sheepskins, the men did not take the great coats, I suppose?—They preferred the sheepskins.

1610. There were plenty of them?—Yes.

1611. There was no want of them?—I believe 1,000 remained after all were supplied.

1612. There was no want of fur coats?—None.

(*President.*) What dates is the witness referring to?

1613. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) During that winter, between December and the end of January. (*To the Witness.*) You had got a quantity of boots in store?—Yes, a great quantity.

1614. What was the reason that you did not issue them?—I issued all that were large enough and could be sorted out from the smaller ones.

1615. How many pairs are there in a barrel?—Generally the barrels run about 80 pairs.

1616. How many out of those 80 pairs were useful to the troops? how many would a quartermaster take?—I have known a quartermaster on one occasion, I believe Mr. Peacock, of the —— Rifles, come down, and I told him to use his pleasure and to open as many casks as he thought proper; they were just as they came from England, and I think he opened 10 casks before he could select about 150 pairs of boots.

1617. He took about 15 pairs of boots out of 80?—Yes.

1618. And the rest remained in hand?—Yes.

*Mr. Samuel Boyd.*

6th May 1856.

1619. Were those sent away again, and put on board ship?—There was a quantity of boots of small sizes that were returned into store and sent down to Scutari, and there was a large quantity shipped and sent to Malta.

1620. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) We were so limited for space that when we found that of those military boots called ammunition boots we could only find available 10 out of 80, —the others encumbered our stores very much,—we sent them away by any ship that we could get. We put a certain number of those barrels on board and sent them away, and it is supposed that barrels of boots were being carried about, backwards and forwards, up and down the Black Sea, while the troops were in want of them. (*To the Witness.*) At first the regulation was, I believe, that where a regiment wanted 80 pairs of boots, they would have had a barrel containing 80 pairs of boots; but afterwards you got orders to let the quartermasters open the barrels and take any number that they liked, only leaving the rest in your hands?—That was the case. I did not give those orders.

1621. And the men were allowed to fit themselve as well as they could?—They were.

1622. What were the fatigue parties that you had?—Upon some occasions I had to the amount of 100 men; a captain and 2 subalterns, and 50 men, and so on; but very often for days together we had no men; none whatever.

1623. Some days you did not get this labour?—Many days.

1624. What was the reason?—The duty was so hard; the regiments moved to the front when something extraordinary was going on. I applied to Mr. Archer, the commissariat officer, and we wrote frequently to the commissary-general, stating that the business of the issues was partly put a stop to for the want of fatigue parties.

1625. Was that owing to Sir Colin Campbell's movements, and the pressure of the enemy?—On one or two occasions particularly I recollect that.

1626. You were deprived of the fatigue parties in consequence of the movements of the enemy?—Yes,

1627. From the state in which your stores were, in the space that you had, were you at all times able to say what you had in store?—Impossible; I could not.

1628. Then what did you then do?—In the course of time in the last summer, by getting an opportunity, the weather being fine, and getting the stores out, we got to the bottom, and we got an account of the winter stores that were in charge; but during the whole of the winter I was not aware of the exact quantity.

1629. You made a sort of guess?—Yes; all a guess of the whole. When those stores were given over to Mr. Archer, I believe no one knew what quantity there were in store.

1630. Were you at all times able to lay your hands upon anything that you wanted?—Not at all.

1631. (*Major General Peel.*) Were there no sentries when the goods were landed in the wharf, and before they were taken into store?—There were sentries at the gates at the entrance to the store, and I had one sentry inside.

1632. You stated that very often when the bales were landed, they were opened, and some things taken away?—So they were; and it was impossible, where the sentry was stationed, to protect the whole of the stores. The stores were so piled up, the commissariat stores and others, that thieves could run about, and the sentry could not see them. Those Maltese that came from the small private vessels came alongside at night quietly, and did as they thought proper.

1633. It was from the vessels that you suspected they came?—Yes.

1634. How did the issue which you describe as having been made occasionally without requisition or authority appear on your store account?—The quartermasters got the requisitions afterwards. I gave the things in advance.

1635. After having delivered them without the requisitions, the quartermasters brought them down?—Yes, perhaps some days afterwards.

1636. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Were you examined by the Commissioners in the Crimea?—No.

1637. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) Have you read the Blue Book?—I have had no opportunity.

1638. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you say that the quartermasters refused the rugs at a certain time?—Yes, they did on certain occasions.

1639. Was that because you offered them sheepskins instead?—When they refused the rugs I believe the sheepskins had not arrived, but were daily expected, and they preferred to wait till they should come; it was the deficiency of blankets that caused me to offer the rugs; we were some short time without blankets, or few were in store, and they could not be got at, and those rugs were shown to the quartermasters, and they declined them till the blankets could be issued.

1640. Had they requisitions for any other covering?—When the requisitions were given in for blankets we were short of them, but Colonel Wetherall put in the requisition "Blankets or Rugs," and that caused me to show them the rugs, but they declined them.

1641. Were there blankets available for them?—There were soiled ones, that came from Varna, and they were issued to the Turks and the transports sometimes, but some of them were not so very bad; they had been used in the tents, and got a little mud upon them.

1642. Are the Board to understand that they neither took the blankets nor the rugs?—The blankets were not in store at the time.

*Mr. Samuel Boyd.*

6th May 1856.

1643. I thought you said that soiled blankets were ?—Yes ; but they would not accept of them.

1644. Will you state the date when that occurred upon any occasion ?—I think it was in the course of December. I have no memorandum. I did not bring a scrap of paper away from the store, and I have nothing to refer to, to refresh my memory.

1645. To what period does your evidence refer that you have given to-day ?—From the middle of December up to June. I left on the 12th of June.

1646. What you have stated has no reference to November ?—No.

1647. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) Were you not storekeeper in November ?—Yes, at Varna.

1648. (*Judge Advocate General.*) When did you first begin to act in the office of storekeeper ?—I arrived at Scutari about the 10th of May 1854, and I had the charge of the commissariat stores there until the quartermaster-general's stores commenced arriving ; then I took charge of them also, and remained there till after the expedition moved on to Varna. I remained at Varna, and I continued in charge there till the expedition moved on to Sebastopol.

1649. Did you go at the time that the army did ?—No, I was detained for some time after at Varna, waiting for a vessel to take up the quartermaster-general's stores.

1650. When were you established in your office at Balaklava ?—I landed on the 12th of December 1854, I think, and I took the charge immediately.

1651. (*Major-General Peel.*) Were there any quartermaster-general's stores previous to your arrival at Balaklava ?—Great quantities, such as blankets, great coats, havresacks, and canteens.

1652. Who was in charge of them ?—An assistant storekeeper of the name of Hunter.

1653. You relieved him about the 12th of December ?—Yes.

1654. Therefore you knew nothing of what took place in November ?—No.

1655. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Had you any paillasses in your stores ?—There were paillasses and bolster-cases, but they were hospital stores, and they ought to have been in the hospital store.

1656. Did you issue many paillasses ? Were there any requisitions for them ?—None, but to the hospital.

1657. None for the regiments ?—None ; they were never applied for, for the regiments.

1658. (*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) Previously to the landing of the stores from the ships, had you any information given to you so that you might make some arrangments for taking them under your charge or storing them away ?—Whenever the boats arrived with the stores, whatever man was in charge, the boatswain or the mate came immediately in as soon as he could, and told me that he had a boat with the stores.

1659. Had you no previous notice of their being landed, so that you could have made some arrangements ?—I knew day after day that those stores were to be landed. As they came in they were obliged to be put where they possibly could in the yard. In general, the small houses were blocked completely up.

1660. (*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Did every ship bring you an invoice ?—Frequently.

1661. Did they always do so ?—No ; they merely came, and said that they had such stores, and they wished to get them landed as soon as possible, but boats could not be found. There were many causes that prevented them being landed.

1662. They came without a regular invoice ?—Very often.

1663. (*Major-General Knollys.*) You only received them when they were landed ?—I had to obtain assistance to discharge the boats.

1664. When they came to the shore; but you had not to land them from the vessel ?—No, not from the vessel. The captains of those transports seldom landed the stores with their own boats, but they waited to get them from the men-of-war, which could not be supplied at all times ; they were short of hands, and I frequently sent fatigue parties on board to assist in getting the stores out. I have frequently had to go on board myself to look after the stores, and to beg the captains to get at them and to send them on shore.

1665. (*Major-General Peel.*) On whom did the duty of landing devolve ? You say that you had nothing to do with it nor the masters of the transport; how were they landed ?—The chief officer of the transport is the officer who generally sees the stores sent out of the ship, and also takes them in.

1666. He does not find the boats to land them in ?—They expect to be supplied with boats from the men-of-war, or hired boats.

1667. Did you hire boats ?—They were hired by the commissariat.

1668. Then the duty of landing devolved upon the commissariat ?—Those boats that were hired by the commissariat rendered every assistance in landing the quartermaster-general's stores as well as their own stores.

1669. When the transports arrived with your stores on board, to whom did they report themselves ? to the commissariat ?—It was generally the case that they had stores for each department, and they went to the commissariat ; and they came to Mr. Archer's office.

1670. Having reported to Mr. Archer that they had quartermaster-generals' stores on board, was it his duty to make arrangements for landing them ?—No ; I do not see how it was.

*Mr. Samuel Boyd.*

6th May 1856.

1671 (*Lieut.-General Knollys.*) Whose duty was it to make arrangements for landing the stores that were on board ship?—The transport agent, and I was frequently applied to myself. I have seen Admiral Boxer, at different times; he has been with me daily, while in existence, at Balaklava. I have seen him frequently aiding and assisting, and giving orders about the boats. He said, "Boyd, how are you getting on to-day; do you want boats? We will give you all the assistance that we can."

1672. (*Major-General Peel.*) Having received notice of those stores, you made application to the transport agent for boats?—Frequently.

1673. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you ever know the stores, for which you had received requisitions, left with you for want of transport to convey them to the army?—The quartermasters held requisitions for stores, and when they were issued to them, they had not the means often of taking them away, and they could only take, at times, but a small portion of them, which caused great confusion and mistake in the store accounts for the want of transport.

1674. (*President.*) Had they not fatigue parties?—They had sometimes, but not at all times.

1675. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) In what condition were those soiled blankets, which the troops refused to take?—Some of them were very bad, others of them might have been made use of, but not very pleasant or comfortable, still they were blankets; shortly before I left Varna, I believe in November, a heavy storm came on, and then each man had two blankets; the army was all called up to Balaklava, and those blankets were returned into store, very much soiled in consequence of the storm.

1676. (*Major-General Peel.*) If a quartermaster had taken those soiled blankets as part of his requisition, he would not have got good ones afterwards?—By returning them into store he would.

1677. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Have you any other statement that you wish to make?—I would thank the Board to let me run over the particulars of my duties.

1678. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) What does that paper refer to?—It is a memorandum of the duties performed, and explaining the difficulties that I had to encounter in the issue of stores. "At other times boats loaded with stores lay unprotected at the "wharf for days and nights, at the mercy of the weather, for the want of assistance "to unload them, and were damaged by the wet. Again, portions of clothing and other "stores on board of ships in the harbour, and which were much required, could not be "got at, in consequence of the heavy stores for the ordnance and other departments "having been placed on the top of them, and so they remained for weeks. General Airey "has climbed and forced his way through every part of the old buildings containing "stores at Balaklava, suggesting to me every means of issuing the stores with quick dis-"patch, desiring and cautioning me on no account, if possible, to let any party go away "empty-handed, and if the articles required were not in store, or could not be got at, to "give whatever there was in store that would answer as a substitute, to use every means "possible, late and early, in the issuing of the stores, to supply and comply with all de-"mands for stores. General Airey very often visited the stores, examining them, making "inquiries as to all stores in hand, and showing the greatest anxiety for the issuing of "all stores required for the army. Colonel Wetherall was almost daily through the "stores, seeing what there was for issuing, and giving instructions for the same, all of which "I acquainted Mr. Archer with. Colonel M'Kenzie and Major Ross were several times daily "in the stores late and early, rendering every assistance. Those two officers resided close "to the stores, in fact I was seldom one hour from daylight to dark without one "officer or another of the quartermaster-general's staff in attendance assisting and "arranging the issuing of the stores; four assistant and six active serjeants for "issuing stores and horse shoes, and nails, stoves, and funnels; another examining "and issuing boots; another buffalo robes, gregoes, watch coats, and skeepskin coats; "another blankets, great coats, soup kettles, canteens, and havresacks; another horse "clothing and other stores for the cavalry; two others issuing flannel shirts, drawers, "socks, stockings, mitts, comforters, collars, belts, &c.; another issuing waterproof coats; "another issuing tents, coffee-mills, &c., all this at one and the same time, from morn-"ing to night, Sunday not excepted, which often passed over without my knowing it. "The state of the yard was so crowded with stores piled up not allowing sufficient room "to move to distribute the clothing and stores to the troops, and when they were deli-"vered to them they had not the means of taking them away in order to make room for "others to receive what they required, which caused great obstruction and delay. The "yard was crowded to excess with officers and their men waiting for their stores during "the day. Every possible means were adopted to supply the army with every article "required that was in store. I was most anxious to issue all I possibly could get away "to make room for the stores that were lying on the wharf. Many of the quartermasters "had requisitions for a large amount of stores of which they could only take a small "portion at a time, and weeks passed over before they received their full amount of "stores for want of transport, notwithstanding the men were in want of them. This "taking of the stores by instalments caused great confusion, extra trouble, and led to "great mistakes in the store accounts. The blankets were cumbersome to carry; the "buffalo robes and large sheepskin coats were very heavy. The men who were sent for "those stores travelled six or seven miles knee deep, or nearly so, in mud and snow.

*Mr. Samuel Boyd.*

6th May 1856.

"They had the same distance to go back, and were completely exhausted and done up. They could take but a couple of articles each man, and if 100 men could have been spared from each regiment, they would have had to come several times to Balaklava to complete each regiment with one article alone. Then let it be considered what time it took to convey so much clothing to the camp, in addition to tents, stoves, and other stores. The quartermasters held requisitions for weeks for want of means to take their stores away. I had orders to secure all the cloth wrappers of the bales, and everything of that description for the use of the cavalry horses; to let nothing go to loss that would be of use for them. There was a great deficiency of picketing-posts, and ropes for the horses; all that was in store was issued. There were several bales of small rope, which was freely given to all that would take it, to make what use they could of it for halters, and it was freely given to all parties to secure the blankets and clothing; and without it I do not know what we should have done. At one time there were nose bags and corn sacks in store that could not be got at from the crowded state, the stores having been bundled in in great haste from the rain, without the means of sorting them, and the stores being filled up to the doors. Every means were used to get at those nose bags, and when got out they were immediately issued. I received a considerable number of nose bags that were made on board the fleet (I believe by request of the quartermaster-general), and when brought to the store they were immediately issued. Those nose bags were small, canvas was very scarce; there were a number of hospital and other tents repaired on board ship, the worst of the tents being cut up to repair the others, as the boatswains and sailmakers told me they had no canvas to spare. Colonel M'Kenzie gave me orders respecting the repairs of those tents. It often occurred that requisitions were given for articles that were in store, but could not be got out for some days after they were applied for. I have no recollection that great coats were at any time refused; but I issued, upon all applications, the old coats not taken into store. A quantity of great coats sent up from Varna, that had been in wear, were given to any one that required a coat, without any order. Respecting boots: the first issue of boots commenced at Varna, where I experienced great difficulty in finding the number required of a size large enough. When winter commenced, the men's feet were much swollen, and large woollen stockings were issued. One half or more of the commissariat boots were too small. There was every means used to select the largest size for issue. When the regiments got their store huts pitched at Balaklava, they received any number of boots they pleased to take, to sort out the largest and return the remainder into store. The boots were sent to Scutari, and shipped for Malta. When the small size boots were returned into store by the regiments, a great number of the boots were very bad, not lasting a week's wear. Men were coming every hour in the day with them in pieces, and barefooted. I, in general, replaced them by sending the men into the store to fit themselves from those returned by the regiments. The rugs alluded to as being in store and not issued were of a thin, light, cotton texture, intended for hospitals, not at all suitable for the soldier in the field or in quarters. These rugs, paillasses, and bolster cases, which were sent from the purveyor's stores at Varna, were hospital stores, and ought not to have been taken on the returns of the quartermaster-general's stores. Many bales of those stores were often landed with the quartermaster general's stores at Varna, when I invariably forwarded them to the surveyor's stores at the general hospital, and Mr. Jennar, the purveyor, was thankful for my doing so; and I have gone repeatedly to Mr. Fitzgerald, the purveyor, at Balaklava, requesting him to relieve me of these stores, as they ought not to be mixed up with the quartermaster-general's stores, and upon each occasion he promised to do so as soon as he possibly could get store-room for them. He occasionally sent for large quantities independent of any authority from the quartermaster-general. On one occasion, when Colonel Wetherall was going his usual rounds with me inspecting and examing the stores, I brought these rugs, paillasses, and bolster-cases under his notice, wishing that they were removed to the hospital stores. On that inspection of stores, we examined some bales of coatees, which some of the quartermasters declined to take. I do believe that had the Commissioners been made fully acquainted with all the particulars respecting the rugs and paillasses, they would not have made any comment upon them. Respecting the incorrectness of the returns forwarded to the quartermaster-general by Mr. Archer, when all is considered it could not be expected that it was possible for these returns and accounts to be kept correct. There was but one clerk, in a little hut, which was crowded from morning till night with quartermasters and other officers writing memoranda, reciting requisitions, waiting to see what they had received and what was due to them or their requisitions; captains and mates of ships in crowd wanting their bills of lading settled and signed as delivered; boat notes requiring to be examined and signed, and a thousand other things daily, and all this in a little hut without door or window, the snow and rain pelting in on the books and papers, the hands cold and numb, the body shivering, and the stomach empty, this poor clerk had to make out three returns every day—one for the quartermaster-general, one for the commissary-general, and one kept in the office—of all stores received and issued each day, and to book all stores, as they were issued; also

*Mr. Samual Boyd.*

6th May 1856.

"three weekly returns of all stores on charge received and issued during the week. "These returns were passed through my hands to Mr. Archer with my initials, "and he looked to me for their correctness; I had no time to examine them, "and go they must, right or wrong, I depending on the clerk; until, seeing him "become so bewildered and stupified by the great pressure of business, notwithstanding "my fatigue during the day, I sat up night after night till 12 o'clock, in examining "the books, finding figures entered in the wrong columns or lines, of serious amount; "for instance, four or five thousand blankets entered as rugs or coats, seven or eight "thousand ankle-boots entered as long boots, and so on. This I reported to Mr. Archer, "time after time; we could not get another clerk; at last he was sent to his regiment, "and one of the assisting storekeepers took his duty as clerk. This, I hope, will account "for the erroneous manner in which those returns were filled up; there was, at times, "sufficient business to employ half a dozen clerks. And I beg to say that every means "and exertion that were possible to be used were used in the quartermaster-general's "stores, to supply and satisfy all parties under the existing and trying circumstances. "Quartermasters of regiments frequently received the stores they required before they "got their requisitions, that no delay should take place; and they were at all times "made acquainted with whatever stores were on charge for issue, and they all appeared "satisfied that everything possible was done to assist them. Embarking at Scutari, and "also at Varna and at Balaklava, upon all occasions there was a deficiency of hands, "and at Scutari I sent parties on board to assist in getting the cargoes out; they "appeared always to be short of hands, and had it not been for that assistance we should "have been often waiting for a long time for those stores."

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I wish to ask Colonel Wetherall a question (*To Colonel Wetherall*) Will you explain what the peculiar functions and duties of assistant quartermaster-generals of infantry divisions are with the generals of divisions, as to procuring stores?

(*Colonel Wetherall.*) The first thing when the regiment wanted anything was to make the requisition in the form already handed in, signed by the commanding officer of the regiment. He took that to the assistant quartermaster-general of the division, who submitted it to the general of division; and frequently I have known, and quartermaster-generals of divisions have told me, that the generals of divisions did not approve of their troops drawing any large quantity of stores. And after it had received the sanction of the general of division, the asssistant quartermaster general put his signature to it, and either brought it or sent it to me by his deputy; and when they went down to Balaklava to draw those stores, and had any cause of complaint, the regiments complained again to the assistant quartermaster-general of the division that they belonged to, who again reported it to the general of division, who, if he had any cause of complaint, used to report it direct to the quartermaster-general; thus the complaints of the generals, if ever they made any, came direct to us. All went through the proper channels.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I wish to elucidate what the channels of communication were between the divisions of the army and myself, and to show that there was a regular machinery complete in all its parts, that the assistant quartermaster generals of the infantry divisions were in constant communication with the general officers of divisions and with my department, as to all subjects in that department.

1679. (*Major-General Peel.*) Did the assistant quartermaster-generals inform you of the grounds on which the generals of divisions objected to the requisitions?—Sometimes; I remember one or two instances in the Light Division; the general objected, and thought the stores were not absolutely necessary, and he thought that working the men to go down and fetch them was of less advantage than having the stores, when the stores were not absolutely necessary; he objected to the fatigue parties going.

(*President.*) What stores were those?—I forget; sometimes the regiment used to ask for a larger proportion of tents than were necessary, and they frequently asked for the full establishment allowance of any article, when their strength was much below that, and the general very frequently thought it unnecessary, that the regiment should have that quantity of store on hand.

*Captain A. Milne, R.N.*

Captain ALEXANDER MILNE, R.N., examined.

1680. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you be so good as to state to the Board what office you hold in the Admiralty?—I am one of the members of the Board.

1681. Had you the charge of the transport service from February 1854 to February 1855?—I had the general superintendence, but the details were carried on in another department subordinate to me.

1682. Can you inform the Board how the contracts for the transport service were made?—The contracts were made by public advertisement for the sailing ships in the usual manner, but receiving no tender whatever of steam vessels by public advertisement, they were taken up by private agreement.

1683. Can you inform the Board what were the instructions issued to the masters of the transport vessels?—General printed regulations were issued, the same as had been in force for many years with regard to the details of the charge of the various stores put on board, as well as for the conduct of the masters towards the troops.

*Captain A. Milne, R.N.*

6th May 1856.

1684. Have you got those instructions?—No.

1685. They could be procured from the Admiralty, could they not?—Certainly.

1686. If a naval officer in charge of the transport service in the Black Sea had been asked to give sail-cloth, or to allow the masters of the transports to sell it for the use of the troops on shore, do you consider that he had any discretion in doing so?—I think that, generally speaking, it would have been injudicious, and for this reason, the whole supply of sails to the transports consists simply of two suits; and generally one of those is half worn, or partially worn, before the ship can leave England; therefore by the time she was employed in the Black Sea, it would possibly be more worn, and therefore she would have only one spare suit on board, which would be only sufficient to meet her necessities, supposing she lost any by bad weather; but I may mention that an order was given to all the transports to supply whatever spare sails they could for the use of the army; and in consequence of certain demands upon the Admiralty for a repayment for spars and sails, the question was asked by what authority those had been supplied, and I have here an answer from an officer who was in charge of the transport service at Balaklava. It is dated, "Her Majesty's Ship 'Triton,' Balaklava, June 1st, 1855," from Captain Heath: "With reference to your letter of the 15th May, requesting information "as to some awnings said to have been supplied by the 'Candia' to Her Majesty's Ship "'Sanspareil,' I have the honour to inform you that in December 1854, Lord Raglan "was anxious to house the horses belonging to the Royal Horse Artillery, and that he "applied to me (the captain of the 'Sanspariel') to appoint an officer to superintend the "erection of the building. The officer so appointed was Mr. Wheeler, master of the "'Sanspareil' (now master of 'Royal Albert.') The awnings, spars, &c., were supplied "to him from the different transports, by virtue of a general requisition made on them by "the late Captain Christie, but the accounts thereof will not in any way appear on the "'Sanspareil's' books. I know Mr. Wheeler gave receipts, and I rather think he kept "a tolerably detailed account of what he received." That was in answer to the claims that were made upon the Admiralty for a certain amount of sails which had been landed from the transports at Balaklava, but it is very trivial. Spars were the principal; there were a few sails, one main top-gallant sail, a spanker, a mizen royal, and a few smaller sails.

1686*. I think you stated that before sailing they received instructions to afford any assistance or supplies to the army that they could?—Yes, but that would not embrace the question of supplying the stores belonging to the ship, for if the ship was lost for want of those stores, a very serious question would arise that the ship was lost from having given those sails.

1687. There was no restriction upon them?—I cannot say that any order was given to afford supplies of that description which did not belong to the Admiralty, but actually belonged to the owner of the ship.

1688. There was nothing in the contract to that effect?—Nothing.

1689. Will you state what were the terms on which the transports were hired by the Government in 1854?—They were hired for a certain period, and to be continued if their services were required.

1690. (*Major-General Peel.*) It was necessary to have a certain amount of stores, including a certain amount of sails, on board?—It is fixed by the charter-party; that insists that there shall be on board every transport a certain number of sails for the use of the ship, and our officers on the inspection of the ship see that those sails are on board, and the same with the crew; that is fixed according to the size of the ship, four men for every 100 tons and two boys in addition, to each ship.

1691. (*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) It has been stated by a witness who has been examined before this Board, "It was part of my duty to make "an inspection of the transports as fitted up for the conveyance of the sick "from the Crimea down to the British hospitals on the Bosphorus; and in con-"versations I had with some of the transport captains, I understood that they had both "sailcloth and sailmakers to spare." Can you give the board any information upon that?—I cannot, not having been in the Crimea, but there are officers in England who were specially appointed to superintend the duty of the embarkation of the sick, and also the landing of the stores.

1692. You have in some measure answered it by saying that you could not require the transports to give anything?—Certainly not, but there was a requisition from Captain Christie, requesting that anything they could spare might be landed.

1693. Can you explain how our transports in the Black Sea were supplied with forage, and how it happened, that in the passage for a few days from Varna to Old Fort, where the army landed, some of the transports were short of forage?—I cannot, that is between the commissariat department and the agent of transports; it did not come before me officially. We supplied hay and oats at first from the Admiralty—it was then subsequently transferred to the commissariat department, and when any transport is now leaving this country we write to the commissariat, requesting them to provide necessary fodder for the horses to be embarked.

1694. (*Major-General Peel.*) What are the duties of the transport as to landing the cargo?—It is our duty to land it, and to afford every assistance in our power to the

*Captain A. Milne, R.N.*

6th May 1856.

department to which it is consigned; the master of the transport gives a receipt for the cargo to the party in England or Malta, where the stores are embarked, and he is bound to deliver that cargo, and to obtain a receipt from the party; on receipt of this by the Admiralty Department payment is made.

1695. It has been stated that objections were made on the part of the masters of transports to do more than take the cargo alongside?—They are obliged to assist in landing in their own boats, and the whole of the boats of the transports were employed in Balaklava harbour in the delivery of stores.

1696. (*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) Are they at liberty to use their own discretion as to the time of landing those stores?—That depends very much upon the requirements of the party to whom they are consigned. The working hours are from daylight to sunset.

1697. (*Major-General Peel.*) When a transport was taken up as a horse transport, were hay and corn included in the stores?—We supplied everything: hammocks for slinging the horses, and nose-bags; and everything was supplied by the Admiralty.

1698. What amount of hay and corn did you supply?—We supplied to the steam transports about 25 days, and we supplied to the sailing transports up to three months. Some of our ships could not carry the quantity, and therefore we were obliged to make them take as much as they could, picking up more at Malta or Gibraltar, where they put in for water.

1699. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You stated that there were some officers now in England who could give information relative to the horse forage on board the transports?—Yes; I should think that there are officers now in England, with regard to the question between Varna and Old Fort. I am not cognizant of any complaint having originated on that head.

1700. There was a complaint made that several horses were lost in consequence of the deficiency of forage. I think it was in the Scots Greys?—I was not aware of the fact. I should think that it would have been the duty of the military department to have seen the supply put on board abroad, if our supply of forage which we provided from England to Constantinople in the first instance, and from that to Varna, was expended, we had no means of getting it; we have no Admiralty agent out there to enter into a contract for hay; we were aware that the commissariat were to obtain forage.

1701. (*Major-General Peel.*) You had a transport agent, had you not?—Yes; but it would not be his duty to enter into a contract for hay. He should have made a demand, if he was aware the service they were going on, upon the commissariat department for the hay.

1702. When Lord Raglan gave the order that each transport was to have so many days' forage on board, that would not be directed to the Admiralty?—No; the agent for transport, if he saw that order, ought to have made a demand upon the commissariat officer, or have seen the military commandant, and to have arranged it with them. It was impossible for the Admiralty to supply hay and corn in the Black Sea.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) What we wanted to know was how this deficiency occurred?

1703. (*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) I asked Commissary-General Filder, whose duty it was to supply the transports with forage, and he says, "It was the duty of the "Admiralty?"—It was perfectly impossible for us to do so.

1704. In answer to another question he says, "To feed horses and men was a duty "belonging to the Admiralty"?—To feed the men we admit, not the horses.

1705. Commissary-General Filder says, "Lord Raglan, at the time that the order was "given was at Constantinople, and Admiral Boxer was at the head of the transport "service at that time, and the order was addressed to him"?—We never thought of making any arrangement to lay up a supply of hay and corn in the Black Sea.

1706. In answer to Sir George Berkeley's question "Then, the commissariat had "nothing to do with it?" he answers "Nothing whatever."

1707. (*Lieutenant-General Sir J. Peel, to Sir Richard Airey.*) Are you aware of the order of Lord Raglan that the horse transports should have so much forage on board?—No, I am not.

1708. If such an order had been issued during the time that you were quartermaster-general, to whom should you have applied?—Certainly to the commissariat. The naval authorities have no power to furnish forage or military stores of any kind; my impression is that in the absence of a regularly constituted naval authority from the Admiralty, thal duty devolves upon the commissariat.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) The agent for transport would have nothing to do with it.

*Captain Milne.* Nothing. If he ever received that order of Lord Raglan's, I consider that it was his duty to see that order was carried out; if he saw there was a deficiency of fodder on board any ship he ought to have communicated with either the military commandant there or the commissary-general to afford his assistance in carrying out the military order.

1709. And to have reported any deficiency?—Certainly.

1710. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you say that that claim was conceded, that was made upon the Admiralty for spars and sails?—Yes.

1711. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) How would the commissariat department know that there was a deficiency of forage on board a transport, unless it was reported

by the agent for transports?—It is probable that it would be; the agent of transport would report, and the commissary general receiving such an order would naturally inquire what there was on board, and the military officer who was to embark in charge of horses ought also to have inquired.

1712. But it would be his duty to report?—Certainly, the officer for transport might not have been aware what service they were going on, therefore it was only those parties receiving the military orders from Lord Raglan that could deal with the question, most likely the transport people were totally ignorant of the service that they were going to be employed on.

1713. When the cavalry were embarked at Varna, those ships must have been almost empty?—I should think very nearly so, in consequence of being so long from England, but so particular were we at the Admiralty, that the moment the cavalry was heard of at Scutari and other places, we wrote off and gave instructions to Captain Christie to have the whole of the transport provisioned for men and horses in case of any re-embarkation, and similar instructions where sent also when they landed in the Crimea.

1714. (*President.*) It was stated in Lord Lucan's evidence that in the "Simla" the forage was out in nearly a week after leaving Varna, and it was understood that they ought to have had six weeks' forage on board?—I do not know what orders were given there.

1715. (*General Sir G. Berkeley, to Sir Richard Airey.*) Who was the quartermaster-general when they embarked at Varna?—The duties were carried on by Major Wellesley. Lord De Ros was very ill. I was appointed quartermaster-general after the whole force was embarked, and when I was on board ship myself.

1716. You did not know that there was any inspection made of those horse transports to ascertain what forage they had on board?—I presumed that the same action took place previous to the army proceeding to the Crimea as it did on subsequent military expeditions; when there was an expedition to Kertch, and when there was an expedition to Kinburn, I notified to the commissary-general the nature of the expedition, the force, and the number of days' provisions, both for man and horse, that was to accompany the expedition.

1717. And you presume that that was done on embarking at Varna, or before?—I presume the same thing was done there; there was no naval storekeeper at Varna; at Scutari there was a naval storekeeper; and there was no positive naval storekeeper at Balaklava either. There was a naval agent of transports, but he had not the attributes of a naval storekeeper.

1718. (*Sir Richard Airey, to Captain Milne.*) I think I understood you that a very serious question would have arisen with the charter-party, if a quantity of what is called spare sail-cloth had been parted with?—Certainly.

1719. There was a certain list sent to the Admiralty, with claims upon the Government, for payment of what had been issued?—Yes.

1720. Could I be furnished with that list?—Yes; that is a copy of the return of the supplies that were given from certain transports in Balaklava harbour, and repaid for by the Admiralty (*handing the same to Sir Richard Airey*).

1721. Are these all?—Yes.

1722. (*Leiutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Was not the supply of forage to the transports a naval charge up to very recent regulations?—It was a supply made by the requisition of the Treasury on the commencement of the war, we at first remonstrated against it, and said that we did not consider that the Admiralty were the parties that ought to supply hay and corn, but we entered into contracts to supply them; but finding the demands coming so heavy, and our other duties being so responsible, we wrote to the Treasury, and begged that they would relieve the Admiralty from the purchase of hay and corn for the horses; in the first commencement of the war we did give that supply, but subsequently we did not.

1723. But how was that the period of which we have been speaking?—It was a a charge at that time, for the sea voyage.

1724. Then of course the Admiralty must have found forage?—Yes, in England, not abroad; we considered it entirely as a commissariat question. We had no agents out there at all, and no storekeeper, and no civil naval authority in the Black Sea.

1725. You had a transport agent?—Yes, but the agents for transports cannot enter into any contracts abroad.

1726. Do you think that it was perfectly understood who was to supply those transports?—I should think so; I had not the slightest idea that any difficulty would have been raised about it. We have nothing to do with it now. I think it must have been for about 15 months or more. I presume that hay and corn would also be supplied abroad by the commissariat. We make all demands for supplies upon the commissariat at places where there is not a naval agent.

1727. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Who would put the forage on board now at Malta?—Demands would be made on the commissariat department.

1728. (*Major-General Peel.*) Sir Richard Airey states, in his evidence before this board, at page 33, "On the 4th December I had a letter from Captain Christie, the principal "agent for transports, and he says, 'I beg to acquaint you, for the information of "'Lord Raglan, that I have ordered all the small spars, sails, and awnings, &c., "'to be collected on board the transports in Balaklava, and as they are now

*Captain A. Milne, R.N.*

7th May 1856.

" " ready to be landed, I request you will be pleased to inform me to whom they are " " to be delivered." " It was in consequence of that order I suppose, that the charge you have referred to was made?—They were delivered to the master of the "Sanspareil" then in Balaklava, who was ordered to superintend the construction of certain barracks or coverings for the shelter of the horses. I have just given to General Airey a return of those very supplies that were made on that account.

1729. (*President.*) Was it intimated to Lord Raglan that the Admiralty only supplied the transports going from England with forage?—I am not aware of that, but I will refer back, and if I find any document upon the question of supplies in the Black Sea, I will send it to the Board; I think there may be something at the Admiralty as to the point.

1730. (*Major-General Peel.*) If that order of Lord Raglan's had been addressed to Admiral Boxer it would have been forwarded to the Admiralty?—Most likely a copy would have been forwarded.

1731. (*President.*) Will you have the kindness to furnish the instructions for the transports?—I will do so.

1732. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Lord Lucan stated that in the case of four transports in which horses were embarked from Varna, that before the eighth day they were short of hay?—I am not acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case, nor ever heard of it.

1733. The Admiralty was in no way responsible?—I think that the agent for transport ought to have seen what quantity was on board, and he ought to have been told what fodder should be on board the ship, and then he ought to have communicated with the commissariat for the requisite supply; but whether he knew where the ships were going to I cannot answer.

1734. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Commissary General Filder states, that there had been an order from Lord Raglan that no horse transport was at any time to have less than six weeks' provisions on board?—Whom was that order addressed to?

1735. (*Judge Advocate General.*) That is not in evidence.—I do not recollect any such order. I will refer back and see whether such a thing exists.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) The board wish to know what course you intend to pursue. Have you any other witnesses to-day.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I observe that Colonel Chapman of the Royal Engineers is here, and as he is one of my witnesses for to-morrow, perhaps to save time the Board will allow him to be examined now.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Very well.

---

*Colonel Frederick Chapman.*

Colonel FREDERICK CHAPMAN, examined:

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I have to inform you that it is not compulsory on any witness to disclose matters which may form the subject of a a charge against him before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement that he may make will be admissible against him.

1736. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) You have read perhaps the Commissioners' report?—Yes, I have.

1737. Have you any recollection of your evidence?—Perfectly.

1738. In the concluding of your evidence, at page 132 of the blue book, it is stated, "For the facility of procuring forage, these mules were kept at Balaklava under cover "of sail cloth put up in a day, and they came up whenever the weather was not very "unfavourable. The result of this arrangement has been that the whole are still "alive after having done the work throughout the winter." Now if the Board will turn to page 36 of the report of the Commissioners, it is there stated, with regard to the loss of cavalry horses, "Considering also the suffering and severe loss of "horses from exposure to the weather in the commencement of the winter, there "appears to have been a want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising for them some "means of temporary shelter, such as saved the baggage horses of the sappers and miners "at Balaklava." Perhaps you would be good enough to explain to the Board the nature of the temporary shelter that was erected for those baggage mules at Balaklava, to see how far it is a parallel case, and what analogy it bears with regard to the covering of the cavalry horses in the valley of Kadikon, or on the heights?—The temporary shelter erected for the baggage horses and mules of the sappers and miners was merely formed by a house and three other walls; there were three dwarf walls forming an enclosure of a courtyard against the house, and one end of a sail was stretched as it might be against that wall, and the other end was brought down, and with a rope fastened to the dwarf wall on the opposite side; that was all the covering that we used for the shelter of the baggage animals, but a shelter of that sort is totally different from what would have been required for the cavalry on a place like the plateau, it is not a parallel case at all; what can be done in one place where there are walls cannot be done in another place where there is nothing of the sort.

1739. What would have been the extent of this structure provided it had been erected for the shelter of the cavalry horses?—So far as I recollect going into it at the time, we should have required about a mile and a quarter of covering for the cavalry or artillery that were on the plateau, speaking of the month of November.

1740. Would such a description of shelter have been applicable for the cavalry upon the plateau?—It would have been applicable if you could have made framework enough to have borne the canvas, but in the state that the army was in at the time, I think it was quite impossible to have got such a framework as would have carried that canvas against the high winds that prevailed.

1741. Or in the valley of Kadikoi?—The wind there is as bad, if not worse, than on the plateau. I mean from the currents that rushed through the different ravines and hills.

1742. The difficulties at the valley of Kadikoi would have been much the same as the difficulties on the plateau?—Much the same, except that you would have had a smaller distance to have carried the material.

1743. What is your opinion with regard to the weight and strength of the framework that would have been necessary for the support of the canvas?—For the support of the canvas against that enormous pressure of the wind, I think you would have required a much larger framework than you might have had for the small huts.

1744. With regard to the sail-cloth that you covered the animals of the sappers with, where was it obtained?—As well as I recollect it was found in some of the houses at Balaklava, in one of the stores there; it was a part of an old Russian sail.

1745. You did not get it from one of the ships?—Certainly not; to the best of my recollection it was obtained out of one of the houses.

1746. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) I do not think that I have any other questions to ask.—I cannot be certain as to where that canvas was obtained; it was obtained by a subaltern officer, who had the charge of putting it up, who lived in Balaklava. I resided in the front.

1747. Do you remember whether the animals were horses, or what they were?—They were mules and oxen. I do not think that there was a horse amongst them.

1748. (*Major General Peel.*) You state that it would have required an immense quantity of framework or wood to erect shelter for horses on the plateau?—Yes.

1749. Do you recollect when the first shipload of wood arrived in the Crimea?—No.

1750. It appears that the first shipload did not arrive till November, and there would have been no possibility of erecting the framework before?—If you had canvas without a framework you might have left it in Balaklava. I had nothing to do with the hutting, I was employed in the front.

1751. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Had you ever occasion to apply to the transports for canvas?—I certainly never did.

1752. You cannot say whether they had any to dispose of or not?—I am not aware whether the transports had or not. My duties were entirely in the front. I seldom or never went down to Balaklava.

1753. (*Major-General Peel.*) For that temporary shelter which you erected in Balaklava, there was no framework required?—None whatever. So many walls, with a large sail that was just stretched over, like any common awning.

1754. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Do you consider that a canvas cover could have been erected on the plateau to cover the horses, without danger of being carried away?—There would always have been great danger of carrying it away by high winds.

1755. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) You stated in your evidence before the Commissioners, that you allowed your men two nights in bed for one on duty?—Whenever I could; I tried to work it so during the winter.

1756. It was not such severe duty as the infantry had in the trenches?—Certainly not; my men went down in two reliefs, whereas frequently the infantry were down for full 24 hours.

1757. Your men were not on duty the longer time?—Our men were on duty for shorter periods than the infantry, generally speaking.

1758. (*Major-General Peel.*) How many men had you under your command?—In the latter part of the siege I had nine companies.

1759. (*General Sir G. Berkeley*). That was on the right attack?—No; I was on the the left. I had the charge of the whole of the sappers since March. Up to March I had the charge of the left attack; after that I had the charge of the whole, after Colonel Gordon was wounded.

1760. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) The Board will observe it was stated at page 24 in the Report, "In a meteorological register kept at Balaklava, it is stated, that till then the "weather was generally fine with little rain, but that during the latter part of that "month and a considerable portion of December, there were heavy rains, with cold "nights." The month of November was all fine; we had that dreadful hurricane in November, but with regard to the temperature it was fine and perfectly bearable; and the Report says, that one blanket and one great coat appears to have been sufficient for the men, and on the 2d of December the first issue of planking took place.

1761. (*Judge Advocate General, to the Witness.*) Have you seen your evidence since it has been printed in the Blue Book?—Yes, I have.

1762. Is it correctly given?—I have not referred to my own copy of it. I should say that the substance of it was generally correct.

1763. Did you keep a copy of the evidence that was taken and signed by you?—Yes.

*Colonel Frederick Chapman.*

6th May 1856.

1764. Have you got the original deposition?—Yes; in London. I have not got it here.

1765. You are not prepared to say that there is any variance?—I do not think that there is.

1766. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Did you sign it?—Yes, I did.

1767. (*Major-General Peel.*) You received no requisition for blankets previously to the 10th of January that you had not availed yourselves of?—No; not that I am aware of.

1768. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) It was the general case in the army that they were in advance by the requisitions of the supplies that they had been able to make available?—I think we were always able to get our supplies up. Whenever we made a requisition on the quartermaster-general's department, it was approved. I found very little difficulty in getting the supplies to the front.

1769. The engineer officers were in Balaklava and the horses were in Balaklava, therefore I should have thought that they would have had every opportunity of carrying to the front if they had wanted it?—So we had.

1770. (*Judge Advocate General.*) I believe you had always an officer stationed at Balaklava with regard to the supplies?—Yes; always. He had the entire management of the supplies, and the management of the horses, and sending everything to the front.

1771. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) You had a very active officer, had you not—Lieutenant Leahy?—Yes; very much so indeed.

1772. (*Judge Advocate General.*) You ascribe the regularity with which your supplies were obtained to that circumstance?—Yes; I think we were in a great measure indebted to the officer that we had in Balaklava, Mr. Leahy.

---

*Colonel M'Kenzie.*

Colonel M'KENZIE further examined.

1773. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) There was a part of the evidence of Mr. Boyd, the commissariat issuer, which was not very clear, with regard to the steps that were taken for the landing of stores that were known to be on board ship, and as Colonel M'Kenzie was stationed at Balaklava, although it was not exactly his office, yet he made himself very active in carrying out that service. Perhaps the Board will let him explain the course that was adopted?—I was aware of every vessel arriving in Balaklava, and generally what that vessel contained, and I made it my business every afternoon, just before dark, either to communicate personally with Captain Christie or his secretary, and arranged for the landing of the troops and all the different stores the following days, so that I knew exactly what was wanted, and how to economize the boats, which were always very scarce. I inferred, as far as I was able, the exact stores that we wanted, and the same with regard to landing the troops.

1774. (*Major-General Peel.*) You are talking now of general stores, and not of quartermaster-general's stores?—I am talking particularly of the quartermaster-general's stores, but I being there as General Airey's representative knew exactly, at least not exactly, but pretty well, everything that arrived. Generally I saw Captain Christie, as I said before, and the boats were economized so that there were not too many things taken to one store and too many to another; they were equally divided. I knew the wants of the army as well as any one individual could do from being on the spot, and I mean to say that no stores left the vessels without instructions of the proper authorities where they were to be landed.

1775. Your superintendence extended over other stores than merely those of the quartermaster-general?—So far as that went, it did.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I was anxious to supply this evidence because there was an incompleteness in the evidence given by Mr. Boyd on that subject—the chain was incomplete.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Captain Milne says that it was the duty of the transport to land them on the shore, and it appears in the evidence that that was a duty that they did not perform on many occasions.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) It was a matter of conversation with Commissary-General Filder—he frequently remarked to me upon the error that had taken place in the original contracts. In common cases, if you freight a vessel to carry supplies of any description, either to North America or Australia, it is quite sufficient to charter that vessel to carry the cargo, because you find that there are tide-waiters and labourers and everything of that sort at every port who discharge a vessel, but in this expedition it was not considered that those transports would get upon the coast, which they naturally did, in the Crimea, where there was no possibility of getting any labour. I believe, myself, that the contract was only to carry the cargo, and that it was an omission in the original contract in not making the arrangement that they were bound to deliver the cargo on shore into the storehouses.

(*Major-General Peel.*) That is contrary to Captain Milne's evidence; who was the person who engaged them?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I do not believe that there was a single transport which arrived at Balaklava that had boats or crew to deliver its own cargo under very great length of time.

1776. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Was that reported at the time to anybody?—It was a commissariat question, and I have no doubt that the commissary-general represented it at home to the Treasury or to the naval authorities.

1777. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Because, by the contracts for the transports, they are bound to furnish them?—That depends entirely upon the condition of the contracts, but Captain Milne said that he would produce them.

1778. (*Lieut.-General Knollys, to Colonel M'Kenzie.*) You made arrangements every evening with Captain Christie as to what stores should be landed the following day?—Always. Of course I did not interfere with the commissariat supplies no more than was absolutely necessary, but I knew the exact disposal of the boats for the following day.

1779. (*Major-General Peel.*) The commissariat had particular vessels appointed to their own service, had they not?—Yes; to carry their own stores, particularly for cattle.

1780. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) You had nothing to do with the landing of the ordnance stores?—Nothing; that was quite a separate thing; there was an artillery officer there on purpose, Major Anderson.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I have no further question to put to Colonel M'Kenzie.

(*Judge Advocate General,*) Who is your next witness?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) In the absence of Colonel Tulloch, or one of the Commissioners, I cannot go on any further in the examination.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you state distinctly what are the grounds on which you object to proceed in the absence of the Commissioners?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I want to examine Colonel Tulloch personally; independently of the circumstance that Colonel Tulloch has examined me, I should under any circumstances have required to examine him.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) As the person who framed the Report?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) As one of the Commissioners?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Who presented this Report.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes, as the representative of the Report which I have come here to explain away.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) But you have other witnesses, I presume, besides Colonel Tulloch?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I do not think that I have any other witness that I can examine before Colonel Tulloch; that must depend upon what comes from Colonel Tulloch.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) It is in that character you want him as a witness, so that if Sir John M'Neill were to arrive it would be the same thing.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Very much the same thing, having the admission from Colonel Tulloch that they acted conjointly, and that everything connected with the evidence received the sanction of Sir John M'Neill. I think that was said yesterday, and I should consider Sir John M'Neill in the place of Colonel Tulloch.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Colonel Tulloch's medical attendant has been examined upon that point since the morning, and he says that there is very little chance, and that there is no expectation that Colonel Tulloch can re-appear this week, but that notice was sent of his illness to Sir John M'Neill. There would therefore be an opportunity for him, if he thought fit, to appear now, not having been here before. On Thursday morning, you could be informed whether either of those Commissioners is likely to attend.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Could not Sir Richard Airey call upon the Board, if he thinks it necessary, to summon Sir John M'Neill as a witness?

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Do you think it necessary, in order to proceed with your case, that one of the Commissioners should appear here, for the purpose of your examining him.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) What I should wish, and prefer, would be that Colonel Tulloch should be here; but if the Court cannot adjourn over for so long a time as the uncertainty of the illness of Colonel Tulloch would necessitate, and Sir John M'Neill was prepared to identify himself completely with all that has fallen from Colonel Tulloch, then I suppose I might consider Sir John M'Neill in the place of Colonel Tulloch. But there must be an assurance that, whichever it is, he identifies himself with everything that has fallen from the other.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Then the Board understand that you wish this communication to be made to the Commissioners that you expect one or both to be present.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) If you please. I cannot go on with my examination of Colonel Tulloch, which I wish to do, unless one of them is present; and whichever Commissioner it is, must identify himself with what has fallen from Colonel Tulloch.

(*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) You are aware that we have no power to compel the attendance of Sir John M'Neill?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Really I do not know. I am not able to say what the powers of the Board may be under the Queen's Warrant, but I am, individually, quite prepared to wait over any length of time that the Board think necessary to produce Colonel

*Colonel M'Kenzie.*

6th May 1856.

Tulloch; it would be much more satisfactory to have Colonel Tulloch here; he was the officer who examined me, and it is necessary for my case to examine him. Although my present answer is, that I wish for the attendance of Sir John M'Neill here as the personification of Colonel Tulloch, yet I am not prepared to say that afterwards I shall find the appearance of Sir John M'Neill at all sufficient, for I do not know how it is possible to look upon Sir John M'Neill as the representative of everything that has fallen from Colonel Tulloch.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You have referred to the statement of Colonel Tulloch that he was identified in everything with his colleague?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I think yesterday Colonel Tulloch said in one part of the evidence that in the alterations and so forth that had taken place he had the entire concurrence of Sir John M'Neill; there was a little ambiguity about it.

(*Major-General Peel.*) I think Colonel Tulloch distinctly stated from the first that Sir John M'Neill was not bound by anything that he said before this Board.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) But there are particular details of evidence that are separate from the general statement in the report.

(*President.*) Would Colonel Gordon be able to go on, or would the same difficulty exist in his case?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Colonel Gordon will be ready to go on to-morrow.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Can he go on now?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes; but the same reason, the absence of Colonel Tulloch, will apply to my doing anything in his absence. My statement is principally with regard to my evidence, and only my evidence. Sir Richard Airey has taken upon himself all the acts of the department, and I have only to speak with regard to my evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) On Thursday morning the Board will be prepared to state what course the Commissioners intend to take, whether one or both can or will re-appear before this Board.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Supposing it be decided on Thursday morning that Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch will not appear, you must then come to some conclusion of your case?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I must be allowed time to consider.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Can you consider between now and Thursday morning, and say distinctly then what you will be prepared to do?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Certainly; I shall be prepared to say on Thursday morning what course I propose to take, provided neither of the Commissioners appears.

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Assistant Commissary-General Crookshank.*) I presume Commissary-General Filder is ready at any time to go on?

(*Assistant Commissary-General Crookshank.*) I cannot answer for certain; but I do not think that he would be prepared to make a full statement till the case of each of these officers is closed, as everything connected with his department is so mixed up with theirs.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) He appears here because he complains of some passages in the Report, does he not?

(*Assistant Commissary-General Crookshank.*) I rather think that any future address that he may make to this Board will have reference, to a great extent, to a pamphlet published by Sir Charles Trevelyan, in reply to a statement that he made referring to the Commissioners' Report.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) But that is quite independent of the officers who have lately been before the Board?

(*Assistant Commissary-General Crookshank.*) Independent of them, but not altogether independent of their evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) You will be prepared on Thursday morning to state what course you intend to pursue, supposing that neither of the Commissioners will re-appear before this Board.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes, I shall be prepared on Thursday morning.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) The board has already intimated that they sit here for the purpose of receiving any explanations that any officer has to make, who is affected by this report.

(*To Assistant Commissary-General Crookshank.*) You will inform Mr. Commissary-General Filder that the Board are ready now, to receive his statement.

(*Assistant Commissary-General Crookshank.*) I will do so.

*General Sir Richard Airey* applied to the Board to give their sanction to the publication by himself of a statement in a separate form.

*The Judge Advocate General*, on the part of the Board, informed him, that the Board did not consider it within their province to sanction the publication of any part of the proceedings before their Report should be presented to Her Majesty.

Adjourned to Thursday, at Eleven o'clock.

## NINETEENTH DAY.

8th May 1856.

### 8th May 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) The Board wish to know what course you intend to pursue, whether you intend to call any more witnesses?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Am I to expect the attendance of either Sir John M'Neill or Colonel Tulloch?

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Tulloch's medical attendant is here, and he is prepared to say that for the next ten days Colonel Tulloch will not be able to leave his room. He is further of opinion, that it will require a greater length of time before he will be so far recovered as to be able to appear here. (*To Dr. Balfour.*) Have you received any answer from Sir John M'Neill.

(*Dr. Balfour.*) I have to request the permission of the Board to make a statement with reference to a remark made by the Judge Advocate General on Tuesday last.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You refer to the report of what I said with respect to the suggestion made to Sir John M'Neill to appear here?

(*Dr. Balfour.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Dr. Balfour informed me that he had written to Sir John M'Neill, to acquaint him that Colonel Tulloch could no longer appear before the Board. I stated to the Board, or I stated in this hall, that in consequence of that information, he (Sir John M'Neill) would learn that there was an opportunity for him to appear in lieu of Colonel Tulloch, in defence of the Report. As it appears in the papers, it seems as if Dr. Balfour had made a suggestion to Sir John M'Neill to come. I understand that he did not make that suggestion.

(*Dr. Balfour.*) I made no suggestion of any kind.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) When did you write to Sir John M'Neill?

(*Dr. Balfour.*) By last Monday evening's post; but I received no answer, nor did I expect any; I put no question, I simply reported to Sir John M'Neill the illness of Colonel Tulloch, and I expected no answer.

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) I have to inform you that due notice has been forwarded to Sir John M'Neill to the effect that Colonel Tulloch was too ill to re-appear in this room for the present. I sent him also a copy of the proceedings, and particularly of that part of the proceedings in which the Report was impugned by you, and I informed him that he had an opportunity of saying whether he would appear here to defend the Report, but I have received no answer. It was sent after the Board rose on Tuesday.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I very much regret to learn that the Board cannot have the advantage of pursuing this inquiry without the presence of either Sir John M'Neill or Colonel Tulloch, but I wish to be assured of that circumstance, and of what I am to expect; otherwise, it is impossible for me to make up my mind. I was led to suppose that to-day I should be informed whether either of the Commissioners would appear. In the absence of that knowledge, it is impossible for me to say what course I can pursue. It depends entirely upon the presence of either both or one of the Commissioners.

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Dr. Balfour.*) You are prepared to state, are you not, that Colonel Tulloch is not likely to appear here for the next week or ten days?

(*Dr. Balfour.*) I do not belive that he can leave his bed for a week or ten days; and Sir James Clarke and Dr. Martin say that after that they do not consider that it is likely that they could permit him for a period, of perhaps, two or three months to undertake any business of importance whatever.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) It would be three months probably before Colonel Tulloch would be able to attend here.

(*Dr. Balfour.*) I am authorized by Sir James Clarke and Dr. Martin to say so. That is their opinion.

(*President, to Sir Richard Airey.*) Under these circumstances do you object to going on at prsent?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes, certainly; but I wish to give my reasons to the Board. I should like to ask in the first instance, whether I may expect or whether I may hope for the attendance of one of the Commissioners in a short time?

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) The Board has received no answer.

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) You will perhaps state the reasons why you object to going on, except in the presence of one of the Commissioners.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, my reasons are these:—If each general officer will be kind enough to turn to the original warrant convening this Board, about the 15th line from the top, they will perceive that Her Majesty's warrant recites that the conduct of some of the officers on the general staff of her army had been animadverted upon in the Report by Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch. I am one of those officers

8th May 1856.

on the general staff thus referred to in Her Majesty's Warrant. The Judge Advocate General, addressing me on Tuesday last, said that it was the opinion of the Board, that in the absence of either or both of the Commissioners I ought not to impugn the credit of the Report. In this view I entirely concurred. It was to impugn the credit of the Report, so far as it had animadverted upon me, that I appeared before this Board; and since the general officers whom I have the honour to address are most justly of opinion that I ought not to continue the performance of this painful duty in the absence of the Commissioners, I should have rejoiced, if the nature of Colonel Tulloch's illness had been such as to justify the hope, that an adjournment for a moderate time might have given the Board the advantage of his presence in this hall; or, that under altered circumstances, it not being possible that he can appear, they would have the advantage of the presence of the other Commissioner, Sir John M'Neill.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) It was upon the first occasion, when Colonel Tulloch became ill, that you proposed to stop, and the Board made a suggestion through me to you, that there were two points before the Board, one of them appeared to be personal to the Commissioners, inasmuch as it had reference to the peculiar mode in which they had collected the evidence, and the other was a statement contained in the Report which you had proposed to explain; and it was suggested to you, with regard to that day's proceedings, that you should proceed with your explanation of the Report, and leave the personal matter until the Board had heard whether Colonel Tulloch would be able to re-appear.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) For that reason it is difficult for me to go on without the presence of Colonel Tulloch.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Yes, with respect to that point, as far as the credit of the Commissioners is affected

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I have already stated that it was for the very purpose of impugning the credit of the Report, so far as it tended to animadvert upon me, that I appeared here. But the general officers whom I have the honour to address will bear me witness, and the shorthand writers' notes will confirm my assertions, that in performing this duty I have never for an instant departed from that tone of courtesy which I have deemed it appropriate to maintain in the conduct of this discussion. And I can say now, that if I could find words that would do simple justice to myself as an officer, without giving the slightest pain or vexation to the friends of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, those words, and those only, would I use; but I do not know where to find such words, and declare that the subject of this discussion is such, that every sentence coming from my lips would be checked by the thought that neither of the Commissioners is present to hear me and to combat my conclusions. I desire a full and fair investigation in the presence of Colonel Tulloch, or his colleague, and I was most anxious also to examine Colonel Tulloch, being under the firm impression that there were matters upon which he could throw far more light than any other man. It is not only of an important witness that Colonel Tulloch's illness deprives me, but this deplorable event deprives me also, I will not say of an opponent, but of one who would endeavour to sustain the allegations contained in the Report; and I do really feel that as his presence is not to be replaced by that of Sir John M'Neill, I cannot bring myself to go on with explanations of evidence which might by probability give pain to an absent man.

Therefore, deferring respectfully to what I consider to be the view of the Board, which calls upon me either to continue my explanations or to leave the case as it stands, so far as Colonel Tulloch is concerned, I have come to the conclusion that the latter of these two courses is the one which, if not the more wise and the prudent, is at all events the one best consistent with my feelings.

All who watched the progress of this discussion on Monday and Tuesday last must have seen that there was much indeed which I should wish still to have an opportunity of saying, if I could persuade myself to complete my explanation by summing up the evidence already given before this Board; but if there is much that I should like to add to my address, there is happily in it nothing that I wish either to withdraw or to qualify; and now disarmed by the illness and the absence of Colonel Tulloch, or of the other Commissioner, all that I will venture to ask of the Board is, that in considering their decision, they will only revert to the shorthand writer's notes of my statements, as well as to the evidence which has been given in the progress of this inquiry.

I will only add that I trust the Board will permit me to continue my part in this discussion in any matters that may come forward with regard to the organization of the army, which do not tend to bring me into any kind of antagonism with Colonel Tulloch.

(*President.*) Do you mean to go on any further?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No, Sir.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Will you state a little more clearly what it is you apply to the Board to be allowed to do?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I tried to express what I meant, which was that a temporary adjournment should take place until one of the Commissioners could appear. I have a most positive disinclination to go on in the absence of either of the Commissioners.

8th May 1855.

(*President.*) You wish not to go on?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I wish not to go on; but of course, if I am overruled by the opinion of the Board, I must leave my case entirely in their hands.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Cannot you show that the assertions contained in the Report, so far as they relate to you, are incorrect, without referring to the parties by whom they were made?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) It is impossible for me to do so without impugning the credit of the Report.

(*Major-Gen. Peel, to Commissary-General Filder.*) How long is your case likely to last?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I am in the same difficulty that Sir Richard Airey is. I appear here to impugn the correctness of the Report.

(*Major-General Peel.*) I understood Sir Richard Airey to say, that if Colonel Tulloch had not appeared he would not have had the same difficulty in going on as he has now.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) If Colonel Tulloch had not abandoned his original position of Commissioner, and not come here to cross-examine witnesses, and, as I may say, to assail me, and had he not animadverted again upon me here, I should have been able to go on with my explanations without his presence, but it is the circumstance of his having appeared that creates the difficulty.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) If Colonel Tulloch's absence were voluntary I would go on, but it is difficult to go on impugning the correctness of a statement when the person making that statement cannot be present to uphold it. If the Board will permit me, I will state to-morrow morning the course I will pursue. Not expecting that Sir Richard Airey's case would be interrupted, I have not got all my papers with me.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Did not Mr. Crookshank intimate to you that the Board would be ready to go on with your case?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I think in the evidence that I saw it was said that the Board would examine me in the course of the week. I have applied to the War Department for some official papers which are necessary to my defence, but I have not received them yet, although I applied as far back as the 25th of April.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I wish the Board to understand that I leave my case in their hands. I do not decline to go on.

[*The Board retired to deliberate. After a short time they returned.*]

(*Judge Advocate General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) I believe you could not attend here to-morrow?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I have received the commands of Her Majesty to accompany her to-morrow to the Crystal Palace.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) I am desired by the Board to state that they regret much the necessity for a further adjournment, but in consideration of the statements made by Sir Richard Airey and Commissary-General Filder this day, the Board will adjourn to Wednesday next, by which time they hope that it will be decided whether either of the Commissioners will be present. If not, the Board will call upon Sir Richard Airey and Commissary-General Filder to take that course which they may think proper to adopt in the absence of the Commissioners.

(*To Colonel Gordon.*) The Board understood you to state that you had the same objection to proceed with your case as has been stated by Sir Richard Airey?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I have the same objection to enter into the whole case, for since Colonel Tulloch has been here he has made many statements with regard to the evidence of Colonel Wetherall and myself, which I wish to go into in his presence. There are many inaccuracies and mistakes which he has made, which I should wish in his presence to point out.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) At present you feel that it would be inconvenient to proceed without the presence of one of the Commissioners?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) If the Board is going to adjourn it would be more convenient, perhaps, not to do so.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) With the permission of the Board I wish to correct a mistake in the notes of the shorthand writer which appears in the proceedings of the 2d of May, page 269 and 270. It is the last question in page 269, question 1222. Major-General Freeth has brought to my notice an inaccuracy in the printing of the answer which I gave to the question with regard to the reserve for 50,000 men being at Malta. In the printed evidence at the top of page 270, it is made to appear that it was General Freeth who said that that reserve for 50,000 men at Malta was all smoke. Those were my words in a letter that I wrote to him, referring to that reserve. I stated that the reserve was all smoke, and did not exist,—and not General Freeth. I wish to state emphatically that it was I who made use of those terms, and not General Freeth.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Your evidence has been sent to you to correct, has it not?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes, I receive it every day.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Commissary-General Filder wishes to give some explanation of the evidence taken on the last day with respect to the horse transports. Have you the paper referring to the order of Lord Raglan?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I have it in my possession.

8th May 1856.

(*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Have you seen the evidence of Captain Milne on the subject?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) It was that which induced me to bring the document, which is a memorandum submitted to me by Lord Raglan, proposing that the surplus forage beyond the six weeks' supply on board ship should be given over for the use of the army.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Lord Raglan had given orders that six weeks' supply of forage should be on board each transport?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) They came out, I believe, with three months' supply; and it was the surplus that I asked for, which Lord Raglan authorized me to appropriate to the use of the army, reserving on board six weeks' supply. They came out from home furnished by the Admiralty with three months' supply, and there was a great excess in those vessels which made a quick passage. There was a large surplus, and Lord Raglan said it might be appropriated to the army if I reserved six weeks' supply for the horses they could carry.

(*President.*) Did you reserve the six weeks' supply?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I only took out the surplus. I had nothing to do with the reserve; that was Admiral Boxer's province.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is that paper which you hold in your hand the order that you refer to?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes; this is the order. It is the original order as to six weeks' supply. The transports came out originally with three months' supply, and this is the original order of Lord Raglan that they should retain on board six weeks' supply.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) If I understand you, the transports came out with three months' supply?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes; that was arranged by the Admiralty.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) And Lord Raglan gave an order, that all the surplus forage above six weeks' supply should be handed over to the commissariat.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes.

(*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) They left England with three months' supply?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes; but the sailing vessels which had a long passage had a very little over; they had not six weeks' supply at the time.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) How came the cavalry transports going from Varna to have so short a supply, that several horses were lost in consequence?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I do not know how that happened. That is not my duty.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You were ordered to take out all the surplus, leaving six weeks' supply. You must know how much was left on board the transports, whether there was any at all, or enough for six weeks' supply.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No; that was arranged by the agent of transports.

(*Major-General Peel.*) What is the date of that article?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) The 12th of June 1854, at Constantinople. This is the order of Lord Raglan, "Approved, with the above alteration." Where I had said that they should keep six weeks' supply on board "for the number of horses they brought out from England," he said, "for the number of horses they are capable of carrying." Then he writes in the margin, "Approved, with the above alteration; (signed) Raglan. Write to Admiral Boxer accordingly;" and there is a note by Colonel Steel. "Instructions to Admiral Boxer, sent 12th June 1854."

(*Major-General Peel.*) Had you such a difficulty in procuring forage in June, that you had to apply to the transports.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) There was a great deal over, and I should have been very glad to have had the pressed forage at Varna I got very little after all; but I got what I could at Varna, and it was very useful; some of the cavalry were at a distance.

(*Major-General Peel.*) The order you have referred to, only authorized you to take the surplus above six weeks' supply?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Did you see that letter from Colonel Steele, which was written by Lord Raglan's desire to Admiral Boxer, about this forage?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No, I never did; but this is the order with the original note of Colonel Steele upon it, stating that he wrote on such a date.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) There was a letter addressed to Admiral Boxer?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I infer so, for he says that he wrote on such a day to Admiral Boxer.

(*President.*) Whose duty was it to see that there were six weeks' supply of forage on board those transports?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) It is the duty of the Admiralty to see that all vessels employed by them are found in everything necessary for the service in which they may be employed. If they had made a requisition on the commissariat, I could not have supplied pressed hay for six weeks' supply. To put on board loose forage, would not have done; I should suppose that the agent for transports would have communicated

with the Admiralty at home, and that they would have sent out what was necessary. Anything that we could have supplied would not have answered the purpose.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) With regard to this letter to Admiral Boxer, was it to require him to supply forage?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) It was to authorize him to give up to me any surplus that there might be over the six weeks' supply; I know nothing of how they arranged it, but I got very little of it after all.

(*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Will you explain the mode of supplying the horse transports with forage when they were out there? We could not arrive at that very clearly the other day.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I think for anything that the Navy required, whether for the horse-transports, or for any others, and which they could not get themselves, they would make a requisition upon the commissariat; but the commissariat would not be responsible for that requisition being sufficient for the service.

(*Lieut.-General Sir J. Bell.*) You could only comply with the requisition. It was the duty of the naval department to see that there was a sufficient quantity.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) But it would have been of no use to apply to you, because you could not have supplied it?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No, the forage was loose, and the transports could not have carried six weeks' supply in addition to the animals. What Captain Milne meant to say, I think, was this, that he would have made a requisition upon the commissariat for what he wanted; and if he had made that requisition on me, I should have said that I could not supply pressed forage. Then, I should suppose, he would write home to England, and say, you must send this from England.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) That is what they will not do. The Admiralty send out those transports filled with forage, and they look upon it as the duty of the commissariat out there to keep the supply complete.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I did not understand that from Captain Milne's evidence. I think he meant that they would make a requisition upon the commissariat for what they wanted, because they could not get it in any other way; but the naval authorities are responsible for every ship being properly found. When a man-of-war comes to a station, and they have no other means, they make a requisition on the commissariat; and if they cannot get what they want in that way they send to England for it. What I could not get in the country for the service of the army I wrote to England for.

(*Lieut.-General Sir William Rowan.*) Whatever you supply becomes a charge against the Admiralty?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes; and it is immediately notified as a charge against the transport.

(*President.*) In Regulation 79, "the commissariat are to provide, by means of contracts "or otherwise, and, when necessary, to keep in store, and issue provisions and forage, "fuel and light, for the use of all the branches of the land service abroad."

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) But this is the sea-service, as I consider it. When the Admiralty take up a transport it is their duty to see that that vessel is found in everything necessary for the performance of the service. They themselves acknowledge it, and Captain Milne gives up the question of provisions for the men.

(*Lieut.-General Sir William Rowan.*) Has that regulation been changed since the period of which we are now speaking?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I believe, owing to the difficulty the Admiralty found in undertaking such a service (for they supplied, not only for the horse transports, but they purchased what was necessary for the army in the East), from the month of February 1855 the commissariat undertook the business of supplying hay upon the requisition of the Admiralty; but it is for the naval authorities to see that there is an adequate quantity.

(*Lieut.-General Sir William Rowan.*) Was there an agent of transports in each transport?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No, not as there used to be. I should mention, that the Admiralty did send out a supply of forage afterwards to complete those vessels, and it was consigned to the Commissariat without saying that it was for the horse transports, and I took it for the army. It arrived, to my surprise, not having heard of it, shortly after we reached the Crimea. That which was lost in the "Progress" was a part of it.

(*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) It came out without your being apprised of it.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes; otherwise than as being consigned to the Commissariat, but it was sent out by the Admiralty for the horse transports.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I understood from an expression that fell from one of the members of the Board, I think, on the last day on which they sat, that it would not have been competent for me to ask for the attendance of Sir John M'Neill, even as a witness.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) That you could not compel him to attend.

(*Major-General Peel.*) You can summon him.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I am very anxious for his attendance in both capacities—both as a witness and as a Commissioner.

(*Major-General Peel.*) You can call upon the Board to summon Sir John M'Neill.

8th May 1856.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) A letter was written by me on Tuesday upon the understanding that the Board thought it right that Sir John M'Neill should be apprised that you wished for his attendance here.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Was he distinctly summoned as a witness, or was it left optional to him to attend here or not?

(*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) You are aware that Colonel Tulloch never was required to attend.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes; but as I have explained, Colonel Tulloch's appearance here has entirely changed the state of things, and I am anxious that Sir John M'Neill should be summoned as a witness by this Board.

(*Major-General Peel.*) The Board will summon for you any witness that you may suggest.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) In that character, I am very anxious that he should be summoned.

(*Major-General Peel.*) You can apply to the Board to summon any witness that you think proper.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) If that is the case, I apply to the Board to be good enough to summon Sir John M'Neill. I also beg that I may be apprised, as soon as possible, whether he is coming or not, that I may prepare myself to go on. If any intelligence arises between this and the time appointed for the next meeting of the Board, I should be glad to be informed of it.

(*President.*) You can communicate with the Judge Advocate.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) The other matter that I have to press is that I may be furnished with the manuscript of the Report of the 9th of June, and that of the 10th. At the close of the sitting of the Board of the 5th of May, I stated, "I should like also to have "the original manuscript of the Report of the 10th, and that of the preliminary report "of the 9th."

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) That is what you applied for?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Application has been made at the War Office, but no return has been made whatever. I will read to you the letter which I sent to Sir John M'Neill, from which you will see that he has already received information that you wish him to attend before this Board: "Judge Advocate General's Office, 6th May 1856.—Sir, I "am desired by the Board of General Officers appointed for the purpose of considering "so much of the report on the supplies to the British Army in the Crimea, as animadverts "upon the conduct of certain officers in Her Majesty's army, to inform you that they have "been engaged for some days, in hearing the case of Major General Sir Richard Airey, "and have been obliged to adjourn the further hearing of that case, by reason of the "sudden illness of Colonel Tulloch. Previously to this occurring, Sir Richard Airey had "put some questions to Colonel Tulloch, with reference to an alleged discrepancy between "the evidence as printed by the Commissioners, and the evidence as taken from the "mouths of the witnesses in the Crimea, and he had also referred to a preliminary "Report by the Commissioners, dated 9th June 1855, which report was sent by them to "Lord Raglan, but was not laid before Parliament, and has not been submitted by the "Secretary for War to the Board. At this stage of the inquiry, Sir Richard Airey "expressed a disinclination to proceed with his case in the absence of Colonel Tulloch "or yourself, and as it appears from the statement of Colonel Tulloch's medical advisers, to "be very uncertain whether he will be able to re-appear before the Board within any "definite period, the Board are desirous of being informed whether, after receiving this "communication, you propose to come before the Board, with a view of enabling Sir Richard "Airey to put the questions to yourself which he would othewise have put to Colonel "Tulloch. The Board have adjourned their sittings till Thursday next, at 11 A.M., with a "view to having your reply to this communication before their next meeting. I have, &c. "(Signed) C. P. Villiers.—P.S. A copy of the evidence given before the Board on the "5th instant is transmitted herewith, and your attention is called to the marked passage "in page 281."

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) The only objection that I have to that letter is, that it is still a proposition. It still leaves it to the option of Sir John M'Neill whether he will attend or not.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) But as he is a civilian, you are aware the Board has no power to do more than to request him to attend.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I wish to put in my request that he shall, if possible, be required to attend.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*)—Is there any body else that you require to be summoned for the next meeting of the Board?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No; I think not. I am very anxious, if the Board of General Officers have decided to meet again on Wednesday, that I should know, as soon as possible on Monday or Tuesday, whether Sir John M'Neill is likely to appear or not. It would make a difference to me in shaping my future proceedings.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) His reply will be forwarded to you.

Adjourned to Wednesday next, at Eleven o'clock.

## TWENTIETH DAY.

### 14th May 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea, pursuant to adjournment.

14th May 1856.

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) The proceedings were adjourned from last Thursday, for the purpose of ascertaining whether either or both of the Commissioners would attend. The Board so understood the ground of your application for an adjournment, and since then a summons has been sent to Sir John M'Neill to attend as a witness, and, as you required also, that he would appear here in the absence of Colonel Tulloch; and a reply has been received from him, which I will now read:—"In "reply to your letter of the 8th, requesting me to attend on Wednesday the 14th instant, "at 11 o'clock A.M., in the Great Hall at Chelsea, for the purpose of being examined as "a witness, I have to inform you that I am too unwell to be able to attend at that "time. But although the state of my health of itself precludes the possibility of com- "plying with the request contained in your letter of the 8th, or with the suggestion "contained in your letter of the 6th, I think it right, with all possible respect for the "Board, to add, that even if that obstacle had not existed, I could not have agreed to "depart from the course I have hitherto taken in the absence of authoritative information, "more definite than I have yet received, as to the precise objects and the scope of the "proceedings going on at Chelsea, and as to the position occupied or expected to be "occupied relatively to the Board and to each other, by the persons who have appeared "or have been invited to appear in these proceedings, and especially whether the pro- "ceedings are intended to bear upon the manner in which the members of the late "Commission of Inquiry in the Crimea, of whom I was one, discharged their duties; and "if so, in what respect and particulars, and to what effect." After hearing that letter I presume you will infer that Sir John M'Neill does not intend to attend this Board.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Am I to understand from that letter that there is no hope or expectation on the part of the Board, that by a further adjournment I may have the advantage of the attendance of one of the Commissioners?

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) With respect to Colonel Tulloch, his medical adviser has just handed in a certificate, which is from Sir James Clark and Dr. Martin, to certify that they visited Colonel Tulloch yesterday, and that, although convalescent, he is still in such a state of debility as to render him quite unfit for the transaction of any business; I think he can hardly be expected to re-appear here; and with respect to Sir John M'Neill, I should infer that he does not intend to come.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Therefore I am not to expect any further adjournment?

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) That is the state, at present, of the matter. The Board are not disposed to adjourn on the ground of any expectation that the Commissioners will appear in future. I have further to inform you, that in compliance with your request, application has been made to the War Office, to know whether any preliminary Report had been submitted to Lord Panmure, dated the 9th of June, and yesterday afternoon a reply was received from the War Office, to the effect that there was such a preliminary Report, and that Report has been submitted to the Board of General Officers, in case they should wish to examine it. You did not state to the Board for what purpose you sought for that information; but you desired to know whether any such Report had been transmitted to the War Office. It is not the Report that has been referred to the Board to consider, and it has been intimated by the War Office since, that the only report that Lord Panmure recognizes is the Report dated the 10th of June, the other being confidential and preliminary, and not presented to Parliament.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) My object in wishing to have that Report was to show the difference that existed between the Report of the 9th of June, which was stated to be a complete report, and the Report that was afterwards published—the Report dated Constantinople, the 10th of June. And if I could have pursued this examination in the presence of the Commissioners, I should have been inclined to ask them whether at Constantinople they were furnished with a printing-press which printed the Report dated the 10th of June; because, in the absence of such machinery, it turns out, I think precisely as I imagined, that the Report of the 9th of June was the only printed Report submitted to the Secretary of State for War from Constantinople. That is the actual Report of the Commissioners; I mean the one of the 9th of June at Constantinople.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You requested also to have the minutes of the Report of the 10th of June?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes; the manuscript.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) As regards the manuscript report dated the 10th of June, this is a letter from the Under Secretary of State:—"I am directed by Lord Panmure to "acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th instant, conveying the request of the

14th May 1856.

" Board of General Officers appointed for the purpose of considering so much of the " Report on the supplies to the British army in the Crimea as animadverts upon the con- " duct of certain officers in Her Majesty's army, to be furnished with the preliminary " Report of the Commissioners, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, bearing date the " 9th of June, and also with the original manuscript Report of the Commissioners, dated " 10th June. Secondly, a copy of the preliminary Report of the 9th June is here- ' with transmitted for the information of the Board of General Officers; but as regards " the manuscript of the Report dated 10th of June, I am to state that that document " has not been laid before Lord Panmure, but is in the hands of the Commissioners, by " whom it was prepared for the press, and the Report printed from it revised. Thirdly, " I am to add that this printed Report, which is the one presented to Parliament, is " that which has been officially referred to the Board, and is alone recognized by his " Lordship."

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Then we have now distinctly from the office of the Secretary of State for War the admission that the manuscript report of the 10th of June was not laid before Lord Panmure?

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) It appears from that letter that this document was not laid before him, but it is in the hands of the Commissioners.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Then I ask to be provided with a copy of the preliminary report of the 9th, and when in possession of that I propose to have it transcribed, to show the difference that exists between that Report of the 9th of June and the Report that was afterwards printed, and dated Constantinople, the 10th of June.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) I think you must show the Board for what purpose that is to be done. They have had a report referred to them, and they are informed that it is the only report that Lord Panmure recognizes. You have mentioned that there was another Report made by the Commissioners, and you want a copy of it?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Have you the Report of the 9th of June here?

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Yes. It has been furnished for the information of the Board, in case they require to see it.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) May I ask you to read the first sentence of that preliminary Report?

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) "We have the honor to inform your Lordship that we have " completed the inquiry entrusted to us."

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) That is quite enough; that is exactly what I meant. That is the preliminary Report of the 9th of June, and in the very first sentence it states that they have completed the task entrusted to them.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You are aware of the concluding paragraph, which states that they have not received all the evidence upon the subject of their inquiry, but when they have received that evidence, and the answers to the queries submitted at the same time, they will have the honour of reporting upon the matters to which they relate.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) That I interpret to mean certain details of the evidence, in order to make out their appendix, but the Report itself was completed.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Are you desirous of showing any inaccuracy in the Report which the Board are considering?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I want to point out the difference between that Report of the 9th and the printed Report of the 10th. It is at my instigation that that Report is now before the Board. Have the Board any knowledge of when that date of "Constantinople, the 10th June," was affixed to that Report, the 10th of June having been on Sunday?

(*Major-General Peel.*) That document is not before us as a Report: the only Report submitted to this Board is the printed Report dated the 10th of June.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) It is dated Constantinople, the 10th, that appearing to be on a Sunday. I have no wish to delay the Board, but I presume that I may expect a copy of the Report of the 9th.

(*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) We have not had an opportunity of reading it ourselves.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) It is perhaps of more value to me than to the Board.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Are the Board to understand that a copy of this Report was sent to Lord Raglan, and that he referred it to you?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Lord Raglan put it into my hands for my perusal.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Was it dated the 9th of June?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes, it was.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) I presume, then, that you have seen this Report.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I had it in my hands to read.

(*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Was that Report marked "confidential" that was transmitted to Lord Raglan?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I cannot quite take upon myself to say that it was. I should be inclined to say that the Report was not marked "confidential."

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Are the Board to understand that this Report was transmitted to the War Office, or were there duplicate copies, one being sent to Lord Raglan and one to England?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) The one that I saw was addressed to Lord Panmure, and therefore I presume it was a duplicate.

14th May 1856.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Was the copy sent retained by Lord Raglan, or was it forwarded by him to Lord Panmure?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) It was retained by Lord Raglan. He was not the channel of communication between the Commissioners and the Secretary of State; but I have no wish to detain the Board. With the permission of the Board I will prepare a copy of what I am anxious to present to the Board of General Officers, and I will now proceed with the evidence.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Sir Richard Airey, I understand that something took place on a former occasion before this Board which has given rise to some misapprehension out of doors, to the effect that the Board had intimated to you through me that there had been something disrespectful in your manner or your language to Colonel Tulloch.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I think that the word you used was "personal."

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) I believe it was owing to an incautious expression of mine that this misapprehension arose. Nothing could have been further from the intention of the Board than to convey such an idea, for nothing could have justified it less than your manner has generally. It arose in this way, that when you suggested an adjournment of the proceedings in consequence of Colonel Tulloch's illness, the question was, whether you could not proceed with your explanations, those explanations not having reference to anything personal to Colonel Tulloch and to the other Commissioner, and it was to distinguish the subject-matter of the evidence from that which had reference to their mode of preparing the Report that I used the word "personal." But the Board wish me to state that it was in no offensive sense that this word was used, and that they have seen nothing in your conduct towards the Commissioners that has not been marked with courtesy and consideration. I perceive in the printed copy of the proceedings that all possibility of doubt upon this matter is already removed, for a question is there raised as to the word "personal," and is there explained.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) It gives me great satisfaction to hear that this is the general opinion of the General Officers. I wish to say in the most distinct and emphatic way that nothing could be further from my intention than to say anything that could give pain to either of the Commissioners.

---

*Colonel Edward Wetherall.*

Colonel EDWARD WETHERALL, further examined.

1781. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) When did you leave the Crimea to go down to Constantinople to join the Turkish Contingent?—About the 31st of May, I think it was.

1782. Had you occasion to hire carpenters?—Yes. About July, I think it was, or the beginning of August, the Contingent was ordered to go to Eupatoria, and I was very anxious to take there a large body of artificers and artizans for the purpose of carrying on the works which I knew would be necessary. Having no Engineers belonging to the Turkish Contingent, I endeavoured to obtain a corps of about 200 or 300 carpenters, bricklayers, and artificers of different sorts, but we could not succeed. At first we got some Hungarians and some Polish refugees readily, but we could not get any Greek or Armenian carpenters or Turkish carpenters; they would not leave Constantinople, for they disliked the Crimea. We were subsequently ordered to Varna, to go to Schumla, and there I got about 200 native carpenters. The destination was again changed for the Crimea. They objected to go; but having got them on board ship, I took them to Kertch, under the idea that they were going to Varna. They would not go to the Crimea of their own accord. I think we gave them 1,000 piastres a month, a rate of wages unheard of.

1783. That was in the fine season?—In July or August 1855.

1784. You had great difficulty in getting carpenters then?—The greatest possible difficulty.

1785. Had you occasion to get canvass for shelter of any description, for tents or the construction of magazines?—Yes; we demanded canvass to make 200 hospital marquees, and the Turkish Government undertook to supply them, but after a short time, they had been a week or two in making their preparations, they wrote to say that they could get no canvass whatever; this was from the arsenal. The Pacha who had the direction of the Tophana arsenal wrote to say that he could not get any canvass, either from the arsenal or by purchase, and he begged that cotton might be substituted; I had tried to get canvass to cover some pontoons; we had eight or ten large lighters which we could not tow through the Black Sea uncovered, and I tried to get canvass to deck them, but there was nothing to be got. I tried at the arsenals, and I engaged several commissioners to buy any quantity; price was no object, but they could not get it.

---

*Major John Hackett.*

Major JOHN HACKETT, examined.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) I am directed by the Board to inform you, that it is not compulsory on you to disclose matters which may form the subject of a charge against you before a court-martial, and that any voluntary statement made by you will be admissible in evidence against you.

1786. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) You are one of the assistant quartermaster-generals, who were attached to the staff of the army in the Crimea?—Deputy assistant.

*Major John Hackett.*

14th May 1856.

1787. When did you leave the Crimea for Constantinople?—About the 16th of February.

1788. Had you any occasion then to try to procure carpenters and artizans?—Not carpenters; but I know that the deputy assistant quartermaster-general at Scutari had, and when he had got any number we were obliged to put them on board ship, they deserted in such numbers. I have known them have 400 sent up, and the next day, because we could not put them on board ship, we should not have two, they had gone away in the night.

1789. Had you any occasion to purchase canvass?—Yes; there was a necessity for it for making tents, but the Turkish Government were unable to supply it, and I employed Mr. ———, a merchant there, and having a large establishment, to try and get it for me, but he could only get two small bolts, and that of very inferior quality, and I gave up the hope of getting them made; that was about the end of February, or the beginning of March.

1790. Were the bazaars searched at that time for canvass?—Mr. ——— had been a merchant in Constantinople for many years, and he knew where to get all those things. He had been employed at one time in making tents, and he said that he had searched Constantinople for three or four days, without success. He had been one of our officers in the Crimea, and was anxious to assist us in every way.

---

*Captain Samuel Hoskin Derriman, R.N.*

Captain Samuel Hoskin Derriman, R.N., examined.

1791. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) At what what period and in what way were you employed in the Crimean campaign?—I commanded Her Majesty's steamer "Caradoc," and was attached to Lord Raglan. I took his Lordship out, and was attached to him at head-quarters, down to the time of my bringing his Lordship's body home.

1792. Where were you stationed?—Generally at head-quarters.

1793. In Balaklava?—Moving from Constantinople to Varna, and from Varna on to the Crimea. I was stationed latterly at Balaklava.

1794. Your ship was in the harbour of Balaklava?—Yes; excepting at times when she was carrying despatches to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, at Constantinople; and on one occasion I was employed in the expedition to Kertch.

1795. You were at Balaklava from the first commencement of the bombardment on the 17th of October 1854, throughout the winter of 1854-55, with the exception of those special services?—I was there from the time that the army marched on to Balaklava, and from that to the last I never left it, except when I have stated.

1796. What were the peculiar duties that you were employed upon in Balaklava?—Latterly, more particularly in landing huts, and attending to the wants of the harbour with regard to the army.

1797. Was it any part of your duty to try and obtain the services of artificers and carpenters?—Yes; I was directed by Lord Raglan, through the quartermaster-general's office, to assist in obtaining carpenters and artificers, for the purpose then of erecting huts, and building them.

1798. Had you anything to do with getting seamen carpenters from the merchant vessels in the harbour?—I had. My duty then, having received instructions from the quartermaster-general's office, was to go on board each transport as she came into the harbour, and to ask the different captains to be allowed to hire carpenters; it being a voluntary act on their own part giving them, and which they did frequently, considerably to the detriment of the ships; the ships came into the harbour more or less in a defective state, and frequently, to the detriment of the ship, the carpenters were given up by the captains of merchant ships and transports.

1799. Those men were placed under your control and payment?—Yes; I received an order from head-quarters, through the commissariat, to draw money once a week to pay those men, for it frequently happened that transports were ordered to go, and the men were not paid. This was remedied by an order, given through the quartermaster-general's office, that I should have the control of this money, so that when a ship was called away I could pay them at once.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) The explanation of what the witness has stated is this:—The payments from the Commissariat Department were made upon regular pay lists monthly. After the arrival of the counted signature, this monthly money was issued; but as the merchantmen were going to and fro on different services, it frequently happened that a ship steamed away, carrying away her crew and the artificers who had been employed on the military service, and sometimes they did not come back at all, and at other times not for a considerable time; and the consequence was that it got bruited about, and, being employed on military service, got into disrepute. Captain Derriman explained this to me, that it was one of his great difficulties in obtaining the services of those men from the merchant service, and Lord Raglan then gave an authority for Captain Derriman to have a sum of money which he could disburse in his own name, and on his own responsibility, and pay every ship's crew before they went away, for the number of days that they had been so employed.

1800. (*To the Witness.*) Had you any occasion to get carpenters elsewhere?—Yes; When the transports became less in number in the harbour; consequently, the means of obtaining

*Captain Samuel Hoskin Derriman, R.N.*

14th May 1856.

carpenters became less, and I was then ordered by Lord Raglan to go to Constantinople to procure them there.

1801. Did you succeed there?—I did, with difficulty. I endeavoured to obtain them, but finding that it was perfectly impossible, I made application to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and through the means of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who appealed to the Turkish Government, I then procured I think 49.

1802. Were you able always to ship the number that you procured?—Yes, I got them away; a certain day was named, and a certain sum was advanced to them, and then they came, not voluntarily I believe, but by authority from the Sultan, whose wishes were law to those people.

1803. (*Major-General Peel.*) What was the date of that?—As far as I can remember it was early in the month of February.

1804. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) That was after the winter was over, comparatively; spring was beginning?—Yes.

1805. Therefore there was less disinclination to go to the Crimea in that season of the year than there would have been in the month of November or December?—Yes.

1806. How did you employ those carpenters?—Wholly and solely in erecting huts, and I attended to them.

1807 Do you mean the wooden frame huts that came from England, or hutting such as the booth that you put up for the sick and wounded men who came down?—That was done previously to the carpenters coming up; it was done by my own carpenters, and after this place had been erected for the sick and wounded that came down, their other duties were in erecting wooden huts.

1808. That was after the huts came out in February?—Yes.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) The persons that the witness obtained were employed in putting up those huts that came from England?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes; during the months of October, November, December, and January, Captain Derriman had been appointed by Lord Raglan to superintend the body of seamen and ships' carpenters that could be procured from the merchant navy. He was very active and very indefatigable in erecting shelter for the sick and wounded men that came down from the front, during the interval before they could be put on board the transports; and he employed those men in putting the sick on board the boats, in constructing shelter for them, and establishing a sort of large tea and coffee shop, so that every man got a bowl of hot coffee or tea and a biscuit.

1809. (*To the Witness.*) Could you explain the manner in which the ships' crews were generally employed on the land service?—They were generally employed in building wharfs and in landing stores and provisions.

1810. And the boat duties of the harbour?—Yes; and really there was not a soul unemployed that was possibly available.

1811. Is it your opinion, as a naval man, that as many of the crews from the different merchant ships were landed to perform military service as could be spared?—It is, even to the detriment of their own ships.

1812. Had you occasion to try to procure canvass?—Yes, for the use of the ship that I commanded.

1813. Where?—At Constantinople.

1814. Did you find any difficulty in getting it at Constantinople?—I found it impossible.

1815. Why?—There was none in the place. I took the awning that covered the upper deck of the "Caradoc" to cover a house that I built to supply the sick and wounded with tea and coffee; and when I went to Constantinople I applied there for canvass to replace the awning, but I found that I could not procure it, and I was obliged to send a demand to Malta. That was about the month of February, to the best of my remembrance. Moreover, with regard to canvass, I can state that it is my opinion that if the fleet had gone to sea and met with bad weather, they had not canvass to repair their sails, supposing, as is the natural consequence, that in bad weather ships more or less split their sails.

1816. Could not they have replaced a split sail at Constantinople?—They could not have replaced a split sail there by any canvass that they could have procured there. They must have been dependent upon their own resources which they had on board the ship.

1817. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) Do you say that from your own knowledge?—From my own belief.

1818. You say that they could not have replaced the sails at Constantinople?—They could not have found canvass to repair the damages that might have been done by a heavy gale of wind. It was impossible for me to get canvass to make an awning, and therefore I conclude that they could not have got it.

1819. Are you speaking of Constantinople?—Yes.

1820. Having attempted it you were unable to get any?—Yes.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I believe Mr. Watson is in the Hall—he was in the Crimea, and was one of the Purveyors of Stores. If he is here, I should like very much to examine him.

Mr. WILLIAM WATSON, examined.

*Mr. William Watson.*

14th May 1856.

1821. (*President.*) What situation did you hold in the Crimea?—I was purveyor's clerk in charge of the first division.

1822. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) You afterwards removed to head quarters?—Yes.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) This witness was an officer attached to the first division, who was in charge of all the stores, such as blankets, rugs, paillasses, and everything that was necessary for the division. They were in his charge, and he issued them out for hospital purposes as they were required.

1823. (*To the Witness.*) During what period were you with the army in the Crimea?—I landed at Old Fort with the troops on the 14th of September, and remained there till the 24th of January.

1824. You were on the plateau with the first division, were you not?—I was on the plateau for 92 days, in front, where the light cavalry were.

1825. When did you go from the plateau to head quarters?—On the the 31st of December I left the plateau and went to head quarters.

1826. You were in the division encamped on that ground all that bad season, during the storm in November, and all through December?—I was.

1827. Did you experience any want then of blankets or rugs for the use of the first division?—Not for the hospitals; I had always a good and sufficient supply all the time.

1828. Could you have got any number of rugs that you wanted?—I was offered them repeatedly when blankets were not given, and I think on one occasion I took a few for the hospital. I accepted them on one occasion in lieu of blankets.

1829. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) At the same time, if a general of division knew that he had in his divisional purveyor's stores a set of rugs, though they were for the hospital use, if the other men of his division wanted them, there would be no hesitation on the part of the purveyor for that division in issuing the rugs for the other men. (*To the Witness.*) Did you use any paillasses?—We found it, out of consideration to the men, better not to use them. We found them perfectly useless either for covering or for them to lie upon. They became so saturated with mud, and their clothes also, and there were no means of drying them, that it would have added to their sufferings to issue them; but I had occasion to use them after the battle of Inkermann, upon tressels, for the wounded to lie upon.

1830. They were used then as mattresses, upon tressels and boards raised from the ground?—Yes.

1831. Is it your opinion that the paillasse covers would have been an advantage for the use of the troops laid down on the ground at the bottom of their tents?—We would not issue them, for we found that they rather added to their discomfort and sickness; their clothes got saturated, and increased the sufferings which they had to endure in consequence of the bad weather.

1832. Were the paillasses that you used on those tressels stuffed?—They were, with hay and straw—with hay chiefly.

1833. Would they have been of use if they had not been stuffed?—They would have been of use, just as a temporary matter for a few hours. They were lying there until they were sent down.

1834. (*Judge Advocate General.*) What was the alternative if they did not use the paillasses; to lie on the ground?—If there were no blankets or rugs, they lay on the ground.

1835. (*Sir Richard Airey.*) Were there any instances then of the sick being without either?—Not one.

(*President.*) Was Mr. Watson there the whole time?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I think he was there from the date that we landed to the 31st of December, with the first division. He then was ordered up to head quarters, which was also on the plateau, but midway between the two armies. He remained there for some time afterwards, and then he was ordered down to Scutari, and he continued his duties on the Bosphorus, but not till after the winter had passed. Sir Alexander Woodford, before proceeding further in my own case I wish Colonel Gordon to come forward and make his statement with regard to his departmental duties.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Do you mean that you will call Colonel Gordon as a witness?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You do not mean that he should go into his own case now?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes, for there are parts of his case that affect my administration of the quartermaster-general's department; he was one of my subordinate officers in the same manner that Colonel Wetherall was who gave his evidence.

1836. (*Earl Beauchamp, to the Witness.*) I think you were stationed on the plateau?—Yes.

1837. You have been speaking of stores, how did you get your supplies up to the plateau?—I got a very considerable quantity up in the first instance, before the transport was stopped.

1838. (*Major-General Peel.*) Through the commissariat?—Yes.

1839. (*Earl Beauchamp.*) What date was that?—It was up to about the 14th or 15th of November, I got a considerable quantity of stores up; after then it was so difficult that I could scarcely get any between that and the end of December.

1840. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Had you any fatigue parties for the division?—None; could not get any granted to us; at that time all the men were occupied.

1841. You never applied for any?—Frequently.

1842. To the general of the division?—To the adjutant-general of the division, and to the quartermaster-general.

(*President, to Sir Richard Airey.*) You are going to call Colonel Gordon as a witness?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) He has certain statements to make regarding that report, and I rather wish that he should make them before I close; but at the same time, I have no objection if the Board prefer it to go on.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) It will be more consistent with the rule laid down at the commencement of the proceedings.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) I have no objection; I will go on. If I understand that it is the Board's wish that I should complete my evidence, I have no objection to do so as far as I can, without touching upon points in the absence of Colonel Tulloch and Sir John M'Neill.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Do you wish Colonel Gordon's case to be mixed up with yours, so as to make it a joint case?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No; it is connected with mine, but at the same time he has a separate case of his own. As he is to a certain extent animadverted upon in the Report, he has some remarks to make to remove the impressions which may have been made on the minds of the Board; but, as being a subordinate officer of mine, I had arranged that he should have brought his statement forward, and interlaced it with mine. But I will proceed, if the Board wish it.

(*Major-General Peel.*) I understand that you disclaim any responsibility as to any stores?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) The custody or the issue of any stores.

(*Major-General Peel.*) I understand that there are certain stores called quartermaster-general's stores, for which it is the duty of the quartermaster-general in the original instance to make a requisition?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No; the quartermaster-general does not make any. Do you mean to the Government?

(*Major-General Peel.*) Either to the Ordnance, or to the other departments of the Government. Take nosebags; that is one of those articles as to which it is the duty of the quartermaster-general to make the original requisition, is it not?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) If he finds from the storekeeper's account (storekeeper and commissariat officer being analogous terms) that the number of any particular article is not sufficient for the army, he directs the storekeeper to increase his supply.

1843. (*Major-General Peel.*) I am talking of the original requisition. When the army was ordered first to go out to the Crimea, whose duty was it to make the original requisition for the following articles, such as "tents, nosebags, intrenching tools, &c."?—The quartermaster-general made a requisition. He was directed to make a requisition through the Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War.

1844. It appears that the commissariat are not at all responsible, supposing there had been none of those articles in store, being only responsible for the custody of them and the issue of them?—The person responsible for their being with the army is the Secretary of State for War.

1845. The quartermaster-general makes the original requisition?—No, he only apportions them. I presume that Lord De Ros was informed of the camp equipment that was with the army, and when I became the quartermaster-general I obtained a return of the camp equipment that was in store, and when that camp equipment required increasing I made a requisition through the Commander-in-Chief to the Minister of War for an increase.

1846. With respect to all extra clothing, such as warm clothing, and other things, I imagine that the quartermaster-general's duty is only that of issuing and giving orders for the issue; giving the requisitions?—The whole service was quite novel; there had been never anything of the kind before. Properly speaking, the adjutant-general's duty is to see to everything regarding the clothing and equipment of the soldier,—the personnel of the soldier; but in this instance Lord Raglan wished me to perform that duty, and I did so.

1847. There is such a difference of opinion between the authorities of the commissariat department, as stated in the evidence given before the Sebastopol Committee and yourself, as regards the duty of the quartermaster-general in making those requisitions, that I have put these questions in order to clear up the matter as to who is responsible for the original requisitions for the articles that I mentioned?—I think that the Secretary of State for War is responsible for the supply of the army, with all its wants; and in the event of their becoming exhausted, that then the storekeeper replenishes them.

*Mr. William Watson.*

14th May 1856.

1848. The Secretary of State for War would not know what articles were in the quartermaster-general's department, unless the requisition came originally from the quartermaster-general?—Yes, he does; the commissariat officer, who acts also as storekeeper, is an officer in direct communication with the Government.

1849. You consider that the quartermaster-general's responsibility merely extends to seeing that the requisitions are renewed, and when supplies are failing that they are in the hands of the commissariat. Suppose the nosebags were nearly expended, or that they had all been issued, it would then become the duty of the quartermaster-general, would it not, to see that a fresh requisition was made?—Yes; he would bring the subject before the notice of the commander-in-chief, and a fresh requisition would be made; but all the arrangements of the army in the Crimean expedition were novel, and a new instruction was issued, which was that the quartermaster-general was to make his requisitions to the military secretary on the spot, and that the military secretary on the spot was to forward those requisitions to the Secretary of State for War; we were not to do it direct through our own department. The commander-in-chief on the spot sent the requisitions to the Secretary of State for War.

1850. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) How are requisitions for shoes made?—Precisely in the same way. I sent for 100,000. I made a requisition to the military secretary on the spot for them or anything new, long boots or anything else, and he sent it to England, and then they were sent out to the commissary-general.

1851. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Why are those articles of equipment called quartermaster-general's stores?—I think that the term "quartermaster-general's stores" was obtained from the circumstance of their being for the use of the army, and it was settled that the quartermaster-general should issue them and apportion them.

1852. (*Major-General Peel.*) It appears very difficult to trace any responsibility as to the original supply?—It is very difficult to say. With regard to everything that is really quartermaster-general's stores, such as intrenching tools, tents, and those articles that are commonly called camp equipments, the quartermaster-general keeps them perfect by a requisition through the military secretary to the home authorities.

1853. (*Major-General Peel.*) It appears, for instance, that there was a very great want of nosebags for the cavalry, and that none were in store; I wish to ascertain whose fault it was that there were none in store; it appears to me that the quartermaster-general ought to have made the original requisition, and to have seen that they were in store?—I think that the quartermaster-general ought to see that his stores are well supplied, and that they are ample for the use of the army; and I think that he ought, if necessary, to bring it to the notice of the commander-in-chief and make a requisition for them.

1854. (*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) When you were appointed quartermaster-general you had a return made out of all the stores that were called quartermaster-general's stores with the army, had you not?—Yes.

1855. Could we see a copy of such a return?—Very probably. I will see whether I have a return in England of all the available stores that we had after we landed in the Crimea.

1856. Was there a considerable deficiency at that time?—The army was sufficiently supplied, and there was also a sufficient reserve store at Varna; until after the storm of the 14th of November we were well supplied, and did not want anything besides which we knew, having had notice of all the stores coming out from England. The "Prince" arrived about the 8th or 10th of November, long before there was any bad weather or any want on the part of the troops.

1857. (*Major-General Peel.*) What control had you over the commissariat to insure that they carried out that portion of the stores called quartermaster-general's stores to the Crimea; when they moved from Varna, of course they would select their own stores to take?—In that respect the quartermaster-general would notify to the commissary-general the expedition, and, so far as he could, the nature of the expedition. He would desire certain camp equipage and stores to accompany it; and in that spirit we always acted when we sent expeditions to Kertch and to Kinburn.

1858. Upon the arrival of that expedition in the Crimea, would it be reported to you, as quartermaster-general, that those stores were there?—Yes, I should know what stores were there.

1859. (*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Did you get periodical returns of the stores that were with the army?—I think that they were weekly returns. I see here in the Appendix, at page 81, is the original letter of the officer who acted as quartermaster-general to the commissiary-general for the stores to accompany the expedition.

1860. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) I see that you made a requisition for 6,000 more bags; did you get them?—Yes; they came from Constantinople. Colonel Wetherall went to Constantinople to purchase all those articles.

1861. You only got 2,000 of them, I see by the return?—I cannot say, without looking to the papers, what quantity arrived.

1862. 6,000 were applied for, and only 2,000 arrived?—I cannot say.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) With the permission of the Board, I will proceed now to sum up what I consider to be my case.

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey.*

14th May 1856.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You do not call any more witnesses?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No.

(*President.*) As to the preliminary report; are you going to make any statement upon that?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Not at present. I wish to have a copy of that preliminary report, and then I wish to draw up a statement and submit it to the Board, showing the variations between that report of the 9th and the printed report dated the 10th.

(*President.*) Before you have concluded your statement?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No; I will endeavour to conclude it now, and it will be given in afterwards.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) I presume that it will have reference only to that part of your case which you are precluded from entering upon now by the absence of the Commissioners?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes; I assume also that whenever Colonel Gordon goe into his case it will be considered part of my evidence; it will be seen to be so closely connected with my case that it can be hardly separated from it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You are not going to refer to this report at all, or to the mode in which this report was prepared?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Not at present.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You abstain from doing so, in consequence of the absence of the Commissioners?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

(*President.*) You will give in a statement?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Only to show on separate sides of a sheet of paper the difference that exists between the preliminary report which is stated to be a complete one, dated Constantinople, the 9th of June, and that printed subsequently, dated Constantinople, the 10th of June.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You intend to submit it to the Board afterwards?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You wish to be allowed to go on with your statement now, and afterwards to hand in to the Board a paper showing the difference between the two reports of the Commissioners.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Merely to lay it before the Board to draw the attention of the general officers to the difference between those two reports wherever there may be a material point. I should be glad to do it now, but as I have only just got the copy it will be impossible. It will not be accompanied by any further statement.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) When will you be able to hand it in? To-morrow?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No; not to-morrow.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you think that it will have any bearing upon the particular matter referred to the Board?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes, I think it will have.

(*President, to Sir Richard Airey.*) Then that is understood. You can now proceed.

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Sir Alexander Woodford, my Lord, and Gentlemen.—I have stated that I was here to impugn so much of the report as tended to animadvert upon my administration of the quartermaster-general's department, and I had proposed to myself to effect this object by two distinct operations: First, I intended to show that the evidence before this Board effectually removes every shadow of ground for those animadversions upon my department which are contained in the report; Secondly, I had intended to impugn the report, by showing that the conclusions therein contained would have been prevented by that very testimony which, though not printed with the rest of the evidence, was in truth actually given before the Commissioners; and I had intended, I confess, to invite the attention of the Board to the circumstances under which the displacement of the evidence had occurred. From this second portion of my case I am debarred by the absence of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch. But, Sir Alexander Woodford, I do not desire to exaggerate the misfortune which is inflicted upon me by the circumstance of finding myself precluded from a portion of my explanations, for happily, as I conceive, there are ample grounds for the complete justification of the quartermaster-general's department, quite independently of all those topics which tend to "impugn the credit of the Report" in the sense meant by the judge-advocate general. Upon carefully looking through the Reports, and comparing the various statements therein contained with the explanatory qualifications which accompany them, I think I am justified in admitting that the only animadversions really cast upon the quartermaster general's department are reducible to two heads; the first the supposed want of invention and skill in the providing shelter for horses, and the second is the supposed want of good management in the issue department. I will confine the few observations which I shall address to the Board to those matters. In proceeding to render explanations as to the shelter for horses, I must say that the progress of this discussion has strongly confirmed me in the impression which I ventured to state in my opening address, namely, that Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch could not have been entrusted, and were not entrusted, with the duty of making such an inquiry as would justify animadversions upon military officers then engaged with the enemy in the field. I showed the Board that if language has any meaning, the instructions, both of the 19th and of the 22nd of February are strictly confined to the commis-

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey.*

14th May 1856.

sariat. I showed that the formal and official letter addressed by Sir John M'Neill to Lord Raglan announced in the most clear and precise terms an inquiry into the commissariat business and nothing more, and I proved also that the Commissioners themselves in their own Report, at page 3, had stated expressly that the inquiry was one which had reference exclusively to the supply of the army and the arrangements of the commissariat. I also showed that on the 19th of February, the very date of the instructions to Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, the Government had instituted an inquiry into the conduct of the officers on the general staff of the army, but that that inquiry had been entrusted, not to Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, but to Sir James Simpson. I now find, Sir Alexander Woodford, what I was entirely unaware of before, that the perfect accuracy of my statement in this respect is completely borne out by a very high authority indeed; by an authority which would speak with conclusive weight upon any question as to the power really delegated to the Civil Commissioners, and also as to the power really delegated to the Military Commissioners. Upon turning to "Hansard," we find that on the 16th of February 1855, Lord Palmerston (being then, as now, the First Lord of the Treasury and the organ of the Ministers in the Commons House of Parliament) used these words:—"Sir, great alarm and well-founded complaints have been made on the subject of the "accommodation provided for our sick in the hospitals at Scutari, and in the Crimea. "Sir, we are going to send out a Commission composed of individuals, men not "swayed by the bias of professional habits, nor yet military men, but men who "have been accustomed to deal with sanitary questions, not only at home, but "who have been employed in similar duties abroad, one of them having been so "employed upon a service of this nature in the West Indies. We are going to send those "three civilians out with ample power to examine the sanitary condition of the hospitals, "of the camp, and of the ships. There was one sent out some time ago; but "there are three persons now going out simply and solely for the purpose of re-"viewing those sanitary arrangements. I own that I anticipate the greatest advantage "from their scientific labours. I am sure that medical men, whose time is daily occupied "in all the details of their profession, have not leisure enough to consider those great "sanitary arrangements upon which the health and comfort, and the lives, even, of "many thousands of men must inevitably depend. Lord Raglan has been authorized "and instructed to send to Constantinople, and to procure from thence a corps of "labourers whose sole duty will be to cleanse the camp—to cleanse it from that accu-"mulation of various things, which every man who knows anything of the habits of a "camp, and of the calamities which have befallen us in the Crimea, must know are "perpetually accumulating, and which when the warm season comes in, might, if "precautions were not taken, be attended with most disastrous results to the health "of the troops. Then again, Sir, many complaints have been made, and I am afraid "not without some foundation, of a want of system in the Commissariat Department, "of mistakes and defective organization, both as regards the supply and as regards the "issue of things requisite for the Army. A commission is going out at the head of which "we have placed a very distinguished man, well known for his abilities and habits of organi-"zation. I mean Sir John M'Neill, once our Minister at the Court of Persia, and now "connected with the Poor Law Department of this country. He will be the head of that "Commission, and he will have colleagues competent to act with him. That Commission "will go for the purpose of examining into all the defects to be found in the Commissariat "Magazines in the Levant, and will have full power to organize them on a more efficient "basis. In the British Army there has not hitherto existed an officer of that description "who in foreign armies bears the title of Chief of the Staff. The consequence has been that "all the details of the Quartermaster-General's and Adjutant-General's Departments, have "been brought to the Commander-in-Chief, much to his inconvenience, and abstracting his "attention perhaps from matters of more serious and greater importance. Major-General "Simpson, an officer of distinguished merit and great experience, who is well known for his "services in the Peninsula, at Waterloo, and in India, is going out immediately as Chief "of the Staff, to have the control and command of the Quartermaster-General's and "Adjutant-General's Departments, and with power to recommend to Lord Raglan any "change which he might think ought to be made in the different persons belonging to "those departments; and Lord Raglan will no doubt think it his duty to adopt any "recommendations which Major-General Simpson may make to him as to those matters. "There has been also a complaint, and I believe a just one, that the medical establish-"ment of the army has not hitherto furnished a sufficient supply of medical officers for "the want of our hospitals abroad. A hospital is going to be erected at Varna, which "will be placed entirely in the hands of civil medical men, and civilians will be invited "to offer their services in any other part of the arrangements abroad, in which their "medical services may be wanted. My noble friend, the Secretary for the War Depart-"ment, is going to remodel entirely the medical departments at home; I believe that "that is capable of great improvement, simplification, and probably of increased effi-"ciency; and I am confident that the labours of my noble friend in that direction will "not be less valuable than in other departments of the administration which have been "confided to his care. My noble friend also proposes very shortly, I believe this evening, "to present to the other House of Parliament a bill to enable Her Majesty to enlist as

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey.*

14th May 1856.

"soldiers men of a more advanced age; I need hardly say more advanced, but some-
"what older than the limit hitherto fixed; men still in the vigour of life, but older than
"the ordinary range of recruits; and to enlist them for a shorter period than is assigned
"to the general enlistment of soldiers under the present arrangements of the army. I have
"omitted to say that hitherto the commissariat abroad has been charged, not simply with
"the supply and issue of provisions and all other things wanted for the service of the army,
"but has also been charged with providing the means of transporting those articles. That
"has been the source of very great difficulty, embarrassment, and inconvenience, and a
"separate department of land transport has been established, which will correspond in
"some degree with the ancient waggon train, only upon a larger scale, and it will be
"instructed immediately to set to work, and to collect in Asia Minor the animals neces-
"sary for the service of the army, and no doubt sufficient means of transport will thereby
"be provided. During the short period that has elapsed since the formation of the
"Government, these things have been done and are doing, and I should trust that the
"House will be disposed to see the effect which these different improvements and
"arrangements will produce. I am myself perfectly convinced that the results would be
"known in a much shorter period than would be sufficient to enable a Committee even to
"make a report they could recommend to the attention of this House. Sir, so much as
"regards the arrangements for the prosecution of the war, though I should state that in
"addition to those improvements of system, no efforts will be omitted to provide
"reinforcements for the army to enable it to take the field, when the season
"shall admit, with increased numbers and augmented efficiency," &c. I ask the Board if these words do not strictly and accurately coincide with the statement which I made in my address, namely, that there was one tribunal for the investigation of the commissariat, and another tribunal for the investigation of the general staff, and that the latter of those duties was entrusted, as might have been expected, not to Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, but to a general officer of high military rank and authority. The composition of the general staff of the army was investigated by General Sir James Simpson, and the result of that investigation being already known to the Board, it must, I think, seem strange to every general officer whom I am addressing, that, having undergone the ordeal of a really military inquiry, I should afterwards find myself the subject of animadversions pronounced against me by a civil commission. But thus it is, and I proceed. With respect to this question of sheltering horses, I may remark in passing, that the want of shelter was not the cause of the mortality. All who watched the progress of the discussion in which Lord Lucan was engaged before this Board, must have seen that the main causes of the mortality amongst the cavalry horses was the want of forage and the necessity of throwing upon the cavalry for a time a portion of the land transport duty. As a great proof of which, I think I may mention, none of the French horses, and none of the Russian horses, as has been proved before this Board, had any of this shelter that has been now adverted to. But it is also certain, and I never for a moment questioned it, that shelter for the horses, if attainable by any reasonable and practicable means, was an object highly to be desired. Accordingly, the Board has heard from me in full detail, an account of the steps which I caused to be taken, first, for giving the horses some sort of partial and temporary shelter, and then for hutting them in a complete way. And here I will venture to remind the Board that the quartermaster-general has not in his own department any of the workmen or materials, or any of the means for constructing shelter, and that it is only by requisitions on other departments that he can cause the construction of any sort of army works. All that he can do in the regular performance of his duty towards the providing shelter for horses is to move the commissariat for the purchase and transport of the requisite materials, and to put in motion the skill and labour of the Royal Engineers as the means for effecting the construction. All this I did, and it has never been questioned for an instant that I pressed upon those other departments to the full extent of the means at their command, and that everything that was possible in the way of actually hutting the horses was done with as much speed as circumstances would allow. But what is suggested is, that even with the very small means at our command, we might have contrived some sort of canvas shelter. According to this suggestion, we were to borrow or otherwise obtain canvas from the Queen's ships and from merchantmen. We were to obtain scantling and framework from neighbouring countries. We were to transport these materials to the plateau, or, at all events, to the gorge of Kadikoi, and there we were to have canvas stables a mile and a half in length, erected by carpenters from Constantinople. This suggestion is founded upon such an accumulation of fallacies and mistakes, that it is almost difficult to deal with them patiently. The first error, an error which seems to make all old seamen smile, is that of supposing that "spare sails" means "sails which can be spared." This mistake has been effectually dispelled by the evidence of Admiral Dundas and Admiral Lyons. That which may be wanted is, perhaps, quite as necessary to the safety and efficiency of a ship as that which is actually in use, and accordingly the Board has heard that no more canvas than was actually landed could have been spared from the Queen's ships; and the objection to the spoliation of the merchant ships is, perhaps, still stronger, for their supplies of spare naval stores are comparatively scanty, and it would be a gross breach of duty on the part of the master to endanger the efficiency of his vessel by parting with a material portion of his equipment. We also now know that there was

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey.*

14th May 1856.

not a man to spare (beyond those whose services were actually obtained), either in the Queen's ships or the merchant vessels. As to the Queen's ships, the Board knows the fact from the conclusive authority of the admiral, who says that he could not have spared another man; and as to the merchant shipping, the Board has surely heard enough of the labours of the merchant seamen in boating, shipping, unshipping, ballasting, watering, repairing their own damages, &c., to see that very little aid indeed was to be got for the army from this source. But what aid could be got from that quarter was mainly applied to an object which Lord Raglan considered to be of more vital and pressing importance than that of sheltering the horses, namely, the construction of wharves, without which the landing of goods and stores was a process so slow and difficult that the army might be suffering the most dreadful privations for want of the very articles lying on board vessels in the little basin of Balaklava. I cannot think that the vitally important business of constructing a wharf is one which ought to have been abandoned in order to apply the labour of the men to other objects. There was no beach within many miles, and none except those who witnessed our efforts in the autumn and early winter of 1854, can form an adequate conception of the difficulty with which the vast and bulky supplies and warlike stores requisite for maintaining the army and carrying on the siege, were got into a small inlet of the sea, and landed and stored in the narrow little fishing place of Balaklava. There was a gallant army on the hill, and a great nation 3,000 miles off sparing no expense to supply it, but narrow indeed at this point was the channel of communication between them. It was the rich man striving to pass through the eye of the needle. I repeat, that in my view there was hardly any work so important as to justify an abandonment of the exertions which Lord Raglan was making to get the wharves constructed.

Then, according to the suggestion, carpenters were to be got from Constantinople, but the possibilty of doing this was not founded upon any inquiry as to whether the men could really be hired or not, but upon a supposition that that would necessarily be the case, because many of the houses at Constantinople are built of wood. But the truth is, as we now know, that carpenters were not to be got from Constantinople; and the reasons are very obvious; the French and English military authorities were constructing upon the Bosphorus works of such magnitude as to cause a great demand for builders and carpenters, and the wages quickly rose to an amount largely exceeding the most ample rate of payment ever before heard of. Was it likely that workmen, enjoying at their own homes so rich a harvest as this, should voluntarily consent to quit all and share our winter hardships in the Chersonesus, enduring privations so dreadful, that if they encountered them they would be far more likely to die than to live?

Both the Mahometans and the Oriental Christians who are settled in the cities of the Levant, are men strongly attached to their homes, and no man who has any idea of the sufferings endured by our unfortunate camp followers during the winter of the first campaign will believe that any temptation in the form of mere "high pay" would have induced any number of able carpenters from Constantinople to go and bind themselves as followers of the army, in the midst of the most dreadful sufferings.

I say "bind themselves," for the Board knows well that camp followers employed in the service of an army in the field are necessarily compelled by sharp military discipline, not only to observe due order in their conduct, but to carry out the engagements into which they have entered. All these sufferings and this restraint they would have to encounter, without being animated by the feeling which impels men to court the dangers and hardships of war.

Perhaps I ought scarcely to have troubled the Board on this point, for the Commissioners themselves say that hired labourers could not be obtained. They state, "No "scarcity of wood existed along the shores of the Black Sea, but the difficulty was to "provide it at the camp in sufficient quantities for building purposes. Hired labour "could not be obtained, and the demands for the services of the troops in the trenches, "and for other military duties, were such, that they could not be spared to prepare it, "even had they been capable of doing so."

It is very true that the Commissioners are there speaking of another matter, namely, hutting for the men. It seems plain that if labour could not be hired for that purpose, it could not be hired for the other, but very similar purpose, of constructing shelter for horses. But the latter service would have been infinitely more onerous and painful to the men. In the construction of the huts they had all their timber and all their implements; they had only to fasten them up and nail them. In the other they were up to their knees in mud, and exposed entirely to the weather, removing a dreadfully deep wet soil in a state of slush; a sort of service that, in the case of those Turks without stockings, and wearing the oriental slippers, nothing would have induced them to come out of their tents to undergo. But, after all, we find upon examination, that the one single recommendation supposed to attach to canvas shelter for horses, is one which does not really belong to it. That recommendation was the supposed lightness of the materials, but upon testing the matter by tha evidence of those who really understood the business, namely, engineer officers, we find that canvas shelter for horses would require so much of heavy scantling, and such extensive framework, that, taken altogether, the materials for such constructions would have been as completely beyond our small means of transport as stables made

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey.*

14th May 1856.

entirely of wood, of which wood, I may remark, we were in possession, and there was no want of wood at the time.

When I add to all this mass of impossibilities, the fact that a canvas booth, whether erected on the plateau or in the gorge of Kadikoi, would have inevitably given way to the first serious gale of wind, I think I substantiate the assertion which I ventured to make in my address, to the effect that the construction of canvas shelter for the horses was impracticable, and that, if practicable, it would have been useless. The Commissioners seem to have thought the contrivance which "saved the baggage animals of the sappers and miners" was an example of what might have been effected for the horses of the cavalry. We now know exactly what the shelter was which was appropriated to these baggage animals. The animals were 9 bullocks and 11 mules, and they were kept in the village of Balaklava, within substantial walls, which were standing before the war began; and the only addition made to this previously existing shelter was that of stretching an old sail, a sail found, I believe, at Balaklava, from wall to wall. Why, the very difficulty of constructing a canvas shelter for horses consists in the necessity for building supports sufficiently strong to sustain very heavy pressure; and how, then, can the contrivance of stretching a sail from one stout wall to another be seriously compared to a project for constructing a mile and a half of canvas stables, upon bare ground, where no walls and no shelter of any kind previously existed?

That there are circumstances under which canvas shelter may be applied I well know, and I was fully alive to the fact long ago; for, as the Board well knows, I succeeded, with the aid of the naval authorities, in causing to be erected a shelter of this sort for the artillery horses and baggage mules. But I can explain how this was possible; simply, because the situation in which it had to be erected was not the open plateau or the gorge of Kadikoi, but the sheltered village of Balaklava, and was so close to the waters edge that we had not, of course, to encounter that difficulty which always beset us in any attempt to erect shelter in camp, namely, want of land transport.

I put in the papers showing some of the steps taken for erecting the shelter in question. I ought to add, that after all, even in the protected position in which it stood, the structure did not answer well, and it could not have been continued in use at all but for the circumstance that from its immediate proximity to the town and harbour, means could be found of repairing the injuries which it sustained from day to day.

Now, as to the issue department, I have in my address so fully dealt with the error arising from the term, "Quartermaster-general's" stores, that my remaining task is short. The Board clearly understand that the quartermaster-general's department has no stores, no storehouses, no storekeepers, no issuers, no means of landing transport, none, in fact, of the machinery necessary for receiving stores or keeping them, or for transporting them or delivering them to the men. All these duties had in former times devolved upon an officer, called the storekeeper, but several years ago, that office was abolished, and its duties were thrown upon the commissariat. The inexpediency of that change has now been recognized, and the office of storekeeper has been revived, but that revival did not take place until after the period embraced in the Report of the Commissioners. The only duty of the quartermaster-general's department in relation to the issue of stores was, as I have stated, that of determining the proportions in which they should be shared by the troops, and I have already described so fully that machinery of "Approved requisitions," by which the duty was performed, that I think it wholly unnecessary to travel again over the same ground. It was of vital importance to the men during the dreadful sufferings of the first winter's campaign, that this issue department should be administered in such a spirit as to annihilate all formal and technical difficulties unnecessarily interfering with the issue of the clothing, and it appears to me that in order to bring about this result, it was the duty of the quartermaster-general first to establish such general rules for the conduct of the sub-department as could assure an easy and beneficial method of transacting the business, and next, to take care that the officer representing the quartermaster-general in this sub-department should be a man of such qualities as to preclude the apprehension that there could be any mismanagement tending to obstruct the due issue, either of the articles constituting the ordinary equipment of the soldier, or of those extra articles which were supplied to meet the peculiar exigencies of the campaign. I surely fulfilled all these conditions. I gave such instructions for the management of the office as seemed certain to prevent anything like undue hindrance or trouble in obtaining the approved requisitions; and who was the officer whom I selected to represent me in the business of this sub-department? Colonel Wetherall has appeared as a witness before this Board, and I think it was impossible to hear his testimony without seeing that he was thoroughly master of the business of the issue department, and that he administered it with all that good sense and straightforwardness which were so needful at the period of our sufferings. Again, so far as concerns the removal of all difficulties occurring at Balaklava, where the stores were situate, I do not see how I could have adopted any measure more certain to have a thorougly beneficial effect than that of selecting exactly such an officer as Colonel Mackenzie, and entrusting him with the most full and ample powers to represent the quartermaster-general at Balaklava, with a very intelligent and practical officer, Brevet-Major Ross, to aid and assist him. And to show the manner in which this sub-department was administered, and in the very way I wished that it should be administered, I think I need only refer to the evidence

*Major-General Sir Richard Airey.*

14th May 1856.

of Colonel Wetherall, Colonel M'Kenzie, and Mr. Boyd, the issuer, as officers who were best qualified to speak as to the machinery of the department. I hope the Board will give their particular attention to the evidence of those officers, and it will be seen that my department gave every possible facility to the distribution of the clothing among the men.

If the Commissioners whilst in the Crimea had seriously entertained the idea that anything had gone wrong in the department, and that they were justified in inquiring into the matter, their course would have been very plain to everyone acquainted with the organization of the British army.

The organ of communication between any particular division and the quartermaster-general of the forces is the assistant quartermaster-general of the division; and if anything went wrong in the issue department, say, for instance, in granting the approved requisition for blankets, the assistant quartermaster-general of the division is the officer who would first have official cognizance of the circumstance. He therefore would have been the person to examine in support of the complaint (if complaint there had ever been), and I, as the head of the department complained against, should have been examined with a view to elicit my explanations.

No statement by a regimental officer could be effectually used as a substitute for that of the assistant quartermaster-general of the division, for requisitions made by a regimental officer may of course be stopped in their transit by the divisional general, and it does not at all follow, therefore, that a requisition is even presented to the central department, merely because it has been made by the regimental officer; it may be stopped by the divisional general as useless and unnecessary. Yet neither I nor the divisional assistant quartermaster-general were ever asked one question either orally, or in writing, about the issue department, and really, in the absence of any attempt by the Commissioners to elicit evidence so absolutely necessary to anything like an inquiry, I sometimes can hardly imagine that they intentionally retained in their report those comments upon the issue department which have the effect of animadversions, and my doubt as to the real intentions of the Commissioners in this respect is increased when I find them stating, as they do at page 31 of the report, "From these it must be inferred that in "many cases the supplies did not reach the men for a considerable time after they "appear, from the quartermaster-general's returns, to have been issued. But there is no "reason to believe that the delay was in any degree attributable to that department "Owing to the deficiency of transport, these supplies may have remained in Balaklava "for a considerable time before they could be conveyed to the front, or in any other "way be made available for the use of the men." To show that anything went wrong in the issue department, so far as concerns the ordinary equipage of the soldier, it would have been necessary to sustain two propositions: First, that during the period in question viz., from the beginning of December to the close of the winter, some requisition was disapproved by the quartermaster-general's department; and secondly, that the disapproval was wrong; but, curiously enough, neither of these propositions has been established up to this hour; for not only is the Board without any proof that a requisition was wrongly refused, but there is absolutely no proof that any requisition was ever refused at all. Then, as to the extra clothing, the steps taken by my department for, if I may so speak, pressing these things upon the acceptance of the men, were as follows: First, A tabular statement of the available articles was kept hung up for the information of all comers in my office; second, the assistant-quartermaster-generals of divisions came to me daily, and were specially instructed to keep themselves continually informed of the articles from time to time becoming available for the men, and I particularly requested them not simply to take for granted the completeness of the commissariat returns, but to make inquiries also at the stores for the information of their divisions; 3rd, approved requisitions were from time to time prepared and originated in the quartermaster-general's department, and handed to the assistant-quartermaster-generals of divisions. This was done from time to time with careful regard, not only to the quantities of goods returned as being in store, but to the particular descriptions of goods which were at the time most easily accessible. From this constant endeavour of the quartermaster-general's department to press upon the men the acceptance of the articles available for their use, the troops soon found themselves in possession of "approved requisitions" for much more of clothing than they could really possess themselves of, and the evidence of Colonel Wetherall, confirming that of Colonel Cobb eand other regimental officers to the same effect, shows clearly that during the whole time in question the "approved requisitions" granted by the quartermaster-general's department were largely in advance of the actual deliveries from the commissariat stores.

I conceive that these observations, in addition to my former address, and to the evidence adduced before the Board, sufficiently meet all the animadversions upon my department which are contained in the Report; but I repeat, as I stated on a former occasion, that I shall gratefully receive any request which the Board may be pleased to make for further elucidation of any questions raised by the Report. Before I proceed, I wish to say that I feel deeply indebted to the judge-advocate-general for anticipating my anxious wishes by stating that in my manner of conducting my justification there has been an entire absence of all approach to personality on my part. And I am anxious to take this opportunity of repeating most emphatically, that not a sentence has passed my lips which throws any impu-

tation upon Colonel Tulloch's honour. I may add, that no man, except perhaps Colonel Gordon, can regret so deeply as I do the distressing illness which has deprived the Board of his presence in this Hall. *Major-General Sir Richard Airey.*

I can understand that anxiety and mental exertion may have contributed to produce this result; for I also have learnt what it is to be engaged day by day, and week after week, in that most painful of all duties, the duty of justifying one's own conduct. 14th May 1856.

It has been asserted—and this, I confess, is the most painful thought of all—that Her Majesty was wrongly advised when I was permitted to receive these honours from Her gracious hand.

"Is it right?" my friends say to me, "Is it right to content yourself with a mere justification of your conduct, however complete, and to avoid all utterance of complaint?" I answer, I have not complained yet, and I do not intend now to begin.

I have learnt, from the example of as noble a soldier as ever commanded a British army in the field, that it is one of the duties of an officer in these modern times to bear injustice from many quarters with a long enduring silence; and to regard all obloquy, and all unfounded blame, very much in the light of those mere physical hardships which are part of a soldier's lot.

It happened to me to be with Lord Raglan in an hour of trial more bitter than that to which I, a mere subordinate officer, now find myself exposed, and I saw that my chief was able to bear all, and to stand firm by the army in its time of need, because he simply cast away every thought of self, and remembered, for these were his very words, his "duty to the Queen."

This was the great spirit of the great Duke of Wellington's school, and it seems to me that even in my own humble sphere of duty, I may accept and apply the example.

Therefore, Sir Alexander Woodford, without dwelling on any hardships which may be thought to attach to my position, and without even inviting attention to the singular causes which have led to the necessity for this justification, I commit my reputation as an officer, a reputation which I value more than life itself, to the judgment of this high military tribunal, and I do so with full confidence that truth and justice will prevail.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Colonel Gordon.*) It has been officially communicated to this Board that you are among those officers who have reason to complain of the Report of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch as to the deficient supplies to the Army in the Crimea, and that you have desired to have an opportunity of making certain explanations with regard to that Report, considering yourself in some degree aninadverted upon. The Board now inform you, that you have an opportunity of giving those explanations, and they are ready to hear anything you have to state. *Colonel Gordon.*

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Before I proceed to read the statement which I have prepared upon certain passages of the Report, I wish to complain, and I wish to state some circumstances connected with what has passed in this Hall with regard to the evidence which has been produced by Colonel Tulloch. I had the intention of doing that when my turn came to appear before the Board, and I made memoranda as the proceedings went on with that object, little expecting that Colonel Tulloch would be obliged to withdraw, or else I should have interrupted the Board, and at the time explained certain things which were mis-stated by Colonel Tulloch by mistake. He has stated to the Board that all the originals of the evidence given by the officers in the Crimea were sent to them for correction. And in answer to General Airey's question, at page 224, Colonel Tulloch said "No, there was no condensation whatever; every word that is in this book was "taken down at the time in the presence of the officer, and it was then forwarded to "the officer, in order that he might sign it. In some cases the officers preferred re-"copying it and sending it back to us, in which case we received it as their original "evidence." Again, in another place, at page 280, Colonel Tulloch stated, with regard to the omitted part of Colonel Wetherall's evidence, "Those notes were never introduced "into the body of the evidence, because the marked difference between what was "received in the one case and acknowledged in the other showed that the inquiry "would lead to no beneficial result, and I therefore struck out the whole of the latter "part of the memorandum, and in that state it was subsequently sent to Colonel Gordon "for Colonel Wetherall, along with his evidence, to save the trouble of re-copying it." With regard to the first statement, that the original notes were sent to the officers for correction in the Crimea, I merely state that the original notes of my evidence which I hold in my hand I never saw till they were produced here the other day by the direction of the Board.

The papers which were sent to me for correction as the original notes of my evidence, are the papers which I hold in my hand. There is a material difference between the two, and I have prepared a statement to show that. I will read, with the permission of the Board, the original notes which were taken down in my presence by Colonel Tulloch in his own handwriting. I state "That with reference to the number of paillasses received "into store for the use of the army, the reason why they were not issued except for the "use of the sick was, that straw to stuff them could not be obtained, and they were "considered useless without straw. That he will ascertain and state the reason why the "rugs were not issued; is of opinion that it would have been of advantage to a man to "have had one under him. That he will in like manner furnish a return of the number

*Colonel Gordon.*

14th May 1856.

" of blankets available for the use of the troops, and of the date of their distribution, but " is not aware that the question has ever been raised as to the issue of a third blanket to " each man, even if the supply afforded it. That he will furnish a return of the number " of great coats available for the use of the troops, and the date of their distribution, but " is not aware that it has ever been contemplated to issue a second great coat in addition " to the one in wear, as we knew that the sheepskin coats were coming for every man. " That many of the dates of the receipt of warm clothing by the quartermasters of corps " do not appear to correspond with the dates of his requisitions, from which he anticipates " that considerable delay has occurred in bringing up these supplies, after the authority had " been given for drawing them; and on a few instances being given him of these delays, he " will refer to his books and ascertain by the date of the requisition, whether it has been in any " way attributable to delays in his department, or to the quartermaster being late in sending " for these supplies." That is a copy from the original notes taken in my presence. No part of that appears in the paper that was sent to me as my evidence when the Commissioners left the Crimea. It was given on the 24th of May, the first day that I was examined, and here is a transcript of what I am supposed to have stated, and there is not a syllable of that recorded. On the 28th of May I was again examined, with Colonel Wetherall; and in the minutes of the examination of the 28th of May I have given no evidence at all about the clothing and the stores, because Colonel Wetherall was there to give the answers; and the evidence itself and the records of the examination show that I did not give any answer at all on the subject. When I received those papers, two hours before the Commissioners left the Crimea on the 4th of June, I found this statement entered as part of my evidence on the second day of my examination :—" The memorandum referred to in the preceding " evidence of Major Wetherall, relative to the non-issue of a large proportion of the warm " clothing and winter stores, and the explanation of that officer having been read over to " him (Colonel Gordon), he concurs therein, and states that he is of opinion it would have " been an advantage to each man to have had a rug under him; but that though the number " of blankets admitted of it, he is not aware that the question was ever raised as to the expe- " diency of issuing a third blanket, nor does he think it was ever contemplated to issue a " second great coat to each man in addition to the one in wear, as sheepskin coats were shortly " expected." When I received this paper from Colonel Tulloch, as the report of my evidence, I read it, but I did not remember the memorandum having been read to me. I did not recollect having given those answers which are here recorded, but I had been examined for four days for five or six hours a day, and an immense amount of business was going on, and I was under the impression that they were right; that my memory had failed me, and therefore I thought it my duty to let it stand, as they had gone, and I had no means of explaining it to them. I knew that they had the original notes in their possession, and I took it for granted that what they sent me was a copy of them; I therefore thought it my duty to let every word that they had sent to me stand, with one exception, which was so contrary to the fact, that I scratched it out, namely, " That though the number of " blankets admitted of it, he is not aware that the question was ever raised as to the expe- " diency of issuing a third blanket." I was obliged to scratch that out. I thought that if I had made that statement, it was from some misunderstanding between us. But I now find, looking at the original notes of the proceedings, that there is not a syllable on that day given by me like that evidence, but that the evidence was given on the first day, before I had any knowledge of the memorandum which was submitted to Major Wetherall, and I gave the answers which I read to the Board just now, and which appear here; so that it appears that the evidence that I gave on the one day in answer to questions has been condensed either by the Commissioners or by the Commissioners' clerk, for it is in the handwriting of the clerk that this summary is made, and it appears as an answer to a memorandum which I only saw four or five days afterwards. There is a material difference in the summary of the evidence which has been prepared by the Commissioners' clerk and that which I gave. It is this, that that part of the statement which I made about the paillasses is entirely omitted, stating that there was no straw to stuff them with, and that they were only used for the sick, and they were thought useless without straw. And also that part wherein I stated that there had been a delay in obtaining the clothing after the dates of the requisitions, and that I will ascertain whether it is attributable to the quartermaster-general's department or to the regiments, is entirely omitted.

Therefore, I think that the statement which Colonel Tulloch has made has been made in a mistake; that he submitted the original notes of every officer's evidence to them for correction. In my own case it was not done; and we have a specimen of the mode in which my evidence has been, I will hardly say altered, but it has been given a very different appearance to what the true evidence was. I will hand in a statement of the original evidence and the omitted evidence.

With regard to the second statement of Colonel Tulloch that I alluded to, that the omitted portion of Colonel Wetherall's evidence had been sent to me for correction, or for his correction, I must state that Colonel Wetherall applied to the Commissioners, through me, after he had finished his examination, to know whether he might leave the Crimea; he was going to the Turkish Contingent, and the Commissioners consulted together, and they stated that they had nothing further to ask him; that they had ascertained all they wished as to the clothing, and he was perfectly at liberty to go to Constantinople. In the meantime the questions to General Airey were brought or sent up by

*Colonel Gordon.*

14th May 1856.

the Commissioners, and in those questions there was not one with regard to Major Wetherall's branch of the department as to the clothing. Therefore I imagined, as we all did, I believe, that the Commissioners had nothing further to ask upon the subject of the clothing, and they told me that Major Wetherall need not be detained, as they were satisfied; and as they did not put a single question to General Airey upon that subject, I took it for granted that they were satisfied, and nothing further was required. Consequently, on the 4th of June, when I received these papers as a summary of our evidence, I did not think it necessary to send them to where Colonel Wetherall was, (he had gone to Constantinople, where he was going to join the Contingent,) for correction, because that evidence was entirely with regard to figures taken out of the books, which we could correct as well as he could. He had not the books with him, and therefore he could not refer to them in the Bosphorus. Now, the part of the evidence of Colonel Wetherall which has been omitted, is that part which was in the original notes of his evidence, but on a memorandum of Colonel Tulloch's, which he states was a private memorandum made for the use of the Commissioners, and that memorandum he never sent me. I never saw it till I saw it printed in this country. The omitted part of Major Wetherall's evidence is in the margin of that memorandum; therefore I could not have seen it, and it is quite obvious that Colonel Tulloch would not have sent it to me, for as he states, it being a private memorandum, there was no object in sending it to me. He only sent this paper which purports to be the evidence given by Major Wetherall as to the issues, and which he sent to me for the purpose of having certain appendices attached, which I had done. I put those Appendices A, B, C, and D, that Colonel Wetherall alluded to in his evidence, and it has been printed quite correctly with the exception of the last paragraph, which has been struck out. I will hand in a copy of the original evidence given by Major Wetherall, and those paragraphs of the Report which appear to be borne out by the evidence. It has been read to the Board by Colonel Wetherall before, and I wish to put them in juxtaposition, that the omitted part of the evidence may be seen, and what bears upon it.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You are aware that Colonel Tulloch stated that you revised the proof sheets of Colonel Wetherall's evidence?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) In print?

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) I presume so.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) He stated that I revised the evidence of Colonel Weatherall. I do not know whether he meant when it was printed, or in manuscript. I revised the manuscript evidence of Colonel Wetherall, and it is here. It is quite correct, and it is printed correctly, with the exception of the last paragraph, which is struck out. There are no alterations here, excepting the Appendices.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You suggested, did you not, that he should append two letters that had been omitted?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Not two letters. I do not think so. No; no letter had been omitted that I know of.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) None had been omitted; but I think he stated that you suggested to him, when you sent back those revised sheets, to make some correction?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) There was a memorandum of my own that was omitted to be put in, but there was nothing else. Colonel Tulloch did state something of that kind, but I did not know what he meant.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) He stated that two letters had been omitted, which you suggested should be appended.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I have no recollection of it. If that is so, it is all correct. Nothing was more liberal than the way in which they behaved; they put in anything that we wanted, and they left out what we wished.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Did that paragraph that was afterwards struck out form a portion of Colonel Wetherall's evidence, when it was submitted to you?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes, it did. This paper was sent to me as it is, but I have no recollection of its being struck out then; if it had been, I should have taken notice of it. Here is my own handwriting,—the appendices that I attached; I have no recollection of that part being struck out. It is this:—"With regard to the watch-coats, "1,210 were issued early in December, and on the 21st of December 1,200 more, and on "the 4th of January 1,100; that on the 2d of December about 2,000 watch-coats were "in store, of which 1,210 were issued as above." It is struck out here, but before that there is an entry in Colonel Tulloch's handwriting, an alteration of it, to improve the grammar of it. There is an alteration to make those in store come before the issue, and the result is that the whole has been scratched out. The moment that I found that a part of the memorandum was omitted, I immediately took notice of it.

1863. (*Major-General Peel, to Colonel Gordon.*) You were examined on the 24th, without Colonel Wetherall?—Yes.

1864. On the 28th a joint examination took place of you and Colonel Wetherall, which was afterwards divided, and submitted to you separately?—Yes, in those papers here.

1865. Were the original minutes of your examination on the 24th submitted to you?—Never; I never saw them till I saw them in this Hall. Now I do see from all those alterations, and two omissions, that the alteration is of such a nature that it makes it appear

*Colonel Gordon.*

14th May 1856.

that I said that there were blankets in store and we did not issue them, whereas, the words that I did use were doubting that they were in store, namely, "He is not aware that the question was ever raised as to the expediency of issuing a third blanket, nor does "he think it was ever contemplated to issue a second great coat to each man," even if the "supply afforded it. I doubted the supply affording it. But even if the supply afforded it, I doubted whether "the question was ever raised," because we could not have given a third blanket till the buffalo-robes arrived, and after that there was never any question of giving a third blanket.

1866. The original minutes of the evidence published here were never submitted to you for correction?—Never.

1867. A portion of that evidence given by you on the 24th of May appears afterwards in the evidence stated to have been given on the 28th?—Yes. But in reality I never answered a question about it. The original minutes prove that Colonel Wetherall did, but the substance of my answers to the other questions are given condensed as my answers to the memorandum that I never had read to me. When I received those papers, I took for granted that what they sent to me was correct, and that my memory must have failed me.

The next statement that I wish to draw the attention of the Board to, is of the same nature, and which I am sorry Colonel Tulloch is not here to answer about. It might be important, but I must mention it. In a paper given in by Colonel Tulloch are the questions proposed to be put to me after returning to England. They were submitted to Sir John M'Neill for his approval.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Are they in print?—I hold in my hand the original draft submitted to Sir John M'Neill for his approval; at page 199 are the additional queries put to me in London. I think I stated that Sir John M'Neill told me that Colonel Tulloch wished to put certain additional queries to me, that he did not attach much importance to them, but that he had consented, and asked me to answer them, and I stated that I should be very happy to do so. The question in the draft runs thus: "You state, "at page (so and so) of your evidence, as a reason for not making these issues, that you "thought when the men had two blankets, a sheepskin coat, a fur cap, a pair of leggings, "a waterproof hood, one-third of a buffalo robe, two Guernsey frocks, two pairs of drawers, "two pairs of socks, a pair of winter boots, a comforter, and two pairs of gloves, as well "as an extra suit of uniform, &c., that they were not so badly off. Were you aware when "you made this statement that the returns received from the quartermaster-general's "department show that the articles of which the non-issue is complained of arrived "at Balaklava between the 21st and 28th of November, while those to which you "refer (with the exception of the blankets) were not received till near the middle "of January?" Sir John M'Neill, in the margin of this question, has put, in his own handwriting, "It would be better to quote the words of the evidence here referred to." Nothing could be more just or more proper than that direction of Sir John M'Neill, because when you refer to a previous question, you ought to quote the words that were used. If the Board will turn to page 169, they will find the reason that I gave for those issues not being made was, that I did not believe that there was a sufficient number in store to enable the issue to be made of blankets, great-coats, and rugs. Therefore, if the directions of Sir John M'Neill had been attended to, the question would have taken quite a different turn, if it had been put. It should have been, "You state, as a reason for not "making those issues, that you thought there was not a sufficient number in store, to "enable the issue." The question could not have been asked, because they could not ask me the question, as to why I did not issue things when I had already stated that I did not believe they were in store. The question was put to me as it was originally drafted. Sir John M'Neill's direction was not attended to, and the consequence was that I could not answer the question. My answer was, that I could not answer it, as it contained assertions which I belived to be entirely incorrect, and I must therefore decline answering a question founded upon error. I wish to state, with regard to getting Major Wetherall's signature to his evidence, that it must have been obvious that I could not do it. I was directed to return the papers to Colonel Tulloch on the following morning, a few hours before the packet left Kazatch Bay. As they knew that Colonel Wetherall was at Constantinople, it is plain that they did not intend me to get his signature in the Crimea and return it the following morning.

(*Judge Advocate General*). You stated that they knew that he was at Constantinople?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Because the Commissioners had consulted and allowed him to go there, stating that they had nothing further to ask him. I know that he went, for I was present, and they said that he might go to Constantinople to join the Turkish Contingent.

(*Judge Advocate General*). He has stated that he expected that you would submit his evidence to him, or, if he was absent, that you would account for his not having signed it?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I have Colonel Tulloch's note here:—"I enclose a copy of the "evidence, which, when you have examined and altered as you think fit, you will please "to sign at the end of each day's work. It has been thought best to have the evidence "of Major Wetherall put separately, as you will see. Will you be so good as return

*Colonel Gordon.*

14th May 1856.

"the evidence to us on board the mail-packet to-morrow, with any relative papers of "which you have been making copies, and the answers to some queries I have left with "General Airey." Those relative papers I did attach to the evidence, and returned them, not the following day, but as soon as I could. I received them 10 minutes before 11, and they were to leave that day at 12 o'clock. I wish to state this, in order to remove the impression that Colonel Tulloch seems to have himself, that he returned all the evidence to me, and that I revised and returned it to him as it has been printed.

1868. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Are you alluding to Major Wetherall's examination on the 28th of May?—Yes, I was present at that.

1869. When was it sent back to you to get Major Wetherall's signature?—On the 4th of June, at 10 minutes before 11. Major Wetherall was then at Constantinople or in the neighbourhood.

1870. The Commissioners were then at Balaklava?—Yes; they say "We shall leave this "harbour about mid-day to-day. The captain takes us round to Kazatch, and we shall "get on board the packet to-morrow forenoon, when I suppose the necessary arrangements "have been made in regard to the passages of ourselves, two servants, and of Mr. Bassano, "who accompanies us as secretary;" it would be obliging us if you could let us have the "papers a few hours before the packet sails, that we may look them over and inform you "if anything further is wanted which can be forwarded after us." I was under the impression that as they were going to where Colonel Wetherall was, anything that they required from him they would obtain there. I attach no importance to Colonel Wetherall's evidence as regards any mistakes, because they had not put a single question to General Airey upon that subject. I thought they would have done so if they were not satisfied with my evidence or Colonel Wetherall's, but there is not a single question to General Airey upon that subject. Therefore I attached very little importance to what happened. Colonel Tulloch, at question 1303, in Colonel Wetherall's evidence states, "Did you not leave the "Crimea the morning after the examination?—No. When did you leave?—I think two "or three days after the examination." I think I have explained my reason for not making this statement before. I thought it more respectful not to interrupt the Board by at once stating that what an officer had stated was not quite correct. I thought I should have my own opportunity in his presence of doing it. I will now read my remarks upon the two paragraphs in the report of which I have reason to complain.

In accordance with the request made by Sir Richard Airey on the 2nd of May, when addressing this Board, I shall confine the few remarks I am about to make to the two paragraphs of the London Report, in which the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea have thought it necessary to animadvert upon the evidence I there gave. The paragraphs in question will be found at pages 24 and 26 of that Report. But, before I proceed with my explanation, I must request that my position, both during the examination in the Crimea and on the present occasion, will be throughout borne in mind. I allude to the circumstance, that I was not the officer specially charged with the distribution of the warm clothing and stores, a fact which appears to have escaped the recollection of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch when drawing up their Report, although it was explained to them in the Crimea by both Major Wetherall and myself.

I do not mention this with a view to throw off myself any responsibility or blame which might be supposed to attach to me, because I think Colonel Wetherall has clearly shown the inaccuracy of the London Report with regard to the issue of clothing; but for the purpose of showing the manner in which the Commissioners have, I think, unnecessarily brought my name into connexion with duties which did not devolve upon me.

It will therefore be understood, that while giving the Crimean Commissioners the best information I was able, in compliance with the desire of the commander of the forces and the quartermaster general, as the first subordinate officer of the quartermaster-general's department at head quarters, I was not, and could not be, in all cases speaking of matters within my own immediate responsibility and knowledge. Indeed, it was explained to me by Sir John M'Neill himself, that my examination was only preparatory to that of the quartermaster-general, in order to save General Airey's time, and to relieve him from the necessity of entering into a variety of details which could be as readily given by another officer.

I was, therefore, led to expect that my evidence was intended to form a groundwork for the examination of the quartermaster-general, to whom I imagined the Commissioners would naturally refer for explanation upon any point connected with the duties of his department, with the details of which, as received from myself or any other officer, they might not be entirely satisfied.

The first point I wish to notice is relative to the generals of division and the knapsacks. It is stated at page 24 of the Report, that "It will be seen from the evidence of "Colonel Gordon, then assistant quartermaster-general, that he attributes the non-"recovery of the knapsacks at an early period to the general officers of divisions, with "the exception of the Duke of Cambridge, preferring not to receive them. On referring, "however, to two of the officers who commanded divisions on that occasion, one of them "states positively that no such offer was made to him; another that he has no recollec-"tion of it, though it may have been so; the third, being absent, we have had no oppor-"tunity of communicating with him on the subject."

*Colonel Gordon.*

14th May 1856.

Thus implying that I had not sufficient grounds for the evidence I gave at page 177, which is there recorded as follows: "Having been requested to explain the circumstances connected with the inconvenience experienced by the troops in consequence of being separated from their knapsacks on their first landing in the Crimea, Colonel Gordon states that on the 1st October Sir E. Lyons was requested to send a ship to collect the knapsacks of the army from the different transports. He appointed the 'Orinoco' steamer for this duty, but in consequence of the generals of division, with the exception of the Duke of Cambridge, preferring not to receive the knapsacks at that time, there was some delay in sending her for them, and in the meantime many of the vessels went away on other duties. The question being put, whether, if the generals of division, in reply to the circular addressed to them on the subject, expressed a desire to get the knapsacks, the 'Orinoco' could have collected and brought them to Balaklava, Colonel Gordon states that he has no doubt of it, with the exception of those in one or two ships which may have been sent away on duty, or broken down, like Her Majesty's ship 'Simoon.' For instance, the knapsacks of the 33rd regiment and 88th regiment were on board the 'Apollo' at anchor outside the harbour on the 1st of October, and could have been obtained with the greatest ease, if wished for; in fact, it was very inconvenient to keep them on board, as they occupied a considerable space."

By this evidence it appears that one of the first steps taken by the quartermaster-general on arriving at Balaklava, was to apply to the Admiral on the station for a vessel to collect the knapsacks of the army. This was on the 1st of October. The "Orinoco" was in consequence selected, but was not sent, as the Generals of Division, with one exception, expressed a wish not to receive them at that time, namely the 1st of October.

At that moment great doubt and difference of opinion existed as to what the next operation of our army might be. It was believed by many that Sebastopol would be taken by assault in a few days, in which case the future position of the army would have been settled and the transports would have been able to enter the great harbour, when the baggage and knapsacks of the whole army would have been obtained with ease. In the case of an assault, the knapsacks would certainly have been an encumbrance to the men.

In the meanwhile, the "Orinoco" was employed on some other duty, but in consequence of several commanding officers wishing to have their packs, the "Sydney" steamer actually left Balaklava on the 6th October with a serjeant on board from several regiments who wished to avail themselves of that opportunity for getting at their luggage and knapsacks.

As the Commissioners have not thought it necessary to state the names of the two generals to whom they applied, or to insert the correspondence which passed on the occasion, so neither do I wish to introduce into this explanation any matter of a mere personal nature between any of the generals of division and myself. I will therefore merely repeat the steps taken by the quartermaster-general to enable them to obtain the knapsacks of their men.

On the 1st of October, a vessel having been appointed to collect the knapsacks, a circular memorandum was sent to the generals of division to inquire whether they wished to have them. I have General Airey's minute directing this to be done, and the officer, Major Hackett, deputy-assistant quartermaster-general, who wrote the circulars, and received the answers, is now in this country, and can be examined by the Board if they think proper.

On the 3rd of October, General Airey made an entry in the office memorandum book, that the knapsacks were to go to regiments as sent for; and on the following day another circular was sent to the generals of division, requesting them to send a serjeant from each regiment that wished to obtain their knapsacks on board a steamer then waiting at Balaklava for the purpose of collecting them; the result of which was that the "Sydney" sailed from Balaklava on the 6th of October with these serjeants on board.

From this it is clear that measures were at once adopted to procure the knapsacks for such divisions or regiments as desired to have them.

I wish to remark, in addition, that when I replied to the question of the Commissioners respecting the restoration of the knapsacks to the men in the Crimea, I was alluding to what took place on the 1st of October, which it is important to remember was three days before the army took up its ground for the siege in front of Sebastopol; and I had not the slightest intention of blaming any one, as I was aware that the generals might have had sufficient reason for not desiring to receive the knapsacks at that time. Indeed I did not imagine that the question involved any imputation of blame, or I should certainly have referred it to my superior officer.

I cannot but regret that if the Commissioners intended, when in the Crimea, to make use of my evidence on this subject for the purpose to which it has since been applied, they did not at once refer to the generals of division, and to the adjutant-general, and quartermaster-general on the spot, when the requisite explanation might with ease have been obtained from those who were most competent to give it.

The other point to which I wish to draw attention is at page 26 of the Report, where the Commissioners state that "it will be observed that Colonel Gordon in his evidence

*Colonel Gordon.*

14th May 1856.

" assigns as a reason for the non-issue of many of these supplies, that he conceived the " men had enough, and he enumerates a long list of articles supplied to them ; but he " overlooks the fact, that the greater number of these were not issued till about the end " of January or beginning of February, whereas the period during which the men " principally suffered was in the months of December and January, when it appears that " there were supplies enough in hand to have averted much of that suffering."

I must beg to deny, unequivocally, the accuracy of this statement. I will ask the Board to turn to the evidence, where will be seen, at page 169, the reason I really did assign. It is there recorded that the reason I gave for blankets, great coats, and rugs not having been issued to the extent suggested by the Commissioners, viz., a third blanket, a second great coat, and an extra rug to each man, was " that I did not believe " there was a sufficient number in store, during the greater part of the winter, to admit of " such an issue."

I confess that I was rather astonished when I saw the construction which had been given to the above words ; and I was the more surprised at it from the circumstance that on the 1st August, the Commissioners sent to me some additional queries, which will be found at page 199 of the evidence, in the first of which they distinctly state that I had " assigned as a reason why various supplies were not issued, that there was not a suffi- " cient quantity of them in store during the greater part of the winter to admit of such " an issue."

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Were those queries sent to you in London ?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes. It is evident then that at this time, that is, the 1st of August, the Commissioners fully comprehended the reason I had assigned, and in my answers to those queries, I repeated my disbelief of the amount of the clothing supposed to have been in store ; I am therefore at a loss to understand what can have led to any change in their view of the effect of my evidence on this point.

I will now ask the Board to read the next sentence of my evidence. It is in continuation of my reply to the memorandum at page 169, submitted by the Commissioners on the 28th of May to Major Wetherall (who had already been fully examined) requiring an explanation on various points as to the amount of warm clothing issued to the troops during the winter ; the last explanation required being as to why about 4,000 buffalo robes were still in store on that very day, viz., the 28th of May.

Immediately after stating my disbelief of the articles under consideration having been in store in the profusion imagined by the Commissioners, and observing that Major Wetherall had not informed them of the scale of issue of warm clothing, according to which it had been decided in the Crimea, to furnish every man as fast as the supplies arrived, I added that " when (in conformity with this decision) the men had received " two blankets, a sheepskin coat, a fur cap, a waterproof coat, a pair of leggings, a water- " proof hood, one-third of a buffalo robe, two Guernsey frocks, two pair of drawers, two " pair of socks, a pair of winter boots, a comforter and two pair of gloves, as well as an " extra suit of uniform, consisting of a coat, a pair of trowsers, and a pair of ammunition " boots, which was renewed when required, I thought they were not so badly off," an opinion in which I think most military men will be inclined to agree with me.

It appears to me that this part of my evidence will referring to the time when the men had received these things, tends clearly to show that according to the principle of the quartermaster-general's department in the Crimea, it was not considered that a soldier "had enough" or was complete in his warm clothing equipment, until he had received the whole of the articles I have enumerated, because it shows that the issue of extra clothing did not cease until each man was supplied according to that scale.

I certainly did not overlook the fact that these articles were (for the most part) not issued till about the middle of January, and I am unable to perceive how the impression, that I had overlooked that fact, can have been produced in the minds of the Commissioners, for I myself gave them on the 24th of May, a return showing the dates on which nearly every article of winter clothing had arrived at Balaklava, and I also informed them that they were issued as soon as praticable. The Commissioners in their report, state the end of January or the beginning of February, but it is more correct to state the middle of January.

The next paper that I will read is one that I should have read in answer to Colonel Tulloch if he had been here. The last question put by Colonel Tulloch to Colonel Wetherall was with reference to the answer that I gave about the limitation of blankets and great coats. Colonel Wetherall very naturally referred him to me for an explanation of my own evidence, and I have no doubt that Colonel Tulloch, if he were here, would put the same question to me ; therefore I wish to give an explanation just the same as if he had been present. At question 1316, page 292, the answer is this—

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Will you read the question ?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I will read it. " I will read to you a paragraph from page 163, upon " the evidence of Colonel Gordon, ' Here was no limitation in the issue of blankets and " ' great coats, except the Queen's warrant, and no instructions were received from home " ' to suspend the operation of that warrant, although Lord Raglan took upon himself to " ' do so when he thought it necessary,' if there was no limitation in the supply of great " coats, how do you account for Colonel Gordon's statement to that effect ?" The answer

*Colonel Gordon.*

14th May 1856.

was, "You had better ask him, not me." The paper that I am going to read was written without reference to that; it was written before, and I will read it as it is.

The Commissioners state, at page 27 of the report, that "one of the reasons assigned "for not issuing the regimental great coats, was that the regulations of the service, as "established by the Queen's warrant, did not authorize such issue more frequently than "once in three years. The proportion of corps in the Crimea entitled to them in terms "of that warrant was very limited, and it does not appear that any instructions "dispensing with its restrictions were received there, or that any intimation was given "of the intention with which they were sent out. Had an application been made, "however, it is not probable that the general commanding would have refused to "authorize on his own responsibility, the distribution of articles of clothing which were "likely to contribute to the health and efficiency of the troops, and if the quartermaster-"general doubted his own powers on this matter, it appears to us that he ought to have "applied for that authority."

I have searched the evidence of Sir Richard Airey, Colonel Wetherall, and myself, as well as of the regimental officers examined, for anything to justify this statement, but can find nothing at all resembling it. The Commissioners have made the statement but they do not quote their authority, as the have done in most cases.

My evidence, while it shows that as to the particular article of great coats, the issue was in fact conducted upon the principle of keeping the men always supplied with one great coat, and issuing a new one as soon as the old one was worn out, also proves distinctly that neither in this nor in any other subject connected with the issue of clothing, was there at any time any hesitation whatever in exceeding any limits imposed by the regulations, whenever it appeared advisable to do so, for the purpose of issuing articles of clothing which were at the time available, and which were considered likely to contribute to the health and efficiency of the troops.

When asked by the Commissioners, on the 24th of May (and before the time when I had any intimation of the object with which inquiries relative to the issue of stores in the quartermaster-general's department were being made by the Commissioners), when asked about blankets and great coats, I said that there had been "no limitation to their issue;" but fearing that such an expression, if standing alone, might possibly convey the idea of too great a latitude in dealing with public stores, and too little care in the their equal distribution among the troops, I referred to the "Queen's warrant" as a document by which such issues were regulated, and from which we were not expressly liberated by any instructions from home; adding, however, subsequently, most distinctly, that "Lord "Raglan took upon himself to suspend the operation of that warrant when he thought "it necessary to do so;" thus showing the perfect liberty of action with which we were enabled to deal with these stores. So that as far as we were concerned, this warrant was deprived of any restricting power it may have possessed, while it enabled us to issue, under Lord Raglan's orders, whatever we thought proper.

The Commissioners, however, appear to be unacquainted with the provisions of the warrant which they are referring to, when they speak of its "restricting the issue of great coats to once in three years," for it is well known to every officer of the army who has had any experience of these matters, that under this warrant great coats are issued to troops in the field once in every two years; and that any general officer commanding abroad has the power of issuing great coats whenever he thinks proper, provided he complies with certain regulations ordered by the Secretary at War.

When I spoke of Lord Raglan suspending the warrant, I had in view, among other things, the suspension of the returns and requisitions required by the Secretary at War under the provisions of the warrant, on every issue of great coats and haversacks, &c. Instead of the forms of requisition established by regulation, we established one of a much more simple kind, which has been found to answer very well. The former contains about 300 words, the latter only 9.

Having now, I trust, clearly shown that there was no intention of restricting the issue of great coats, or indeed of any other article, in consequence of the stipulations of any warrant or regulation, I will proceed to notice the latter part of the paragraph in question, where the Commissioners state that Lord Raglan would, probably, have authorized the distribution of clothing on his own responsibility, had application been made to him; and that if the quartermaster-general doubted his powers in this matter, he ought to have applied for that authority.

Having distinctly stated, in page 163, that Lord Raglan had, of his own authority, suspended the warrant which regulated the issues, and in page 200, in reply to a supposed apprehension of responsibility on the part of the officers of the quartermaster-general's department, having stated "that we did not shrink from that responsibility, but issued the "stores as we thought proper, without any definite instructions from home," I am at a loss to understand the object of the Commissioners in suggesting that application should have been made for authority to act precisely as I stated we did act, in all cases in which any removal of such restraint as might be contained in the regulations was considered likely to contribute to the health and efficiency of the troops.

I have now given my explanations upon the two paragraphs of the Crimean Report, of which I thought I had reason to complain; and I hope I have shown that they are not borne out by the evidence upon which they are supposed to be founded I gave that

*Colonel Gordon.*

14th May 1856.

evidence in the Crimea (which was more prolonged than that of, perhaps, any other officer of the army,) freely and without reserve, having been desired by Lord Raglan and General Airey to give the Commissioners all the information in my power. I am prepared, if necessary, to explain every part of it; but I must protest against my meaning, if not my actual words, being so altered as to convey a different sense from that which I intended.

A point upon which I think I have some reason to complain, is the fact, that after having obtained from Major Wetherall and myself, and from numerous other officers, the materials from which those portions of their report to which I have been adverting were drawn up, the Commissioners should not have put to Sir Richard Airey, the quarter-master-general, in justice to himself as well as to his subordinate officers, a single question upon the subject, either of the knapsacks or the issue of clothing, which had unquestionably formed in their minds from an early period so important a feature of the inquiry. I was shown by Sir Richard Airey the questions, 63 in number, which were sent to him as containing the points upon which the Commissioners required information; and finding that there was not one relative to the issue or non-issue of clothing or to the knapsacks, I had every right to conclude that the evidence of Major Wetherall and myself had on these subjects been deemed satisfactory.

It is gratifying to me to find that in those branches of the department which in a more especial manner were placed under my own personal charge, and concerning which it was therefore my peculiar duty to give information, the Commissioners have found it unnecessary to make any remark, from which I may presume that they were so far satisfied with the quartermaster-general's department; and as I have reason to believe that I have performed my duty to the satisfaction of those under whose immediate orders I have at different times been serving, and who have therefore had the best opportunities of judging of my qualifications for the office I held in the Crimea, as well as for that I have now the honour to hold, I trust the Board will permit me to lay before them the following papers on this subject.

The first paper contains an abstract of correspondence between the General Commanding-in-Chief and the Commander of the Forces in the Crimea, relative to my recommendation for promotion on three separate occasions; and has been kindly furnished to me by Viscount Hardinge, for the express purpose of being submitted to this Board. Perhaps the Board will allow Colonel M'Kenzie to read it.

(*Colonel M'Kenzie.*) "Abstract of private correspondence with Lord Raglan respecting "Colonel the Honourable A. Gordon, proposed to be made deputy-quartermaster-general "of the army in the Crimea, and aide-de-camp to the Queen." The first letter is from Lord Raglan to Lord Hardinge, dated December 30, 1854. "At the close of your letter "of the 11th, you say 'you have not submitted a single name to the Queen for an aide-"'de-camp,' and you are so good as to add that 'I should let you know my wishes and "'opinions, and that they shall be carried into effect.' I am much obliged to you for "this proof of confidence and kindness. The recent promotions have made most of the "regimental lieutenant-colonels colonels, and therefore there is not much choice from "them; and this induces me to take the liberty of mentioning Lieutenant-Colonel Steele "of the Coldstream Guards, my military secretary, &c. There is another officer of the "Guards, Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable A. Gordon, who is making himself very "useful at head-quarters as assistant to Major-General Airey; he is high up on the list." The next letter is of the same date, December 30, 1854, from Lord Raglan to Lord Hardinge. "I should like Colonel A. Gordon to be made deputy-quartermaster-general, "and Pakenham deputy-adjutant-general, if this could be; but they are not the senior "of the assistants in their respective departments, and I could not afford to lose their "services at head quarters."

The third letter is from Lord Raglan to Lord Hardinge, dated the 26th of May 1855, in which he says, "Colonel Gordon has conducted his laborious duties entirely to my "satisfaction, since I transferred him to the quartermaster-general's department, upon "the death of Major Wellesley in September last. I should be very glad if the services "of these officers (Colonels Gordon and Pakenham) could be noticed in the way I pro-"posed (on December 30th, 1854), and which I still recommend."

The next letter is from Lord Hardinge to Lord Raglan in reply to the foregoing of the 26th of May, dated the 7th of June 1855:—"I have received your letter of May 26th "in reference to Gordon and Pakenham being made deputy quartermaster-general and "deputy adjutant-general of your army; I quite concur with you. Shortly after the "battle of Inkermann I wrote to you requesting you to send in the names of officers "whom you wished to be laid before the Queen, to be Queen's aides-de-camp, and in "your letter of the 30th December you recommended Steele, Gordon, Percy, Herbert, "and Dacres (Royal Artillery). The second batch of regimental promotions has now "been made, and the time has come when I may be able to recommend Gordon and "Pakenham."

(*Colonel Gordon.*) The next paper is a letter from the quartermaster-general of the Army in the East, written on the day on which I left the Crimea for England, and which I value as being the spontaneous expression of the opinion of the officer under whose immediate orders I served,

(*Colonel M'Kenzie.*) "Head quarters, 3d July 1855.—My dear Gordon, I am anxious "before your departure, to express my acknowledgments and thanks to you for the

*Colonel Gordon.*

14th May 1856.

" valuable and very able assistance I have at all times and under all circumstances " received from you as a most efficient staff and departmental officer, during the whole of " the past arduous winter and trying campaign.

" In the present state of the public mind, any official testimonial from me would be " worse than useless, but I am very desirous that you individually should know how " sensibly I feel the ability and zeal with which you have at all times aided me, and how " grateful I am for your very cordial co-operation, as well as the unsparing labour at all " hours of the day and night which you have devoted to the public service.

" Wishing you very heartily a good journey, and every happiness, believe me, my dear " Gordon, very truly yours. (Signed) RICHARD AIREY."

(*Colonel Gordon.*) The next is an extract from a letter to myself from Viscount Hardinge when Master-General of the Ordnance in 1852, and which I am permitted by his Lordship to use on this occasion, relative to the exertions I had made in preparing the new musket which has since been adopted for the whole of the British army, and which I believe I may add, will shortly be introduced into some of continental armies.

(*Colonel M'Kenzie.*) These are extracts from a letter from Viscount Hardinge to Lieutenant Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon, dated " Office of Ordnance, 4th " September 1852," relative to the new musket lately introduced into the British army, " You have very clearly elucidated a very complicated subject on points where theory and " practice are not always to be reconciled. I need scarcely repeat to you that you have by " the perseverance, energy, and ability shown during your laborious investigation, done " more than any other officer in clearing up doubtful and difficult points; and we are all " prepared to admit the very great credit which is due to your gratuitous exertions. " True copy, (Signed) J. E. ADDISON, Major, acting Private Secretary to the F. M. Com- " manding-inChief."

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) As Chairman of that Committee on Small Arms, I beg to add my perfect concurrence to everything that is said there.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) The last paper is a certificate of study in the course of instruction adopted for the officers of the Royal Engineers and men of the Royal Sappers and Miners from the director-general of the establishment at Chatham.

(*Colonel M'Kenzie.*) " Portsmouth, August 26th, 1855.—I have very great satisfaction " in stating that Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon, of the Grenadier Guards, " went through a course of instruction in military fieldworks at the Royal Engineer " establishment at Chatham in the year 1848, when I was the director of that institu- " tion; and that Colonel Gordon's exertions to qualify himself to conduct such works on " actual service could not be surpassed in intelligence or zeal. He entered fully and " carefully into an examination of all the details of the practice of the officers of the corps of " Royal Engineers, and the men of the Sappers and Miners, and I consider him quite " qualified to carry on any branch of the engineer duties in the field, and more especially " in mining operations, in which he not only took a peculiar interest, but made some " useful improvements in our mining system. I should consider myself very fortunate " to have the valuable assistance of so accomplished an officer as Colonel Gordon in the " attack of a firstrate fortress, and I should have an entire reliance that any engineering " work he might undertake would be successfully performed. (Signed) FREDERICK " SMITH, Major-General, Commanding Royal Engineers, South-west and Sussex Dis- " trict."

(*Colonel Gordon.*) In conclusion, I will only express my firm conviction, that when the excitement of the present moment is passed, and men view the events of the late war with more composure, it will be found that the blame now so freely bestowed was not deserved; and that but for the energy and zeal with which every officer and every soldier performed his duty during the winter of 1854, the sufferings and distress of the army would have been far greater than they actually were. I do not propose to trouble the Board with anything further.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Sir Richard Airey.*) I believe you stated in your opening address, that there were 14 questions sent to you by Sir John M'Neill, and you subsequently referred to a series of questions put to you by the Commissioners, 63 in number; the Board wish to know whether the 14 are embodied in the 63?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you receive a series separately from Sir John M'Neill?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes, I received the 14 separately, and then he transmitted to me, or they were transmitted, the other 49 questions as Colonel Tulloch's questions.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do they appear in the Report?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) They make up the 63 that are in the Blue Book.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) There are 63 questions put to you in that Report, to which you are supposed to return answers?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Then they are comprehended in the Report?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) They are numbered from 1 to 63, or they run one after the other.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do they appear in the Report as written queries sent to you by the joint commissioners?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) They were sent at different times and severally by the Commissioners

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) Yes.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Were the functions of the Commissioners considered in the nature of a court of inquiry in the Crimea?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) No. They were considered merely as commissioners to inquire into the system of the commissariat with a view to improvements, and to find out the defects.

(*Major-General Peel.*) No warning was given to any of the officers that any answers that they might give might form the substance of a charge against them?

(*Sir Richard Airey.*) None whatever.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Colonel Gordon.*) I will call your attention to this statement in your evidence, at page 169. "Thinks it very important that the Commission "should inquire into the cause of so extraordinary a discrepancy, and that he should be "confronted with some of the witnesses, in order that they may explain more clearly "these facts which at present have only been stated by them in secret evidence." What did you refer to by the words "secret evidence"?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I referred to Colonel Tulloch's witnesses. When I was examined, there were some very large sheets of paper, with some very minute and elaborate returns, which had been obtained from different quartermasters, of which abstracts have been published in the appendix. I stated that they were quite wrong. I was aware, from entries in the books, that the returns that they had got were quite wrong. They said they had been given by the quartermasters. The officers were examined singly, so far as I know, but I never could ascertain about the examination. I was examined singly, except when Major Wetherall was there; and I believe that every other officer was examined singly. I stated that they had got wrong evidence; that the evidence that those quartermasters had given was wrong evidence, and I wished to be confronted with them to go into the question, to show that they were all mistaken.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Had you ever an opportunity of being confronted with them?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) No, they did not think it necessary. The next thing that I heard was that they had gone.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Are those returns appended to the Report?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) There are returns in the Appendix stating what the quartermasters had received from the different divisions, and I imagine that they are the same.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Are they erroneous?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes, they are; even now as they stand here they are erroneous, and they are erroneous as proved by their own returns, which they had got from the commissariat, showing what had been issued; and those representations do not agree with them.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you point out to the Commissioners in what respect they were wrong?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I pointed out certain things.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you show them by what means you knew that?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes, by our requisition books.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) With respect to the way in which they procured those returns, you referred to the mode in which the examinations were taken in the Crimea.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Was that an accident, or was it the system in which the examinations were taken, that the officers were examined privately by the two Commissioners?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) That was the system adopted; they sent for each officer and put questions to him.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you mean by saying that the examination was conducted singly, that no one else was present besides the two Commissioners and the witness under examination?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I think not.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Was not there a secretary or clerk?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I never saw him; he never was there when I was examined.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) How was the evidence of the witness taken down?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) By Colonel Tulloch; Sir John M'Neill acted as president, and directed what was done, and took the lead entirely. Colonel Tulloch acted as secretary, and wrote down what Sir John M'Neill desired him, and Sir John M'Neill corrected him, and desired him to strike out things that he thought unnecessary.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) That was the case with your own evidence?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes, during the four days that I was under examination.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Did not a discrepancy between the quartermaster, and the storekeeper frequently exist between the actual issues and the approved requisitions.?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) That was the cause of discrepancy. I saw that the Commissioners had in their possession returns which they relied upon as to the amount of things given to the regiments. I saw that that was not the amount which had been given to the regiments, and therefore I begged to be allowed to go into it with the quartermasters. In some cases they had received more, and in others less; in fact, they were altogether

14th May 1856.

erroneous. I think by that time Colonel Wetherall was gone, or it would have been his duty to have done it. He had taken his leave of the Commissioners, at any rate, and therefore I wished to do that to prevent their going away with a wrong impression.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Was not that the reason why they corrected Colonel Wetherall's evidence, that you had stated that some of the returns were totally at variance with the entries in your office?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I cannot tell what induced him to alter his evidence; they did not alter it, they omitted it. They have altered my evidence, and they have omitted Colonel Wetherall's. I do not think that they have altered any of his evidence.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Colonel Tulloch has stated that you said the returns were at variance with the entries in your office?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) He stated that he had omitted that part of Colonel Wetherall's evidence because it did not agree with the returns which he received from the commissariat.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) He proceeded upon your opinion, did he not?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I do not know how that was. My opinion referred to those returns from the quartermasters of the regiments. It had nothing to do with Colonel Wetherall's evidence, and as their wrong returns affected our department, I thought it but fair that we should have an opportunity of going into them and seeing with the quartermasters how they stood.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You say that those returns of the Commissioners are incorrect; have you correct returns that show the difference?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I do not know that they exist.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Have you the requisitions?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) A return might be made out from those, showing whether the Commissioners Returns are in error?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Colonel Wetherall has shown that with regard to the papers conclusively in the paragraph that was omitted from his evidence. As to the other things, we can prepare a Return. They state at page 32 that it is upon the quartermaster-general's returns that they have acted, and not upon the quartermaster's returns. I do not attach any importance to that evidence that I gave now that I see the result, but I was referring then to elaborate returns of which I had only a partial inspection, and that showed me that they were incorrect, and therefore I wished to put upon record that they must not rely on those returns. I do not see what would be gained by going into that now, we know that more things were given than the men could draw.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Will you refer to the return at page 116 upon that; where would the Sappers and Miners appear in that?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) The Sappers and Miners and Royal Artillery did not appear at all; the whole of the clothing issued to them had been omitted, apparently by the Commissioners. Though we issued very largely to them, they had not taken those issues into account, they had merely taken the divisions of infantry and the cavalry. Then the commissariat drew upon our stores very largely, upon their own authority, without any reference to the department, which was also a mode of getting rid of the supplies.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Therefore the returns of the amount of things actually issued must be very erroneous indeed, if they do not include the issues to the Sappers and Miners and Artillery.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes; and seeing that they were erroneous, made me put that upon record that they might not be misled by it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) You do not call any evidence?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) No, I do not wish to call any witness. With regard to the knapsacks, I do not wish to go further into that. None of the generals of division have ever intimated to me that they were the least dissatisfied with the evidence that I gave. I do not wish to put myself in opposition with regard to any of them. I regard them with very great respect.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Assistant Commissary-General Crookshank.*) I believe Commissary-General Filder fully understands that the Board will enter upon his case to-morrow at 11?

(*Assistant Commissary-General Crookshank.*) Yes; he will be perfectly prepared.

(*President.*) Will he call witnesses the first day?

(*Assistant Commissary-General Crookshank.*) I am not aware that he proposes to call any witnesses at all.

Adjourned to to-morrow, at Eleven o'clock.

## TWENTY-FIRST DAY.

### 15th May 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

(*Judge Advocate General, to Colonel Gordon.*) I believe you had forgotten the fact when you stated yesterday that no letter had been omitted. At page 351 of the proceedings yesterday you were asked whether you had made a suggestion with regard to some letters being appended to the evidence, having reference to Colonel Wetherall's evidence. Will you be so good as to look at this; this is the proof sheet of Colonel Wetherall's evidence. Is that your handwriting at the back? And is that your note at the bottom. 15th May 1856.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes; with the appendices.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Are you aware whether that was printed?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes; I can explain that. The appendix which is missing there was printed on the first sheet of General Airey's evidence, and it was not sent to me till afterwards. I missed it in that, and asked for it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) It is the suggestion that you made on Colonel Wetherall's evidence. On returning the proof sheet of Colonel Wetherall's evidence you made the suggestion which appears in this note?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Upon that suggestion something was added to the Appendix?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes; but I should like to know what the object of this is.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) This refers to the answer that you gave yesterday, in which you stated that no letter had been omitted that you knew of.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I meant that no letter had been omitted in the Blue Book as it is printed. I understood that you were asking me whether any letter has been omitted in that Blue Book, and I stated that none had been omitted.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) It had reference to the evidence of Colonel Wetherall's, which you had revised.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) No allusion was made to this paper at all.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Yes; I will read you the evidence:—"You are aware that "Colonel Tulloch stated that you revised the proof sheets of Colonel Wetherall's evidence? "—(*Colonel Gordon.*) In print?—(*Judge Advocate General.*) I presume so.—(*Colonel "Gordon.*) He stated that I revised the evidence of Colonel Wetherall. I do not know "whether he meant when it was printed, or in manuscript. I revised the manuscript "evidence of Colonel Wetherall, and it is here: it is quite correct, and is printed correctly, "with the exception of the last paragraph, which is struck out. There are no alterations "here, excepting the appendices.—(*Judge Advocate General.*) You suggested, did you not, "that he should append two letters that had been omitted?—(*Colonel Gordon.*) Not two "letters. I do not think so. No; no letter had been omitted that I know of."

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) "But I think he stated that you suggested to him when "you sent back those revised sheets to make some correction?—(*Colonel Gordon.*) "There was a memorandum of my own that was omitted to be put in, but there was "nothing else."

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) With reference to this evidence, your attention is called to the revised sheet of Colonel Wetherall's evidence, in which you suggested the letter to be appended?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) They sent to me this evidence in pieces, and in looking it over I found that a very important document was missing, and I made this note calling their attention to that appendix about the mistakes in the Commissariat returns. I pointed out that it was omitted, and I begged that it might be included, and Colonel Tulloch or somebody, when they sent General Airey's evidence, said, "There it is, on the next sheet." When you asked me the questions, I was under the impression that you were alluding to omitted letters in the Blue Book, as it was laid before Parliament, no reference was made to this paper.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) This is the paper that the question had reference to, namely, the revised proof sheet of Colonel Wetherall's evidence.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) But it had not been laid before the Board, and therefore I had not the slightest knowledge of it.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) But all the previous examination has reference to Colonel Wetherall's evidence not having been signed or seen by him. Colonel Tulloch's reply was, that he had sent it to you, and that you sent it back without saying that Colonel Wetherall had not seen it, and with your own corrections.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) That is a revision of the appendices, not of the evidence. I do not think that you will find a single mark upon the evidence; it was merely the appendices.

15th May 1856.

Colonel Wetherall left the Crimea before they were attached, and therefore he could not do it; I had to do it. One of the appendices was missing when it was in print, therefore I begged that it might be inserted. You will find, I think, that there is no correction in the evidence.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) There is not.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I think I had not the manuscript to correct it by; I cannot state that positively. We do not find any fault with Colonel Wetherall's evidence as it is printed, for it is correct; but we say that there is an omission of certain portions, and as to what was omitted, we could not tell the reasons of the Commissioners for omitting it. It was a private memorandum, Colonel Tulloch said, for the Commissioners, which was not intended to be printed

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Commissary-General Filder.*) I believe you intend to bring before the Board a statement purporting to be made by Sir Charles Trevelyan in explanation of the arrangements made by the Treasury in reference to the supply of forage?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I mean incidentally to allude to it in my explanations about the forage.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You have had no communication with Sir Charles Trevelyan as to his being present?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) I informed Sir Charles Trevelyan that his statement would be laid before the Board, and that Commissary-General Filder would probably comment upon it, and that every facility would be afforded him to take any part in the proceedings that he thought proper; and this morning I received a letter, stating—"As "I have no reason to complain of any part of the Report of the Commissioners, and as a "full explanation has been furnished of the proceedings of the Treasury in reference to "the supply of forage which had been commented upon in a previous statement by "Mr. Filder, I do not consider it necessary to avail myself of the permission which has "been kindly given by the Board of General Officers to appear before them to-day.—I "have, &c. C. E. Trevelyan."

(*President, to Commissary-General Filder.*) The Board is ready now to hear what you have to state.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) The letter which I addressed to the Secretary for War, in reply to the Report of the Commissioners, and which was laid before Parliament, has, I am informed, been communicated to the Board; I am prepared to prove what I have there stated, and am desirous also of making some addition to that reply, and to put in some documentary evidence in support of it.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) The Board would like, before you proceed, to know what it is precisely that you complain of in this Report of the Commissioners, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, and what it is that you are going specifically to draw their attention to.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) That there are misrepresentations in the Report.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You consider that so far as your department is concerned there are misrepresentations; can you point to those passages in the Report?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes; I am prepared to do so.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Can you refer now to the particular passages before you begin your address?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Those particular passages are stated in the reply that was laid before Parliament. I have some additions to make to that reply in the shape of documentary evidence, which I have had from the Crimea since it was written.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Have you made extracts from the report here?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes, I have.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Are you going to read those extracts again?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I will refer generally to them. I have brought the matter, for the sake of convenience, into one consecutive view.

(*Judge-Advocate General.*) But those are the passages of which you complain?

*Commissary-General Filder.*

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes, those are the passages of which I chiefly complain. Having in that letter answered the allegations of the Commissioners in the scattered form in which they are presented in the Report, my reply as there given does not convey in a clear and consecutive view the facts and the deductions to be drawn from them. The difficulty of dealing satisfactorily with the case in that manner was augmented by the circumstance that not from any one passage or any number of detached passages in the report, the exact charges made or intended to be made can be gathered, the effect being produced rather by the tone and tenor of the whole than by any particular expressions which it would be possible to point out. Direct imputations, however, of the most criminatory nature are not wanting, as where, at page 13 of the Report, I am charged with having supplied the troops with expensive and unhealthy food, instead of the cheaper and more nutritious, which, as they allege, might have been obtained, merely in order to spare myself and my department (in the words of the Report) "the extra trouble, complication of accounts, "and personal exertion," which the latter course would have entailed upon me. But independently of distinct accusations such as this, the general style and character of

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

the Report is throughout a censure upon the commissariat department, and more particularly upon me as its head, for mismanagement and improvidence, for want of energy to repair disasters, and indifference to the best interests of the service and the welfare of the troops. It is, therefore, necessary that I should address myself to this general tone and spirit of the whole, as well as to the more precise charges, and show that it was not justified by the actual facts; and I feel gratified in reflecting that I now submit my explanations before a Board of General Officers whose experience makes them competent judges of the difficulties I had to contend with in supplying a large army whose basis of operations was suddenly changed, by which all previous arrangements were subverted, and the troops were removed to a country furnishing nothing for their subsistence, supplies of every description having to be conveyed by sea at an unfavourable season of the year. The Board will be competent judges also of the difficulties I had to contend with in the insufficiency of the establishments with which I had to carry on most extensive and onerous duties, and the impossibility of foreseeing the misfortunes that from a combination of causes befel the army.

If all these circumstances be taken into consideration it will not be found surprising that arrangements, which were, I believe, the best that could have been made, as far as the then existing circumstances could guide my judgment, should not have fully answered their purpose, and that in whatever respect the result fell short of that success which I had hoped had been insured, it was to be attributed to causes which could not have been foreseen, and the effect of which (when they had once happened) it was not in human power to do more than mitigate, even by the most strenuous exertions. But of these qualifying circumstances, however, the Commissioners have taken no account; their report is essentially fault finding. It was indeed almost a necessity of their position that it should be so. I say it with all possible respect, but the truth is that their business and function was to fix blame somewhere. Being sent to inquire into the causes of acknowledged disasters, they set out upon their mission with a foregone conclusion that there was fault and negligence somewhere, and might well think that they would have failed in the object of that mission if they had not traced and laid it to the door of some one or more individuals. Accordingly they begin at the hospitals in Constantinople, and make their inquiries there as to the causes of the sickness and suffering of the troops. They amass a large quantity of evidence at Balaklava (not all strictly to be relied upon) as to the extent to which these causes operated, and thence they arrive at once at the conclusion that the blame of all this rests on the commissariat department or the commissary-general. No inquiries were made of myself on either of the two examinations I attended, or of my officers when examined, which could have shown us where the Commissioners thought there had been neglect or omission, or have given us the opportunity of clearing up any misapprehension which might exist in their minds; and I have now to meet their allegations when I am far removed from the official records of my proceedings, as well as from officers whose more immediate acquaintance with facts and details would materially assist me in explaining and justifying them.

A report so prepared is in truth a mere statement of what was not done, and not a careful and dispassionate investigation of the causes and circumstances to which the shortcomings might be justly and fairly attributed. Moreover, I hope to satisfy the Board, that even as a statement of facts, it is a misrepresentation in many parts and exaggeration in others. But in order that they may be in a position to form a better judgment upon the whole case, I trust the Board will permit me to make a few preliminary remarks on the nature of the duties the commissariat had to perform with the Army in the East during the time of my charge, and the means I had of carrying them out.

The commissariat has the duty by the regulations of the service of raising, of holding, and of paying the funds necessary to meet the whole of the army expenditure, and of making all purchases required for the service of its own or any other department. It is responsible for keeping up the supplies of provisions, forage, fuel, and light, according to the regulated scales of allowance, with such additions as may be specially authorized by the commander of the forces; but the commissary-general has no authority to alter, nor has he, except so far as his opinion may be asked or deferred to, any influence in altering the established ration or other allowances in the most minute particular. With respect to supplies of any other kind, such as quartermaster-general's and hospital stores, the commissariat during the time I was in charge of it only held them on behalf of the departments at whose respective disposal they were, and issued them on their requisitions. Stores of this description, with the Army in the East, have recently been given over to storekeepers of the ordnance department; but it was and is still the duty of the commissariat, in case of any deficiency in the supply sent out from England, or of any emergency rendering necessary articles of a description not ordinarily in use, to purchase them on the authorized requisition of the proper departments, the heads of those departments being responsible for the extent and nature of their demands. The commissariat had likewise, until it was transferred to a separate and independent establishment, the duty of providing all the land transport required for the service of the army. That these duties were heavier than the commissariat could reasonably be expected to discharge, embracing as they do the whole civil administra-

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

tion of the army, excepting the hospitals, seems to be acknowledged by their having been since divided amongst three separate departments; but for their performance I had from the first an insufficient establishment, both of officers and subordinate employés, which was still further weakened by the great amount of sickness and mortality which prevailed, owing to the nature and excessive labour of the duties to be performed. No one of the subordinate establishments, absolutely necessary to the efficiency of a field commissariat, existed at the outbreak of the war; and even the officers had to be collected from the most distant parts of the empire, from Sierra Leone, the Cape of Good Hope, and New South Wales, and of course by slow degrees. In the meantime, I had to carry on the duties with the temporary assistance of gentlemen furnished from other public departments, and wholly without experience in commissariat service. This inefficient state of the department when I took charge of it, necessarily diverted much of my attention from the more important general arrangement of the service to the regulation of details; but I notice it less for the purpose of accounting for my own possible errors and omissions, than with the object of meeting the comparison which has been frequently made elsewhere, and is partially made use of in this Report, between the success of the French and British commissariat operations. That the success has been uniformly on the side of the former is far from being established, but that generally it ought to be so is quite clear, inasmuch as there is the greatest possible advantage on that side, in the completeness of the establishments on which so much of commissariat success depends. These are not, as with us, discarded at the termination of a period of active warfare, and wholly neglected during the continuance of peace, but are constantly kept up in an effective, even if a reduced state, and are considered as necessary an accompaniment of every body of detached troops as any other portion of the army, and thus give a facility of action to a French force at the outset, which can be acquired by an English army only after long, and perhaps disastrous, as well as costly experience.

Another and very serious impediment to the prospective arrangements necessary for the supply of the troops was the uncertainty of the intended or even probable position of the army during the winter after its landing in the Crimea. The supply of a large force in that season requires, in almost any country subject to great alterations of climate, timely and extensive previous arrangements, but in a situation like that of the besieging force before Sebastopol it demanded attention as early even as when the army first landed. I had, indeed, before that expedition was known to be projected, and when it was generally supposed that the troops would be put into cantonments near Constantinople, applied to Lord Raglan for instructions to guide my preparations. I repeated my application when the expedition was on its way, and renewed it in the early part of October, but it was not till the 12th of that month that his Lordship was able to give me any orders whatever on the subject. They then went no further than directions to lay in a stock of fuel at Scutari. The papers are in the appendix, marked A, B, and C; and it was only on the 8th of November, when winter had already commenced, that I learnt that the army would remain in the Crimea, and received orders to make provision accordingly. Yet the Commissioners, though apparently aware of these facts, represent as a defect of intelligence and foresight on my part that I did not, of my own authority and on my own responsibility, take measures for which the officer in chief command withheld his sanction; and they assume, contrary to the fact, that through adherence to established but inapplicable usages I omitted to avail myself of the resources within my reach, by which the extraordinary and unforeseen exigencies of the service might have been met.

During the time that the army was stationed in Bulgaria it was entirely supplied from the resources of the country, without any aid from England, and no fault has ever been found with the arrangements then made, excepting the allegations brought forward by Lord Lucan with respect to forage, which, I trust, I have already satisfactorily answered. Fresh meat was supplied in abundance. A large quantity of pack animals and waggons of the country had been provided for land transport, the only description of transport that could by any exertions have been collected in time to undertake operations during the year 1854. The further accumulation of the means of transport was stopped by the change that was made in the scene of operations. I trust the Board will admit that the army could not have been well supplied in a country of which the resources were unknown, if there had been a want of energy or forethought on my part. I will lay before the Board the copy of a correspondence which will show the measures I took for procuring supplies and transport in Bulgaria. The sudden change of the scene of operations when the expedition to the Crimea was resolved on, compelled me to start afresh with arrangements adapted to the new course of operations, and little benefit was derived from preparations made or stores accumulated for a different object; yet to the duties thus thrown upon it, the commissariat showed itself fully equal, and until the 14th November 1854, there had not been on a single occasion any omission to supply the army with all that it required, excepting as regards forage, which, as in the former case, I hope I have satisfactorily explained in my answer to Lord Lucan's allegations. Up to this period fresh meat was obtained, partly from the Crimea, and, partly by importation, in such quantity that it was supplied to the troops three times a week. All supplies were conveyed to the different corps in camp by the commissariat transport, and there distributed. For this purpose I had provided

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

226 mules and carts complete, and 226 pack animals, and about 200 wagons; a transport amply sufficient for all the purposes of the commissariat, including the transport of forage, whilst the army was so stationed. That was before the issues of fuel had commenced.

The first disaster was that of the great storm of 14th November 1854, when four-fifths of the pressed hay on board the transports at Balaklava were lost. This was immediately followed by the entire break up of the weather, and by our finding ourselves (in consequence of the extreme severity of the season,) in a position of great difficulty. On the one hand, sea carriage was subject to many and serious interruptions from storms and the inclemency of the weather, and sailing vessels were, for the most part, wholly useless, often occupying three weeks in the voyage from the main land; on the other hand, the sole road from Balaklava to the camp was through a morass of the most hopeless description, where the pack animals had to struggle when laden from one deep hole into another as bad, until completely worn out, they died, or were rendered wholly inefficient. The peculiar position of Balaklava must always be borne in mind; it is the key to and explanation of all the misfortunes and embarrassments that occurred. I never was blind to the difficulties that it involved me in, and constantly and steadily applied myself to overcome them. One might suppose from the accusations made against me that I had quietly resigned myself to apathy, as if it had been hopeless to escape from them. I hope to show that, so far from this being the case, I procured and made use of every ship that I could obtain, and made strenuous exertions myself, and continual and earnest applications to the other departments, whose co-operation was needed for the purpose, to keep up the land transport in an efficient state. In one respect I own that I had not fully realized the obstacles I should have to contend with. I had not foreseen, and no one could have imagined, the condition of the country between Balaklava and the camp during the winter. The transport of the French army did not suffer from this cause. The road from their camp to Kamiesch lay over downs the whole of the way till it abruptly terminated close to the bay; when one track became impassable another was used. But for the description of the country which we had to traverse, I can only repeat my former expression, it was simply a morass. The Commissioners allow, at page 18 of their Report, that the want of a road increased the difficulty of supplying the army after the middle of November. But the consequences of the want of a road are very inadequately described, when all that is said is that it increased the difficulty of supplying the army. It was the true cause of the difficulty which would otherwise scarcely ever have been felt, and operated in several different ways. First, it at once reduced to one-third of its previous power all that portion of the transport which consisted of wheel carriages, for the carriages being useless the animals could only be used as beasts of burden; and it is well known that a horse or mule can only carry one-third of the weight which it can draw. In the second place, it considerably diminished the load which even pack animals could carry under ordinary circumstances; moreover, it rendered the progress of pack animals, even with such diminished loads so slow, that the time occupied in each journey was nearly doubled; and lastly, the exceeding and unremitting toil of carrying heavy burdens across such a country as I have described wore out the animals employed so rapidly, that they could not be replaced as fast as they were destroyed, but became daily fewer in number in proportion as the need of their labour increased.

As an example, permit me to show how it operated with regard to a matter which has been made the subject of most serious charges against me, charges which had been made and repeated with extravagant exaggeration long before the inquiry of the Commissioners commenced. I mean the alleged deficiency in the supply of rations to the troops during the month of December and the greater part of January. I allude to provisions chiefly.

The Commissioners have admitted that the deficiencies in the rations were, except in the case of the fourth and light divisions, merely "fractional," meaning, as I presume, slight and altogether exceptional. Even in the case of the light division, the deficiencies were rather apparent than real, since they were, with the exception of some few that occurred in the first days of December, made good from the quantities brought up by the men from the commissariat depôt at Balaklava, and placed in regimental stores. This is stated as regards most of the regiments of the division, in the answers printed at pages 212 and 213 of the evidence. The returns on which so much reliance has been placed take no notice of the supplies obtained in this way, but show the deficiencies of rations on the issues from the commissariat stores in camp, without allowing for the rations brought up from Balaklava by the men themselves. The returns sent in by commanding officers of the regiments composing the light division to the adjutant-general were made up on the same plan, so that they only mislead as to the extent of the deficiencies actually experienced by the men, and the system was consequently condemned by Lord Raglan.

The fourth division, no doubt, experienced the deficiencies stated in the returns, but it is not pretended that the supplies required did not exist. It is allowed on all hands that it was simply a question of transport. And the fact is, that the number of animals that were lost on one single occasion by the military escort furnished by that division, would have been sufficient to bring up from Balaklava all the deficient quantities. That is stated at page 423 of the Third Report of the Sebastopol Committee; it is in the note, the fourth paragraph.

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Is that evidence?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes, it is stated in a note in the appendix. For the rapid destruction of the transport animals the commissariat were not to blame. I have never asserted, as has been supposed, that it was in any way attributable to want of forage. What I did say, and still maintain is, that they died from exposure and overwork. The real question is, whether we could have replaced the animals as fast as they were destroyed or rendered useless, and could have procured forage during the winter for additional transport if imported.

And this brings me to the other branch of the question, that of sea carriage. It, in fact, came to this question: Had I the means of procuring by sea a sufficient quantity of transport animals, and also a sufficient quantity of forage to feed them when there? for after about the 20th of October all the forage had to be brought by sea, and to the question of the supply of this, the most bulky of all articles which had to be provided, I shall presently address myself. In the meantime let me show how other matters of very great importance which have been made the subject of charges against me really do come back to the same question of carriage by sea. And first, I will take the question of a more frequent issue of fresh meat to the troops. Of the importance of fresh meat I was at all times fully aware, and exerted myself to the utmost to obtain it, irrespective of any question of expense.

During the time the army was in Bulgaria I made arrangements, as will be seen by reference to the evidence given by me before the Commissioners (page 63 of Report), for the supply of live cattle, and during all that time there was a regular and constant supply. In like manner during the first month or six weeks that we were in the Crimea I obtained an abundance of fresh meat, but the supplies of the country itself for this purpose being by that time exhausted, we became dependent on cattle imported by sea. For the purpose of obtaining them in this manner, I employed all the suitable vessels I could procure; and, as will be seen by the letter which I hand in, I pressed on Lord Raglan the importance of letting me have every vessel of that description that could be spared. Sailing vessels, however, I consider essentially unsuitable during winter to such a purpose; the casualties to the cattle so carried are enormous. Of all the cattle which were forwarded in sailing transports from Varna at the end of October and beginning of November, more than one-third were lost. Nor could sailing horse transports, as suggested by the Commissioners, have been obtained. On referring to the return signed by the principal agent of transports, at pages 453 and 454 of the Third Report of the Sebastopol Committee, showing the appropriation of every steam and sailing transport with the army in the East, it will be seen that at the period mentioned all the sailing transports, with the exception of a few which were retained at Balaklava as store ships, or for other special purposes, or were discharging cargo there, were employed under the orders of Admiral Boxer at Constantinople; and the evidence, at pages 239 to 242 of that Report, abundantly proves that the commissariat officer at that place employed all the transports he could possibly obtain from Admiral Boxer, in forwarding supplies of forage and fuel to the Crimea, and that he could not obtain enough for those purposes.

In confirmation of this statement, I beg to hand in copies and extracts of letters from Mr. Smith, the deputy commissary-general at Constantinople. The first is an extract from a letter, dated Constantinople, 23rd November 1854: "Admiral Boxer has not "received instructions to place steam transport at my disposal. He says he has none "available, and that he cannot give me any more sailing transports for hay and straw." Then again, on the 25th November, he writes, "It is most difficult to get any vessels to "go to the Crimea, owing to the recent disasters. I have had to pay an immense sum for "a small vessel to take up barley." This was written immediately after Lord Raglan had sent orders that Admiral Boxer was to give every possible means of conveyance to the commissariat officers at Constantinople.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Is that letter addressed to you?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) All these are addressed to me, from the commissariat officer at Constantinople. On the 25th of November he says, "It is most difficult to "get any vessels to go to the Crimea, owing to the recent disasters; I have had to "pay an immense sum for a small vessel to take up barley. There were three "cargoes of barley on board; the captains said they would go at the usual rate, but they "now refuse altogether, which has embarrassed us a good deal." On the 12th of December he writes, "The master of the 'Palmerston' has thrown every impediment "in the way of loading his ship. I have reported him several times, both verbally "and in writing, to Admiral Boxer, but without effect; he ought to have been "away a fortnight ago at least; the trouble he has given us and the contractors is "incalculable." On the 14th of December he writes from Constantinople, "If some "change be not effected in the naval administration here, the army will be reduced to "a state of starvation. I can do nothing with Admiral Boxer, who seems to be per-"fectly reckless and desperate." What I am now reading has been published before, otherwise I should not have read it. "I can do nothing with Admiral Boxer, who seems "to be perfectly reckless and desperate: he has just sent me notice, one hour before the "time of starting, that the steamer 'Snake,' will tow up a barley vessel; and moreover "requires me to bring this vessel alongside the 'Snake,' which I have not the means of "doing. This is perfect mockery and subterfuge; our tug steamer having burst her

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

" boiler on the 2nd instant, has been inoperative ever since, much to our hindrance. I " shall, of course, make a proper deduction for this loss." Then on the 17th of December he writes, " The 'Tonning' is still here: she has been detained since the 15th solely for " want of water, which it rests with Admiral Boxer to supply. The most urgent applica- " tions have been ineffectual; I told the master to purchase immediately, let the cost be " what it may, and I would pay for it; but he says that it must be put into tanks, he " could not do without the engine-boat, which has been otherwise engaged by the " admiral. The 'Arabia' was ready yesterday with a very large quantity of charcoal, " timber, &c. on board. I went off yesterday to see if she could not start with a fine " fair wind, but the answer was, 'we have no water.' Lord Arthur Hay was with me. " I went again this morning, and the captain promised to get under weigh with only the " small supply of water to be had on board. An admiralty tug was sent off to assist, " but to my infinite disgust, the vessel is still in her berth, and the wind, which continued " blowing fair all day, has now entirely ceased. If any difficulty as to foul anchors or " anything else of the kind existed, it might have been removed in a few minutes by " getting three or four hundred men from two of Her Majesty's frigates which are lying " almost within hail. To see the public service frustrated in this manner makes my " blood boil so, that I dare not give utterance to my feelings. I sincerely hope you will " mention these matters to Lord Raglan." On the 20th of December he says, "I " anticipate much difficulty with regard to firewood, as there is a reluctance on the " part of the native vessels to proceed to the Crimea at this season of the year." On the 21st of December he writes, "Mr. Guarracino thinks he can supply firewood and " charcoal from a very safe place named Fatyah, near Samsoon, on very reasonable terms, " provided vessels be sent for the cargoes. It is quite useless to look for native vessels at " this season of the year. Mr. Guarracino will report first both to yourself and to me on " the subject." Then on the 28th of December he writes, " The means of transport will " constitute the chief difficulty in keeping you supplied with forage." On the 9th of January 1855, he writes, "The 'Brandon' starts to-day with some of Falanga's hay " which has been pressed by our presses; her accommodation has been hampered " by a lot of orderlies and others put on board by Admiral Boxer, otherwise she " would have taken up a 1,000 instead of about 600 bales. I am loading the 'Eveline' " with hay and oats, and she will be ready in a few days. All the hay which " Whittal and Watson can supply goes by this vessel, they have been disappointed " like ourselves in getting the quantity promised. The 'Timandra' is taking in " hay at Buyuk Tekmidger; I am to have the 'Belgravia' for more hay and straw, " as the sick are landed from her. Admiral Boxer says this is the last vessel he can " give me. The want of suitable transport is the great difficulty to be contended with. " The hire of vessels to convey straw in bulk is something enormous, but I will do it, " nevertheless the expense. We cannot possibly keep up the supplies of hay, the whole " of which will soon be exhausted." Then he writes on the 4th of January, " I will " send the steamer 'Brandon' for some of Falanga's hay, which Mr. Downes has got " pressed to the extent of about 1,200 bales. The 'Eveline' has commenced loading with " forage from some transports, but I am sadly in want of ships. The 'War Cloud' " and 'Escort' were promised, like a great many other things, without effect." I quote these letters to show the incessant difficulties with respect to ships. I have shown that I could not get any regular transports from Admiral Boxer; nor, as appears from the same correspondence, at this period, so recently after the disaster at Balaklava, was it possible to induce the owners of private ships to take freight for the Crimea, where they might be forced to anchor off a dangerous coast. But apart from these facts, I still entertain the opinion already expressed by me, that even had they been available, the employment of sailing vessels in the conveyance of cattle in winter would have led to a deficiency in the sources of supply. The communications made by me to the War Department before I had any knowledge of this Report of the Commissioners, will show that I was of opinion that we could not rely on replenishing the depôts on the coast by supplies of cattle from the interior after the middle of December, nor would it have been prudent in such circumstances to rely on contractors who might undertake to do so. In proof of my having grounds for this opinion, I beg to be permitted to read and deliver in the copy of a letter from the commissariat officer at Constantinople, reporting that parties whose tender for supplying cattle in winter had been accepted, had notified their inability to fulfil their engagement, and their consequent willingness to pay the penalty of 1,000*l.* incurred by such default.

This is a letter from the commissariat officer at Constantinople to me, dated the 13th of February 1855:—" Sir, I have the honour to submit the accompanying copy of a " letter from the firm of Samandgé and Falanga, stating their inability to fulfil the tender " made to yourself by Mr. Falanga, on the 14th January, for supplying a certain number " of cattle, but offering to furnish in lieu an equivalent number of sheep at the rate of 5*l.* " per 100 okes of meat; if this offer is declined, they express their readiness to pay the " stipulated penalty of 1,000*l.*" My answer to that is, " It would require 60 steamers to " convey the number of sheep proposed to be given in lieu of the 6,000 head of cattle. " I should not be able to appropriate such a number of vessels to their conveyance. I " cannot, therefore, accept this offer in lieu of the stipulated penalty of 1,000*l.*" This is a letter from the contractor to the commissariat officer at Constantinople, dated 13th Fe-

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

bruary 1855, in which he states, "We beg leave most respectfully to inform you that it is "quite out of our power to fulfil the conditions of the contract entered into by our "Mr. Falanga, dated Balaklava, 14th January 1855, for the supply of 6,700 head of "cattle, for reasons which we will now submit to your consideration. We are fully con- "vinced that Mr. Falanga has been induced to enter into the said contract under the "impression that the state of our cattle market was the same as when he left "this city, at which time the supply was abundant; but at the present moment, "owing to the very severe and unfavourable weather, the mortality among oxen has "been unusually great, which, added to the extraordinary demand, has caused "such a scarcity of the same, that it would be totally impossible to find, in the "neighbourhood of Constantinople, by the time fixed in Mr. Falanga's contract, the "number stated therein. Being desirous to fulfil, as far as circumstances will allow, "whatever engagements we have entered into, we propose by the present, to offer as a "substitute for the oxen (which is out of our power to supply) an equivalent number of "sheep, reckoning ten sheep to one ox; and we will engage to deliver the same at such a "place in the neighbourhood of this city as may be required, within two months from the "date of this contract, at the rate of 5*l.* sterling for ten sheep; the weight of each ten "sheep to be fixed at 100 okes; the excess to be, as usual, in favour of the commissariat. "Should the total stipulated number of sheep not be accepted by the commissariat within "two months from the date of the contract, or by such a date as may be fixed therein, "the sum of 1*s.* sterling per day for every ten sheep to be paid for their keep, and after "the stipulated term all losses by death to be for the account of the Government. We "beg leave most respectfully to observe, that as we are very anxious to liquidate the "engagements we have entered into for the supply of cattle to the British Army, we "shall feel greatly obliged if you will cause our claims on the British commissariat on "the said contracts to be finally settled; and we likewise beg to observe, that without "such a settlement it will be quite out of our power to enter into any new contracts, "and that it must be on such conditions only that we engage ourselves to undertake the "above-mentioned supplies. Should the above proposal not meet the approbation of the "commissariat, we are ready to forfeit the penalty of 1,000*l.*, for which Mr. Falanga has "rendered us liable, for the non-fulfilment of the contract of the 14th of January ult., "made by him."

The following extract of a report from the commissariat officer at Sinope, dated in February 1855, serves further to confirm my view of the case:—"These supplies (that "is of cattle,) are drawn at some distance inland, and on each side of the coast from "Sinope. Arriving from any direction the communication is very bad, they must cross "high mountain ranges at present covered with snow, and there are no roads and also no "bridges over the rivers. From these causes generally the finest animals perish from "their heavier carcases." The explanation of a smaller quantity of fresh meat having been issued to the troops in December than in other months, is this, that two of our most efficient cattle vessels were then under repair and useless, and that the commissariat officer at Eupatoria had sent back empty two transports despatched to that place for a supply of cattle, he having given over the cattle he had in charge to the French and Turkish troops, who had arrived there without any supplies of fresh meat or the means of providing any. However much this was to be regretted, the officer to whom it is attributable acted no doubt under the impression that he ought to assist our allies when in want, and was not perhaps aware of the injurious consequences of his act to our own army.

The suggestion made by the Commissioners, that supplies of cattle might have been procured either from Samsoun or Sinope, shows how superficially they had considered the question of supply. The fact being that the experiment had been tried, and that experience had shown that these districts were not the most suitable, notwithstanding their vicinity, for furnishing the required supply.

In the month of January, on the suggestion of Sir Edmund Lyons, I stationed the officer, from whose letter I have previously quoted, at Sinope, and in February the first consignments were received from that place; but although the cattle vessels which had been under repair in December had returned to the service of the commissariat, the quantity of fresh meat issued during that month was less than at any other period except December, when the diminution was owing to the causes I have already stated. The animals of that district are, in fact, so miserably poor and small, that they are correctly described by Admiral Dundas in his evidence before the Sebastopol Committee as being little better than carrion; and the number of the cattle of that country which a vessel could bring at one time would afford only about 45,000 rations of meat, whilst a cargo of the larger cattle from the north coast of the Black Sea would give 75,000 or 80,000 rations, if from Roumelia or Bulgaria, and 100,000 if from Moldavia or Wallachia, so that the greater distance was more than compensated by the greater quantity of meat conveyed by a vessel. The larger number of the smaller animals which a vessel can carry not making up for their inferior size and weight.

The Commissioners suggest that if there was difficulty in bringing the additional cattle alive they might have been slaughtered, and at that season of the year the meat might have been carried without much loss. If the Commissioners had made the inquiries which it was possible for them to make, they must have learnt that slaughtered meat was sent by the cattle steamers during the winter in addition to cargoes of live cattle,

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

notwithstanding that the plan, in a climate where the variations of temperature are so extreme, was attended with much loss. The Commissioners cannot, I presume, mean that slaughtered meat should have been forwarded in sailing transports as vessels of that class were often in winter nearly a month in performing the voyage.

I will now proceed to consider the supply of fuel. With respect to this article there seems to have been an entire misapprehension on the part of the Commissioners; I never said or supposed that the troops were not to be supplied with fuel by the commissariat, if they were so circumstanced that they could not provide it for themselves. It had been settled early in November that the commissariat was to supply the troops with fuel when they could no longer provide themselves with it, and we were quite prepared to commence the issues whenever ordered; 800,000 rations of charcoal, which had been brought up in steamers by the navy at the request of Lord Raglan, and given over to the commissariat early in November, remained untouched up to the 4th of December, when the order was given to commence the issues. When that order appeared, notice was immediately sent by me to the commissariat officers attached to the divisions in front, that the troops could receive rations of charcoal from the depôt at Balaklava. The only delay was with respect to the issues to the officers of the staff and departments, for whom no scale had been fixed; but I at the same time gave orders that officers in camp before Sebastopol might receive what was necessary for their immediate use, pending the decision on this point of the Commander of the Forces, as stated in the memorandum addressed by me to Lord Raglan, which is printed at page 80 of the Appendix to the Commissioners Report. The Commissioners must indeed be ill-informed as to the rules and usages of the service, if they really supposed that the issue or non-issue of fuel depended upon the will of the commissary-general. It must be well known to this Board that in all such matters the commissary-general of an army in the field has only to obey the orders of the General Commanding in Chief. The day following that on which I received the first intimation of the description of fuel that was to be provided, I despatched the order to Constantinople to send up the charcoal that had been laid in there in consequence of orders from Lord Raglan. Part of the fuel I had ordered to be sent up from Constantinople having arrived between the 4th of December, when the issues commenced, and the end of that month, there was in the possession of the Commissariat on the last day of that month nearly a million of rations for an army consisting, at that time of about 28,000 men.

It is stated by the Commissioners that firewood could have been procured from the southern coasts of the Black Sea in unlimited quantities. On this I have to observe that the fuel was, in the first instance, obtained from Constantinople, because a supply had been laid in there, and was ready for shipment. It could not have been obtained with equal despatch from any part of the Black Sea, where it had not been previously prepared. All subsequent supplies were obtained from the neighbourhood of Sinope.

There was never at any time, in fact, a want of fuel at Balaklava. The only difficulty was to find the means of conveying it to the front. Irregularities, no doubt, may have occurred in the issue of it at Balaklava, owing to the total want of accommodation and of space necessary for transacting the business of a large army. I need hardly say that under the circumstances in which the army was placed, I could not allow many of the transport animals to be used for the carriage of fuel. I was very desirous that the 237 mules which arrived from Alicante and Malta on the 22nd of January, should be employed in the conveyance of fuel, but they were placed in charge of an officer (*vide* page 37 of the Report,) of the quartermaster-general's department, in pursuance of the following letter from Lord Raglan, solely for the purpose of carrying up huts. I will read Lord Raglan's letter to me:—"Before Sebastopol, January 18th, 1855.—My dear "Sir, I inclose a letter from General Rose, which will show you that General Canrobert "will let you have one vessel loaded with straw. Considering the paramount importance "of getting the men under shelter, I would propose that the Spanish mules should on "their first arrival be put under the quartermaster-general, for the particular duty of "bringing up the huts, and whilst they are in his charge, that I should appoint an officer "of cavalry (one of those recently raised from the ranks), to see that they are taken "proper care of, and some few dragoons to do the stable work, whilst the muleteers alone "should be entrusted with them out of doors. I hope you will see the propriety of this "arrangement. Yours faithfully, RAGLAN."

Had it not been for this appropriation of the mules, the quantity of fuel that they could have conveyed to the front, in addition to the supply carried up by the regimental bât animals and ammunition animals, would have been sufficient for the troops, all deficiencies of provisions having at that time ceased.

As I said, therefore, any deficiency on this head is to be explained by the want of sufficient transport, and except in so far as this cause operated, the commissariat performed all their duties with regard to the fuel. It results in the same question, namely, whether I could, from the middle of November to the end of February, have increased the number of transport animals in the Crimea, and whether when I had got them there I could have obtained from any quarter sufficient forage to supply them with food; and this question of the carriage by sea of transport animals and their forage, is what I have to meet, and to it I now address myself.

If it was expected that I should provide transport for the conveyance of indefinite quantities of huts, timber, buffalo robes, warm clothing, &c., it must be obvious to the

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856

Board that it would have been wholly impracticable, even had there been no difficulty with respect to forage. The additional transport power could only have been procured by long previous preparation, the time for which was never allowed me.

It must be well known to Members of this Board, from their own experience, that a transport establishment, which might have been amply sufficient for the ordinary services of an army in the field, would have been totally inadequate, however efficient or complete, for the performance of extraordinary services of the magnitude I have described. Even the conveyance of fuel was an unusual and unforeseen service, and not required of the commissariat of our allies, the French troops having provided themselves with fuel throughout the winter, and chiefly from the neighbourhood of the English encampments. The transport necessary for these purposes could only have been obtained by having recourse to extraordinary measures; and, as the roads were impassable for wheel carriages, it would have been necessary to purchase and import pack animals, to an amount which could not, under the most favourable circumstances, have been collected and transported by sea, particularly during the winter, under a period of many months.

But even to carry the number required for the most ordinary commissariat purposes, there was, in fact (as I have shown), no more sea transport available than that which was actually used, the navy not having been able, at the period under consideration, to meet, together with other pressing demands upon them, the requisition of the commissariat for the conveyance of fuel and forage. It is, no doubt, a fact, that the transport was for a few days reduced (as stated by the Commissioners) to an effective number of 333 pack horses and mules, and 12 camels. But, in the first place, this was the case for a few days only, and would not have occurred if th e "Jason" had not been detained seven or eight days at Constantinople, with sick on board, on her second trip for transport animals; and, in the second place, in addition to the commissariat animals, the public bât animals attached to regiments, and those appropriated for the conveyance of ammunition, both of which now form part of the general transport corps of the army, were available and employed in carrying up rations; and though these establishments were incomplete, the number of animals amounted to several hundreds.

That the transport animals belonging to the commissariat, were, even by the delay of a vessel for a few days, reduced to this number, can scarcely be considered surprising. As an example of the rate at which the animals perished, I will refer to the Spanish mules mentioned before.

As shown in Lord Raglan's letter, these animals had a double set of men to take care of them. Stabling had been provided for them, and they never experienced any deficiency of forage, pressed forage having been brought for their use from Malta in the same vessel, which lasted until the arrival of supplies sent out from England upon my requisition, sufficient to meet the wants of the army. Shortly after their arrival also, our difficulties with respect to the weather and state of the road, had begun to disappear; yet, notwithstanding all these advantages, the casualties amongst them were not much less than amongst the animals which had been in charge of the commissariat throughout the winter. I have a return, signed by the commissariat officer in charge of the depôt transport, in which reference is made to these mules; for although transferred temporarily to another department, the commissariat was still accountable for them as public property. By this return it is shown that on the 19th February, that is, in little more than three weeks after their arrival, 40 of them were non-effective; and in a return dated 26th February which I saw at the quartermaster-general's office, and of which I took a note now with me, it is stated that "40, perhaps 60, are now in "the sick stable, some of which will never recover," and that up to that time seven had died or were lost. I noted also from another return, that, on the 2nd March, 63 were sick, making, with seven dead or lost, nearly 30 per cent. in a period of little more than five weeks, under circumstances much more favourable than those in which the animals in charge of the commissariat had been worked during the winter.

I do not attribute blame to anyone for these casualties, for no one can know better than I do that it arose from the laborious nature of the work in which they were employed, and the terrible difficulty of struggling whilst laden through the intervening morass. It is, however, the best proof that the mortality earlier in the winter was not due to negligence. (*A paper was handed in.*)

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) What is this?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) A memorandum that I took of the casualties among the Spanish mules.

(*Judge Advocate-General*) Is this a copy of an official return?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No; it is the original return.

(*Judge Advocate-General*) To whom is the note addressed?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) It is addressed to me. I should mention that I sometimes got a portion of those mules; 60 or 70. Some of them would not carry the huts, but the bulk were appropriated to the huts. They were not accustomed to that sort of work, and they kicked them off. But even if the animals of which I stood in need could have been secured, how was hay and other forage sufficient for their wants to be obtained? And here I have to answer, not only the Report of the Commissioners, but also (of course incidentally only, and so far as is necessary for my own defence,) a printed statement recently made by Sir Charles Trevelyan which has, I learn, been communicated to the Board.

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1855.

The explanation already given by me on this subject in my printed statement, is to the effect that so early as the time at which an expectation was entertained that the army would advance to the Danube, I made a contract for about 3,500 tons of hay, to be delivered loose at different places in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, and I also desired the commissariat officer there to form a depôt of chopped straw in case the army should return and occupy cantonments in Turkey during the winter. I took these steps as a precaution, notwithstanding that supplies of chopped straw, the usual forage of the country, can be obtained to almost any amount along the shores of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Sea of Marmora; and these arrangements would have been adequate to the object in view had the army been cantoned in these districts. Subsequently, when it became known that we were to proceed to the Crimea, the contractors, at my request, were willing to engage to deliver about 500 tons of the hay pressed instead of loose; but learning, when the army was on the way to the Crimea, that I could not rely on the fulfilment of this contract, I wrote on 13th of September to England, requesting that 2,000 tons of hay might be sent from thence. Of this demand only about one tenth was forwarded, and this portion reached Balaklava on the 30th of November; and although shortly after arriving before Sebastopol, that is, on 8th of October, I reported that the supply of forage to be obtained in the Crimea was nearly exhausted, and by my letters of 23d October, and 8th, 18th, and 27th November, represented that we should be entirely dependent for this article on England.

(*Major-General Peel.*) What were the dates of those letters?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) The 8th of October, the 23d of October, the 8th, 18th, and 27th of November.

(*Major-General Peel.*) It appears in Sir Charles Trevelyan's evidence, given before the Sebastopol Committee, that he was asked, "When did he (Commissary-General Filder) "write home, and acquaint the Treasury with his difficulty in regard to obtaining "forage?" and his answer was, "The first letter, in which we received from him informa- "tion that there was likely to be any deficiency of forage, was written when the fleet "was crossing the Black Sea in September."

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes; I dated it off Sebastopol. We were off Kalamita Bay, but I dated it off Sebastopol; that was the 13th of September.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Was that the first requisition that you made to England for hay?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) The first that I had made in connexion with the army in the Crimea. There had been some previous correspondence relating to forage for filling up the horse transports. This was the first that took place. I represented that we should be entirely dependent for a supply of pressed forage on England, and urged the forwarding of further supplies, and repeated these representations in December and January; the consignments fell greatly short of my wants, the whole of the quantities forwarded from England during a period of six months not amounting to the 2,000 tons for which I first made a requisition, or about two months supply, according to the estimates I had transmitted home.

No exertion on the part of the commissariat could remedy this deficiency, it being impracticable to convey across the Black Sea chopped straw or loose hay in sufficient quantities, or to procure the means of pressing enough of either for the consumption of a large army. The latter plan was adopted to the utmost extent to which means could be procured. Notwithstanding that upwards of 25,000 tons of hay were collected by my directions during the last spring and summer at one port alone in the Black Sea, besides large quantities at other places, it is still found necessary to forward from England supplies of pressed hay nearly equal to the whole of the consumption of that part of the army which is in the Crimea. Inasmuch, however, as the deficiency of fodder for the animals of the army in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, has been made the chief ground of accusation against my management of the supplies, it is necessary for my vindication, more especially since the appearance of Sir C. Trevelyan's statement, to enter into a fuller explanation with regard to this head than I have thought necessary with the other charges.

I repeat, then, that by a letter dated at Sea, off Sebastopol, on the 13th September, I made the requisition I have mentioned for 2,000 tons of hay to be sent out from England in the course of the autumn, in consequence of the failure of a contractor at Constantinople, and on account of the uncertainty I was under of being able to procure sufficient supplies of forage in the Crimea.

This is my letter: "Referring to my letter, No. ——, I have the honour to report, "for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that the "contractors having failed to provide the quantity of hay therein adverted to, of proper "quality, and under the uncertainty of being able to procure in this country a sufficient "supply of forage for the great number of animals belonging to the allied armies, I have "the honour to suggest that 2,000 tons of hay be forwarded to Constantinople during the "course of the autumn," By every subsequent mail, or nearly so, from the time of our arrival before Sebastopol, throughout the months of October, November, and December, and up to the 22d January, I represented, in either official or private letters, addressed to Sir Charles Trevelyan, that it would be impossible to convey by sea sufficient quantities of unpressed hay or straw to meet the consumption of the army, or if it were possible,

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

that we could not land or issue sufficient quantities of forage in that shape, and that we should, consequently, be dependent upon supplies of pressed hay from England, the quantity of that article which could be procured from Constantinople being quite inadequate to our wants. One or other, and sometimes all of these topics were mentioned by almost every mail. On the 13th November I transmitted an estimate of supplies required to be forwarded from England for the service of the army in the East, during a period of three months, in which the supply of hay is stated at 5,820,314 lbs., or 2,600 tons, or 866 tons per month. On the receipt by me, after I had transmitted the estimate above mentioned, of an intimation from the Treasury, by letter dated 9th November, that shipments of hay would only be made at the rate of 357 tons per month, I immediately informed Sir C. Trevelyan, by letter dated 27th November, that this quantity would not suffice, and that I should require 580 tons per month for the artillery, cavalry, and commissariat transport animals alone; and by the next mail, that is, on 8th December, I wrote to say that in consequence of Lord Raglan having ordered full rations of forage to be issued for all the baggage animals of the army, I should want the whole of the hay estimated for, or 866 tons per month. So little attention did this meet with, that, in fact, even the 357 tons per month was not sent; the total quantity shipped and forwarded during the two months of October and November not having exceeded 270 tons, that is to say, by the "Belgravia" 402,775, "Esk" 108,100, "Helen" 88,459; total, 599,325 lbs.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You stated that it had not been ordered?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) They were not shipped, or ordered to be shipped either.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you refer to any evidence on that point, that they were not ordered to be shipped?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) This is derived from evidence. I think it is in Sir Charles Trevelyan's own pamphlet that he acknowledges that, but I will refer hereafter to a document to show that I reported at the time what I here state.

(*Earl Beauchamp.*) When you landed that chopped straw, how was it carried about?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) The cavalry came down with sacks for it. We landed it in large sacks that we got from Constantinople.

Before sending the estimates and representations contained in those somewhat urgent letters, I had fully taken into account all the circumstances affecting the supply. I felt that it was very uncertain whether the country would be open to us. I knew that none of the forage on board the horse transports would be available (there being, in fact, a deficiency instead of a surplus), and after the storm of November, I had further to allow for the loss of 357 tons of hay in that hurricane. Sir C. Trevelyan, however, thought fit to assume that a much smaller quantity would be sufficient for my purposes, and that I might calculate on supplies from those quarters from which, as I have first said, I knew nothing was to be looked for. In justification of that assumption, Sir C. Trevelyan, in his pamphlet, page 7, after quoting from my letter of the 8th of October, the following passage,—this is my letter,—"The "forage of the country within the limited space to which we are confined, is nearly "exhausted, but the opportune arrival of the ships from England, laden with the hay, of "which a large proportion may be appropriated to present use, will, I anticipate, prevent "any serious inconvenience being experienced from this cause," goes on to quote another passage from another portion of the same letter, presenting it, however, in his pamphlet, as if it were in immediate juxtaposition with the last. This second passage is as follows: "It had been my intention to transmit, for the information of their Lordships, a state-"ment of the commissariat supplies on hand on the 30th ult., but the navy, in their "desire to despatch the vessels in which they were laden on other services, have taken out "the stores, and distributed them amongst other transports, and I have as yet been unable "to obtain a correct statement of the quantities remaining, but I believe them to "be ample."

(*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Were those extracts from two different letters?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No, the same letter; but stated in two separate paragraphs, and they are put into one paragraph; and the word "ample" in that statement is put in italics, and is meant to apply to the hay.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Have you the whole letter?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) The whole letter is printed in the Appendix to the Third Report of the Sebastopol Committee. It is there fully set forth.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You state that two paragraphs have been taken from the same letter, and put in juxtaposition here, as if they had appeared so in the original letter; but they do not appear so?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes, they were in separate paragraphs, and they referred to different things.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) What do the words "I believe them to be ample," refer to?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) They refer to our commissariat supplies, rice, biscuit, and salt meat, from England, not hay, which I had specially observed upon in the preceding paragraph.

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) What was your average consumption of hay a month, if they had sent out the whole quantity?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) 860 tons would have done for the winter before the augmentation of the cavalry and artillery, which took place in the spring.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You never had more than 200?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I reported to the Treasury what I did get. I stated in pounds what I got. 599,000 lbs. I said had been ordered up to the first days of December.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) It appears by this letter to refer to other stores, not to hay; as it appears in this statement of Sir Charles Trevelyan?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) You would think that it applies to other stores, and not to hay; I think he means that it should be inferred that it applied to hay.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) "But the navy, in their desire to despatch the vessels in "which they were laden on other services, have taken out the stores and distributed "them amongst other transports, and I have as yet been unable to obtain a correct state-"ment of the quantities remaining, but I believe them to be ample?"

(*Commissary General Filder.*) That does not refer to hay, which I had specially mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Do you think there is any delution in this paragraph, conveying to the reader that it means hay, whereas it means stores?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) It means other stores; biscuit, rice, &c.; but I think the inference meant to be drawn by that pamphlet is, that it applies to hay especially. Sir Charles Trevelyan must mean it to apply to hay, because the whole of the pamphlet is about hay, but I had no such intention whatever; and I do not think it bears that construction, even as it stands now; but the articles which it does apply to were continued to be sent out agreeably to my previous requisitions, but not the hay.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You are referring to a requisition made in September, not to the one made in November, when you say that inadequate supplies were sent out?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes. My letter is dated the 8th of October, and it could not mean that periodical document which I subsequently sent home; the latter had nothing to do with my original requisition for 2,000 tons.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You have not got yet in your statement to your application of the 8th of November, have you?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I have mentioned what my requisition was of the 13th of November.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You made subsequent applications for hay in the beginning of November?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes, on the 13th of November. By the regulations we are required to send home an estimate annually of what is required from England, but I was in the habit of sending one home every three months. I kept notifying to the authorities in England any change that was rendered necessary in that estimate by a change of circumstances. The inference which it appears to me was meant to be drawn from the two paragraphs so combined, is that I represented the supply of hay, as well as of other stores, as being at that time ample. Nothing, however, can be plainer than that this expression applied only to the general stores last mentioned; though even if it had applied to the forage, it could not fairly or reasonably have been construed in the sense which Sir Charles Trevelyan seeks to put upon it, but simply as intimating that the recent opportune supply from England had provided for present exigencies. I will read this letter relating to the hay which did not appear in the Appendix of the Third Report of the Sebastopol Committee.

(*Major-General Peel.*) You have read the letter of the 8th of November?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I have it here, and will read it if you desire it. I have also read a letter from Sebastopol, dated the 13th of September. Then on the 8th of October I say, "In like manner also the forage of the country, within the limited space "to which we are confined, is nearly exhausted, but the opportune arrival of the ships "from England laden with the hay, of which a large proportion may be appropriated to "present use, will, I anticipate, prevent any serious inconvenience being experienced "from this cause." On the 23rd of October I write from Balaklava. "With regard to "forage also, it is wholly impracticable, as I have already reported, to procure either hay "or straw in the country we now occupy. Pressed hay could alone be brought from a "distance, and it appears from the reports of D. C. G. Smith, to be improbable that the "contractors at Constantinople will be able to deliver, under the agreement reported in "my letter of 25th July last, a sufficient quantity of hay of good quality to meet the "consumption of the troops in the Crimea. I would recommend, therefore, that "shipments of this article from England be also continued till the future position of the "army, and the practicability of making other arrangements for its supply are known." That was all before we knew that we were to stay in the Crimea. I write on the 8th of November, "With respect to hay also, had the army wintered at Constantinople "or its vicinity, it might have been supplied with the forage of the country." This was the same day that we got notice that the army would winter in the Crimea. "And it would "have been necessary only to forward from England, as a measure of precaution, such a "quantity of hay as would provide against the possibility of a scarcity; but if the army "is to winter in the Crimea, it will be necessary that it should be entirely supplied with

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

" hay from England, as it would not be possible to convey by sea straw or hay loose in " sufficient quantities for its consumption; and the hay which has been delivered under " contract at Constantinople, and is now being pressed there, will last but for a short " time."

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Whom is that addressed to?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) By me to Sir Charles Trevelyan. All those are addressed by me to Sir Charles Trevelyan, and are official.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Do you know the date of the receipt of that letter?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) It would be about the 23d of November, I think. Then on the 18th November, by the first mail after the storm, I write, " It is with much regret " that I have to report to you, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her " Majesty's Treasury, that since I addressed you on the 8th instant, respecting the state " of the supplies of this army, seven of the vessels laden with provisions and forage for the " commissariat have been wrecked whilst at anchor at Balaklava harbour, during a " hurricane which occurred on the 14th instant. I enclose a return of the vessels and " supplies lost on this occasion. Subsequent arrivals of provisions from England have " relieved me of any present anxiety with respect to the food of the troops, but the hay " lost was all, with a trifling exception, that we had on hand for the service of the army, " either on shore or afloat, and was equal to about 20 days consumption, the issues " being at present confined, owing to the scarcity of forage, to the horses of the artillery " and cavalry, officers chargers, and commissariat transport animals; and it might have " been expected to last till the arrival from England of the 'Belgravia,' laden with the hay " advised by your letter of 12th October. The great loss we have sustained of forage " corn precludes the possibility of increasing the ration of that article as a substitute for " the deficiency of hay. As it will be impracticable, I am of opinion, to convey forage " by sea in an unpressed state in sufficient quantities to meet the consumption of this " army, I am apprehensive that this loss and consequent deficiency of food for the animals " will be attended with the worst results, especially with respect to those belonging to the " commissariat transport establishment, upon which the supply of the army depends, several " of them having already died, although hitherto well fed, from exposure to wet, and cold." On the 27th of November, I write—" I have the honour to acquaint you, with reference " to the last paragraph of your letter, No. 443, of the 9th instant, by which you inform " me that directions had been given to ship from England every 14 days a quantity of " hay equal to that conveyed by the 'Belgravia,' viz., 400,000 lbs., that the issues of hay " to this army, when confined to the horses of the artillery and cavalry, officers' chargers, " and transport animals, amonnt to 1,300,000 per month. As the ship 'Progress,' which " was lost in the late hurricane, brought out a consignment from England of nearly " 900,000 lbs. of hay, two vessels per month would nevertheless carry the requisite " supply. In estimating the consumption of this army at 1,300,000 lbs. of hay per " month, I have excluded baggage animals of every description from the calculation, as it " may be possible, although attended with much inconvenience and expense, to bring to " the Crimea from Turkey a supply of chopped straw for them, sufficient for a diminished " ration whilst they are not working. The estimate transmitted with my letter of the " 13th instant will show the quantity of hay which would be required for all the animals " of the army." Then on the 8th of December——

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Is that last letter in the Appendix?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes, at page 395.

(*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) It is not in Sir Charles Trevelyan's statement.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) On the 8th of December I proceed, and this follows by the next mail to the last one, " The Commander of the Forces having given directions " that all the baggage animals of this army should in future receive a full ration of " hay or straw, as well as of corn, I request, with reference to my letter of the 27th " ultimo, that the quantity of pressed hay included in the estimate transmitted by me on " the 13th November may be sent out from England by periodical shipments. It is " impracticable to convey by sea unpressed forage in sufficient quantities to meet this " consumption, or in the absence of all accommodation for storing and issuing it to make " the deliveries to the troops of forage in that condition."

(*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) That is not in Sir Charles Trevelyan's statement either.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No, it is not.

(*Major-General Peel.*) Is that letter in the Appendix?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No, it is not. Here is one that I addressed to Sir Richard Airey. It was communicated to Sir Charles Trevelyan, but I believe not till after the commissariat had been transferred to the War Department, and therefore, is not strictly applicable. This is my letter to Sir Richard Airey, dated the 14th of December: " Of chopped straw we have a depôt at " Constantinople, from which place it can most readily be shipped, and there is at all " times a supply of this article at Balaklava; but it is not possible by any means of " transport available with this army to convey from a distance by sea, forage, (either hay " or straw) in an unpressed state, in sufficient quantities to meet its consumption. A vessel " of 600 tons will not contain more than 50 tons of unpressed hay; nor, if it were possible " to convey them, could sufficient quantities of forage in an unpressed state be issued for

*Commissary General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

"the vast number of animals belonging to this army from one depôt when the commissariat is not provided with the requisite magazines and sheds on shore for its reception, and it can consequently only be issued in proportion as it is landed from the ships." I then wrote the following letter previous to receiving my advices of the shipments for the whole of the month of December, and was apprehensive from the rate of shipments advised, that deficiencies would occur. This is to the Under Secretary of State for War. "Balaklava 12th January 1855. Sir,—The enclosed return of the quantity of hay which has been advised as having been shipped from the United Kingdom for the service of the Army in the Crimea, but not yet arrived, I request you will be pleased to lay before his Grace the Secretary of State for War. The period during which the shipments have been made embraces nearly the whole of the month of December, whilst the quantity shipped does not amount to half the monthly consumption of this army, according to the estimate transmitted with my letter to Sir Charles Trevelyan of 13th November. I am apprehensive, consequently, that we shall be deficient of the requisite supply." On the 22d of January I write, "I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, with reference to your letter of the 5th instant, that a shipment of 400,000lbs. of hay every fortnight from England, exclusive of the quantity of forage that it may be practicable to obtain here from the surrounding countries, will not suffice for the wants of the army. Since the date of that letter, the baggage animals of the army have been placed, as stated in my report of the 8th December, on full rations of forage, and their number has greatly increased by the arrival of many that had been left behind at Varna, and of which many more are yet to follow; and by the importation also of an additional number of commissariat transport animals to meet the requirements for the new service of conveying fuel to the army in camp, the warm clothing, wooden houses, and other unusual stores."

Those were the Spanish mules. "With the exception of a small quantity, equal to about two days' consumption, by the 'Esk,' no hay has been received from England since the 400,000 lbs. that was shipped on the 8th November by the 'Belgravia,' which vessel arrived here on the 30th November. The loss, therefore, of 800,000 lbs. by the wreck of the ship 'Progress' in the hurricane of the 14th of that month, has never been replaced, and I have in consequence experienced great difficulty in keeping up a supply of forage for the troops, by obtaining wherever practicable pressed hay and unpressed hay and straw." This was not in Sir Charles Trevelyan's time; it was addressed to Mr. Roberts, the Under Secretary of State.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Has that not been published before?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Never. "The resources of the country with respect to hay in the former shape, appear to be pretty nigh exhausted, and I have pointed out in former letters the almost insurmountable obstacles of conveying from a distance by sea an adequate supply of forage unpressed. In these circumstances it is of the utmost consequence that 800,000 or 900,000 lbs. of hay should be sent from England every fortnight for the service of the army." Sir Charles Trevelyan himself said before the Sebastopol Committee, that it was cheaper in consequence of the hay being very highly pressed in England, to send pressed hay from England than to convey loose chopped straw from Constantinople; that is at question 13,756.

(*President.*) What was the price of hay when pressed?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I do not know; but Sir Charles Trevelyan mentions it in his evidence before the Sebastopol Committee in answer to question 13,756. I believe it became dearer subsequently; but his answer was that it could be conveyed cheaper, in consequence of the very high pressure which it undergoes in England, than chopped straw could be conveyed from any of the ports in the Black Sea.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) It only appears as an opinion of his?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Only as his opinion. In his pamphlet it appears too. He states it as a fact before the Sebastopol Committee.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) I see that in June and July 537 tons of hay were sent out. At page 11, Sir Charles Trevelyan says that in August and September there were 457 tons, in November 267, in December 633, and in January 337 tons. Did they all arrive?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Those shipments in December I never received till February.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) In June and July did you get 537 tons?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) That is the quantity that I alluded to as having unexpectedly arrived in the Crimea. It was originally sent out partly by the Admiralty to complete the horse transports, and partly on my requisition to replace the quantity I had expected to receive from the horse transports, but which I never got. I got but very little from the horse transports.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) In August and September there were 457 tons?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Supposing all that had been sent out from England from the commencement, that is, from June, or 994 tons, had been available, it would have left me deficient 1,006 tons of my requisition of 13th September, and I only got, or there was shipped on account of that 1,006 tons, according to Sir Charles Trevelyan's own statement, up to the 1st or the 5th of December, 268 tons.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Then in December there were 633 tons?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes, that were ordered to be shipped.

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Which you did not get?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Not till February. I never received up to the end of January, more than 510,000 lbs. or 228 tons. To have done it properly, the shipments ought to have been consecutive and immediate, and allowance should have been made for the time occupied in the voyage.

(*Major General Peel.*) Was the arrival of transports at Constantinople with your stores on board reported to you, or did you not hear of it till they arrived at Balaklava?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) They were sent on as fast as possible until I could keep up a certain supply in the Crimea; the remainder would not be notified to me in any way. The officer would unload them in Constantinople where I had a large depôt, and he kept me informed of the things arriving. As a rule, I do not think that he would consider it necessary to report to me the arrival of every vessel that was unloaded at Constantinople. He had orders to keep up the supplies in the Crimea to a certain point, and the remainder he unloaded at Constantinople, and he sent me accounts of the state of his depôt.

(*Major-General Peel.*) I find in the evidence taken before the Sebastopol Committee, at page 154 of the Second Report, that two vessels laden with hay, one called the "Helen," a barque, and the other a schooner, arrived at Constantinople, one of them on the 4th of February, and the other on the 6th. And the gentleman giving evidence stated "I saw "letters from the two captains, of the date of February the 12th, stating that they could "not get any orders for those two ships," and they were absolutely lying at Constantinople laden with the hay that you were requiring.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Mr. Smith, the commissariat officer at Constantinople, would have sent it on with all rapidity. There might have been delay in getting steamers to tow them through. A vessel might be lying at Constantinople a month if the wind should be down the Bosphorus, and nothing but a steamer would get her through.

(*Major-General Peel.*) It would have been the duty of Mr. Smith at Constantinople to forward it?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes, and I have no doubt that he did his duty, he well knew the state of things with regard to the supply of hay.

(*Major-General Peel.*) When did those two vessels arrive?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I think there is a mistake in one of the names. The "Helen" arrived towards the end of February, and she completed that quantity of 599,325 lbs. which you see in Sir Charles Trevelyan's pamphlet.

(*Major-General Peel.*) The "Clyde" was laden with stores from Woolwich?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I began to be pretty well off at the end of February, but those vessels did not reach me till the end of February. The "Clyde" was one of the vessels laden in December. The "Helen" completed the previous quantity of 599,325 lbs.

(*Major-General Peel.*) It appears that there was a complaint of the captains of these vessels being detained at Constantinople for want of orders?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) It is not possible.

(*President.*) The orders would be from the agent of transports, would they not?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes; Deputy Commissary-General Smith would communicate with him. He would have communicated with Admiral Stopford at that time. His letters which I have read, I think show his constant anxiety on the subject, and how constant his efforts were to forward on the supplies that I required. I proceed to state, if the authorities in England are to judge of the expediency of complying with the requisitions of a commissary-general in charge of the supply of an army in the field, founded on his personal knowledge derived on the spot of his wants and resources, it seems clear that the responsibility of that officer must be at an end. It is the first time in my experience I have ever known demands made under such circumstances to be disregarded, whatever future investigation they might be supposed to call for. Of the nature of these requisitions, how often they were repeated, I beg to offer the Board conclusive evidence by laying before them copies or extracts of my official letters on this subject; and if the whole of my semi-official letters were produced instead of isolated passages being quoted, it would be seen that I never ceased making representations to the effect I have mentioned. That Sir Charles Trevelyan was not ignorant of our urgent want of forage appears from the correspondence generally. In a semi-official letter from him, dated 18th November 1854, the following passage occurs: "It will be satisfactory "to me to learn that the hay sent from this country, aided by such supplies as Mr. Smith "has been able to forward, or as you may have been able to obtain from the horse trans- "ports, and possibly, in case of need, by a temporary loan from the French, will enable "you to meet the demands upon you until the arrival of the large quantity shipped in "the 'Belgravia,' after which the supplies of this article will be continuous." Yet the large supply here mentioned did not exceed 180 tons, about five days' supply for the army, or ten days' for the cavalry and artillery.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Have you that letter?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes, this is an extract from a semi-official which I have possession of. I can deliver in the original, if necessary. He says that there will be continuous supplies, yet the large supply here mentioned did not exceed 180 tons, about five days' supply for the army, or ten days' for the cavalry and artillery, and the additional quantity forwarded in November amounted only to 88 tons, or 2½ days' supply for

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

the army. Again, in a semi-official letter, dated 23d November, Sir Charles Trevelyan says (in consequence of the receipt of a private letter from me of 8th November), "You "may depend upon regular and ample supplies being sent out from this until you can "again obtain sufficient quantities from the seat of war." These ample supplies, however, never came. I have already stated what supplies were shipped from England up to the end of November, and those shipped or ordered to be shipped in December and January, after our losses by the storm were known, were little more than half the quantity shown by my estimate of 13th November to be required.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) This is a semi-official letter that you are reading?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes; which I can produce.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Do you distinguish between the shipments, which Sir Charles Trevelyan states to have been made in December, and what you received? He states that a shipment, equal to 633 tons was made in December?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) If you add the 633 tons to the January tonnage it amounts only to half of what I required; but I did not receive it. It was only ordered to be shipped, and it did not reach Balaklava till the end of February; and from that time I began to be pretty well off.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) What was the amount of the hay which you say you received after that semi-official letter of the 18th of November, in which you are assured that you will have a continuous supply. I think you stated that you never received more than 200 tons?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I never received up to the 22d of January more than 228 tons, and less than that. I received 402,775 lbs. by the "Belgravia," and 108,100 lbs. by the "Esk;" that is all that I received up to the 22d of January of the 268 tons which had been shipped up to the end of November.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You are aware of that statement in the pamphlet, which says that the shipments of hay amounted to 633 tons in December, and 357 tons in January?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I meet that by saying that if that was so it was only half of what I asked for. I did not receive any part of it, though it was shipped in January and December, till the end of February; and though nothing but continuous supplies would have met my wants, there is a break during the whole of the months of October and November.

(*Lieut.-General Knollys.*) Commissary-General Filder says that he only received about 228 tons up to the 22d of January.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I had not received the whole of the 268 tons on the 22d of January; only 228 tons.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) What time would elapse before you would receive any shipment made from this country?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) That which was shipped in December I did not get till the end of February.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Is that the ordinary time?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes. You could not count upon it under six weeks. The only instance of steam conveyance was the "Esk." Mr. Smith never received any hay at Constantinople from England; it was ordered on immediately to Balaklava to the depôt officer there. He never took out any of the supplies of hay at any time.

(*President.*) He did not unload them?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Not the hay, but other things of which I had a superabundant quantity in Balaklava. The importance of supplies of compressed hay arose from another circumstance. It could always be landed, which loose hay and straw could not. At the time when the greatest deficiency of forage was experienced by the army, that is, soon after the storm, there were always two or three vessels in the harbour laden with chopped straw; but that was to a certain extent useless, as it could not be landed in sufficient time and quantity. Sir Charles Trevelyan argues that there were always ships containing supplies of forage in the harbour. Chopped straw was useless; beyond a certain extent I could not land it. It was impossible for a large army.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Does he not refer to some communication of your own, to the effect that you always had plenty at Balaklava?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes; that is what he means by saying that I was never without forage; but I had chopped straw which I could not land.

(*President.*) For want of store room?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) You could not land loose chopped straw in quantities fast enough. The question has been often discussed about not having storehouses at Balaklava; but to prepare for a large army you must have the stores laid in in advance, but the army reached Balaklava before the supplies, and it was unavoidable. As respects the landing of stores we were from the beginning from hand to mouth. The ships were our magazines. Had my requisitions for hay been complied with, the deficiency in this respect, which was felt throughout the winter, would have been prevented, and I should have been enabled to maintain a sufficient transport establishment. I mean sufficient for the usual rations of the troops. The very slight deficiencies of provisions which occurred throughout the winter, show how little additional transport was necessary for that purpose, and with respect to forage, under the circumstances in which for army was placed, it was no great exaction to require that the animals should come down the their own forage. But as it was, we were limited by the impossibility of feeding a

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

greater number of animals. The commissariat officers, who were cognizant of my unceasing anxiety on this subject, and of this being the real cause of my not bringing up more animals from the reserve at the depôt, are not now in England to speak to the fact, but it will be seen at pages 157 and 158 of the evidence, that I stated to the Commissioners before Lord Raglan's death, and when they had frequent communication with him, that his Lordship was always desirous of having as much transport in the Crimea as possible, but that he was sensible of the difficulty of feeding the animals during the winter. In the evidence of the quartermaster-general also, it is stated that I at the time always assigned the disappointment I had experienced in the receipt of supplies of forage from England, as the reason for not augmenting the number of animals. Having thus shown that the authorities in England omitted to comply with requisitions so earnestly repeated, I will now endeavour to make it apparent to the Board, that by no exertion of my own, or of the commissariat officers acting under my direction, could the deficiency have been remedied from local resources.

For this purpose I may commence with the state of the supply after the occurrence of the storm; for up to that period the troops had experienced no deficiencies, except that the cavalry were placed on a restricted ration of 8 lbs hay instead of 10 lbs., and the baggage animals, not being required to do any work at that time, received a diminished ration. It had not been deemed by Lord Raglan prudent to issue the full ration to the cavalry until I had a reasonable assurance that the arrival of further supplies would enable me to keep up the issues; otherwise the cavalry and artillery might have been left dependent upon a small ration of chopped straw, which alone could have been landed, had the whole of the army received that description of forage. The storm, however, destroyed 800,000 lbs. of pressed hay, and left me without any other forage than an inconsiderable supply of chopped straw; and thenceforward what I did not receive from England must all be derived from Turkey. Unpressed forage could have been obtained at different points on the mainland, but the difficulty of transport could not be overcome. As an example of which I may mention, that upwards of 25,000 tons of hay were collected by my order during the last spring and summer at one port alone in the Black Sea, besides large quantities along the coast from the Dardanelles to the Gulf of Salonica; but it has been found impossible to remove this hay, and it has consequently hitherto remained unused, notwithstanding that four sets, consisting of sixteen hydraulic presses, with the necessary engines, and two screw field presses, have been sent out from England on my requisition. During the winter of 1854-55 all available means were used by the commissariat officers at Constantinople for pressing and forwarding forage in every shape, in bales, in bags, and loose; but every one acquainted with Turkey must be aware that pressed forage is unknown in the country. The only press I could hear of out of Constantinople was at Smyrna, and that was engaged by one of the parties who had entered into a contract for supplying pressed straw; and so far from being able to procure supplies of forage from any of the ports in the Black Sea, it was found necessary to send fodder from Constantinople for the cattle which were in depôt at Sinope, the Consul at Samsoun, from whence in ordinary times a supply might have been drawn, having represented that he was unable to forward forage, either to the Crimea or Sinope, in consequence of the demands for the Turkish troops at Batoum having exhausted the supply at Samsoun. In proof of this, I beg to submit to the Board a tender which was accepted at Constantinople, for the delivery, by a mercantile house at that place, of chopped straw at Sinope. This is a tender from the house of Valsamachy Brothers at Constantinople. "I hereby engage to deliver to the order of the British commissariat, free of all charges, "at Sinope, two thousand cantars weight of Constantinople of fourty-four okes, of straw, "of good and sweet quality, free from dust or sand, at the rate of piastres fifty per said "cantar, payable in bills on Her Majesty's Treasury at thirty days sight, at the exchange "of piastres one hundred and forty-two per pound sterling. (Signed) J. W. Val-"samachy." Then "We hereby engage ourselves to the British commissariat in the "penalty of one hundred pounds sterling for the due performance of the above tender, by "Andrew Valsamachy." We had a cattle depôt at Sinope, and instead of having any resources to draw from in that country, I was obliged to send fodder from Constantinople to Sinope for them.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Was that tender accepted?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) It was accepted. The commissariat officer writes on the back, "Accepted and recommended for approval, Pera, 31st March 1855. (Signed) "Philip Turner, D.C.G. Approved, William Filder."

But I repeat that in the face of the constant representations made by me of the impossibility of obtaining in the country sufficient quantities of pressed forage, or of conveying sufficient quantities of unpressed, or, had that been even practicable, of landing or issuing it in that shape, it was the duty of the superintending department in England to have forwarded the supplies in conformity with my requisitions, even if I had been incorrect in my estimate of the available resources of the conntry.

Sir Charles Trevelyan indeed acknowledged in a semi-official letter, which he addressed to me under date of 2nd of April 1855, when the Sebastopol Committee was sitting after the winter, and all our sufferings were over, that no blame attached to me in respect of the supplies of forage. His words were as follows:—"You" (with two marks of emphasis under the word you) "at any rate are quite blameless about forage, and I do "not think that we are justly open to blame."

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856

It should be borne in mind, in considering the question regarding the supplies of hay which were required for the army in the Crimea, that the quantities deemed to be necessary were different at two different epochs, one when it was supposed that the troops would go into cantonments for the winter, and the other after it had become certain that we should remain encamped before Sebastopol. The arrangements which might have been sufficient in the former case, as in the instance of the pressed hay, for which a contract had been made at Constantinople, had there been no failure on the part of the contractors, were quite inadequate in the latter, and the uncertainty which hung over the last-mentioned contingency, to which I have before more particularly adverted, was not removed until the season for making suitable arrangements had already gone by.

I certainly entertain a confident hope that when the Board see that I addressed repeated applications to England for hay, and was repeatedly disappointed; that I collected all the forage that I could procure in Turkey and on the shores of the Black Sea, and more than I could obtain ships to carry; that I procured and used every available vessel that I could lay my hands on; they will be of opinion that, as respects deficiency of forage, wherever the fault may rest, it was not with me; and I am equally sure that they will acquit me of blame in respect of the deficiency of transport animals, if satisfied that I have proved that their numbers were kept up to the greatest amount that I could feed. This really disposes of nearly all the charges against me. There are, however, a few others, relating rather to the particular quality or nature of the supplies given out than to any deficiency; and as to which the Commissioners seem to have been more misinformed and more ready to arrive at conclusions than as to any other matters on which they have grounded their charges against me. And, first, as to the issue of vegetable food. The Commissioners maintain that much of the evil done by the too frequent use of salt meat would have been obviated had there been a sufficient supply of vegetables. Now the providing of vegetables, either fresh or preserved, has never before been part of the duty of the commissariat. It has always been usual that each regiment should obtain a supply for itself; but when, on the 24th of October, on account of the appearance of scurvy among the troops, I received for the first time an order from Lord Raglan to send a vessel with a commissariat officer to purchase vegetables, the "Harbinger" was despatched that very day for that purpose to Constantinople, as being the place where a supply could be obtained with the greatest certainty and despatch.

Moreover, Lord Raglan, without my knowledge, desired the commandant at Varna to forward supplies of vegetables to the army, and every vessel coming from thence brought a proportion. But the quantity that can be obtained from any part of Turkey, on the shores of the Black Sea, is inconsiderable as compared with the wants of a large army, as I subsequently found when, it having become the duty of the commissariat to provide vegetables for the troops, I attempted to procure supplies from Samsoun, the supplies which I could obtain there being soon exhausted.

When also, in the month of April or May 1855, I urged the Consul at Trebizonde to forward supplies from thence, he was unable to undertake to do so till the month of November.

The vegetables received by the "Harbinger," having been shipped (owing to the anxiety of the commissariat officer to meet the urgency of the occasion) in wet and boisterous weather, a large proportion of them arrived bruised and damaged. This was in November. In December, vegetables which had been ordered by Government to be forwarded from Trieste and Venice arrived, but a portion of these also were in a damaged state. But for these losses there would probably have been no deficiency in this respect, as, in addition, large quantities of onions and potatoes had been brought to Balaklava for sale in good condition by private individuals. The following is a copy of a report from the commissariat officer in charge of the depôt at Balaklava on this subject:—"Crimea, "December 22, 1854. Sir, I have the honour to transmit for your information, Board "of Survey statement of issues, &c., respecting vegetables received from ships 'Har-"binger,' 'Jason,' 'Trent,' 'Cormorant,' and 'Albatross.' It will be perceived that "great losses have accrued from the inclemency of the weather, and I also attribute much "to the large quantities shipped and arriving here at the same time, or nearly so. I "have, &c. (Signed) W. H. Drake, D. C. G. To Commissary-General Filder."

Up to the 10th of December the troops paid for their vegetables, whether sent out by Government or procured from other sources, but when from that date they were ordered to be issued gratuitously, it became obvious that the supply must be wholly undertaken by Government; I accordingly took measures for procuring them, and from the time that my arrangements came fully into operation, aided by the consignments which had been ordered by Government, and were already on the way from Trieste and Venice, large quantities have always been issued to the troops. It being, however, difficult at certain seasons to procure sufficient supplies of fresh vegetables, I sent a telegraphic message to England for preserved ones, in order to insure a regular and uniform issue of vegetables (preserved or fresh) to the troops; but it was not, I believe, practicable at that time to obtain in England or France sufficient quantities for the purpose.

Nor were preserved vegetables by any means eagerly sought for at first by the troops. The following memorandum will show that with a large quantity of preserved potatoes constantly in store, there was an entire unwillingness on the part of the men to take them. "(Copy.) Preserved potatoes—32,468 lbs. were landed from Varna in November 1854.

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

"Though frequently offered, none were taken either in November or December. A "further supply was received from England in January 1855, and in that month the "troops first began to take them. The issues were as follows:—January, 53,474 lbs.; "February, 3,780 lbs.; during the latter month 558,925 lbs. of fresh vegetables being "issued. (Signed) W. H. Drake, D.C.G. May 22d, 1855."

In like manner limejuice as to the non-issue of which so much complaint has been made, was an article which had never before been supplied for general issue to the troops, nor had I received any intimation that it was to be so for the future. That which arrived by the "Esk" was sent out from England by desire of the Director-General of the Medical Department, and was supposed, in the absence of special instructions, to be intended for the hospitals.

All stores intended for other departments are, as I have already mentioned, forwarded to the commissariat. The Medical Department was informed of the arrival of the lime-juice, and could have had any quantity on application, but as no demand was made upon the commissariat for it, it may be concluded that the purveyor at Balaklava was provided with a sufficient quantity for the use of the hospitals. Dr. Hall also, being advised by Dr. Smith of the shipments of lime-juice from England, would have made inquiry had there been any omission on the part of the commissariat to apprise the Medical Department of the arrival of expected supplies. It is apparent from the medical memorandum of Dr. Hall, the Inspector General, dated the 2nd of January, which is printed at page 167, No. 6, of the Appendix, and from the monthly memoranda on the health of the army submitted by him to Lord Raglan, through the Adjutant-General, that at the time referred to, the providing and issuing of this article were entirely regulated by the Medical Department; that Dr. Hall was advised of intended shipments; that he knew of the quantity in store and that which was expected from England, and that he did not recommend an issue to the army generally until the arrival of further quantities, but confined its use to men affected with scurvy.

(*Judge Advocate General.*) Do you say when the limejuice was discovered and when it was issued?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes; I will mention that. It is to be regretted that on a matter which the Commissioners considered of such vital importance, they did not ascertain, by questions put to Dr. Hall or to me, the cause of the non-issue of limejuice to the troops generally. It was not till the 29th of January that I received a letter from the adjutant-general, accompanied by one from Dr. Hall, dated the 27th, informing me that the issue of limejuice was to become general. When shortly afterwards it was directed that limejuice should in future be a regular ration, and that the commissariat was to provide it, steps were promptly taken to procure a supply from Malta and Sicily, the nearest points from which any large quantity could be obtained; and from that time the issues to the troops have been regularly maintained under arrangements made by the commissariat.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Can you state when the "Esk" arrived.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) She arrived on the 19th of December, but the Commissioners say in their Report that the limejuice had been lying unused ever since the 10th of December, but she did not arrive till the 19th. A reference to the Appendix to the Commissioners' Report, page 76, No. 25 B, will show my letter of representation.

(*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) Was the General Commanding in Chief informed of the arrival of the limejuice?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No; stores belonging to other departments we informed the proper officer of.

(*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) Then you informed the medical department?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes. I have a certificate here which I will read. After the 22d of January, I used to furnish Lord Raglan with a statement of all the stores in our possession of every kind, and it was not till the 29th of January that he gave me an order to begin the issue. Upon this subject I beg to be allowed to read the following extract of a letter, dated 4th ult., which I have received since my reply was laid before Parliament, from the commissariat officer who was in charge of the depôt at Balaklava:—"As regards the first limejuice, I perfectly recollect all the circumstances "connected with it; 20,016 lbs. of it were shipped in England to the commissary-general "for the medical department, by steamer 'Esk.' The vessel arrived, I believe, on the "19th December 1854, landed the casks next day. Information of this arrival was "given to Purveyor Jenner, and he took some of it away from the beach as it was put "on shore. Sir J. Hall must have been aware of this limejuice being in store; but as "his purveyor was, it only required requisitions on him for its issue, and I should "have been glad to have been rid of it, as like all other extraneous articles it impeded "our work. I enclose copies of several documents relating to the first supply of lime-"juice. About the same time, 15th to 18th of February, by your orders, I put myself in "communication with Captain Christie, R.N., and the senior naval officer, to endeavour to "obtain limejuice; and I did get some, which, except a small quantity kept for hospital "use, was issued immediately." It will be thus seen that the "Esk" arrived at Balaklava, not on the 10th, but on the 19th December, and that the limejuice was delivered into the commissariat store on the 20th.

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

(*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) Delivered into the commissariat stores on the 20th?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes, on the following day. It will be also seen from the foregoing letter that the medical department was duly apprised of this supply. With respect to the issue of limejuice to the army generally, it was not till the 29th of that month, although I had previously apprised Lord Raglan that there was limejuice in store, that I received an order to commence the issue of a small ration to the troops generally.

(*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) You stated that it was delivered into the commissariat stores on the 20th of December. When did you apprise the medical department of that?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) The officer of the commissariat in charge of the depôt would communicate those things to the medical department, and he says in the letter I have quoted, that while he was unloading it, the purveyor took a part of it away from the beach.

(*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) Therefore the purveyor must have been aware of that on the 20th?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes. On the 16th of February a general order appeared directing an increased ration of limejuice to be issued to the troops, when I addressed the following letter to the Adjutant-General:—"Sir, I have the honour to acquaint you, "with reference to the general order of 16th instant, No. 1, that I have not the means of "complying with that order, there not being more limejuice in charge of the commissariat at Balaklava than is sufficient for one day's rations at the rate mentioned in the "order. The commissariat does not provide limejuice for the army. It is merely con- "signed to the department, and we furnish the requisite transport for its conveyance. "I would, on this occasion, beg to submit, for the consideration of the commander of the "forces, the inconvenience that may arise to the public service by an order being issued "without previous communication with the department which has to carry it into effect." In consequence of this letter, Lord Raglan desired that in future, limejuice should be provided by the commissariat, which was done accordingly, only a short delay occurring on account of the distance from which the supplies had to be drawn.

The Commissioners can hardly have been aware that the commissariat would neither have been justified in providing limejuice until this last order appeared, nor in even issuing it to the troops when in store without the former order of Lord Raglan, given, no doubt, on the recommendation of the medical officers.

Again, with respect to fresh bread, the Commissioners can hardly have taken into account the difficulties I should have to overcome before I could have supplied the whole army with bread. Even for the army hospitals, whose demands are of course unlimited and uncertain, the commissariat only provides supplies on special requisitions. When a requisition for bread for the general hospital at Balaklava was first presented to the commissariat, immediate arrangements were made for supplying it to the full extent of the demand.

Shortly afterwards I received a communication from Lord Raglan transmitting a representation from Dr. Hall on the subject, when I informed his Lordship that the necessary measures had already been taken for supplying the hospital with bread on the usual requisition of the purveyor. I should mention, however, that in the early part of the winter the purveyor had made a requisition for bread on the depôt officer, and he was unable to supply it at that time, therefore I am incorrect in saying that it was the first time that it had ever been done. I learned afterwards that there was a demand previously in the early part of the winter before any ovens were opened. In order to supply the army at large with bread, I must have organized a field bakery establishment, a thing of which there is not in our service the slightest trace or rudiment. The French army moved to the East with the portable ovens and the military bakers, by means of which it had been supplied with bread in France or Algeria. The Intendant-general had no new establishments to create nor any change to make. It was only necessary to let things go on in their ordinary course. Indeed, whilst the French troops are stationary and close to the seaboard, there is little or no difference between the manner in which they are supplied at home and abroad. When the French army became too numerous to be supplied with bread by means of the portable ovens, or the ovens had been worn out, 50 artificers were furnished by the "Corps d'Arts et Metiers" for building permanent ones; and at the same time 150 men from the line were furnished for constructing magazines and sheds at Kamiesch Bay.

Without an establishment so organized, absolutely nothing could have been done, and I could obtain none of the assistance I should have wanted for the construction of ovens, sheds, or magazines. I had myself applied to have a floating mill and bakery sent out from England.

I wish here to be allowed to read a memorandum submitted by me to Lord Raglan and a copy of the letter which I addressed to the commissariat officer at Constantinople on the 6th of November, only two days before it was determined that we were to remain in the Crimea, which will show both that I had made preparation for supplying bread to the troops, and that I was not bound down, as alleged by the Commissioners, to routine in the mode of securing supplies for the army. This is the memorandum of the 6th of November 1854:—"It is submitted that if it should be considered probable that "the army will be so circumstanced during the ensuing winter that a commissariat

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

" bakery can be established and bread baked for the troops, a supply of flour should be " laid in with that view at Constantinople, from whence it might be forwarded as required " wherever the army may be. The quantity which it may be necessary to secure in " the first instance would not be less than 3,000,000 lbs. (Signed) William Filder, C.G." And this is marked " Approved. (Signed) Raglan." This is my letter to the commissariat officer at Constantinople :—" Balaklava, 6th November, 1854.—Sir, You will be pleased " to purchase 3,000,000 lbs. of flour to be delivered at Constantinople in certain propor- " tions and at certain periods ; in three monthly proportions would probably be the most " convenient. As the calling for tenders for so large a quantity of flour by public " advertisement, would, I am of opinion, in a market like that of Constantinople have " the effect of enhancing the price, you will make the purchase either on commission or " by special agreement with parties of known respectability and means, who are eminent " in this branch of trade. You will ascertain the proper proportions of hard and soft " wheat respectively which are most suitable for making good bread, and stipulate for " flour made of these different quantities accordingly ; the flour should be equal in " fineness to that of which bread known in England as seconds is made."

Now, may I ask the permission of the Board to proceed to-morrow with my statement ; I have some papers which are not quite prepared, and I shall be able to finish to-morrow.

(*President.*) Could you not go on any further to-day ?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Not conveniently, but I shall be able to finish to-morrow.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Were you not in the middle of some paper ?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No, I had just begun ; but I will begin again to-morrow. I could not get through the whole to-day, but to-morrow I shall be able to finish.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Do you call any witnesses ?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No ; it is not my intention to call any witnesses.

(*President.*) Have you here the instructions that you received from the Treasury when you were first appointed ?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I have not got them here, but they were not of a particular nature. They were in accordance with the common practice of the service to obey all orders that might be given to me by Lord Raglan. I have not got them here. All the papers were left in the Crimea by the rules of the service, to enable my successor to carry on the duty, but a copy could be got by application to the Treasury.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) When you were appointed commissary-general, before leaving England with whom did you communicate first as to the supplies. Of course you must have had some information of the strength of the army, so that you as commissary-general would be enabled to proportion your supplies, and make your demands accordingly ?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I received information through the Treasury, and once or twice direct from the Duke of Newcastle, but my communications upon the subject usually came from the Treasury.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Your appointment was from the Treasury ?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Did they call upon you to furnish any report of the supplies or tell you where you were going ? How were you to obtain the supplies ? was it left all to you ?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) It was left to me to propose anything. The numbers were given as 10,000 men and 1,200 horses, 900 horses it was said in a letter to me, but they might amount to 1,200.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Were you told where you were going, or where you were to obtain the supplies from ?

(*Commissary General Filder*) I was ordered to go to Constantinople, and I made a requisition upon the Admiralty through the Treasury for supplies of all those things which I thought should be taken out as a reserve in case of not being able to procure them in the country.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) What supplies did you call upon the Admiralty for ?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Biscuits, spirits, salt meat, and other articles of that kind. I did not make any application for hay at that time. With only 1,200 horses, I did not think it necessary to make any application for forage. I relied upon the forage of the country.

(*Earl Beauchamp.*) When did you arrive at Constantinople ?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) On the 22d of April.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Had you many commissariat officers out there previously ?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) There were three or four sent on from Corfu to make preparations for the troops, and on their arrival, with the exception of some difficulties, the country transport being bad, the troops were well supplied from the first. Sir George Brown was in chief command, and when I waited upon him he said he was thoroughly satisfied with the manner in which they had been supplied.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You were always well supplied till you left Varna for the Crimea ?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Always up to the 14th of November, with the exception of some difficulties about forage during the march from Old Fort to Sebastopol,

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

from the difficulty of landing it in proper quantity, and the very late hour at which the troops took up their ground every night. All through, until we arrived before Sebastopol, there was always more or less difficulty about foraging, owing to the circumstance that I now state.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Had you no difficulty in supplying the infantry?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) None; but some of them would not carry even a day's rations. As to the 49th regiment, the commissariat officer made a complaint that that regiment refused to take a day's provisions, though it is the practice to carry three days' supply.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Can you account for the deficiency of forage on board the transports, by which several horses of the Greys were lost?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I cannot account for it. I never knew the state of the forage on board the transports; we should have no knowledge of it but through the agent of transports.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) In one of the papers Lord Raglan authorized you to take from the transports all the forage except for a certain consumption?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) That was previous to their going to the Crimea?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yes, but I never took any, or very little. I should have been very glad of the pressed hay for that proportion of the force which was stationed close to Varna, the heavy cavalry, the head quarters, staff, and some artillery. For them I brought chopped straw from Constantinople, which was easier than bringing it from the interior, a distance of not less than 18 or 20 miles from Varna by land transport. There was inconvenience in carrying chopped straw to the heavy cavalry at a distance, and I was anxious to get pressed hay.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You got no pressed hay from the transports?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Very little indeed, and I never replaced any.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) We understood that you had drawn some forage from the transports?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) A little hay, but it was always under the obligation that I did not touch the six weeks' supply. It was the duty of the naval agent to see that I did not take that.

(*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Some of those transports had not this supply?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I never heard of a deficiency till Lord Lucan mentioned it in this hall, as regards the first expedition to the Crimea. I do not know what happened to the heavy cavalry which were left behind; I was not present. Forage might have been put on board sufficient for a few hours' sail from Varna to the Crimea, but if they had made a requisition for six weeks' supply, it would have been impossible to have furnished it otherwise than from England; nothing but pressed forage would have done.

(*Earl Beauchamp.*) What provisions did the troops land with?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) With three days' provisions, but the troops remained three days there, and when they marched, they only marched with one day's supply —sometimes they refused that. I never asked them to take three days' supplies; they were very much enfeebled by what they had gone through at Varna; they were not in the state the troops were in the Peninsula for marching. However, one day's supply I certainly expected they would take, but as to the 49th regiment, the commissariat officer in charge of the division came and reported that they refused to take a single day's supply, and that threw more inconvenience and labour upon our transport. The regiment suffered by not having their provisions ready cooked when they arrived late at night on the ground, but it was not the fault of the commissariat.

1871. (*Major-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Did you not receive any official instructions on your appointment as commissary-general to that army?—None, but the usual one, that I was to supply forage and provisions. A copy of the letter to me might be procured from the Treasury.

1872. What was the date of it?—It must have been in the month of February 1854; and thereupon I considered myself authorized to take measures immediately upon the numbers being given to me, and I made a requisition upon the Admiralty for supplies.

1873. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) Was it from Sir Charles Trevelyan that you received your instructions?—In the name of the Lords of the Treasury he transmitted my appointment.

1874. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Had you the nomination of the commissariat staff under you?—No.

1875. Had you in regard to their number?—I always represented that I had not enough, but it was settled that they were to give me all that they could draw from the colonies until I said I had enough, but I never said that word.

1876. (*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Was there any correspondence to that effect?—I think I have a semi-official letter, I can produce it, and for one moment I thought I had enough, but there is a letter from me in the Report of the Sebastopol Committee stating what my strength was, and the number that was efficient. That is dated towards the end of August, and therefore it must have been my state immediately before proceeding to the Crimea, that is, on the 24th of August. After we had embarked a

*Commissary-General Filder.*

15th May 1856.

large batch, chiefly drawn from the constabulary force, joined, and a number of storekeepers; I then said that I thought for the present I had enough, but not of the right sort. I should have been glad of more regular commissariat officers, but I thought I had enough at that time of one sort or another, supposing it would have been an ordinary siege. When, however, we got to the Crimea the sickness was so great that I repeated my requisitions to send me more officers.

1877. Your establishment was merely for a force of 10,000 men?—It began with that. I afterwards learned that it would amount to 25,000 men, but my strength did not keep pace with the addition to the force.

1878. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You say in this pamphlet "I had from the first an "insufficient establishment, both of officers and subordinate employées, which was still "further weakened by the great amount of sickness and mortality that prevailed?"—Yes.

1879. (*Earl Beauchamp.*) Whose fault was that?—The country has never kept up a sufficient commissariat establishment. I do not suppose it is the fault of Sir Charles Trevelyan; he has often proposed to have a commissariat in England, such as an army might move with at once; but he has never been allowed to do it. Until the army is certainly provided with a commissariat in England you never will be prepared for expeditions.

1880. (*President.*) What depôts were there on first landing at Constantinople?—All my depôts were at Constantinople by the order of Lord Raglan. I can produce the order. It was my own proposal that that should be the grand depôt, and he approved of it.

1881. What depôts did you establish on your first arrival there?—Both depôts of biscuit and salt meat as a reserve, relying upon the resources of the country for ordinary supplies, which never failed. I was never obliged to touch that biscuit or the salt meat till we got to the Crimea.

1882. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) While you were towards the Danube you had no want of anything?—No; we had regular supplies. I took ample supplies to the Crimea. I took 60 days' supply of all articles with me for the whole army, excepting forage.

1883. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) Had you other depôts of hay besides those at Constantinople?—Yes, below Constantinople; it was a part of that contract which I alluded to. They were below Constantinople. I forget the names of the places.

1884. About 26 miles from Constantinople?—Yes; there were two depôts about 13 miles apart.

1885. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) There is one question not relating to forage. Had you, with your mules and horses, the charge of conveying all the siege stores up to the batteries in the trenches?—No; I had nothing to do with that. Upon the requisition of General Cator, there were ammunition animals provided by me, and buffaloes; but it was for him, or the artillery officer who succeeded him, to bring what he thought proper to the Crimea; but it was no business of mine. That would be considered entirely under the artillery. They would procure from me what was necessary, and it would be entirely at their disposal.

1886. When once handed over to them?—I had nothing to do with it. What they came upon me for would interfere with the provision I had made for other services.

1887. Were those mules, or bullocks, or horses, included in your returns, or struck out altogether?—They are not in my returns. When I speak of having so many animals for commissariat purposes, and so many waggons, that is exclusive of what had been provided for the siege train; but it was understood by Lord Raglan that the ammunition mules, when not working in that way, should be available for carrying up the commissariat supplies if necesary, and they were so applied all through the winter. The French army distribute a certain number of animals among the regiments as we did, but when they are stationary they withdraw them all; with us they remained during my time with the regiments.

1888. Had you any knowledge of how the French cavalry horses were fed, or where they drew their supplies from?—They were nearer to their supplies than I was. They got pressed hay chiefly from Algeria, but they were on one occasion 15 or 20 days without any forage at all.

1889. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) What happened in consequence?—They lost as many horses as we did, I have no doubt. I repeatedly passed by a battery of artillery on my way to Lord Raglan's, and I inquired about the deaths, and I know that on one occasion, the last time I saw them, they said they had very few horses left; but the losses were not known.

1890. Are you aware that Commissary-General Smith has stated that there was more hay and chopped straw on board ship in the harbour of Balaklava than could be landed and used?—Yes; and he founds that upon the notion that I could not land all the chopped straw; that is a fallacy, as I could have landed pressed hay when I could not have landed chopped straw.

1891. With one or the other, there was always more than could be landed?—Yes. Not of hay, but of chopped straw alone.

1892. Then it is correct to say, that you had more hay or chopped straw than could be landed?—Yes; if you apply it to one or the other.

1893. Did Commissary-General Smith write to you on the 2d of September, urging ou to apply for supplies from England?—It was upon the receipt of his letter that I wrote

my letter of the 13th of September; I was not aware of the failure of the contractor but through him.

1894. (*Major-General Peel.*) Did you ever receive any other instructions than those contained in the Minute of the Treasury of the 17th of February, which was also the date of your appointment?—Those were the instructions, I imagine, from the date, that I referred to.

1895. Sir Charles Trevelan says, "The nature of the preparations to be made, in consequence of this instruction, was very carefully considered, and a minute was prepared "which was finally recorded under date of the 17th of February, containing a programme "of the preparations, but a portion of the minute was carried into effect previously to "that." He is then asked, "Whom did that minute appoint to be the commissary-"general?" to which his answer was, "Mr. Filder." That is the minute of instructions?—That, I suppose, was the minute that I referred to. I think that the preparations he means were rather with a view to things that had never been before provided for any army, such as selling to the troops rice and tea, and such things, at cost price.

1896. (*Major-General Peel.*) No; the instructions were, "Downing Street, 9th of "February 1854.—Sir, I am directed by the Duke of Newcastle to request that you will "move the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to appoint an adequate staff of commis-"sariat officers to accompany the expedition about to proceed to the Mediterranean." It was in consequence of that direction that this minute was given, which I suppose contained the directions that you received?—Yes; only of a general nature.

1897. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) You say that your staff was inadequate from the very first?—Yes; up to the date that I was there I was constantly urging that I wanted more officers. I represented that we were not fit to take the field without more officers.

1898. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) If Sebastopol had fallen, and a forward movement had taken place across the Crimea, you had not assistance enough in the commissariat to fulfil your duties in keeping the army supplied?—No; certainly I never had.

1899. For any forward field movements?—No. They had been very greatly decreased by mortality and sickness; and every ten or twenty miles I should have had to drop an establishment, and hospitals must have been established.

1900. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) What proportion of your staff had had any previous experience in the commissariat, even in the colonies?—The returns show that; I could easily ascertain it from the returns.

1901. (*President.*) Was it in your power to obtain any additional assistance?—Yes; but they were ignorant of the duties. I appointed every eligible person that I could get hold of in the way of interpreters and storekeepers. There was no such thing as an establishment of subordinates; it is unknown in the English service. I got a great number in the course of the year from the regiments.

1902. Did you get any officers from the regiments?—Yes, at Varna, six or eight.

1903. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Had you any officers who had served in the Peninsula?—Yes, one, Mr. Ramsay. He was afterwards promoted. He had served in the Peninsula, and he was the only officer. Mr. Adams had served in the Mediterranean. There was one other, Mr. Cowan, who was obliged to return to England.

1904. Except you and two or three others, there were none who had had experience in the field?—None whatever. There were some few, one or two, who had been at the Cape of Good Hope, in the Kaffir war.

1905. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Do you recollect who they were?—Mr. Palmer was one, I think he had been in the Kaffir war; and Mr. Cumming was another who had been in the Kaffir war; Mr. Bartlett, and Mr. Bagot Smith.

1906. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) The duties of the commissariat in the field and in the colonies are perfectly different?—Quite different, except in the knowledge of accounts; they acquire no knowledge of the duties of an army in the field.

1907. (*President.*) When you found that the army was likely to winter in the Crimea, could not you have formed depôts in the front?—Not after the 8th of November. I mentioned, I think particularly, in my pamphlet the circumstances that prevented my doing it; various obstacles occurred. I had been trying before I knew that we should remain, seeing that the weather would break up the roads, and render them impassable; but after the 8th of November, and the battle of Inkerman, I was obliged to give up all my spare transport to convey ammunition to the troops, which were in the presence of the enemy without it.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) May I make a few remarks as to the questions that were put to me this morning by the Judge Advocate-General, with reference to questions that were put yesterday afternoon. I was again questioned this morning upon a paper which I now have here, but which I have not seen before; it had not been laid before the Board, and I was not aware what the questions alluded to that we put to me yesterday. At page 351, I stated that I did not understand a remark that Colonel Tulloch had made about some letter having been omitted, because I understood the question to allude to the Blue Book as it was printed. This morning the Judge Advocate-General produced this proof-sheet, and showed me my remarks upon it, and it appeared as if there was a contradiction between this paper and what I had stated. I wish the Board to examine the paper to see that my remarks merely apply to the appendices, and to nothing else. As I stated

*Colonel Gordon.*

15th May 1856.

yesterday, I merely had the papers to put the appendices to them. There is no alteration in the text of the evidence at all.

1908. (*Judge Advocate-General,*) But your note is at the foot of Colonel Wetherall's evidence?—Yes. With regard to the missing appendices, I cannot think that that can be construed into any authority for omitting any part of Colonel Wetherall's evidence; that is what I wish to correct.

1909. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) The idea was from your evidence yesterday, that you did not recollect that you had put that note upon the evidence?—Yes, because I did not know that the question alluded to these papers.

1910. It is the proof-sheet of Colonel Wetherall's evidence?—Quite so. But that question of the evidence is very important,—the omitted evidence,—therefore I should be sorry that there should be any misunderstanding about it. Colonel Tulloch states at page 285, that he could not reconcile Colonel Wetherall's evidence which was omitted, with the commissariat account at page 100 of the appendix, and therefore he omitted Colonel Wetherall's evidence about the blankets and about the issues. But if that was the case, it appears to be very strange that he did not put to me a question upon that subject with the supplementary questions, because those supplementary questions were intended to remove any doubts that the Commissioners had upon the quartermaster's department and the evidence that had been given; but there was no question about Colonel Wetherall's memorandum which had been omitted, and so far from thinking that the Commissioners were to print all that they received, Colonel Tulloch informed me on the 16th of August in a note that I have here "I have not "printed the supplemental questions or answers till I see whether the necessity for it "can be avoided by an explanatory note by Sir John M'Neill and myself at the foot of "the answer objected to." I made no objection to that; we were under the impression that they were entirely satisfied with the quartermaster-general's department; there was no question among the 63 that referred to the stores, therefore I did not object to anything having been omitted, little thinking that they were going to omit matters which they would afterwards include in their report as condemning that department, and I was perfectly indifferent as to what they omitted and as to what they did not omit; I merely wish to explain that before the Board adjourns.

Adjourned to to-morrow, at 11 o'clock.

## TWENTY-SECOND DAY.

### 16th May 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea, pursuant to adjournment.

*Commissary-General Filder.*

16th May 1856.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) Yesterday I had occasion to quote several letters referring to Admiral Boxer, but I should not have done so if those documents had not been already published. I am desirous of taking this opportunity of saying, that at a subsequent period he arrived at Balaklava, and I was then in direct communication with him; and I wish to bear testimony to the very great assistance which I always derived from him when he was at Balaklava. Nothing could exceed his zeal and activity in forwarding all things connected with the commissariat. He built a very excellent wharf for landing all the larger articles of supply, which, with his inadequate means, was such as perhaps a professional engineer could not have constructed. And from the naval officers generally I always received the most prompt assistance in all matters relating to my department.

I will now submit a few additional remarks to the Board with regard to the supply of forage and the deficiency of the quantities transmitted from England, notwithstanding my repeated representations to Sir Charles Trevelyan of the impossibility of my obtaining a supply from local resources. I have to add, that it would appear that the home authorities subsequently became aware of the necessity of responding to the demand of the commissariat, for from the time I resigned the charge of the commissariat with the army in the East, forage was forwarded from England by the War Department at the rate upon an average of 2,385 tons per month, and during that time the greatest number of animals foraged in any one month was 27,650; the increase in the number of animals bearing no proportion to the increase in the quantities of forage forwarded, a fact which distinctly shows that it was acknowledged that my successor could not by any exertions obtain and convey to the army the requisite supplies from local resources, and which fully justifies the course I had taken in requiring the supplies to be sent from England.

The quantity forwarded by the War Department from the 1st of March 1855 to the 31st of March 1856, a period of 13 months, was upon an average of 2,104 tons per month, and the average number of animals with the army in the Crimea during the same period would have been (had the Cavalry remained there the whole of the time instead of being brought down in the month of November to the forage at Constantinople) 21,742.

Now assuming, as Sir Charles Trevelyan seems to have done, that 400 tons per month, the largest quantity ordered to be contracted for by the Treasury, were sufficient to supply 7,000 animals, the quantity of 2,104 tons per month would at the same ratio have fed 36,820 animals, or if the larger quantity of 500 tons per month, which Sir Charles Trevelyan ordered to be shipped during the months of December and January is taken, the quantity provided by the war department would, at the same ratio, have fed 29,456 animals. I am further borne out by the fact that no supplies of forage have, since I resigned, been obtained for the use of the army in the Crimea, from any place in the Turkish dominions from which I did not procure them; and, although the supplies may have been obtained and forwarded to the Crimea in larger quantities from the same places, it must be remembered that sixteen additional hydraulic and two screw presses had been sent out from England on my application, and had been erected and put in use subsequent to my departure.

I was yesterday proceeding to speak about the supplies of tea which we had in store. Blame has been attributed to me that green coffee was continued for the use of the troops while tea was available. The Commissioners state that 2,705 lbs., or 173,000 rations of tea, were lying in the commissariat stores in December, whilst green coffee continued to be issued to the troops till the month of February, leaving it to be inferred, therefore, that tea was not issued till then. In both respects the Commissioners are in error, the troops having ceased to receive green coffee from about the 20th or 24th of January, and as much tea having been issued to them in that month as in February. The supply of tea was constantly being increased throughout the winter, either by consignments from Constantinople or by purchases on the spot, and the issues were made in proportion. I will proceed to quote from the return at page 13 of the Appendix to the Commissioners Report. It will be seen from that document that in the month of October 7,110 lbs. had been issued from the depôt, being more, relatively to numbers, than has been issued to the troops in the Crimea at any time since that article has formed part of the fixed ration; and by this issue the supply was nearly exhausted. It was at this period that I desired the commissariat officer in charge of the depôt to retain always on hand a sufficient quantity to meet the demands for the hospitals, of the probable extent of which he was better able to judge than I was, all requisitions for that service being addressed directly to him. A quantity having been received in November, the remains on 1st December were 1,490 lbs., which must be considered a small supply for the hospitals of an army of which the sick were so numerous. On the 15th of December, 1,215 lbs. having been received from Constan-

*Commissary General Filder.*

16th May 1856.

tinople, the quantity in store, after deducting the issues that had been made during the month up to that date, was 2,495 lbs., not 2,705 lbs., as stated by the Commissioners; and by subsequent issues the remains were reduced to 2,387 lbs. on the 31st of December; and the issues having been continued through January the balance at the close of that month stood at about the same low point as on the 1st of December, or 1,470 lbs. It was only, therefore, during about 16 days (from the 16th to the 31st of December) of the period mentioned that the remains of tea in depôt at all approached the quantity stated by the Commissioners, who appear in this case, as in the instance of limejuice, to have made their report from documentary evidence instead of inquiring of parties on the spot who could have given them correct information. As in the case of limejuice, also, the report is not consistent with the documentary evidence they carried away with them, for on referring to the same return it will be seen that there was no limejuice in store on the 16th of December. Yet the Commissioners state it was lying there unused from the 10th.

The Commissioners, at page 17 of their Report, complained of the inexpediency of the arrangements in putting up the hay presses at Constantinople, by which arrangement the hay was greatly delayed. I have replied to that in the letter laid before Parliament. But I was not aware till a considerable time after they were erected that the presses were separated from the hay; but when it did come to my knowledge I disapproved of the arrangement, and I then received the following explanation from Mr. Smith, in a letter dated 24th December 1854. "I sent Mr. Edwards and Mr. Downes to see what was "best to be done; and they both recommended, under all the circumstances, that the "presses should be erected where they are. To have erected buildings in other places would "have been a work of months, with interminable expense." I subsequently learnt also that there were two depôts of hay,—not one as stated by the Commissioners,—13 or 14 miles apart, and that the one set of presses and the engine were put up near that depôt which rendered it unnecessary to erect new buildings, and where also there was nearly as much hay of suitable quality as at the other. The best possible course, therefore, was that adopted by the commissariat. The Commissioners must have got their information at Constantinople, yet no officer of the commissariat there appears to have been examined by them although the two officers who selected the site for the presses, and who could have given the best explanation of the transaction, were present at Constantinople when the Commissioners were pursuing their inquiries. When I answered the only two questions that were put to me on the subject by the Commissioners in the Crimea it had escaped my recollection that I had received an explanation of the transaction from Deputy Commissary General Smith, and it was not till after I had transmitted to Lord Panmure my reply to the report that I found Mr. Smith's letter to me, which recalled the matter to my recollection. The Commissioners comment in very severe terms upon the arrangement by which the presses were separated from the hay, but had they made inquiry of the proper parties they would have found that it was the best that could have been adopted.

I wish to deliver in a statement obtained from the Audit Office, showing the quantities of rice issued to the troops between the 16th of November and the 27th of December 1854, when that article had ceased to form part of the authorized ration, and the Commissioners said that the troops were wholly without it; and showing, also, the quantities deficient on the returns on which the issues were made. The result is as follows:—

| | |
|---|---|
| Number of rations due on the returns - - | 485,941 |
| „ rations issued - - - - - | 459,833 |
| „ rations deficient - - - - | 26,108 |

The vouchers for these issues are not liable to the objection stated at page 44 of the Commissioners' Report, that receipts were granted for the full amount of the rations due, whilst there were deficiencies in the quantities actually delivered; the receipts in these cases showing deficiencies, while other vouchers relating to the same period show no issue at all of rice.

I am naturally desirous of showing that it did not require the presence of the Commissioners in the Crimea to bring about the excellent state of the supplies, in which they have described it to have been at the time of their departure. It had been gradually brought about by the unaided exertions of the commissariat, directed by me, in proportion as they ceased to be impeded by impassable roads and continuous storms. I have no recollection, indeed of ever having received any specific suggestion from them on the subject, and I am quite certain that no measures were taken by me for procuring supplies that were not in operation before they arrived. I beg to hand in a certificate which I have obtained from the Audit Office of the quantities of the different articles of diet issued from the depôt at Balaklava during the first fifteen days of March, that is, before the Commissioners had arrived in the Crimea, or I had had any communication with them. This includes every article of diet that was in course of issue when the Commissioners left the Crimea, or has at any subsequent time been issued to the troops there, with the exception of fresh bread and the two minor articles of pepper and salt. The former, as I have already stated, was, at the period when the Commissioners left the Crimea, exclusively furnished from the floating bakery which I had obtained from

*Commissary-General Filder.*

16th May 1856.

England, aided by two ovens built by Colonel Tulloch, yielding, according to a certificate which I beg to deliver in, 2,412 rations of bread daily towards the consumption of an army drawing, exclusive of Turks and Sardinians, 42,000. The latter, that is the pepper and salt, had been added to the ration on the recommendation of a board of officers of which I was myself a member; and with respect to the issues of fresh meat, I had as many vessels employed in importing cattle when the Commissioners arrived as when they left, more indeed in proportion to numbers, the British force drawing rations having increased in the interval from 35,000 to 42,000. The Commissioners may in general terms have mentioned the need of increased issues of fresh meat, bread, and vegetables; but of that I was already perfectly well aware. They neither made any specific suggestion to me, nor did they do anything themselves towards this improved state of things, excepting always the two ovens which had been built by Colonel Tulloch.

The Commissioners arrived at the commencement of the spring, when there was every day an improvement in the state of the roads, in the sea navigation, and in the health of the troops. With the return of fine and warm weather the cause of our difficulties ceased. Without having any more cattle depôts, or more vessels employed in the conveyance of cattle, I was enabled gradually to increase the issues of fresh meat in proportion as the season advanced and the weather became less tempestuous. The issues, which in February had amounted only to eight days' rations, were increased in March to twelve and a half days', in April to fifteen days', and in May to seventeen days', as will be seen from the accompanying statements, furnished by the Audit Office, showing the issues of salt and fresh meat respectively during those months, as extracted from the attested accounts of the commissariat officers. The vouchers for these issues are not liable to the objection urged by the Commissioners, and already adverted to. There having been no deficiencies of provisions at this period, and fresh meat not having been issued daily, according to a regulated allowance, the quantities could only have been filled in after the issues had been completed. The issues continued to increase, and in the first part of June they were in the proportion of 19 days per month, and in the latter part of June and in July 21½ days.

In May, previous to the departure of the Commissioners, a proportion of porter had also been issued, but the quantity did not exceed six days returns in the whole of the month, and the issue was not in consequence of any suggestion of the Commissioners, but resulted from inquiries instituted on the recommendation of the board of officers, by which salt and pepper were added to the ration.

I have now submitted my explanations on the more important points, as to which charges of mismanagement, negligence, and improvidence, are either directly or by inference brought against me by the Commissioners. I have not thought it necessary to enter into a detailed explanation of each particular case. My conduct, I am sensible, must be judged from a larger point of view, such as whether I am to blame for the deficiency of forage, to which, step by step, all other deficiencies are mainly attributable, as limiting the number of transport animals that could be maintained in the Crimea, and whether I availed myself of all the sea transport which I could obtain for the conveyance of forage and live cattle. I trust I have shown to the satisfaction of the Board that in neither of these respects can blame be justly imputed to me.

The Commissioners, indeed, arrived in the Crimea when our difficulties were at an end, and at a season of the year when it was not possible for them to form a just idea of what they had been, and they appear, consequently, to have failed to make allowances for circumstances beyond human agency or control, or to appreciate the unforeseen contingencies which thwarted all reasonable calculations.

Neither was it difficult for them to suggest improvements, the expediency of which had been already indicated by experience; but the Commissioners might at least have satisfied themselves by inquiry, whether what they had to suggest had not been previously adopted; and if they had so inquired, they would have found that there is scarcely one remedial measure recommended by them which had not in fact been already put in practice in the Crimea, or which is not conformable to the established custom of the commissariat with armies in the field whenever circumstances admit of it.

It is made a general charge against me, not perhaps directly expressed, but certainly implied, that I only followed the beaten track in obtaining supplies; that I was incapable of originating new measures, or of availing myself of means within my reach, however obvious they might have been. I might be permitted to ask the Commissioners on what grounds this imputation rests, there not being, so far as I have been able to discover, any evidence to this effect, and it is inconsistent with the fact. As stated in my pamphlet, I obtained supplies by every variety of mode in which it was possible to procure them, according as one or other was most suitable or necessary, and there were always ample supplies of all articles in possession of the commissariat, except forage.

The Commissioners do, indeed, admit, that I and the other officers of the Commissariat acted according to the measure of our ability, but I decline for myself and for them this palliation of imputed errors, improvidence, and mismanagement; and without desiring to claim for myself or them an undue measure of capacity for the discharge of our functions, I yet think I can assert that we not only did our best, but the best which the circumstances, unprecedented and unparallelled, permitted.

Having thus endeavoured, not unsuccessfully, I trust, to show that the heavy incul-

*Commissary-General Filder.*

16th May 1856.

pations laid against me in the Report of the Commissioners are devoid of real foundation, and would probably have been withheld had a fit opportunity of explaining the supposed grounds of them been afforded me. I beg to be allowed to add a few words on the apparent hardship of the treatment to which my case has been subjected.

I would first observe, that the arduous charge which I held with the expeditionary force was unsought, and devolved upon me as a professional duty, from which my age and long and laborious services might perhaps have excused me, but which I cheerfully undertook, notwithstanding the manifest inadequacy of the then existing means of execution, in the confidence that the deficiency would gradually be remedied, and that due allowance would, in the meanwhile, be made for its natural consequences. Considering what the extent of the deficiency was not only in the number and experience of the officers through whose agency I was to conduct the very numerous and dissimilar branches of duty then allotted to the commissariat, but, in the almost absolute non-existence of the various subordinate establishments necessary to the efficient performance of them, I do not think that the manner in which they were discharged at any period fairly subjects me to the imputation of either negligence or incapacity, nor, except in regard to the provision of transport, and even that only prospectively, is any such inference drawn from it in the Report antecedently to the time of our terrible winter difficulties. To the disastrous consequences thence ensuing I accordingly presume that I must ascribe it, that I have been, without any previous trial or even accusation, taunted in an official and published document with being through incompetence to my task a chief cause of them, superseded in my charge when both they and the true causes of them were at an end, and deprived of all acknowledgment of my otherwise unquestioned services, though this has been granted in the shape of honorary recompense in every parallel case, and even to the officer who succeeded to my post when it had been freed by my exertions from all serious difficulties, and who was never afterwards called upon to encounter any resembling them. Had I been convicted of actual delinquency, my offence could not have been visited with a heavier penalty; but I must respectfully deny that it has been merited by any proved misconduct of mine; and although I of course cannot appeal to this Board for redress of what I deem a grievous wrong, I confidently submit my case to your impartial consideration, and request you to declare whether or not in your opinion the allegations against me are sufficiently established to require that they should be referred to a more formal tribunal. If not, I trust that the previously irreproachable services of more than fifty years, of which forty have been passed out of my own country, may entitle me to expect the withdrawal of a severe and unmerited censure.

1911. (*General Sir G. Berkeley*) What proportion of commissariat officers do you consider ought to be attached to each division of infantry and each brigade of cavalry?—There should be one officer in charge of a division, and one officer to each brigade.

1912. Do you mean a deputy commissary-general to each division?—It has been customary to attach an assistant commissary-general to a division, one officer to each brigade, and one to the artillery. Latterly there have been two batteries of artillery with each division of infantry, and that makes one officer scarcely adequate to that duty.

1913. You had one commissariat officer to each brigade of artillery?—No, I had not enough to put one commissariat officer to each brigade of artillery. I had one to the artillery of each division, and there were two companies of foot artillery in each division, that is double the proportion of artillery there used to be in the Peninsula. I had not two officers to appoint to the artillery of each division, and one officer cannot well attend to two brigades of artillery without some additional assistance.

1914. In the Peninsula there was one head commissariat officer attached to each division of infantry, and a commissariat officer to each brigade, and one to a battery of artillery?—Yes, it was so. That was the organization I should have carried out, if I had had the means. I was once or twice without any officer for two or three of the brigades of infantry.

1915. That would have been ample?—Yes, I should think for field operations that that would be sufficient; but such duties do not form a very large proportion of commissariat duties; the depôts require a great number of officers.

1916. You could not do with less in each division than the number you have mentioned?—No.

1917. (*Lieut.-General Knollys.*) Did you take any steps to make Lord Raglan acquainted with all the stores of provisions you had in hand?—I communicated personally with him nearly every day, and whatever information he asked for I gave him. But I gave him no return till about the 22d of January.

1918. You obtained from the navy a supply of salt meat on the 21st of January 1855, did you not?—Yes.

1919. Can you give an approximation to the number of days supply you had on hand at that time, you state that you had 750,265 lbs.?—That would be about twenty-eight days supply.

1920. When you received that loan from the navy you had twenty-eight days supply on hand?—But not available. I could not get at it. The supply might have been at the bottom of the ships, and could not readily be got at.

1921. It was in the harbour of Balaklava?—Yes; according to the account of the depôt officer.

1922. Had you mentioned any apprehensions on this subject to Lord Raglan in conversation?—No.

1923. Had you stated to his Lordship the number of days supply that you had on hand at that time?—In consequence, I think, of understanding that I had borrowed from the navy that which was to repay what had been issued to them, he wrote to desire that I would send to him a return of the stores every eight days, I did so from that time, about the 21st of January.

1924. Before that you had kept him informed by personal communication?—Yes.

1925. With regard to that supply which you received from the navy, it was only a repayment of a former loan?—Yes; they had two forces on shore, one in front under the command of Captain Lushington, which was supplied direct from the ships of war, and another in the neighbourhood of Balaklava, which drew from the commissariat stores. When the latter began to draw originally, I objected to supplying them, as I had made no provision for them, and I thought it better that they should be supplied from their own ships in the harbour, but Captain Powell represented that it would be attended with inconvenience to the men, and I ordered them to be supplied from the commissariat stores, but the quantity that I got back was not equal to what was issued to them.

1926. (*Major-General Peel.*) At page 7 of the Report of the Commissioners it is stated, "It was not until the latter end of January, when circumstances forced upon Lord "Raglan's attention the necessity of his being kept personally informed of the actual "amount of the supplies on which he could rely for the maintenance of the troops, that "periodical returns of the quantities in store at Balaklava were ordered to be submitted "to him;" are those the circumstances that you have just stated?—Those are the circumstances. Lord Raglan was satisfied that I had always abundant supplies, excepting forage; and he was fully aware of the difficulty about that.

1927. (*Lieut.-General Knollys.*) Can you state approximatively the lowest number of days for which you had a provision of salt meat and biscuit on hand?—I have not the means here. I think there must be a mistake in the quantity as to 28 days.

1928. At page 11 of the Appendix there is this return, "Statement of salt meat "received, issued, &c., from 1st to 21st January, at depôt of supplies, Balaklava. "January 21st 1855, received from Her Majesty's ship 'Curlew,' 69,720 lbs.; remaining "in store 1st January, 750,265 lbs." ?—That is perfectly correct. I have proved that from the accounts in the Audit Office.

1929. The return goes on to state, "Received from other sources than royal navy, "1st to 21st January, 318,800 lbs." ?—Yes.

1930. The total issued from the 1st to the 21st of January, 658,540 lbs?—That is the total quantity. I had 247,000 lbs. remaining.

1931. On the 21st?—Yes.

1932. Eight or nine days supply?—Yes; that is the smallest number of days supply, to my belief, that I ever had on hand at any one time, and that arose partly from my issues to the navy.

1933. That arose from your issues to the navy?—Yes; and the detention of the vessels by contrary winds.

1934. (*Major-General Peel.*) What is the present organization of the commissariat? who is the head of it now? To whom do you report?—That is rather difficult to know. I address all my letters to the Under Secretary of State, but they come back without any reference, signed by Mr. Petrie, formerly the chief clerk of the commissariat at the Treasury.

1935. In fact since the commissariat has been removed from the Treasury, you hardly know to whom you are attached, or who is at the head of it?—I consider Lord Panmure to be the head, certainly; but as to the officer with whom we correspond, and through whom we receive all orders, I am really in doubt as to who is the proper officer.

1936. (*President.*) Can you state why the depôt at Malta was never established?—We wanted the supplies in the Crimea, that was the only reason.

1937. It was intended by the Government to establish a depôt at Malta?—Yes; I proposed it originally, but my requisitions were made faster than the supplies arrived, and therefore it was never formed.

1938. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Do you consider that it would have been an advantage to have had a large depôt at Malta?—It was better in the Bosphorus, that was our principal depôt; but I wanted a further reserve, more than I thought I could have magazine room for in Constantinople, not knowing exactly the locality when I proposed it, but it was better to have it at Constantinople.

1939. Because it was nearer?—Yes. I wish to make a few observations to the Board on such parts of the statements made by the officers who have preceded me, as appear to call for explanation on my part. The Earl of Cardigan in making his statement before the Board, quoted the evidence given by the Duke of Cambridge before the Sebastopol Committee, to the effect that he was obliged to kill twenty-one ammunition ponies which he had not the means of feeding.

1940. (*President.*) Are you referring to Lord Cardigan's statement?—Yes, he quotes the evidence which the Duke of Cambridge gave before the Sebastopol Committee.

1941. (*Judge-Advocate General.*) What does the Duke of Cambridge say?—That they were obliged to kill them for they had not the means of feeding them.

(*President.*) You had better refer to the evidence.

*Commissary-General Filder.*

16th May 1856.

1941. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) Were you not present when Lord Cardigan made his statement?—No; I was not here. The Duke of Cambridge's evidence is at page 187.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) It would appear that he shot them from the dreadful state they were in, not because he could not feed them.

(*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) But the previous question implies that; Question 3874 says, "When they arrived they could get no food."

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) The Duke of Cambridge says, "My baggage animals had "constantly none at all."

(*Major-General Peel.*) He says, "The animals were very inferior to begin with, and no "doubt if you did not feed them they would die."

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) The ammunition animals were very much worked, they carried shot during the siege. I have here the minutes of two boards of survey condemning them. (*The same were handed in.*) One was held on the 12th of October, when there was no difficulty about forage, though those animals being much worked could not perhaps be sent for it regularly. Lord Lucan bears testimony that up to the 28th of October he foraged the cavalry in the villages. The other was held upon the 20th.

1943. (*President.*) At that time had they rations?—They foraged themselves. Hay was not issued by the commissariat; it was in all the villages up to the 20th of October.

1944. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) Then those animals were killed from the peculiar state that they were in, and not from the want of forage?—I consider that Lord Cardigan brought forward that evidence to prove that there was a deficiency of forage.

1945. (*Major-General Peel.*) There was no forage issued then at all?—Hay was not issued; but those baggage animals that were not working had a diminished ration of barley from the commissariat, for hay they foraged themselves.

1946. *Judge Advocate-General.*) Did you say the 13th October?—One board sat on the 12th of October, and the other on the 20th.

1947 When you say that the forage did not fall short?—There was hay in all the villages, and they foraged themselves; both the cavalry and the other portion of the army.

1948. (*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) If you had had the means of landing it; you were never without chopped straw in the harbour of Balaklava?—I was never without chopped straw in the harbour of Balaklava.

1949. (*President.*) Did the commissariat take possession of all the stacks of forage on their arrival before Sebastopol?—We put sentries over them, but they were very little more than haycocks; they were very numerous, and the consequence was, that with all the sentries that you could place you could not secure it. I put storekeepers and guards over them, but it was not possible to protect them adequately, and there was a waste, therefore, to a certain extent.

1950. (*Major-General Peel.*) Will you state what responsibility you consider attaches to the commissariat department for that portion of the stores usually known by the name of "Quartermaster-general's stores"?—Solely for their safe custody; I am not responsible that they are equal to the wants of the service in any way.

1951. Merely for the custody, and for the issuing of them?—Upon approved requisitions.

1952. Who makes the original requisitions?—The quartermaster-general sends them home. He is not in communication with any department at home, but sends a demand through the Commander of the Forces, who submits it to the Secretary of State for War.

1953. How was that branch of stores originally furnished, where did they come from to you?—They came consigned to me, but not upon my requisition. It must have been by the quartermaster-general's department in England, communicating with the Ordnance Department I presume.

1954. They came direct from the Ordnance Department to you?—They came consigned from the Tower to the commissariat.

1955. Can you enumerate what the articles are which you consider come under the denomination of the quartermaster-general's stores?—They are very numerous,—everything wanted for field or camp equipment; for instance, they wanted horse shoes for officers chargers under the new service in which we were employed, as the cavalry officers could not buy at any price horse shoes. The quartermaster-general sent home a requisition for horse shoes from England, and the officers paid for them. That shows that whatever is necessary, as arising out of the service, the quartermaster-general makes application for it; it was quite new, and I should not have enumerated horse shoes for officers horses in ordinary cases.

1956. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Quartermaster-general's stores embrace not merely the equipment, but everything that the army can require in the field?—Yes; there is no other channel by which the wants of the army can be ascertained but through the quartermaster-general.

1957. (*Major-General Peel.*) The coffee that was issued to the troops was unroasted, was it not?—Yes.

1958. When were complaints first made to you on that subject?—I never heard of any complaint till the month of November.

1959. Were the troops supplied with any coffee mills to grind it from the commissariat?—We purchased some on the requisition of the quartermaster-general, and they were distributed among the regiments.

*Commissary-General Filder.*

16th May 1856.

1960. At what date?—It was in the middle of winter. I will not be sure but it was further advanced than November. It was December or January.

1961. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Was it upon your requisition that the coffee was sent out green?—I have endeavoured to explain that in my pamphlet. A board was held, of which I was a member, to ascertain which of the different articles that we were supplying to the troops at cost price should be made a fixed ration. I found them going so fast, that unless some regulation was made, I could not keep up the supply, and I proposed that some one article should be a fixed ration, and the evidence was in favour of coffee, but the board knew that we were selling it to the troops green

1962. Up to that time the troops paid for it?—Yes, in unlimited quantities. Do all we could, we could not check the demands for these things till they all disappeared. I think what would have lasted 72 days under regulation went in 30, and the troops soon would have been without anything at all.

1963. Where did your first supply of green coffee come from?—From England, by order of the Treasury; they sent out various articles for the troops to purchase at prime cost.

1964. (*Major General Peel.*) Before the supply of coffee-mills, how did you anticipate that the soldiers were to roast it?—That would not be a subject for my consideration; but there would have been no difficulty, I should consider, if they had fuel and their usual camp kettles. I still think that coffee burnt at the moment is better than anything else.

1965. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) They used to roast their coffee in the lids of their camp kettles, did they not?—Yes; but they threw them away.

1966. (*President.*) Could it not have been roasted at Constantinople?—I think not, to any extent; it would have had to be distributed all over Constantinople.

1967. (*Lieutenant-General Knolly's.*) Had you, as Commissary-General, anything to do with it being roasted or unroasted?—No, not till it was desired; but there was great delay in sending out the roasted coffee. I sent home for it in the early part of October, and though my letter must have reached London about the 23rd of October, I did not get the roasted coffee till the 24th of January. Then it will be seen from what I have just stated that a certain quantity of tea was issued, and I kept constantly getting it up from Constantinople. In March nearly as much was issued as in October, but not being at that period a fixed ration I took no measures for procuring a supply from England. The tea issued in the month of October was larger in quantity than was at any time issued, either after or before it became a ration in proportion to numbers.

1968. When were the coffee mills issued?—Speaking from memory, I should say that it was in December.

1969. Were they after the French pattern?—Not that I know of; they were got from Constantinople.

1970. Do you know the French pattern?—I do not know that I have seen it; but they were used very much in Constantinople. I think those were smaller than the French ones, and we purchased 2,000 of them.

General Airey, in his statement, makes an allusion to a statement that I made in a letter which I laid before the Houses of Parliament. He says, "The Commissary-General, "in his explanatory letter laid before the Houses of Parliament, has no doubt shown, "that from the 1st of August until after the first bombardment of Sebastopol, he was in "more or less uncertainty as to the situation in which the British army would have to "winter; but I am sure he does not intend to convey the impression that this uncer-"tainty was occasioned by any omission or reserve on the part of Lord Raglan." I never meant to insinuate that there was any reserve on the part of Lord Raglan. I submitted a memorandum as a point of duty, and I always received every assistance from him that was possible. I do not suppose that the Commissary-General of any army ever had such frequent communication with the Commander-in-Chief as I had with Lord Raglan. He never denied me access at any time whatever; however important the business he might be employed upon, he invariably gave me audience. I saw him at all times, and I always received every possible assistance from him in every way, and I never have had any cause to complain of want of confidence in his communications with me, but the contrary.

Colonel Gordon, in his evidence yesterday, or on the 14th, says, "The commissariat "drew upon our stores very largely upon their own authority, without any reference "to the department, which was also a mode of getting rid of the supplies." Now I never sanctioned any issues from the stores excepting on two occasions. There was a quantity of old blankets that the troops had refused, and I authorized their being appropriated to the muleteers and Turkish labourers; and I also upon one occasion authorized the issue of about 20 tin kettles for the use of the storekeepers,—20 or 30,—beyond that I never authorized any issue of quartermaster-general's stores. I bought a large quantity of clothing from the regiments. Upon finding that they got clothing gratuitously they did not want to make use of the necessaries that had been ordered out from England, and I paid the regiments the amounts of the bills, and those articles were issued upon my order by the authority of the Duke of Newcastle to all the drivers. Those were the only instances in which I ever interfered with the quartermaster-general's stores; but the necessaries that I bought of the regiments could not be considered as quartermaster-general's stores. I wish to explain that I never interfered with the supply of the army in that respect, the requisitions for all articles that we required for our own use being invariably approved by the quartermaster-general,

*Commissary-General Filder.*

16th May 1856.

and no issues were made to the commissariat but upon his approval. I think General Airey stated that they were called quartermaster-general's stores merely with reference to the accountability,—the convenience of accounting for them,—but that was not the origin of the term quartermaster-general's stores. In the early part of the last war, in 1806, the quartermaster-general not only had the control of the supply and the appropriation of the stores, but he had the custody of them also. I can produce proof that he was the public accountant for the stores, and when they were transferred to the commissariat we kept up the term of quartermaster-general's stores.

1971. (*President.*) When were they turned over to the commissariat?—I think it must have been about the year 1806 or 1807. I can produce the quietus of the quartermaster-general for his accounts for those stores given in 1806 in Sicily.

1972. (*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) But there was a storekeeper-general's department?—From the quartermaster-general the custody was transferred to the commissariat; and then, in consequence of the magnitude of the transactions in the Peninsula, a storekeeper-general was appointed, and he took them out of our hands. Then afterwards they reverted to the commissariat.

1973. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You were talking of a time before when the army was in Sicily?—That was the time when the quartermaster-general was the accountant. He absolutely had those stores in his custody, and he was a public accountant.

1974. You may recollect that when a cargo came out to the Peninsula the commissary-general used to report to the quartermaster-general that so many thousand pairs of shoes had arrived, and then notice would be given in orders to the regiments to make their requisitions on the quartermaster-general?—Something like that took place in the Crimea.

1975. Then he signed the requisition, but the commissary-general issued them?—Yes; we had the custody and the issue, he had the appropriation; but the commissariat officer to whom I assigned that duty in the Crimea communicated directly with the officers of the quartermaster-general's department. It was reverting back again to the commissariat having the custody instead of a separate storekeeper-general.

1976. (*Major-General Peel.*) In answer to question 14,540, at page 127 of the Third Report of the Sebastopol Committee, the Duke of Newcastle says, "The arrangement, I "am bound to say, was adopted after a very careful consideration by the Ordnance and "the Commissariat together, Lord Raglan having given his opinion on the point before he "left the country; it was, I believe, founded upon the existing practice, and was one "with which I did not interfere until I began to feel that it was working ill, about "August or September?"—When we started originally the stores were for a force of 10,000 men, and we could very easily have done that, but it afterwards required a separate department for them.

1977. (*Lieut.-General Knollys.*) Would it have been better to have had a separate storekeeper's department?—Certainly.

1978. So as to have left you to perform your duties of the commissariat undisturbed by the duties of the storekeeper?—Yes.

1979. (*Major-General Peel.*) That has been adopted now?—Yes, Captain Gordon relieved the commissariat officer of the charge in the summer, when all our difficulties were over.

1980. (*Lieut.-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Is that a new department now?—I consider it to be a branch of the ordnance. He is the ordnance storekeeper. He reports direct to that branch of the War Department which has taken the ordnance duties.

1981. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) I think the purport of your statement to the Board yesterday and to-day has been chiefly to impress upon them that it was owing to your requisitions to the Treasury at home not having been attended to that there was this great deficiency of forage?—Certainly.

1982. I wish to ask you how you reconcile that statement with the statements which we find you made yourself to the commander-in-chief, as well as to the Under Secretary of the War Department, and also with the statements made to you by the subordinate officers of the commissariat; for instance, in your letter to the Under Secretary of State to the War Department you state, that "at no time, from a few days subsequent to the "hurricane, have we ever been without two or three vessels in the harbour of Balaklava "laden with chopped straw. So uniformly has this been the case, that I have not found "it necessary, until now that a long continuance of contrary winds has retarded the "arrival of further supplies from Constantinople, to avail myself of the offer, which "General Canrobert made, of three vessels of chopped straw which he placed at our "disposal immediately after the loss of all our forage by that event. Previous to the "hurricane, we had always a large supply of English hay on hand." On the 15th of January, Commissary Smith addresses you from Constantinople, and he states that he has no occasion to draw upon the depôt that has been formed for chopped straw, because, he says, "There has been an abundance of straw more easily available for shipment to the "Crimea, and I have caused cargoes of it to be forwarded to the utmost extent to which "the means of transport afforded me would admit of." He says, further down in the same letter, "At all events, there has never been any want of barley or other forage "corn at Balaklava." In your own communication with Lord Raglan, on the 27th of January, you say, "With respect to forage, I would observe that, with the exception of a "few days after the hurricane (that is, from about the 21st to 30th November,) we have

*Commissary-General Filder.*

16th May 1856.

"never been without a supply of hay or straw at Balaklava; but the state of the weather, "the appropriation of the men-of-war's boats (upon which we are dependent) to the landing "of guns and ammunition, and embarkation of sick and wounded, or other circumstances, "have occasionally prevented a sufficient quantity from being brought on shore." And at the close of that memorandum you say, "It may be stated, that all horses of this army "which are under shelter are almost without exception in good condition, although they "have received no greater allowance of food than other horses." Then Mr. Tyrone Power says, "Hay, since the tempest on the 14th of November, has somewhat been deficient, but "chopped straw or bran was always procurable in lieu of it." Does not it appear that there actually was forage within your reach?—There was always forage, chopped straw, in Balaklava, certainly; but I could not land it in sufficient quantities; it was not possible for the supply of that army; but I could have landed pressed hay.

1983. If you had had more, you could not have landed it more easily?—Not the chopped straw, the pressed hay I could have landed. We did not land more hay than was sufficient for the day; we had to keep pace with other supplies too.

1984. You have not met the statement now of Mr. Commissary Smith. The question is, how the horses came to perish, and it was because the forage had not been sent out from England, according to your statement. But I see that Commissary-General Smith states, "There never has been any want of barley or other forage-corn at Balaklava." There was always sufficient chopped straw according to that statement, besides hay?—The cavalry were on a reduced ration of hay because I had not more throughout the winter.

1985. But all the difficulty was in landing?—Not in landing the hay, but in landing the chopped straw; if more had come I could not have landed more.

1986. (*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) Will you describe the process of landing chopped straw?—It came up loose, particularly in the early part of the time, and we employed labourers; and the cavalry also and those who were entitled to rations of forage went on board the vessels to fill their sacks to bring it on shore, and it was brought on shore in large sacks which we obtained from Constantinople for the purpose; very large sacks.

1987. (*Earl Beauchamp.*) Was the straw very short?—It was chaff; but latterly, after we had finished pressing the hay, all our presses were appropriated to pressing the chopped straw.

1988. (*President.*) In bags?—We had bales made on purpose, and latterly we got up more chopped straw, and issued more than we could have done before when loose. Some of the contractors also undertook to bring presses out from England.

1989. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) Do you conceive that any communication was made to the authorities at home that could have misled them as to your having sufficient supplies?—I consider it impossible.

1990. Do you mean that your requisitions were so precise and urgent, that they could not be mistaken?—If any word of mine had possibly misled them, the next mail would have corrected it. I never ceased writing by every mail.

1991. Do you consider that Sir Charles Trevelyan's replies to your statements are not sufficient?—I do not consider them sufficient, certainly; and the proof I think is, that he says the arrangements that were necessary for 7,000 animals are very different from the arrangements for 23,000. If he had sent out hay for those 7,000 in the winter, as the War Department did for the 23,000, I should never have wanted; and in the statement which I have made to-day I meant to make that point clear.

1992. (*Major-General Peel.*) What is the difference of the proportion between what the War Office sent out and what Sir C. Trevelyan sent out?—They must have sent out four or five times as much. I have in my calculations taken, not what I received; but the highest quantity ever contracted for, and during three months I did not receive five days' rations of hay from England.

1993. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) Have you heard what has been stated here by Sir Richard Airey, as well as what is contained in the Report, that you were constantly urged, I think daily urged, by Lord Raglan, and I think General Airey, to increase your transport?—I do not recollect what communications General Airey made to me; he might have made them by the order of Lord Raglan, but Lord Raglan was constantly impressing upon me the necessity for more transport, but he knew I could not feed more animals.

1994. Was Lord Raglan satisfied with the answers that you gave him?—He was satisfied that I had done my duty.

1995. But he repeatedly urged you to get more transport?—He always expressed his desire about the transport.

1996. You always told him that you could not feed more?—I told him I had more animals in the Crimea than I could feed.

1997. Did he not send some officers to Eupatoria to procure horses?—I was separated from the head quarters, and was at Balaklava. The usual practice in buying horses is for a veterinary surgeon or an officer of cavalry, accompanied by a commissariat officer, to buy the animals, and he gave an order to a veterinary surgeon to proceed to Eupatoria, and he carried instructions to the commissariat officer there to pay for them, and they came.

1998. What were they for?—They were for my purposes, commissariat purposes, and partly for regimental bât animals.

1999. What became of those horses; were they fed?—Yes; but they did not do more than replace the casualties.

*Commissary-General Filder.*

16th May 1856.

2000. You had a number of horses at Constantinople, had you not?—Yes; and I brought them up as fast as I could get conveyance for them.

2001. Had you to the amount of 2,000 at Constantinople?—Originally I had, but I could not have fed them in the Crimea.

2002. You did not bring them to increase the transport, but merely to supply the casualties?—Yes; I would have brought them all if I could have fed them all.

2003. (*Major-General Peel.*) If it had been consistent with military considerations to have sent the cavalry in the year 1854–55 to Scutari, as during the last winter, and you had been relieved from supplying them with forage, could you have brought over at that time an additional number of transport horses, and have fed them?—Yes, certainly; but about the conveyance, I am doubtful.

2004. The transports that took the cavalry might have brought them back?—Yes, but I am certain that I got all the transports that I could; I got every possible transport.

2005. Had you horses at that time in the depôt at Varna?—At Constantinople.

2006. Therefore, it was not a deficiency of animals, but a deficiency of forage?—Yes; but there would have still remained the impossibility of conveying them to the Crimea; I could have fed them if the cavalry had been sent away.

2007. Besides the want of forage, there appears to have been a want of transport?—Certainly; I did not get all the transport that I applied for; they offered me horse transports, but they had been converted into cargo vessels, and were down at Constantinople under the orders of Admiral Boxer; and Mr. Smith's letters show that he was every day urging Admiral Boxer to give him all the transports he could, but he could not get enough for forage and fuel.

2008. At what date did Lord Raglan transfer to you the whole of those horse transports?—I do not recollect, but it is mentioned in Colonel Gordon's evidence that the first occasion they offered me them was on the 19th of November; three days before that they were all at Eupatoria, and I sent to Eupatoria to take out the hay, but they were all gone. The head quarters for sailing transports after the storm was the Bosphorus, owing to the want of room at Balaklava, and the unsafe anchorage at any other place. On the 11th of December, under the idea that the "Jason" was still under repair, they offered me again the horse transports, but I did not accept them; they were offered to me in lieu of the "Jason," which was already repaired. If Colonel Gordon were here, I would ask him where they were. The return of the principal agent of transports shows that there was not a single available vessel at Balaklava, and that all the sailing transports were under the orders of Admiral Boxer. Deputy Commissary-General Smith's letters show that he got all that he could from him.

2009. The horse transports were sailing vessels?—Yes, but most of them had been converted into cargo vessels. The "Arabia" that brought up the charcoal was one of those vessels; there were four or five that brought over the heavy cavalry, and their fittings were removed, and they were converted into cargo vessels.

2010. How many vessels had you placed under your own control exclusively?—Only three in December; originally there were only two when I started from England, these were fitted up for cattle vessels. I afterwards increased the number, and in March I had six permanently employed in conveying cattle only.

2011. The ordinary way of transacting business was to make a requisition to the transport agent for transports, instead of which Lord Raglan placed under your control a number of vessels, over which the transport agent had no control?—Yes; for a time. I consider that those, except the original number that I had from England (all the others were lent me), were under the orders of the naval authorities, but they never did interfere in any way,—they gave them up to my use,—but they might have interfered if they chose. By the instructions given by the Admiralty with respect to the other vessels that I had brought out from England, nobody could interfere with them, but those that I obtained from the navy out there were still under the control of the naval authorities, but they never did interfere.

2012. That arrangement was found to work much better than the ordinary process?—Very much better, I think.

2013. (*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan.*) The horse transports are fitted up in a particular way and when those fittings are taken away they are useless?—Yes; for the conveyance of horses.

2014. (*Major-General Peel.*) They converted the transports into vessels to bring over bullocks, did they not?—No; charcoal and chopped straw; the "Arabia" brought up a cargo of charcoal and timber; she had been originally a horse transport.

2015. What vessel did you complain of as having lost so many bullocks in coming over?—The "Rip van Winkle" was lost entirely; there were four vessels in which I lost, in the early part of the winter, one-third of the animals; if they had been available I should not have considered it prudent to employ them after such a loss, but they were not available, there were not any available at Balaklava. Mr. Smith obtained all that he could from Admiral Boxer at Constantinople, and a part of those vessels that he did get had been horse transports.

2016. (*Judge Advocate General.*) Did you always complain of not getting forage from England?—Always.

2017. When you were on the spot?—Yes.

2018. And in the winter of 1855?—From the beginning; from the first arrival in the Crimea I constantly repeated my applications for pressed hay.

2019. Did you put in yesterday any letter addressed by you to Sir Charles Trevelyan, complaining that your requisitions had not been attended to?—I quoted several; they are official letters.

2020. With the dates?—Yes. With regard to those 279 horses from Eupatoria that were supplied at the time, they did not do more than put my transport where it was before; I was very shortly after that at the lowest point.

2021. Those were horses that Lord Raglan had sent for when you abstained from sending for your own stock at Constantinople?—Yes; because they were so much nearer. Lord Raglan heard that horses were to be got there, and he sent an officer to purchase them.

2022. Then horses could have been easily procured at Eupatoria?—At one time they might have been.

2023. What horses were they?—Ponies, such as the ammunition ponies.

2024. Ponies of the country?—Yes. But with regard to feeding them, it did not increase my number of animals to feed, for I lost as many as were bought.

2025. They were bought at a low price, were they not?—The same class of animals were bought at Varna for about 4*l.* or 5*l.* I think they were rather higher at Eupatoria, but not much.

2026. You will put in everything that you read yesterday, if you please?—Yes.

2027. (*President.*) In the absence of hay, could Indian-corn straw have been procured in any quantity?—There would have been the same difficulty in carrying anything loose. I could not get it pressed from Malta. Lord Raglan wrote to Malta, in October, I believe, and I wrote to the commissariat officer, and we got some supplies; but the means of Malta are very insignificant. During 150 days I received 16 days' supply; they were shipped, not received; but I only received from October up to the end of February four days' supply of pressed forage from Malta.

2028. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) What are the precise difficulties in carrying unpressed hay?—An Austrian vessel of 600 tons on one occasion brought me 50 tons of unpressed hay, and she was full; that is the proportion, about one in twelve.

2029. What could that vessel have carried of pressed hay?—Pressed as it is in England it would carry equal quantities; they have kept improving the process of pressing, till at last you can bring a ton weight of hay into a ton of measurement, or nearly so.

2030. You referred in your statement yesterday to the position of these presses with reference to the hay?—I did, to show that the best possible arrangement was made. There were two depôts. I did not know it at the time, but on looking over my letters I find that I had written to Mr. Smith long after I heard that the presses had been put up for the hay, not knowing the locality, and I wrote with some degree of dissatisfaction, and then he explained to me that to have put them elsewhere new buildings must have beenerected. Since that I have learned from him that there were two depôts of hay. I did not know it at the time, but where he did put the presses there was much good hay; he had only one set of presses.

2031. Sir Charles Trevelyan sent out four?—He calls them so, but it was one set of presses—an engine with four presses; it was one set.

2032. You only applied for one?—One set. I did not know what was the construction of the presses; he could not have sent me less.

2033. But they were sent out immediately?—Yes. I believe there was no delay whatever in that respect. I applied for them when I was not aware of our winter campaign in the Crimea, or I would have applied for more.

2034. You applied before November?—Yes. The moment I made that contract for 3,500 tons, and they converted a part of that into pressed hay, I wrote home for the presses, not thinking that we should be in the Crimea during the winter.

2035. When you state that you represented to the Treasury that pressed hay was wanted, do you overlook what Sir Charles Trevelyan has said, that they could not, without further communication with you, ascertain what quantity you required?—I wrote for 2,000 tons, being a better judge than he could be, and they did not send those 2,000 tons; that was the 13th of September.

2036. You applied on the 13th of September for 2,000 tons?—Yes; when I was off Sebastopol.

2037. And you got one-tenth?—I did not receive more than one-tenth of that particular demand; in November, I sent another estimate of the quantity, and then on receipt of that he made arrangements for a larger supply, but still not more than half the quantity that I estimated for, and that is the quantity that he alludes to in December and January.

2038. Have you any letter of his in which he states his reasons for not directing more to be sent?—No. On the contrary, in the letters that I read yesterday, he keeps saying that I shall have ample supplies; and he recommends me to borrow from the French. Therefore I must have made him very sensible of my distress; but the ample supplies never came. The large supply that he talks of was only five days' hay.

2039. You are not aware of any difficulty in getting hay in this country?—I cannot answer for that. I know that when Lord Panmure came into office, there seemed to have been no difficulty. I can give in a statement showing the number of tons that were ordered

*Commissary-General Filder.*

16th May 1856.

to be shipped by Lord Panmure immediately; and instead of 800,000 lbs. a month, the first shipment is 3,600,000 lbs.

2040. When did that shipment begin?—In March. (*A paper was handed in.*)

2041. You procured this from the War Office?—Yes. I now hand it in. Colonel Gordon could speak to those horse transports. They were not available at Balaklava, and the returns that I have referred to show that they were all down at Constantinople.

2042 (*President.*) Do you wish to put a question to Colonel Gordon?—Yes.

2043. (*Commissary-General Filder, to Colonel Gordon.*) On the 11th of December it is stated in your evidence that the horse transports were at my disposal—are you aware whether they were so at that time?—If I recollect rightly they were placed at your disposal. Instructions were given to Captain Christie to place all the horse transport at your disposal about that time, but before that, I think, in the end of October, they had also been placed at your disposal. Upon the requisition of the commissariat officer, at Eupatoria, any of the horse transports were to be used for conveying cattle.

2044. In October I used them—it was at the end of October and the beginning of November I used so many sailing ships?—I think in the end of October the naval officer, Captain Christie, was desired to place any horse transport at the disposal of the commissariat upon their applying for them—they were then lying in Kalamita Bay, and in various ports in the neighbourhood, and in the bay of Balaklava after the storm; those that were not lost were all brought into port somewhere—some had gone to the Bosphorus, and, in fact, they all got into some port. Again, in December, another letter was written either to Commissary-General Filder or to Captain Christie to say that all the horse transports of all kinds were to be placed at his disposal, because then it was quite evident that the army would not want them for any move, and they were all to be placed at his disposal. That is as well as I can recollect.

2045. You would consider a return signed by Captain Christie, showing where every vessel was, would be more correct than any information which you possess?—My information was then quite correct.

2046. On the 11th of December were there any horse transports at Balaklava?—There were transports at Balaklava, but at that time I should think that those that were there not employed were all dismasted, and I should doubt the fact of there being any there that were available.

2047. If there is an appropriation return, signed on the 8th of December, by Captain Christie, that would contain a correct account, would it not?—Undoubtedly.

2048. If they were down at Constantinople, and the commissariat officer made application for them, and he got as many of them as he could, that would be what you would call an appropriation—making use of them?—Exactly.

2049. (*Lieut.-General Knollys.*) The hospital stores would come directed as the quartermaster-general's stores?—Invariably.

2050. You handed them over to the medical department, and made them cognizant of their arrival?—That was the practice, and they generally took them off our hands on the beach, in very many cases.

2051. For instance, the limejuice?—The officer in charge of the depôt sent a letter, which I quoted, to show that the purveyor took a portion of them off his hands on the beach.

2052. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) In the explanation given by the Treasury, it is stated, at page 17, "At no period did Mr. Filder express in his correspondence with the "Treasury any intention or desire to increase the number of transport animals beyond "the above-mentioned standard; on the contrary, it will be seen by a comparison of his "two memorandums submitted to Lord Raglan, dated 5th October 1854, and 16th "February 1855, that he considered the transport he had in the Crimea within a fort-"night after his landing sufficient"?—That refers to a very different period, when there were no deficiencies, when I carried up everything that the troops could want. There was no fuel at that time issued, nor required to be issued; that was in October, the 5th or 8th of October.

2053. On the 1st of November 1854, the number of animals in the Crimea which were fed by the commissariat previously to the hurricane amounted to 7,250?—Those were all the cavalry, artillery, and baggage animals; but my memorandum that is there submitted to Lord Raglan refers to an earlier period, when we had no difficulty about transport.

2054. Then you never did express in your correspondence with the Treasury any intention or desire to increase the number of transport animals?—No. I intimated a desire to increase the quantity of forage which would have enabled me to bring more animals if I could have got transport for them. I only asked them for forage, not for animals. I had animals.

2055. (*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) You had them at Constantinople?—Yes; I do not consider it any answer to my requisition for forage that I did not tell them that I wanted animals.

2056. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You could have got any number of animals?—Yes; if I could have found transport to convey them and have fed them; but I could not feed them. I could not bring forage enough. Unless I had pressed hay I could not feed them. I have a letter here to Mr. Smith, the officer at Constantinople. A letter has been quoted from him, saying that I never wanted forage; but this letter from me to

*Commissary General Filder.*

16th May 1856.

him in January will plainly show what was the real state of things at that time. I was not so well off as Mr. Smith seems to assume.

2057. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) What is the date of that letter?—It is dated the 28th of January. "Balaklava, January 28, 1855.—Sir, should you find it impracticable to "obtain from the naval officer superintending the transport service in the Bosphorus a "sufficient number of vessels for the conveyance of the forage, which, at various times, "I have represented to you, in my semi-official letters, to be most urgently required for "the army in the Crimea, you will engage hired vessels, either country or foreign ones, "and send on all the chopped straw for which you can by any means procure freight. "You will apply to the naval officer to have the vessels towed by steamers, and when "this assistance cannot be afforded, you will give orders that they proceed to their "destination without it. This army will in two days be totally without forage unless "fresh supplies should arrive; some unusual measures must, therefore, be had recourse "to to forward chopped straw and hay with the utmost despatch. If you should have "forwarded any vessels laden with forage since the 'Eveline,' 'Gomelza,' and 'Con-"ciliator,' you will be so good as to state the names and dates. I have, &c. (Signed) "William Filder, Commissary-General."

2058. Assistant Commissary-General Smith is not in England, is he?—No.

2059. (*Major-General Peel.*) It was Assistant Commissary-General Smith who was examined before the Sebastopol Committee, was it not?—Yes.

2060. (*President.*) There is this passage in Sir Charles Trevelyan's letter, at page 18, "The only conclusions that can be drawn from them are that the difficulty of arranging "for the conveyance of animals across the Black Sea, under the actual circumstances of "the time, were so great as to prevent even the replacing of the animals which had "died." Had you replaced them?—I had a number down at Constantinople, but I was disappointed once or twice in my own applications for steamers to convey the animals. I got them as quickly as other demands would allow, but at other times I was without them, occasionally. On making an application to the quartermaster-general for a steamer on 24th December, an order was given for one immediately, but there was not one available till the "Jason" had discharged her cargo on 29th December, a delay of five days; that was her second trip; and to those five days must be added the seven or eight days she was detained with sick on board at Constantinople, making twelve or thirteen days, whilst the transport ainmals in the Crimea were diminishing in number daily. It was at this time the transport was at the lowest point.

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Dr. Balfour.*) You have handed in a statement purporting to have been dictated or sanctioned by Colonel Tulloch, making an observation upon some statement made by Colonel Gordon as to the mode in which the evidence was dealt with. The Board are unwilling to re-open a case now closed, but if you think proper to furnish Colonel Gordon with a copy of the statement, so that he may make any answer that he thinks proper, the Board will receive his statement together with yours and reconsider them. Are you prepared to furnish Colonel Gordon with a copy?

(*Dr. Balfour.*) I will furnish him with a copy of it to-night or to-morrow morning.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Shall I send in any remarks that I may have to make upon it to the President, or to the Judge Advocate, or will it be necessary for the Board to re-assemble?

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) A copy of the statement of Colonel Tulloch will be sent to you. It is then proposed that if you have any observations to make you will forward them in writing to me, and they will then be considered by the Board. The Board are unwilling to re-open the discussion in Court. You ought to be informed that Captain Heath has applied to the Board to read a statement, in answer to some observations of yours in your evidence, and the Board has decided to give Captain Heath an opportunity of making his statement here, and the Board will meet again on Monday, if you think proper to attend. It is expected that Captain Heath will be here. You are aware, are you not, of the passage in which you refer to Captain Heath?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I am aware of the evidence that I gave, but I do not know what parts of it he objects to at all. I have heard nothing upon the subject from that day to this.

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Commissary-General Filder.*) Have you any other statement to make?

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) No.

Adjourned to Monday at Eleven o'clock.

## TWENTY-THIRD DAY.

### 19th May 1856.

The Board of General Officers met at Chelsea pursuant to adjournment.

*Captain Heath.*

19th May 1856.

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Captain Heath.*) I believe you have addressed a letter to Sir Alexander Woodford, complaining of some passages in the evidence reported by the Commissioners, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch; have you a copy of the statement which you have sent?

(*Captain Heath.*) No; but I have another one a little enlarged. It is much in the same style, but rather more detailed.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) The Board give you this opportunity of stating what it is that you complain of, and of making any reply to it which you may think right.

(*Captain Heath.*) I refer to page 178 of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch's Report.

Colonel Gordon, in his evidence before the Crimean Commissioners, gives, at page 178, first, his general reasons for thinking that the sea transport should be under a merchant captain instead of one in the Royal Navy, and then a special reason, founded on my individual conduct. It is upon this latter point that I wish to address the Board.

Colonel Gordon first states that "Captain Heath, the present agent of transports, finds "it necessary to live on board a man-of-war steamer at the outer end of the harbour in "Cossack Bay, rendering the transaction of business very inconvenient, especially where "wounded and sick officers are concerned, who often have to wait at the water side until "a communication can be had with Captain Heath, or his clerk, in Cossack Bay." Colonel Gordon then draws a personal comparison between myself and Admiral Boxer and Captain Christie, and he goes on to state, "Captain Heath finds it incompatible with "the 'dignity of his position,' to continue the practice adopted by his predecessor, of "sending a daily report to the quartermaster-general of the arrivals and departures at "Balaklava, stating whether the vessels contain troops, stores, &c. As a compromise, he "allows one of his subordinate officers to do so, but declines to sign it, as Captain Christie "used to do."

With respect to the first paragraph which I have read, as to whether it would on the whole have been better for me to live on board a transport or on board a man-of-war, I beg to state to the Board that my duties as principal agent of transports were of a very varied nature, and by no means confined to that particular branch which was connected with the quartermaster-general's department; and in order to show this more clearly, I beg to read the following extracts from my instructions:—"You are to assume the charge and command "of the various steam vessels and sailing transports which have been or may be hereafter "chartered by the Admiralty for the conveyance of troops or military stores, and you will "take care that these vessels are always kept in an efficient state, fully manned, in accor- "dance with the charterparties, and at all times ready for service, and that the respective "agents or masters in command perform their duties in a proper and attentive manner. "As the transports have been chartered for the special service of the army, it will be your "duty to attend to all requisitions which you may receive from the Commander in-chief or "officer in command of the troops, and to afford every assistance in your power to for- "ward the military service; with this view you will correspond direct with him on all "subjects which relate to the embarkation, landing, or movement of troops or military "stores by sea, keeping the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, as well as myself, "informed of the same, and, if necessary, the Rear-Admiral Superintendents in the "Bosphorus and at Malta." Then, "You will control the movements of all steam vessels "and transports which are under your orders, and you will afford such assistance to me, "and to the Rear-Admiral Sperintendents in the Bosphorus and at Malta, as may be "necessary for the conveyance of stores or provisions, when it does not in any manner "interfere with military movements." "You will be furnished with charts of the Medi- "terranean and Black Seas, also with the signal-books of the Fleet, and those of Captain "Maryatt, each transport having a copy, and also the necessary flags. Having confided "to you this responsible command, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty place the "utmost confidence in your exertions to discharge the duties of your office in a satisfac- "tory manner; and to whatever position the troops may be moved, you are to consider "the nearest harbour as the proper rendezvous for the transports, and as your head- "quarters, or such other position as the Commander-in-chief of the Army, on consultation "with you, may decide."

It seemed to me that in order to ensure an efficient control over the service afloat, and to superintend effectually the various active duties devolving on me, it was proper that I should live on board ship, and that in order to be in an independent position as regarded the transports, it was highly advisable that such ship should be a man-of-war, by which

*Captain Heath.*

19th May 1856.

means I should be also free to move from port to port, if the circumstances of the campaign should require it.

These views being coincided in by Sir Edmund Lyons, the "Triton," a small steamer with paddle-box boats (which would be useful in the harbour), was placed under my orders, and she was moored in Cossack Bay, because from thence I could command a view of the ships at the outer anchorage, and because she would, in any other part of the harbour, have taken up room much wanted by vessels discharging cargo.

With regard to any inconvenience arising to the quartermaster-general's department from any supposed difficulty in communicating with me, I have to state that it took about five minutes for an ordinary boat to pull from the ordnance wharf to my ship, that there were, at the time Colonel Gordon gave this evidence, on the 30th of May 1855, upwards of 30 registered and licensed boats plying for hire at 6*d.* a trip, that there was from morning until night a lieutenant at the sick wharf with transport boats in attendance waiting for sick, who, if applied to, would always send off any message or person to me, and moreover, that the master of the "Baraguay d'Hilliers," whilst that transport was in port, and after she had sailed the master of the "Bucephalus," had strict orders to answer every one who hailed from the beach close to which his ship was moored, and to send off in his boat, at any hour in the day or night, any person wishing to communicate with me, or any letters that might be sent, and that this arrangement was officially notified to the officers of the quartermaster-general's department.

With respect to the inconvenience which Colonel Gordon states was suffered by sick and wounded officers, I beg to hand in the accompanying letters from Lieutenants Goss and Scott, the officers who superintended the embarkation of the sick, showing that statement to be unfounded. This letter is from Lieutenant Scott:—"'Sir Robert Sale' "transport, No. 125, Balaklava, April 7th, 1856. Dear Sir,—In answer to your letter "of the 20th March, relative to Colonel Gordon's evidence before the Crimean Com-"mission"——

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Are you reading from an original letter?

(*Captain Heath.*) Yes.

*Judge Advocate-General.*) Which you will hand in?

(*Captain Heath.*) I have sent a copy of it to the President; a certified copy in the statement that was communicated. If it would be convenient to return me that statement, I would then put in the originals.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) If you will hand in a copy, we will compare the original with the copy. This is a certified copy?

(*Captain Heath.*) Certified by myself.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) You are reading that of which you sent a copy?

(*Captain Heath.*) Yes. "Dear Sir,—In answer to your letter of the 20th March, "relative to Colonel Gordon's evidence before the Crimean Commission, I beg to state that "whenever a sick or wounded officer presented himself on the sick wharf to be sent on "board a hospital steamer without the regular order, he was taken into my hut or sent "on board the steamer, at his own option; and the practice was for me to send one of "the sick boats for the regular order to you, which order was immediately handed to the "officer when the boat returned. No officers have ever been kept on the beach since I "have had the embarkation of the sick and wounded (from May 1855). When Sir "Richard Airey was about to leave the Crimea he sent me a complimentary letter for the "manner I had conducted the duties of the sick wharf, a copy of which letter I have "appended for your further information. I have the honour to remain, your obedient "servant, (Signed) Chas. K. Scott, Lieut. R.N. To Captain Heath, R.N., C.B., H.M.S. "'Sea Horse,' Devonport, Devon." This is a copy of Sir Richard Airey's letter:—"Head "Quarters, Crimea, 17th Nov. 1855. Sir,—I consider it my duty, previous to quitting "the Crimea, to express to you the high sense I entertain of the manner in which "you have conducted the service at Balaklava; in the embarkation of the sick "officers and men at Balaklava, and it will afford me great pleasure in bringing "the same to the notice of his Excellency Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, G.C.B. "I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant, (Signed) Richard "Airey, Q.M. General. To Lieutenant Scott, R.N. Balaklava." This letter is from Lieutenant Goss, the officer who superintended the embarkation of the sick up to the end of April:—"H.M. Ship, 'Hibernia,' Malta, 31st March 1856. Sir,—In reply to your letter "of the 20th instant, this day received, with reference to the embarkation of the sick and "wounded officers at Balaklava, whilst I was on duty at the sick wharf there, I beg to "state that medical officers accompanying sick officers from the camp for embarkation, "brought with them an order, stating to what ship the officer was to be sent; if he "failed to do so, it was referred to the principal medical officer to know whether the "officer was in orders, when, if for treatment at Balaklava, he was immediately sent to "the transport told off for their reception; the order was afterwards sent from the "principal agent, but I do not remember any case of an officer, seriously indisposed or "sick, being kept on the wharf. Boats were ever ready, from early day till night, at the "wharf, waiting for any officers or men that might come down; it sometimes happened "that sick officers arrived before their medical attendants, who, having charge of other sick "men on the way, and attending to the worst cases that were usually in the rear, may "have had to wait a short time till his arrival. On many occasions the sick came down

*Captain Heath.*

19th May 1856.

"by hundreds at a time, three or four hundred within an hour or two, sometimes six "hundred; 1,059 sick and wounded men were put on board seven ships in three and "half hours, on the 11th December 1854. On such occasions, as a very large proportion "of the numbers stated were sent on board upon stretchers, it did occur that some of "them waited a while upon the wharf, for it was impossible that so many men who "could not move of themselves could be carefully put on board in a shorter time than they "were. This was represented by myself and the principal medical officer on more occa- "sions than one, and afterwards the sick men were sent down in smallers number. I "beg to remark, that all sick reports accompanying officers from the camp were given "to the staff assistant-surgeon attending the embarkation. I have the honour to be, Sir, "your most obedient servant, Thomas Goss, Lieut. R.N., Agent of Transports."

As to the second portion of Colonel Gordon's evidence of which I complain, I beg to state to the Board that as I was never called on to sign the report in question, I never could, as he says, have "compromised the matter by allowing one of my subordinates to "do so." The true facts are as follows: On the morning after I had relieved the late Captain Christie, the boarding officer, Lieutenant Hutchinson, brought in two reports of the arrivals and sailings on the previous day, one for myself, the other for the quarter-master-general. He stated that Captain Christie used to sign the latter, and I, thinking the officer who was personally acquainted with the matter of the report was the right person to sign for his work, directed him to do so, both then and in future; and until I read this evidence of Colonel Gordon's, I never knew that the change had been noticed, still less that it had been considered worthy of mention before the Crimean Commissioners.

It appears that Colonel Gordon's evidence was left for some time in his own hands for revision and correction. He has placed inverted commas before and after the words "dignity of his position," as if in quotation; but I think I may nevertheless safely affirm that no such expression ever escaped my lips or my pen; for I should indeed be sorry if I had allowed any trivial notions of etiquette to interfere with the public service. I thank the Board for affording me this opportunity of publicly replying to Colonel Gordon's statement.

*Colonel Gordon.*

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I wish to inform the Board, in the first instance, that I was requested by the Commissioners in the Crimea to state to them anything connected with the duties of the army of which I had any knowledge or had had any transaction, and which required, in my opinion, any alteration, or anything as to which we found anything that was not quite desirable. The Commission was appointed with the object of inquiring into the working of the departments and machinery of the army, as I understood. Accordingly, when the question of sea-transport was under discussion, and as to which I had had the principal part of the correspondence, I thought it my duty to point out to them the inconvenience which we had felt to a very great extent, and which had been the subject of a considerable deal of representation, both personally and by writing, and everything that I stated to the Commissioners, as it appears here, is perfectly correct. I spoke of my own knowledge, with perhaps the single exception of what Captain Heath has mentioned, the expression about his position, but I can state that I used that expression very shortly after I received it, and Captain Heath may recollect a conversation that General Airey had with him at Balaklava, upon the particular subject of his sending and signing the reports to the quartermaster-general in the way that his predecessors had done. I had also myself spoken to Captain Heath at the sick wharf upon that very subject, and his answer to me was, You have one of your own officers at Balaklava, why cannot he send you a report? I pointed out to him that our officer was of course a military officer, and not so competent to give this information; that we had always had it from Captain Christie, and we begged to have it in future. I was not in a position to give him any positive order on the subject, I could only represent it. I think a very few days after that, in consequence of my having failed to obtain what we wanted, General Airey spoke to him, and on his return to head quarters he repeated to me all that had passed during that conversation with Captain Heath, and he told me that he had said to Captain Heath that if he or anybody else were to say that they wished to have a return of the number of men then sweeping the yard, he, General Airey, would give it with the greatest pleasure. "Tell me that you want a report, and I will send it to you, whatever it is;" but Captain Heath declined. The expression which General Airey told me that Captain Heath made use of was that a man must recollect the dignity of his position. If Captain Heath, as he has now stated, is positive that he did not use that expression of course I am in error, but I gave it to the Commissioners a very few days after it had been repeated to me by General Airey, and my reason for giving it was to elucidate the difficulties that we had found. If Captain Heath did not make use of it, of course I am in error, but that is the sole exception as to any matter with regard to my evidence. Letters have been read with regard to the ability with which Lieutenants Goss and Scott performed their duty. I am perfectly aware of it, and nobody can be more willing than I to concur in it, because I know they showed the greatest industry and ability; but I did not refer to the embarkation of sick men, but to the sick and wounded officers. The men came down, as Captain Heath has stated, in very large numbers, the result of previous arrangements a day or sometimes two days before. When a ship was taken up she was examined by a Board, partly of military and of naval men, and the

*Colonel Gordon.*
19th May 1856.

report of that inspection came to the quartermaster-general's office, and we arranged with the adjutant-general and the quartermaster-general's department, the number of sick to go down to make up that ship's load; and on a certain day they went down and were conveyed away by Lieutenants Scott and Goss; but the difficulty I alluded to was the case of individual officers for whom no previous arrangements had been made. Officers were taken ill in the morning, and they died in the afternoon, consequently it was of the greatest importance to get them away at once, and it was in those cases that the delay occurred. It has been reported to me, by an officer of our department, whose duty it was, that those officers had been in boats going from ship to ship seeking for Captain Heath, or his clerk, till they could get an order to go on board a ship, and it is obvious that a ship lying off at the furthest end of Cossack Bay could not be so accessible as if there had been an office on shore. If the Board will look at the General Orders in the Crimea, they will find that those representations which I had made about the necessity of having an office on shore were carried out, though it was after I left; and I am told by an officer who was there, that the greatest advantage has been derived from it. I think I may say that an office was established on shore directly after Captain Heath left, or very soon after. The French had an office on shore for their ships, and at the place where I saw it working, it answered so much better, that I thought it my duty to represent it to the Commissioners, as we had failed to establish it, that they might with their influence obtain it, and it has been done, whether through their means I do not know, but the object has been gained. So much did we desire to obtain an office on shore, or an office in communication with the shore on board a transport, such as Captain Christie used at one time, that Lord Raglan desired General Airey to speak to Sir Edmund Lyons. His Lordship said that the cordial co-operation by the navy was so admirable that he did not like to make an official matter of it, but he asked Sir Richard Airey to speak to Sir Edmund Lyons, and Sir Edmund Lyons stated that he would speak to Captain Heath upon the subject. Captain Heath will know whether he did or not. I believe that he did; he told Sir Richard Airey that he would arrange it, but nothing came of it, for the whole time that Captain Heath was there, he lived in this inconvenient place. As to Captain Heath's allusion to a merchant captain, or an officer in the navy, that is of course a matter of opinion which anybody may express or not; perhaps he does not agree with me with regard to the separation of the command of the transports of the army and of the fleet in that way; that also is a matter of opinion in which he may differ, but I am firmly of opinion that a divided command is the best. I find, on looking at the evidence of Admiral Dundas, given before the Sebastopol Committee, that he entertained precisely the same opinion, that he had nothing to do with the transports, that they were entirely under the orders of Lord Raglan and the military authorities, and that he had no control over them; therefore I am glad to find that my opinion is corroborated by so distinguished an officer, who had experience on the spot; that is again merely a matter of opinion. I was desired to inform the Commissioners of all that I knew upon the working of the system with which I had been connected. I dislike exceedingly the necessity of bringing officers of the army to give evidence upon anything connected with such a subject, and I shall not do so unless it is necessary; but an officer is in this country, on other duty, who had the charge of our department at Balaklava, from whom, among many others, we received accounts of the great inconvenience that he experienced in consequence of the distance at which Captain Heath lived. I can call General Airey, if necessary, but I do not wish to do so unless I am compelled. Captain Heath may recollect an occasion on which General Airey came down at about 8 or 9 o'clock at night to transact some important business, and he had the greatest difficulty in getting out to Captain Heath, and that delayed the business. There is nothing in what Captain Heath has stated, that I am aware of, which at all tends to discredit anything that I have stated. With reference to the single expression—which I have stated my authority for,—if he did not use it, I am in error. It is now a year ago, and therefore I cannot be positive. Captain Heath will, no doubt, recollect more correctly than I can.

*Captain Heath.*

(*Captain Heath.*) I hope Colonel Gordon will not be kept back by any delicacy of feeling from bringing witnesses forward; but I rather think he is referring to a much later period than the date of his evidence. His evidence is dated the 30th of May, and in August, or thereabouts, or perhaps September, there was a very great press indeed for passages for officers out of the Crimea, some on leave, some on duty, many sick, and some on private affairs, and it was necessary to crowd up the transports considerably, or else they could not have got out of the Crimea, or more transports must have been brought in at great expense. I rather think that the officers to whom Colonel Gordon alludes must have been the officers leaving the Crimea long after the date of his evidence on the 30th of May. I think the pressure for passages was about August, either August, September, or October, and there was then great difficulty in finding sufficient accommodation for officers wishing to leave.

2061. (*Major-General Peel, to Captain Heath.*) Was the report of the arrivals and departures from Balaklava of vessels containing troops and stores to the quartermaster-general discontinued, or was it signed by another officer?—It was signed by the actual boarding-officer, and sent up every day through Colonel M'Kenzie.

2052. Did that other officer, whom you considered responsible for the accuracy of it,

*Captain Heath.*

19th May 1856.

make it daily to the quartermaster-general's department?—Whether he did or not I cannot say; it was done as part of the previous routine of the harbour; it went on as it had done, except that it appears that Captain Christie had previously signed it. I got my knowledge from that same officer, and I thought it more consistent with the service that he should sign it.

2063. The complaint was not of the discontinuance of the order?—No; it wanted my signature in addition to that of the lieutenant who boarded the vessels.

2064. Were the instructions which you have read, and which were given to you as agent of transports, similar to those which Captain Christie had received?—With the exception of the preamble, which directed him to repair to Malta, it directed me to repair to Balaklava. I left out some portions which did not bear upon this particular point.

2065. (*President.*) Why did you change the position of your vessel?—I never changed the position of my vessel. From the moment that I went to Balaclava I thought it would be a benefit to the service that I should be in a man-of-war, and the mere circumstance of being in a man-of-war, made it necessary that her position should be in Cossack Bay. The number of vessels in cargo were increasing till I left, and the wharfage-room which was in the middle part of the harbour, where Colonel Gordon wished me to be, was becoming daily more important; and the reason why I anchored at the outer part was just to make way for the merchant ships, and because I could superintend the vessels at the outer anchorage, which I could not have done from the inner part of the harbour.

2066. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Your position was about half a mile further off than Captain Christie's, was it not?—No; his vessel, the "Harbingers" was on the south side of the ordnance wharf; I should think about 200 yards from my ship; it may be 300 yards.

2067. (*Earl Beauchamp.*) It seems that you were in the outer harbour?—Yes, the outer part of the harbour.

2068. (*Major-General Peel.*) Were you captain of the vessel?—No; but she was entirely under my orders.

2069. Was there any man-of-war under Captain Christie's orders?—No. (*The Witness explained to the Board on the map the positions of his vessel and that of Captain Christie.*)

2070. (*Colonel Gordon.*) The difference does not consist so much of the distance. This, where Captain Heath lived, (*pointing to the map*) is open to the Black Sea, and with a southerly wind it is almost impossible to get there at all. An officer was sent to see Captain Heath, and he was away the whole day, and when he returned, he said it was with the greatest difficulty that he could get there at all in a miserable Maltese boat, for which he paid 6*d.*, and was sea-sick. General Airey had the greatest difficulty one night in getting there; there was no rudder, and one oar was of one length, and the other of another length; but that only increased the necessity of having an office on shore. All we wanted was some place in which to transact our business, that we could get at; and the want of it was so great that I thought it my duty to represent it to the Commissioners.

2071. (*Captain Heath.*) If the Board think it necessary, I will produce naval witnesses, who, speaking from the general experience that they may have had, will tell them what it takes to make a man sea-sick. (*A Government chart was handed in, and explained to the Board.*) As to getting sea-sick, I think Colonel Gordon must refer to some vessel in the outer bay.

2072. (*Colonel Gordon.*) Not at all. In the very place supposed to be so safe, I have seen a ship with nothing visible but her masts; she was sunk there.

2073. (*Captain Heath.*) That was after the storm of the 14th of November; she came in from the outer roads. I saw her drifting; she drifted in, and sank where the "Leander" is lying.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) That was another vessel. There was another sunk just in front of where your vessel was lying.

2074. (*General Peel, to Colonel Gordon.*) If that report was daily made to the quartermaster-general's department, and signed by the officer, what inconvenience did you find from that?—We had not the signature of the responsible officer; we did not care very much whether it was signed by him, so long as it was correct; but I find, looking at this book, entries of two letters to Captain Heath, dated the 13th of May and the 14th of May, with respect to omissions and errors.

(*General Peel.*) Was not the officer responsible who made the report?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Not to us. Captain Heath was the officer who was appointed to communicate with the army, and Captain Christie always did it.

2075. (*Lieutenat-General Knollys.*) You had nothing to do with the subordinate officer, but you looked to Captain Heath?—Yes; as there were those omissions and inaccuracies we wished that he would do it, but very great objection was made, and we gave it up.

(*Captain Heath.*) I will read the two letters which Colonel Gordon has referred to They came in such a loose way that I kept copies of them, wondering what they were for. "May 13th, 1855. Dear Captain Heath,—General Airey begs me to say that "there is a good deal of uncertainty in the reports of the arrivals and departures of "vessels; for instance, we find that the 'Alipore,' with timber, is in the harbour, and

*Captain Heath*
19th May 1855

"has not been reported. The 'Magnet' is reported to-day as sailing, but her destination "is not put. Lord Raglan is so constantly asking about the ships and their destination "that we require exact information on these points. Yours truly, Alexander Gordon." This was a very proper letter to write, but there is no complaint there of my not signing papers. And it happened that this "Alipore" had been anchored close to the quartermaster-general's wharf long before I arrived. I answered that letter. The other letter was the next day, and it was that which made me keep this letter. It seemed to me that Colonel Gordon, by pressing these little points, had some reason for it, as it seems he had; and if he had asked me at once I should, probably, have shown that it really was better for the actual officer to do it; but I never was asked to do it. I never knew that I was wanted to do it. I will read the next letter. "May 14th, 1855. My dear "Heath,—Has the 'Mariner' arrived here from Woolwich? You have not reported her "yet." Colonel Gordon knew that I had not reported her, but he put it in this way by way of leading me into reporting as he wished. "You report the 'Deva' from Ports-"mouth: is that correct? or should it be Woolwich?"

(*President.*) With regard to Lieutenant Hutchinson, he had not been in the habit of signing before, had he?

(*Captain Heath.*) He lived on board with me; he was a sort of aid-de-camp. He was the officer who went on every duty that was not specially appointed to another officer. His own special duties were those of boarding every vessel that came into the harbour, and he wrote out two returns; one I kept, and one was sent to Colonel Mackenzie.

2077. He was not with Captain Christie, was he?—Yes.

2078. Did he sign the returns then?—He did the same duty, and I think he signed them; but it may be that Captain Christie countersigned them.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I believe that is a mistake. May I ask Captain Heath to read the letter that he wrote to me in answer to my application for a vessel on the day that the Mamelon was attacked and taken, and the White Works and the Quarries, with regard to his instructions not authorizing him to report to the assistant quartermaster-general?

(*Captain Heath.*) Yes, but that was all subsequently to the 30th of May. I have strictly confined my statement to the Board to matters which occurred with respect to Colonel Gordon, before 30th of May. The Mamelon was attacked on the 7th of June.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) What connexion is there between the letter which you now call for and the matter before the Board?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) It is with reference to Captain Heath's not being authorized to report to the assistant quartermaster-general. The circumstances were these:—On the day that the allies attacked the Mamelon, the White Works, and the Quarries, after Lord Raglan had got on his horse to go to the attack, I was ordered to write a letter to Captain Heath. I was going with Lord Raglan, but I went back to the office and wrote it. The usual way of my signing was, "For the quartermaster-general," but on this occasion I merely signed my own name, and the answer that I received was, "Sir,—My "instructions do not authorize me to report to the assistant quartermaster-general." Sir Richard Airey thought that style of writing so injurious, that he took up the question; but the answer was, although that was the only occasion on which I had omitted to put that addition, Captain Heath thought it necessary to send that answer.

(*Captain Heath.*) Although this refers to a matter subsequently to the complaint that was made, dated the 30th May, perhaps as the Board have listened to Colonel Gordon's statement that they will allow to answer it. Colonel Gordon generally wrote the letters for the quartermaster-general, and signed himself "Alexander Gordon, assistant quartermaster-general, for quartermaster-general." My instructions which I have read to the Board state that I am to be in direct personal communication with the Commander-in-chief, but when I first went out there it struck me that many difficulties arose from the quartermaster-general's department having more control over the transports than was intended by the instructions which Captain Christie had, or than was for the good of the service. They made special requisitions for certain ships, not merely that a vessel should be sent for a cargo of charcoal, but that the "Himalaya" should be sent for a cargo of charcoal, (a service for which that ship would not have been selected by a naval officer,) and things of that sort, and my desire was to endeavour to put myself for the good of the service rather more free from those trammels than I found my predecessor had been. Colonel Gordon, in the two letters that I read, seemed to assume that I should report to him.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Will you read my letter?

(*Captain Heath.*) I have read them both. Shortly after this there was a great difficulty about bills of lading—in the colonies more particularly. The ordnance officers at Corfu and Malta sent up cargoes of ammunition without bills of lading coming in the ships addressed to the department, and the consequence was that there was a great difficulty, and Colonel Gordon was naturally anxious that he should have copies of the bills of lading of every ship, but instead of consulting with me on the subject he at once wrote down officially for me to have these copies made and sent to his office. He probably did not know the immense amount of labour that would occasion, and that I had applied to the Commander-in-chief for more clerical assistance, and could not get it, and it was perfectly impossible for me, even if it had been my duty, to make copies of those bills of lading. I saw Lord Raglan on the subject, and I stated this to him, and I said that I thought the best way would be for the officer to whom the stores were consigned to

*Captain Heath.*
19th May 1856.

copy out the bill of lading, and send it up for Colonel Gordon's information. It seemed to me still to be the wish of Colonel Gordon to retain the hold that his department had assumed over the naval transport service; and I felt it right for the good of the public service, but in a quiet way, to retain my own position. Therefore when so shortly after this discussion I received this letter, signed as it was, and worded more as a direct order than any letter that I had hitherto received, (I speak from recollection, but I think it was, "you are to inspect the 'Chalmers,' and report whether she is ready and fit for "taking a certain number of Croats to Constantinople."

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I must beg to say that no letter of mine will bear out that I ever wrote in that style. I always used the word "request." I am certain that I never made use of those words. All my letters will prove that.

(*Captain Heath.*) I wrote to Colonel Gordon the letter that he has quoted, and by the same courier I wrote to General Airey this letter:—"My dear General,—I think official "etiquette a very proper thing to keep up, but it should not be an obstacle to the public "service. I have answered your assistant's letter in the only way I see open to me, and "I now send you by the same courier the information your department requires. The "'Chalmers' is ready for sea, and has, in my opinion, sufficient accommodation for the "Croats you wish to send away, and also for 20 Hammels that the commissariat wish to "send back. I have no means at my disposal for fitting ships; she must, as far as I "am concerned, be taken as she is, or be fitted by engineer or railroad artificers. She "is now at the outer anchorage. If you will order the usual inspection, and she is "approved of, I will have her brought in for embarkation. Yours truly, L. G. Heath." General Airey wrote to me on the subject of this letter, and I went up and saw him.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) May I ask to have the other letter read?

(*Captain Heath.*) I have not got it. He wrote to me and requested that I would send back Colonel Gordon's letter, as it had not been copied. I sent it to him, and I then went and called upon him in order to explain the whole matter, and his expression to me was, as to Colonel Gordon,—and I must be excused for mentioning the whole thing,—"I am aware "that Colonel Gordon's manner is often very bad; he has a great want of tact." The letter was further discussed, and I said, I am really unwilling that this should go on, and if you like I will tear the letter up, and I tore it up then in the office, and that is the reason why I cannot produce it. I hope the Board will take notice that this is a matter which has been entirely brought before them by Colonel Gordon, and not by me. His evidence was dated the 30th of May, and I should not so strongly have denied all I have denied, but that I was perfectly sure that this matter was not referred to in that evidence, which evidence has, I think, been given in rather an ungracious manner. On this last occasion Colonel Gordon might have supposed that I was standing on my dignity—and I was standing on what may be called my dignity—but I thought it my duty to take my proper position. That is the explanation of that letter which Colonel Gordon has himself brought up, but which I have not got, because I tore it up in General Airey's office.

2079. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Did you ever make any representation to the admiral, or to Lord Raglan, on the peculiarities, as you state, of your situation?—No; there were no peculiarities in my orders, which I sent to Lord Raglan on my first arrival. He saw the exact position in which I was placed.

2080. He never made any remarks upon it, nor did you ever make any further representation to the admiral?—None whatever.

2081. (*President.*) Was there no communication with the admiral on the subject?—I think not.

2082. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You were under his orders?—Yes; those orders were given me by Sir Edmund Lyons.

2083. (*Major-General Peel.*) You were under the joint orders, were you not, of the admiral and Lord Raglan?—No, not under Lord Raglan's orders. These are my instructions. "It will be your duty to attend to all requisitions which you may receive "from the Commander-in-chief or officer in command of the troops, and to afford every "assistance in your power to forward the military service; with this view you will "correspond direct with him on all subjects which relate to the embarkation, landing, or "movement of troops."

2084. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) Was it the custom of the quartermaster-general to name the transports that were to be employed on a particular service?—It was when I first went there, but I think he gradually disused that practice.

2085. Ultimately you had the naming of the transports?—Yes; I received requisitions for certain things.

2086. You selected them?—Yes.

2087. (*Major-General Peel.*) I will call your attention to the evidence given by Sir James Graham on the 14th of May 1855, before the Sebastopol Committee, at page 261 of the 5th Report: "It was stated by Admiral Dundas, on Friday, that Lord Raglan had "a concurrent authority with Admiral Boxer over the transports; will you state to what "extent that is true?—Lord Raglan had a concurrent authority with the naval com-"mander-in-chief, Admiral Dundas; and the order was imperative that there should be "no movement of any transports without the knowledge of Admiral Dundas and Lord "Raglan; and with respect to their combined operations, the Committee will see that "that was indispensably necessary." It would appear from that, that Lord Raglan had a concurrent authority with the admiral, with respect to transports?—I can only speak

*Captain Heath.*
19th May 1856.

from my own official instructions; I believe that Sir Edmund Lyons had an entire control of the transport service, and I rather think that Admiral Dundas did not consider himself in authority over the transport service, but that Captain Christie was independent of him to a certain extent; but of that I have no official knowledge. Sir James Graham's evidence apparently does not agree with my instructions; but my instructions are very plain and clear, they came from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, but they were given by Sir Edmund Lyons as commander-in-chief.

2088. That was after Admiral Lyons succeeded Admiral Dundas?—Yes.

*Colonel Gordon.*

2089. (*Colonel Gordon.*) I beg to say that this is the first time that I have ever heard what has been stated as to my manner not being agreeable to Captain Heath. I had communicated with Captain Christie and with Admiral Boxer, and nothing could have been more pleasant than the whole of my transactions with them until Captain Heath became superintendent of transports, and then there certainly was not the same facility for business; but I never knew till to-day that Captain Heath was under the impression that we wished to do too much in the business, and it is the first time that I ever heard of any idea that the quartermaster-general's department had taken too much upon themselves, or that they did not do the business in the way in which Captain Heath wished. Now I hear it I can understand why there was a little coolness, but I wish all my letters to be produced, to show that nothing could have been more proper, as I think in the style of them. I have never had a complaint made by anybody, either by a general of division, or a naval officer, or anyone; it is the first time I ever heard of it.

2090. (*Major-General Peel, to Colonel Gordon.*) Can you state to the Board what the question was which the Commissioners put that elicited the evidence that has been referred to?—There were four days' examination, and it is very difficult for me to state what the question was, I was desired to state anything, as it was quite evident there was something in the machinery of the army that would bear improvement with regard to the connexion between the different departments. I was desired to tell them anything that I thought would be an improvement, and it was given to the Government Commissioners for their information. Captain Heath was there, and I took it for granted that they would inquire into the matter on the spot with Captain Heath, and if he had anything to say I should again have had an opportunity to explain, but instead of that they took the evidence away, and I hear no more of it until it is published. I agree that as they did not see Captain Heath upon the subject, it was rather imprudent their publishing it; they were not bound to do it, and I think it would have been much better if they had not done so. It was given by me for their information, and as they did not think proper to communicate with Captain Heath, I think it would have been better if they had not.

2091. (*Major-General Peel.*) Do not you consider that in evidence of that kind there was something inconsistent with the instructions given to the Commissioners?—I did not see the instructions till I saw them in this book. I did not know what the instructions to them were, but I gathered that they were to inquire into the machinery of the army, and to ascertain how it was, when there was a quantity of stores and provisions, that the army was starving, and whether a better arrangement was not required; and among other things, the communication of the army with its own transports I thought was one of the subjects that they were to inquire into, and I told them what inconvenience we had felt, in the hopes that they would go into that subject, but instead of that they went away.

2092. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) I will call your attention to a statement that was made here, that your evidence was submitted to you, after it was given and before publication, for the purpose of revision and correction. Is it part of that evidence that is now in question before the board?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes; but when you say for publication, it was not submitted to me with a view to publication.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Previously to publication, it was submitted to you for the purpose of revision or correction?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Yes, that is perfectly true, as a matter of fact, but not with regard to publication. It was submitted to me before being printed or being read by Lord Panmure. Colonel Tulloch has explained that to facilitate the reading he had the evidence printed, and the report printed, before it was submitted to Lord Panmure. I signed it before it was printed to be laid before Lord Panmure, but I did not know whether they were going to publish it. I rather think that Lord Palmerston said last year that he should only publish parts.

2093. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) This evidence was not inserted by the Commissioners after you had returned it to them revised and corrected. You gave this evidence to them, and they sent you a copy of it to correct. When they sent you that evidence to correct, was this portion of the evidence which has been referred to to-day in it?—Yes.

2094. And you returned it to them?—Yes; and then they put it in print; but it was not with reference to any publication.

2095. (*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) When a vessel arrived with stores, did the quartermaster-general's department derive its first information from the agent of transports?—Yes, of the arrival of a ship; that was the only means we had of knowing. In some cases an officer came up and reported it, and, if it was of very great importance, Colonel Mackenzie went to the top of the hill where the old castle is, and if he saw a ship he came or sent an officer to report it. But the custom was this; every morning at 9 or 10

*Colonel Gordon.*

19th May 1856.

o'clock we received from Balaklava by an orderly the letters of the night previous, and, among other documents, a report from the naval officer of the transports which had arrived at Balaklava, stating also their contents, whether troops or stores; and when we received that notice, we made arrangements to land them.

2096. It was of great consequence that you should have an authorized return made to you as soon as possible?—Yes, and we had that up to a certain period; and I never knew that this question of too much authority over the transports had ever been entertained. It was never mentioned to me. I wished to go on with one officer in the same way that I had done with other officers.

(*Captain Heath.*) I wish to correct a misapprehension under which Colonel Gordon seems to labour, and to say, with regard to that letter which was torn, that there was nothing whatever discourteous or uncivil in it. What I meant to convey was this, that it was more strongly worded than usual. That was what I intended to convey; but there was nothing discourteous.

*Colonel M'Kenzie.*

2098. (*Lieutenant-General Sir W. Rowan, to Colonel M'Kenzie*). Was any inconvenience experienced in consequence of the position in which Captain Heath's ship was placed in communicating with him?—Certainly, to a considerable extent.

2099. Will you state what that inconvenience was?—When I first went to Balaklava, Captain Christie was then the naval agent of transports, that was on the 6th of December 1854. He was then on board the transport called the "Harbinger," and she was close alongside, you could go on board by a raft; afterwards in "Orient," close to what was called the sick wharf at the entrance to the town, and you could communicate easily and hail the ship from the shore; but when Captain Heath came, he lived over on the opposite side of the bay altogether, and of course it was very inconvenient to me and to others to go that great distance.

2100. Was the service delayed in consequence?—Certainly, much delayed, and I reported it several times to Sir Richard Airey in writing. One of the greatest inconveniences was with regard to the sick officers, as Colonel Gordon has stated. When the sick men came down, non-commissioned officers and privates, there was always a previous arrangement made for a certain number to go on board a certain number of vessels; but the officers came down individually, and at all hours, and those officers frequently came without any authority from the quartermaster-general, and then they had to come to me. But no officer could go on board a transport without the quartermaster-general's authority being countersigned by the navel agent or his secretary; and I have known officers sent away from transports without it, not being furnished with it; and I have represented that over and over again to General Airey.

2101. (*Major-General Peel.*) You stated that the order must be countersigned by the naval officer or his secretary?—Yes.

2102. Then could the naval officer have deputed that duty to any person he pleased on shore?—Certainly not. There was no naval officer on shore.

2103. (*President.*) At what distance from the shore was Captain Christie?—Not the length of this room.

2104. How did you communicate with him?—Personally.

2105. Was there a gangway?—No, there was no gangway; but there were always boats alongside there, and, as I stated in my evidence previously, either Major Ross or myself did everything personally; we had no non-commissioned officers.

2106. Had you any officers delayed by having to wait in Balaklava until a ship for their embarkation could be obtained?—Yes. I wish to state that I was the person representing the quartermaster-general there, and with regard to reports of arrivals I found great difficulty about it. When Captain Christie was there I received, either the evening before or very early the next morning, a list of every arrival that took place the previous day. I generally saw either Captain Christie or his secretary, and I had it in writing to forward it to the quartermaster-general as I got it; but when Captain Heath came there I could not get this. Lieutenant Hutchinson, who was there, brought this report to me every morning about half-past six; but I do not consider that Captain Heath was responsible for the signature of Lieutenant Hutchinson, nor was it a correct report, and so little so, that I never sent it up as correct information. I collected information as I could of all the arrivals, and sent up a report of my own. When Admiral Freemantle came, who is there now, and Captain Burnett, the agent of transports, who succeeded Captain Heath, they both of them thought this report of so much consequence that the admiral had it made out on board his own vessel, signed by his secretary, and sent it to me every night, so that the quartermaster-general was supplied with full information of everything that had gone on on the previous day.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I beg to state that we never asked them to live on shore. We only wanted them to have an office on shore.

2107. (*Judge Advocate-General, to Colonel Mackenzie.*) Were you referring just now to the period before the 30th of May?—Yes; I was referring to the time when we had the very greatest difficulties, and from the very hour that I went down to Balaklava till Captain Heath went away.

2108. When did Admiral Freemantle go there?—Not till this summer.

2109. (*Major-General Peel, to Captain Heath.*) When did you succeed Captain Christie?—On the 1st of April, 1855.

*Colonel M'Kenzie.*

19th May 1855.

2110. (*President.*) When were you relieved?—On the 10th of November. I was practically relieved on the arrival of Admiral Freemantle; he combined the duties of senior naval officer with those of principal agent for transports, and I remained there for, I think three months, until an officer was sent out to work under him—Captain Burnett.

2111. (*Captain Heath, to Colonel M'Kenzie.*) You have stated that the service was delayed by my living where I did; do you mean the service of your own particular department, or the general service of the transports as to discipline, and so on?—I mean generally as to everything that I had to do with, more particularly in the case of sick and wounded officers.

2112. You stated, I think, that the sick officers had been sent to my ship, and that they had been sent without tickets?—I never stated that.

2113. Then I misunderstood you.—What I stated was this: that sick and wounded officers had gone alongside a transport, and had been refused to be taken in, because they had not Captain Heath's signature, or his secretary's.

2114. Did you hear the letters from Lieutenant Goss and Lieutenant Scott read?—I did hear them read; but both those letters apply to non-commissioned officers and men, and they required no order to go on board? but the officers could not do that.

2115. I will read to you extracts from those letters—"Whenever a sick or wounded "officer presented himself on the sick wharf to be sent on board a hospital steamer "without the regular order to be received on board, he was taken into my hut or sent on "board the steamer, at his option"?—Exactly.

2116. In another part he says, "No officers have ever been kept on the beach since I "have had the embarkation of the sick and wounded." That is Mr. Scott who says that. Mr. Goss, who was there a short time with me, says, "I beg to state that medical officers "accompanying sick officers from the camp for embarkation, brought with them an order, "stating to what ship the officer was to be sent; if he failed to do so, it was referred to "the principal medical officer to know whether the officer was in orders, when, if for "treatment at Balaklava, he was immediately sent to the transport told off for their "reception. The order was afterwards sent from the principal agent; but I do not "remember any case of an officer seriously indisposed or sick being kept on the wharf. "Boats were ever ready from early day till night at the wharf, waiting for any officers or "men that might come down;" and I ask you whether those two officers, one succeeding the other, were not continually and specially attached to that particular duty?—They certainly were; but they had no power, as I have stated already, to take officers on board of any of the transports without your signature or the signature of the secretary. I have known many refused, and I have had them in my own house waiting, and I have had frequently, and Major Ross, to get orders for those officers countersigned by yourself; and I have seen officers lying in the mud there for the want of an order, it is perfectly clear.

2117. (*Major-General Peel, to Captain Heath.*) Could you have deputed to either of those officers who have been named the power of signing when your signature was necessary?—I could have done so if it had been necessary; but it was not necessary, because the captains of those hospital transports had orders to receive every officer that came. A list was made out and sent to me for my final approval; some of them came down with their orders already countersigned. The officers whose letters I have read state that no officers had ever been kept on the beach; and they must know, I should think. Colonel Mackenzie says that he has seen them lying in the mud, but I never heard of that till now.

(*Colonel M'Kenzie.*) You may not have seen it, but I saw it. In one of those very letters it stated that they were "taken in my hut," or somewhere else. In Captain Christie's time, and Captain Burnett's time, there was no necessity for that. Here was Captain Christie's ship (*describing the position*), the sick officer was sent down, I went on board and got the order countersigned, and he was sent away at once, whereas in the other case you must go off to the "Triton" to get it signed, either by Captain Heath or by the secretary.

(*Captain Heath.*) There was no necessity whatever for this order to be received on board to be signed by me before an officer was received in any of the hospital steamers.

(*Colonel M'Kenzie.*) Excuse me, I state here again that I have seen officers go alongside a transport and they have been refused; sick officers. Captain Heath has stated that one day there were upwards of 1,000 sick embarked, none of those were in hospital ships.

2118. (*Captain Heath.*) I ask Colonel M'Kenzie whether, knowing as he does, I presume, intimately, Lieutenant Goss and Lieutenant Scott, he thinks they would deliberately write the two letters which have been read if the facts were so totally at variance with their own ideas of what took place?—I know them both, and there could not be two men better fitted for their work. I state what I saw and what happened. Officers sometimes came down after dark, but they could not go on board without Captain Heath's signature, that was where all the difficulties took place. These officers were to superintend the embarkation of the sick men, and as I have related many officers went on board without going near them.

2119. (*Captain Heath.*) With respect to the reports, you complain that you received them in the morning instead of in the evening?—No.

*Colonel M'Kenzie.*

19th May 1856.

2120. But previously to that you used to get them in the evening, and after my arrival you got them in the morning?—No; I made no complaint of that; I stated that in Captain Christie's time I got the report either late in the evening or early the next morning, and that that was sent up in the original, but that after you came the report that was furnished to me by Lieutenant Hutchinson—and I did not consider that you were responsible for the signature to that report—was so incorrect that I never sent it up, but made out one of my own.

2121. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) You received it in the morning?—Yes.

2122. (*Captain Heath.*) Did Captain Christie board all those vessels that arrived, and have personal knowledge of their arrival, with the nature of their cargoes?—That is a naval question, but I should say certainly not.

2123. I wish to elicit from you whether you suppose that Captain Christie's signature would have been a better guarantee for the authenticity and correctness of the document than the officers' who actually boarded the vessel?—Decidedly; I do not believe that Mr. Hutchinson went on board every vessel.

2124. As far as you are aware, was not Lieutenant Hutchinson the officer who boarded those vessels during Captain Christie's time?—I believe he did, but I never got any report from him.

2125. (*President.*) You mean in Captain Christie's time?—Yes.

2126. (*Captain Heath.*) Why do you suppose that a document drawn out by the said officer in the middle of March would probably be correct, and that a similar document drawn out on the 2nd of April would probably be incorrect?—For this reason, that I acknowledged Captain Christie's signature or his secretary's, and I acknowledged none other under him; and I found Captain Christie's reports correct while I found Lieutenant Hutchinson's most incorrect.

2127. Was the case of the "Alipore," about which Colonel Gordon wrote to me, one of those cases of incorrectness?—I do not recollect about her. What was the date?

2128. The 13th May?—I cannot speak to that, not having my returns here.

2129. Can you name any special cases of inaccuracies?—I found them so generally inaccurate that I never sent them up. They were my own reports that I sent up, and formerly I sent the originals.

2130. Can you give any plausible reason why the nature of the documents should have been altered; do you think that Captain Christie investigated them, or looked into them to verify them?—I give this reason, that the one report was right, and the other was wrong.

2131. Athough made by the same officer?—Not by the same officer. They were signed by Captain Christie, and they were made out by his secretary. I do not believe that Lieut. Hutchinson went on board all the ships.

2132. In Captain Christie's time?—In anybody's time.

(*Captain Heath.*) I have nothing more to ask Colonel M'Kenzie.

*Captain Heath.*

2133. (*Judge Advocate-General, to Captain Heath.*) You were on board a man-of-war?—Yes, the "Triton."

2134. Captain Christie was ashore, was he not?—No, he was on board a transport.

2135. He was nearer in than you, was he not?—Yes; he was in different positions at different times. For a long time until the 15th or 16th of November, two days after the great storm, he was at the outer anchorage, and not in the harbour at all—some two miles off.

2136. Was any complaint made of the position that you were in?—There was this complaint of General Airey's, which Colonel Gordon mentioned—he wrote a note to say that it was inconvenient; the date of that was the 16th of May.

2137. Did you read that letter to the Board?—No. It is not a public letter, and it refers again to a matter which I think had better not be brought before the Board. It was a report of Colonel M'Kenzie's which I had to answer, and it was a complaint of inconvenience to the service on account of my living in the "Triton."

2138. What was done in consequence?—I spoke to Lord Raglan on the subject, and he expressed himself satisfied, and that I had better stop where I was. That was in a private conversation that I had with Lord Raglan. General Airey thought that I had better live on board a transport nearer in, or that I should change the position of my ship; but I explained to Lord Raglan the reasons why I thought I had better remain where I was.

2139. Was that communicated to General Airey?—I cannot tell, in the least.

2140. Was any request made to you to sign those reports?—Never; and until I read, about six weeks or two months ago, the report and the evidence of Colonel Tulloch and Sir John M'Neill, I never heard a word about it, and I never knew that there was any wish for my signature. It was not mentioned to me in the way of remonstrance.

2141. Was any intimation made to you of any inconvenience that was suffered in consequence?—None.

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I am afraid I must call General Airey as a witness. I did not intend to do it, but Captain Heath has stated that no application was made about signing those reports. I stated when I gave evidence, a short time back, the substance of what General Airey had related to me in conversation, and he illustrated the matter by saying,

*Captain Heath.*
19th May 1856.

"If you were to ask me to sign a return about the men sweeping the yard, I would do it." I wish to ask Captain Heath whether he does not recollect General Airey at Balaklava speaking to him about signing the reports.

(*Captain Heath.*) No, I recollect nothing of that sort. I recollect a conversation with General Airey at head-quarters, with reference to one of those matters which Colonel Gordon has brought before the Board, and which occurred subsequently to the date of this evidence, and which I have already explained. It was on the subject of that letter which was torn up in the course of conversation. Colonel Gordon's letter ordered me to report to him some matter about some particular ship, and I thought it best to talk this over with Sir Richard Airey, and in the course of that conversation, I think, I do remember the repression that he has mentioned, but that was a matter totally unconnected with that which is now before the Board, it was a letter of Colonel Gordon's, which had nothing to do with those general reports. It was a special report as to whether one particular ship was ready for the reception of some sick Turks.

2142. (*Major-General Peel.*) I understand you to say that no complaint or application was made to you on the subject of signing the reports previously to the date of Colonel Gordon's evidence?—Neither then nor afterwards.

(*President, to Colonel Gordon.*) Have you any further question to put to Captain Heath?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) No, Sir; as I have stated before, on the day that we took the Mamelon there was an application for a ship to be got ready, and Captain Heath was asked to report when it would be ready. The word "report" is the usual military term, and he was asked to report when she would be ready. I did not know that it would be taken in the sense at all of reporting to me. I wrote the letter as I wrote others; but I should like to explain the reason why the captains of these transports could not take officers without Captain Heath's or the agent's order. Early in the year, in the bad time of it, it was found that officers of the army used to go on board the transports, and when they had done so, nobody knew where they were, and upon two or three occasions the officer commanding at Balaklava was desired to go on board the transports and see what officers were on board, and send up to head-quarters their names and their regiments. A great many, whether ill or not, were there without medical certificates, and they were living on board of those ships. An order was then given, that no captain of a transport was to receive any officer without the signature of the naval agent, and therefore the captains of the ships, if they attended to their orders, could not have received any officer without the signature of their own chief, who was the naval officer.

(*Captain Heath.*) In answer to what Colonel Gordon has just stated, I would say that the arrangements about passages is founded upon printed instructions issued many years ago by the Lords of the Admiralty to agents of transports. The captain of a transport gets no allowance for table money, unless he produces an authority from the naval agent to receive the person, and the officers of whom Colonel Gordon has spoken, I presume, were down there under their own private arrangements with those captains, otherwise, the captains of those transports would not have got any pay for table money.

2143. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) What was the relation in which Lieutenant Hutchinson stood to you?—He was a lieutenant and agent for transports, whom I had selected for his activity and good common sense to live with me as a sort of aide-de-camp, a sort of assistant for general purposes, specially to board every vessel that came into the harbour, and keep up the register.

2144. Had you a secretary?—I had an officer called a secretary, a paymaster in the navy.

2145. Where did Lieutenant Hutchinson live?—With me, at my table.

2146. Was he in Balaklava every day?—He lived with me on board the "Triton."

2147. Did he convey those reports to the quartermaster-general?—Yes, every morning, I think at 7 o'clock, before the morning orderly left for head quarters at 8 o'clock. His duty was to be with that report at the quartermaster-general's office before 8.

2148. Did you see those reports?—Not the one that went up, but he made a duplicate for me, and one he took up and one he left with me.

2149. He had been with Captain Christie before had he not?—Yes; he was with him the whole time in the same capacity.

2150. He did not take up the reports then did he?—It appears that he wrote them out, as he did with me, but the difference was that Captain Christie signed them instead of Lieutenant Hutchinson signing them himself.

2151. Was any representation made to you about the incorrectness of Lieutenant Hutchinson's reports?—Those two letters, which I have read, from Colonel Gordon.

(*President.*) Do you wish to call any further evidence?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Sir Richard Airey said he would come, but I do not wish to bring any military officer. I have written him a note, he is at the Horse Guards; but I rather think on the whole I will not call him. I wish to state that Captain Heath is mistaken in thinking that Lieutenant Hutchinson made out the reports for Captain Christie. They were made out by Mr. Prichard, and signed by Captain Christie.

(*Captain Heath.*) That I have no knowledge of whatever.

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Colonel Gordon.*) You do not call anybody?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) No.

(*Captain Heath.*) I have nothing more to say.

*Captain Heath.*

19th May 1856.

2152. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) You do not consider that Lord Raglan had complete power over the transports?—I considered this as my authority and guide for doing anything I did, namely, the instructions coming from the Admiralty, which were to attend to any requisition of Lord Raglan. I was not under his orders.

2153. You went there, I think, after Admiral Dundas left?—Yes.

*Commissary-General Filder.*

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Commissary-General Filder.*) I wish to call your attention to a passage in your evidence, given on the 15th of May, in which you refer to a letter that you addressed, I believe, to Sir Charles Trevelyan, dated the 8th of October, and also to a pamphlet of his, commenting upon your reply to the Commissioners. You drew the attention of the Board to the circumstance of his having put two sentences together, which you thought were not immediately connected, in order to make it appear that you had said that you had ample forage in store. It was from your using the word "store," and from your having said that the stores were ample, that he inferred that you included hay in those stores, though in point of fact you were referring to other stores and not to forage. Sir Charles Trevelyan, in reply to that, wishes to call your attention to what you deemed supplies when you made a requisition to the Treasury yourself, and refers you to the estimate of provisions required from England which you sent in November; and he finds there amongst other things, put down in parallel columns, the item of "hay;" and says from that circumstance he considered that you must have included hay when you referred to the stores of supplies in that letter of October.

(*Commissary-General Filder.*) I was in the habit of putting hay into the same estimate as other stores, certainly, as he observes; but I had in the preceding paragraph disposed of the question of hay, as I thought, sufficiently. I might have written it in a hurry, but my second paragraph alludes solely to biscuit, rice, &c.; and as another proof, those things to which the word "ample" did apply, he sends out, notwithstanding I said I had ample supplies of them; but he does not send hay, though I had expressly said that it would only meet the present exigencies.

2154. There is no reference made to rice and biscuit in that sentence, on the contrary, you state, "It had been my intention to transmit for the information of their Lordships, "a statement of the commissariat supplies on hand on the 30th ult., but the navy, in "their desire to despatch the vessels in which they were laden on other services, have "taken out the stores and distributed them amongst other transports, and I have as yet "been unable to obtain a correct statement of the quantities remaining, but I believe "them to be ample." You understand what is there referred to?—Perfectly.

2155. There was ground for misunderstanding your reference there to stores, inasmuch as when you speak of stores you include hay, and you have not specified any stores in particular, but in alluding to supplies you state, "I believe them to be ample"?—Having in the previous paragraph dwelt particularly on the state of the supply of hay, I did not suppose that Sir Charles Trevelyan could possibly have imagined I included hay in the next paragraph, among the other articles. We are in the habit of putting it in the same returns and estimates, but, as I said before, he did send all the articles of which I said I had ample supplies, but he did not send the hay. Then I should also observe, that on the 23rd of October, if he had misunderstood that, I corrected it by saying that I was still in distress for hay. The next mail carried another letter to say that I was still in urgent want of hay.

2156. (*Lieutenant-General Knollys.*) With reference to losing the horses sent down to Balaklava for forage, what was the weight of the packages of pressed hay?—They varied very much, from 150 to 320 lbs., so that the men had to break the bands, and then apportion the load to what the horse could carry.

2157. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) The Commissioners state in page 9 of their report, that there were bakers enough in the regiments to have worked many more ovens than were required to supply the whole army: what would have been the number of bakers that you would have required, supposing you could have got them, or if you applied for them, how many could you have got?—I could have got none in the state the army was in, and if I could have baked bread it could not have been carried the front. It requires 50 per cent. more of transport for bread than for biscuit, and the road not being passable for waggons, the only way of carrying the bread was by putting it in very large hampers which came quite below the horse; a horse might struggle through with two bags of biscuit on the top of its back, but not with a load of bread coming low down towards the ground.

2158. The Commissioners say, "We are not aware of any sufficient reason why soft "bread might not have been baked at any time for the use of the sick, and also for the "whole army. The French army has been regularly supplied with fresh bread, and the "erection of a sufficient number of ovens was not an operation involving any great "expense." I suppose you could not have erected ovens in the rear of the lines?—So long as I could not carry it up in the depth of winter, I never thought of constructing ovens: I could not have carried up the bread.

2159. This evidently alludes to the building of ovens constructed in the lines themselves, or in the rear of the lines?—I think that the Commissioners alluded to the practicability of constructing ovens at Balaklava and Kadikoi, where there were some small ones; but there would have been a still greater objection in constructing them on the top of the hill; I should have had to carry fuel besides the flour; but I was always in expectation of receiving the floating bakery from England. I received in the depth of the winter a notification

*Commissary-General Filder.*
19th May 1856.

that the floating bakery was to come out, with bakers, complete, and a mill in a separate vessel to grind the corn; and during the winter I could not have carried up the bread. But I never contemplated constructing ovens, thinking that this vessel would be out quite as soon as the roads would have been in a fit state to send up the bread.

2160. (*President.*) When did it arrive?—It was ready on the 13th of February, but like everything else that came from England, there was delay; one steam vessel arrived with the bakery on the 12th of May, and the other with the mill did not reach me till the middle of June.

2161. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) You have stated that you received an order from the War Office to supply tea upon alternate days; what was the date of that order?—It would be about April, I should think.

2162. That order did not come from Lord Raglan?—It came from the War Department, but at that time we were issuing roasted coffee and ground coffee.

2163. Were you in the habit of receiving orders direct from the War Office relative to the rations?—Yes, on some occasions; on that occasion I did.

2164. On any other occasion?—Yes. The question of roasted coffee began originally in England. They sent out a specimen of roasted coffee from England, without its originating in the Crimea.

2165. It never appeared in the General Orders in the army what the issues were to be, or that they were changed, that is, you changed tea for coffee, or coffee was issued so many days, and tea so many days?—We should consider it very nearly the same ration, for instance, as in the case of the difference between wine and spirits; but to the best of my recollection, it was notified that the troops were to receive alternately coffee and tea.

2166. It has been generally the custom in the army for that to appear in th General Orders of the divisions?—To the best of my recollection it did appear in Orders, but it would only be substituting one ration for another. I think it did appear in the General Orders to be issued alternately. There was one other matter which the Judge Advocate-General pointed out to me, I believe on Friday, inferring that if I could have fed the transport animals from Eupatoria I might have fed the animals from Constantinople, if I had brought them. I then explained that those transport animals did not do more than replace my losses. Shortly after their arrival the transport was at its lowest point; they arrived at the end of December, and the lowest point of our transport was on the 11th of January. But the question might be asked me,—Why, if Lord Raglan had the means of bringing those animals, I did not bring them from Constantinople? I should be glad to have an opportunity of explaining that point. The vessels in which they were brought were the "Tynemouth," the "Queen of the South," and the "Shooting Star," as will be seen at page 414 of the Third Report of the Sebastopol Committee. On referring to pages 453 and 454 of the same report, it will be seen that these same vessels are reported by Captain Christie, on the 8th of December, as having either gone, or as preparing to go, to Varna to carry Turkish troops from Varna to Eupatoria; and it was after they had set down the troops to Eupatoria that they brought those transport animals. They were never available before. I was so much distressed occasionally for means to bring up transport animals that I was obliged sometimes to employ the cattle vessels. The other vessels named in page 414 were the commissariat cattle vessels, which I was obliged to appropriate for the transport animals. I never could get sea transport enough to replace the animals as fast as they were lost, or I should certainly not have employed the cattle vessels for the purpose.

(*Judge Advocate-General, to Colonel Gordon.*) I believe you have received a copy of Colonel Tulloch's statement?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I have.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Do you wish to put in any reply to it?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) Certainly.

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) Have you got it prepared?

(*Colonel Gordon.*) I have only a rough draft of it; I can hardly put it in just now. Col. Tulloch's is a long paper, and alludes to many things, and as it will be an official document, I should like that my answer should be a complete one to everything that is stated.

*Colonel M'Kenzie.*

2167. (*Captain Heath, by permission of the Board, to Colonel M'Kenzie.*) You stated that you saw an officer lying on the mud on the sick wharf, connecting that with my living on board the "Triton," I wish to know if you can remember nearly the date at which that occurred. I ask the question because I arrived at Balaklava as principal agent of transport on the 1st of April and left on the 10th of November, and so far as I recollect during that year (1855), between those intervals there was little or no mud?—I cannot recall any particular time.

2168. (*General Sir G. Berkeley.*) What sort of a wharf was it?—It was always more or less muddy.

2169. He was lying down on the mud?—He was. Those officers came down without any previous intimation, so that the officers had often to wait.

2170. By whose orders did they come down?—They came down by orders from their own medical officers and generals of division.

*Colonel M'Kenzie.*

19th May 1856.

2171. By whom were they sent down?—By the commanding officer and the medical officer combined. They had to get the sick officers out of the tents, and they sent them down at all times.

2172. Then no arrangements were made when officers came down for their accommodation?—They could get on board ship without a reference to me, but not without a reference to Captain Heath.

2173. Whom did those officers come down with?—There was a general medical officer, or a brother officer.

2174. Where did they go to?—To Captain Heath.

2175. Not to you at first?—No; they need not come to me at all. If they had Captain Heath's signature, that was quite sufficient. I could only give assistance. It was not necessary to have my signature to embark an officer, but it was necessary to have Captain Heath's signature.

2176. It seems extraordinary that officers should have been sent down in that sort of way, and that there should have been no arrangement whatever to receive them. If they had been allowed to come down in that sort of way there ought to have been some arrangements made?—So there was. They brought them down to the sick wharf, and as long as Captain Christie was there, the ship was within 50 yards of it, and while I was putting the officer on board I got an order, but I could not go to the "Triton" to get it done. I had merely to embark them.

2177. When sick and wounded officers and men came down, by whose order did they come down?—The general of division. It was my duty to put them on board, when I knew that they were coming.

2178. You always knew when the men came?—Yes; always. In the case of the officers I was quite prepared to put them on board, but they could go on board without my assistance, if they chose, but not without Captain Heath's signature.

2179. Why was not Captain Heath's signature applied for?—I did not know when they were coming; they came down at all hours. Latterly, when things were put to rights, after I had been there for some time it was differently arranged. No officer could leave without previous arrangements being made. At this time the officers came down there, and got on board ship, and nobody knew anything about sick or not sick; and I had to turn them out, and that was what brought out the order. It was necessary for the naval authority to give an order to the captain of the transports to take them on board.

2180. (*Captain Heath.*) May I ask the name of that officer who was lying in the mud?—They came down half a dozen times.

2181. But he who was lying in the mud?—He was on a stretcher on the wet sick wharf. I do not mean one officer.

2182. Did this happen in the middle of the winter, when, I have no doubt, that those things did happen, and could not be helped, from the circumstances of the case. I wish to know whether it occurred between the 1st of April and the 10th of November. I had not heard of such a thing, neither was there any mud during that period, between the 1st of April and the 10th of November. The weather cleared about the end of March?—We had very wet weather in that very April. It was previous to that, because I had no necessity to make any representations as long as Captain Christie was there.

2183. (*Judge Advocate-General.*) Did this occur between the 1st of April and the 10th of November, or can you fix the period?—No, I certainly cannot; but it occurred frequently.

2184. Within what period?—It occurred; I do not know about the mud, but it occurred down to the very last of Captain Heath being in Balaklava, an officer having to wait there.

2185. (*Captain Heath.*) Whilst I was agent of transports or captain of the "Sanspareil"?—Agent of transports; up to the very last. It may have happened when you commanded the "Sanspareil."

2186. But this particular case, when did it happen?—I did not say any particular case, but I say that officers were delayed and kept in the mud.

(*President.*) Is there any further evidence?

(*Judge Advocate-General.*) No. There has been no application to me on the part of any other officer complaining of this report, and there is no further matter that I am aware of to bring before the Board.

(*President.*) Under these circumstances the Board will adjourn.

*Thursday*, 22*nd May* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and proceeded to read the minutes and consider the same, and then adjourned till Monday forenoon, the 26th instant, at 12 o'clock.

---

*Monday*, 26*th May* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Tuesday forenoon, the 27th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Tuesday*, 27*th May* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Friday forenoon, the 30th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Friday*, 30*th May* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Saturday forenoon, the 31st instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Saturday*, 31*st May* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Tuesday forenoon, the 3rd of June, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Tuesday*, 3*rd June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Wednesday forenoon, the 4th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Wednesday*, 4*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Thursday forenoon, the 5th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Thursday*, 5*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Friday forenoon, the 6th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Friday*, 6*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Saturday forenoon, the 7th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Saturday*, 7*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Monday forenoon, the 9th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Monday*, 9*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Tuesday forenoon, the 10th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Tuesday*, 10*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Wednesday forenoon, the 11th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Wednesday*, 11*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Friday forenoon, the 13th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Friday*, 13*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Saturday forenoon, the 14th instant, at11 o'clock.

---

*Saturday*, 14*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Tuesday forenoon, the 17th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Tuesday*, 17*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Thursday forenoon, the 19th instant, at 12 o'clock.

---

*Thursday*, 19*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Friday forenoon, the 20th instant, at 12 o'clock.

---

*Friday*, 20*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Saturday forenoon, the 21st instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Saturday*, 21*st June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Wednesday forenoon, the 25th instant, at 12 o'clock.

---

*Wednesday*, 25*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Thursday forenoon, the 26th instant, at 11 o'clock.

---

*Thursday*, 26*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Monday forenoon, the 30th instant, at two o'clock.

---

*Monday*, 30*th June* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and adjourned till Friday forenoon, the 4th July, at 12 o'clock.

---

*Friday*, 4*th July* 1856.

The Board met pursuant to adjournment, and signed their Report, and closed their proceedings.

# APPENDIX.

# I.

*Papers delivered in by Lieutenant-General the* Earl of Lucan.


Page.

No. 1.—Morning state of the 2d Cavalry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General the Honourable J. Y. Scarlett, 3rd October 1854 - - - - - 412

No. 2.—Summary (extracted from the War Office Monthly Returns) showing the number of all Ranks, excluding officers, of the Cavalry serving in the Crimea - - 413

No. 3.—Memorandum from Sir R. Airey as to removal of Cavalry Brigade to Windmill Heights, 2d November 1854 - - - - - - - 415

No. 4.—Letter from the Earl of Lucan to Brigadier-General Airey of 2d November 1854, as to the removal of the troops - - - - - - - 415

No. 5.—Copies of the Earl of Lucan's divisional orders - - - - - 415

No. 6.—Sketch of the hutting of two horses - - - - - - 457

No. 7.—Return of Brigade duties performed by the Heavy Cavalry Brigade, between the 13th December 1854 and the 28th February 1855 - - - - 458

No. 8.—Letter, dated War Department, 19th May 1856, from Sir B. Hawes to the Judge Advocate-General, enclosing a return of transport and ambulance animals foraged in the Crimea - - - - - - - 459

No. 1.

## CRIMEAN COMMISSION INQUIRY.

*A Return put in evidence by Lord Lucan (21st April 1856).*

MORNING STATE of the 2d Cavalry Brigade, under the Command of Brigadier General the Hon. J. Y. SCARLETT, the 3d day of October 1854.

| REGIMENTS. | Officers. | | | | Serjeants. | | | | | | | | Trumpeters. | | | | | | | | Rank and File. | | | | | | | | | | Alterations since Yesterday. | | | | | | | | Troop Horses. | | | | | Government Bat Horses and Mules. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | Present. | | Sick. | | | | | | Present. | | Sick. | | | | | | Present. | | Sick. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Field Officers. | Captains. | Subalterns. | Staff. | Under Arms. | Otherwise employed. | Present. | Absent. | On Command. | Prisoners of War and Missing. | On board ship "War-cloud." | Total. | Under Arms. | Otherwise employed. | Present. | Absent. | On Command. | Prisoners of War and Missing. | On board ship "War-cloud." | Total. | Under Arms. | Batmen, and otherwise employed. | Present. | Absent. | On board Ship "War-cloud." | Prisoners, and absent without Leave. | Attached, of other Corps, and on Command. | At Depôt, Varna. | Total. | Joined from England. | From Desertion. | Transfers received. | Dead Men. | Dead Horses. | Discharged. | Deserted. | Transfers given. | Detached. | Fit for Duty. | Sick or Lame. | On board Ship "War-cloud." | Total. | |
| 4th Dragoon Guards | 2 | 4 | 8 | 6 | 15 | 5 | – | 2 | – | – | | 22 | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | | 4 | 206 | 22 | 4 | 7 | | 1 | – | 6 | 246 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 9 | 206 | 7 | | 222 | 8 |
| 5th Dragoon Guards | – | 3 | 6 | 3 | 18 | – | – | – | 2 | – | at sea. | 20 | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | at sea. | 4 | 184 | 18 | – | 24 | at sea. | – | 2 | 3 | 229 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 204 | 9 | at sea. | 220 | 11 |
| 2d N. B. Dragoons - | 1 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 20 | – | 1 | – | – | – | | 21 | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | | 4 | 243 | – | 11 | – | | 2 | – | – | 256 | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | 215 | 6 | | 221 | – |
| Inniskilling Dragoons | 2 | – | 3 | 4 | 14 | – | – | – | – | – | 7 | 21 | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 4 | 136 | – | 3 | 18 | 94 | – | 1 | – | 252 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 3 | 130 | 5 | 93 | 231 | 15 |
| Ditto, on board "War Cloud" - - | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Total - | 5 | 10 | 24 | 18 | 67 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 2 | – | 7 | 84 | 14 | – | – | – | – | – | 2 | 16 | 769 | 40 | 18 | 49 | 94 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 983 | – | – | – | – | 1 | – | – | – | 19 | 755 | 27 | 93 | 894 | 34 |

Royal Dragoons still at Sea - 262 Horses.

J. Y. S.

*Signature of the Commanding Officer,* J. YORKE SCARLETT,

Brigadier General.

No. 2.

SUMMARY (extracted from the War Office Monthly Returns), showing the NUMBER of all RANKS, excluding OFFICERS, of the CAVALRY serving in the CRIMEA, in each of the following Months.

HEAVY BRIGADE, including Sick, Servants, and on Detachment.

| | Nov. | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | March. | April. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Dragoons | 178 | 202 | 197 | 174 | 155 | 163 | |
| 2d „ | 208 | 169 | — | 156 | 158 | 140 | |
| 6th „ | 181 | 168 | 161 | 142 | 139 | 142 | |
| 4th Dragoon Guards | 193 | 169 | 155 | 154 | 155 | 163 | |
| 5th „ | 186 | 158 | 138 | 118 | 118 | 125 | |
| Total | 946 | 866 | 806 | 744 | 725 | 733 | |

SICK PRESENT of HEAVY BRIGADE so far as ascertained.

| | Nov. | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | March. | April. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Dragoons | 12 | 13 | 12 | 15 | 20 | 12 | |
| 2d „ | 19 | 43 | 31 | 26 | 25 | 32 | |
| 6th „ | 20 | 30 | 32 | 36 | 32 | 34 | |
| 4th Dragoon Guards | 26 | 36 | 31 | 20 | 24 | 12 | |
| 5th „ | 9 | 15 | 16 | 19 | 14 | 13 | |
| Total | 87 | 137 | 122 | 116 | 115 | 103 | |

SERVANTS to OFFICERS.

| | Nov. | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | March. | April. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Dragoons | 17 | 12 | 18 | 15 | 16 | 16 | |
| 2d „ (not stated) | 19 | 17 | About same number, but not stated. | | | | |
| 6th „ | 15 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 15 | |
| 4th Dragoon Guards | 21 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 19 | 22 | |
| 5th „ | 13 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 14 | |

LIGHT BRIGADE, excluding Sick, Servants, and on Detachment.

| | Nov. | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | March. | April. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4th Light Dragoons | 121 | 124 | 119 | 116 | 117 | 116 | |
| 8th „ | 79 | 80 | 75 | 61 | 63 | 64 | |
| 11th „ | 121 | 108 | 86 | 105 | 117 | 118 | |
| 13th „ | 120 | 124 | 124 | 122 | 147 | 107 | |
| 17th „ | 124 | 124 | 90 | 85 | 97 | 109 | |
| | 565 | 560 | 494 | 489 | 541 | 514 | |

SICK PRESENT of LIGHT BRIGADE so far as ascertained.

| | Nov. | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | March. | April. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4th Light Dragoons | 35 | 32 | 25 | 14 | 16 | 13 | |
| 8th „ | 14 | 18 | 13 | 12 | 4 | 8 | |
| 11th „ | 16 | 23 | 22 | 17 | 11 | 11 | |
| 13th „ | 21 | 20 | 17 | 14 | 12 | 16 | |
| 17th „ | 27 | 23 | 22 | 14 | 10 | 11 | |

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

### Men on Detached Duty.

| | Nov. | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | March. | April. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4th Light Dragoons - | — | — | — | — | — | — | |
| 8th „ - - | 34 | 35 | 36 | 58 | 60 | 49 | |
| 11th „ - - | — | — | — | — | — | — | |
| 13th „ - - | — | — | — | — | — | 17 | |
| 17th „ - - | 5 | — | 19 | 20 | 15 | 13 | |

### Servants to Officers.

| | Nov. | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | March. | April. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4th Light Dragoons - | 16 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 12 | |
| 8th „ - - | 16 | 16 | 16 | 20 | 19 | 19 | |
| 11th „ - - | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | |
| 13th „ - - | 19 | 18 | 18 | 18 | — | 18 | |
| 17th „ - - | 6 | 10 | 10 | 14 | 14 | 14 | |

### Abstract showing the Deaths of Horses by Sickness, and the Strength in Cavalry Division for the Months under-mentioned.

| | November. | | December. | | January. | | February. | | March. | | Total. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Heavy Brigade. | Str | Died. | Str. | Died. | Str. | Died. | Str. | Died. | Str. | Died. | Average Strength. | Total Deaths. |
| 1st Dragoons - - | 182 | 14 | 168 | 33 | 135 | 31 | 104 | 11 | 93 | 1 | | |
| 2d „ - - | 220 | 15 | 195 | 28 | 167 | 51 | 110 | 4 | 106 | 3 | | |
| 6th „ - - | 189 | 28 | 161 | 29 | 131 | 23 | 108 | 3 | 105 | 1 | | |
| 4th Dragoon Guards - | 220 | 22 | 198 | 35 | 163 | 38 | 125 | 8 | 117 | 3 | | |
| 5th „ - | 196 | 19 | 177 | 56 | 113 | 28 | 85 | 14 | 70 | 3 | | |
| Total - | 1,007 | 98 | 899 | 181 | 709 | 171 | 532 | 40 | 491 | 11 | 727 or 69 per cent. | 501 |
| Light Brigade. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4th Light Dragoons - | 143 | 18 | 125 | 38 | 87 | 40 | 47 | 4 | 43 | 3 | | |
| 8th „ - | 135 | 11 | 124 | 15 | 103 | 44 | 65 | 1 | 64 | — | | |
| 13th „ - | 144 | 20 | 111 | 33 | 65 | 16 | 49 | 4 | 46 | 2 | | |
| 11th „ - | 126 | 17 | 116 | 42 | 74 | 24 | 50 | 2 | 48 | 2 | | |
| 17th „ - | 110 | 12 | 101 | 19 | 66 | 19 | 51 | 5 | 42 | 3 | 92 per cent. in Light Brigade. | |
| Total - | 658 | 78 | 577 | 147 | 395 | 143 | 262 | 16 | 243 | 10 | 427 | 394 |
| | | | | | | | | | Aggregate | | 1,154 or 77 per cent. on the whole. | 895 |

Transfers :—1st Dragoons received 72 horses from Light Brigade in November. 6th Dragoons received 34 horses from Light Brigade in November.

Casualties :—11th Light Dragoons ; 1 killed in November ; 1 shot for disease. December, 1 shot for disease. January, 1 do. do.

### Sick Horses in Heavy Brigade, according to Returns.

| | Nov. | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | March. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st Dragoons - - | 28 | 20 | 35 | 40 | 43 | |
| 2d „ - - | 26 | 25 | Return missing. | 63 | 27 | |
| 4th Dragoon Guards - | 15 | 22 | 42 | 87 | 52 | |
| 5th „ - - | 22 | 11 | 21 | 23 | 45 | |
| 6th Dragoons - - | 14 | 20 | 31 | 43 | 45 | |
| Light Brigade. | | | | | | |
| 4th Light Dragoons - | 39 | 18 | 26 | 25 | 20 | |
| 8th „ - - | 17 | 5 | 16 | 13 | 16 | |
| 11th „ - - | 22 | 20 | 22 | 23 | 26 | |
| 13th „ - - | 37 | 33 | 27 | 25 | 34 | |
| 17th „ - - | Returns absent. | | | | | |

Extracted by
M. M. Tulloch,
Colonel.

No. 3.

(Copy.)

MEM. Head Quarters, 2d November 1854.

THE light cavalry brigade will proceed this morning and take up ground, as pointed out yesterday by Q.M.G., near the windmill on heights, close to encampment of brigade of guards.

(Signed) RICHARD AIREY.

Original sent.

Colonel Gordon, R. A.

---

No. 4.

Camp before Sebastopol,
2nd November 1854.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I HAVE viewed the ground, and as it appears to me, there will be the greatest difficulty possible in watering many horses there, or many more men than there are there already; again, here we sustain much inconvenience from the shortness of transport in getting our forage and supplies, at such a distance from Balaklava. Unless much additional transport is given, our horses cannot be fed. The infantry appear to draw wood from a distance; this will be an additional difficulty with us. Having now stated the matter, and being in entire ignorance whether the object is a simple change of location or one suggested on military grounds, I have only to ask you kindly to instruct me whether the cavalry is to move in part, in the whole, or not at all. And again, what of the artillery, of which both troops are now encamped with us here?

Yours, very truly,
LUCAN.

Brigadier General Airey,
&c. &c. &c.
Head Quarters.

---

No. 5.

ENGLISH CAVALRY IN THE ARMY OF THE EAST.—1854 & 1855.

DIVISIONAL ORDERS AND CORRESPONDENCE WHILST UNDER THE COMMAND OF LIEUT.-GENERAL THE EARL OF LUCAN, K.C.B.

DIVISIONAL ORDERS.

Kulalie, 29th May 1854.

No. 1. Major-General the Earl of Lucan, commanding the cavalry division, requests that the brigadier-generals and commanding officers of corps will see that every officer under their command is provided, as quickly as possible, with the baggage-animals necessary for service in the field. Those officers will be careful that, on no occasion and under no pretext whatever, any officer keeps more baggage-animals than are allowed by the regulations, unless special leave shall have been given by the Commander of the Forces.

2. The Major-General is most anxious that squadrons should always be composed of the same troops, and that the troops should occupy the same posts in squadrons, when squadrons are once formed by commanding officers of regiments. Any change that shall become necessary will only be made with the consent of the Brigadier-General; and the circumstance is to be notified to the Assistant Adjutant-General of the division so soon as the whole regiment has arrived. A return will be sent into the Assistant Adjutant-General's office, giving the letters of the troops composing the squadrons, and the names of the captains of each.

3. The Major-General directs, that where the ground will admit of it, squadrons be picketed together: the squadron or troop is always to be picketed in two lines, front and rear rank, with the lines at an interval of ten yards, the horses facing inwards. Four feet will be allowed between each horse, and a picket-post placed at every sixteen feet. The whole of the horse kits are to be placed one yard in front of each horse, covered by the sheep-skins turned inside out.

4. The dragoons, with the exception of the lancers, will always have thirty rounds of good ammunition; one packet loose in the pouch, the other two in the ends of the valise. When near the enemy, a second package will be carried in the pouch and the third in the wallet. The lancers will carry ten rounds loose in their pouch and a packet in the off holster.

5. Commanding officers of corps will be good enough to appoint farriers to shoe for the staff officers of the cavalry division. They will be careful that this is so divided that it can in no way interfere with the ordinary troop duties. Until further orders, each troop will have a farrier and assistant-farrier. The assistant-farrier is to perform no other duty whatever.

J.
Papers delivered in by t e Earl of Lucan.

6. The Major-General calls upon brigadier-generals and officers commanding corps to insist upon their officers being properly dressed. When the officer is wearing any part of his uniform, the uniform must be complete; when in plain clothes, the Major-General hopes that officers will not appear in fantastical, foolish dresses, but will appear like gentlemen, and as they would in their own country.*

7. The Major-General observes that officers do not wear their gold sword-knots as prescribed by the regulations. It is to be observed, that a gold sword-knot has always been considered, in the English and foreign armies, as one of the distinctive marks of a commissioned officer. The officers composing the cavalry division are to wear their regulation sword-knots, and no others.

8. The Major-General finds it necessary to observe on the hair and beard of both officers and men. Long hair on the head is most objectionable; on service the hair cannot be well kept too short. Moustachios and whiskers are to be allowed to grow, but no officer or private will be allowed to wear a beard. Below the mouth there is to be no hair whatever, and the whisker is not to be worn more forward on the chin than the corner of the mouth.†

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.

---

Kulalie, 2nd June 1854.

The brigadier-generals and officers commanding regiments will be particular that the soldier's valise is packed as follows by all dragoons, as has been ordered:—

A packet of ammunition is to be carried in each end of the valise.

*Near side of the Valise.*—One pair of canvas trousers, one shirt, one flannel vest, one towel, one pair of socks, one hold-all complete, with one mug, a knife, fork, and spoon, one shoe-brush, one clothes-brush.

*Off side of the Valise.*—One pair of overalls, one pair of drawers, ten rounds of ammunition.

Forage-cap on the top between the holsters; canvas frock, stabling-jacket, and shoes under the pocket; web-surcingle and plume in pocket of the valise; camp-blanket doubled, folded in three, and laid evenly on top of the valise; corn-sack with 24lbs. of barley evenly divided, the centre of the sack falling behind the cantle of the saddle; two fore shoes with nails in the near shoe-case, and two hind-shoes with nails in the off shoe-case; havresack containing mess-tin over right shoulder, falling to the near side; currycomb and brush in off holster or wallet; canteen over left shoulder, falling to the off side.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.

---

Kulalie, 2nd June 1854.

The 17th Lancers having been supplied by order of the Commander of the Forces with picket ropes and posts, hobbles and heel-ropes, as used in the Turkish service, for 150 horses, Colonel Lawrenson will use them constantly and exclusively for one of his squadrons. These articles of equipment having been prepared by the colonel of a Turkish regiment, it is hoped and expected that they will perfectly answer the purpose. The Major-General commanding the division hopes that Colonel Lawrenson will be good enough to do all in his power that they should; and he is requested to communicate the result so soon as he shall have had sufficient experience on the subject.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Lieut.-Col. A.A.G.

---

Kulalie, 5th June 1854.

The Special Reports from the different officers commanding the cavalry detachments on board those ships which have arrived from England, have not all been received by the Assistant Adjutant General of the Cavalry division, as they should have been long since. The Major-General desires that these reports may be carefully filled up, giving the fullest particulars, and immediately forwarded. All officers commanding detachments of cavalry will for the future be required to forward such reports within twenty-four hours of their disembarkation.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.

---

Kulalie, 6th June 1854.

When a brigade or any part of the Cavalry division shall be so far detached as to prevent them forwarding the usual daily states, the Major-General directs that effective states shall be made out for the Assistant Adjutant General on the 1st, 8th, 15th, and 22nd of each month. A brigade state will be accompanied by the regimental states of the

---

* This order referred to the town of Constantinople.

† At this time there had been no relaxation of the General Orders of the army as to shaving, after which this order dropped.

same date, and these will be again accompanied by the surgeons' and veterinary surgeons' reports of those days. These returns will be forwarded by the first opportunity that shall offer.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.

---

Kulalie, 9th June 1854.

The Assistant Quartermaster-General will have the regiments of cavalry provided with tents and baggage-animals, according to the following lists approved of by the Commander of the Forces. When any regiment is in possession of a larger number of tents, these will be returned into store; and supernumerary baggage-animals will be handed over to the Commissariat department.

Tents, as recommended by Board, and approved of by the Commander of the Forces for a cavalry regiment, consisting of two squadrons:—

| | |
|---|---|
| 2 Field Officers | 2 |
| 4 Captains | 4 |
| 8 Subalterns | 4 |
| Orderly-room and Adjutants' books | 1 |
| 2 Surgeons, Veterinary Surgeon, and Medicine | 3 |
| Paymaster and books | 1 |
| Quartermaster and stores | 1 |
| 280 Rank and file, 14 per tent | 20 |
| 17 Serjeants | 2 |
| 6 Staff Serjeants | 1 |
| Total | 39 |

Baggage-animals to be furnished for a regiment of cavalry consisting of two squadrons:—

| | |
|---|---|
| Carriages of tents for non-commissioned officers and men | 6 |
| Paymaster and books | 1 |
| Medicine of Surgeon and Veterinary Surgeon | 1 |
| Quartermaster, to carry orderly tents, stores, and tools | 3 |
| Forge-cart | 2 |
| Portable forge | 1 |
| For forge-cart harness for two horses. Total | 14 |

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, June 22nd, 1854.

All officers commanding detachments of troops on board of ships, who have not had an opportunity, by landing in the Bosphorus, of leaving their squad-bags, with spare necessaries and other stores, with the divisional serjeant storekeeper, are required to leave them, previous to landing, with the captain of the transport, who is to take the first opportunity of handing them over to the serjeant in charge at Scutari barracks.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 27th June 1854.

No. 1. The Major-General desires that every officer of the cavalry division under his command (excepting the regimental staff), be provided with a spy glass, compass, and a watch; and they are never to appear in marching order, or proceed on any duties, without these three very necessary articles.

2. On all general parades and reviews, the whole of the trumpeters of the different corps composing the brigade will be formed on the right of the line; and in general salutes, they will give the sound prescribed by regulation. In marching past, they will be equally formed in one body, and will again sound together.

3. It is important that the calvary soldier be well practised in turning out in marching order, and that the horse should be habituated to his load. The Major-General desires, when other more important duties do not interfere, that parades, in complete marching order, be held not less frequently than three times per week.

4. All the horse-kits of dead horses are to be delivered over to be stored by the Commissariat department at Varna.

5. On the line of march, the dismounted men will be required to carry their valise, cloak, and camp-blanket.

6. The Major-General hopes that officers commanding corps will themselves make every possible exertion that their troop farriers should be constantly well supplied with the best fuel that can be procured. They will have to rely entirely upon the result of those exertions, inasmuch as it will form no part of the duty of the Commissariat department to provide fuel for the forges.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Varna, 28th June 1854.

Commanding officers of regiments will have all the troop-horses marked by scissors, with the number (without any letters) of their regiments, not to be less than four inches long, and placed in the centre of the off hind-quarter.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 30th June 1854.

It is stated that various regiments of the division of cavalry have left articles of camp equipment under the care of the Royal Artillery at Varna, and this without either proper authority, or giving proper information of their having done so. The Major-General requests that this may not be repeated, and that officers will, when they find it necessary to leave such articles, first obtain the sanction of superior authority, of which they will take the earliest opportunity of rendering detailed information to the Assistant Quarter-master-General of the cavalry division. Those cavalry corps that have left such stores will be good enough to send in a return of them, and will explain under what circumstances they had been left.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 8th July 1854.

No. 6. On all occasions when divisional memorandums are sent to brigades or regiments, a copy is to be taken, and the original memorandum signed by the proper party, and returned. When letters are written with half-margin, the reply will naturally be written on the margin, and a copy of both original and reply will be kept by the party to whom it is addressed.

7. The Major-General is again obliged to call the attention of brigadiers to the divisional orders issued respecting trumpet-sounds, and the discontinuance of the use of the bugle. The Major-General directs that as the trumpeters of each brigade will occasionally have to sound together, they be practised together until they are perfect in all sounds of parade.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 11th July 1854.

No. 1. General officers commanding brigades are requested to insist upon all dead horses being always buried immediately, and to be covered with not less than three feet of earth. On no account whatever is any dead horse to be put into the sea; but should any dead horse be found floating near the shore, he must be immediately towed in and buried.

2. The general or other officers commanding brigades at Devna are requested to send in daily, brigade states, accompanied by the regimental states. The surgeons' and veterinary surgeons' reports will only be sent in on the days already ordered.

3. The Major-General commanding the division is much embarrassed by learning that some corps are very inadequately supplied with horse-nails. He desires that an immediate return be sent in by each regiment of the quantity in its possession; and further, an estimate of its requirements for the ensuing six months, as he proposes immediately having a supply of nails sent from England—of course, at the cost of each regiment using them.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col. A.A.G.

---

Varna, 13th July 1854.

No. 1. The commanding officers of regiments are requested, through the general officers commanding their brigades, to send in to the Assistant Adjutant-General of the division, lists detailing every casualty in the horses of their regiments from their leaving England up to the present time. The date of the casualty, and its cause, is to be given in each case, as near as possible; a similar list is to be sent in on the last day of each month.

2. The government bât-horses are to be accounted for daily in the morning states, in a separate column. In a paper to accompany the first state, it is requested that the gross number received from the commissariat may be given; and that all those animals that have since become non-effective, be accounted for. These government bât-horses are to be numbered on one hoof with the regimental number; on the other, on the off quarter, they are to be similarly marked to the troop-horses. On all marching-order parades, these government horses are to parade in the rear of their squadrons and regiments in their pack-saddles for inspection; after which inspection, they may be dismissed.

3. It is the wish of the Major-General commanding the division that the trumpeters of each brigade should, when the regiments are encamped near each other, sound the watch-setting together: it is desirable that the trumpets should be brought to one key; and that the trumpeters of each brigade be frequently practised *together* in all sounds, whether for the camp or for the field.

4. The Major-General commanding the division earnestly hopes that every possible effort will be made, and every attention given, to maintain the efficiency of the horses of the regiments, of which so large a number are unfortunately sick. For some time to come,

he requests that all drills may be confined to a walk, and all orderly and despatch duties be done at the slowest pace the service will admit of.

5. The Major-General wishes that the troop and regimental inspections, previous to field-days, should be as short as those duties will admit of; for, as a rule, it is most desirable that the men should not be kept any unnecessary time on their horses' backs; and to forward this object, the men should fall in for inspection by their non-commissioned officers previous to mounting.

6. As it is proposed to ship for Scutari, on the earliest day, all the spare baggage and stores the regiments of cavalry are unable to take with them into the field, the Major-General requests that all such baggage may be at once sent to the head-quarters of the cavalry division to the Assistant Quartermaster-General. The Brigadier-General commanding the 1st cavalry brigade will be pleased to have application made to the Commissariat at Devna, to supply arabas for the above purpose, which are to be forwarded under escort.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 14th July 1854.

No. 1. The Major-General commanding the division is doing his utmost to supply the cavalry under his command with heel-ropes. They will be issued as they are ready, and are to be at once and always used. With these ropes, the picket-lines will run close to the ground; and commanding officers are requested to have their present wooden posts shortened and fitted for the purpose. Every heel-rope will, before use, be marked on each heel-band with the letter and number of the horse, and it must be kept in repair as part of his equipment. On each marching-order parade the dragoon will carry his heel-rope neatly coiled on the off side of his saddle.

2. When the short posts are used, one will be carried by every fifth or sixth man, on the top of that part of the sheep-skin which covers the valise, secured in the best way that commanding officers shall devise.

3. The picket-lines, averaging something like fifty feet, must be coiled and carried on some part of the saddle by the dragoons alternately. Lord Lucan considers no part of the equipment of a dragoon of more importance than that which properly secures his horse in his lines in camp; and the attention of the brigadier-generals is earnestly requested to holding all officers commanding corps to all picket-lines, posts, and heel-ropes being kept in perfect repair, and to their not allowing any detachment to leave their quarters without being properly provided.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 16th July 1854.

No. 1. The Major-General commanding the cavalry division regrets that he has observed much irregularity in the parties proceeding to Varna for forage, which he attributes to their not being accompanied by the regimental quartermasters, or in charge, as they should always be, of the regimental orderly officers.

2. It is the business of the quartermasters to precede the forage-parties sufficiently to enable them to be prepared with the orders for forage and rations; they should then accompany their parties, and see that the issues are good and of proper weight, and that no unnecessary delay is caused by the contractors: where measures are used, they should be tested by weight.

3. The orderly officer is never to absent himself, but is to be most watchful of his party, as he will be held responsible that they return to their camp in the most orderly and soldier-like manner.

5. When at the head-quarters of the division, regiments will be informed by the Assistant Quartermaster-General of the hours at which to draw rations and forage.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 17th July 1854.

After much consideration by a board of officers, to whom the question was referred, it was arranged that the staff officers of the army should, when their horses are shod or removed by cavalry regimental farriers, be charged one-third more than the price paid in England by regimental officers. The Major-General commanding the division therefore directs, that the regimental farriers do charge the staff officers belonging to the division one shilling for finding each shoe and shoeing, and sixpence for removing.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 21st July 1854.

Officers commanding brigades and corps in the cavalry division are desired to be most particular that no parade or drill is allowed to continue after eight o'clock A.M. It is to be observed, that the troops are to be already in camp and dismissed by that hour.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Varna, 22nd July 1854.

No. 1. The Major-General commanding the division observes that great difference prevails in the different regiments under his command in the time given between the sounds preparatory to turning out for the field. He considers it most important in this, as in every other part of the service, that strict uniformity should be established, and that no longer time should be allowed to the dragoon to turn out than is absolutely required.

He desires that regiments will conform to the following rules;—

*For Marching Order Parade.*

Boots and saddles to sound forty minutes before the regimental general parade.
Trumpeter's call to bridle up twenty-five minutes after boots and saddles.
Turn out five minutes after trumpeter's call to bridle up.
Ten minutes will thus be allowed for troop inspection and the telling-off of squadrons.

*For Drill Order Parade.*

Boots and saddles to sound twenty-five minutes before the general regimental parade.
Trumpeter's call to bridle up ten minutes after boots and saddles.
Turn out five minutes after trumpeter's call to bridle up again, allowing ten minutes for troop inspection and the squadrons telling-off.

Troops should always fall in when mounted in open ranks for inspection, sized as they stand in squadron; and as every man should occupy as far as possible his own place, very little telling off should be necessary, or consequently allowed.

2. General officers commanding brigades will be good enough to have affixed to the back of the regimental states the names of all officers sick. They will also have affixed both on brigade and regimental states the names of the interpreters attached to themselves personally, and to the corps under their command.

3. Brigadier-generals are requested to report as soon as the general order No. 2, of 18th July 1854, desiring the marking of all interpreters' horses, shall have been complied with.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 24th July 1854.

No. 1. Two good mules have now been supplied for the forge-carts of the regiments composing the cavalry division.

2. The Major-General hopes that every care will be taken of them, and that they will not be allowed to be used for any other purpose whatever. They will always parade with their regiments when mounted, with or without their forge-carts, as shall be most convenient. One man is to be appointed as forge-cart driver, and will be responsible for the mules, harness, and the state of the forge-cart. He will do no other duty.

3. The commanding officers of regiments are on no account ever to allow any article whatever excepting farriers' tools to be carried in the forge-cart. No spare shoes, iron, or coal must be carried upon it, for it is to be feared that the forge-cart alone will be occasionally found more than the mules can well draw. On the line of march the mules are never to be ridden, but driven in rope reins.

4. Equal attention must be paid to the carriage of the portable forge. The best of the government bât animals should be selected for this service. When with the head quarters of the regiments, the portable forge horse and pack-saddle will be taken care of by the forge-cart driver; at other times another man will be appointed for this duty.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 27th July 1854.

No. 1. The major-generals commanding brigades are reminded that by the orders of the Commander of the Forces, besides the two forge mules and the pack-saddle supplied with the portable forge, each regiment is entitled to thirteen baggage animals and twelve pack-saddles for the following purposes:—

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| To carry regimental tents | - | - | 6 bât horses and | 6 pack-saddles. |
| „ Paymaster and books | - | - | 1 „ | 1 „ |
| „ Quartermaster and stores | - | - | 3 „ | 3 „ |
| „ Surgeon and medicines | - | - | 1 „ | 1 „ |
| „ Veterinary surgeon and medicines | | - | 1 „ | 1 „ |
| „ Portable forge | - | - | 1 ditto | without pack-saddle. |

The major-generals commanding brigades are requested to have the corps under their command kept effective with these thirteen bât-animals. Any supernumerary ones are to be given over to such corps as may be deficient; after which, all in excess are to be immediately, with their equipment, handed over to the Commissariat department.

Lord Lucan desires that the men should be much practised in loading the animals, and that the latter should constantly be trained to carrying loads in every way that it can be conveniently done. It is to be hoped that these animals can soon be led in strings of three or four, and not as at present, that each should require a dragoon to lead it.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

2. In the morning state of the 8th Hussars, of 26th July, one horse is given as dead, without any explanation on the back of the return. The Major-General commanding the division desires that all casualties of men and horses be explained on the back of the states.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 28th July 1854.

The Major-General observes that women belonging to the regiments of cavalry under his command wash in the troughs near the different fountains. When it is recollected how indispensable these troughs are, and how precious is every drop of water for the use of the horses, it is a matter of surprise to him that such a thing should be done or tolerated. The particular attention of all commanding officers is directed to this subject, and if it cannot be otherwise checked, sentries must be placed over the fountains.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, 31st July 1854.

No. 1. The Major-General commanding the cavalry division directs that all commanding officers of corps do insist upon their non-commissioned officers and privates wearing cholera-belts. Where these have to be made, they should be nine inches broad.

2. In reference to General Order No. 1, and dated 30th instant, in which the men are urged to abstain entirely from the wine of the country, the Major-General commanding the division directs that all commanding officers of corps do prohibit altogether any such wine being sold by the sutlers attached to their regiments.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, Adrianople Road, 1st August 1854.

No. 2. Previous to the dismiss from stables (evening), the troops will fall in in cloaks. The orderly officer will attend this parade.

3. The assistant and deputy quartermaster-generals are requested to have all offal and other substances likely to engender disease from exposure, removed or carefully buried.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Varna, 8th August 1854.

No. 2. The Major-General commanding the cavalry division directs that all the regiments shall, when mounted, turn out in the following order, and no other, on all occasions of duty:—

1. Review order.
2. Review order, with baggage.—As above, but with valise.
3. Marching order.
4. Field-day order.—Stable-jackets, dress-caps, cloaks, arms and belts, stripped saddles and gauntlets.
5. Drill order.—Stable-jackets, stripped saddles, forage-caps, arms and belts.
6. Riding-school order.—Stable-jackets, forage-caps, without carbines, pistols, or pouches.
7. Watering order.—Stable-dress without arms or belt.

Excepting on watering parades, the collar-chains are always to be used.

4. Officers commanding regiments will send in as soon as possible, through the officers commanding brigades, a return of the number of spare horse-kits in their possession, and where those kits are; and at the end of each month they will insert the same at the back of one of the monthly returns of camp-equipment.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, near Varna, 10th August 1854.

No. 1. There will be No. 8 order for mounted parades, called patrol order, field-day order, with the camp-blanket rolled in three behind the saddle, and secured by the baggage straps, and a shirt folded in the inside, the corn-sacks laid flat on the top of the blanket, and the dragoon to have his havresack. The wallets will carry the men's shoes and two brushes. Brigadier-generals, when commanding at a distance, will of course exercise their own discretion as to whether an escort or patrol is to move in complete marching or patrol order; but the Major-General commanding the division is of opinion that the men can most conveniently be sent on duties of even a week's duration or more so equipped; and it is therefore his desire that this order shall be preferred to any other for all ordinary patrol duties, and where it will not be attended with inconvenience. It is supposed that the horse will be lightened to the extent of two stone weight, or thereabouts.

2. The Major-General commanding the division enjoins the generals commanding brigades, and officers commanding corps, to be most vigilant in the proper securing of the

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

troop-horses, not to allow them to escape from their lines: where such a thing shall have happened, to take care that no exertion be spared in seeking for their recovery. The escape of a horse can be most frequently attributed to a bad collar-shank or rope, a hand-stall out of repair, or the horse not being tied by heel-ropes, when there might have been a heel-rope for the purpose. The stable-man, or man in charge of the horse, is generally to blame; and either one or both should be at once, and as a matter of course, made a prisoner of. A special report is on the earliest occasion to be made to the Brigade or Assistant Adjutant-General's office, or both. Information is to be given to the different cavalry regiments in the vicinity, who are to assist in the search, and the whole country within several miles should be thoroughly scoured. If the horse is not recovered within twenty-four hours, a second report, explaining the circumstances of the escape of the horse, and what steps have been taken for his recovery, will be made to the Brigade or Adjutant-General's office; which report is always to be forwarded to the Major General commanding the division. Although, doubtless, a horse might possibly be lost without much blame, still Lord Lucan will view with much jealousy and distrust the escape of troop-horses.

3. The Major-General commanding the division has observed that a great variety of practice exists in the different cavalry regiments as to cooking. In some regiments all are cooks, and consequently bad cooks; while in others there are frequently but two cooks a troop, where the failure of both or either of them, through the casualties of service, would entail serious inconvenience. Lord Lucan considers that he will best secure to the dragoon a good mess, made by experienced cooks, by ordering that there shall be always ten good cooks per troop, of whom two in their turn will take the duty, and one of these only will be relieved at a time, and weekly.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp near Varna, August 16th, 1854.

From the irregularity with which the returns and states are made out and forwarded, it is quite impossible that the business of the division can be properly conducted. It must be borne in mind by the general officers commanding brigades, that it is their duty to verify all accounts, reports, and papers forwarded by them to their superior officers. They are on the spot, and can inform themselves readily on all points. The officers at the head quarters of the division are unable, if it were expedient or right they should do so, to take upon themselves the verification and analysis of returns when the materials are wanting, and to be sought at such distances.

The brigade staffs will be held responsible for the exactitude of all papers forwarded through them: it is their business to exact the same accuracy on the part of regimental officers. From the states now received, the Major-General can undoubtedly learn of the diminution of strength, whether of men or horses; but as no state appears to take notice of any casualty that has not taken place within the preceding twenty-four hours, any proportion of the regiment might have been destroyed by the enemy or by disease, and Lord Lucan left in entire ignorance. It is obvious that all periodical returns should include and specify all alterations and casualties which may have occurred since the preceding return, and the Major-General hopes that the general officers commanding brigades will be careful to shape their returns and reports so as to keep him thoroughly acquainted with the position and circumstances of the division under his command, and of the different corps composing it.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp near Varna, August 15th, 1854.

All cavalry guards are to have their camp-blankets. They are to be rolled long, and hung over the men's shoulders when parading for guard, together with the cloaks.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, Adrianople Road, 19th August 1854.

The Major-General commanding the division enjoins the officers commanding the cavalry regiments in the neighbourhood of Varna to secure for their horses and their men a good and an easy supply of water. This is only to be done by their taking in charge and guarding by sentries the fountains allotted to them: sentries should be always posted over the different fountains by four A.M., and not removed before seven P.M.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, Adrianople Road, August 20th, 1854.

No officer's call is to sound even on the occasion of a general parade. It is the duty of the officers to be on their parades as early as the men.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Camp, Adrianople Road, August 22nd, 1854.

No. 1. The Major-General commanding the division orders, that when local circumstances shall not interfere, the general officers commanding brigades will be good enough to have the internal duties of the regiments under their command regulated as follows:—

The reveillé at 5 o'clock, except on such mornings as there are drills or parades, when it will be at half-past four A.M. Stables at a quarter of an hour after, to continue until seven o'clock. Seven o'clock, breakfast. Half-past seven, general watering parade: the whole of the officers to attend. After the parade, exercise and water, by troops or squadrons, but attended by an orderly officer per squadron. Twelve o'clock, stables to feed. One o'clock, dinner. Four o'clock, water, under an orderly officer per squadron. Six o'clock, stables for one hour. Seven o'clock, supper. Eight o'clock, watch relieving. On the mornings of drills, breakfast will be at a quarter past five o'clock, and the watering immediately on the return from drill.

2. The Major-General commanding the division requests that an effective state for the 1st of August be sent immediately in to the Assistant Adjutant-General, for his keeping; and a similar return will be required monthly.

The Major-General commanding the division requests that with all future monthly returns, a special report may be written to him by any general officer, or commanding officer of a regiment detached from the head-quarters of the division, giving an account of the health and condition of the men and horses; also, of the drills and duties performed during the preceding month; and they will state particularly how the troops have been supplied with food and forage. Notwithstanding these periodical reports, it will continue incumbent, as it has always been, on a brigadier, or an officer commanding troops detached, to make special reports concerning the health and condition of both men and horses, when the necessity occurs.

3. It will be the business of the Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General to make the foraging of the cavalry corps within reach of the head-quarters of the division his first study and duty. He will daily personally wait upon the Brigadier-General, and officers commanding corps, and from them inform himself of the quantity and quality of the forage issued. He will be in constant communication with the commissariat of the division; will assist those officers by every means in his power; and will keep the Major-General informed of the result of these highly important duties.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, Adrianople Road, 23rd August 1854.

No. 1. The Major-General commanding the division will inspect the mules and bât-horses of the heavy brigade, and 4th Light Dragoons, to-morrow morning, at seven o'clock, on the ground in the rear of head-quarters camp. The brigadier-generals, and commanding officers of corps, with their veterinary surgeons, will attend. The forge-carts are not required, but the forge mules are to be paraded with their harness, and the other bât-animals in pack-saddles.

2. The commanding officers will bring with them, on this occasion, returns of the service ammunition in possession of their corps, specifying the rounds in packets, and those loose; also as to their condition.

4. The forage ration of the cavalry at head-quarters of the division will be 14 lbs. per horse for the present, in consequence of the very short allowance of forage lately issued, and the large quantity, therefore, owing.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, Adrianople Road, 24th August 1854.

No. 1. The Major-General commanding the cavalry division finds himself compelled to remark upon the number of horses allowed to break and stray from their lines, as also upon the numerous casualties in the way of fractures and other accidents. It appears that the collar-shanks, whether of chain or rope, are frequently worn out and worthless. Commanding officers are reminded that there is plenty of good rope to be bought, and that it is their duty to provide as much, at the cost of the colonel, as will effectually secure their horses.

2. The Commander of the Forces has sanctioned the issue of horse-nails and the purchasing of coals from the Commissariat department, should they be able to furnish them, on requisition through the Assistant Quartermaster-General of the division, to the Quartermaster-General.

3. The Major-General commanding the division urgently requests that the commanding officers of regiments will do everything in their power to promote cleanliness on the part of their men, both in their clothes and persons. With the consent of their medical officers, they should promote occasional bathing on the part of the men, at proper hours. The men should ride to and from the sea.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Camp, Adrianople Road, 25th August 1854.

No. 1. On all mounted parades, the men will turn out in boots and spurs.

2. The Major-General commanding the division desires that the leather of the overalls shall be kept oiled or blackened.

3. On all foot-parades, attending funerals, &c., swords are to be worn, unless otherwise ordered.

4. The heavy brigade are always to parade in watering order, with saddles. Camp-blankets will never be used on such occasions.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, Adrianople Road, 27th August, 1854.

No. 1. On all occasions of marches or general parades of corps at the head-quarters of the division, the orderly trumpeter of the division will give all the soundings at the Assistant Adjutant-General's tent or quarters, commencing, in the case of mounted parades, with boots and saddles, and in the case of foot parades, with the warning trumpet. What is required at the head-quarters of the division, the brigadier-generals are requested to have practised by their brigades when detached, making their orderly brigade trumpeters sound in like manner at the quarters of the brigade major. These sounds will be repeated at once by all regiments at hand; by others in the best way that circumstances shall allow. The orderly trumpeters of the division or brigade will of course parade fully equipped before the first trumpet is to sound.

2. With the exception of the lancers, who carry a pistol, all the other regiments of the division will, in marching order, carry their shoes and brushes in their wallet.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, Adrianople Road, 30th August 1854.

No. 1. The Major-General commanding the division, although undoubtedly less dissatisfied with some corps than with others, is not satisfied with the cleanliness of any of the regiments composing the cavalry division. The men are not cleanly in their appearance or in their persons; their cloths are unnecessarily dirty and stained; their arms such as have come under the Major-General's observation, are not as clean as they ought to be; their belts, leathers, and appointments both of horse and man, are rusty and dirty; nor can it well be otherwise when, as it appears, the commanding officers of regiments are dispensing with the use of soap, oil, pipe-clay, blacking, chrome, and everything else, without which it is unreasonable to expect a dragoon to make a decent appearance. It would really appear as if the object were that every soldier on service should look as unsoldierlike, slovenly, and dirty as possible. In the infantry, no such mistaken idea appears to prevail. In the French cavalry, which it should be our object to emulate in every way and on every occasion, no such notion is entertained. They do not attempt to dispense with those requisite for cleanliness and appearance, but approach the cleanliness of home service as near as they can. The Major-General, well knowing the difficulties which exist, in the occasional absence of water, is not so unreasonable as not to make allowances for camp life; but he cannot excuse the laxity which appears to prevail, and he will not admit that every rule for cleanliness and order is to be abandoned on service. Commanding officers of regiments will at once provide themselves in this country, or from England or elsewhere, with all that is necessary for the cleansing and preservation of their arms, appointments, and their kits. The Major-General hopes, as he expects, that having urgently called the attention of commanding officers to what he considers so necessary and so important to discipline, that he will receive such support from them and the generals of brigades, that he will have for the future but to approve of the cleanly and soldierlike appearance of all the regiments composing the cavalry division of the Army of the East; and that he will be enabled to feel, which he does not at present, that they are in a state to be seen by, and compared with, any other cavalry.

2. The Major-General commanding the division requests that where there are rope collar-shanks, these may be of sufficient thickness, and that as much uniformity as possible in the fastening them to the collar and carrying them round the neck may be preserved. He hopes that general officers commanding brigades will induce commanding officers of regiments to give their immediate attention to the proper securing of the troop-horses in the lines—a point of much moment in the approaching service. The Major-General requests to be informed how commanding officers have succeeded in providing themselves with the rope required for this purpose.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, Adrianople Road, 1st Sept. 1854.

No. 2. The Major-General commanding the division finds that it will be most difficult to embark the whole of the light cavalry brigade on board the four steamers; he must therefore require the strictest obedience to these instructions:—

The divisional and brigade staffs will embark two horses each officer; field officers of regiments two horses; all other officers one horse each. Officers will take or leave their

bâtmen, as they shall prefer. Only one bât-horse per squadron will carry camp kettles. The forge-cart mules will also be embarked. Orders are given that these bât-animals and mules should not occupy stalls, but stand on deck.

By Order,
(Signed.) W. Paulet, Col. A.A.G.

---

Steam Ship Simla, 7th Sept. 1854.

No. 1. The Lieutenant-General commanding the cavalry earnestly hopes that the Major-General and officers commanding on board the troop-ships will, by previous and judicious arrangements, do everything in their power to effect an orderly, soldier-like, and expeditious landing; and when landed, a speedy formation of the different squadrons. The Lieutenant-General, with this object, wishes the following rules to be as closely adhered to as circumstances shall admit of.

2. All the corn-sacks holding horse-kits should be arranged by troops in different parts of the vessel easiest of access, as early as possible, and must contain every part of the equipment, with the exception of the camp-blanket and cloak.

3. The dragoon is to be already fully equipped, with his carbine, blanket, and cloak at hand, and with his canteen *full* of water, and his haversack, containing his mess-tin and rations, on his person.

4. The Lieutenant-General wishes three days' rations to consist of three pounds of pork cooked, three pounds of biscuit, and three days' sugar and tea. The regimental quartermaster will carry the rum on shore in a barrel, and serve it out daily.

5. The oats will be landed, if possible, in the first boats, in ship sacks or barrels, and distributed by the regimental quartermaster, who will have landed for that purpose so soon as a troop is landed and equipped.

6. The forage ration for three days should consist of thirty pounds of oats and eighteen pounds of hay; the hay should be put into the nets previous to landing, and accompany the dragoon on shore.

7. The landing should as much as possible be effected by troops;—Where this cannot be done, by squadrons.

8. The captain of a troop will land in the first boat, leaving the next troop officer to superintend the duties on board, and to land in the last boat, whose business it will be to arrange the order in which the horses are to land; and he will be careful that every dragoon accompanies his horse in the same lighter, or one of the towing-boats, and that he has with him his horse-kit, camp-blanket, cloak, and carbine or lance.

9. The regimental quartermaster will land in the first boat, to weigh out the corn, and the troop farriers, to look over and fasten such shoes as may be loose.

10. Twelve water-buckets will be landed, and carried in the forge-cart.

11. The attention of all officers is earnestly called to the state of the carbines and ammunition, an attention which the Lieutenant-General hopes will be constantly given to a point of such importance.

12. The officers commanding cavalry troop-ships will recollect that they are to wait for orders previous to any disembarkation whatever.

13. The Commander-in-Chief having ordered that sabretasches are to be worn by hussars alone, all other regiments composing the cavalry, whether in the light or heavy brigade, will at once discontinue their use.

14. The Lieutenant-General earnestly hopes that every endeavour will be made by commanding officers of regiments to mount every troop-horse on landing. Where it shall be found necessary, the second bâtmen of the field officers are to be mounted, and join the ranks; after which the bâtmen of all the officers, commencing from the junior subaltern. These mounted bâtmen will act like serjeants' men, waiting on their master's horse and their own, and accompanying their masters on all mounted duties.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Ship Simla, Sept. 15th, 1854.

To reduce the weight of the drago n, the light cavalry brigade will disembark in patrol order, with sheeprskins and dress jackets, without scales or epaulettes.

The stable-jackets will be left behind. The twenty rounds of ammunition will be carried in the pouch, the remaining ten in the wallet,

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, Steneskoi, Crimea, Sept. 18th, 1854.

No. 1. The Lieutenant-General commanding the cavalry feels much concerned at the very reduced state of the light cavalry brigade. He much fears that many horses will be found not in condition to enable them fully to do the arduous duties which await them. The Lieutenant-General feels, as must the Major-General and all the commanding officers of regiments, that their own characters are involved in the due efficiency of the corps under their orders; and he does hope and expect that every effort will be made to give flesh and condition to the horses. To effect this all-important object, every exertion must be made well and perfectly to water them, and to give them the best and largest quantity of food

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

that can be procured. This alone will avail little, unless it is thoroughly instilled into all officers, that every unnecessary exertion, however trifling, must be spared the horses. The dragoon should not be allowed to sit upon his horse except when indispensably obliged to do so. Parades and inspections should be as short and as few as possible, and the men taught and made to dismount at the first moment practicable. The pace, again, should be as slow as the service will admit of.

2. The Lieutenant-General commanding the cavalry desires that all officers should understand that the chief duties of light cavalry are by their vigilance and activity to insure the safety of the army from all surprise, and to procure all the information within their power respecting the enemy and the country; but it is not their duty needlessly, without authority, to engage the enemy. When attacked, it is doubtless their positive duty to defend themselves at all hazards; but on no account should any party attack or pursue, unless specially directed so to do. In the present campaign it is more than ordinarily necessary that this should be both well understood and well attended to, as the capture or slaughter of a few Cossacks must always prove a most valueless triumph, and certainly will never compensate for the risk and exertion it will impose upon both man and horse. Lord Lucan hopes that the light cavalry will prove, by their vigilance, the eyes of the army; that they will never engage in petty skirmishes, but will reserve their efforts for the day of battle, when he is confident they will not fall short of what will be expected of them.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G,

---

Camp, near Duvankoi, Sept. 23d, 1854.

No. 1. Commanding officers of regiments will be good enough to state whether the whole or what part of the horses were watered yesterday morning before leaving Alma. In those cases where the horses were not watered, they are required to account for what appears a neglect of an order of the highest importance.

2. Commanding officers are requested to state whether the regimental forge-carts yesterday carried other than the farriers' tools, agreeably to division order, dated 18th and 24th July 1854; and they will consider how far they have disobeyed this division order.

3. When a general or division order is considered of sufficient consequence to be immediately promulgated, and the major-general commanding the brigade is absent, it is the duty of the major of brigade to call the immediate attention of the next senior officer to it, that he may act.

4. When the cavalry is moving, commanding officers of regiments and horse artillery will report with the parade state when the horses were last watered, and what corn and provisions are in possession of the troops.

5. When a body of cavalry, consisting of one brigade (say eight squadrons), is moving near the enemy, one squadron at least will form the advance guard. The leading troop loads, and marches with carbines carried: this is to supply all advance parties and flankers. The second troop follows as the support, with drawn swords. In all retreats, the rear-guard is formed in the same way. Supposing the troop to be fifty men, two men and a corporal are in advance, and at a distance; followed by a serjeant and twelve men. The serjeant's party furnishes the flankers, and is reinforced to its full number by the support which follows.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Balaklava, 28th Sept. 1854.

As it is not intended for the army to march to-day, the Lieutenant-General requests that the Major-General commanding the light cavalry brigade, and all commanding officers of corps, will avail themselves of the opportunity to make their men wash themselves thoroughly clean, and repair their clothing; also to see to their arms and horse appointments. These last should be inspected by troop officers in the course of the afternoon, as should be their ammunition.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Balaklava, 29th Sept. 1854.

No. 1. Whenever the cavalry have to fetch their corn themselves, the Lieutenant-General directs that one man and two horses, both with stripped saddles and with their corn-sacks, shall carry rations of 12 lbs. each for eighteen horses. On the dragoon's own horse he is to carry 24 lbs., on the led horse two sacks containing 96 lbs. each. A dragoon with two horses, and riding himself, will thus carry rations for eighteen horses.

2. There will be a field officer for the day, whose duty it will be to post and inspect pickets, in and out-lying, quarter-guards, and other divisional duties. This officer will come on duty every afternoon at four o'clock; he will make his report in writing to the Assistant Adjutant-General for the Lieutenant-General's information; and he will, in the course of the afternoon, wait upon the Lieutenant-General to receive his orders respecting

the night duties. The next field officer for duty will always be placed in orders, and in the event of the field officer of the day being removed to a distance, he will at once take up his duties.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Balaklava, Oct. 1st, 1854.

No. 1. The Lieutenant-General is most apprehensive, that unless much more regularity, arrangement, and economy are practised in the consumption of fodder, that the cavalry will fall into great want. He must insist upon officers commanding regiments themselves giving their attention to what is not only their duty, but is so essential to the interests of their regiments. They must on no account allow more forage to be drawn from the stacks than the horses can eat up clean; and they will be good enough to name hours once only in the day for the drawing of fodder, when the regimental quartermasters and the troop sergeant-majors are invariably to attend. The attention of the general officers commanding brigades is earnestly desired to the carrying out of these instructions.

2. It is the duty of the field officer of the day to inspect all pickets and patrols previous to their leaving the camp, and to see that all orders have been duly carried out. It is also their duty to inspect all in-lying pickets when they come on duty and are mounted.

3. All patrols and pickets will be turned out by the orderly trumpeter of the division, whose duty it will be to attend upon the field officer of the day at the guard-call.

4. All patrols and pickets, in and out-lying, are always to have ready corn and cooked provisions.

5. One quarter of each patrol is always to move off with loaded carbines. Care must be taken that, on the return of patrols, their arms are put away, and discharged the next day in the presence of the orderly officer at mid-day, according to the general orders.

6. It is most urgent that every endeavour possible should be made to procure supplies such as cattle, corn, forage, &c. for the use of the army; and in addition arabas, horses, and every sort of transport. The commander of the forces will naturally expect that such assistance can and will be given by the cavalry. The Lieutenant-General hopes that all officers commanding patrols, &c., or others where opportunity shall offer, will forward to the utmost of their power this important object. On the return of every patrol, the commanding officer will wait upon the Lieutenant-General and report on all matters, and particularly on the foregoing part of their duty. The field officer of the day will wait upon ths Lieutenant-General at sunrise and at sunset each day, to report any occurrences that have to be communicated to the Quartermaster-General.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Balaklava, Oct. 2nd, 1854.

The Lieutenant-General has been dissatisfied to-day at finding an advanced picket of the —— Light Dragoons, commanded by Cornet ———, without any belts on, and as unprepared for action as if they were at Hounslow Barracks. It is to be remembered, that on picket, no man is ever, under any pretence whatever, to be allowed to take off any part of his appointments; that one-half the horses only are to be allowed to feed at a time; that by day, there is to be always at least one sentry, by night two, mounted or dismounted, as the case may be. The Lieutenant-General also found videttes out of sight of their pickets. When it is right to post videttes at a distance from the picket, or in a position where they cannot be easily seen by the sentry of the picket, then a non-commissioned officer's party should be posted between them, so as to keep up a most perfect communication. This party by day, and under ordinary circumstances, may be dismounted; but prepared to mount instantly, and always to have one man with his eye on the videttes.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Balaklava, Oct. 3rd, 1854.

No. 1. The Lieutenant-General has observed that parties parading for mounted duties, and on other occasions, are still kept an unnecessary time sitting on their horses; and that videttes are kept mounted when it is altogether uncalled for. He hopes that the attention of all the officers of the division will be given to what he considers essential to the ease of the horse. By day, no vidette or scout need be mounted, when no enemy is in sight, and when he can see a tolerable distance. By night, on the contrary, every vidette is to be mounted.

2. The orders of the Lieutenant-General respecting the marking of the troop-horses are not sufficiently attended to; with most of them, the marks have altogether grown out; in others, they are nearly invisible. The attention of generals commanding brigades is called to what Lord Lucan attaches much importance. It is desired that troop-horses alone should be marked on the off-quarter; and that when officers mark their horses, it should always be on the near quarter.

3. It is to be observed, that no leave can be given to any officer, or any individual whatever, to ride a troop-horse without the *previous* sanction of the General Officer commanding the cavalry. On the field of battle, or on any important duty, where an officer's charger

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

is killed, or becomes totally ineffective, the senior officer present can sanction the immediate use of a troop-horse for the occasion; but this permission cannot extend beyond the *occasion;* and a report of such an occurrence must be always made for the information of the divisional general.

4. When an unexpected turn-out is sounded at the Assistant Adjutant-General's tent, it should be immediately repeated by the orderly trumpeters of regiments; and on these occasions the men will turn out in complete marching order. Again, when "boots and saddles" is unexpectedly sounded, it means complete marching order, and everything to be done except bridle up.

5. No plumes will be worn by heavy dragoons on any occasion.

7. The Lieutenant-General is really much concerned at the slow and unsoldierlike manner in which the regiments in the field (where vigilance and activity are essential for the very safety of the army) are discharging their duties as cavalry. It is to be observed, that it is to the cavalry that the army must look for safety against all surprise; and no confidence can be felt, where the pickets allow themselves to be unprepared for immediate action. The Lieutenant-General has again to repeat, that *all* pickets, in-lying and out-lying, must be fully equipped—both officers, men, and horses. With in-lying pickets, the horses need not be bridled by day; but it is expected that an in-lying picket shall always be in their saddles within three minutes of the guard-call sounding at the Assistant Adjutant-General's tent; and no telling-off the squadron can be allowed, as this should have been done when the picket was first paraded for duty. The Lieutenant-General desires that the field officer of the day will always, by trumpet's guard-call, turn out the in-lying pickets at least once. He will report in how many minutes the picket was formed. The general officers commanding brigades are requested occasionally to turn out the in-lying pickets in the same way. The Lieutenant-General intends doing so; and no exertion on his part shall be wanting to secure on the part of the Cavalry division a soldierlike, smart, and business-like discharge of those duties; at the same time, he wishes to spare the cavalry all others which the exigencies of the service and the safety of the army do not require. General officers commanding brigades are requested to have these orders read to the troops of the corps under their command on three successive days. In-lying pickets, unless otherwise ordered, are to be in the lightest order.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G,

---

Balaklava, October 4th, 1854.

The generals commanding brigades will see that all officers going on duty are provided with Lieutenant-Colonel Aranchild's instructions. The inspecting officers will have them always produced on the parades. Strict attention will be required from all officers to the Abridgment by Colonel Ponsonby.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Balaklava, October 5th, 1854.

The foraging is not done expeditiously, or in a soldierlike manner. The Lieutenant-General requests that generals commanding brigades will require from commanding officers of corps attention to these orders. The regimental quartermaster and orderly officer are always to attend. Only that portion of the regiment is to be on this duty that is required for the quantity of forage to be drawn. When drawing barley or fodder from a moderate distance, say two miles, the dragoon having ridden to the spot, should be always made to return on foot, leading his horse, and the horse should be loaded to the full extent of what he can easily carry. Two hundredweight is no excessive weight for a horse for a short distance, and the dragoon should be made to put upon his horse a quantity as near approaching it as the bulk will allow. In this way a very large quantity of forage can be collected without unnecessarily harassing or distressing a man or a horse.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Balaklava, 7th October 1854.

Until further orders the whole of the Cavalry division will parade with stripped saddles, cloaks, and collar-chains, every morning at five o'clock, in front of their lines. Every morning the brigadiers will be good enough to have all the men told off to their horses, and to see that every available man is mounted. The Lieutenant-General will expect to see in the lines dismounted, no horses that can carry a saddle. Lord Lucan hopes that more attention will be paid to the horses' backs. He has seen some so horridly bad, that gross neglect must have been allowed. The brigadiers will arrange, so that without leave from the Lieutenant-General, never more than one regiment of each brigade is absent from the lines, whether for forage or for water, at the same time.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Balaklava, 11th October 1854.

No. 1. The Lieutenant-General must insist on far less time being wasted on inspections and tellings-off of the cavalry on their private parades. It is already ordered that troops shall fall in in two ranks, at open order, sized from their proper flanks, and that every individual shall, as far as possible, occupy the same place in squadron. Thus the inspections and tellings-off ought never to exceed five minutes, or even last so long. On no account is a troop, when about to form a half-squadron, ever to be told off; it is contrary to the regulations, useless, as it has to be repeated by the squadron officers, and mischievous, as it cannot fail to confuse the men.

2. The dragoons are never to be allowed to mount their horses except on the troop parade, which is equally the squadron parade; one horse's interval only will be allowed between the two troops.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Balaklava, 14th October 1854.

No. 1. The chief medical officer of the Cavalry division will have the sick removed to the spot selected near Balaklava, from the different regimental hospitals. He will be good enough to see that the different hospital serjeants are placed there, and that the whole is under sufficient medical superintendence.

2. A spot has been selected for a divisional veterinary hospital. Mr. Delany will take the entire charge of it, and have such sick horses as he shall think right removed there. The Lieutenant-General wishes the horses to be divided into brigades, to facilitate the foraging by the brigade commissaries. For the present, a party consisting of one serjeant, two corporals, ten privates, and one trumpeter of the 1st Royals; one corporal and six privates of the Inniskillings; two privates of the 11th Hussars; and two privates of the 4th Light Dragoons, will be appointed to do the duty of this depôt. A guard will be mounted daily, consisting of a corporal and three privates. The generals commanding brigades will be good enough to provide that no part of the horses' accoutrements, excepting what is necessary to tie the horses up, and a bridoon bridle, be sent with them, Mr. Delany will be good enough to send in daily, at nine A.M., a report of the state of his depôt, and he will himself be stationed with it.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Balaklava, 15th October 1854.

The field officer going off, as well as the field officer coming on duty, will always attend the parade of the day duties.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Balaclava, 17th October 1854.

The light brigade will transfer sound horses to the heavy brigade, according to the following table:—4th Light Dragoons, twenty horses; 8th Hussars, ten horses; 11th Hussars, thirty horses; 13th Light Dragoons, fourteen horses; 17th Lancers, twenty-six horses: total, one hundred horses. Of these, sixty-five will be received by the 1st Royal Dragoons, and thirty-five by the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons. Any regiment having horses in the possession of any officers or individual not belonging to their regiment, will send in a return of the same to the Assistant Adjutant-General, through their brigade officers, by five o'clock P.M.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Balaclava, 17th October 1854.

The Lieutenant-General is exceedingly displeased at hearing that the horses going on picket this morning had not been previously watered. The regiments concerned are the ——and the——. He requests that the Major-General commanding the light brigade will express to the commanding officers of those corps the Lieutenant-General's displeasure at such neglect of his orders, and such total inattention to that which is so necessary to the health and efficiency of the horses.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp, Balaclava, 20th October, 1854.

When a general, or other officer in command of a brigade, is from sickness, or any other reason whatever, prevented attending a parade, or turning out with his brigade, he is requested immediately, at the first sound of the trumpet, to inform, through a member of his staff, the next senior officer, whose business it is to report the circumstance to the Assistant Adjutant-General, for the information of the Lieutenant-General.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Balaclava, 20th October, 1854.

The Lieutenant-General has observed horses feeding off the ground without nose-bags. He requests the attention of the generals commanding brigades to every horse being furnished with a nose-bag, corn-sack, and forage-cords. The Lieutenant-General attaches much importance to these articles being always in good condition, and being quite complete.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp near Balaclava, 22d October, 1854.

No. 1. When the cavalry are dismounted, or sitting at ease, the Lieutenant-General requests that the generals, or officers commanding brigades, will not allow any officer to leave his regiment without permission, nor will commanding officers of regiments allow officers to leave their squadrons on these occasions. The regimental staff are also requested to remain with their regiments. General officers are themselves requested, when visiting advanced pickets or works, not to allow themselves to be accompanied by many persons, as it is objectionable and mischievous so to attract the attention of the enemy.

2. Although there is as little desire as there is necessity for forbidding officers to visit the outworks and outposts, the Lieutenant-General does wish that this should be always done with discretion by officers off duty, and they will be good enough to show themselves dismounted. No person is to enter a fort mounted, or even to get upon the works.

3. The Lieutenant-General requires that every endeavour shall be made for the dragoon to find his breakfast ready on the return of the troops to camp of a morning. Breakfast is always to be prepared by half-past seven o'clock. Should there not be other men to act as cooks, two duty-men per troop may be left in for that purpose. The Lieutenant-General equally requires that on the removal of the horses' bridles, the nose-bags should be put on, and the horses left feeding during the men's breakfast.

4. The Lieutenant-General has decided upon a "saddles-off" call. All the regimental trumpeter are to be instructed by the trumpeter-major, 17th Lancers.

5. When an attack from the enemy is expected, and our cavalry have approached the outposts, it is the duty of the field officer of the day to see that the pickets are drawn in at the proper time; and when no longer required, that all out and in-lying pickets do rejoin their regiments. And again, when the cavalry have returned to camp, it is equally his duty to see that all the posts have been re-occupied, and the duties resumed as before.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp near Balaclava, 28th October 1854.

The Lieutenant-General finds it necessary to remind the cavalry division of what has been fully explained by the Commander of the Forces, that all horses and property of any description, taken from the enemy, are public property, and cannot be retained, sold, or purchased, by any individual, of what rank soever. Lord Lucan hopes and expects that the officers will themselves be careful that this positive general order shall be in no way whatever infringed with their knowledge, and that they will make it their business at present, as on all future occasions, to inform the Assistant Adjutant-General of the division of all captures.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Before Sebastopol, 30th Oct. 1854.

The Lieutenant-General learning that an advanced cavalry picket close to the enemy had returned to the camp without being relieved, and of course, in his ignorance, without proper authority, has had the matter investigated by a Court of Inquiry. It is with extreme regret that he finds that Captain ———, when in command of a picket of his own regiment, the ————, should have conducted himself on the occasion in question in a way to deserve the severest punishment that a General Court-martial can award. The Lieutenant-General feels that he is taking a great responsibility upon himself in not preferring charges against that officer. It has appeared before the Court of Inquiry, that Captain ——— did, on the night of the 27th October, when in command of a most important post close to the enemy, placed there to watch the enemy's movements, and so provide for the safety of the army against surprise, without any proper authority whatever, and so far from being overpowered by superior force, without any hostile demonstration whatever, but solely on the trifling excuse of hearing shouts from the enemy's camp, relinquish that post, bring his picket into camp, and dismiss it; nor did that officer have the Lieutenant-General informed of his extraordinary proceedings; by which the cavalry camp and the army were left entirely without any picket of observation. It is true that Captain ——— alleges that he acted on the authority of a general officer: that officer denies ever having given any such authority; and, moreover, it should be well known to an officer of Captain ———'s standing, that the general could give no such authority; for a picket placed by a divisional general cannot receive orders from any inferior officer whatever, but solely from the divisional general himself, his staff, or the field-officer of the day.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Before Sebastopol, 1st Nov. 1854.

All horses in possession of regiments, taken from the enemy or captured, are to be marked with the number of the regiment, and taken on its strength as remounts, and reported to the Assistant Adjutant-General.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp near Sebastopol, 3rd Nov. 1854.

Those officers *doing duty* only are to be put on the face of the morning state; those sick to be named at the back. An explanation of all columns—such as "On command," "Detached or otherwise employed, &c."—and all casualties—is also to be placed on the back.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp near Sebastopol, 4th Nov. 1854

The officers commanding brigades are requested to have the accounts of the non-commissioned officers and men placed under the command of Captain Tower, 6th Dragoons, at the Veterinary Depôt, settled forthwith; and in future the settlement is to be made weekly.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp near Sebastopol, 9th Nov. 1854.

No. 1. The Lieutenant-General is most anxious that every man of the cavalry division shall at the earliest moment have his valise and his entire kit; and he is much surprised that commanding officers of regiments have not availed themselves of the opportunities of landing the baggage left on board the different ships. He desires that a return may be sent in to the Adjutant-General, stating on board what ships, or where, their kits are.

2. The Lieutenant-General proposes sending a regimental quartermaster, to be accompanied by a troop serjeant-major of each regiment in the division, to Constantinople, to-morrow if possible, with the object of giving to commanding officers an opportunity of bringing from their stores at Scutari so much as they may require for their present use; and also to provide themselves with those necessaries which will conduce to the comfort of the men, as also to render them more creditable in their appearance. An immediate inspection of necessaries should be held, to ascertain what is deficient; and his Lordship hopes that there will be no further want of oil, blacking, pipe-clay, chrome, buttons, soap, and horse and other brushes. The men's gloves and gauntlets must also be completed.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp near Sebastopol, 10th Nov. 1854.

The Lieutenant-General begs to remind the cavalry division that the *Trent* and *Jason* are in harbour, and he hopes that no exertion will be wanting in the recovery of regimental baggage from those ships, or any other that may arrive.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col. A.A.G.

---

Camp near Sebastopol, 15th Nov. 1854.

The Lieutenant-General is much displeased at the little attention paid to the marking of the troop-horses: he has cause of complaint that the officers commanding brigades do not have his orders attended to by the different officers commanding corps. It is evident how essential it is that every horse straying from his corps or from his lines should be at once known; and if unmarked, or insufficiently marked, this cannot be done. Lord Lucan hopes that he may not have again to remark on this subject. Every troop-horse is to be immediately fresh-marked, and the generals commanding brigades will be pleased to report that they have themselves seen it carried into effect; and the Lieutenant-General wishes them to be good enough to make occasional inspections of the different regiments of their brigades, thus to insure the most constant attention on the part of regimental officers to an order, upon obedience to which rests the security of the troop-horses.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp near Sebastopol, 16th Nov. 1854.

The Major-General commanding the light cavalry brigade will, as soon as possible, send to Balaklava the troop serjeant-majors, to settle the accounts and provide such necessaries as are indispensable for the men of his different regiments stationed at the Veterinary Invalid Depôt.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Camp before Sebastopol, 17th Nov. 1854.

A passage to Constantinople is given on board the *Medway* steamer for to-morrow to the troop serjeant-majors of the different cavalry regiments. She will sail at 11 o'clock A.M. The Lieutenant-General hopes that commanding officers will avail themselves of the opportunity, to provide everything that is necessary for the comfort of the men, their personal cleanliness, and the cleanliness of their arms, clothing, and appointments.

By Order,
(Signed) W. Paulet, Col., A.A.G.

---

Camp before Sebastopol, 23rd Nov. 1854.

The monthly camp-equipage return, which should be in on the 1st of every month, is not yet received from the Royal Dragoons or Scots Greys, although they have been repeatedly, but vainly, applied for. The commanding officers will state for the information of the Lieutenant-General why these returns are not forthcoming.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Camp before Sebastopol, 28th Nov. 1854.

The first and great object of the general officers commanding brigades must and will be to give the men and horses all the benefit in their power of the driest spots in the neighbourhood of their encampment. The Lieutenant-General wishes it to be perfectly understood, that he relies upon those officers to keep this great object in view; and it is his order, that without reference to those secondary objects, uniformity or appearance of any sort, any commanding officer shall shift his men and horses always at the earliest moment, and to the most suitable places that shall offer. Commanding officers will of course communicate their wishes to their brigadiers personally if possible; but when this cannot be done immediately, they are hereby authorized to act of their own accord at once, informing their brigadiers as soon as possible that they have done so.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Camp before Sebastopol, 29th Nov. 1854.

The Lieutenant-General directs that all missing horses shall continue to be entered under the head of "Missing" in all succeeding states, until special instructions are given to the contrary. The same to apply to prisoners of war.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Camp before Sebastopol, 30th Nov. 1854.

No. 1. Lieutenant-Colonel Doherty, of the 13th Light Dragoons, will, as senior officer, take command of the light cavalry brigade until otherwise directed, and all reports will be addressed to him.

2. All officers in command of patrols, pickets, or on any division duty, will be careful to make out a detailed report of all the occurrences during their period of duty, immediately on being relieved; which report is to be delivered to the senior officer on duty, if any, and by him handed to the Lieutenant-General, if thought necessary, but if not, forwarded to the Assistant Adjutant-General.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Head-Quarters, Cavalry Division, Kadikoi, 5th Dec. 1854.

No. 1. The Lieutenant-General desires that all the public baggage-animals, including the forge-cart mules, be assembled for the purpose of carrying the materials to be used in the construction of the stabling. Commanding officers will therefore inform the Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General by four o'clock this afternoon how many are in possession of each regiment, to enable the Lieutenant-General to make provision for their care. It is wished that they should be well marked, that at the end of this service no confusion may take place in their restoration to their regiments.

2. Commanding officers of regiments are required to insert in their regimental and troop order-books the memorandums of the Quarter-master-General, dated November 29th, regarding winter clothing.

3. The Lieutenant-General has reason to suppose that the detached parties of regiments are not provided with necessaries, and with such warm clothing as has been distributed lately for the preservation of the men's health. Commanding officers of regiments are desired at once to see that all such parties are provided with what is due to them of such clothing; they will further have the necessaries of all such detached parties, stationed within reasonable distances, inspected by the commanding officers of their troops, who will complete those necessaries immediately. And in future, brigadier-generals are requested to see, and to have reported to them, that all parties are visited by their troop officers

always once in the fortnight; and that their necessaries and equipments are kept as complete and in as good a state of repair as circumstances will admit of.

4. The Lieutenant-General directs, that whenever the commissaries are unable to give transport, and it is necessary to send the troop-horses for forage, that all officers shall draw their own forage; as in no case can it be allowed for a troop-horse to draw forage for an officer.

5. The Lieutenant-General has to complain that but little attention is given to the marking of the troop-horses on their off quarter and their fore feet. The officers commanding brigades are desired to hold an inspection purposely, and to report to the divisional general that they have done so. They will be pleased to have parades for this inspection on Friday next, or as soon as convenient afterwards; and Lord Lucan hopes that they will have it in their power to report that every troop-horse in their brigades is newly and distinctly marked. The Lieutenant-General will always require the attention of brigadier-generals to this, considering, as he does, that the very security of the horses depends on it.

6. Lieutenant-Shewell, having rejoined, will, as senior officer, assume, until further orders, the command of the light brigade, and all reports will be addressed to him.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 6th December 1854.

No. 1. It is so important not only to the discipline and efficiency of the cavalry, but also to the character for regularity of the Lieutenant-General, the brigadier-generals, and the commanding officers of corps, that the strictest punctuality should be observed in the making out and delivery of all periodical returns, that the generals commanding brigades must for the future be held responsible in this important matter; they will be required always to furnish to the proper officer of the divisional staff, at the proper hour and day, either the whole of the returns required from their brigades, or a letter explaining the cause of the deficiency of any one of them; thus enabling the Lieutenant-General at once, which he will do, to resort to such measures as shall insure regularity. The brigadier-generals, on the non-receipt of any return, will be good enough to call upon the commanding officers at once to explain in writing the cause of its absence; which explanation will be forwarded to the Lieutenant-General as soon as received; but it is not to retard, on the part of the brigadier-general, such a communication as is required above.

2. As many commissions have, and are likely to, become vacant in the division by the casualties of service, the Lieutenant-General wishes to state that it will give him the greatest satisfaction to support the recommendation for promotion of non-commissioned officers received through the brigadier-generals from the commanding officers of corps; but he considers as a rule, admitting of course of exceptions, that a preference should be given to those non-commissioned officers who are present with the regiments in the field over those serving with the depôt at home; for which purpose he desires that all cases of extraordinary gallantry before the enemy shall be particularly noticed and recorded. The Lieutenant-General desires, that when a non-commissioned officer is recommended for a commission, his age and the date of his service in the different grades be given.

3. The foraging-parties of the light cavalry brigade may ride into the town, but are to lead their horses and *not* ride on their return.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 7th Dec. 1854.

No. 1. The Lieutenant-General wishes it to be understood, that the general order allowing 2s. 6d. for skinning a horse also makes it the duty of officers commanding corps to see that every dead horse is skinned. The brigadier-generals will be good enough to require that every dead horse is skinned. Officers commanding brigades will be good enough to require returns showing that as many skins have been handed over to the Commissariat department as horses have been reported dead.

2. It must now be evident to all, that one of the greatest wants during the campaign has been that of oil and grease; the arms have suffered much from their want; saddlery has very much deteriorated from it; and the men's boots and the leather on their overalls would have been much benefited by their use. The Lieutenant-General is very anxious to call the attention of the division to a valuable practice in the French army; viz., they collect all the marrow-bones, and, after breaking them between stones, boil them in a pot, skimming off the fat. In this way they find no difficulty in providing themselves with the best grease for all purposes. The Lieutenant-General desires that the division butchers do immediately adopt this valuable practice, and the regimental quartermasters will be prepared to receive and pay for any quantity of grease, at a price to be fixed; and it is desired that the quartermasters will monthly send in a return to the Assistant-Quartermaster-General of the division, showing the quantity so manufactured and the manner in which it has been disposed of.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 8th Dec. 1854.

No. 3. The Lieutenant-General was sorry to observe yesterday that officers had appropriated to themselves, for the use of their own chargers, horse-clothing belonging to the public, and provided for the use of the troopers. He desires that it shall instantly be applied as intended, and he hopes that, without special authority, no article supplied for the use of the troops may ever be taken or used by an officer.

4. The Lieutenant-General wishes it to be understood that no general alteration affecting the appearance of the cavalry can be made without the sanction of the divisional general. The horses' tails of the heavy cavalry have been shortened and squared: an alteration that should have been previously submitted to the Lieutenant-General.

5. Officers commanding brigades will in future daily send in to the Assistant Quartermaster-General, at the same time as the morning states are forwarded to the Assistant Adjutant-General, a report, signed by themselves, stating whether any and what deficiency has taken place in the supply of rations and forage the day previous. These reports will of course be founded on the information they will have collected from the officers commanding regiments. It is the duty of these last to inquire constantly whether the letter-parties and other detachments from the regiments have been thoroughly foraged and fed.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 9th Dec. 1854.

No. 1. When regiments fetch their own forage, it will be the duty of the officer in charge of the party to take from the regimental quartermasters a docket, giving the number of horses and the quantity of corn and hay or fodder wanted. Upon this docket the officer will require that the storekeeper shall indorse the quantity issued of each, and the quantity deficient. This docket will be daily laid before the officer commanding the regiment, and transmitted by him to the Brigadier-General, who will again inclose it in the report that general officer is required to make to the Assistant Quartermaster-General.

2. The Lieutenant-General desires that the foraging parties may never carry their hay in sacks, but in forage-cords equally balanced on each side of the horse.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 14th Dec. 1854.

No. 1. General officers commanding brigades are informed that the Field Marshal has intimated that the ration of forage to the cavalry horses has not been reduced by his sanction, and that the troop-horse is to receive the allowance given by general orders, June 7th. By those orders, the ration consists of twelve pounds of oats or barley, and sixteen pounds of chopped straw, or ten pounds of hay; the ration of the baggage-animals, nine pounds of corn, and ten pounds of hay or chopped straw. The brigadiers are requested to be most particular in giving in their daily reports any deficiency in the above scale of rations.

2. The Lieutenant General observes that in the monthly states of December 1st, there appears to be of the different regiments as follows:—Men at Scutari and Varna—4th Dragoon Guards, 31 men; 5th Dragoon Guards, 45 men; 1st Royals, 42 men; 2nd or Scots Greys, 55 men; 6th Inniskillings, 43 men; 4th Light Dragoons, 64 men; 8th Hussars, 69 men; 11th Hussars, 75 men; 13th Light Dragoons 82 men; 17th Lancers, 59 men; making in the whole 565 at that date. Lord Lucan does not believe that any such number of men are alive at those places; and it is most important for the efficiency of the regiments that the fact should be ascertained; for so long as those men remain on the strength, the regiments will never be fully reinforced from home. Lord Lucan wishes that commanding officers would be good enough to endeavour themselves to ascertain, from their own officers and non-commissioned officers on the spot, what men have died, and what men have been sent home invalided.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 15th Dec. 1854.

No. 1. The Field Marshal has directed that instead of ten pounds of hay, the ration is at present to be eight pounds, and made up with three pounds of chopped straw. The Lieutenant-General desires that this three pounds of chopped straw shall be always drawn and carried in sacks, and that care be taken that it is given at every feed of the corn.

2. The regiment funishing the second division detachment of twenty horses will draw its full ration of forage, and the quarter-master will then forage the detachments from the head-quarters of the regiment, instead of from the town.

3. No detachment, or detached orderly, is ever to be relieved or exchanged by commanding officers without the previous knowledge or sanction of the Lieutenant-General.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

I. Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 16th Dec. 1854.

No. 1. The Lieutenant-General has been informed that since his order was given that videttes might cloak in bad weather, they have not always done so. The officers commanding the pickets are always to allow it, and when the weather is either wet or cold to insist upon it. Patrols will also be allowed to cloak, although their swords will be drawn as usual. The pickets have always been in the habit of wearing their cloaks, and will of course continue to do so.*

2. The Quartermster-General of the division is to come on duty at *reveille;* he will wait upon the Assistant Quartermaster-General at eight o'clock every morning.

3. The Lieutenant-General finds it necessary to observe that there is not sufficient promptitude shown in carrying out the "Requisitions;" he desires that, unless very good reason can be shown against it, they are always presented at the stores on the day on which they are received. The reason for this order is, that Lord Lucan considers that the horse-clothing should have been drawn yesterday, and he is sorry to hear that it was not.

4. It is quite evident, from the difficulty of getting a sufficient number of Turks, and the little work that can be got out of them, that unless we can make stabling for ourselves, we shall be without, which cannot fail to be attended by the fearful consequence of our becoming altogether dismounted. The ground for the stabling is already marked out; the regiments are in possession of a certain number of intrenching tools, and, if required, more shall be given them. The Lieutenant-General does entreat commanding officers to endeavour, by every means in their power, to give shelter to their horses. Lord Lucan conceives that they could readily scarp away in their front, and pave under their horses' feet, and he will anxiously watch the progress of the work.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 17th Dec. 1854.

No. 1. In consequence of the state of the weather, and nearly all the men of the division being absent on commissariat and other duties, there will be no church parade to-day.

2. Officers commanding regiments are requested to send in forthwith a requisition to the Assistant Quartermaster-General for the quantity of horseshoe-nails required for their respective regiments.

3. The Lieutenant-General has to complain that, notwithstanding all the orders he has given on the subject, the out-laying picket had no hay conveyed to them yesterday—an inattention to orders, and an absence of all care of the horses. Lord Lucan will hold the commanding officers of regiments responsible that all out-lying pickets always receive their full forage within one hour of their reaching their post.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 18th Dec. 1854.

Twenty-four baggage-animals and twelve men in charge of a quartermaster, to be furnished by the heavy brigade to-morrow morning, to draw timber for the stabling. They will be at the timber-yard, Balaklava, at eight A.M.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 19th Dec. 1854.

No. 2. The Lieutenant-General thinks the strictest attention to the following general order is so absolutely necessary to keep up the efficiency of a regiment, and to secure regularity in the settlement of men's accounts, &c., that he inserts it in his division orders, urging upon commanding officers immediate and constant attention to it.

Lord Lucan desires that officers commanding corps will hold their regimental surgeons responsible that no soldier is removed to any general hospital whatever without one of those tickets being properly filled up, with which he will only supply himself from the orderly-room as he requires them; and it is the business of the commanding officer to be careful that he always has a sufficient number of them in store.

The Lieutenant-General thinks that these tickets should be numbered as they are issued, and filled up in the orderly-room, and that a book should be kept by the adjutant, giving the number of the ticket, name of the man, and also the circumstance of his removal.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

[GENERAL ORDER.]

Head-quarters before Sebastopol, 18th Dec. 1854.

No. 1. The attention of officers commanding regiments is called to the necessity of sending with soldiers ordered to a general hospital the prescribed form of admission-ticket

* The cloaking of videttes and patrols was ordered by Lord Raglan, though objected to by Lord Lucan, as being attended with danger to the men.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

which will be issued on application at the purveyors. In some cases great difficulty has occurred in identifying soldiers, from the neglect to send proper documents with them, and much inconvenience to regiments and irregularity in returns have been the result. It is the duty of the military officer placed in charge of invalides on passage to Scutari, when circumstances prevent his being furnished with a correct nominal list of those on board, to prepare a list himself, and to deliver it, noting any casualties that may have occurred during the voyage, to the officer who superintends the disembarkation of the invalids at Scutari.

2. The purveyors at the several hospitals are strictly ordered to communicate to regiments as soon as possible the death or removal to England of any soldier.

By Order,
(Signed) J. B. B. Estcourt, A.G.

---

Cavalry Head-quarters, 27th Dec. 1854.

No. 1. Whenever a regiment receives a pass order, it is to be indorsed with the day and hour on which it is received, and passed on.

2. The Turkish coats, of which about twenty have been served out in each regiment, are to be reserved exclusively for the use of men on mounted duty. All pickets will in future parade in them.

4. A few tarpaulins have been served out to the different regiments. It is desired that they should be used entirely for the preservation of the horse-kits. All spare kits that have not been stored should be cleaned, greased, then placed together on raised paved foundations, and covered up with the tarpaulins. The horse-kits in use will be covered by the others as far as they will go.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 28th Dec. 1854.

The Lieutenant-General requests that the officers of his divisional staff will wait upon him every morning at half-past nine.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Head-quarters, 29th Dec. 1854.

When the divisional quartermaster of the day receives a requisition, it is his duty to carry it out at once; and he will be held responsible for its execution after his tour of duty has expired; for, without special permission, he cannot transfer it to his successor. It is the duty of the quartermaster, when he fails in obtaining the whole of the requisition, to report the circumstance officially in writing to the Assistant Quartermaster-General as soon as possible.

By Order,
(Signed) C.C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 1st Jan. 1855.

It is with much concern that the Lieutenant-General has to observe that commanding officers of regiments do not give that immediate and constant attention to the changing of the ground of the lines of the troop-horses as is necessary to their health and preservation. When it is not totally unavoidable, a troop-horse is not to be allowed to remain any time (however short) where it is muddy or wet. Undoubtedly, there has been a smaller proportion of loss amongst officers' chargers than troop-horses; and in Lord Lucan's opinion, it is very much, though not entirely, to be attributed to the greater facility which exists in the changing of the ground of the one to the other. His lordship hopes that he will receive from commanding officers their attention to what he attaches the greatest importance.

There never was a time when it was more necessary for all regimental officers to give the strictest attention to their stable duties, and the management and care of their troop-horses. The difficulties are so numerous and so serious, that they require constant vigilance and zeal from all. The Lieutenant-General does hope that regimental officers will not allow it to be said or supposed in any quarter that to them, at least, can be attached blame, on account of the unhappy losses which have occurred, and are still occurring. He wishes all officers to bear in mind, that their own professional characters are and must be involved in the efficiency of the brigades, regiments, and troops under their care; and he feels assured that he will receive from all that support, without which he must despair of retaining even that very reduced efficiency which unhappily exists, and which he hopes and believes cannot be charged upon them.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 2nd Jan. 1855.

No. 3. It should be remembered that the Assistant Adjutant-General is the postmaster of each division, and that no regimental officer can properly open a bag of division letters.

It is the duty of the regiments, when any divisional bag reaches them accidentally or otherwise, at once to forward it to the Assistant Adjutant-General's office of the division.

4. It having been intimated from the Quartermaster-General's office, that it is not the intention to issue horse-clothing for officers' horses, officers commanding brigades will give instructions to the commanding officers of regiments strictly to preserve any supernumerary sets that may have been issued to their regiments.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 3d Jan. 1855.

No. 2. The Lieutenant-General has learnt with great displeasure, that an officer's party was sent on a distant duty without being previously fed, and without any provision of corn. Officers commanding regiments are desired to be careful that there shall be no recurrence of such neglect, which must prove so destructive to the horses and so injurious to the character of the regiments.

3. The Quartermaster-General having intimated that there is no intention to provide horse-clothing for officers' chargers, officers commanding regiments will, to-morrow, 4th inst., hand over to the division Quartermaster of the day all suits in excess, that they may be returned into the Quartermaster-General's store. The Lieutenant-General requests attention to the clothing of those horses which shall become non-effective, as the regiments will be held accountable for them.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 4th Jan. 1855.

No. 2. Commanding officers of regiments are reminded that it is their duty to see that their regimental quartermasters keep an exact account of the number of horses foraged, and the quantity of forage issued for each; particularly specifying when that quantity falls short of the regulated ration. The Lieutenant-General will occasionally call upon the officers commanding brigades to inform him what the quantities of forage issued, or the deficiencies, have been, during particular periods.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 5th Jan 1855.

It will be the particular duty of the Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General always to superintend the foraging of the horses of the division. To him will the brigadier-generals, commanding officers of regiments, and commissaries, refer at all times and report.

The Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General will require daily reports from each corps. He will keep a journal, in which will be inserted all complaints and all deficiencies, with any other daily remarks which may be useful for future reference. This book will be laid before the Lieutenant-General every morning.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 6th Jan. 1855.

No. 3. The Lieutenant-General was much shocked yesterday at finding a considerable number of the ———— without any officer or non-commissioned officer, with their horses loaded with corn, and secured to posts in the street of Balaklava. The Major-General commanding the heavy brigade will be good enough to institute an inquiry into this matter, sending the full particulars for the information of Lord Lucan.

4. By the general orders of this army, all officers are required to wear their swords. During a walk of many hours yesterday, the Lieutenant-General did not see one cavalry officer with his sword on. He hopes that it will not be again necessary to advert to this subject.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 9th Jan. 1855.

No. 3. The Lieutenant-General is informed that the 17th Lancers have not got their portable forge. The officers commanding the light cavalry brigade will be good enough to inquire and report why it is so. If it was left on board ship on landing in the Crimea, opportunities in abundance were offered, and orders sufficiently distinct have been given for landing it. The brigadiers will be good enough to report what forges, or portable forges, each regiment in their brigades have in their possession, and in use.

4. Whenever any deficiency in forage is reported by a regiment, the gross quantity short is to be given, and the extent of the consequent reduction upon each ration.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 10th Jan. 1855.

The 5th Dragoon Guards yesterday were unable to draw straw, in consequence of not taking with them corn-sacks. The Lieutenant-General hopes that he will not again have to complain of neglect in the foraging of the horses, and inattention to division orders.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 13th Jan. 1855.

No. 3. The field-officers, when on divisional duty, omit to send to the Assistant Adjutant-General, as is their duty, the reports of the different officers on duty with them.

4. Officers commanding regiments will always reserve for their own foraging at the rate of one horse for every four effective or non-effective, for which they have to draw forage.

By Order,
For the A.A.G.,
(Signed) G. W. MAYOW, Lieut.-Col., A.Q.M.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 15th Jan. 1855.

No. 3. It has been reported to the Lieutenant-General that men have been sent to the cavalry depôt from the different regiments of the division without brushes or currycombs. As regiments may be allowed to be equally deficient in other necessaries, he refers the officers commanding brigades to the division order, June 2nd, 1854, and he requests that they will be good enough, by personal inspection, to ascertain whether commanding officers of corps are allowing their men to be deficient in their kits, and to report as to their condition.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 16th Jan. 1854.

No. 3. A commissariat officer of the division will visit Balaklava early every morning, and will inform the commanding officers of regiments what fodder or corn they will be enabled to draw, that they may be prepared accordingly.

4. The Lieutenant-General desires that the currycomb shall not be used in the grooming of the horses, but that horses-brushes may be on all and every occasion.

5. The field-officer of the day inspects all parties paraded for divisional duties, and hands them over to the different officers and con-commissioned officers to command. To him will be addressed all their reports, and the Assistant Adjutant-General of the division is responsible that he receives his report accompanied by one from each party.

Each brigade will have an adjutant of the day, who will come on duty with the field-officer; he will assist the brigade-major in the inspection of all parties, and when that officer is prevented attending, he will make the inspection alone. This officer will not leave the camp without the leave of the field-officer, or in the absence of the brigade-major.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 18th Jan. 1855.

No. 2. The Lieutenant-General is sorry to have to observe that the men's hair is not cut; he has also to remark that the horses are not marked; a point to which he attaches much importance.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 19th Jan. 1855.

No. 3. Officers commanding brigades will be good enough to report to-morrow, Saturday, the 20th instant, how many troop-horses are already housed, and how many remain to be housed in each regiment. A like report will be expected every Saturday.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 20th Jan. 1855.

No. 4. The Lieutenant-General requests the attention of officers commanding brigades to divisional order No. 2, July 13th, which of late, whether as to the marking of the bât-horses, or to the accounting for them in their morning states, has for some time past been totally disregarded.

6. The Lieutenant-General's attention has been called to the serious consequences which must attend the not burying the dead horses. Officers commanding brigades are requested to give their immediate attention to this important matter. They will recollect that they are responsible for the cleanliness of their camp, and should see this nuisance removed,

whether the animals belonged to their brigade or not. The officers commanding brigades will be good enough to report upon this subject this day week.

7. The Lieutenant-General is sorry to observe, that in the light brigade no exertion whatever, not even an attempt, has been made to put any of the horses under cover: a fact not creditable to commanding officers. They should have shown some desire to save the few that remain; and as the disproportion between men and horses is in this brigade far more favourable than in the heavy brigade, it is impossible to explain, far less to justify, why, whilst the one brigade has hutted more than one-half their horses, the commanding officers of the light brigade have done nothing. Each of these commanding officers will be good enough to report daily how many disposable men he had the day previous, and what progress they have made.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 27th Jan. 1855.

No. 1. It is stated that there is an ample supply of bran. The Lieutenant-General recommends that officers commanding regiments should apply for and draw as much as possible. The bran is no substitute, but an addition to the ration of forage. Commanding officers will recollect, that whether the straw is whole or chopped, the ration is 16 lbs.

3. The Lieutenant-General directs that when a hospital-hut has been carried for each regiment, the whole attention of commanding officers may be devoted to the drawing of timber for completing the hutting for the horses, which Lord Lucan considers should be done within a few days.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 29th Jan. 1855.

No. 2. The Lieutenant-General has heard with much concern, and has indeed himself witnessed, that the men very much damage the roads so well made by the French; made entirely for our convenience, and for which we should feel much obliged. The men not only break down the sides of the road, but they break down the banks of the side ditches. Lord Lucan requests the constant attention of all officers and non-commissioned officers to what he attaches much importance. Nobody must be allowed to leave the centre of the road; and everybody must be most careful not to cross a ditch with a horse, except where there is a bridge. It is forbidden that any horse or baggage-animal be watered on this line of road. This order to be read at three parades.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 30th Jan. 1855.

No. 1. No horses are ever to be detached from their regiments on commissariat duty without the leave of the Lieutenant-General. When any horses are required for immediate and temporary purposes, they may be given by the officers commanding brigades, who will report the same.

2. By the rules of the army, all officers are required to salute any general officer they meet; and non-commissioned officers and privates are required to salute all commissioned officers whatever. Courtesy and civility demand that the same compliment be paid to the officers of the allied army. The Lieutenant-General has observed with regret a relaxation and neglect of orders, which he considers indispensable to secure good feeling, good order, and discipline; and he calls upon the officers commanding brigades and regiments, and every other officer in his division, to give him their assistance in having these rules more strictly observed and enforced in future.

3. It is with great concern that the Lieutenant-General has to complain of the manner in which regimental duties are carried on. The men's kits and appointments are unnecessarily dirty, the horses are badly groomed, and all uniformity of dress appears to be purposely avoided; horses are sent on duty without shoes, or so badly shod that some shoes are sure to be lost. It is inconceivable how the different duties pass the inspection of officers and non-commissioned officers Exposed as the cavalry are to the criticism, not only of the other branches of this army, but of foreigners, it is matter of surprise that a greater anxiety is not shown by commanding officers for the characters of their regiments. It would be more agreeable to Lord Lucan to have to approve instead of disapprove so constantly of the manner in which the duties are performed; but it is his duty, so far as he can, to preserve the discipline, efficiency, and character of the cavalry division; and he is resolved that no consideration towards corps or individuals shall induce him to overlook a system of irregularity and neglect, which, if allowed to continue, must seriously damage the character of all.

4. The officers commanding brigades are reminded that by a standing division order, whenever no other duty interferes, and weather permitting, a regimental watering parade, with every officer present, is required to be held each morning excepting on Sunday.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 1st Feb. 1855.

No. 1. Early in the spring the cavalry will receive their new clothing and of the new patterns: the Lieutenant-General hopes that officers will have already provided themselves. After the 1st of April he will require the division and brigade staffs to be dressed accordingly, and he trusts that on the cavalry staffs there will not be shown that entire neglect of appearance and of uniformity which is the case elsewhere. When staff officers belonging to cavalry regiments wish to wear their regimental uniforms, Lord Lucan will require them to be dressed strictly as if they were with their regiments.

2. Commanding officers of regiments are reminded that during the last month, there have been veterinary medicines in abundance in the Quartermaster-General's stores.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 2nd February 1855.

No. 3. Officers commanding brigades will be pleased to direct, that when lime juice is issued by the Commissariat, it is always mixed as follows:—Five pints of lime juice, eight pints of rum, eighteen pints of water, and four pounds of sugar for 100 men; and by the general orders of the army, it is the duty of an officer, previous to the issue, to see that the lime juice is properly mixed in these proportions. Again it is ordered, when preserved vegetables can be issued, they should be cooked according to the following directions:—" The mixed vegetables should be boiled in a little water for about half an hour; cabbages to be boiled with sufficient water for about half an hour; carrots and turnips to be soaked in cold water for an hour, and then boiled for about fifteen minutes; potatoes to be boiled in sufficient water for half an hour."

4. The Field Marshal has called the attention of the divisional generals to the fact, that the French officers are not saluted by the English army as is due to their rank. The Lieutenant-General hopes that this has not been the case in the cavalry division, since the issue of the order of the 30th of January 1855, which he hopes will receive the attention of all. All guards are to turn out to French general officers.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 7th Feb. 1855.

No. 2. The Lieutenant-General calls the attention of officers commanding brigades to No. 3 Order, December 5th, 1854; and he desires that he may be informed how often since that date, and by whom, the detached parties of the different regiments have been inspected.

3. The Lieutenant-General has not yet received from the officers commanding brigades the reports called for by Division Order No. 3, January 15th, 1855.

4. Whilst the Lieutenant-General, yesterday, was much pleased by finding the whole of the horses of the 4th Dragoon Guards under cover, well groomed, and with horse-clothing clean and in repair, he was as much displeased with the ——, who, with house-room at their command, positively had their horses exposed to the weather; the horses were incrusted with mud and dirt; and again, but few horses had clothing at all, and that clothing in filth and rags: Lord Lucan scarcely ever visited a camp with less satisfaction. He desires that Colonel Shewell will give his attention to the manner in which this regiment carries on its stable duties, as he has lately observed much carelessness, and a carelessness not observable till within the last three months.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 8th Feb. 1855.

No. 2. The officer commanding the light brigade is requested to give his attention to the number of men under the column of bâtmen, and otherwise employed. These should be reduced to the least possible number; and there can be no pretence, with the small quantity of fresh meat unfortunately now issued, for having, as it appears in this morning's state, eight butchers.

3. The Lieutenant-General apprehends that commanding officers of regiments do not avail themselves of as many opportunities as they should of purchasing vegetables for the men's messes. These are frequently to be obtained from the different ships in the harbour; and Lord Lucan hopes that the regimental quartermasters may be constantly on the look out, and purchase whenever the prices are at all moderate. It is upon the messing and good boots that depends the health of the men: too much attention cannot be paid to two points so essential.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 9th Feb. 1855.

It is to be observed that all claims for compensation for losses must be addressed to the general officer commanding the division. The Lieutenant-General will think it always

his duty scrupulously to examine such claims, and on no occasion will he certify when the loss has been occasioned by any inattention to orders, or any neglect whatever. Commanding officers of corps will recollect that they incur pecuniary liabilities themselves, when losses occur to officers or men under their command from any inattention to orders, or any fault of theirs.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 10th Feb. 1855.

No. 1. The Lieutenant-General cannot doubt that the commanding officers of the service-squadrons in the field receive from their depôt monthly, as they should, exact returns of their strength, losses, and increase. He requests that they will be good enough to forward the last returns received to the Assistant Adjutant-General of the division for perusal, after which they shall be sent back.

2. Commanding officers of regiments are requested to be prepared for the embarkation of the whole of the spare horse-kits on Monday morning next, at nine o'clock, on board of the *Rockcliffe*. To prevent confusion, the general officers commanding brigades will be good enough to desire that the embarkation shall be according to the seniority of regiments, and commencing with the heavy brigade. Capt. Seager, 8th Hussars, and Quartermaster McBean, will prepare to embark; the non-commissioned officers and men will be detailed to-morrow.

3. It is with some surprise that the Lieutenant-General has learned that a cattle-guard from the light brigade is still attached to the commissariat officer of the brigade. Lord Lucan thought that it was well known and understood that no party or individual can be detached without his consent, given in division orders, except for a very temporary purpose, where it must have received the sanction of the officer commanding the brigade.

4. All baggage-horses belonging to officers invalided, or returned to England on leave, must be, within one week of their quitting the regiment, struck off the forage returns.

5. The Lieutenant-General wishes it to be understood that the two forge-cart animals are not to be considered as baggage-animals, but rationed as troop-horses.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 11th February 1855.

No. 2. There are horses in the division with backs and withers as unaccountably bad as they are disgraceful to the regiments to which they belong. The Lieutenant-General cannot account for such backs. There has been no march of long and successive days; and except on such marches there can be no excuse for very sore backs. Commanding officers have themselves occasioned them by allowing horses to be sent on duty with backs which required care. It is not in one or six days such backs are created. The Lieutenant-General considers, and always will consider, that sore backs denote absence of all proper care. He desires that veterinary surgeons and troop-officers will examine all the horses, and that the number of sore backs in each regiment may be reported to him. In the report, the depôt horses will be included, as if with their own regiments.

3. The serjeant saddler (where there is none, then the chief acting-saddler), with three assistants from each brigade, to be appointed by the officer commanding the brigade, will embark to-morrow, in the *Rockliffe* transport, No. 130, under command of Captain Seager, 8th Hussars, at nine o'clock. The boats to put them on board will be at the wharf, astern of the *Rockliffe*.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 11th February 1855.

With reference to Division Order No. 4, of January 10th, when the commanding officer will take upon himself to do so, or with the sanction of the officer himself, baggage-ponies may be, with the consent of the Lieutenant-General, foraged as public bât-animals, and used as such, provided the number of these animals in the regiment does not exceed that allowed by general orders.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 13th Feb. 1855.

No. 2. Until further orders, the light cavalry brigade will furnish thirteen baggage-ponies; the heavy brigade, 12; making altogether 25; which will, under the Quartermaster of the day, draw the whole of the soldiers' huts, the allocation of which will always be directed by the Assistant Quartermaster-General of the division.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. SHUTE, Major, A.A.G.

---

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

[Pass Order.]

12th Feb. 1855.

No. 3. Without special authority, it is positively forbidden to use a trooper to carry timber, or anything except forage. The baggage-ponies are always to be used on this duty. The troop-horses cannot be sufficiently saved.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G,

---

[After Order.]

13th February 1855.

The Lieutenant-General cannot separate himself from his division, without sincerely thanking the officers commanding brigades and regiments for the support he has invariably received from them, or assuring the officers and men generally, that whilst he will ever look back with pride to the time he has been at their head, he will always continue to feel the greatest anxiety for their honour, success, and welfare.

By Order,
(Signed) C. C. Shute, Major, A.A.G.

---

Balaklava, Dec. 25th, 1854.

Sir,—In obedience to General Order No. 3, December 20th, 1854, I have the honour to report that in the whole of the ten regiments composing the cavalry division under my command, the messing has been carried on strictly according to Her Majesty's regulations, and as is usual at home; the messes being cooked by troop-cooks, and always inspected by the orderly officer on duty. I am glad to have it in my power to report so favourably of what I consider indispensable to the health of the troops.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

---

Cavalry Head-quarters, January 25th, 1855.

Sir,—Many men of the Cavalry division are suffering severely from being entirely barefooted. I am assured by commanding officers that it cannot be helped, inasmuch as all boots and shoes issued are too small; that out of large casks from the Quartermaster-General's stores, frequently eight or nine pair only can be made available, the rest all being under-sized.

It appears that the sizes chiefly wanted for winter use are from nine to twelve, in consequence of the men's feet swelling, and their wearing thicker stockings.

It would appear a more rational arrangement, if boots were packed according to their sizes, than indiscriminately; as it is now necessary to take out those large barrels of shoes to find a few of large size, which, as it appears, they do not often contain. I hope you will consider this letter of sufficient importance to bring it to the notice of the Field Marshal.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster General.

---

Cavalry Head-quarters, Jan. 25th, 1855.

Sir,—I find it necessary to report that there appears to be an insufficiency of medicine for the regimental hospitals. Commanding officers of the cavalry regiments have represented to me that the supplies they have received are usually scanty, and in some instances of late have been altogether deficient.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Cavalry Head-quarters, Jan. 25th, 1855.

Sir,—I have the honour to enclose letters from officers commanding brigades, and the officer commanding the 6th Dragoons, on the subject of a store for the saddlery of that regiment. Doubtless, it is most important that a store should be provided for the saddlery of regiments, which, from the number of non-effective horses, is now requiring storage to a large amount.

As I believe there may be difficulty in finding room in Balaklava, I would suggest that one of the new huts should be given to each brigade for that purpose.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Cavalry Head-quarters, Jan. 29th, 1855.

Sir,—I have the honour to submit for the consideration of the Field Marshal, that all the serjeant-saddlers, and some others of the cavalry division, be sent *at once* with all the

spare horse-kits to Scutari, in charge of a regimental quartermaster of each brigade; and that a shop be given them for the taking to pieces, washing, oiling, and repairing of the saddlery. There they would find it possible to provide themselves with what is required for the purpose; and I know no better place to facilitate and hasten the equipment of the remounts on their arrival from England; and it will, moreover, enable a great deal of saddlery to be saved that would otherwise have to be thrown away. If his Excellency should approve, as I hope he will, it cannot be carried out too soon; and the saddlery must be collected at once for the purpose.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Cavalry Camp, Jan. 30th, 1855.

Sir,—The boots already given to the cavalry by Lieutenant-Colonel Dacre's orders, from the artillery stores, and those to be given will be of essential service. I have hitherto failed in finding Mr. Hanson's stores. From the experience we have had of Turkish boots we little desire them: they give no protection against wet, and don't last at all.

In respect to the supply you propose calling for from England, I wish to observe, that for the cavalry soldiers, the boots should be strong, large in the feet, and also large in the leg. In a wet camp it is most desirable that they should be large enough in the leg to admit of the dragoon slipping his overalls inside.

From what we have seen, for winter campaigning, outside boots coming up to the knee are the best, and the only serviceable ones.

In cavalry boots it is important that the heels should be perfectly well secured, as they are apt to be pulled off by the spur.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Cavalry Camp, Feb. 6th, 1855.

Sir,—In compliance with General Order No. 1, January 31st, I have the honour to state that in the division under my command the messing of the troops has been invariably carried on according to Her Majesty's regulations, and that the messes are duly and daily visited by a regimental orderly officer in addition to the troop officer.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

---

Camp near Varna, Aug. 26th, 1854.

Sir,—I have the honour to acquaint you that the picket-ropes of the regiments of the heavy cavalry brigade at Varna are so worn out and unserviceable, that the horses are constantly getting loose, and accidents occurring; I therefore request that the Commander of the Forces will sanction a fresh supply being obtained from the naval authorities or transport-shipping here, as that appears to be the quality best suited for the purpose; 420 yards are required for each corps. The total amount for the four regiments would thus be 1,680 yards of two-inch rope.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Major-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Before Sebastopol, Nov. , 1854.

My Lord,—Last evening some time after dark, an orderly arrived, bringing a despatch from your Lordship, with orders, as he said, to carry another to Colonel Mayow at the light cavalry camp.

The Lieutenant-General has directed me to impress upon your Lordship the great objection which he entertains to having orderlies out after dark, except where the *urgency* of the service renders it indispensable; and he further objects to any orderlies being sent where they can be saved; the low condition of the horses is such, that the Lieutenant-General feels that he has no choice, but is compelled to restrict to the greatest possible extent all unnecessary work or exertions. Your Lordship will recollect, that from the Light cavalry camps to your yacht and back is at least a distance of fifteen miles; and Lord Lucan feels assured that, bearing this in mind, your Lordship will carry out his views as far as possible, by not despatching orderlies who can be in any way dispensed with, recollecting that in your case it would be throwing additional work on the cavalry, to meet your own individual convenience.

(Signed) W. PAULET, Col., A.A.G.

Major-General the Earl of Cardigan.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Camp before Sebastopol, 2nd Nov. 1854.

Sir,—The horses of the cavalry are suffering, and will suffer, so fearfully from any extended exposure to the cold, that I have the honour to request that you will submit to the Commander of the Forces my opinion, that immediate steps should be taken to procure for them the warmest covering which could be found; I am informed that the French cavalry are providing themselves in this way, for their horses, at Smyrna. I really consider this matter urgent.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Heights before Sebastopol, 7th Nov. 1854.

Sir,—With reference to the clothing for the horses of the Cavalry division, I am anxious to be supplied with 2,000 sheets, measuring eight feet by seven, made of the best material the country can produce, to protect against both wet and cold, and to be secured with broad rollers of strong webbing with good buckles. I also wish that 500 hoods should be supplied for the use of the more delicate horses.

You will much oblige me by submitting the above observations to the Commander of the Forces.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Before Sebastopol, 11th Nov. 1854.

Sir,—Having well considered the hutting of the division of cavalry under my command, and which, from the present severity of the weather, should not be unnecessarily one day delayed, I have the honour to submit that so important, and indeed, under our circumstances, so difficult a work cannot, in my opinion, be satisfactorily planned or executed without the assistance of an engineer officer. If the Commander of the Forces will kindly authorize the appointment of an officer for this purpose, I will give him all the assistance in my power, so that the horses shall be protected from the weather as expeditiously as possible.

I am inclined to think that Lord Raglan has been misinformed about the French cavalry or Chasseurs d'Afrique, as having had their camps visited by an officer of my staff; I cannot learn that the troop horses are in any instance, as yet, hutted, or changed from the way in which those horses have hitherto stood at their pickets.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Camp near Sebastopol, Nov. 17th, 1854.

Sir,—Having well considered the matter of the hutting of the men and horses of the heavy cavalry brigade, and the two troops of horse artillery, I am fully convinced that without the continual superintendence of an officer of engineers, it is hopeless to attempt to carry out a work of such magnitude within such seasonable time as the advanced period of the season makes indispensably necessary. With such assistance for a fortnight, I really feel sanguine that such shelter could be given as would save the lives of many men and hundreds of horses.

A young engineer officer, Mr. Stokes, has been with me upon this business: if the officer commanding the royal engineers could so arrange as to spare me this officer for the short period I require his services, I am satisfied that the greatest possible good would result. I must conclude in repeating that alone I am quite unfit to hut the cavalry, which, for their efficiency or their existence, is now become a matter of the greatest urgency.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.

The Quartermaster General.

---

Camp near Balaklava, Nov. 29th, 1854.

My Lord,—I have received this evening, through the usual channel, a division order by your Lordship relative to officers in command, or in temporary command of regiments, being permitted to change the form of the brigade camp, in my temporary absence, without a previous reference to me.

The alignment of tents and the regularity of encampments have hitherto been attended to by me as much in accordance with your Lordship's orders and directions as my own views on the subject. I conclude some report has been made to you by some officer under my command as to what occurred a day or two since. I found the camp extended in a most unusual manner, over an immense space of ground, without any apparent reason or advantage; Colonel Douglas seemed to think it so unnecessary that he had not moved his horses: I consequently directed that no horses or tents should in future be moved without my previous authority, as the general officer commanding the brigade. Your Lordship's order completely annuls and destroys all my authority in the brigade. If officers under my command can mutilate and derange the camp under my orders without my authority, according to their own whims and caprices, there is no reason why they should not act independently of my authority upon every matter.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

The reports are daily sent to me, and my requisite answers returned; and since your Lordship pointed out to me in a letter from the Adjutant-General that mounted orderlies for the purpose were objectionable, as being for my own personal convenience alone, in almost every case these reports have since been sent by my own horses and my servants. I request your Lordship will reflect before you require me to insert in brigade orders the order in question, completely subverting my authority in the brigade, and whether, provided your wishes with regard to change of ground are carried into effect, you are not disposed to leave the matter in my hands, as the general officer commanding the brigade.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) CARDIGAN, Major-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Brigade.

Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Lucan.

---

Before Sebastopol, Nov. 29th, 1854.

My dear Lord Cardigan,—I have heard nothing from any officer of your brigade on the subject of the shifting of the tents or horses; indeed, I am never in communication with any of them, nor do I wish that the order you referred to should trench upon your authority or be at all obnoxious to you. This order has been practically carried into effect in the heavy brigade ever since the state of the weather and ground have become so bad.

I think that the commanding officers of regiments should at the earliest moment always have it in their power, by moving a little to the front, rear, or flanks, to ameliorate the position of their horses or men, or, unless the brigadiers are constantly present, such opportunities may be lost. If you will propose any change of the order that will make it more palatable to you, and at the same time unobstructive to the great object I have in view, I shall cheerfully adopt it.

Yours faithfully,
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.

---

Balaklava, Nov. 29th 1854.

Sir,—I have the honour to request that you will state to the Lieutenant-General commanding the division that I feel obliged to him for his private letter of to-day. As, however, I should not know how to alter the wording of the division order referred to in his letter, and as I have requested to be reported sick on board ship, and no longer commanding the brigade, I have sent the division order to Lieutenant-Colonel Doherty, in command of the brigade, requesting him to insert it in brigade orders to morrow.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) CARDIGAN, Major-Gen.
Light Cavalry Brigade.

The Assistant Adjutant-General.

---

[MEMORANDUM.]

Engineer Camp, Head-quarters, Dec. 4th, 1854.

Lieutenant Lennox, R.E., has been specially appointed by the Commanding Royal Engineer, for the purpose of superintending the construction of the cavalry stables, &c., and orders will be sent to that officer to report himself forthwith to Lord Lucan, and to remain at his head-quarters, for the period mentioned by his Lordship.

(Signed) E. T. BOURCHIER, Capt. R.E.
Acting Brigade Major.

The Quartermaster-General, Head-quarters.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, Dec. 5th, 1854.

Sir,—I think it necessary to state how the detachment of the 4th Light Dragoons is circumstanced. Attached as they are to the 2nd division, no transport is given them for their forage; they are consequently compelled to fetch it from Balaklava, a distance of six miles, and at such a distance, it is not possible for them to draw other than corn.

It is quite clear that those horses without hay, upon corn alone, cannot, in the present state of the roads, draw corn, travelling twelve miles distance in addition to their other duties, without imperilling their existence, and the fearful losses occurring daily in the light cavalry brigade, make me look with the greatest anxiety upon those horses that remain to them.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General, Head-quarters.

---

[MEMORANDUM.]

I fear that the hutting will be much and unnecessarily delayed, for instead of an engineering officer being sent to remain and superintend, *as ordered by Lord Raglan*, he only occasionally visits, and thereby time has already been lost. This should be set right, and orders should be given about the timber to Capt. Hamilton; on *my requisition alone* any timber for stabling should be at once given. Every chance of delay or obstruction to this all important work should be removed.

(Signed) LUCAN.

I trust that the horse-clothing and men's warm clothing, which are arrived, may be issued at once.

(Signed) LUCAN.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Cavalry Camp, Dec. 11th, 1854.

Sir,—I am under the necessity of requesting that you will be good enough to give your early and serious attention to the supply of horse-nails, collar-shanks, forage-cords, picket-lines, nose-bags, and corn-sacks, for the regiments in the division under my command. Without a constant and a ready supply of these articles, indispensable for the security of the horses and their condition, the efficiency of the cavalry is compromised. Commanding officers report that without nails the horses will soon become unshod. It is to be observed, that in this country, shoes, lasting as they do for several months together, are not required in the same proportion as nails. I hope it will be possible to provide for this important deficiency. I attach no less importance to the nose-bags, collar-shanks, and forage-cords. Corn thrown on the ground is either damaged or wasted; these nose-bags, from constant exposure to wet weather, even when made of good materials, which they seldom are, will still last but a very few months.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Head-quarters, Cavalry Camp, 11th Dec. 1854.

Sir,—On the 5th inst. I felt myself compelled to request your attention to the situation of the detachment of the 4th Light Dragoons, consisting of 20 horses, stationed with the second division: I consider that situation so very dangerous for the lives of the horses, that I hope I shall be excused (not having received any reply to my former communication) again calling your attention to the subject.

They still have to draw their own corn at a distance of above seven miles from Balaklava, where, from the system of landing it, they constantly are much delayed; and, with the exception of their corn, they receive no other forage whatever.

It is obvious that horses already much reduced from short feeding and winter exposure, cannot, in addition to their other duties drawn corn there, and back fifteen miles deprived of hay, without endangering their very lives.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

P.S. It is better that I should add, that the foraging of all the cavalry horses attached to the different divisions of infantry is very uncertain, and in most cases totally insufficient.

---

Kadikoi, Dec. 12th, 1854.

Sir,—In reply to your desire to be informed of the progress making in the hutting of the cavalry stabling, I have the honour to state that we have all the masons of the division at work, and that the different regiments being now about to have intrenching tools, will at once scarp the rising ground, and give the horses the best shelter they can.

Notwithstanding my personal application to Osman Pasha and Musham Pasha, the assistance we receive from the Turks is nearly valueless; they only remain three or four hours; they vary in numbers from fifty to one hundred, but from the little exertion they can be got to make, ten good workmen in a full day's work would do much more. We are much wanting the order for timber, that it may be drawn.

Every possible exertion shall be made to forward these stables, but I fear that it is a work that, with the limited assistance we are getting from the Turks, must occupy much time.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Cavalry Head-quarters, 21st Dec. 1854.

Sir,—I find myself again compelled to request your attention to the great difficulties I experience in the construction of the stabling for the troop-horses. Employed, as every dragoon is at this time, in regimental duties, I can receive no assistance from them, and all Turkish assistance is altogether withheld. Having, by your direction, applied to Osman Pasha for Turkish soldiers, he gave an order to Roostum Pasha to give me all the men I might require. During a few days only, a small number of Turks was given; he then refused to send any more without a positive order from Sir Colin Campbell, who, I am sorry to state, has informed me that he is unable to send any Turks to aid in this operation in consequence of the numbers already employed on different fatigue-duties.

In consequence of being thus deprived of the Turkish soldiers, the masons belonging to the division are obliged to wait upon themselves; thus rendering the work slow and costly. The disappointment I experience is most annoying, as I am satisfied that the stabling will not be constructed to an extent or in time to be of much use to the cavalry horses.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Balaklava, Dec. 22nd, 1854.

Sir,—Your letter of the 20th inst., received yesterday, informed me that 200 Turkish soldiers would be sent and placed under my command this morning, and instructed me, as I understood, to select a spot in the neighbourhood of the works to be carried on for their encampment. This I immediately arranged with the Assistant Quartermaster-General. I did not understand that I was to advise you of my having done so. From the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel Mayow, I am unable, at this moment, to refer to your letter. I have received information from Sir Colin Campbell that he has selected a body of Turks already encamped close by, and recommending that I should allow them to continue there. This I purpose to do, as I cannot see that it will be inconvenient. Should it, however, prove so, they can be removed. I hope and expect to have the Turks at work to-morrow.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Kadikoi, Dec. 24th, 1854.

My dear General,—We have not as yet succeeded in getting a *nail* for our stabling. My object in sending you the enclosed is more to satisfy you that the charge of being dilatory must not be placed on me.

(Signed) LUCAN.

Quartermaster-General Airey.

---

Engineer's Yard, Balaklava, 23rd December.

My Lord,—Will you be good enough to tell Lord Lucan, that in consequence of the "Jason," on board of which the supply of nails is, being also loaded with clothing, which could not be landed in the rain, we have up to now been unable to get the requisite supply to get the roof on the depôt stable.

(Signed) G. HALL, Major,
R. E. Dept.

To Lord Bingham, A.D.C.

---

Balaklava, 31st Dec. 1854.

Sir,—I think it right to forward a report from the officer intrusted with the conveyance of the mail-bags yesterday morning.

It appears as faulty as it is mischievous, that troop-horses should be kept out during nearly eleven successive hours.

I have also thought it necessary to forward a report concerning the party employed on a similar duty the preceding evening, with Major-General Scarlett's observations.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

---

Cavalry Camp, Balaklava, January 1st, 1855.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that the horse-clothing issued for the use of the troop-horses of the division under my command is now, in consequence of the many casualties which have unhappily occurred, become in excess, to the number of forty-nine suits.

The troop-horses being now provided, I consider it my duty to submit that sets should be given for the use of the officers' chargers. Not being able to give the exact number that would be required to complete every effective charger, I hope the Field Marshal will kindly sanction a further issue of 250 sets, which, with the 49 sets in hand, will I hope be found sufficient.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Cavalry Camp, Jan. 13th, 1855.

Sir,—Notwithstanding the great diminution of troop horses, the regiments have no great superabundance of men, and those to spare are urgently required for the hutting of the horses; still the spare horses of the staff corps must be groomed. I would propose for this purpose, attaching to Major Grant, temporarily, a party of one serjeant, one corporal, and 11 men, to be furnished by the 4th and 13th Light Dragoons. There are many objections to detaching men in this way, and in this case not the smallest will be associating men on fifteenpence a day without rations, with the staff corps receiving six shillings a day and rations free.

I have calculated upon, and hope that the duties of the dragoon will be confined to the grooming and care of the horses.

(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

---

Cavalry Head-quarters, Balaklava, Jan. 29th, 1855.

Sir,—I have the honour to inclose the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry assembled by your order. It appears that it was not the Royal, but Inniskilling Dragoons, which were embarked on board the "Warcloud." The Royals were equally unfortunate; but

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

their horses were embarked on board of other vessels. In the "Wilson Kennedy," 99 horses, were, I believe, lost; and on board of other sailing vessels very many, whilst on board of the steamers the losses were few. The fearful loss of horses, amounting in the whole, I believe, to near 300, was occasioned by the horses being embarked on board of sailing vessels; by their being made to carry so many more than they had been fitted for; by their being detained at Varna, many of them after the embarkation was completed, by which they lost the fine weather; and by their putting to sea in weather so bad and so threatening, that several of the captains, as I have been informed, offered objections to sailing.

(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

---

Cavalry Camp, Kadikoi, Feb. 7th, 1835.

Sir,—Lieut.-Colonel Doherty, commanding 13th Light Dragoons, informed me two or three days since, that Major McKenzie had sent in a horse belonging to the letter party stationed in Balaklava, with a verbal message that he was to be replaced by another troop horse. I instructed him *not* to do so till that officer had made a proper written application, giving his reasons for wishing the exchange. I consider such to be the proper course, and one necessary to be followed; it appears, therefore, that this party has not been reduced by any order from me, as you seem to suppose: but by Major McKenzie, who first reduces the party, and then does not take the proper measures to have the reduction made good.

Such has been the wear and tear of horses belonging to parties attached to the different parts of the army, that I found it necessary to give out a division order forbidding any exchange of a troop horse, or the replacing of any casualty, without my previous knowledge and sanction.

I consider that the general officers who have cavalry parties attached to them are responsible for them, and that it is their duty to report for my information the casualties that occur, as it is undoubtdely my duty not to allow myself to be left uninformed; again, if they desire any exchange, it is to me that they should apply, responsible as I am for the cavalry. However arduous and difficult it may be to do so, I am determined, so far as I can, to preserve their efficiency.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Cavalry Camp, Kadikoi, Feb. 12th, 1855.

Sir,—When visiting the stables occupied by the Quartermaster-General's letter party in Balaklava a few days since, I observed that the troop horses had been removed from the only good part of the stable to make room for some officers' horses, and that the former were, from the dilapidated state of the stable, exposed to much risk. The necessary repairs could easily and quickly be made, as a few boards would do it.

Removing troop horses for officers' horses, I consider always a questionable proceeding; but when, as I cannot doubt in this instance, it was proper, surely the place where the troop horses were put should have been rendered fit.. You will oblige me by giving the necessary directions.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

FORAGE.

Bivouac, Balaklava, 29th Sept. 1854.

Sir,—Even at such a moment as the present, I am driven to complain of the commissariat arrangements, and the very defective manner in which their duties are carried on in the cavalry division under my command. The men and horses have constantly to bear with privations, which seriously impair their efficiency, more particularly the horses; with them it is no exaggeration to state that they are occasionally bordering on starvation. I have in the last few months repeatedly, indeed, on every occasion, remonstrated with Commissary-General Filder, and entreated his attention to the wants of the cavalry, but to no purpose whatever. He insists upon leaving the commissariat duties with youths altogether without experience, and who do not show any zeal or desire to make up for their personal deficiencies.

Seeing them as I do myself every day, and often in the day, I have still failed in getting them to exert themselves sufficiently to afford a hope that they will at all adequately discharge their duties. Unlike other divisions, Commissary-General Filder persists in leaving the cavalry division without any superintending commissariat officer. It appears irrational that the cavalry, requiring more and larger supplies than the rest of the army, should be left in the hands of the most inexperienced, and the most inefficient, and without a head to instruct or control them. With a very small number of horses at present with this army, and operating as it is so close to the sea-board, there can be no real difficulty in providing corn; still our supplies are always most irregular, and frequently fail us altogether. The 4th Light Dragoons, who I was informed received one day's supply yesterday, have just

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

reported to me that they got none, and that their horses are suffering much. Not one grain of corn was issued to the troops here on Wednesday, and it was only very late yesterday that they received one day's forage.

I am unwilling to extend this letter, or I could add very much to the positive grievances of which, as the general commanding the cavalry, and responsible for their efficiency, I have to complain. No care will make up for want of food.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Camp near Balaklava, Sept. 30th, 1854.

Sir,—I have the honour to report, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, that I found it necessary to place Deputy-Assistant Commissary General Crookshank under arrest yesterday,—1st, For disobedience of my orders; 2ndly, For making a report to me verbally, not founded on fact.

The circumstances are:—On halting on Wednesday morning on this ground, though expecting a move, so urgent did I consider it, that I ordered him at once to commence slaughtering; and so soon in the afternoon as we were instructed to encamp, knowing him to have meat ready, I enjoined him in the strongest manner, and ordered him at once to forward rations for the men of the 4th and 11th Light Dragoons, which two regiments had been moved on: I was told that Lord Raglan had himself, as also had the Quartermaster-General, given instructions to the same effect. How great was my annoyance when Mr. ——, the junior ——, informed me next morning, and no earlier than eight o'clock, that his serjeant had failed in finding the 4th Light Dragoons, and that they consequently had received no rations.

This flimsy and tardy excuse dissatisfied me much, and I ordered him at once to proceed himself and take this regiment their provisions, which I supposed him to have done, having received a report from him subsequently, that the 4th Light Dragoons were rationed: so far, however, was this from being the fact, that I have since learnt that the regiment received no rations whatever from Mr. Crookshank or Mr. ——, and considered themselves most fortunate in getting assistance late in the evening from the commissary of the 3rd division, which they had only joined so late as three o'clock in the afternoon.

I consider that Mr. Crookshank was most neglectful in the provisioning of the 4th Light Dragoons; that he altogether disregarded the instructions he had received from Lord Raglan, and disobeyed the orders he had received from me.

2ndly. No grain of any sort was served out to the division on Tuesday or Wednesday last; Mr. Crookshank, throughout the latter day, always stating that it was landing. On Thursday morning early, he informed me that he held a quantity landed the previous evening, and which, in reply to a question from me, he said was sufficient for one day's ration of grain for the 4th Light Dragoons and 11th Hussars. Believing these two regiments to be positively famishing, being without either corn or fodder, I ordered him in the most positive manner, to give them a preference over the regiments here, or the divisional or brigade staff, and to send the grain at once to them. You may well believe that my annoyance was very great when I was officially informed by Lord G. Paget yesterday, that his regiment had received no corn whatever from Mr. Crookshank; and that, had he not succeeded in borrowing from the artillery 6 lbs. of corn per horse, his horses must have starved.

I immediately sent for Mr. Crookshank, and I found not only that he had disobeyed my orders, in not supplying the 4th Light Dragoons with corn, but had imposed upon me by making me believe the day previous that those orders had been carried out, and that the regiment was provisioned.

I considered it due to the service, to place Mr. Crookshank under arrest, there to await the decision of the Commander of the Forces; but I have authorized him to be under arrest at large.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

---

Camp Kadikoi, Dec. 11th, 1854.

Sir,—I forward for the information of the Lieutenant-General the forage and ration reports of my brigade:—

| Forage due. | Returns due. | Time consumed in foraging. |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 4th, nil. | nil. | 8 hours |
| Dec. 5th, nil. | nil. | 7½ „ |
| Dec. 1st, nil. | nil. | 6 „ |
| Dec. 2nd, nil. | nil. | 7½ „ |
| Dec. 6th, nil. | nil. | 5 „ |

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. YORKE SCARLETT, Brig.-Gen.

Assistant Quartermaster-General
Cavalry Division.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

[MEMORANDUM.]

These reports are forwarded, and the attention of the Quarter-master General is earnestly requested, not to what occurred yesterday only, but what occurs every day, to a greater or a less degree. So long as the present mischievous system of having no stores in hand, and on shore, is allowed to continue, the difficulties and the constant disappointment of the troops in drawing supplies must continue also.

(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

---

Head-quarters, Cavalry Camp, Dec. 13th, 1854.

Sir,—In General Orders No. 4, December 7th, it is stated that in future all bât and ammunition horses are to receive full rations of forage. I wish you will be good enough to inform me whether it is not the intention of the Field Marshal that the cavalry horses should equally receive full rations; they are now only allowed eight lbs. of hay; at other times they were only allowed six lbs. I cannot doubt but that his Excellency will be of opinion that for large troop-horses eight lbs. of hay, and still more six lbs., is a quantity totally inadequate for the nourishment of such animals. The French allow ten lbs. French to their *smallest* animals.

A troop-horse in condition in England never receives less than twelve lbs., and work-horses sixteen, twenty, and sometimes more. Although the troop-horses have improved since they have left the hill, in these very few days, to an extent which is really incredible, still, I fear, that unless the quantity of hay is increased, their condition will not be improved to such an extent as I anxiously desire, and as will give the Field Marshal satisfaction.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

[MEMORANDUM.]

Head-quarters, 14th Dec. 1854.

Having represented to the Field Marshal commanding, that, in the present state of the supply of hay in the commissariat not more than 8 lbs. could be issued to the cavalry, his Lordship has directed that issues are to be continued at that rate for the present, but that the deficiency should be made up with chopped straw.

(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, Comm.-Gen.

---

Cavalry Head-quarters, Dec. 15th, 1854.

Sir,—In reference to the conversation you had with me, and the correspondence which has passed since, I am bound to say that you have not established against the dragoons that, having the hay at their disposal, they left it on the quay to save themselves the trouble of removing it.

I have myself visited the landing-wharf, and I am quite satisfied that there has been a deficiency of hay landed, and that the troops have received short rations and have severely suffered in consequence.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Commissary-General.

---

Cavalry Head-quarters, Dec. 16th, 1854.

Sir,—I consider it incumbent upon me to state that reports are made to me daily by the officers commanding brigades and regiments that the men and horses are in all weathers detained for very many hours, in consequence of their finding neither hay nor corn landed; adding as this does very severely to the duties of foraging; indeed the dragoons are frequently obliged to go on board ship and there throw it out of the holds themselves. Until the Commissary-General can be induced to land some forage in advance, these difficulties must continue; but I hope, Sir, that you will be able to make arrangements that he should do so.

I have the honour, &c.
(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

Two reports are herewith enclosed.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Camp, Kadikoi, 23rd Dec. 1854.

Sir,—For the information of the Lieutenant-General commanding the cavalry, I have the honour to report, that the regiments in the brigade under my command received their full rations and forage yesterday, except the 5th Dragoon Guards, who are deficient 84 lbs. of barley, not having been able to send sufficient horses to carry forage, and also furnish their number for carrying provisions to the infantry and mounting the picket.

It will also be necessary this morning to send for forage those horses that have been on picket the last twenty-four hours.

The time consumed in carrying provisions to the infantry yesterday was from seven to seven and a half hours.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. Yorke Scarlett, Brig.-Gen.

The Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division.

---

Balaklava, Dec. 31st, 1854.

Sir,—I find it necessary to report that out of the ten regiments composing the Cavalry division, only two were given hay yesterday. The partial substitution of oats I consider no equivalent, and the horses, from their low condition, their exposure to cold, and the hard duties imposed upon them, cannot afford any deficiency of their small ration. I much lament that it should be found impossible to land one or two days' forage in advance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.

The Adjutant-General. Commanding Cavalry Division.

---

Balaklava, Jan. 1st, 1855.

Sir,—I am compelled to request earnestly your attention to the accompanying report. On two successive days scarcely any hay has been supplied to the troop and officers' horses. The arrangement by which the cavalry only forage in the afternoon, becomes most inconvenient and objectionable when all the hay landed is taken by the artillery, which forages first.

If some method cannot be devised by which the cavalry can be supplied with their small rations of forage daily, I quite despair of saving the few horses which survive. I earnestly hope for your assistance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.

The Quartermaster-General. Commanding Cavalry Division.

---

Camp, Balaklava, Jan. 2nd, 1855.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 26th instant, but only handed to me two days since. In the return of forage, you have selected a period from the 4th to the 16th in the month of December, when the whole of this correspondence referred to what had occurred previous to the 4th, when you called upon me. Doubtless, in my letter of the 15th December, I mentioned having visited the landing-wharfs, and stated that the arrangements were so faulty, that I was satisfied there must have been a deficiency of hay landed; an opinion I still adhere to; and I must observe that the heavy charge you made against the dragoons of "*through idleness* leaving the hay on the wharf," when called upon to prove it, you have not attempted to do so. I am aware that since the 13th December, when the cavalry have often to a horse been called upon to perform commissariat duties, carrying provisions to the infantry, it has on some days been found impossible to forage completely for ourselves; which explains short forage in the 5th Dragoon Guards and Royal Dragoons.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.

Commissary-Gen. Filder. Commanding Cavalry Division.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, Jan. 2nd, 1855.

Sir,—I consider it my duty to request your attention to the deficiency of hay still issued to the cavalry horses: it has now continued to a greater or lesser extent three days.

Landed as the hay is, it must always be an uncertainty whether the full or any rations can or cannot be drawn, and I am assured that the new system of not allowing the cavalry to forage until the afternoon tells altogether to their disadvantage, as the artillery, it is said, carry away all they find landed; and that, whilst the cavalry are unable to draw their rations, the artillery are storing in advance. Without more regularity in the foraging of the cavalry, I cannot indulge in a hope of improvement in the condition of the horses.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.

The Adjutant-General. Commanding Cavalry Division.

---

Cavalry Camp, Kadikoi, Jan. 9th, 1855.

Sir,—I have the honour to inclose forage-reports from the officers commanding brigades in the Cavalry division, and to request your attention to the facts that the troop and officers' horses are, and have been, receiving scarcely any hay whatever, and that little of a very inferior description. It is hopeless to expect that they will long withstand the severe trials they are subjected to. I am informed that more than one transport is in harbour with hay, and have been some time.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.

The Adjutant-General. Commanding Cavalry Division.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Cavalry Camp, Kadikoi, Jan. 10th, 1855.

Sir,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a statement of forage issued to the cavalry, referred to me by the Field Marshal's orders for my remarks. I observe that the Commissary-General has cleverly enough taken a period of 12 days, from the 4th to the 16th ultimo, when the horses were foraged with extraordinary regularity, and unprecedented liberality; the Light Cavalry brigade having been allowed during a few days to draw an unlimited amount of forage, in discharge of the great arrears due to them, and to endeavour, as far as possible, to repair the emaciation from positive starvation which they were suffering; the Heavy brigade were also allowed to draw some of the large quantity of forage owing to them. During these short twelve days there was no cause of complaint, and no complaint was made, and I was enabled, when expressing regret at the necessity of giving to the cavalry transport duties, to state that the improvement in the condition of the horses from the time the cavalry had moved down the hill was incredibly great. Undoubtedly the Light Cavalry brigade, which had been for a long period receiving short rations, and during some days none at all, were, after the 4th ultimo, for a very short time, —as it was stopped by Mr. Filder's orders,—drawing more than the daily allowance, and to some of the heavy regiments, though to a much less extent, some of the forage owing was given. I am accepting the Commissary-General's statement as correct; but I should remark that the quantities of forage issued cannot be known correctly by the regimental officers attending, from the absence of all scales and measures; indeed nothing can be more irregular and disorderly than is the issue of forage: no commissariat officer attends; the duty is left entirely to issuers, a very low class of officer; and from the fact that no forage is ever landed in advance, there is great delay, great scrambling, and the greatest uncertainty what quantity of forage, and whether any at all, will be got. If Commissary-General Filder wishes to show by the statement before me that the incessant complaints I have been compelled to make are not founded in fact, I am bound to state that the forage issued to the cavalry under my immediate observation, whether in Turkey or the Crimea, has been most irregular and altogether insufficient. At Varna it was so irregular and uncertain that I was driven to confine the duties of one of my aides-de-camp exclusively to the superintendence of the foraging of the regiments. I have throughout felt the great inconvenience of having no commissariat officer of rank; and it certainly has appeared to me most extraordinary that the cavalry division, where the duties must be more important and onerous, should alone, of all the divisions, be left without a responsible Assistant Commissary-General, whose opinion and recommendations would legitimately command more attention and respect than those of the young inexperienced officers of the lowest rank to whom the whole of the commissariat duties of the cavalry division have been confided. Whenever the Commissary-General shall think it prudent broadly to affirm what I suppose this statement is intended to imply, that my many complaints are not well grounded, I shall be prepared to establish, by the unanimous evidence of every individual of all ranks in the cavalry division, that the foraging of the cavalry, perhaps excepting a few days, has been irregular and deficient, and that the troop and officers' horses have unhappily most severely suffered in consequence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Cavalry Camp, Kadikoi, Jan. 13th, 1855.

Sir,—In reference to the statements made by Commissary-General Filder on the subject of chopped straw, I have made the closest inquiries possible, and I now have the honour to enclose a report from Major-General Scarlett, and the officers commanding the ten regiments.

Attaching as I do the greatest importance to having sufficient bulk in the horses' rations, I have never ceased to urge commanding officers to take all the chopped straw they could get, and in preference to a substitution of corn for hay, and previous to the receipt of this statement, had issued an order complaining of the —— Guards leaving a day's straw, in consequence of not having provided themselves with sacks to meet the case of there being no hay.

It may, and undoubtedly has happened, that regiments, from not having a sufficient number of horses at one time, and at others from not having with them their sacks, and from foraging in the afternoon, being unable to repair any of these deficiencies, have been prevented drawing their ration of straw, when hay, upon which they had calculated, failed them; but I do not think that Mr. Filder's statement can be supported by evidence; and to say the least of it, it is an exaggeration. For the information of the Field Marshal, I wish to observe, that whereas one horse will draw hay for sixteen horses, of chopped straw he will only draw for six; again, that whilst forage-cords are used for the hay, corn-sacks are required to hold the chopped straw; an officer late in the afternoon may consequently, on finding a deficiency of hay, find it impossible to draw straw in lieu.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

---

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Cavalry Camp, Balaklava, Feb. 3rd, 1855.

Sir,—For some days there has been a great deficiency of fodder, and it appears to be very doubtful when a supply can be calculated upon. I think it my duty to represent to the Field Marshal, of what extreme urgency it is that the cavalry horses should be provided with hay or straw: on corn alone, I am confident they cannot live through the cold they are exposed to.

I am assured that there have been ships in the Bosphorus with English hay for some time: if towed, they might have arrived already.

The horses are too low in condition to admit of their being left for a day without fodder in safety.

I have, &c.
(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Cavalry Camp, Kadikoi, Feb. 7th, 1855.

Sir,—I find it necessary to request that you will be good enough to submit to the Field Marshal this letter, with its three inclosures, though one is three and the other two days old. The total absence of all fodder for the horses continues, and still there have been two ships with hay in harbour since Monday; during the whole of which time it can scarcely be urged that the landing was prevented by bad weather.

His Excellency will, I am sure, agree that no cargo can be deemed more important, or deserve a precedence over a cargo of hay, when all the horses of the army are suffering from a want of it, as has been the case now for many days: it is to the naval authorities, and not to the Commissariat, that the blame, if any, and of which I cannot doubt, attaches.

I have, &c.
(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

CAVALRY TRANSPORT FOR COMMISSARIAT AND SICK.

Cavalry Camp, 12th Dec. 1854.

Sir,—Having since the receipt of your letter of this date communicated with Commissary-General Filder, I am now able to inform you what arrangements for carrying out the Field Marshal's order I propose to make. Four parties of sixty men mounted, with sixty led horses, each commanded by an officer aided by two serjeants, will be at the Commissariat stores at 8.30, 9, 9.30, and 10 a.m., and will there do as directed by the Commissariat department.

Having thus promptly arranged to carry out the orders of the Field Marshal, I consider that I might fail in my duty if I did not express my fear and belief that the condition of the cavalry horses is unfortunately such as to make it more than probable that a considerable number of them are quite incapable of work so severe, and must altogether be lost to the service in consequence; an opinion entertained not alone by myself, but already expressed to me by the officers commanding the brigades, and those at the head of the different regiments.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, 13th Dec. 1854, 8 o'clock a.m.

Sir,—In reference to your letter dated yesterday, and just received, I have the honour to state, that should the Field Marshal desire it, it must of course be done or attempted; but that I am of opinion that a man riding cannot lead two horses carrying loads, when those horses are troop-horses, and have not pack but their own saddles: we never do so in foraging for ourselves. The difficulties would be, first, loading the horses, which always requires two men for each horse; then going through the street of Balaklava, and other places where the roads are narrow and bad; and again, it is impossible on troop-saddles to secure bags but that many of them will slip, when a dragoon with three horses will become so embarrassed as to occasion much delay to the convoy. It is to be recollected, that pack-horses follow in strings, and are generally accompanied by drivers on foot, accustomed to this business, and who not only have the proper means of securing the load, but well understand how to do it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Quartermaster-General.

---

Cavalry Camp, Head-quarters, Dec. 15th, 1854.

Sir,—I have the honour to inclose a report from Brigadier-General Scarlett, which I think it right to submit for the information of the Field Marshal. I only hope that so soon as the pressing exigency of provisioning the troops in the front is abated, that his Excellency will kindly consider the serious consequences which must attend the continuance of employing the cavalry in transport.

I have, &c.
(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Kadikoi, Dec. 15th, 1854.

Sir,—I have to request that you will draw the attention of the Lieutenant-General to the number of sore backs reported by the veterinary-surgeons this morning, viz.:—4th Dragoon Guards, four; 5th, eleven; 1st, one; 2nd, eight; 6th, fifteen; also to the number of horses, as reported by the officers on duty, taken sick in commissariat duty.

N.B.—First Dragoon Guards were not on commissariat duty the first day; 4th were not on duty yesterday. The others have performed two days each.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. Gordon Scarlett, Brig.-Gen.

The Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division.

---

Cavalry Camp, Dec. 17th, 1854.

Sir,—In reply to the Field Marshal's inquiries, I have the honour to state, that 112 pounds of biscuit is the quantity which the troop horses have each carried; that I failed in getting from the Commissariat department pack-saddles, and was consequently obliged to use the regimental saddles, on which it is most difficult to carry any such amount of dead weight without giving some sore backs.

On the first morning, the Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General attended the loading of these horses, and he assured me that it was done as perfectly as possible; nor have I any reason to suppose that there has been any neglect.

I have been obliged to give the whole of this duty to the Heavy brigade, making the Light brigade forage for both brigades and take the picket, in consequence of the inability of the latter, in their reduced state, to undergo such fatigue.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-General,

The Adjutant-General. Commanding Cavalry Division.

---

Camp, Kadikoi, Dec. 22d, 1854.

My Lord,—I have with regret the honour to call your attention to the number of sick horses and the daily deaths of from four to five horses in the regiments in my brigade.

This decrease of effective horses is so rapid that some of the regiments will be unable to furnish the required number of pack-horses and draw their own forage when it becomes their turn to give the picket.

The improvement which had taken place since the horses came to a more sheltered spot has within the last twelve days ceased to be visible. Many are becoming affected with disease of the lungs, &c., which ends in glanders. The cavalry when they came down here were in a state that required care and grooming to renovate and restore them to condition.

They are now employed six hours *per diem* in carrying provisions or forage, which leaves the men few hours of daylight to groom and clean arms and appointments in such weather as this, and leaves no possibility of proceeding with hutting or building stables.

It is for your Lordship to consider whether the cavalry can perform their present duties and also retain any chance of doing effective service in the field when called on now or at any future period. It may be for the good of the service generally, that they should perform their present duties, but it can scarcely be relied on that they will also be effective as cavalry at a future period.

There has been latterly no deficiency of forage, but many horses are off their feed from debility and low fever, contracted from long exposure, and are unfit for work in consequence.

I wish lastly to advert to the want of veterinary medicines, for which applications have been sent in.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. Yorke Scarlett, Brig.-General.

Lt.-Gen. the Earl of Lucan, &c. &c.

---

Kadikoi, Dec. 23d, 1854.

Sir,—I consider it my duty not to withhold from the Field Marshal the inclosed letters from Brigadier-General Scarlett, commanding the Heavy brigade in the Cavalry division.

Like the Brigadier-General, I feel keenly, and with the deepest regret, the serious losses of horses occurring daily in the different regiments of cavalry, occasioned, as they are, by their carrying up provisions to the front of the army, a labour occupying many hours in the very bad state of the roads, and with their own reduced condition far beyond the power of these animals. So many have died, and so many more have fallen sick, that it is not even found possible, with this duty, for these regiments to forage for themselves; the 5th Dragoon Guards, in consequence, only drew a part of their allowance yesterday.

I feel that I ought not to conceal from his Excellency that, on the part of the Brigadier-General and the officers commanding regiments, a strong feeling exists that their regiments will become altogether dismounted, and that, in the total inefficiency of their regiments for any service in the field, their own characters will become compromised; a feeling in which, from the situation I hold, I must more than share.

These officers have all expressed to me their desire to endeavour, in the provisioning of the infantry, to give all the assistance in their power; but, from the long continuance of this onerous duty, they are apprehending the most serious consequences.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

---

[Memorandum.]

Dec. 24th, 1854.

Lord Raglan can form no opinion on this matter, without knowing how many horses are employed in carrying provisions to the troops, how many in fetching forage for themselves, and how many are left at home.

(Signed) Estcourt, A.G.

---

Balaklava, Dec. 25th, 1854.

Sir,—In answer to the information you call for—

No. 1. How many horses are employed in carrying provisions to the troops?
2. How many in fetching forage for themselves?
3. How many are left at home?

I have the honour to state that in the Heavy brigade there were on the 23d instant:—

| | |
|---|---|
| On commissariat duty | 381 |
| Regimental foraging | 123 |
| Pickets | 40 |
| Deficient for foraging | 8 |

In the Light brigade on the same day for duty, 201.

| | |
|---|---|
| Commissariat duty | 122 |
| Regimental foraging | 72 |
| Orderlies | 7 |
| | 201 |

It thus appears that no horse was left in on the day named, but that there were eight horses deficient for the foraging of the Heavy brigade.

I think it necessary to give a daily list of the dead horses since the cavalry have had to perform transport duties, amounting up to this morning to 121 horses; the increase of sick in the same time appears to be 93.

*Dead Horses.*—Dec. 13th, two; 14th, thirteen; 15th, six; 16th, five; 17th, fifteen; 18th, eight; 19th, nine; 20th, seven; 21st, six; 22nd, five; 23rd, seven; 24th, nine; 25th, twenty-nine: total, 121.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-General,
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

---

Balaklava, Dec. 26th, 1854.

Sir,—I think it necessary to report that twenty-one troop-horses have died in the last twenty-four hours, making an aggregate of 142 since the 12th instant. I cannot exaggerate the concern with which I view so fearful a mortality amongst the troop horses.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-General,
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

---

Camp, Kadikoi, Jan. 3d, 1855.

Sir,—I feel myself again compelled to request your attention to the great mortality of horses, which continues to a fearful extent. Im my letter of the 26th ult. I reported, that from the 12th of that month, when the cavalry gave the commissariat transport, 142 horses had died; since when 74; making in the whole a loss of 216 horses. My fears are, I am sorry to say, fully realised; and unless the troop horses can get more forage, and be eased in their work, I apprehend that no care will save them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-General,
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

P.S. I think it necessary to add that the hay issued to the cavalry is worthless rubbish, and quite unfit to nourish any animal. (Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-General.

---

Camp, Kadikoi, 6th Jan. 1855.

Sir,—It is with much concern that I have to report that 28 horses were reported dead yesterday; 16 the preceding day; and 43 this morning; 87 in three days; making a total loss of 303 horses since the 12th ultimo, when the cavalry first commenced doing commissariat transport duties.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-General,
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

Cavalry Camp, Kadikoi, Jan. 17th, 1855.

Sir,—It is with much regret that I find myself again compelled to represent the fearful consequence to the cavalry of having to continue in the discharge of transport duties, and to make another appeal in their behalf to the Field Marshal.

The horses continue dying fast; the discipline and economical management of the regiments deteriorate; feelings of disappointment and dissatisfaction are felt by the officers commanding brigades, regiments, and others; and in addition, this army is losing a cavalry it will be difficult to replace, whilst the country is suffering an enormous, and in my opinion, a needless pecuniary loss.

Since the 12th December, when the cavalry were first made to give commissariat transport, no less than 426 horses have died; many daily sinking under their load, and then left helplessly by the way to perish; the mortality and sickness are indeed so great, that unless the regiments are relieved quickly of these duties, a sufficiency of horses will not survive to forage for the sick and weakly, and the whole must starve or be destroyed; whilst a cessation of these duties, with great care and nursing, might yet, in my opinion, save 400 or 500, or more. When the commissariat duties were first given to the cavalry, I indulged in the confident expectation that it was an extreme temporary measure to meet an extraordinary unforeseen difficulty in provisioning the infantry, not likely to last beyond a few days; but it has now continued above five weeks, and, however bad the state of the roads and weather, without the intermission of a single day, and sometimes when the provisions carried were not for immediate use, but taken to the front to be stored; and during this time baggage-animals have been landed 200 or 300 at a time, to an aggregate amount, I should suppose, of thousands, without any apparent intention of relieving the cavalry of these onerous duties.

Independent of the loss to the army of so important a branch of the service, the pecuniary loss to the country from the destruction of so many horses is enormous. Much above 400 are gone already; as many more may be expected to go; 800 horses will have been worth 60,000*l.*; and I wish to direct the attention of the Field Marshal to the fact, that whereas a troop-horse is worth 75*l.* baggage-ponies can be procured in Asia Minor, and elsewhere, at 5*l.* a head to any amount; and as the pony carries on a pack-saddle two bags of biscuit, a load requiring four troop-horses, two to ride and two to carry, the pony costing 5*l.*, is equal to a transport power from troop-horses of 300*l.* The saddlery, from improper use, constant exposure to weather, without the means or time for giving it proper care, is suffering severely; the discipline and economical arrangements of the regiments are suffering from the fact that the men leaving camp early in the morning, and only returning late in the afternoon, are scarcely ever seen by their troop-officers; the whole of the messing is deranged, and it is found impossible to hold any parades, or have any inspections whatever; and further, from the great number of men employed in this way and in foraging, it is not possible to make much progress in the hutting of the horses; by which they again have to suffer; for I cannot doubt that, but for this constant occupation of the cavalry, the hutting would ere this have been completed, and the horses all under cover.

Having now stated the dreadful losses, and explained the many inconveniences consequent on the cavalry acting as commissariat transports, I must not withhold from his Excellency the great disappointment—I might add the great dissatisfaction—felt by the officers commanding brigades, regiments, and indeed by the officers generally, at the long continuance, and without any apparent early termination, of duties so totally foreign to their profession. In the beginning they were hurt at being told that these duties were given them in consequence of their having no field duties to perform; they now find that they are becoming rapidly dismounted, and that their inefficiency will be complete, when they can consequently no longer look for that honourable service and distinction in the field which was the ambition of all, and with many were the sole inducements to undergo the hardship and privations of the campaign. They again feel, that though having profited of an opportunity which has not yet offered itself to the French cavalry, of distinguishing themselves against the enemy, still they find themselves humiliated in the eyes of those allies by having to discharge duties strange to cavalry. Such feelings the Field Marshal will not, I am sure, think discreditable or improper, but I trust deserving of his indulgent consideration.

With every desire to obey every order and carry out every wish expressed by his Excellency, I find myself compelled, as a lieutenant-general in this army, and responsible for the efficiency of the cavalry, to lay these facts before him, and to express my hope that he will be disposed to relieve my division from duties onerous and destructive, and which from their nature are so distasteful that they cannot fail seriously to lessen that zeal and that *esprit de corps* which are so essential, and which unquestionably it is always an object to promote.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

---

Cavalry Camp, Feb. 9th, 1855.

Sir,—I am desirous of being allowed to suggest, for the consideration of the Field Marshal, not alone the advantage, but the extreme importance, of at once organizing an ambulance service for the army, similar in every way to the French.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

I should suppose that fifty equipped mules, in addition to our ambulance-waggons, would be sufficient. Of the number of mules in charge of Cornet Gibson, such could be selected for their power and their tractability that would perfectly answer the purpose; and the fifty pack-saddles and cacoléts, there can be little doubt, would, on application to the French government, be sent by the first return packet.

It is evident that, without such a corps, the present difficulties attending the removal of the sick will be permanent, and the duties in consequence imposed on the cavalry are onerous and mischievous, and performed at great risk and suffering to the sick. I hope that if his Excellency should consider such a corps desirable, it will be to France, and not to England, that he will apply, as at home attempts at improvement would assuredly be made, which would only have the effect of retarding what is most urgent and pressing.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Lucan, Lieut.-Gen.
Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Adjutant-General.

No. 6.

Sketch of the Hutting of two Horses.



Section of stable hut, as erected on the slope of a hill by the 11th Hussars.

Section of the ground as prepared and used for the horses of the Chasseurs d'Afrique.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

No. 7.

RETURN of BRIGADE DUTIES performed by the HEAVY CAVALRY BRIGADE between the 13th December 1854 and the 28th February 1855.

| Date. | Men. | | | Horses. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | On Picket. | Commissariat Duty. | Carrying Sick. | On Picket. | Commissariat Duty. | Carrying Sick. | |
| 1854: | | | | | | | |
| Dec. 13 | 25 | 246 | — | 25 | 491 | — | On these days the forage for the whole division was drawn by the Light Brigade. |
| „ 14 | — | 248 | — | — | 496 | — | |
| „ 15 | — | 248 | — | — | 496 | — | |
| „ 16 | — | 248 | — | — | 496 | — | |
| „ 17 | — | 248 | — | — | 496 | — | |
| „ 18 | — | 248 | — | — | 496 | — | |
| „ 19 | 40 | 190 | — | 40 | 370 | — | |
| „ 20 | 40 | 190 | — | 40 | 370 | — | |
| „ 21 | 20 | 190 | — | 20 | 370 | — | |
| „ 22 | 40 | 190 | — | 40 | 370 | — | |
| „ 23 | 40 | 190 | — | 40 | 370 | — | |
| „ 24 | 20 | 190 | — | 20 | 370 | — | |
| „ 25 | 40 | 190 | — | 40 | 370 | — | |
| „ 26 | 46 | — | 102 | 46 | — | 306 | |
| „ 27 | 20 | 156 | — | 20 | 302 | — | |
| „ 28 | 40 | — | 77 | 40 | — | 231 | |
| „ 29 | 40 | 110 | — | 40 | 210 | — | |
| „ 30 | 20 | 110 | — | 20 | 210 | — | |
| „ 31 | 40 | 110 | — | 40 | 210 | — | |
| 1855: | | | | | | | |
| Jan. 1 | 40 | 110 | — | 40 | 210 | — | |
| „ 2 | 20 | 110 | — | 20 | 210 | — | |
| „ 3 | 40 | 110 | — | 40 | 210 | — | |
| „ 4 | 40 | 97 | — | 40 | 188 | — | |
| „ 5 | 20 | 97 | — | 20 | 188 | — | |
| „ 6 | 40 | 97 | — | 40 | 188 | — | |
| „ 7 | 40 | 81 | — | 40 | 157 | — | |
| „ 8 | 20 | 81 | — | 20 | 157 | — | |
| „ 9 | 20 | 81 | — | 20 | 157 | — | |
| „ 10 | 20 | 81 | — | 20 | 157 | — | |
| „ 11 | 10 | — | 64 | 10 | — | 185 | |
| „ 12 | 20 | — | 70 | 20 | — | 200 | |
| „ 13 | 20 | — | 70 | 20 | — | 200 | |
| „ 14 | 10 | — | 70 | 10 | — | 200 | |
| „ 15 | 20 | — | 70 | 20 | — | 200 | |
| „ 16 | 20 | — | 70 | 20 | — | 200 | |
| „ 17 | 10 | — | 70 | 10 | — | 200 | |
| „ 18 | 20 | — | 70 | 20 | — | 200 | |
| „ 19 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 20 | 10 | — | 70 | 10 | — | 200 | |
| „ 21 | 20 | 81 | — | 20 | 157 | — | |
| „ 22 | 20 | 81 | — | 20 | 157 | — | |
| „ 23 | 10 | — | 60 | 10 | — | 170 | |
| „ 24 | 20 | — | 44 | 20 | — | 124 | |
| „ 25 | 20 | 68 | — | 20 | 131 | — | |
| „ 26 | 10 | — | — | 10 | — | — | |
| „ 27 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 28 | 20 | — | 44 | 20 | — | 124 | |
| „ 29 | 10 | — | 44 | 10 | — | 124 | |
| „ 30 | 20 | — | 44 | 20 | — | 124 | |
| „ 31 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| Feb. 1 | 10 | — | 43 | 10 | — | 122 | |
| „ 2 | 20 | — | 43 | 20 | — | 122 | |
| „ 3 | 20 | — | 43 | 20 | — | 122 | |
| „ 4 | 10 | — | 43 | 10 | — | 122 | |
| „ 5 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 6 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 7 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 8 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 9 | 20 | — | 40 | 20 | — | 110 | |
| „ 10 | 10 | — | — | 10 | — | — | |
| „ 11 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 12 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 13 | 10 | — | — | 10 | — | — | |
| „ 14 | 20 | — | 40 | 20 | — | 110 | |

| Date. | Men. | | | Horses. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | On Picket. | Commissariat Duty. | Carrying Sick. | On Picket. | Commissariat Duty. | Carrying Sick. | |
| 1855: | | | | | | | |
| Feb. 15 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 16 | 10 | — | — | 10 | — | — | |
| „ 17 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 18 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 19 | 10 | Every available horse mounted. | | — | — | — | Advance upon the Russian outposts above Tchorgoun. |
| „ 20 | 20 | | | | | | |
| „ 21 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 22 | 10 | — | 37 | 10 | — | 101 | |
| „ 23 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 24 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 25 | 10 | — | 37 | 10 | — | 101 | |
| „ 26 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 27 | 20 | — | — | 20 | — | — | |
| „ 28 | 10 | — | 37 | 10 | — | 101 | |

In addition to the above return, the following information was applied for by the Board:—

*Pickets.*—The pickets up to December 11th amounted to 100 men and horses. They were then reduced, the outposts of General Liprandi's corps having been withdrawn to Tchorgoun.

*Forage.*—One fourth of the horses actually in the lines went daily for forage (the horses fit for duty foraging for the sick). There was one dragoon with every two horses, and such proportion of non-commissioned officers in charge as could be spared. This duty averaged about five hours.

| *Employed daily in the camp:* | Men. |
|---|---|
| Day camp guards, 5 regiments | 20 |
| Stable guards „ | 25 |
| Butchers; cooks „ | 25 |
| Armourers; hospital serjeants | 10 |
| Saddlers; orderly room clerks | 10 |
| Commissariat guard | 4 |
| Farriers | 25 |

*Casualties varying daily.*—Hospital orderlies, one for ten patients; men for cutting wood and fetching water; Quartermaster's fatigues for burying dead animals, fetching stores, cleansing the camp, &c. &c.

James Conolly,
Major, D.A.Q.M.G., Cavalry Division.

No. 8.

From Sir B. Hawes, K.C.B., to the Judge-Advocate-General.

War Department, 19th May 1856.

Sir,—With reference to the letter from this department dated the 29th ultimo, I am directed by Lord Panmure to transmit to you for the information of the board of general officers, appointed for the purpose of considering so much of the report on the supplies to the British army in the Crimea as animadverts upon the conduct of certain officers in Her Majesty's army, an extract of a letter from the Commissioners of Audit dated the 30th ultimo, and copies of letters from the same board, dated the 2nd and 8th instant, with the three returns enclosed in the last; and I am to state that the Commissariat accounts afford the only means in this country of supplying any of the details called for by your letter to the Treasury dated the 26th ultimo, but that if the Board of General Officers desire it, an application will be made to the Commissary-General in the Crimea, with a view to obtain more full and complete information on the several points embraced in the enclosure of that letter.

I have, &c.
B. Hawes.

The Judge-Advocate-General.

A.

Return of Transport Animals in charge of Deputy-Assistant Commissary C. Bagot Smith, in the Crimea, on the 30th September, 1854.

76 Horses and Mules.

The Ambulance and Government Baggage Animals not being in charge of the Commissariat, no account of their numbers landed with the expedition, can be furnished from the Commissariat accounts.

Audit Office, 8th May, 1856.

I.
Papers delivered in by the Earl of Lucan.

B.

RETURN of TRANSPORT ANIMALS received by Deputy Assistant Commissary General SMITH, in the CRIMEA, from 1st to 8th October 1854,* and from 12th December 1854 to 31st March 1855, as shown by a Statement furnished by that Officer.

| Date. | No. of Vr. | Horses & Mules. | From whom received. | Station. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct. 2, 1854 | 1 | 201 | A. C. G. Uniacke | Varna. |
| 8 „ | 3 | 200 | „ | „ |
| Dec. 12 „ | 5 | 252 | „ | Checkmedgee. |
| 24 „ | 12 | 50 | „ | „ |
| 25 „ | 14 | 50 | „ | Mackrickaway. |
| Jan. 17 1855 | 17 | 100 | „ | „ |
| 13 „ | 18 | 238 | A. C. G. Malassez | Malta. |
| 21 „ | 21 | 350 | A. C. G. Uniacke | Mackrickaway. |
| Feb. 21 „ | 39 | 4 | A. C. G. Gem | Varna. |
| 24 „ | 41 | 12 | A. C. G. Uniacke | Mackrickaway. |
| „ „ „ | 42 | 30 | „ | „ |
| Mar. 12 „ | 51 | 363 | „ | „ |
| „ 14 „ | 54 | 86 | „ | „ |

* From the 8th October to the 12th December 1854, no Accounts of the Transport Animals have been sent to the Audit Office.

Audit Office, 8th May 1856.

C.

STATEMENT of the Number of TRANSPORT, AMBULANCE, and GOVERNMENT BAGGAGE ANIMALS foraged in the Crimea, as shown by the FORAGE RETURNS transmitted with the COMMISSARIAT ACCOUNTS at the following dates, viz.: on the first issue of forage after the landing of the Army in September 1854, and on the 1st of October, and on the 1st of the five subsequent months, as compiled from the ACCOUNTS of Commissary-General FILDER.

| Date. | Transport Animals. | Ambulance Animals. | Baggage Animals. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1854. | | | |
| September - - | — | — | — |
| October - - | 195 | 2 | 239 |
| November - - | 631 | 74 | 344 |
| December - - | 483 | 68 | 740 |
| 1855. | | | |
| January - - | 826 | 21 | 498 |
| February - - | 1,045 | 85 | 574 |
| March - - | 980 | 51 | 597 |

Audit Office, 8th May 1856.

# II.

## *Papers delivered in by Major-General the* Earl of Cardigan.



No. 1.—Copy of a Report of Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 18th November 1854, on the state of the light brigade - - - - - - 461
No. 2.—Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 18th November 1854, calling attention to Lord Lucan's visit to the camp - - - - 462
No. 3.—Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 19th November 1854, enclosing returns and daily states - - - - - - - 462
No. 4.—Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated, Camp, near Sebastopol, 20th November 1854, reporting the state of the light brigade - - - 462
No. 5.—Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 21st November 1854, on the same - - - - - - - - - - - 463
No. 6.—Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 22nd November 1854, reporting the state of the light brigade - - - - - - 463
No. 7.—Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 24th November 1854, relative to sending the troop horses of the light brigade to fetch up barley - 464
No. 8.—Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 25th November 1854, enclosing states and reports - - - - - - - - 464

### No. 1.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. Wynell Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan.

My Lord, November 18th, 1854

1. Lord Lucan gave no orders in camp, except that mentioned in my letter about double ground for the horses in any future encampment, and saying that we should have to be hutted. He assembled the commissioned officers, and spoke to them about their letters, but it did not amount to anything very tangible; he did not find fault with anything; he gave the officers permission to wear boots outside their trowsers, and also that the tents might be pitched as most convenient, without much regard to regularity. I do not remember that he said anything else.

2. The 72 sick men are not gone; it is not known when they go.

3. The horses had hay and corn yesterday, but not their full allowance; by some mistake the artillery got some intended for us. I had spoken to Mr. Crookshank (who is now gone to Balaklava), and he said he hoped to be able to supply full rations this evening.

4. I will inform Major de Salis what he is to do about the court-martial.

5. No answer has come about the paymaster of the 4th Light Dragoons or the 13th Light Dragoons.

6. I will send the reports to-morrow if your Lordship does not come by one o'clock, as you direct.

7. The squadrons were stronger this morning, viz:—

| | Files. | |
|---|---|---|
| 4th Light Dragoons | 28 | Exclusive of S. files. |
| 11th Hussars | 19 | |
| 17th Lancers | 23 | |
| 11th Light Dragoons | 28 | |
| 8th Hussars | 20 | |

I am, &c.,
George Wynell Mayow,
Lieut.-Colonel, Brigade Major.

P.S.—I had sent your reports, &c., down before Mr. De Burgh arrived.

G. W. M.

I forgot to mention that Lord Lucan ordered the orderlies furnished to the Naval Commandant, Captain Lushington, to make up to a corporal and three, and to be furnished daily by the brigade.

G. W. M.

To the Earl of Cardigan,
&c. &c.

II.
Papers delivered in by Lord Cardigan.

No. 2.

Lieut.-Colonel GEORGE WYNELL MAYOW to the Earl of CARDIGAN.

November 18th, 1854.
Half-past two, p.m.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to enclose the reports and some letters and orders, also a rough copy of the equipage return that was made by the different regiments, showing the numbers of each article they have made a requisition for. Lord Lucan was here to-day. I communicated to him what your Lordship directed me to do. He came chiefly to speak to the officers commanding regiments about the letters which they had forwarded about the state of the brigade through your Lordship. He said, also, that the brigade would have to be hutted, but that nothing could be done about it till further orders. He expressed a hope that warm clothing might be procured, and said that high-lows might be procured by applying to his (Lord Lucan's) D.A.Q.M.G. Capt. Fellowes. He also said that he wished, in any future encampments, double ground might be taken for the horses, one on each side of the rows of tents, so that when one side was cut up by the tread of the horses in wet weather, the horses might be moved to the other without removing the tents.

I have, &c.
GEORGE WYNELL MAYOW.

To the Earl of Cardigan,
&c. &c.

---

No. 3.

Lieut.-Colonel GEORGE WYNELL MAYOW to the Earl of CARDIGAN.

MY LORD,

November 19th, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to enclose your returns and daily states, also a report from Mr. Crookshank, and a note I have received from Major Lowe, 4th Light Dragoons. The brigade mounted this morning the following number of files per regiment, viz. :—

| | File. |
|---|---|
| 4th Light Dragoons | 26 |
| 11th Hussars | 22 |
| 17th Lancers | 29 |
| 13th Light Dragoons | 26 |
| 8th Hussars | 18 |

Exclusive of S. Files.

I enclose also a general order just received. Separate requisitions for boots are sent to the brigade approved of, and that also for corn sacks, piquet posts, &c. &c. (of which I sent a rough copy yesterday), is also returned approved, but all that part relating to the warm clothing and the boots for the men crossed out.

When Lord Lucan was here yesterday, he told Colonel Douglas, 11th Hussars, not to turn the brigade out till six a.m, instead of half-past five. As this communication took place when I was not present, I was not aware of it at the time, but heard it afterwards from Colonel Douglas. I have had no communication from the chaplain to-day, but I shall order a church parade at three, p.m. Should no chaplain come, I shall read a short service myself.

I have, &c.
GEORGE WYNELL MAYOW.

To the Earl of Cardigan,
&c. &c.

P.S. The chaplain has this moment come up, and wishes to have the service at a quarter past three, p.m.

G. W. M.

None of the sick men have as yet gone on board ship. Lieut.-Colonel Shewell went yesterday. I did not see him before he went.

G. W. M.

---

No. 4.

Lieut.-Col. G. WYNELL MAYOW to the Earl of CARDIGAN.

MY LORD,

Camp near Sebastopol, Nov. 20th, 1854.

1st.—I learn from Major de Sabis that Colonel Shewell communicated personally with Lord Lucan when Lord Lucan was here, and immediately afterwards went away. Colonel Shewell made no communication to me, nor did I see him previous to his departure.

2d.—I have put in the brigade order about the turn-out at 6 a.m., as you have directed.

3d.—I have called on the regiments for copies of the return of equipment and dress, a rough copy of which I sent your Lordship yesterday, and told them to have them ready by to-morrow.

4th.—I return answers to your Lordship's other questions in this letter.

5th.—All articles of dress were crossed out at head-quarters from the general return, and Captain Fellowes forwarded to me, and by order, and directed me to give the regiments approved requisitions for highlows, filled up for the same number as there had been pairs of boots in the general return. All the regiments but the 4th Light Dragoons have sent for their highlows to-day, but they have not yet come up.

6th.—No quarter-master was ordered to go from this brigade. The 7th serjeant-majors went and have not returned, so it is presumed that they got off in the "Medway," if she has sailed. I understand the quarter-master selected to go belongs to the Scots Greys.

7th.—The 4th Light Dragoons have got their extra tents. The 13th got two tents on their first requisition; the other regiments have sent to-day to try and get them. The requisitions were only returned yesterday.

8th.—The troops have a supply of barley not quite to the full amount. There is no hay,* and I fear little chance of any being issued.

9th.—The seventy-two sick men have not gone.

10th.—The paymaster of the 13th Light Dragoons is gone on board ship. He was recommended by medical certificate. The officer commanding the 13th Light Dragoons tells me he is ignorant by whose authority he quitted the camp.

11th.—The stables have been punctually attended every day but to-day. To-day the weather here is so dreadfully bad that it is impossible to do anything except get the horses watered and fed.

I send the returns.

* The men have their rations, but there is great difficulty about cooking, the rain is so very heavy on these hills.

I remain, &c.
G. Wynell Mayow,
Lieut.-Col., Brigade-Major.

To the Earl of Cardigan,
&c. &c.

P.S.—Your Lordship makes no remark about Captain Stephenson's application.

I sent copies of Lord Lucan's refusal to recommend paymasters to be allowed to reside in Balaklava to the four paymasters concerned. G. W. M.

---

No. 5.

Lieut.-Col. Wynell Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan.

My Lord, November 21, 1854.

1. I forward your statements, as you desired, by your batman.

2. The horses got barley last night,—not quite the full quantity,—but no hay. The men have their rations.

3. The 11th have their tents and highlows.
The 8th their highlows.
The 13th send for highlows and tents to-day.
The 4th and 17th expect a full supply of boots and highlows of their own from Scutari by their serjeant-major, and do not take any highlows from Captain Fellowes.

4. I forwarded a letter from Major De Salis.

5. The sick men are not yet gone on board ship.

I send copies of the requisitions made by the different regiments for equipment and clothing, as your Lordship directs.

4th Light Dragoons send me their return at the last moment, made out in a different form from the others, but say it is the account of the things they required.

I have, &c.
George Wynell Mayow,
Lieut.-Col., Brigade-Major.

To the Earl of Cardigan,
&c. &c.

---

No. 6.

Lieut.-Col. Wynell Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan

My Lord, November 21, 1854.

As your Lordship did not mention how you wished your reports sent to-day, I send them by an orderly of the 13th, who is going with letters to the post.

1. No more of the sick men but the nine I mentioned yesterday have as yet gone on board ship.

2. There was, as near as possible, a full ration of barley came up last night, but no hay. The men are well off for rations.

II. Papers delivered in by Lord Cardigan.

3. The letter which Colonel Douglas forgot to sign, I could not find on my return to camp. I think I must have left it on board your Lordship's yacht, on the table. Would your Lordship be good enough to send it by the orderly, if you can find it.

4. I forgot to mention, yesterday, that, in a private note, Lord W. Paulet says, alluding to the letter you forwarded from Major Lowe, 4th Light Dragoons:—"Lord "Lucan says Major Lowe may recall the man now taking care of Captain Morris's horses "in the 17th."

5. The men got their horse brushes in their valises; the brushes that some regiments brought with them were shoe brushes.

I have, &c.
GEORGE WYNELL MAYOW,
Lieut.-Col., Brigade-Major.

To the Earl of Cardigan,
&c. &c.

I send Mr. Crookshank's report of yesterday; also one from the 13th, about sick horses, and one from the 8th, about camp equipment.

Will your Lordship send word by the orderly how I am to send the report to-morrow.

G W. M.

---

No. 7.

Lieut.-Col. WYNELL MAYOW to the Earl of CARDIGAN.

MY LORD, November 24th, 1854, Camp near Sebastopol.

1. CAPTAIN Stephenson says, that the "London" was in Balaklava for 24 hours only, some considerable time since, when she landed some of the 17th kits, and went away before any one knew that she had been there.

2. I have seen Mr. Crookshank, and told him you did not approve of the troop horses going down for barley. He said he did not wish them to go down periodically, but only once, to bring up the arrears, when, if he knew the day before, he would take care they were not kept waiting.

3. I send the present brigade order book.

4. I have inquired of every regiment in the brigade, but none of them have an order book that goes back as far as Scutari or Coolalie. The 17th, however, expect their orderly room box up from Balaklava to-day, and Captain Stephenson thinks possibly there may be an order book of that date in it, of which I can, of course, have the loan when it arrives.

Surgeon White belongs to the 3d Dragoon Guards, and was attached to the 8th Hussars by orders from the Medical department; his arrival was noted on the morning daily state yesterday, but not otherwise notified to the brigade-major.

Dr. Anderson has been unwell for a couple of days; but besides that he informs me that as he is senior medical officer of the brigade it was understood that Surgeon White should take medical charge of the 8th Hussars.

5. List of mounted parties and orderlies yesterday:—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 4th Light Dragoons | Captain Lushington's party, 4 men - | 6 a.m.—all day. |
| | Orderly to Balaklava—letters - - | ½ p. 7 a.m.—5 hours. |
| 17th, Orderly to Balaklava, letters - - - - | | 10 a.m.—5 hours. |

I have, &c.
GEORGE WYNELL MAYOW,
Lieut Col. Brigade-Major.

To the Earl of Cardigan,
&c. &c.

---

No. 8.

Lieut-Col. G. WYNELL MAYOW to the Earl of CARDIGAN.

My LORD. November 25th, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to forward your states, &c. You will see that a man died suddenly in the 4th Light Dragoons; the Surgeon has made a note of it on the back of the sick report.

The number of orderlies that left camp yesterday, the 24th, were:—

| | Probable Time of Absence. |
|---|---|
| 8th Hussars, Captain Lushington's party, 4 men - - | All day. |
| 4th Light Dragoons, Lord Lucan's orderly. - - - | 5 hours. |
| 11th Hussars, Letters, Balaklava. - - - - - | 5 hours. |

I send Mr. Sutherland's report of the Commissariat. There was not more than half a ration of barley got up last night owing to the state of the roads, and no hay.

I send also a note that came by an orderly yesterday evening.

I send five general and divisional orders and memorandums that came yesterday evening, and which I request you will be good enough to return to me as they have not been as yet entered, except a notification that I must have the daily states half an hour earlier. I beg to draw your attention to the divisional order about the brigade not bridling up in the morning, and request your instructions.

II.
Papers delivered in by Lord Cardigan.

If I do not forget, Number 4 in orders related to burying the horses, in which case I mentioned the subject to your Lordship when you were last in camp.

Yesterday the ground on which the horses stood got so completely cut up with the rain, that I have this morning taken upon myself to move most of the horses a little to the front (where they usually parade), so that, though the horses are on new ground, they are quite close to the tents, not one of which, or the saddlery, have had to be moved; this was the more necessary, as from the want of nose-bags the horses were obliged to be fed on the ground in a great measure, and the corn consequently was in a great measure wasted.

I have, &c.

To the Earl of Cardigan,
&c. &c.

GEORGE WYNELL MAYOW,
Lieut-Col. Brigade Major.

No sick were sent away yesterday, no ambulance having come for them; they hope that one will come to-day.

G. W. M.

# III.

## *Papers delivered in by* Major-General Sir Richard Airey, K.C.B.

No. 1.—Letter, dated Horse Guards, 28th February 1854, to Lieutenant-General Fergusson, respecting the articles to be carried in the knapsacks and squad bags - - 466

No. 2.—General Order, Sebastopol, 17th November 1855, on Sir Richard Airey's leaving the Crimea - - - - - - - - - - - 467

No. 3.—Letter, dated War Department, 19th February 1855, from Lord Panmure to Major-General Simpson, defining the duties to be performed on his appointment to be Chief of the Staff - - - - - - - - - - - 467

No. 4.—Letter, dated Head Quarters, Crimea, 26th April 1855, from Major-General Simpson to Field Marshal Lord Raglan, as to the composition of the General Staff - - 467

No. 5.—Table showing the periods of time occupied in the execution of orders required to be executed in England - - - - - - - - - 468

No. 6.—Form of Requisition for new great coats - - - - - - 469

No. 7.—Tabular Statement of great coats issued and received - - - - 471

No. 8.—Paper of the parts erased from Memorandum of Replies of Colonel Wetherall - 471

No. 9.—Statement showing the quantity of warm clothing and stores for which orders had been given to regiments - - - - - - - - - 472

No. 10.—Statement of watch cloaks actually drawn from the stores - - - - 472

No. 11.—Letter from Major-General Sir Richard Airey to the Right Honourable C. P. Villiers, dated Horse Guards, 22d May 1856, transmitting a paper showing the two Reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, dated Constantinople 9th and Constantinople 10th June 1855, and a Memorandum upon the responsibility for the original supply of camp equipage - - - - - - - - - 472

No. 12.—Letter, dated War Department, 13th May 1856, from Colonel Mundy to the Judge Advocate General, transmitting copy of the Preliminary Report of the Commissioners, Sir John M'Neil and Colonel Tulloch, dated 9th June 1855 - - 502

### No. 1.

LETTER from to Lieut.-General FERGUSON, C.B.

Horse Guards, February 28, 1854.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the General commanding in chief, to acquaint you that squad-bags will be sent with the drafts of the 41st, 47th, and 49th Regiments—32 with each, in charge of the officer in command of those detachments, and when on arrival at Malta will make them over to the officer commanding the corps for which they are intended.

The General commanding in chief deeming it essential that a soldier, when actually in the field, should carry no more than is absolutely necessary for his efficiency, desires me to say, that those regiments have been furnished at the public expense with squad-bags, four per company, each capable of containing the articles extracted from the authorized kit of the soldier. The articles carried in the knapsack, and those in the squad-bags, are specified in the margin, it being clearly understood that the shell jacket may be carried in the one or in the other, at the discretion of the commanding officer, and according to local and other circumstances, the coatee and great-coat or blanket being under ordinary circumstances considered sufficient for the comfort and health of the soldier.

*In the Knapsack.*
1 pair trousers.
1 shirt.
1 pair boots.
1 forage cap.
1 pair mitts.
1 brush.
Small book.
Holdall reduced.
Blacking.
1 towel.

*For the Squad-bag.*
1 shell jacket.
1 shirt.
1 pair socks.
1 towel.
2 brushes and such articles from the holdall as can be immediately dispensed with.

The squad-bag will be left in the barracks or quartermaster's store when the regiment is actually in the field.

I am to request you will be pleased to communicate the above to the officer commanding the respective regiments.

I have, &c.
(Signed)

No. 2.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Head Quarters, Sebastopol, November 17, 1855.

No. 1.—Lieut.-General Sir R. Airey, K.C.B., being ordered home on duty, will leave the command this day.

The Commander of the Forces cannot allow Sir R. Airey to quit this army without recording his knowledge of the high estimation in which he was held by the late Field-Marshal Lord Raglan and General Sir James Simpson, for his services throughout the whole campaign, in the very important and trying duties in which he has been engaged. The Commander of the Forces can only regret, on grounds both of military estimation and private friendship, that he cannot have the benefit of an assistance which he would have so highly valued.

No. 2.—The following changes have been ordered in the staff of this army, and will take effect from this date:—

Lieut.-General Barnard, C.B., to command the 2nd Division.

Major-General Garrett, K.H., to command the 4th Division.

Major-General Windham, C.B., to be Chief of the Staff.

---

No. 3.

LETTER from Lord PANMURE to Major-General SIMPSON.

SIR, War Department, February 19, 1855.

HER MAJESTY having been graciously pleased to appoint you chief of the staff of the army in the Crimea, and as your position is novel in the British army, I think it necessary to state to you in distinct terms the nature of the duties which you will have to perform.

1. On arriving at the head-quarters of the army, you will report yourself to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, to whom a copy of these instructions will be forwarded by the next mail.

2. As chief of the staff, you will receive from the Field-Marshal, and promulgate in his name, all orders to the army.

3. You will convey the Field-Marshal's special instructions to the departments of the quartermaster and adjutant generals; and it will be your business not only to convey to these officers the orders referred to, but to see that those orders are speedily and implicitly carried into effect.

4. It will be your duty to look into the composition of the general staff of the army, and report your opinion and any changes which it may occur to you to think necessary to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan. This report you will make in duplicate, and instructions will be given to the Field-Marshal to forward one of them for the information of the Secretary of State for War.

5. All reports from the quartermaster and adjutant generals' departments will, as a general rule, pass through your hands.

6. All appointments and removal of officers from the general staff of the army will rest with the officer in supreme command; but you will not fail, if you find any officer in your opinion unfit on trial for the duties entrusted to him, to report the same, without favour or affection, to the Commander-in-chief.

7. From the above instructions, you will perceive that great responsibility attaches itself to your situation, which, however, I feel quite confident of your ability to undertake.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PANMURE.

---

No. 4.

LETTER from General SIMPSON to Field-Marshal Lord RAGLAN.

MY LORD, Head Quarters, Crimea, April 26, 1855.

REFERRING to the instructions contained in paragraphs 4 and 6 of Lord Panmure's letter to me of the 19th of February last, desiring me to report to your Lordship my opinion of the composition of the general staff of this army, and any changes which might appear to me to be necessary, I have the honour to state that, ever since my arrival in this camp, it has been my daily custom, by personal intercourse, to make myself acquainted with every officer employed on the staff of the army.

There is not one of them whom I would wish to see removed. They are, almost without exception, men of very considerable abilities, well thought of by their generals, active in their habits, zealous, willing, and attentive to orders or to any suggestions for the good of the service.

III. Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

I have delayed making this report, in order that a little time might enable me to be certain of the correctness of my opinion, and because I confess myself to have come amongst these officers, many of them strangers to me, with some degree of prejudice against them, created in my mind by the gross misrepresentations current in England respecting them.

I do not think a better selection of staff officers could be made; and therefore have no reason to recommend any changes to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES SIMPSON, Chief of the Staff.

No. 5.

TABLE showing the Periods of Time occupied in the Execution of Orders required to be executed in England.

| Nature of Requirement. | When made. | When executed and available in the Crimea. | Time occupied in the Completion. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Requisition for 2,000 tons of hay (Commissioners' Report, p. 157, and Mr. Filder's letter to Mr. Peel, February 27, p. 25, 1856). | 1854. Sept. 13. | About 228 tons between the end of Nov. 1854 and Jan. 1855. Remainder between February and June 1855, and later. | 5 to 8 months. | October 24.—Lord Raglan instructed Mr. Filder to send to every place in the Black Sea for hay, straw, or some other fodder (Appendix to Commissioners' Report, p. 85), but at only one of them could hay be procured, and there only a small quantity (Sev. Com. Rep. 3. p. 404). |
| Renewed applications for hay— | | | | November 14. — The "Progress," wrecked with nearly 900,000 lbs. of hay out of 1,079,686 lbs. in store and afloat (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. pp. 393, 395). At this time the monthly consumption of hay was 1,300,000 lbs. (580 tons), (Sev. Com. 3. Rep. p. 395). |
| On (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 385) | Oct. 8. | | | |
| On (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 388) | „ 23. | | | |
| On (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 389) | Nov. 8. | | | |
| On (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 393) | „ 13. | | | |
| On (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 394) | „ 18. | | | |
| On (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 395) | „ 27. | | | |
| Organization of regular transport brigade and service (Sev. Com. 2 Rep. p. 256). | June | Between March and Summer 1855. | 9 to 12 months. | The organization of the Land Transport Corps commenced in March 1855 by Colonel M'Murdo, who was sent out from England for that purpose. |
| Same subject. Despatch dated - | Aug. 3. | G. O. March 16, 1855. | | |
| Application for 350 drivers (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 392). | Nov 8. | | | |
| Same subject (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 391). | „ 11. | | | |
| Application for 30 covered and 20 uncovered waggons, with 4 horses each (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 397). | „ 22. | | | |
| Same subject (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 399). | Dec. 13. | | | |
| Application for 220 Maltese mule-carts (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 397). | Nov. 28. | | | |
| Floating steam bakery (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 391, and the Duke of Newcastle's despatch, 2d December 1854). | Nov. 8. | End of May 1855. | 6 months and upwards. | "Lord Raglan has instructed me to say that he is now desirous that the construction of the mill and bakery should be proceeded with, and the vessels sent to this country with all practicable despatch." (Sev. Com. 3 Rep. p. 391.) |
| Requisition for 3,000 tents, &c. Quartermaster-General. Appendix to Commissioners' Report, pp. 83, 84. | Nov. 28. | Between end of April and Summer 1855. | 5 to 7 months. | The delay in supplying the tents, &c. mentioned in this requisition, is specially alluded to in the Quartermaster-General's address, and in despatches handed in to the Board on that subject. |

No. 6

REQUISITION for NEW GREAT COATS for the_____Regiment of Foot.

*Head Quarters at*_____*the*_____*day of*_____185__.

No. of great coats received since the last requisition, dated* _____

| Dates of Receipts. | Whether supplied by the Ordnance Department, received with drafts, or in any other manner. | Serjeants. | Drummers and rank and file. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brought forward - - | In possession, serviceable, at the date of the requisition above mentioned* - - - - - - - - | | |
| Effective strength at the date hereof. | Serjeants. / Drummers and Rank & File. — Total received within the above-mentioned period - - - - - - - | | |
| | †Deduct, worn out, lost by deserters, &c., as per annexed state - - - - - | | |
| Present - - - - - | Total of great coats now in possession serviceable - - - - - - - | | |
| Recruits, &c. expected to join soon - - - - - | Wanting to complete for men present, and for recruits, &c. expected to join soon - | | |
| Total - - - - | Total - - - | | |

| Cause of deficiency, whether worn out, lost by deserters, transferred with drafts, or otherwise. | Serjeants. | Drummers and rank and file. |
|---|---|---|
| Worn out, having been in use since the_____day of_____18 - | | |
| Ditto - - ditto - - since the_____day of_____18__ - | | |
| Ditto - - ditto - - since the_____day of_____18__ - | | |
| Ditto - - ditto - - since the_____day of_____18__ - | | |
| Total to be given up as unserviceable - - - - | | |
| Lost by deserters since the last requisition above mentioned*—(*See Statement on the other side hereof*, A.) - - - - - - - - - - - | | |
| Transferred to the_____on the_____day of_____ | | |
| Ditto - to the_____on the_____day of_____ | | |
| Lost or destroyed through neglect, and the value, namely, £_____ charged to the men, and remitted to the agent, for the purpose of being paid to the Treasurer of the Ordnance.—(*See Statement on the other side hereof*, B.) - | | |
| Total worn out, lost by deserters, &c., to be deducted from those received† - | | |

I do hereby certify that_____great coats, including_____for serjeants, are required for the_____regiment of foot, as herein specified.

_____*Commanding.*

*** Great coats are expected to last at least two years in North America, or in active or continued operations in the field, and three years on ordinary stations, and are not as a matter of course to be replaced immediately on the expiration of those periods, nor until the Commanding Officer shall feel warranted in certifying that by fair wear, and other satisfactory causes, the great coats have become unfit for service, or missing. All great coats reported as unserviceable are, at the time of the delivery of new great coats, to be transferred as condemned stores to the nearest Ordnance station or barrack, and none so reported are to be retained, or appropriated by the regiment, on any plea whatever, except by the authority of the Secretary at War. When great coats are required to be furnished by the Ordnance Department direct to detachments at out-stations, a memorandum to that effect, showing distinctly the numbers to be supplied at *each station*, should be annexed to the requisition.

3 P 2

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

(A.)

STATEMENT of GREAT COATS which have been lost by DESERTERS.

| Names of Deserters. | Date when the Great Coats were first issued to the Men. | Date of Desertion. | No. of Great Coats lost and not recovered. | No. of Great Coats before reported as lost, but since recovered. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | |
| | | Total - - | | |

* These are, of course, to be re-credited.

Form No. 1.

REQUISITION
FOR
NEW GREAT COATS

For the Regt. of Foot.

*Dated* _____

[W. O. Form 130.]

(B.)

RETURN of GREAT COATS which have been LOST or DESTROYED by Neglect, and the Value charged to the under-mentioned Men.

| Names of Men to whom the Coats have been charged. | Date when the Great Coats were first issued to the Men. | When lost or destroyed. | Amount actually stopped from the Men for each Coat.† | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | |
| Total Amount stopped for the service above mentioned, and remitted to the Agent, on the_____day of_____ - - - - - - | | | | | |

† The value of groat coats, when first issued, may be estimated at thirteen shillings and sixpence for serjeants, and twelve shillings and sixpence for other ranks; and when worn out, at not less than three shillings each.

_____ *Commanding.*

_____ *Quartermaster.*

Care must be taken that the amount of the stoppage for coats lost, &c. is remitted to the Agent with each return; except at foreign stations, where there is an Ordnance storekeeper, in which case the person to whom paid, and the date of payment, are to be reported.

Required for the Regiment.

Quartermaster General's Office.

No. 7.

TABULAR STATEMENT of GREAT COATS.

| | Orders issued by Major Wetherall. App. p. 89. | Received by the Regiments. App. pp. 115, 116, 117. | REMARKS. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prior to 2d December 1854 - | 1,409 | 451 | |
| Week ending 9th December 1854 | 717 | 656 | |
| „ 16th „ „ - | 250 | 484 | |
| „ 23d „ „ - | 609 | 167 | |
| „ 30th „ „ - | 1,035 | 616 | |
| „ 5th January 1855 - | 1,587 | 307 | |
| „ 12th „ „ - | 603 | 121 | |
| „ 20th „ „ - | 367 | — | |
| | — | 2,802 | |
| | — | 247 | Received by 19th Regiment. No date given. |
| Total - - | 6,577 | 3,049 | |

No. 8.

REPLIES OF COLONEL WETHERALL.

12 Dec. 425 had been ordered for the 23d Regiment. The 34th landed with two blankets each man from the ship, and these were charged the Q. M. general's store; the men came without blankets.

The 77th have only received, by the Q. M. general's books, 435; the rest must have been made up by recruits joining with two blankets each. The 90th received also two blankets each on landing.

The 17th and 18th both came out from England, and received two blankets per man on landing, while the 57th, the 46th, the 68th, and the 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade, all received on 2d December an order for 400 each; and they might have had them if they chose; the delay is presumed to have arisen from want of transport.

Same answer applies to 47th, 49th, and 63d Regiments.

The same remark applies to the Guards. The 1st Dragoons received an order for 108 up to 2d December, and on the 9th January 156.

The 2d Dragoons had 100 on 1st December, and 187 on 10th January.

It was entirely their own fault, or want of transport, which created the delay.

PART ERASED FROM MEMORANDUM.—

Page .

If the returns supplied by the quartermaster of each corps are correct, it would appear that larger and earlier issues were made to some than to others. This requires explanation.

For instance, in the Light Division only 200 blankets are stated to have been issued to the 23d Foot, while 1,960 were received by the 34th, of which 1,230 were so early as the 8th December, the strength of the two corps being about equal.

The 77th also received 1,511, and the 90th also 1,315, while the 88th, with nearly the same strength, received only 568.

In the 4th Division, up to the 17th December, the 57th had received only 300, the 46th only 150, the 68th only 185, and the 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade only 150, while the 17th Regiment received 1,836 on that day, and the 18th Regiment in the 3d Division received 1,630 so early as the 8th December.

In the 47th Regiment only 100 blankets were issued up to the 24th December, in the 49th only 200 up to the 11th January, and in the 63d Regiment about the same number.

In the Grenadier Guards no blankets were issued till after Christmas, and not more than half of that corps, and of the Scots Fusiliers were completed with additional blankets till the middle of January, while in the 1st Dragoons no extra blankets, and in the 2d Dragoons only 66, were issued up to the 11th January.

If it be alleged in the cases where these delays have occurred that no blankets were available, there appears no reason why the men should not have had rugs for a substitute.

True copy.
(Signed) ALEX. GORDON.

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

No. 9.

STATEMENT showing the Quantity of WARM CLOTHING and STORES for which Orders had been given to Regiments to the 15th of January 1855.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Blankets | 34,179 | Great Coats | 6,459 | Officers' coats | 588 |
| Rugs | 513 | Comforters | 18,227 | Tarpaulins | 853 |
| Woollen frocks | 56,838 | Mitts | 26,804 | Stoves | 1,199 |
| Trowsers (Militia) | 4,079 | Horse clothing | 2,327 | Mangols | 580 |
| Socks | 49,720 | Turkish boots | 1,844 | Nosebags | 1,145 |
| Drawers | 44,852 | Capotes | 4,127 | | |
| Boots | 18,878 | Sheepskin coats | 7,421 | | |

E. R. WETHERALL, Colonel.

No. 10.

STATEMENT of WATCH CLOAKS actually drawn from the Store during the Months of November, December, and January 1854–5.

| Regiment. | Nov. | Dec. | To 16th Jan. | Regiment. | Nov. | Dec. | To 16th. Jan. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 42d | — | 20 | 25 | Brought forward | 102 | 701 | 514 |
| 63d | — | 20 | — | 21st* | — | — | — |
| 71st | — | — | 30 | 57th | — | 20 | 25 |
| 79th | — | — | 25 | 46th | — | 20 | 25 |
| 93d | — | 50 | — | 68th | — | 20 | 25 |
| Rifle Brigade | — | 10 | — | Rifle Brigade | — | 20 | 40 |
| Grenadier Guards | — | 20 | 25 | 7th | — | 20 | 58 |
| Coldstream Guards | — | 20 | 12 | 23d | — | — | 69 |
| Scots Fusilier Guards | — | 20 | 25 | 33d | — | 20 | 58 |
| 30th | — | 67 | — | 34th | — | — | 34 |
| 62d | — | 62 | — | 97th | — | 70 | 25 |
| 55th | 20 | 42 | — | 19th | — | 20 | 25 |
| 95th | — | 62 | 25 | 77th | — | 20 | 50 |
| 47th | — | 64 | 22 | 88th | — | 20 | 33 |
| 49th | — | — | 61 | 90th | — | — | 59 |
| 41st | 62 | — | 52 | Rifle Brigade | — | 10 | — |
| 1st | 20 | 14 | — | 2d Dragoons | — | 10 | — |
| 38th | — | 38 | — | 4th Dragoon Guards | — | 10 | — |
| 50th | — | 34 | 44 | 4th Light Dragoons | — | 10 | — |
| 44th | — | 20 | 30 | 8th „ | — | 10 | — |
| 9th | — | 54 | 43 | 11th „ | — | 10 | — |
| 18th | — | — | 25 | 17th „ | — | — | 10 |
| 28th | — | 34 | 45 | | | | |
| 4th | — | — | 25 | | 102 | 1,011 | 1,050 |
| 29th | — | 50 | — | Artillery | — | 50 | — |
| Carried forward | 102 | 701 | 514 | Total | 102 | 1,061 | 1,050 |

* Did not draw the Watch Cloaks, for which they received an order in November, until 24th January 1855.

(Signed) RICHARD AIREY, Quartermaster-General.

ABSTRACT.

| | |
|---|---|
| Issued in October | — |
| „ November | 102 |
| „ December | 1,061 |
| „ to 16th January | 1,050 |
| „ 4 Cavalry Regiments who have not made a return, say | 40 |
| | 2,253 |
| „ from 16th to 31st January | 513 |
| Total | 2,766 |

No. 11.

LETTER from Sir RICHARD AIREY to the Right Hon. C. P. VILLIERS, M.P.

SIR, Horse Guards, May 22, 1856.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you, for the purpose of being submitted to the Board of General Officers assembled at Chelsea, the accompanying documents, namely:

1st. A paper showing the two reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, dated Constantinople, June 9, and Constantinople, June 10, 1855.

2nd. A memorandum upon the responsibility for the original supply of camp equipage for a British army in the field.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RICHARD AIREY, Quartermaster General.

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

Constantinople, June 9, 1855.

My Lord,

We have the honour to inform your Lordship that we have completed the inquiry intrusted to us.

The course which we proposed to pursue is[1] explained in the letter [to Lord Raglan[2]] of the 13th of March,[3] and his Lordship's entire concurrence in [the expediency of[4]] that course is conveyed to us in his letter of the 15th of March, of which a copy is also enclosed.[5]

[6]We have [accordingly[7]] seen, and personally examined, either collectively or separately, the commanding officer, surgeon, and quarter-

Constantinople, June 10, 1855.

My Lord,

We have the honour to report that, in pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, we set out from London on the 23d February, and arrived at Constantinople on the 6th March.

We proceeded at once to Scutari, and, having visited the barrack and general hospitals, examined the Purveyor and the principal Medical Officer.

As the condition and arrangements of those hospitals have been the subjects of a separate inquiry and report, we shall not trouble your Lordship with any details in regard to them.

The information which we obtained at Scutari and at Constantinople was of great importance to our future proceedings.

We ascertained that the sick arriving from the Crimea were nearly all suffering from diseases chiefly attributable to diet, and that the food supplied to the army during the winter, consisting principally of salt meat and biscuit, with a very insufficient proportion of vegetables, was calculated, in the circumstances in which the troops were placed, to produce those diseases.

It was, therefore, evidently desirable to increase the supplies of fresh meat and vegetables, and to substitute fresh bread for biscuit.

On this subject we had the advantage of a conversation with Dr. Sutherland, of the Sanitary Commission, who confirmed, from the results of his professional investigations, the information we had obtained as to the causes of the prevailing diseases, and entirely concurred in the necessity of substituting fresh meat for salt, and fresh bread for biscuit, as well as of increasing the supply of fresh or preserved vegetables.

Colonel Tulloch had acquired experience in such matters from having been chiefly instrumental in providing a supply of fresh bread for his regiment when stationed in the ceded provinces, after the first Burmese war; and, therefore, it was arranged that he should direct his especial attention to that subject from the moment of our arrival in the Crimea.

We entered the harbour of Balaklava upon the 12th of March, and the following day proceeded to Head Quarters to wait upon Lord Raglan, and to arrange our proceedings in conducting the inquiry entrusted to us.

[1] was
[2] Omitted.
[3] of which a copy is annexed,
[4] Omitted.

[5] Annexed.—And on the following day we commenced the examination of the regimental officers stationed in the vicinity of Balaklava.
[6] Following out that course,
[7] Omitted.

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

master of every corps in this army who was not prevented by illness from attending, and from them have obtained evidence of such deficiencies as have occurred in the supplies to each corps.[1]

We next examined the officers commanding brigades and divisions,[2] together with the staff officers, the principal medical officers and the commissariat officers attached to brigades and divisions; and finally, we have examined the Quartermaster General and Senior Assistant Quartermaster General [as well as[3]] the Commissary General, and the two Deputy Commissaries General who are present with the army.

The personal examination of the Quartermaster-General having, however, been[4] interrupted[5] by the necessity of attending to other more pressing duties, a series of questions was sent to him to be answered.

It is a [source of] great satisfaction to us to find, [upon[6] almost all] important points, a remarkable concurrence in the testimony as to matters of fact.

The evidence is so voluminous that it will occupy some time to prepare a detailed report founded upon the information which we have collected, and to suggest what may appear to us to be the best mode of rectifying the defects which become apparent, or which have been pointed out to us in the course of our investigation.

We have therefore thought it advisable at once to report confidentially to your Lordship some of the results at which we have already arrived, and some of the opinions to which we have been led by the facts which appear to us to be established.

The sufferings of the army in the course of the winter, and especially during the month of December and January, have been intense.[7]

It has been only by slow degrees, and after the frequent repetition of similar details, as one witness after another revealed the facts that had come under his own observations, that we have been able to form any adequate conception of the distress and misery undergone by the troops, or[8] to appreciate the unparalleled courage and constancy with which

[1] and of the consequences of those deficiencies.

[2] with the exception of Sir George Brown, who was absent at Kertch,

[3] Omitted.

[4] repeatedly

[5] or prevented by his being called upon to attend to more pressing duties; and finding ourselves unable, from illness, to postpone our departure till he should be sufficiently disengaged, a series, &c.

The notes of the examination, taken down in presence of the witnesses, without the assistance of a short-hand writer, were in all cases subsequently sent to them for correction and signature.

Printed queries were also addressed to the commanding officer and to the surgeon of each corps, and the answers returned were signed by them. These documents have not been subjected by us to any correction beyond what was necessary to rectify mere verbal errors or omissions obviously arising from inadvertence.

It would have been easy to relieve them of many repetitions, and otherwise to dress and polish them without materially altering their import; but we have thought it better to submit them without erasing the rough original stamp of authenticity, than to change in any respect the form in which they were returned to us, corrected and signed by the witnesses.

[6] on most of the

[7] We have not noted all the particulars related to us, many of which were unconnected with our inquiry, but we may state, that it has, &c.

[8] fully

they have endured their sufferings. Great Britain has often had reason to be proud of her army, but it is doubtful whether the whole range of military history furnishes an example of an army exhibiting throughout a long campaign qualities as high as have [been displayed by[1]] the forces under Lord Raglan's command.

The strength of the men gave way under excessive labour, watching, exposure, and privation; but they never murmured, their spirits never failed, and the enemy, though far outnumbering them, never detected in those whom he encountered any signs of weakness. Their numbers were reduced by disease and by [frequent contests[2]] to [such[3]] a handful of men, compared with the vast extent of the lines which they constructed and defended [against armies many times as numerous, that it is impossible to view the ground without amazement.[4]]

Yet the army never abated one jot of its confidence, and never descended [one step[5]] from its acknowledged military pre-eminence. Both men and officers, when so reduced that they were hardly fit for the lighter duties of the camp, scorned to be excused the severe and perilous work of the trenches lest they should throw an undue amount of duty upon their comrades; yet they maintained every foot of ground against all the efforts of the enemy, and with numbers so small that perhaps no other troops would even have made the attempt.

Suffering and privation have frequently led to crime in armies as in other communities, but offenses of a heinous[6] character have been unknown in[7] this army. Not one capital offence has been committed[8] by a soldier; and intemperance has been rare.

Every one who knows anything of the constitution of the army must feel that when troops so conduct themselves throughout a long campaign, the officers must have done their duty and set the example.

The conduct of the men [is therefore[9]] the highest encomium that can be passed upon their officers.

They have not only shared all the danger and exposure and most of the privations which the men had to undergo, but [the evidence is full of incidental[10]] indications of their solicitude for the welfare of those who were under their command, and their constant readiness to employ their private means in promoting the comfort of the men.

Doubtless there has been, as there always must be, better management in some regiments than in others; but amidst[11] much that was painful in the evidence that we have heard, it was always gratifying to observe the community of feelings and of interests that appeared everywhere to subsist between the officers and their men.[12]

[1] distinguished

[2] casualties

[3] Omitted.

[4] Omitted.

[5] Omitted.

[6] serious

[7] in the British Army in the Crimea.

[8] or even alleged to have been committed

[9] implies

[10] we everywhere found

[11] amongst

[12] and which the regimental system of the British Army seems almost always to produce. We hope to be excused for venturing to offer these general observations upon the conduct of the army. It was impossible to refrain from expressing, however inadequately, the admiration which a careful investigation of the circumstances cannot fail to produce.

It was inevitable that[13] a siege carried on throughout the winter in the Crimea should

[13] the operations of

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

involve a very considerable amount of hardship and sickness. These are consequences of such operations as certain as losses in action when a battle is fought.

The sickness and consequent mortality in [this army[1]] have, however, been very great. The deaths[2] appear to amount to[3] nearly one-half of the average strength[4] from the 1st of October 1854, to the 31st of March[5] 1855, and it seems to be clearly established that this excessive mortality is not to be attributed to anything peculiar[6] in the climate, but to overwork, exposure to wet and cold, improper food, insufficient clothing in the early[7] part of the winter, and insufficient shelter from inclement weather.

To determine the limits beyond which we should decline to pursue our investigations required[8] careful deliberation. The influence of overwork and exposure on the health of the troops might appear to be foreign to the objects of our[9] inquiry, which had reference especially[10] to the supply of the army, and the arrangements of the Commissariat; but much of the labour and exposure which the troops had to undergo was a consequence of the want of sufficient land transport, which it was the duty of the Commissariat to provide. The effects of overwork and exposure could not therefore be excluded from our consideration. In like manner the injurious consequences of defective cooking, which are not obviously connected with the subjects of our inquiry, were in a great measure produced[11] by a deficiency of fuel, or of transport to convey it,[12] both of which are matters affecting the Commissariat.

It may be right also[13] to state that in doubtful cases we have preferred running the risk of pushing our inquiries beyond what might have been contemplated, to incurring the hazard of falling short of what was intended.

At the same time we have not pursued our investigations into matters unconnected with the supply of the army. The Commissariat have furnished returns of the quantities in store, at various dates, of a great number of articles as they appear upon the books; but as no cargo is credited[14] till it has been completely discharged, these returns do not show the quantity afloat. On the other hand, as issues were necessarily made occasionally from cargoes[15] afloat which[16] had not yet been credited, the cargo, when credited, might in fact have already been issued wholly or in part. The Commissary-General has therefore been unable to furnish a return of the smallest quantity at any time in store of any of the articles constituting the rations of the troops as regulated by General Orders. In respect to all of these articles, we must rely upon the general statement of the officers of that department, as to the sufficiency at all times of the supplies in store. From those statements, however, the accuracy of which we do not question, it appears that, including what was[17] on board of ships in the harbour, the Commissariat has never been without a supply at Balaklava of the articles issued as rations to the men.[18]

[1] the British Army in the Crimea
[2] including those at Scutari and elsewhere.
[3] about 35 per cent of
[4] of the army present in the Crimea
[5] 30th of April 1855
[6] peculiarly unfavourable
[7] during
[8] demanded
[9] an
[10] exclusively
[11] attributable
[12] from Balaklava to the camp,
[13] here
[14] in those books till the whole has been
[15] still
[16] therefore
[17] afloat in
[18] But the ration of biscuit having on the 15th October been increased by General Order to 1⅓ lb., in consideration of the severe labour to which the troops were subjected, it was reduced, on the

Having [been informed by persons unconnected with the Commissariat[1]] that there had been such a deficiency, or apprehended deficiency, of salt meat as to make it necessary to apply on the 21st January to the Navy for assistance, we inquired into the circumstances. From the returns handed in to us by the Commissary-General, and from his statements, it appears that although the Commissariat had at that time in store a quantity sufficient for several days' consumption, there was still, in consequence of some mistake, it is stated, on the part of the Commissariat officers at Constantinople, cause for considerable anxiety lest the[2] army should be left without salt meat at a time when no other articles of food were available, except biscuit and rum, and the ordinary groceries. The arrival of a vessel with a supply of salt meat, before that which[3] was received from the Navy had been issued, relieved the Commissary-General from the anxiety which he had previously felt upon this subject.

The deficiencies in the supplies provided by the Commissariat, from which the army, and especially the troops encamped upon the heights before Sebastopol, suffered, were,—a deficiency of fresh meat; a deficiency of vegetables; a deficiency of soft[4] bread, particularly for the sick, and more especially for those whose gums were affected with scurvy; a deficiency of fuel; a deficiency of hay and straw, to such an extent that enough could not be procured to fill the paillasses of the sick; and, above all, a deficiency of land transport, to which many of the other deficiencies are[5] to be attributed.

[6] [It is proved by the evidence, and it is] admitted by the Commissariat, that on several occasions, especially in the month of December, some of the divisions did not receive full rations [[7] of meat, and on some days not even half rations]. Once or twice the ration of biscuit

[*Continued on next page.*]

was 7th November, to 1 lb., on the express ground of "the supply of biscuit being insufficient to furnish the increased ration lately authorized."

[1] heard

[2] whole

[3] had been obtained

For this paragraph, *see* page 6 of the printed Report.

[4] fresh

[5] mainly

[6] The evidence of the commanding officer and quartermasters showed, what indeed was.

[7] Omitted.

It appears that in the Cavalry and 1st Divisions, and in the 2d Brigade 2d Division, the deficiencies were merely fractional; and that even in the 3d Division, and the 1st Brigade 2d Division, where they were somewhat greater, they were not such as could, in ordinary circumstances, materially affect the health of the troops.

In the 4th and Light Divisions the deficiencies in the rations were not only greater in amount, but also much more continuous. In those divisions the men were frequently on three-quarters, two-thirds, and sometimes on half rations of meat and of rum. On two occasions they had only quarter rations, and one day they had none at all. In the other items the defalcations were not very important except in rice, of which the 4th Division did not get any for the first ten days in January, nor for three other days in that month, while a brigade of the Light Division received, for six days in that month, only half the usual quantity. With reference to the probable effects of such

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

[*From preceding page.*]
was incomplete, but not upon the same days on which the rations of meat were short. It has happened, too, that the extra rations of rum which had been ordered could not be issued, except to the men for duty in the trenches.

These short issues, however, of which we have obtained from each regiment returns as accurate as could be prepared, do not appear to have been such as, in ordinary circumstances, could materially have affected the health of the troops; but superadded to the other causes of disease, and the other deficiencies above referred to, they may have been injurious, and certainly they were regarded as an additional hardship and privation.

[[1] It appears, however, that] many of the men did not consume the salt meat, especially the salt beef, when full rations were issued to them.

The prevailing diseases were at that time affections of the bowels, in most cases connected with scorbutic tendency in the system; and not only the men but the medical officers also believed that those diseases were aggravated by the deficiencies, it may be proper to state that prior to December 1850 the ration of salt pork, then issued twice a week to the British troops on several foreign stations, was only 12 ozs., with 1 lb. of beef, fresh or salt, on the other five days; and that prior to 1837 the ration of pork was only 9 oz. on three days in the week, with 1 lb. of beef, fresh or salt, on the other four days, which is less than the average quantity actually issued, even in those divisions in which the deficiencies were greatest. On those stations, however, in addition to 1 lb. of soft bread, the troops had at all times either 4 oz. of rice, or half a pint of pease daily, besides which a portion of their pay was expended in purchasing vegetables in the market, whereas, in the Crimea, during the greater part of November and December, and also in a great measure during January and part of February, the soldier was confined exclusively to biscuit, in addition to his salt meat. The French troops, it is understood, had only 12 oz. of beef, or 10 oz. of pork daily, when salt meat was issued; but besides being always able to use their coffee and sugar with advantage, they had $2\frac{1}{4}$ oz. of rice or dried vegetables, and 27 oz. of soft bread or 20 oz. of biscuit daily.

In considering the probable effects of the deficiencies referred to, it may be presumed from the facts above stated that it was not so much from default in the rations of salt meat and biscuit that the diet of the troops affected their health, as from the insufficiency of other descriptions of food. At the same time there can be no doubt that the short rations were considered an additional hardship and privation by those who could use them, and that any diminution in the nutritive value of the diet, which, even when issued in full, was insufficient to maintain the strength of men undergoing hard labour and much exposure, must have been injurious to all who could have consumed it.

[1] Omitted.

vated, and that tendency increased by the continued use of salt meat.

In many cases the aversion to that [kind[1]] of food seems to have amounted to absolute loathing.

Several of the officers who had lived for a considerable time upon their rations, seem to have experienced similar sensations, and to have ultimately found it impossible to eat the salt meat, especially the salt beef, though it is admitted that both beef and pork were quite sound, and of good quality.

It was remarked that while whole pieces of salt beef were frequently [thrown away[2]], or given away, sometimes to the extent of [above 100 lbs.[3]] in a day, by a single regiment, nearly all the pork was consumed, except by some of the Scotch regiments.

The army appears to have been sufficiently supplied with fresh meat in Bulgaria, and during the latter days of September and nearly the whole of October the cattle obtained in the Crimea, either by capture or purchase, furnished a considerable proportion of fresh meat to the troops; but after the beginning of November, the army[4] was dependent upon the cattle imported.

From that time till the month of March the proportion[5] of fresh meat issued was not sufficient to maintain the health of the army,[6] which, during all that time, suffered to an alarming extent from diseases of the bowels, to which there appeared to be a general predisposition [or tendency.[7]]

The medical officers of all ranks are of opinion, almost[8] without exception, that the continued use of salt meat aggravated those diseases and increased that tendency.[9] [10]

[From a return which we called for from the Commissary-General[11]] it appears that the average quantity of fresh meat issued to each man of the five divisions composing the army, including the sick in the camp, was in [November[12]] ; in December, 6¼ lbs.; in January, nearly[13] 9 lbs.; but as a considerable number of the issues was in small quantities for the sick only, and a preference was given to [them[14] whenever fresh meat could be obtained], it is probable that the men for duty did not actually receive more than [about[15]] 3 lbs. each in December, and 5 lbs. in January.[16]

Some of the corps received even less than that quantity;[17] [and amongst the medical officers there appears to be almost no difference of opinion as to the evil consequences of the substitution to so large an extent of salt meat for fresh, especially during the prevalence of the diseases from which the army was suffering.[18]][19]

The issue of two ounces of rice to each man daily, which had been ordered by Lord Raglan, in Bulgaria, to be continued till the 30th September, in consequence of the prevalence of bowel complaints, was extended at the suggestion, it appears, of the Commissary-General, till the 15th November, when it

[1] description

[2] left unconsumed

[3] hundreds of pounds weight

[4] they were dependent

[5] supply of
[6] troops

[7] Omitted.

[8] with hardly one

[9] predisposition.
[10] With reference to this subject, we have obtained returns from all the regiments employed in the Crimea, showing the quantity of salt and fresh meat issued to each of them respectively during the winter, an abstract of which has been submitted in the Appendix.

[11] A return was also furnished, at our request, by the Commissary-General, from which

[12] Omitted.
[13] about—in February 8 lbs. 2 oz.; but several of the issues which go to make up this amount were in small quantities for the use of the sick only, to whom a preference was given in almost all instances.
[14] Omitted.
[15] Omitted.
[16] and 4 lbs. in February.
[17] and there is hardly any difference of opinion as to the evil consequences.

[18] Omitted.
[19] That evil was aggravated by a deficiency of vegetable food.

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

unfortunately ceased, the order not having been renewed.

Mr. Filder states[1] that the supply of rice in store was such as would have enabled him to continue the issue, but[2] that from [want[3]] of land transport it was impossible to [convey[4]] that additional weight to the front.

[It is greatly to be regretted, at a time when[5]] the troops were[6] as completely dependent upon the Commissariat, as if they had been on board of ship, and were subsisting[7] exclusively upon salt meat and biscuit,[8] that the issue of an article of diet so valuable in those circumstances as rice should have been suspended, in consequence of want of transport, just at the time when it was most needed.[9] [It may be proper

[*Continued on next page.*]

also

[1] and the returns show

[2] he also states [3] deficiency
[4] carry

[5] Omitted.
[6] then

[7] almost
[8] It was therefore most unfortunate

[9] When the original order for the issue of 2 oz. of rice per man expired, on the 30th September, the Commissary-General states, that finding there was a sufficient quantity in store, and that bowel complaints still continued to prevail, he suggested, as a measure beneficial to the health of the army, the extension of the order to the 15th November. It is much to be regretted that when he subsequently found himself unable, from want of transport, to carry the 2 oz. of rice, in addition to the salt meat, he was not induced by the same motives to inform the general commanding that he had still enough of rice in store to continue the issue, which had become even more necessary than on the 30th September, and that he did not call for a decision as to whether the army, then suffering not only from bowel complaints but also from scurvy, should be deprived of the only vegetable food, besides biscuit, which was immediately available, or should submit to a reduction of 2 oz. in the daily supply of salt meat, which a large proportion of the men did not consume. The troops felt the loss of the rice severely, many of them declaring that they would rather have lost their rum; but they submitted without remonstrance, because the belief appears to have been general, that the issue of rice had ceased in consequence of the supply being exhausted.

It appears from the evidence of the Commissary-General, that it has not been the practice in the British Army to keep the General commanding informed of the amount of provisions in depôt, or available for the use of the troops, but only of such as may be in the possession of the troops, and in the charge of the Commissariat officers of divisions. It was not until the latter end of January, when circumstances forced upon Lord Raglan's attention the necessity for his being kept personally informed of the actual amount of the supplies on which he could rely for the maintenance of the troops, that periodical returns of the quantities in store at Balaklava were ordered to be submitted to him.

It appears to us, not only that periodical returns of the supplies in store, and available, ought regularly to be submitted; but that it ought to be the duty of some officer to call the attention of the

[*From preceding page.*]
also to remark, that one penny, fixed by a Board of Officers, as the price to be paid by the soldier for his ration of coffee and sugar, so far exceeded the cost of these articles, that it was sufficient also to cover the cost of two ounces of rice[1].]

[[2] It unfortunately happened, too, that there was some delay in issuing lime juice to the troops generally as a preventive of scurvy, though it had for some time previously been used in the hospitals for the cure of that disease. This circumstance, together with the want of a sufficient supply of vegetables, plainly indicated the necessity for issuing it to the whole army.

Before the end of December, it appears from the Commissariat Return, that there were 278 cases, equal to about 20,000 lbs., of lime juice in store; but it does not appear that any of it was issued till February. Some time seems to have elapsed before the prevalence of scurvy was generally recognized, and, therefore, before the necessity for issuing lime juice was perceived.] It is somewhat remarkable, that Genera commanding to such as are likely, in special circumstances, to prove beneficial. Had Lord Raglan's attention been called to the stores of rice, and other farinaceous and vegetable food at his command,* or had there been any officer on his staff who could be held responsible for the proper application of the available supplies, there can be no reasonable doubt that the men would have received in lieu of 2 ozs. of salt meat, which many of them could not eat, an equal weight of food that would have been both more acceptable and infinitely more beneficial.

The deficiency of transport, which is assigned as the reason why these supplies were not conveyed to the front, need not have affected the corps in and around Balaklava, which were suffering from the same diseases, though not to the same extent.

[1] Omitted.

[2] A more unaccountable, and still more unfortunate, failure to apply to the use of the army stores of which it stood in the most urgent need, occurred in regard to lime juice.

On the 10th December 278 cases, containing nearly 20,000 lbs., arrived by the "Esk," for the purpose of being issued generally to the troops. Small quantities obtained from the purveyor, and also, it is understood, from the Navy, had been issued to the hospitals for the cure of scurvy during the previous month, but no measures had been taken to counteract the tendency to that disease, which was rapidly spreading. The necessity for issuing lime juice as a prophylactic had been stated in many of the medical reports to the Inspector-General, and had been especially pointed out in those which he transmitted to the Adjutant General for the months of November and December.

In these he anticipates the speedy arrival of a supply that would admit of the issue generally to the troops of what they so much needed.

* The following Table, abstracted from the Store Account, will show the Quantities of Farinaceous and Preserved Vegetable Food lying in the Stores at Balaklava and Scutari, while the Troops were suffering in Health for want of them :—

| —— | Rice. | Period available from | Preserved and dried Potatoes. | Period available from | Peas. | Period available from | Scotch Barley. | Period available from |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | lbs. | | lbs. | | lbs. | | lbs. | |
| At Balaklava - - - | 74,574 | 15 Nov. | 32,468 | 1 Nov. | 51,200 | 16 Dec. | 23,120 | 1 Jan. |
| And there were lying in store at Scutari, ready to be brought over as the above supplies became reduced - - - | 296,001 | Nov. | 6,010 | 1 Oct. | Nil. | - - | 42,726 | 1 Dec. and about half that quantity from 1 Oct. |

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

[*From preceding page.*]
the regulations require the issue of lime-juice to troops on board of ship when salt meat is issued for a certain number of days; but [it does not appear[1]] that there is[2] any similar provision for the protection of troops on shore, though the necessity may be equally urgent.[3] It appears to us, after careful consideration of the [circumstances[4]] that have come to our knowledge [here[5]], that it would be expedient, whenever salt meat is issued to the army, to assimilate the diet to that which is used [6] in the navy. This has been strongly recommended by [7] Dr. Walsh, the [intelligent[8]] naval surgeon in charge of the marines on shore, who states in his evidence, that during a service of seventeen years he has never seen scurvy in the navy.

[[9]The deficiency of vegetables, from which the health of the army suffered, is the more to be regretted, as the Turkish provinces, to which there was easy access, could have furnished, and at a later and more unfavourable season have furnished, a sufficient supply; but it appears that according to the Regulations vegetables constitute no part of the soldier's rations, and it is therefore no part of the duty of the Commissariat to issue them, or even to provide them, unless specially ordered to do so. This arrangement, which leaves the soldier to purchase vegetables in the market, may be an ædvantage to him where such a market exists, but is obviously inapplicable to this army. Lord Raglan was urgent in his desire to get vegetables for the troops, but the first attempts to import green vegetables were not successful, and some time elapsed before the defects in the arrangements could be so far remedied as to secure a regular supply. In the meantime scurvy, in its ordinary form, and scorbutic diseases in various forms, extended rapidly, till in several regiments there was hardly a man free from the taint.]

The only bread issued to the troops till the month of April was biscuit, which appears, however, to have been [generally[10]] of excellent quality. [[11]The sick complained much of the

Yet from the 10th December, the lime juice brought by the "Esk" was lying in the Commissariat stores at Balaklava, and none of it was issued till the first week in February, an interval during which the sufferings of the army from scurvy were probably at their height. Had the General commanding been informed of the arrival of that supply, it cannot be doubted that it would have been issued to that part of the army which most required it, nearly two months earlier.

[1] Omitted.
[2] not
[3] as it has been in the Crimea, and would be in a fortress that was invested or blockaded.
[4] facts
[5] Omitted.

[6] so successfully

[7] several officers, and especially by
[8] Omitted.

[9] The health of the army also suffered from a deficiency of fresh or preserved vegetables. Lord Raglan seems to have been urgent to supply this deficiency; but it appears that according to the Regulations, vegetables do not constitute a part of the soldier's rations, and it is, therefore, no part of the ordinary duty of the Commissariat to issue or even to provide them.

This arrangement, which leaves the soldier to purchase vegetables in the market, may be an advantage to him where such a market exists, but it is obviously inapplicable where, as in the Crimea, there was none.

The first attempts to import green vegetables were not successful, and some time elapsed before the defects in the arrangements could be so far remedied as to secure a regular supply.

In the meantime scurvy in its ordinary form, and scorbutic diseases in various forms, extended rapidly, till in several regiments hardly a man was free from the taint.

The advantages attending the use of preserved and compressed vegetables, more especially when the army is in motion, are so great and obvious, and the men have now become so well acquainted with the manner of using them, and relish them so fully, that we venture strongly to recommend that they should be regularly issued to the troops, when fresh vegetables in sufficient quantity and in good condition cannot be provided, and that a specified quantity of the one or of the other should constitute a part of the regulated rations of troops in the field.

[10] Omitted.
[11] The sick complained much of the

want of soft bread, and the men who where suffering from scurvy were often unable to eat the biscuit. A great number whose gums were affected continued to perform their duties, which left them little time for preparing their food, and these suffered much pain in their attempts to eat biscuit.] At length some private establishments for baking bread in Russian ovens which had been found there were set on foot[1] at Balaclava,[2] and shortly after the middle of March an arrangement was made with them by Lord Raglan's directions, for supplying the purveyors with a certain quantity daily for the use of the hospitals.

want of soft bread, and the men who were affected with scurvy, many of whom continued to perform their duties, were often unable from the state of their gums to eat the hard biscuit, or could eat it only with much pain.

[1] by private enterprise

[2] and the men, especially the sick, eagerly purchased the loaf of the nominal weight of two pounds at two shillings, and even at two shillings and sixpence or three shillings. The most urgent craving of the sick was for a morsel of soft bread.

Shortly after our arrival an arrangement was made with those establishments, by Lord Raglan's directions, by which they engaged to supply the purveyor with a certain quantity daily for the use of the hospitals, to be issued, on requisition, as a medical comfort.

We are not aware of any[3] reason why soft bread might not have been baked at any time for the sick, and also for the[4] army. The French army has been regularly supplied with fresh bread; and the erection of a sufficient number of ovens was not an operation involving any considerable[5] expense, or requiring much either[6] of skill or of time, if it had been undertaken by the proper public departments. But there appeared to be an indisposition to make the attempt. There were bakers enough in the regiments to have worked many more ovens than were required to supply the whole army, and if these could not be spared from their military duties, there was no difficulty in procuring bakers from Constantinople. But it was[7] understood that a floating bakery had[8] been in preparation in England, and it was [therefore[9]] considered unnecessary[10] to do anything[11] here.[12]

[3] sufficient

[4] whole

[5] great

[6] much skill or much time

2.

1.

[7] the Commissary-General

[8] for several months

[9] Omitted. [10] or impossible

[11] till it arrived

[12] From the information we have obtained, we are satisfied that it is of great importance to the health of the troops that they should be regularly supplied with a proportion of soft bread; and in standing camp, where flour can be obtained, there is rarely any real difficulty in providing it.

It is unnecessary for us to[13] revert to the issue of green coffee, which has been alluded to by almost[14] all the witnesses we examined, but which[15] had previously been so fully discussed that we did not consider it necessary to investigate[16] the circumstances. [17]There is reason, however, to believe, that being imperfectly roasted and pounded by the men, it became injurious to their health. This is not only their own opinion, but is also that of those medical officers upon whose judgment we should be most disposed to rely.[18]

[13] we need not

[14] nearly

[15] That subject has already been

[16] it

[17] But

[18] And it is much to be regretted that the simple expedient of assembling a board of offiers, as had been done at Varna, was not resorted to, as they could have recommended tea to be substituted for coffee.

When the difficulty about fuel to roast the coffee began to be seriously felt in December, there were 2,705 lbs. of tea (equal to 173,000 rations) lying in the Commissariat store at Balaklava. This

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

would have afforded the usual quantity of a quarter of an ounce per man daily to the corps in front, where the greatest difficulty was experienced in making use of the coffee, till a supply could be obtained from Constantinople, or other quarters, sufficient to make the issue a general one. A temporary supply, too, might probably have been obtained from the navy, as there are generally large stores of tea on board. Nothing of this kind, however, appears to have been attempted, and the coffee continued to be issued in a green state to the men in front till the month of February, though much of it was not used in consequence of the difficulty of preparing it.

It appears to us, from the statements of a great majority of the medical and other officers examined, that tea would, on the whole, be preferable to coffee, especially on a march, provided the ration of sugar were increased by one quarter of an ounce[1]. That change would somewhat diminish the weight to be carried,[2] and would materially diminish the cost of the ration. [3]It has been objected that tea is more liable to be damaged than coffee; but as the whole of the tea used in Russia, and in some countries of Asia where it is largely consumed, is carried overland from China, there can hardly be any serious difficulty in carrying a supply with the[4] army.

From what has been stated, it appears that the diet provided for the troops was not well calculated to preserve their health,[5] but that, on the contrary, the continued use of salt meat, while the army was suffering from diseases of the bowels, aggravated those maladies, and increased the tendency to them, which was general. The same unvarying diet of salt meat and biscuit, without a sufficient quantity of vegetable food, acting upon constitutions debilitated by the other causes previously referred to, produced a formidable disease, which there is reason to believe complicated and rendered more fatal almost every other disease by which the troops were attacked in December and January.

[In all the countries[6] subject to Turkey, to which we have easy access, there] is not, and has never been, any difficulty in procuring a sufficient number of cattle to supply the army with fresh meat. In December, when scarcely any but salt meat was issued, the Commissary-General states that he had about 8,000 head of cattle[7] at his command. He attributes the deficiency in the supply[8] to the want of sea transport, the difficulties of the winter navigation, and the delays caused by the use of Balaklava as the port of the army. All these circumstances, doubtless, increased the difficulty of bringing forward a sufficient number of cattle. But, looking to the amount of sea transport at his command after the 11th December, when the sailing horse transports [of the army[9]] were placed at his disposal,[10] in addition to the steamboats previously handed over to him; and considering the vicinity of[11] the ports on the southern shore of the Black Sea, where cattle could[12] be obtained, and were actually tendered to him in December,[13] we are forced to the conclusion that the Commissary-General was not then sufficiently alive to the

[1] that is, from $1\frac{3}{4}$ oz. to 2 oz.

[2] always an important consideration

[3] It was objected by the Commissary-General

[4] an
*See* page 11, printed report.

[5] in any circumstances, and that instead of tending to counteract the other causes of disease to which they were exposed, it tended rather to aggravate those evils. And the same unvarying diet of salt meat and biscuit, without a sufficient supply of vegetables, acting upon constitutions debilitated by the other causes previously referred to, produced scurvy, which there is reason to believe complicated and rendered more fatal almost every other disease by which the troops were attacked in December and January.

[6] the Commissary-General states, that he considers the issue of fresh meat the rule, and of salt meat the exception; but he has not explained in a manner that we can consider satisfactory the reason why this order was reversed. In the countries subject to Turkey, which were easily accessible, there

[7] secured

[8] camp

[9] Omitted.

[10] for another purpose, to which they were not applied, and could have been made available for the conveyance of cattle, in addition to the steam vessels already at his disposal,

[11] Samsoon and other ports

[12] could not only have been procured

[13] and rejected

importance of that article of food, and that[1] it might have been considerably increased during the months of December, January, and February, if proper measures had been taken for that purpose. The time is not very remote when armies depended upon sailing vessels for all the supplies transported by sea.[2] Three thousand additional bullocks in the three months above mentiond would have given the whole army fresh meat, on the average, every alternate day; and we cannot persuade ourselves that three or four of the sailing horse transports could not have landed that number [[3] from Samsoon and Sinope] in three months, in addition to all that were brought by the steam[4] cattle boats, chiefly from the Bosphorus.[5]

[1] the quantity

[2] but the Commissary-General was deterred from using such vessels for the conveyance of cattle, by what he describes as the "frightful" proportion of casualties. This does not appear to us to be a sufficient reason.

[3] Omitted.

[4] steam vessels

[5] If there was difficulty in bringing the additional cattle alive, they might have been slaughtered, and at that season of the year the meat might have been carried without much loss. In short, it appears to us that fresh meat in much larger quantities might have been, and ought to have been, supplied to the army.

[6] The use of salt meat and biscuit in the navy, without injury to the health of the seamen, may, perhaps, have misled persons who did not sufficiently attend to the precautions [[7]adopted] in that branch of the service for[8] ensuring variety of diet;[9] [and] it is[10] right to keep in view that we are judging after the event, when the importance of a sufficient supply of fresh meat has been proved, though not[11] for the first time by the consequences resulting from the want of it.

[6] The common belief that in the navy the seamen are fed upon salt meat and biscuit may, &c.

[7] which it has been found necessary to adopt

[8] the purpose

[9] and of counteracting the effects of a diet consisting of the two articles in question

[10] also

[11] by any means

Wherever large armies have been collected, a tendency to diseases of the bowels [appears to have[12]] been manifested,[13] and it is of the utmost importance that every precaution should be taken to counteract that tendency. But experience had proved on many former[14] occasions that the long use of salt meat increased[15] that tendency, and aggravated the symptons of those diseases, thereby increasing both the number of attacked and the proportion of fatal cases.

[12] has

[13] These are emphatically the diseases of the camp

[14] and some comparatively recent

[15] increases both the number attacked and the proportion of fatal cases

The influence of improper diet is augmented in proportion to the [debility[16]] and predisposition to disease induced[17] by other causes; and in circumstances so unfavourable to health as those in which this[18] army was placed by the nature of the service and the season at which it was carried on,[19] no practicable means ought to have been left untried to protect the troops from the injurious effects of diet, one of the few conditions of the soldier's existence which are absolutely within [our[20]] control.

[16] constitutional depression

[17] produced

[18] the army in the Crimea

[19] and the unusual disproportion of the numbers to the amount of work to be done

[20] Omitted.

Regarded merely in a pecuniary point of view, irrespective of higher considerations, moral and political, the most wasteful of all expenditure is the expenditure of men.

There is hardly any conceivable price that it may be necessary to pay for what is required to preserve the health and efficiency of the soldier that is not advantageously laid out; [for] every soldier has cost a large sum before he is landed in the Crimea fit for duty, and it costs a like sum to replace him.

The value of the other considerations cannot be estimated;[21] they are above all price.

[21] in money, for

But the highest price that has been paid per pound for fresh meat, including freight and casualties,[22] is actually less than the lowest price

[22] was 5*d.* or 6*d.*, and therefore less, &c.

III. Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

at which salt meat has been put into store in the Crimea, and if the casualties, which in the winter voyage from the Bosphorus in steam vessels did not exceed fourteen per cent.,[1] had been double that amount [in sailing vessels],[2] or even a still larger proportion, that would not have been a sufficient reason for leaving the army without an adequate supply[3] of fresh meat.[4]

[1] are variously stated at from 14 to 20 per cent.

[2] Omitted.

[3] of what was necessary to preserve the health of the troops

[4] Considering the preference which has been shown, not only in the present, but in other campaigns, particularly those in the Burmese and Chinese Empires, for issuing to the troops salt meat and biscuit instead of fresh meat and bread, notwithstanding the alarming extension of diseases of the bowels which usually manifests itself in military operations, there seems reason to apprehend that the facility of obtaining and distributing the former description of supplies, may not unfrequently have had an influence in causing too extensive a use of them.

The duties of the Commissariat are then in a great measure confined to maintaining an ample store of these in the general depôt by shipments from home, which involves little trouble; and the distribution of this supply, according to the numbers in each division, merely involves the simplest operation of arithmetic; but when cattle have to be sought out and purchased, often in remote provinces, have to be fed and cared for, and kept in condition before shipment, when transport has to be provided, forage obtained for the voyage, and subsistence thereafter till they are given over to the troops, the measure, however useful, is one which must necessarily be attended with much extra trouble, great complication of accounts, and no small personal exertion. The preparation of soft bread, in like measure, involving, as it does, the purchase of wheat, its conversion into flour, the building of ovens, the hiring of bakers, and extensive superintendence, requires a very different amount of trouble and responsibility from what would be created by the receipt and issuing of a certain number of bags of biscuit daily. It is, perhaps, but natural under such circumstances that those who have the charge of supplying the troops should cling to a system which tends so materially to relieve their difficulties during a protracted campaign; but as experience has shown that this saving of trouble in the first instance can only be effected at the risk of great suffering, vast expense, and tenfold trouble in the end, the dependence on a diet of salt meat and biscuit only should, in future, be confined to cases in which the general officer in command has satisfied himself as to the impossibility of procuring other supplies, and therefore directs in general orders the issue of that description of food. The restriction to this ration should then be communicated immediately to the home authorities, in order that they may send out supplies of preserved meats and vege-

tables, to counteract its sameness and innutritious quality.

At the time when the army was suffering, in consequence of the want of vegetables, there was in store at Balaklava a considerable supply of vegetable food, both peas and preserved potatoes, which were not issued. The greater part of the peas were not split, but whole, and the men experiencing great difficulty in boiling them, became unwilling to take them. They did not know, and do not appear to have been informed, that the addition of a small quantity of soda would have made the process comparatively easy; but for this omission the Commissariat cannot be considered responsible.

As a reason for not issuing the preserved potatoes during the winter, when they would have been so useful in preventing scurvy, the Commissary-General states that the men rejected them, and returned into store several cases that had been issued.

On investigating the circumstances, however, it appeared that they had been returned into store at a time when the troops had a sufficient supply of fresh meat, and when they understood that they were to pay for one pound of the preserved the price of four or five pounds of the fresh potatoes. When they were afterwards issued gratis, and the men had learned how to cook them, they became exceedingly popular.*

It seems to be a defect in the system of the British army that no one is specially responsible for the fitness of the diet supplied to the troops, or for the most advantageous adaptation of the resources of the countries in which military operations are carried on to the requirements in this respect to the army. Supplies of the utmost value to health may thus be lying within reach without being made available, because they are not specified in the scale of rations, and because there is no one whose especial duty it is to find them out and to suggest their employment.

A commander-in-chief may be a man of consummate genius, capable of attending to everything great or small, but a nation cannot safely ground its system upon the assumption that it can at all times command the services of such men; and it may be worthy of consideration whether there ought not to be upon the staff of an army in the field an officer, holding high military rank, whose duty it should be to devote his attention to the supply of the army, who should be responsible for everything connected with the receipt and issue of supplies and stores of every description,

* Among the reserve supplies at Scutari, which were not brought over to the Crimea at a time when they might have been of the utmost service to troops labouring under scurvy and insufficient nourishment, were 147,088 gallons of porter, which remained in store there from the 1st December 1854 till April or May last. It might have been impossible, considering the inadequate means of transport, to have carried any portion of this porter to the head-quarters camp, but there appears no reason why it should not have been issued to the troops in the vicinity of Balaklava, as well as the numerous parties sent there from camp on fatigue duties, which would by degrees have extended the supply throughout the force in front, without the trouble of carriage. It was one of the hardest consequences of the fatigue duty to Balaklava, that the men had often to remain there for the greater part of the day without food; a pint of porter and a biscuit would have obviated this, and been of material benefit to their health. Such a supply would also have been most valuable for the sick.

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

The deficiency in the supply of vegetables is even more objectionable,[1] because there are several varieties which can safely be carried by sea, and which will keep for several months.

Of these[2] potatoes and onions are, perhaps, the best for general use in the army, and the different varieties of preserved vegetables are available at all seasons [and in all circumstances[3]] at a moderate cost.

[4]At a future time we shall be prepared to submit some suggestions as to rations of troops in the field; meanwhile, we have the[5] satisfaction[6] of reporting that the supplies of food to this army[7] are now abundant, and the diet of the soldier, in the opinion of those who are best able to judge, better than any army in the field has in any previous[8] campaign been regularly supplied with. [9]In their entire satisfaction with the rations they are now receiving the men concur with their officers. The only objection, so far as we canas certain, is to the inferior condition of the cattle, but[10] the grounds of this objection will soon be[11] removed, as the cattle are daily improving in condition upon the[12] grass which is now abundant in the grazing countries.[13]

in the same manner as the quartermaster-general and the adjutant-general are responsible for the manner in which their departments are conducted, and who should be selected with reference to his special qualifications.

A very general opinion is expressed, both by commanding officers and surgeons, that to continue the extra rations of rum which the troops have been receiving would be injurious both to their health and their habits; and there is a remarkable concurrence of testimony in favour of substituting porter of good quality for a part of the rations of rum, or even for the whole, as well as in favour of enabling the men to buy good porter by providing a sufficient quantity to be supplied at a fixed and moderate price while the army is in standing camp, under such regulations as may be considered expedient.

It cannot, we fear, be doubted that many, especially of the young soldiers, who had no disposition to indulge in ardent spirits, or to whom the rum was at first even distastful, have acquired a habit of dram drinking by the use of the rations issued to them; and it is believed that the substitution of good porter, which is nutritious, anti-scorbutic, and, in moderate quantities, on the whole beneficial, would also tend to correct, or to prevent, the formation of habits which are injurious both to health and to discipline.

[1] and more unaccountable than that of the fresh meat. If the army was to be fed on salt meat, a sufficient supply of vegetable food was known to be indispensable to the maintenance of health. The Turkish provinces could have furnished, and, at a later and more unfavourable season, did furnish a considerable amount

[2] there are several varieties which can safely be carried by sea, and which will keep several months, of which

[3] Omitted.

[4] *See* page 15 of printed report.

[5] the honour and

[6] to report that before our departure

[7] the army in the Crimea were

[8] former

[9] We are able to state that

[10] and

[11] are in course

[12] new

[13] But as the natives of those countries are not in the habit of winter-feeding the cattle, they will begin to fall off after the month of October, unless arrangements are made by the Commissariat to have them properly fed and kept in condition. Such arrangements, instead of increasing the cost of the meat, would probably pro-

[We have already had the honour to report that[1]] we anticipate no difficulty in maintaining, or even, if necessary,[2] increasing the supplies of cattle, and of vegetables also, from the [resources of[3]] the Turkish provinces; but the advantages attending the use of preserved, and especially of compressed, vegetables, in the event of the army's being in motion, are so great and obvious, and the men have now become so well acquainted with the manner of using them, and relish them so fully, that we venture strongly to recommend that they should be regularly supplied to the troops.

[1] Omitted.
[2] in largely
[3] Omitted.

*See* last paragraph, page 8 of printed report.

One of the causes of sickness in the army, to which nearly all the witnesses refer, is defective cooking.

*See* page 10 of printed report.

On the march from Old Fort to the Alma, and during the battle, most of the men threw away or lost their camp kettles.

Some divisions did not preserve[4] one in ten of the regulated number, which is one to every five men.

[4] even

When the army arrived before Sevastopol it was, therefore, impossible to organize the established regimental system of cooking by companies, and[5] having a certain number of men[6] told off as cooks.

[5] telling off [6] per company

Each man had to cook for himself in his mess tin,[7] to procure his own fuel, and to light his own fire.

[7] or canteen

For a time there was little difficulty in procuring firewood, but after the brush-wood was consumed in the vicinity of the camp, it could be obtained only by digging up roots,[8] which involved much[9] labour, and in bad weather much exposure. While[10] snow was on the ground, or during frost, the men, who[11] were not supplied with a sufficient number of tools, and who from want of skill in using them soon spoilt or broke such as they had, often found it impossible to procure enough of fuel; [and] in wet weather the inexperienced[12] had great difficulty in getting the green or wet wood to burn.

[8] an operation which to unskilful hands
[9] great
[10] When there was
[11] were inadequately supplied with

[12] who composed the great majority

Men who had been all night in the trenches up to their ankles in mud, and returned to the camp exhausted and benumbed, could not cook food for themselves, without first grubbing up roots for fuel.[13] Many of them wanted either energy or strength enough to undergo that labour, and contented themselves with their biscuit and rum, with[14] perhaps a bit of raw pork. Many more made the attempt to cook their meat, but in consequence of the [difficulty[15] and labour of procuring sufficient fuel, or of getting it to burn, as well as the small size of the mess tin, which was the only cooking utensil they had][16] the process was often[17] imperfectly performed, and the meat was eaten half raw.

[13] which in many cases were to be found only at a considerable distance.

[14] adding in some cases

[15] difficulties just referred to

[16] Omitted.
[17] very

Even after kettles had been procured, which in most regiments was not till some time in January, and after men had been told off to cook for companies, the labour and exposure undergone by the fatigue parties sent to obtain fuel was a serious addition to the other severe and harassing duties which they had to perform.

The Commissariat maintained that it was not the practice of the service to issue fuel to troops in the field; that they[18] were not entitled to duce a considerable saving, for the oxen, if so attended to, would yield nearly double the quantity and of better quality.

[18] a soldier was

III. Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

rations of fuel unless in barracks. When Lord Raglan ordered up fuel from Constantinople, and directed the Commissary-General to have it landed, difficulties were made, on the ground that there was no proper invoice or information regading the cargo; and when a return of the quantity landed was called for, the answer was, that the Commissariat had no information regarding it.

At length Lord Raglan, having instructed the Commissary-General, on the 11th November, to provide a sufficient supply of fuel for the army during the ensuing winter, by a General Order, dated the 4th December, directed the issue of rations of fuel to the troops; but although it appeared that the Commissary-General had, even long before the 11th November, prepared a depôt of fuel at Scutari for the use of the troops in barracks, he was not prepared to issue fuel in the field when it was ordered on the 4th December.

To provide and issue fuel was no doubt[1] a troublesome duty, and the difficulties arising from want[2] of transport and the narrow space for landing stores,[2] [as well as[3] the] amount of labour which the other duties of that department involved in the peculiar circumstances of the army, may have led the Commissary-General to insist on the alleged previous practice in the Peninsula and elsewhere, of leaving troops in the field to find their own fuel; but the circumstances of the army before Sevastopol were obviously exceptional, and an appeal to precedent was out of place.

In consequence of the representation of the Commissary-General, however, the Order of the 4th December[4] was modified; and it was not until the 29th December that the troops in and near Balaklava received rations of fuel. [There appears to have been a][5] want of alacrity on the part of the Commissariat [if not an actual indisposition][6] to provide fuel for the army in the field [but this][7] could not have arisen from any difficulty in procuring firewood. The southern coast of the Black Sea is wooded down to the shore [almost continuously][8] for [several][9] hundreds of miles; firewood could have been procured there in unlimited quantity[10] [and has since been] obtained from thence at little more than one-fourth of the price paid for it[11] at Scutari and Constantinople. Unfortunately,[12] the want of [13]transport made it impossible to carry fuel to the front, except in small quantities, for the use of the hospitals, and [the ration of fuel issued at Balaklava was of][14] no use to the soldier on the heights, unless he could find the means of carrying it to the regimental camp.

The most disastrous of the deficiencies referred to was the deficiency of land transport.[15]

[*Continued on next page.*] All

*See* page 10, printed report, last paragraph.

[1] a considerable addition to the duties of the Commissariat

[2] deficient state of the land

[3] at Balaklava, and the great

[4] appears to have been

[5] This apparent

[6] Omitted.

[7] Omitted.

[8] Omitted. [9] Omitted.

[10] but the resources of that coast had not then been explored. Wood has more recently been

[11] during the winter

[12] after fuel had been provided at Balaklava,

[13] land

[14] being issued only in the vicinity of Balaklava, it was

[15] This was not confined to the transport more properly belonging to the Commissariat, but extended also to the public and private bât animals, the former being such as previous to the formation of the Land Transport Corps were provided by the Commissariat, and handed over to each corps in regular proportion for the carriage of the field equipment, the latter being the private property of the officers, who are, however, authorized to draw rations for them. Public bât animals

[*From preceding page.*]
All the witnesses examined on the subject are of opinion that the duty under arms which the men had to perform in the trenches and on pickets and guards involved as much or more labour and exposure[1] than they could bear without injury to their health.

It was therefore of the utmost importance that they should be saved all other[2] labour and exposure; but owing to the deficiency of land transport they had to perform a large amount of the work that ought to have been done by horses and mules.

The roads or tracks were so deep in mud, that the journey which the men had to perform[3] to Balaklava and back, carrying up [burdens of[4]] rations or warm clothing or huts,[5] frequently occupied [about[6]] twelve hours, during the whole of which time the men were without food, shelter, or rest, unless standing in deep mud, drenched and cold, instead of struggling through it, may[7] be considered rest.

It was in consequence of the want of transport[8] that the men had to undergo the [additional[9]] labour and exposure of digging for roots to cook their food, without always being able to obtain enough.[10]

It was in consequence of the want of transport that the men were repeatedly on short rations, and that they were deprived for about six or seven weeks of the two ounces[11] of rice, which would have been so beneficial to them at that precise time, when hardly any vegetables were supplied,[12] and hardly a man in the army escaped the prevailing disease.

The men were [already[13]] overworked in the trenches and on pickets and guards, and they suffered[14] from both the fatigue and the[15] exposure which those duties involved to these; in consequence of the want of transport,[16] were superadded other duties, involving an amount of fatigue and exposure which alone would have been trying to the[17] constitutions [of the men].

Several of the officers stated that [recently arrived[18]] drafts for their corps, being excused duty in the trenches for the first ten days, were sent[19] on fatigue to Balaklava, but that it became necessary to relinquish the practice, because a fatigue party to Balaklava sent so many of the young soldiers into hospital.

[It appears to us that[20]] from the commencement of the campaign in the Crimea, the scale upon which the Commissary-General proposed to provide[21] transport for the army[22] was dangerously small, yet the scale upon which it appear to have been provided for such corps as were in Bulgaria, and most of the officers of those corps also provided themselves; but when the army embarked for the Crimea nearly all of both descriptions were left behind, and it was not till the end of October that about half the regulated number was landed in the Crimea.

A second and smaller detachment arrived in January, but by that time a great part of those received in October were dead, or no longer effective, and in consequence of the continued deficiency in forage, and the exposure and fatigue, most of those received in January shared the same fate. When the Commissariat transport failed, this deficiency of regimental transport, which otherwise would have been of comparatively little moment in a standing camp, was severely felt.

[1] as great or greater

[2] additional

[3] from the camp on the heights

[4] Omitted. [5] or ammunition
[6] Omitted.

[7] can

[8] even after firewood had been provided at Balaklava
[9] Omitted.
[10] for that purpose.

[11] their rations of

[12] to them

[13] Omitted.

[14] in health from the excessive fatigue
[15] watching and

[16] animals

[17] their

[18] Omitted.

[19] during that interval

[20] Omitted.

[21] land [22] appears to us to have been

III. Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

was actually provided fell far short of even what he had proposed.

From a return prepared by the Commissariat, there appears the startling fact that in January 1855 the whole number of effective animals belonging to the department was 333 pack-horses and mules and 12 camels.

The Commissary-General considered it necessary, before the army should move from Varna, to have transport equal to about 14,000 pack [horses and mules[1]].

In the month of October, however, assuming that the whole army was fixed immovably in its position, the[2] transport [provided] may have been sufficient for purely Commissariat purposes,[3] that is, for the carriage of the rations of food and forage from Balaklava to the camps of the different divisions. But from the commencement of the operations transport was required for siege purposes also.

From the evidence of the Commissary-General it appears that this diversion of a part of his transport from Commissariat to siege purposes prevented him from completing the formation of a depôt near head-quarters which he had commenced, and which was a measure of great importance to the army, as subsequent events too clearly proved.

He was, therefore, from the commencement of the operations against Sevastopol aware that the transport he had collected was not all available for Commissariat purposes, and was not sufficient for all the purposes for which it was required.

In answer to the question why in those circumstances he did not increase the transport in the Crimea, he states that he had as many animals as he could feed. The measure of the amount of transport to be provided for the army in the Crimea was not therefore what was required, but what the Commissariat could feed.

The reason for not increasing the amount of transport was, not that a greater number of animals was unnecessary, but that a greater number could not be fed in the Crimea. But if proper arrangements had been made to provide the army with forage for the winter, wherever it might be at that season, the forage would have been available for use in the Crimea. The Commissary-General had, indeed, concluded a contract for two millions[4] of pounds, or about 1,000[5] tons of hay to be made at Bayook Tchakmedge, on the Sea of Marmora; and hydraulic presses were sent out from England to compress it for shipment. The contractors failed, it is said, to complete their contract, and only about 800[6] tons of hay was made.

These[7] contractors appear to have been men without capital, who borrowed money at a high rate of interest to carry out their various contracts with the Commissariat. Their credit was such that [they could not obtain the money except under an[8]] arrangement by which the sums falling due to them by the Commissariat were to be paid into the hands of the banker who advanced the funds.

The banker was not disposed to make[9] large advances to enable them to carry out a contract for hay, which would[10] not be paid for till the whole was ready for delivery, and which was

[1] animals

[2] available

[3] exclusive of the conveyance of fire-wood

[4] one million.

[5] 800.

[6] 600 or 700.

[7] They

[8] it was found necessary to make an

[9] considered it hazardous to make

[10] was liable to be rejected on account of its quality, or because the whole quantity contracted for had not been prepared

then liable to be rejected on account of its quality, or in consequence of the whole quantity contracted for not being prepared.

[After the army had gone to Varna[1]] objections to receive delivery [of the quantity of hay prepared[2]] appear to have been raised on both of these grounds, and payment was in consequence withheld. The contractors having no means of paying the debt they had incurred to the banker until they received the price of the hay, and conceiving, as they assert, that it had been rejected by the Commissariat, entered into an arrangement to sell it to the French. The British Commissariat then claimed it as their property, and applications were made by both parties to the Porte to compel delivery of the hay, which each asserted they had purchased. At length [by the intervention of the Ambassador[3]] it was secured to the British Commissariat.

But in the meantime the hydraulic presses had been erected in the vicinity of Constantinople, more than fifteen miles from the place where [the hay[4]] had been collected, and it became necessary to carry the loose hay, either by land or water, that distance before it could be pressed. This operation could not be carried on in bad weather [without destroying the hay[5]], and thus, by defective arrangements throughout the whole transaction, the only provision for supplying the army with hay which had been made in Turkey was rendered nugatory at a time when a thousand[6] tons of hay in the Crimea would have been invaluable.

The Commissary-General admits that if the presses had been erected at the place where the hay was made, he could have fed more animals [in the Crimea[7]], and there can be little doubt that every addition to the transport in the Crimea saved the lives of men.

When the roads or tracks between Balaklava and the camp broke up, about the 20th November, and became one great slough of deep and tenacious mud, impassable for[8] carts, the transport power of [the Commissariat[9]] was reduced to one-third of its former amount; for a horse or mule will draw in a cart three times the weight it can carry on a pack.

Even so early as the 14th November, the day of the hurricane, the roads had become difficult, and the transport animals began to suffer. The Commissary-General then resolved to bring up a part of the reserve transport, which had been left at Varna, and had subsequently been ordered from thence to Constantinople. At this time, however, he only contemplated bringing up 250, and the "Jason" sailed[10] on the 26th November [to bring them]. [She[11]] returned to Balaklava on the 16th December, having been absent twenty-days.

The average passage at that season, including coaling, watering, &c., appears to have been about fifteen days. The "Jason" thus exceeded the average time by about[12] five days, of which two may be accounted for by the time occupied in sending for and bringing in the mules from Tchakmedge, where they were recovering from the effects of the journey from Varna.

[The transport animals[13] left at Varna] had been badly cared for, and[14] arrived at Constantinople in[15] bad condition. 250 of the most effective were selected to be shipped in the

[1] Omitted.

[2] Omitted.

[3] Omitted.

[4] it

[5] Omitted.

[6] 600 or 700.

[7] Omitted.

[8] Commissariat

[9] that department

[10] for that purpose

[11] and

[12] a few

[13] They

[14] many were utterly useless; a certain number, however

[15] very bad condition, about the end of November

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

"Jason," but even these appear to have hardly been considered effective by the Commissariat officers when they arrived at Balaklava.

On the 11th December the sailing horse transports of the army were placed at the disposal of the Commissary-General[1], [and] on the 24th he applied for a steam vessel [to bring up transport animals[2]], which appears to have been immediately ordered,[3] [the "Jason," having again been appointed to that service. On the 28th he applied for the "Jason," which had then discharged her cargo of animals, &c.], and in pursuance of the orders given on the 24th, she was immediately placed at his disposal, and sailed on the 29th for Constantinople [to bring up transport animals[4]].

[Mr. Filder[5]] makes it a ground of complaint[6] that, having sick on board for Scutari, she was detained till the 7th January landing them; but having been questioned on the subject, he admitted, that after landing the sick at Scutari, she was sent by the Commissariat, though not by his orders, to the Sea of Marmora, to take in[7] fuel, and he could not say that she might not have been absent a week or ten days for that purpose.[8]

This fact was not alluded to by Mr. Filder, when he complained of the detention of the "Jason" for the purpose of landing sick; and it came to our knowledge accidentally in conversation with persons unconnected with the commissariat. [Neither did Mr. Filder at any time make us aware that the horse transports had ever been placed at his disposal[9]].

The deficiency in the land transport of the army cannot be accounted for on the ground that Mr. Filder could not obtain sufficient sea transport to convey the animals he was desirous of bringing to the camp. [10]Lord Raglan, it is stated by the Quartermaster-General, after "unceasingly and urgently" impressing upon Mr. Filder the necessity of preparing a sufficiency of transport, finally sent officers of the army to purchase [transport[11]] animals at Eupatoria, Constantinople, Smyrna, Sicily, &c.; this measure was, however, deprecated by the Commissary-General, who declared he had not the means of feeding them.

In answer to the question, "Was the Commissary-General at any time urged to increase the amount of transport," the Quartermaster-General says, "Unceasingly, by the Commander of the Forces personally, and by myself."

The real cause of the deficiency of transport appears therefore to have been the want of forage, not the want of ships or of animals, and a similar failure to provide the requisite forage would again limit the number of animals available for the army in the Crimea, whatever might be the number in possession of the Land Transport Corps.[12]

With respect to deficiencies of forage, which form the next branch of our report, there is very considerable difficulty in arriving at accurate conclusions, because previous to 1st January no account of such deficiencies was kept by the quartermasters of cavalry, but it is admitted, both by the regimental and commissariat officers, that very large deficiencies did occur in the hay and chopped straw prior to that date.

There appears always to have been enough of barley in store or in the harbour, though[13] occasionally much difficulty [arose[14]] in getting

[1] to bring up transport animals, but were not employed for that purpose.

[2] Omitted.

[3] on the 28th; he applied especially for the "Jason," which had then discharged her cargo of animals, &c.

[4] Omitted.

[5] He

[6] with reference to the reinforcement of the transport in the Crimea.

[7] a cargo

[8] The deficiency in the land transport of the army cannot therefore be accounted for on the ground that he could not obtain sufficient sea transport to convey the animals he was desirous of bringing to the camp.

[9] Omitted.
*See* page 18 of printed report.

[10] The want of a road from Balaklava to the front, passable for Commissariat carts, greatly increased the difficulty of supplying the army after the middle of November, but the officers commanding divisions, who were examined upon the subject, are unanimous in their opinion that it would have been impossible to employ a sufficient number of men to make the road, and at the same time to carry on the military operations in which the army was engaged. The only remedy, therefore, was to increase the number of transport animals, and Lord Raglan, &c.

[11] Omitted.

[12] It may be hoped that the formation of that corps will prevent the recurrence of any similar calamities from the same cause.

[13] there was

[14] at

it, owing to the crowded state of the shipping, and it was at all times difficult to find conveyance for it to any considerable distance.

The hay and straw began to fail about the 14th November, after the gale in which so many vessels were lost off the coast; prior to that date no serious deficiencies have been established.

During the great scarcity of hay and straw between the 14th November and 1st January, the Commissariat seem to have been in nearly the same difficulty as the quartermasters, in regard to furnishing any accurate statement of their issues. The forage had to be sent up on the regimental bât animals, there being no other means of transport. It was often late before they reached Balaklava, and they were in so weak a state that the men sent with them could only venture to carry up a portion of the forage due; what was left behind would probably be considered by the quartermaster a short issue, while the Commissariat officer would, perhaps, hold that he had made an issue in full.

It is admitted on all hands that there was great irregularity in the arrangements at that time, which we trust[1] will be considered a sufficient reason for our not attempting to enter nto any details of the deficiencies at that period.

[1] hope

It may be sufficient to state, that they must have been very considerable indeed, and, coupled with exposure, were no doubt the cause of very heavy loss and inefficiency.* There is one case, however, from which such serious consequences have arisen that it requires some special notice.

The Light Cavalry Brigade, which had for some time previously been stationed in the valley adjacent to Balaklava, was removed, first to the vicinity of head-quarters for two or three days, and thereafter, on the 1st or 2d November, to Inkermann, where is was stationed near the windmill, a distance of at least seven or eight miles from Balaklava. This change, at a time when the roads were in an extremely bad state, and when there was great difficulty in obtaining the means of transport, created very serious obstacles to a proper supply of forage being obtained. It is alleged by Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Crookshanks that there was a certain quantity of hay at Balaklava, but not the means of carrying it to the front; occasionally he managed to bring up a little, till the 14th November, when the supply failed entirely. After that date the want of transport affected the supply of barley also, which on several days did not exceed from 1½ lb. to 2 lbs. a day per horse, being all that they had to keep them alive. The returns of one of the regiments show that for the last four days they were on the ground the daily average was only about 2½ lbs. for each horse, previously exhausted, as they had been, by the want of hay or straw during the early part of the month.

* At this time several hundred quarters of buck wheat, and a species of millet seed, which had been taken at the capture of the town, were lying in a large stone building close to the cattle wharf under the castle, and might, it is presumed, have been made available for some of the horses or baggage animals, when there was a difficulty in landing corn from the ships; but it remained in this store during the whole winter, and was still there when we left Balaklava in June, thus unnecessarily occupying a building which might have been valuable as a store for other purposes, besides allowing a most useful supply for horses or cattle to go to waste.

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

When the supply began to fail, the Commissariat officer,[1] who appears to have done everything in his power to meet the difficulties of the case, proposed, as he knew there was plenty of barley at Balaklava, that if a detachment of the horses were allowed to go down daily, he would engage to bring up enough for the rest of the brigade. This proposition appears to have been brought specially under the notice of Lord Cardigan by Lieut.-Colonel Mayou, Assistant Quartermaster-General of Cavalry, who states that his lordship declined to accede to it, as he had before done when a similar proposition was made to him to send the horses down for hay before that supply failed.

The whole brigade remained in this state till the 2d December, when it was directed to return to its previous position; but by that time the horses were reduced to such a state from starvation, that they could no longer bear the weight of their riders,—they had to be led down; many were left on the ground in a dying state, and of the remainder, seventeen died on the road before they could reach their former station, a distance of only about six miles.

It is no part of our duty to enter into the military reasons which may have led to the detention of this brigade on a spot [where the horses could not be subsisted];[2] we merely call attention to the fact as one of the instances of a deficiency of supply which formed the special subject of our inquiry.

With regard to the period from 1st January to 31st March last, returns have been obtained from each quarter-master, showing the quantities of forage required, and the quantities received and deficient, of which a summary will be given in the Appendix. This does not establish any [real][3] deficiency of importance during that period, for [it appears to have been][4] the practice, when hay was wanting, to make it up by double the weight of chopped straw, or sometimes by half the weight of barley. Two pounds of bran was, in like manner, occasionally substituted for the usual issue of chopped straw; so that, on the whole, the [cavalry][5] during this period seem [to have been fairly][6] rationed, though not with precisely the same description of forage as they had been accustomed to on home service.

In comparing the regimental and commissariat statements and returns on this head, it is necessary, however, to keep in view that, owing to the difficulty of carrying chopped straw, the men often objected to take it, and much was in consequence left behind, when it could not be exchanged for any other description of forage.

This appears to have been in some cases assumed as a deficiency, though it could obviously not be considered by the Commissariat in that light, or borne on the returns as such.[7]

[*Continued on next page.*] While

[1] referred to

[2] be foraged by the Commissariat, or which may have induced a refusal to adopt the only measure by which apparently they could be subsisted.

[3] apparent

[4] it was

[5] horses

[6] not to have been badly

[7] With reference to the effect of the deficiency of forage, and the other privations to which the horses of the army were exposed, we have ascertained the loss among them, from various causes, in the cavalry and artillery.

A summary of the returns obtained on that head will be found at page 193 of the Appendix, which shows the loss attributable to sickness to be as follows, for

the six months from October to March inclusive:—

| — | Strength. | Died by Sickness. | Ratio per Cent. of Deaths. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Heavy Cavalry - - | 1,055 | 493 | ·47 |
| Light Cavalry - - | 1,161 | 439 | ·38 |
| Artillery - - - | 2,832 | 1,190 | ·42 |
| Total - - | 5,048 | 2,122 | ·42 |

On referring to the loss sustained by the Commissariat animals during the same period, it will be found rather less than in the cavalry or artillery; the deaths among them having, according to a return furnished by Deputy Commissary-General Adams, amounted to about 889 out of 2,329 originally imported into the Crimea, or in the proportion of 38 per cent.; a result which could scarcely have been expected, considering the advantage which cavalry horses might be supposed to have over hard-worked baggage animals, to whom little attention could be paid at such a period.

[*From preceding page.*]
While we have considered it our duty to point out what appear to us to be serious defects in the arrangements of the Commissariat with the army in the Crimea, as well as the [deplorable][1] consequences that have resulted from those defects,[2] it is but just to direct attention to the unusual nature of the duties required of the Commissariat where a large army occupies, as it were, a barren island which furnishes nothing except water and a limited quantity of firewood. The Commissariat[3] had also [many and][4] serious difficulties to encounter, which could not have been foreseen. The tempest of the 14th November was a great disaster, and the peculiarities of the harbour of Balaklava, whatever may be its advantages, created constant difficulties, especially in landing the vast supplies required for the army.[5]

A man of [[6]commanding intellect and] comprehensive views might probably have risen superior to those disadvantages, and created an organization suited to the circumstances. [7]He would probably have turned to good account
[*Continued on next page.*] the

[1] Omitted.

[2] we do not mean to infer that the Commissary-General or the other officers of that department have failed to make any exertion of which they were capable, to provide for the exigencies of the public service according to the measure of their ability and foresight, and

[3] which appears for some time to have been without a sufficient number of hands

[4] Omitted.

[5] The breaking up of the road from Balaklava to the front, and the impossibility of sparing from their military duties a sufficient number of men to make it practicable for Commissariat carts, had not been anticipated or provided for; and the belief, apparently shared in by the Commissariat, that Sebastopol would speedily fall, and the campaign in the Crimea terminate, though not much insisted upon by the witnesses whom we examined, was unquestionably a most influential cause of many defects in the arrangements. It appears to have been assumed, till the beginning of November, that any present inconvenience could be but of short duration, and that any expedients by which the emergencies of the moment could be overcome were sufficient for the occasion.

[6] Omitted.

[7] He would, doubtless, at once have perceived that the established practice of procuring all supplies by tenders and contracts is not calculated to draw forth the

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

[*From preceding page.*]
the knowledge of the country and its resources possessed by a large and respectable body of public servants, Her Majesty's consuls; and he would[1] have found those resources more ample and more easily made available than till lately they were believed to be. But it is unreasonable to expect that every man who may rise to the top[2] of so limited a department, even after a long course of meritorious service, is to display, whenever the occasion may demand it, inventive resources and administrative capacity of a very high order. [[3]It is one of the misfortunes of the Commissariat that they are so much of an isolated and quasi professional body, and have thus a tendency to become wedded to particular notions, and to regard it as an impeachment of their skill or ability that they should be supposed to require advice or assistance, even in circumstances which must be new to them.]

The purely executive duties of the department appear to be well performed.

The officers attached to divisions and brigades are generally intelligent and efficient; [4]some of them are men of considerable capacity.

The general officers commanding divisions and brigades [5]spoke generally in favourable terms of those officers, and used terms of high commendation in speaking of some of them, especially of Mr. Power, attached to the 2d division, who was absent on duty, and whom we therefore did not see.

The evidence in regard to some of the subjects of our inquiry has not yet been corrected by the officers last examined,[6] having been sent to them for that purpose only the day before our departure from Balaklava.[7] When we have received [8]that evidence, and the answers to queries transmitted at the same time, we shall have the honour of reporting upon the matters to which they relate.

We have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient
humble Servants,

(Signed) JOHN M'NEILL.
ALEX. M. TULLOCH,
Colonel.

The Right Honorable
The Lord Panmure.

resources of Turkey, or to make them available when required.

Finding that his supplies must be drawn from provinces, of the resources of which he had little knowledge, and to the inhabitants of which he was unable even to communicate his wants in any language which they could understand

[1] then

[2] head

[3] Omitted in printed report.

[4] several

[5] with few exceptions, expressed their satisfaction with the exertions and services of those officers

[6] to whom it was sent.

[7] And certain written queries were transmitted at the same time, the answers to which will be forwarded to us.

[8] those papers, and have had an opportunity of examining, in a collected form, the whole of the evidence and other documents, we shall proceed to report upon the matters to which they relate, so far as they may fall within the limits assigned to our inquiry by the instructions received from your Lordship.

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

MEMORANDUM.

Horse Guards, May 22, 1856.

ON the 14th May General Peel addressed to me some questions, pointed to the object of tracing the responsibility for the original supply of the camp equipage required by a British army in the field; and the subject is one of so much importance that with the permission of the Board I should be glad to take this opportunity of stating my views in a deliberate way.

The Board will, I am sure, understand that I am now speaking as an officer on the general staff of the army, who is anxious to throw all the light he can upon military questions, and that I am not seeking to utter another word in answer to the statements contained in the Report of the Commissioners. Indeed, General Peel's question, though it concerns the subject of "camp stores," points in a direction very different from that indicated by the Commissioners.

The view of the Commissioners, speaking generally, seems to have been, not that the supply of camp stores in Balaklava harbour was deficient, but that obstacles hindered the due appropriation of them.

On the other hand, General Peel's question—not connecting itself with the *distribution* of storts—seeks to ascertain who was the functionary responsible for originally estimating and formally demanding the quantity of camp stores which the army might require.

I consider that the first step towards a right understanding of the matter is to recognize the broad distinction which exists between the duty of *originally equipping* a force for foreign service, and the far more vast and very different duty of creating those great *reserves* which are necessary to the well being of an army in the field.

The duty of seeing that any force leaving these shores is duly equipped, clearly belongs, as I conceive, to the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards.

The practice, I take it, would be this:—Suppose that war has been declared, and that a force of 20,000 men, to be followed by reinforcements as speedily as possible, is forthwith to be sent on foreign service—say, for instance, to the Tagus,—I conceive that the Secretary-of State for War would notify the determination of the Government to the Commander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Chief, acting through the instrumentality of the Adjutant-General at the Horse Guards, would determine what particular corps and regiments should be selected for the service, and would also call upon the Adjutant-General to give him proper estimates and descriptions of the arms and articles of personal equipment requisite for the present use of the 20,000 men.

The Commander-in-Chief would also obtain from the Quartermaster-General at the Horse Guards proper estimates of the camp equipage requisite for the present use of the force in question.

When I speak of these estimates as estimates adapted to the "*present*" use of the force about to be despatched, I do not, of course, mean that the estimates would not include a certain amount of spare stores. On the contrary, I consider that no force can be said to be properly "equipped" which has not with it such a supply as to leave a margin, a reasonable margin, calculated to meet all exigencies occurring in the interval which may elapse before the force is brought in contact with its reserves. But I employ the words "present use" in order to keep alive the distinction between the business of *equipping* a force, and the business of creating a *reserve*.

Well, to continue the process as to equipment. The estimates both of the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster-General at the Horse Guards would be made the basis of a requisition by the Commander-in-Chief to the Ordnance, now a sub-department of the War Office; and the arms and stores being duly supplied by that sub-department, the Commander-in-Chief would satisfy himself that they were sufficient, and that they were duly appropriated.

And here I may be allowed to say that the present Commander-in-Chief introduced a very valuable improvement in our system; for it was he who first provided that detachments of troops leaving this country should not be separated, as had previously been the case, from the stores intended for their use.

So much for the business of the original equipment of the force.

I now come to the question of the reserve stores.

My opinion is that the duty of accumulating the vast reserve of supplies necessary for the safety and efficiency of a British army in the field is one which attaches upon the responsible Ministers of the Crown, and specially, of course—as I stated in my answer to General Peel—upon the Secretary for War.

I desire also to state that in my judgment this duty ought to be performed upon a scale vastly larger than any that could be formed upon the basis of those mere current exigencies of the day which could be expressed by requisitions from the military departments of the army in the field.

A nation may be so straitened in its pecuniary resources as to be driven to the necessity of attempting to adapt the supply to the almost immediate wants of the army, but nothing short of dire necessity can warrant that perilous course.

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

Suppose—as before suggested—suppose a British force to have been sent to the Tagus, and from that base to be operating against an enemy far away in the heart of the Peninsula, and that the place assigned for the great reserve of stores is Lisbon. Now, what I maintain is, that those stores ought to be of such magnitude as that there would be no question of balancing their quantity against the current wants of the force as expressed in requisitions from the military departments of the army in the field. How could a mere departmental officer from his tent or his bivouac on the Tormes or the Ebro, send back requisitions to England which would operate as a complete guide for the formation of the vast magazines on which an army rests? I say that the proper magnitude of the reserve stores would have to be determined, not only with reference to the current consumption of the army in the field, but to the general plans of the Government at home, the probable direction of the war, and a great variety of considerations, military, political, and financial, all properly within the competence of Her Majesty's responsible Ministers, but far beyond the range of adjutant-generals and quartermaster-generals in the field.

An adjutant-general and a quartermaster-general in the field can only of course express the current exigencies of the service, the one for arms, ammunition, and personal equipment, the other for camp stores, but they cannot form guiding opinions as to the duration of hostilities. They cannot tell whether the expedition in which they are engaged will end in a mere demonstration or swell to the dimensions of a great war.

The matter comes to this: if the reserve is so scanty as that its quantity is to depend upon the "hand-to-mouth" principle of replenishing the stores by estimates based on the mere current exigencies of the service, then assuredly the army resting upon so weak a system will be exposed to risk of enduring great privations.

If, on the other hand, the reserve is on such a scale of magnitude as to be (as it should be) largely in excess of all current demands, then, of course, the necessity for those requisitions from the military departments which aim at estimating the nearly approaching wants of the army, would be entirely superseded.

It would seem that in an early stage of the war, an inquiry arose among the military authorities similar to that now suggested by General Peel, for I find that on the 8th of June 1854, this communication was made by General Freeth, then Quartermaster-General at the Horse Guards, to Lord De Ros, then Quartermaster-General of the Forces in the East.

*Extract of a Letter from Major-General Freeth to Lord De Ros.*

"Horse Guards, June 8, 1854.

"With reference to the reserve stores, I may observe, that the practice in the Peninsula was, that the storekeeper should send periodical returns to the military secretary at head-quarters, showing all he had in store, when the latter applied to the authorities in England for additional supplies of such articles as might be required.

"(Signed) J. Freeth, Quartermaster-General."

Now, obviously, if there had prevailed at the time of the Peninsular War the idea of regulating the reserve of camp equipage by means of requisitions from the Quartermaster-General's department, these returns of the quantities in store would have been sent to the Quartermaster-General of the Forces. But this was not the case. They were ordered to be sent to the military secretary, *i. e.*, in other words, to the Commander of the Forces in the field, personally; and it seems plain that this must have been done, in order to enable him, not to make mere formal requisitions, but to advise with the home authorities as to the scale of magnitude on which the supplies from England should be furnished; and I consider, therefore, that the practice, as elucidated by General Freeth, coincides with my own view, as stated to General Peel, namely, that the duty of fixing the scale of magnitude on which the reserve stores are to be kept up is one which attaches upon the Secretary for War. That Minister, I repeat, will be guided by a variety of considerations; but for such of his data as are of a military character, he will of course turn for counsel to the General commanding the forces; and it was no doubt in order to prepare himself for so advising the home authorities, that the Commander of the Forces in the Peninsula required the returns of stores to be made to his military secretary.

Upon the approach of the winter of 1854, the pressing exigencies of the service certainly induced a tendency to break through forms, and strive to relieve the wants of the army by the most direct means; and I fairly confess that my requisition, made in November 1854, to the Quartermaster-General at the Horse Guards, was a divergence from the regular practice. Accordingly, I found myself corrected by having laid before me this letter:—

"Sir, "War Department, December 26, 1854.

"Having laid before the Duke of Newcastle your letter of the 14th instant, and its enclosures, I am directed to request that you will state to the General commanding in chief, that his Grace is of opinion that it is very desirable that requisitions for tents and camp equipment, and, indeed, for all stores for the use of the army in the East, should be submitted to the Secretary of State, as was done during the Peninsular War; and with regard to the requisitions from the Quartermaster-General in the Crimea, enclosed in your letter, I am to add, that his Grace has given directions to the Board of Ordnance to send

out without delay, consigned to that officer, the several articles therein enumerated, except so far as the demands therein made have been already anticipated.

"I have, &c.

"Major-General Yorke, &c. &c." "(Signed) G. C. MUNDY."

I conceive that the Duke of Newcastle's view, as stated in the letter which I have read, was the right one; and, in justice to his Grace, I should mention that the irregularity which he noticed did not prevent him from acting upon the requisition; and it was not any question of form or etiquette which retarded the home authorities for so many months in their compliance with my requisition.

Shortly, then, my opinion upon the question opened by General Peel is this,—that the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards is responsible for the original equipment of any force despatched from these shores on foreign service; and that the duty of forming the great reserve of stores rests primarily with the Secretary of State for War, and generally upon the other responsible advisers of the Crown.

I also conceive that the Secretary of State for War, in determining the scale of magnitude on which he will form the reserve, must be guided by calculations, partly military and partly political, and that for all military data and all military advice he is entitled to the constant assistance of the General commanding in the field.

Consistently, as I conceive, with the responsibility which I have attributed to the Secretary of State for War, Lord Panmure, about the month of July 1855, took upon himself to reorganize the branches of the service connected with camp stores, and then, for the first time, those stores were placed under the control of the Quartermaster-General's Department.

The officer specially entrusted with the management of the stores was denominated the "Superintendent of Stores," or, at a later period, "Ordnance Storekeeper," and Captain Gordon was appointed to the post.

Some months afterwards,—in November 1855,—a new and very special machinery was created for providing that the reserve stores should be kept up to a level with the proximate wants of the army, and the new system was this:—Heads of departments were to send to Captain Gordon estimates of the quantities of camp equipage which they were likely to require for the ensuing three months, and Captain Gordon being furnished with those data, was declared to be responsible for the duty of keeping up the quantity of stores to their due amount.

That last change occurred after I had quitted the Crimea.

The following are the General Orders by which the alterations in the system were promulgated:—

"12*th July* 1855.

"The Secretary of State for War having decided that all army equipment in the way of camp equipage, extra clothing, &c., should be under the charge of the Quartermaster-General, all such articles will be handed over by the Ordnance Storekeeper, and taken in charge by Captain Gordon, appointed General Superintendent of Stores."

"17*th July* 1855.

"With reference to General Order No. 4, of the 12th July 1855, the Secretary of State for War having decided that all army equipments in the way of camp equipage and clothing shall be under the control of the Quartermaster-General, all such articles will be handed over by the Commissary of Ordnance, and taken in charge by Captain Gordon, appointed Ordnance Storekeeper.

"All expenses connected with the Department will consequently be paid by the Ordnance Paymaster."

"22*d November* 1855.

"The Secretary of State for War having desired that all demands for stores for the army should be made on the Ordnance Storekeeper, and as that officer is held responsible that the stores are kept up to meet the requirements, Heads of Departments will without delay furnish Captain Gordon, through the Chief of the Staff, with a return showing such articles as they are likely to require in the shape of camp equipage, clothing, hospital bedding, entrenching tools, &c., during the ensuing three months, and will in future make their demands, from time to time, in anticipation for the same period.

"With the view of ascertaining the quantity of ammunition, boots, and cloth trowsers likely to be required by the army during the ensuing winter, commanding officers of regiments will send to Captain Gordon a return showing the same."

Those who may have the direction of affairs in any future war will do well to remember that this new organization was prepared to meet the wants of an army which was stationary, and camped at a distance of only a few miles from the stores.

(Signed) RICHARD AIREY,
Quartermaster-General.

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

No. 12.

G. C. Mundy to the Judge Advocate General.

Sir, War Department, 13th May 1856.

I am directed by Lord Panmure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 5th instant, conveying the request of the Board of General Officers appointed for the purpose of considering so much of the Report on the supplies to the British Army in the Crimea, as animadverts upon the conduct of certain officers in Her Majesty's Army, to be furnished with the preliminary report of the Commissioners, Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch, bearing date the 9th of June, and also with the original manuscript report of the Commissioners, dated 10th of June.

2. A copy of the preliminary report of the 9th of June is herewith transmitted, for the information of the Board of General Officers; but as regards the manuscript of the report, dated 10th of June, I am to state, that that document has not been laid before Lord Panmure, but is in the hands of the Commissioners, by whom it was prepared for the press, and the report printed from it revised.

3. I am to add that this printed report, which is the one presented to Parliament, is that which has been officially referred to the Board, and is alone recognized by his Lordship.

I am, &c.
G. C. Mundy.

---

*Confidential.*

Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch to Lord Panmure.

My Lord, Constantinople, June 9, 1855.

We have the honour to inform your Lordship that we have completed the inquiry intrusted to us. The course which we proposed to pursue, is explained in the letter to Lord Raglan, of the 13th March; and his Lordship's entire concurrence in the expediency of that course is conveyed to us in his letter of the 15th March, of which a copy is also inclosed. We have accordingly seen and personally examined, either collectively or separately, the Commanding Officer, Surgeon, and Quartermaster of every corps in this army who was not prevented by illness from attending; and from them have obtained evidence of such deficiencies as have occurred in the supplies to each corps. We next examined the officers commanding Brigades and Divisions, together with the Staff Officers, the principal Medical Officers, and the Commissariat Officers attached to Brigades and Divisions; and, finally, we have examined the Quartermaster-General and Senior Assistant Quartermaster-General, as well as the Commissary-General and the two Deputy Commissaries-General, who are present with the army. The personal examination of the Quartermaster-General having, however, been interrupted by the necessity of attending to other more pressing duties, a series of questions was sent to him to be answered.

It is a source of great satisfaction to us to find, on almost all important points, a remarkable concurrence in the testimony as to matters of fact.

The evidence is so voluminous, that it will occupy some time to prepare a detailed report, founded upon the information which we have collected, and to suggest what may appear to us to be the best mode of rectifying the defects which became apparent, or which have been pointed out to us in the course of our investigations. We have, therefore, thought it advisable at once to report, confidentially, to your Lordship, some of the results at which we have already arrived, and some of the opinions to which we have been led by the facts which appear to us to be established.

The sufferings of the army in the course of the winter, and especially during the months of December and January, have been intense. It has been only by slow degrees, and after the frequent repetition of similar details, as one witness after another revealed the facts that had come under his own observation, that we have been able to form any adequate conception of the distress and misery undergone by the troops, or to appreciate the unparalleled courage and constancy with which they have endured their sufferings. Great Britain has often had reason to be proud of her army, but it is doubtful whether the whole range of military history furnishes an example of an army exhibiting throughout a long campaign qualities as high as have been displayed by the forces under Lord Raglan's command. The strength of the men gave way under excessive labour, watching, exposure, and privation; but they never murmured, their spirit never failed, and the enemy, though far outnumbering them, never detected, in those whom he encountered, any signs of weakness. Their numbers were reduced by disease and by frequent contests to such a handful of men, compared with the vast extent of the lines which they constructed and defended against armies many times as numerous, that it is impossible to view the ground without amazement. Yet the army never abated one jot of its confidence, and never descended one step from its acknowledged military pre-eminence. Both men and officers, when so reduced that they were hardly fit for the lighter duties of the camp, scorned to be excused the severe and perilous work of the trenches, lest they should throw an undue amount of

duty upon their comrades; yet they maintained every foot of ground against all the efforts of the enemy, and with numbers so small, that perhaps no other troops would even have made the attempt.

Suffering and privation have frequently led to crime in armies as in other communities, but offences of a heinous character have been unknown in this army. Not one capital offence has been committed, or even alleged to have been committed, by a soldier, and intemperance has been rare.

Every one who knows anything of the constitution of the army must feel that when troops so conduct themselves throughout a long campaign, the officers must have done their duty and set the example. The conduct of the men is therefore the highest encomium that can be passed upon their officers. They have not only shared all the danger and exposure and most of the privations which the men had to undergo, but the evidence is full of incidental indications of their solicitude for the welfare of those who were under their command, and their constant readiness to employ their private means in promoting the comfort of the men. Doubtless there has been, as there always must be, better management in some regiments than in others; but amidst much that was painful in the evidence that we have heard, it was always gratifying to observe the community of feelings and of interests that appeared everywhere to subsist between the officers and their men.

It was inevitable that a siege carried on throughout the winter in the Crimea, should involve a very considerable amount of hardships and sickness. These are consequences of such operations as certain as losses in action when a battle is fought. The sickness and consequent mortality in this army have, however, been very great. The deaths appear to amount to nearly one-half of the average strength from the 1st of October 1854, to the 31st of March 1855, and it seems to be clearly established that this excessive mortality is not to be attributed to anything peculiar in the climate, but to overwork, exposure to wet and cold, improper food, insufficient clothing in the early part of the winter, and insufficient shelter from inclement weather.

To determine the limits beyond which we should decline to pursue our investigations required careful deliberation. The influence of overwork and exposure on the health of the troops might appear to be foreign to the objects of our inquiry, which had reference especially to the supply of the army, and the arrangements of the Commissariat; but much of the labour and exposure which the troops had to undergo was a consequence of the want of sufficient land transport, which it was the duty of the Commissariat to provide. The effects of overwork and exposure could not therefore be excluded from our consideration. In like manner the injurious consequences of defective cooking, which are not obviously connected with the subjects of our inquiry, were in a great measure produced by a deficiency of fuel or of transport to convey it, both of which are matters affecting the Commissariat. It may be right also to state that in doubtful cases we have preferred running the risk of pushing our inquiries beyond what might have been contemplated, to incurring the hazard of falling short of what was intended. At the same time we have not pursued our investigations into matters unconnected with the supply of the army.

The Commissariat have furnished returns of the quantities in store at various dates of a great number of articles, as they appear upon the books; but as no cargo is credited till it has been completely discharged, these returns do not show the quantity afloat. On the other hand, as issues were necessarily made occasionally from cargoes afloat, which had not yet been credited, the cargo when credited might in fact have already been issued wholly or in part. The Commissary-General has, therefore, been unable to furnish a return of the smallest quantity at any time in store of any of the articles constituting the rations of the troops as regulated by general orders. In respect to all of these articles we must rely upon the general statements of the officers of that Department as to the sufficiency at all times of the supplies in store. From those statements, however, the accuracy of which we do not question, it appears that, including what was on board of ships in the harbour, the Commissariat has never been without a supply at Balaklava of the articles issued as rations to the men. Having been informed, by persons unconnected with the Commissariat, that there had been such a deficiency, or apprehended deficiency, of salt meat as to make it necessary to apply, on the 21st of January, to the navy for assistance, we inquired into the circumstances. From the returns handed in to us by the Commissary-General, and from his statements, it appears that although the Commissariat had at that time in store a quantity sufficient for several days' consumption, there was still, in consequence of some mistake, it is stated, on the part of the Commissariat officers at Constantinople, cause for considerable anxiety lest the army should be left without salt meat at a time when no other articles of food were available, except biscuit and rum, and the ordinary groceries. The arrival of a vessel with a supply of salt meat before that which was received from the navy had been issued, relieved the Commissary-General from the anxiety which he had previously felt upon this subject.

The deficiencies in the supplies provided by the Commissariat from which the army, and especially the troops encamped upon the heights before Sebastopol, suffered, were, a deficiency of fresh meat, a deficiency of vegetables, a deficiency of soft bread, particularly for the sick, and more especially for those whose gums were affected with scurvy, a deficiency of fuel, a deficiency of hay and straw to such an extent that enough could not be procured to fill the paillasses of the sick, and above all a deficiency of land transport, to which many of the other deficiencies are to be attributed.

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

It is proved by the evidence, and it is admitted by the Commissariat, that on several occasions, especially in the month of December, some of the Divisions did not receive full rations of meat, and on some days not even half rations. Once or twice the ration of biscuit was incomplete; but not upon the same days on which the rations of meat were short. It has happened too that the extra ration of rum which had been ordered could not be issued, except to the men for duty in the trenches. These short issues, however, of which we have obtained from each regiment returns, as accurate as could be prepared, do not appear to have been such as in ordinary circumstances could materially have affected the health of the troops; but superadded to the other causes of disease, and the other deficiencies above referred to, they may have been injurious; and certainly they were regarded as an additional hardship and privation. It appears, however, that many of the men did not consume the salt meat, especially the salt beef, when full rations were issued to them. The prevailing diseases were at that time affections of the bowels, in most cases connected with scorbutic tendency in the system, and not only the men, but the medical officers also, believed that those diseases were aggravated and the tendency increased by the continued use of salt meat. In many many cases the aversion to that kind of food seems to have amounted to absolute loathing. Several of the officers who had lived for a considerable time upon their rations, seem to have experienced similar sensations, and to have ultimately found it impossible to eat the salt meat, especially the salt beef, though it is admitted that both beef and pork were sound and of good quality. It was remarked that while whole pieces of salt beef were frequently thrown away or given away, sometimes to the extent of about 100 lbs. in a day by a single regiment, nearly all the pork was consumed, except by some of the Scotch regiments.

The army appears to have been sufficiently supplied with fresh meat in Bulgaria; and during the latter days of September and nearly the whole of October, the cattle obtained in the Crimea, either by capture or purchase, furnished a considerable proportion of fresh meat to the troops; but after the beginning of November, the army was dependent upon the cattle imported. From that time till the month of March, the proportion of fresh meat issued was not sufficient to maintain the health of the army, which, during all that time, suffered to an alarming extent from diseases of the bowels, to which there appeared to be a general predisposition or tendency. The medical officers of all ranks are of opinion, almost without exception, that the continued use of salt meat aggravated those diseases and increased that tendency.

From a return which we called for from the Commissary-General, it appears that the average quantity of fresh meat issued to each man of the five Divisions composing the army, including the sick in the camp, was, in November, lbs.; in December, 6¼ lbs.; in January, nearly 9 lbs.; but as a considerable number of the issues was in small quantities, for the sick only, and a preference was given to them whenever fresh meat could be obtained, it is probable that the men for duty did not actually receive more than about 3 lbs. each in December, and 5 lbs. in January. Some of the corps received even less than that quantity; and amongst the medical officers there appears to be almost no difference of opinion as to the evil consequences of the substitution, to so large an extent, of salt meat for fresh, especially during the prevalence of the diseases from which the army was suffering.

The issue of two ounces of rice to each man daily, which had been ordered by Lord Raglan, in Bulgaria, to be continued till the 30th September, in consequence of the prevalence of bowel complaints, was extended, at the suggestion, it appears, of the Commissary-General, till the 15th November, when it unfortunately ceased, the order not having been renewed. Mr. Filder states that the supply of rice in store was such as would have enabled him to continue the issue, but that from want of land transport, it was impossible to convey that additional weight to the front. It is greatly to be regretted, at a time when the troops were as completely dependent upon the Commissariat as if they had been on board ship, and were subsisting exclusively upon salt meat and biscuit, that the issue of an article of diet so valuable in those circumstances as rice, should have been suspended, in consequence of want of transport, just at the time when it was most needed. It may be proper also to remark that one penny, fixed by a Board of Officers as the price to be paid by a soldier for his ration of coffee and sugar, so far exceeded the cost of those articles that it was sufficient also to cover the cost of two ounces of rice.

It unfortunately happened, too, that there was some delay in issuing lime-juice to the troops generally, as a preventive of scurvy, though it had for some time previously been used in the hospitals for the cure of that disease. This circumstance, together with the want of a sufficient supply of vegetables, plainly indicated the necessity for issuing it to the whole army. Before the end of December it appears from the Commissariat return that there were 278 cases (equal to about 20,000 lbs.) of lime-juice in store, but it does not appear that any of it was issued till February. Some time seems to have elapsed before the prevalence of scurvy was generally recognized, and therefore before the necessity for issuing lime-juice was perceived. It is somewhat remarkable that the regulations require the issue of lime-juice to troops on board of ship, when salt meat is issued for a certain number of days; but it does not appear that there is any similar provision for the protection of troops on shore, though the necessity may be equally urgent.

It appears to us, after careful consideration of the circumstances that have come to our knowledge here, that it would be expedient, whenever salt meat is issued to the army, to assimilate the diet to that which is used in the navy; this has been strongly recommended

by Dr. Walsh, the intelligent naval surgeon in charge of the Marines on shore, who states in his evidence, that during a service of seventeen years he has never seen scurvy in the navy.

The deficiency of vegetables, from which the health of the army suffered, is the more to be regretted as the Turkish provinces, to which there was easy access, could have furnished —and at a later and more unfavourable season have furnished—a sufficient supply; but it appears that according to the regulations, vegetables constitute no part of the soldier's rations, and it is therefore no part of the duty of the Commissariat to issue them, or even to provide them, unless specially ordered to do so. This arrangement, which leaves the soldier to purchase vegetables in the market, may be an advantage to him where such a market exists, but is obviously inapplicable to this army. Lord Raglan was urgent in his desire to get vegetables for the troops, but the first attempts to import green vegetables were not successful, and some time elapsed before the defects in the arrangements could be so far remedied as to secure a regular supply. In the meantime scurvy in its ordinary form and scorbutic diseases in various forms, extended rapidly, till in several regiments there was hardly a man free from the taint.

The only bread issued to the troops till the month of April was biscuit, which appears however to have been generally of excellent quality. The sick complained much of the want of soft bread, and the men who were suffering from scurvy were often unable to eat the biscuit; a great number, whose gums were affected, continued to perform their duties, which left them little time for preparing their food, and these suffered much pain in their attempts to eat biscuit. At length some private establishments for baking bread in Russian ovens which had been found there were set on foot at Balaklava, and shortly after the middle of March an arrangement was made with them, by Lord Raglan's directions, for supplying the purveyor with a certain quantity daily for the use of the hospitals. We are not aware of any reason why soft bread might not have been baked at any time for the sick, and also for the army. The French army has been regularly supplied with fresh bread, and the erection of a sufficient number of ovens was not an operation involving any considerable expense, or requiring much either of skill or of time, if it had been undertaken by the proper public departments. But there appeared to be an indisposition to make the attempt. There were bakers enough in the regiments to have worked many more ovens than were required to supply the whole army, and if these could not be spared from their military duties, there was no difficulty in procuring bakers from Constantinople. But it was understood that a floating bakery had been in preparation in England, and it was therefore considered unnecessary to do anything here.

It is unnecessary for us to revert to the issue of green coffee, which has been alluded to by almost all the witnesses we examined, but which had previously been so fully discussed that we did not consider it necessary to investigate the circumstances; there is reason, however, to believe that being imperfectly roasted and pounded by the men, it became injurious to their health. This is not only their own opinion, but is also that of those medical officers upon whose judgment we should be most disposed to rely.

It appears to us from the statements of a great majority of the medical and other officers examined, that tea would on the whole be preferable to coffee, especially on a march, provided the ration of sugar were increased by one quarter of an ounce. That change would somewhat diminish the weight to be carried, and would materially diminish the cost of the ration. It has been objected that tea is more liable to be damaged than coffee; but as the whole of the tea used in Russia, and in some countries of Asia, where it is largely consumed, is carried overland from China, there can hardly be any serious difficulty in carrying a supply with the army.

From what has been stated, it appears that the diet provided for the troops was not well calculated to preserve their health; but that on the contrary, the continued use of salt meat, while the army was suffering from diseases of the bowels, aggravated those maladies, and increased the tendency to them, which was general. The same unvarying diet of salt meat and biscuit, without a sufficient quantity of vegetables, acting on constitutions debilitated by the other causes previously referred to, produced a formidable disease, which there is reason to believe complicated and rendered more fatal almost every other disease by which the troops were attacked in December and January.

In the countries subject to Turkey to which we have easy access, there is not, and has never been, any difficulty, in procuring a sufficient number of cattle to supply the army with fresh meat. In December, when scarcely any but salt meat was issued, the Commissary-General states that he had about 8,000 head of cattle at his command. He attributes the deficiency in the supply to the want of sea transport, the difficulties of the winter navigation, and the delays caused by the use of Balaklava as the port of the army. All these circumstances doubtless increased the difficulty of bringing forward a sufficient number of cattle. But looking to the amount of sea transport at his command after the 11th of December, when the sailing horse transports of the army were placed at his disposal, in addition to the steamboats previously handed over to him; and considering the vicinity of the ports on the southern shore of the Black Sea, where cattle could be obtained, and were actually tendered to him in December, we are forced to the conclusion that the Commissary-General was not then sufficiently alive to the importance of that article of food, and that it might have been considerably increased during the months of December, January, and February, if proper measures had been taken for that purpose. The time

III. Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

is not very remote when armies depended upon sailing vessels for all the supplies transported by sea. Three thousand additional bullocks in the three months above-mentioned would have given the whole army fresh meat, on the average, every alternate day; and we cannot persuade ourselves that three or four of the sailing horse-transports could not have landed that number from Samsoon and Sinope in three months, in addition to all that were brought by the steam cattle-boats, chiefly from the Bosphorus.

The use of salt meat and biscuit in the navy, without injury to the health of the seamen, may perhaps have misled persons who did not sufficiently attend to the precautions adopted in that branch of the service for ensuring variety of diet; and it is right to keep in view that we are judging after the event, when the importance of a sufficient supply of fresh meat has been proved, though not for the first time, by the consequences resulting from the want of it. Wherever large armies have been collected, a tendency to diseases of the bowels appears to have been manifested, and it is of the utmost importance that every precaution should be taken to counteract that tendency. But experience had proved on many former occasions, that the long use of salt meat increased that tendency, and aggravated the symptoms of those diseases, thereby increasing both the number attacked and the proportion of fatal cases. The influence of improper diet is augmented in proportion to the debility and predisposition to disease induced by other causes; and in circumstances so unfavourable to health as those in which this army was placed, by the nature of the service and the season at which it was carried on, no practicable means ought to have been left untried, to protect the troops from the injurious effects of diet,—one of the few conditions of the soldier's existence which are absolutely within our control. Regarded merely in a pecuniary point of view, irrespective of higher considerations, moral and political, the most wasteful of all expenditure is the expenditure of men. There is hardly any conceivable price that it may be necessary to pay for what is required to preserve the health and efficiency of the soldier, that is not advantageously laid out; for every soldier has cost a large sum before he is landed in the Crimea fit for duty, and it costs a like sum to replace him. The value of the other considerations cannot be estimated; they are above all price. But the highest price that has been paid per pound for fresh meat, including freight and casualties, is actually less than the lowest price at which salt meat has been put into store in the Crimea; and if the casualties which in the winter voyage from the Bosphorus in steam vessels did not exceed 14 per cent., had been double that amount in sailing vessels, or even a still larger proportion, that would not have been a sufficient reason for leaving the army without an adequate supply of fresh meat.

The deficiency in the supply of vegetables is even more objectionable, because there are several varieties which can safely be carried by sea, and which will keep for several months. Of these, potatoes and onions are perhaps the best for general use in the army, and the different varieties of preserved vegetables are available at all seasons and in all circumstances at a moderate cost.

At a future time we shall be prepared to submit some suggestions as to rations of troops in the field; meanwhile we have the satisfaction of reporting that the supplies of food to this army are now abundant, and the diet of the soldier, in the opinion of those who are best able to judge, better than any army in the field has in any previous campaign been regularly supplied with. In their entire satisfaction with the rations they are now receiving, the men concur with their officers. The only objection, so far as we can ascertain, is to the inferior condition of the cattle; but the grounds of this objection will soon be removed, as the cattle are daily improving in condition upon the grass, which is now abundant in the grazing countries.

We have already had the honour to report that we anticipate no difficulty in maintaining or even, if necessary, increasing the supplies of cattle, and of vegetables also, from the resources of the Turkish provinces; but the advantages attending the use of preserved, and especially of compressed vegetables, in the event of the army's being in motion, are so great and obvious, and the men have now become so well acquainted with the manner of using them, and relish them so fully, that we venture strongly to recommend that they should be regularly supplied to the troops.

One of the causes of sickness in the army to which nearly all the witnesses refer, is defective cooking. On the march from Old Fort to the Alma, and during the battle, most of the men threw away or lost their camp-kettles. Some Divisions did not preserve one in ten of the regulated number, which is one to every five men. When the army arrived before Sebastopol, it was therefore impossible to organize the established regimental system of cooking by companies, and having a certain number of men told off as cooks. Each man had to cook for himself in his mess-tin, to procure his own fuel, and to light his own fire. For a time there was little difficulty in procuring firewood; but after the brushwood was consumed in the vicinity of the camp, it could be obtained only by digging up roots, which involved much labour, and in bad weather much exposure. While snow was on the ground, or during frost, the men, who were not supplied with a sufficient number of tools, and who, from want of skill in using them, soon spoilt or broke such as they had, often found it impossible to procure enough of fuel; and in wet weather the inexperienced had great difficulty in getting the green or wet wood to burn. Men who had been all night in the trenches up to their ankles in mud, and returned to the camp exhausted and benumbed, could not cook food for themselves, without first grubbing up roots for fuel

Many of them wanted either energy or strength enough to undergo that labour, and contented themselves with their biscuit and rum, with perhaps a bit of raw pork. Many more made the attempt to cook their meat, but in consequence of the difficulty and labour of procuring sufficient fuel, or of getting it to burn, as well as the small size of the small mess-tin, which was the only cooking utensil they had, the process was often imperfectly performed, and the meat was eaten half raw. Even after kettles had been procured, which in most regiments was not till some time in January, and after men had been told off to cook for companies, the labour and exposure undergone by the fatigue parties sent to obtain fuel, was a serious addition to the other severe and harassing duties which they had to perform. The Commissariat maintained that it was not the practice of the service to issue fuel to troops in the field, and that they were not entitled to rations of fuel unless in barracks.

When Lord Raglan ordered up fuel from Constantinople, and directed the Commissary-General to have it landed, difficulties were made on the ground that there was no proper invoice or information regarding the cargo; and when a return of the quantity landed was called for, the answer was, that the Commissariat had no information regarding it. At length, Lord Raglan having instructed the Commissary-General, on the 11th November, to provide a sufficient supply of fuel for the army during the ensuing winter, by a General Order, dated 4th December, directed the issue of rations of fuel to the troops; but although it appeared that the Commissary-General had even long before the 11th November prepared a depôt for fuel, at Scutari, for the use of the troops in barracks, he was not prepared to issue fuel in the field when it was ordered on the 4th December. To provide and issue fuel was no doubt a troublesome duty, and the difficulties arising from want of transport, and the narrow space for landing stores, as well as the amount of labour which the other duties of that department involved in the peculiar circumstances of the army, may have led the Commissary-General to insist on the alleged previous practice in the Peninsula and elsewhere, of leaving troops in the field to find their own fuel; but the circumstances of the army before Sebastopol were obviously exceptional, and an appeal to precedent was out of place. In consequence of the representation of the Commissary-General, however, the Order of the 4th of December was modified; and it was not until the 29th of December that the troops in and near Balaklava received rations of fuel. There appears to have been a want of alacrity on the part of the Commisssriat, if not an actual indisposition, to provide fuel for the army in the field; but this could not have arisen from any difficulty in procuring firewood. The southern coast of the Black Sea is wooded down to the shore almost continuously for several hundreds of miles. Firewood could have been procured there in unlimited quantity, and has since been obtained from thence at little more than one-fourth of the price paid for it at Scutari and Constantinople. Unfortunately, the want of transport made it impossible to carry fuel to the front, except in small quantities, for the use of the hospitals; and the ration of fuel issued at Balaklava was of no use to the soldier on the heights, unless he could find the means of carrying it to the regimental camp.

The most disastrous of the deficiencies referred to was, the deficiency of land transport. All the witnesses examined on the subject are of opinion that the duty under arms which the men had to perform in the trenches and on picquets and guards, involved as much or more labour and exposure than they could bear without injury to their health. It was therefore of the utmost importance that they should be saved all other labour and exposure; but owing to the deficiency of land transport, they had to perform a large amount of the work that ought to have been done by horses and mules. The roads or tracts were so deep in mud that the journey which the men had to perform to Balaklava and back, carrying up burdens of rations, or warm clothing, or huts, frequently occupied about twelve hours, during the whole of which time the men were without food, shelter, or rest—unless standing in deep mud, drenched and cold, instead of struggling through it, may be considered rest. It was in consequence of the want of transports that the men had to undergo the additional labour and exposure of digging for roots to cook their food, without always being able to obtain enough.

It was in consequence of the want of transport that the men were repeatedly on short rations, and that they were deprived for about six or seven weeks of the two ounces of rice which would have been so beneficial to them at that precise time, when hardly any vegetables were supplied, and hardly a man in the army escaped the prevailing diseases. The men were already overworked in the trenches and on picquets and guards; and they suffered from both the fatigue and the exposure which those duties involved. To these, in consequence of the want of transport, were superadded other duties, involving an amount of fatigue and exposure, which alone would have been trying to the constitutions of the men. Several of the officers stated, that recently arrived drafts for their corps, being excused duty in the trenches for the first ten days, were sent on fatigue to Balaklava, but that it became necessary to relinquish the practice, because a fatigue party to Balaklava sent so many of the young soldiers into hospital.

It appears to us that, from the commencement of the campaign in the Crimea, the scale upon which the Commissary-General proposed to provide transport for the army was dangerously small; yet the scale on which it was actually provided fell far short of even what he had proposed. From a return prepared by the Commissariat there appears the startling fact, that in January 1855 the whole number of effective animals belonging to

III. Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

the department was 333 pack horses and mules, and 12 camels. The Commissary-General considered it necessary, before the army should move from Varna, to have transport equal to about 14,000 pack-horses and mules.

In the month of October, however, assuming that the whole army was fixed immoveably in its position, the transport provided may have been sufficient for purely Commissariat purposes, that is, for the carriage of the rations of food and forage, from Balaklava to the camps of the different Divisions. But from the commencement of the operations transport was required for siege purposes also. From the evidence of the Commissary-General, it appears that this diversion of a part of his transport from Commissariat to siege purposes, prevented him from completing the formation of a depôt near head-quarters which he had commenced, and which was a measure of great importance to the army, as subsequent events too clearly proved. He was therefore, from the commencement of the operations against Sebastopol, aware that the transport he had collected was not all available for Commissariat purposes, and was not sufficient for all the purposes for which it was required. In answer to the question why, in those circumstances, he did not increase the transport in the Crimea, he states that he had as many animals as he could feed. The measure of the amount of transport to be provided for the army in the Crimea was not, therefore, what was required, but what the Commissariat could feed. The reason for not increasing the amount of transport was not that a greater number of animals was unnecessary, but that a greater number could not be fed in the Crimea. But if proper arrangements had been made to provide the army with forage for the winter, wherever it might be at that season, the forage would have been available for use in the Crimea. The Commissary-General had indeed concluded a contract for 2,000,000 of pounds, or about 1,000 tons of hay, to be made at Buyook Tchakmedge, on the sea of Marmora, and hydraulic presses were sent out from England to compress it for shipment. The contractors failed, it is said, to complete their contract, and only about 800 tons of hay were made. These contractors appear to have been men without capital, who borrowed money at a high rate of interest, to carry out their various contracts with the Commissariat. Their credit was such that they could not obtain the money, except under an arrangement by which the sums falling due to them by the Commissariat were to be paid into the hands of the banker who advanced the funds. The banker was not disposed to make large advances to enable them to carry out a contract for hay which would not be paid for till the whole was ready for delivery, and which was then liable to be rejected on account of its quality, or in consequence of the whole quantity contracted for not being prepared. After the army had gone to Varna, objections to receive delivery of the quantity of hay prepared, appear to have been raised on both of these grounds, and payment was in consequence withheld. The contractors having no means of paying the debt they had incurred to the bankers until they received the price of the hay, and conceiving, as they assert, that it had been rejected by the Commissariat, entered into an arrangement to sell it to the French. The British Commissariat then claimed it as their property, and applications were made by both parties to the Porte, to compel delivery of the hay, which each asserted they had purchased. At length, by the intervention of the Ambassador, it was secured to the British Commissariat. But, in the meantime, the hydraulic presses had been erected in the vicinity of Constantinople, more than fifteen miles from the place where the hay had been collected; and it became necessary to carry the loose hay, either by land or water, that distance, before it could be pressed. This operation could not be carried on in bad weather, without destroying the hay; and thus, by defective arrangements throughout the whole transaction, the only provision for supplying the army with hay which had been made in Turkey was rendered nugatory, at a time when a thousand tons of hay in the Crimea would have been invaluable. The Commissary-General admits that, if the presses had been erected at the place where the hay was made, he could have fed more animals in the Crimea; and there can be little doubt that every addition to the transport in the Crimea, saved the lives of men.

When the roads or tracks between Balaklava and the camp broke up about the 20th of November, and became one great slough of deep and tenacious mud, impassable for carts, the transport power of the Commissariat was reduced to one-third of its former amount, for a horse or mule will draw in a cart three times the weight it can carry on a pack. Even so early as the 14th of November, the day of the hurricane, the roads had become difficult, and the transport animals began to suffer. The Commissary-General then resolved to bring up a part of the reserve transport which had been left at Varna, and had subsequently been ordered from thence to Constantinople. At this time, however, he only contemplated bringing up 250, and the "Jason" sailed on the 26th of November to bring them; she returned to Balaklava on the 16th of December, having been absent twenty days. The average passage at that season, including coaling, watering, &c., appears to have been about fifteen days. The "Jason" thus exceeded the average time by about five days, of which two may be accounted for by the time occupied in sending for and bringing in the mules from Tchakmedge, where they were recovering from the effects of the journey from Varna.

The transport animals left at Varna had been badly cared for, and arrived at Constantinople in bad condition; 250 of the most effective were selected to be shipped in the "Jason," but even these appear to have hardly been considered effective by the Commissariat officers, when they arrived at Balaklava.

On the 11th of December the sailing horse transports of the army were placed at the disposal of the Commissary-General, and on the 24th he applied for a steam-vessel to bring up transport animals, which appears to have been immediately ordered, the "Jason" having again been appointed to that service. On the 28th he applied for the "Jason," which had then discharged her cargo of animals, &c., and in pursuance of the orders given on the 24th, she was immediately placed at his disposal, and sailed on the 29th for Constantinople, to bring up transport animals. Mr. Filder makes it a ground of complaint that having sick on board for Scutari, she was detained till the 7th of January, landing them; but having been questioned on the subject, he admitted that after landing the sick at Scutari, she was sent by the Commissariat, though not by his orders, to the Sea of Marmora to take in fuel, and he could not say that she might not have been absent a week or ten days for that purpose. This fact was not alluded to by Mr. Filder when he complained of the detention of the "Jason," for the purpose of landing sick, and it came to our knowledge accidentally, in conversation with persons unconnected with the Commissariat. Neither did Mr. Filder at any time make us aware that the horse-transports had ever been placed at his disposal. The deficiency of the land transport of the army cannot be accounted for, on the ground that Mr. Filder could not obtain sufficient sea transport to convey the animals he was desirous of bringing to the camp. Lord Raglan, it is stated by the Quartermaster-General, after unceasingly and urgently impressing upon Mr. Filder the necessity of preparing a sufficiency of transport, finally sent officers of the army to purchase transport animals at Eupatoria, Constantinople, Smyrna, Sicily, &c.; this measure was, however, deprecated by the Commissary-General, who declared he had not the means of feeding them.

In answer to the question, was the Commissary-General at any time urged to increase the amount of transport, the Quartermaster-General says, "Unceasingly by the Commander of the forces, personally, and by myself."

The real cause of the deficiency of transport appears therefore to have been the want of forage, not the want of ships or of animals; and a similar failure to provide the requisite forage would again limit the number of animals available for the army in the Crimea, whatever might be the number in possession of the Land Transport Corps.

With respect to deficiencies of forage, which form the next branch of our report, there is very considerable difficulty in arriving at accurate conclusions, because previous to the 1st of January, no account of such deficiencies was kept by the quartermasters of cavalry; but it is admitted both by the Regimental and Commissariat officers, that very large deficiencies did occur in the hay and chopped straw prior to that date. There appears always to have been enough of barley in store or in the harbour, though occasionally much difficulty arose in getting at it owing to the crowded state of the shipping, and it was at all times difficult to find conveyance for it to any considerable distance. The hay and straw began to fail about the 14th of November, after the gale in which so many vessels were lost off the coast; prior to that date no serious deficiencies have been established.

During the great scarcity of hay and straw, between the 14th of November and 1st of January, the commissariat seem to have been in nearly the same difficulty as the quartermasters in regard to furnishing any accurate statements of their issues. The forage had to be sent up on the regimental bât animals, there being no other means of transport. It was often late before they reached Balaklava, and they were in so weak a state that the men sent with them could only venture to carry up a portion of the forage due; what was left behind would probably considered by the quartermaster a short issue, while the commissariat officer would, perhaps, hold that he had made an issue in full. It is admitted on all hands that there was great irregularity in the arrangements at that time, which we trust will be considered a sufficient reason for our not attempting to enter into any details of the deficiencies at that period. It may be sufficient to state that they must have been very considerable indeed, and, coupled with exposure, were no doubt the cause of very heavy loss and insufficiency. There is one case, however, from which such serious consequences have arisen that it requires some special noteice. The light cavalry brigade, which had for some time previously been stationed in the valley adjacent to Balaklava, was removed, first to the vicinity of head-quarters for two or three days, and thereafter, on the 1st or 2nd of November, to Inkermann, where it was stationed near the windmill, a distance of at least seven or eight miles from Balaklava. This change, at a time when the roads were in an extremely bad state, and when there was great difficulty in obtaining the means of transport, created very serious obstacles to a proper supply of forage being obtained.

It is alleged by Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Crookshanks that there was a certain quantity of hay at Balaklava, but not the means of carrying it to the front; occasionally he managed to bring up a little, till the 14th November, when the supply failed entirely. After that date, the want of transport affected the supply of barley also, which on several days did not exceed from 1½ to 2 lbs. per day per horse, being all that they had to keep them alive. The returns of one of the regiments show that, for the last four days they were on the ground, the daily average was only about 2½ lbs. for each horse, previously exhausted as they had been by the want of hay or straw during the early part of the month.

When the supply began to fail, the commissariat officer, who appears to have done everything in his power to meet the difficulties of the case, proposed—as he knew there was

III.
Papers delivered in by Sir Rich. Airey.

plenty of barley at Balaklava—that if a detachment of the horses were allowed to go down daily, he would engage to bring up enough for the rest of the brigade. This proposition appears to have been brought specially under the notice of Lord Cardigan by Lieutenant-Colonel Mayou, assistant quartermaster-general of cavalry, who states that his Lordship declined to accede to it, as he had before done when a similar proposition was made to him to send the horses down for hay before that supply failed.

The whole brigade remained in this state till the 2nd of December, when it was directed so return to its previous position, but by that time the horses were reduced to such a state from starvation, that they could no longer bear the weight of their riders; they had to be led down; many were left on the ground in a dying state, and of the remainder seventeen died on the road before they could reach their former station, a distance of only about six miles.

It is no part of our duty to enter into the military reasons which may have led to the detention of this brigade on a spot where the horses could not be subsisted; we merely call attention to the fact as one of the instances of a deficiency of supply which formed the special subject of our inquiry.

With regard to the period from the 1st of January to the 31st of March last, returns have been obtained from each quartermaster, showing the quantities of the forage required, and the quantities received and deficient, of which a summary will be given in the Appendix. This does not establish any real deficiency of importance during that period, for it appears to have been the practice, when hay was wanting, to make it up by double the weight of chopped straw, or sometimes by half the weight of barley; two pounds of bran was in like manner occasionally substituted for the usual issue of chopped straw, so that on the whole the cavalry, during this period, seem to have been fairly rationed, though not with precisely the same description of forage as they had been accustomed to on home service.

In comparing the regimental and commissariat statements and returns on this head, it is necessary however to keep in view, that owing to the difficulty of carrying chopped straw, the men often objected to take it, and much was in consequence left behind, when it could not be exchanged for any other description of forage. This appears to have been in some cases assumed as a deficiency, though it could obviously not be considered by the Commissariat in that light, or borne on the returns as such.

While we have considered it our duty to point out what appears to us to be serious defects in the arrangements of the Commissariat with the army in the Crimea, as well as the deplorable consequences that have resulted from these defects, it is but just to direct attention to the unusual nature of the duties required by the Commissariat where a large army occupies, as it were, a barren island which furnishes nothing except water and a limited quantity of fire-wood. The Commissariat had also many and serious difficulties to encounter which could not have been foreseen. The tempest of the 14th of November was a great disaster, and the peculiarities of the harbour of Balaklava, whatever may be its advantages, created constant difficulties, especially in landing the vast supplies required for the army. A man of commanding intellect and comprehensive views might probably have risen superior to these disadvantages, and created an organization suited to the circumstances; he would probably have turned to good account the knowledge of the country and its resources, possessed by a large and respectable body of public servants, Her Majesty's consuls, and he would have found those resources more ample and more easily made available than till lately they were believed to be. But it is unreasonable to expect that every man who may rise to the top of so limited a department, even after a long course of meritorious service, is to display, whenever the occasion may demand it, inventive resources and administrative capacity of a very high order. It is one of the misfortunes of the Commissariat that they are so much of an isolated and *quasi* professional body, and have thus a tendency to become wedded to peculiar notions, and to regard it as an impeachment of their skill or ability that they should be supposed to require advice or assistance, even in circumstances which must be new to them.

The purely executive duties of the department appear to be well performed. The officers attached to divisions and brigades are generally intelligent and efficient; some of them are men of considerable capacity. The general officers commanding divisions and brigades spoke generally in favourable terms of those officers, and used terms of high commendation in speaking of some of them, especially of Mr. Power, attached to the Second Division, who was absent on duty, and whom we therefore did not see.

The evidence in regard to some of the subjects of our inquiry has not yet been corrected by the officers last examined, having been sent to them for that purpose only the day before our departure from Balaklava. When we have received that evidence, and the answers to queries transmitted at the same time, we shall have the honour of reporting upon the matters to which they relate.

We have, &c.
(Signed) John McNeill.
Alex. M. Tulloch, *Colonel.*

Enclosure 1.

Sir John McNeill to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan.

My Lord, "Gottenburg," Balaklava Harbour, March 13, 1855.

The instructions which directed me to proceed to the Crimea, accompanied by Colonel Tulloch, have no doubt been communicated to your Lordship; and as the demands upon your Lordship's time and attention, which on two occasions to-day prevented us from having the honour of an interview, may again put it out of your Lordship's power to see us when we wait upon you, it appears to me that we may best promote the interests of the public service intrusted to us, as well as your Lordship's convenience, by stating in general terms the course we propose to pursue, and by requesting authority to summon such witnesses, and to require the production of such documents, as may be necessary to the effective prosecution of the inquiry in which we are engaged.

It appears to us, that the first point to be established is the nature and extent of any deficiency of Commissariat supplies for the army that may have occurred; and with that view we should desire your Lordship's authority to summon as witnesses such officers as may be able to speak from their own personal knowledge of the quantity and quality of the supplies furnished by the Commissariat, and actually issued to the men.

It is not probable that we shall be able to examine more than three or four officers daily; and as we should propose to begin with the regiments nearest to the harbour, and to examine the witnesses for the present on board the steam-transport "Gottenburg," which is lying close to the shore on the northern side, near the shoal water, at the head of the harbour, we hope that the inquiry may be conducted without materially interfering with the other duties of the officers whom we might find it necessary to examine.

When we have completed the inquiry into the nature and extent of any deficiency that may have occurred, we should propose to call upon the officers of the Commissariat, and especially the Commissary-General, to state the causes of any such deficiency. It will also be our duty to inquire into the measures that may have been taken to ensure an adequate supply for the future: and with that view it would be desirable that we should have authority to examine Commissary-General Filder at any time when we may consider it expedient.

It is almost unnecessary, I hope, to add, that we consider it our duty, and that it is our anxious desire, to carry out our instructions in a manner that may be useful and acceptable to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) John McNeill.

---

Enclosure 2.

Field-Marshal Lord Raglan to Sir John McNeill.

Sir, Before Sebastopol, March 15, 1855.

I have the honour to receive your letter of the 13th instant.

I regret that I was so occupied when you called on that day, in the dispatch of the mail, that I was not able to see you. I was not aware that you were twice here.

I shall be happy to afford you every assistance in the prosecution of the inquiry you have been instructed to institute; and it appears to me that the course you propose to follow is the best you could adopt.

I will direct Lieutenant-General Sir Colin Campbell to order the attendance of any of the officers under his orders whom you may desire to examine; and I will give the same instructions to Major-General the Honourable J. Yorke Scarlett, who commands the cavalry at Kadikoi.

The Commissary-General will also be requested to attend himself, and to direct the officers of his department to obey your summons, whenever you may require their presence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) Raglan.

IV.
Papers delivered in by Colonel Gordon.

# IV.

## *Papers delivered in by* Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon.

Page

No. 1.—Letter from Colonel Gordon to the Judge-Advocate-General, 22d May 1856, returning the original notes of the examination of Colonel Wetherall and Colonel Gordon - - - - - - - - - - - - 512

No. 2.—Letter of Colonel Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, given in evidence by Colonel Tulloch, dated Quartermaster-General's Office, Sebastopol, 4th June 1855 - - 521

No. 3.—Letter from Colonel Gordon to the Judge Advocate-General, 22d May 1856, forwarding Colonel Tulloch's Memorandum of the 16th May, and Remarks by Colonel Gordon in reply thereto - - - - - - - - - 521

No. 4.—Letters from Lieutenant Goss to Captain Heath, R.N., Malta, 31st March 1856; from Lieutenant Scott to Captain Heath, Balaklava, 7th April 1856; Sir R. Airey to Lieutenant Scott, Crimea, 17th November 1855; and an Extract from Instructions from Sir Edmund Lyons to Captain Heath as Principal Agent of Transports - 525

### No. 1.

### Colonel A. Gordon to the Right Hon. the Judge-Advocate.

Sir, Horse Guards, 22d May 1856.

I have the honour to return herewith the original notes of the examination of Colonel Wetherall and myself, laid before the Board of General Officers by Colonel Tulloch, marked A. B. C.

I have, &c.

The Right Hon. (Signed) Alex. Gordon,
the Judge-Advocate-General. Col. D.Q.M.G.

### A.

*Thursday, 24th May.*

The Honourable Colonel Alexander Gordon, assistant-quartermaster-general to the army in the Crimea, has held that appointment since the 24th September; previous to that date he was assistant-adjutant-general of the 1st division. It has been the duty of the quartermaster-general's department in this army to attend to the issue of extra clothing for the use of the troops. By a letter from the War Department, dated the issue of extra winter clothing was restricted as follows:

2 Guernsey frocks,
2 flannel drawers,
2 pairs of socks,
1 comforter,
1 pair of worsted mits,
1 sheep-skin coat,
1 fur cap,

to each man.

But there was no limitation on the issue of blankets and great coats, except the Queen's warrant.

The watch coats, capotas, and gregos were comparatively few in number, and were intended for the protection of sentries, and a certain proportion was issued to each regiment so far as the supply would afford.

The buffalo robes were issued on a similar principle, in the proportion of three buffalo robes to four men.

The ammunition boots were issued on requisition of the officers commanding, the men paying for the same at the rate of 8*s.* a pair; but Lord Raglan on directed one pair to be issued gratis. Believes the return of stores remaining at the quartermaster-general's magazine at Balaclava on the 2d December last, as furnished by Mr. Archer, to be correct; and submits a return showing what further supplies were received up to 13th March from England, with the dates of arrival in the harbour of each vessel. That this return, however, does not comprise the whole of the receipts; various supplies of clothing and other articles likely to be useful to the troops were ordered from Malta, the Ionian Isles, Constantinople, Trieste, Vienna, Bucharest, Varna, and from Berne viâ Marseilles. That the responsibility of the quartermaster-general's department in regard to such supplies does not commence till they are actually received into store, and intimation given to that effect; but he will furnish all information in respect of these stores which he may be able to obtain. That he conceives the responsibility in regard to

them to rest with the captain of the vessel, till he obtains the commissary-general's receipt, and with the commissary-general thereafter until they are issued. That the course of distribution of these supplies has been as follows:—So far as regards supplies issued under Her Majesty's regulations, officers commanding corps send in a requisition to the quartermaster-general's department, which, if approved, becomes an order to draw from the store. But in regard to the extra supplies not referred to in the regulations, the practice here has been to send from the quartermaster-general's department approved requisitions for such extra articles in the store as it was considered expedient to issue to the troops. That where the supply was sufficient for the whole army it was distributed in proportion to the strength of the regiments; but when it was not sufficient for all, a preference was given to the corps most requiring the article to be issued, and when further supplies arrived the other corps were provided. That instructions were given to officers of the quartermaster-general's department attached to divisions, that it was unnecessary for corps to send in requisitions for extra articles, because they would be distributed by the quartermaster-general so soon as they were ready for issue. That it follows, as a consequence of this arrangement, that commissary officers were in no respect responsible for any delay in receiving the requisitions for these issues, and he considers the quartermaster-general responsible for the proper appropriation of them. In consequence of the irregularity of the supply, the same principle was also resorted to occasionally in regard to some of the articles included in Her Majesty's regulations. Refers to Major Wetherall, who has been charged with the distribution of these stores, for further information in regard to the details of this duty.

---

*Monday, May 28.*

Examination of Colonel Gordon, Assistant Quartermaster-General, continued from Thursday last.

A letter of the 24th December last, from the commissary-general to the quartermaster-general, urgently requesting that a sufficient steamer might be placed at his disposal, for the purpose of immediately bringing up transport animals from Constantinople, having been read, the question was put to Colonel Gordon, what steps had been taken in consequence; and he stated, that on the same day a letter was written to Captain Christie, agent for transports, directing him to place a large horse steamer at Mr. Filder's disposal for this purpose. States that the Jason was in consequence selected by Captain Christie. That vessel had been destined to go to Varna for bât horses and cavalry, but, on Mr. Filder's application, her destination was changed, and she was placed at his disposal on the 28th. In the previous month the same vessel had been placed at his disposal, on 23d, in consequence of a verbal application of the 21st or 22d, for a steamer to bring up 250 pack animals from Constantinople, and the "War Cloud" was also placed at his disposal for the same purpose on the 14th December.

It appears from a letter of Captain Christie, dated 25th December, which was produced, that the "Emperor" horse steamer was also at that date coaling to go to Eupatoria for bât horses for the commissariat, and that on the 19th November the "Trent" steamer was ordered to be sent to Malta for 310 mules, purchased at Alicant by the Government.

With reference to Mr. Filder's letter of 10th January, requesting that steam transport might be appointed as soon as possible to convey from Constantinople about 900 pack animals, states that on the same day a letter was written to Captain Christie, to find steam transport for that number, and that on the 8th January the "Lion" had already been placed at his disposal for horses or cattle, also that on the 15th January the "Cumberland" which had arrived from England with huts was placed at his disposal, so soon as she could be cleared, and also the "City of London." It is presumed that the "Cumberland" may not have been ready to sail and cleared of her cargo by the 16th January, when Mr. Filder reminded the quartermaster-general that his application for nine transports had not been complied with; but the "City of London" actually sailed to the Bosphorus for cattle on the 17th. Has to state, however, that a large number of horse sailing transports was placed at the disposal of the commissariat on 28th October; and from a list produced, showing the distribution of these transports on 19th November, it appears that sixteen of them were then empty and available for commissariat purposes. States generally that he has no recollection of any occasion on which an application from the commissary-general for sea transport was not at once complied with, so far as the means at the disposal of the quartermaster-general would admit.

The memorandum referred to in the preceding evidence of Major Wetherall relative to the non-issue of a large proportion of the warm clothing and winter stores, and the explanations of that officer, having been read over to him (Colonel Gordon), he concurs therein; and states that he is of opinion it would have been an advantage to each man to have had a rug under him; but, that though the number of blankets admitted of it, he is not aware that the question was ever raised as to the expediency of issuing a third blanket, nor does he think it was ever contemplated to issue a second great coat to each man, in addition to the one in wear, as sheepskin coats were shortly expected.

---

IV.
Papers delivered in by Colonel Gordon.

*Monday, 28th May.*

Major Wetherall, assistant-quartermaster-general to the army in the Crimea, having been shown a memorandum hereto annexed, calling for explanation in regard to various supplies of warm clothing and stores for the winter which do not appear to have been applied to the use of the troops to such an extent as the supplies admitted, states that he was charged with the duty of issuing these stores, and produces a return showing the quantity on hand of palliasses, rugs, blankets, trousers, and great coats, and the issues in each week from 2d December to 28th April, made up from the returns furnished to him by Mr. Archer, the commissariat officer in charge of the store. Being questioned whether this return shows the total number received for the use of the army, states, that it does so only to the 25th January, as the supplies in the depôt at Kadikoi and on board the store ships appear to have been excluded. In regard to the rugs and palliasses not being issued, states, that he occasionally mentioned to the quartermasters of the different corps that there were rugs in store, but they declined having them; and that, as regards the palliasses, he conceives that they would have been worse than useless, as it was impossible to get straw to fill them. That in regard to the non-issue of great coats, he had distributed 10,739 up to the 31st March last, and that the old ones were allowed to remain in possession of the corps, and to be cut up for leggings or any covering the men chose to make of them. On being requested to explain why, out of about 12,000 great coats which had been received to the 16th December, 2,376 only were issued, states, tha t, so far as he was aware, it was never contemplated to give each soldier more than one regimental great coat, especially at a time when additional warm clothing was daily expected; and that he considered it absolutely necessary to keep a supply in store to meet the demands which might be made in the ordinary course of the service. Returns of receipts at the quartermaster general's store at Balaklava from the 5th December 1854 to 28th February 1855, prepared and signed by Mr. Archer the commissariat officer in charge of the store, having been shown to Major Wetherall, from which it appears that upwards of 36,231 great coats had been received into that store up to the 28th February, of which only 8,426 had been issued, he states, that, having referred to the books and documents in the quartermaster-general's office, he finds that the receipt of so large a number has not been reported to the quarter-master general, and that there was in his office no information to show that more than 23,830 had been received up to that date. In like manner, the number of blankets returned by Mr. Archer as received into store from 5th December to 28th February, being 56 packages (of 25 each) and 73,600 blankets, having been brought under his notice, he states that the number reported to the quartermaster-general as received between these dates appears from the records in the office to have been only 56,958, of which 43,272 had been issued up to the 2d March. In illustration of the difficulty of obtaining accurate returns of the contents of the quartermaster-general's store from the commissariat officer in charge of it, hands in a letter, dated 24th December, addressed by General Airey to the commissary-general, as also other letters of 26th March, with enclosed report and relative documents, also another letter, dated 29th April, from the quartermaster-general, and another, dated 28th December last, all complaining of great inaccuracies in regard to the quantities reported to be in store, which of course increased the difficulty of making a proper distribution.

That with regard to the non-distribution of militia coatees, he finds that from the beginning of December there were 5,850 reported as being in store or on shipboard, but they were not issued because the new clothing for each regiment was expected daily.

That with regard to the militia trousers, orders were given, on 2d December, for the issue to each regiment in the army of 100 pairs, which exhausted 3,100 pairs, and 2,000 pairs have since been issued in special cases where they were found to be required. That the coattees might probably have been issued at the same time, but that their being in store was not reported.

That with regard to the buffalo robes, they arrived in harbour on the 25th December, and the first issue which took place was 940 to the hospitals on the 9th January and on the 14th 2,020 were issued to the several divisions of the army, a third on the 18th, a fourth on the 23d, which exhausted in all 7,585, leaving about 4,500 in store, which were not wanted, as the men had already been supplied in the proportions of 5 buffalo robes to each tent. With reference to the watch coats, 1,200 were issued early in December, and on the 21st December 1,200 more, and on the 4th January 1,100. That on the 2d December about 2,000 watch coats were in store, of which 1,210 were issued as above.

*Tuesday, 29th May.*

Examination of Colonel Gordon continued.

Being questioned what was the amount of land transport available for the army from the 14th to the 20th November, when the difficulties on that head began to be severely felt, he replies, that the actual amount of transport was only known to the quartermaster-general on the 17th January last. By order of Lord Raglan, a detailed report was called for on the 8th, of which a copy is produced. That on the 18th December a letter was also addressed to the commissary-general by the quartermaster-general, calling upon

him to provide 476 horses complete, with pack saddles, &c. for the use of the small arm ammunition corps. That on the 26th December a letter, of which a copy is produced, was written, informing the commissary-general of the expected arrival from England of huts, timber, buffalo robes, provisions, sheepskin coats, warm clothing of all kinds, &c., and requiring him to state what arrangements he proposed making in the way of storage, commissariat labourers, and issuers, and transport for the conveyance of these stores for the troops. On the 6th January another letter was written, calling upon him to provide 958 bât animals to complete each regiment to its establishment, as well as a large amount of horse equipment; and on the 18th a further letter to provide, bât animals for the sappers and miners. The whole effective transport in possession of the commissariat for the army on 16th January was 333 horses and mules, 12 camels, and one araba. The number in possession of the regiments at that time was .

Being questioned as to what amount of sea transport the commissary-general had at his disposal after the 14th November, when the land transport began to fail, refers to his evidence of yesterday, showing that, besides the steamers there mentioned, 16 sailing horse transports were at the disposal of the commissary-general, and available for the purpose of bringing over horses. Is not aware of any reason why these sailing vessels might not have been so employed. States that on the 12th December, in answer to an inquiry on that subject, Mr. Filder stated in a letter, of which a copy is furnished, that 450 was the number of horses required to be conveyed from the Bosphorus to the Crimea, if not already forwarded by the Jason. The regimental bât animals were not completed till .

On the 11th November a requisition was made by Captain Grant, commanding the ambulance corps, for 12 draught mules, which the commissary-general was unable to comply with. Hands in a copy of the letter and the copy of the commissary-general's memorandum thereon.

Being questioned as to the state of the road between Kamiech Bay and the French camp, he states that on the 13th November, having to proceed on duty to Kamiesch with a French guide from head quarters, to point out the best road, he found that no road had yet been constructed, and that the tract was in the same condition as that leading to Balaklava. That with reference to the state of the road between the camp and Balaklava, the commanding royal engineer was written to on the 23d October, to repair the bridge on that road; and on the 26th October, the day after the battle of Balaklava, the quartermaster-general ordered Captain Hardinge to report upon the upper road by Karani, between the camp and Balaklava; and a copy of his report is handed in. On the 11th November a letter was addressed by the quartermaster-general to the commanding royal engineer, directing a survey, with a view to the repair of the lower road; and on the 12th November the attention of the army was called generally to the bad state of the road, and enjoining all concerned to lighten the weight of the loads to be carried.

On the 13th November the commissary-general called the attention of the quartermaster-general to the state of the road and on the 14th November, in consequence of the report of the engineer officer of that date, of which a copy is handed in, Captain Dacres, of H.M.S. "Sanspareil" was written to, to make 25 scrapers for the purpose of clearing the mud off the roads, preparatory to the engineers commencing operations; and that on the same day the commissary-general was written to for tools, &c. for repairing the road; and an order was issued organizing a working party of Turkish troops; but it was soon found that their work was unavailing, as the short piece of road they made broke up whenever it came to be used, owing to the softness of the subsoil. Is of opinion that it was quite out of the question to employ British troops to construct the road between the camp and Balaklava, and at the same time to carry on the military operations in which the army was engaged.

On 3d December another report was made by Captain Staunton, R.E., on a different line from that in use, which, however, he did not think so good, for the reasons therein stated.

With regard to fresh meat, states that frequent representations were made as to the deficiency of the supply; and on the 16th October a letter was written to the commissary-general, forwarding one from Colonel Gambier of the royal artillery, stating that his men had received no fresh meat since they had been in the camp before Sebastopol. On the 28th October the sailing horse transports were placed at the commissary-general's disposal, and were available for the transport of cattle, in addition to number of steamers already employed. On the 24th of October a letter was written to the commissary-general, suggesting that supplies should be obtained from the southern shores of the Black Sea; and a circular memorandum was prepared for the consuls at Sinope, Samsoum, Trebizond, and other ports, calling upon them to assist the commissariat officers in procuring supplies.

With reference to the want of vegetables, Colonel Gordon states, that when the troops first arrived at Balaklava there was an abundant supply in the villages, but this was soon consumed; and subsequently frequent representations were made by medical and other officers, as to the necessity for a proper supply being procured. That on the 24th October Mr. Filder was written to, requesting him to send a commissariat officer to Sinope, to procure vegetables for the use of the army; and a memorandum was at the same time prepared, requesting the consuls to afford their assistance; but that Mr. Filder, having had verbal communications with the field marshal commanding and the quartermaster-general on this subject, the result was that the project was abandoned, in consequence of Mr. Filder's representations. On the 30th and 31st of October, Mr. Filder was written to, to buy

IV.
Papers delivered in by Colonel Gordon.

vegetables on board ships in the harbour; and on the 1st November he was written to, to know what quantity of vegetables he had purchased, when a memorandum of the same date was received from him, of which a copy is handed in. On the 2d November, a letter, now produced, was also received from him, requesting that his official memorandum of the 1st should be communicated to the commander of the forces. A letter of the 1st November was also produced, showing that a supply of vegetables received from Varna had been distributed in the manner recommended by Dr. Hall, inspector general of hospitals. On the 10th November an order was issued to the army, that a large supply of vegetables was in the harbour, which the different corps might obtain in equal proportions, upon paying for them through the commissariat.

On the 2d December a general order was issued to the army, that a quantity of potatoes from Trieste and of preserved potatoes from England might be obtained at Balaklava, on paying for them through the commissariat; and on the 10th December an order was issued, in consequence of instructions from the War Department, that all such supplies of vegetables were to be issued gratis.

With regard to fuel for the army, at first there was abundance of it everywhere; and, in anticipation of the future wants of the army, Sir Edmund Lyons was written to, on the 11th October, begging him to send the "Himalaya" and the "Simla" to bring patent fuel and charcoal from Constantinople. On 24th October Captain Christie reported the arrival of the "Himalaya;" and on that day the commissary general was written to, to land the charcoal and fuel she had on board, and to keep it for the use of the army; and that Captain Christie was informed on the same day that the commissary-general had received these orders. On the 30th the commissary-general was written to, to know what quantity of charcoal or other fuel he had in store or on board ship; when he replied, on the following day, "the "commissariat has no charcoal or fuel of any kind in its possession, nor has any invoice, "advice, or information been furnished to the commissary-general of any charcoal or fuel "having been shipped or forwarded for the service of this army." And of the same date a memorandum was received from the commissary-general, of which a copy is handed in. On the 1st November, Captain Hamilton, the officer of the quartermaster-general's department at Balaklava, was directed to land the patent fuel. On the 2d November the question of a ration of fuel was under discussion, as appears from a letter of the commissary-general of that date, produced; and on the same day it appears from a letter of Captain Hamilton, that Mr. Adams, the deputy commissary-general, took charge of the patent fuel. On the 4th November the commissary-general was written to, to send a return of patent fuel and charcoal; and on the 4th a reply, now produced, was received from deputy commissary-general Adams, stating that the commissariat department had no invoice or information whatever respecting the patent fuel or charcoal; that the former, he believed, was about 20 tons landed, and the latter, which was then landing, was 1,000 sacks. That on the 8th November an experiment was made to test the relative value as fuel of Wallech's patent fuel, wood, and charcoal; when it appeared from the commissary-general's statement that two pounds of the patent fuel were only equal to three pounds of wood. On 10th November he was asked his opinion whether any more patent fuel should be obtained; and on the following day it was considered advisable to write a letter to the commissary-general, "to take steps for procuring a sufficient supply of charcoal for the use of the army during "the ensuing winter." On the 22d November Captain Hamilton reported that the "Victoria," which had arrived on the 2d, with a cargo of charcoal, had been ordered away, having still on board a quantity of charcoal occupying the space of 400 tons; that ship was not actually sent off, but only ordered to prepare for sea; and on the 24th the commissary-general and Captain Christie were both written to, calling their attention to the fact of this vessel having been ordered to Constantinople, still having on board 400 tons of charcoal intended for the use of the army. Hands in a letter of the 4th December, from the commissary-general, stating that long before the 11th November he had prepared a large depôt of wood and charcoal at Scutari. On the 4th December a general order was issued that the commissary-general should issue at Balaklava certain quantities of fuel and light for the use of the troops. On the 5th December the commissary-general addressed to the quartermaster-general a note, now produced, stating that he much feared that the quantity of charcoal landed from the transports was not so great as was supposed or as it was stated to be, and recommended, therefore, that it should be used sparingly until a supply was received from Scutari. On the same day a letter was received from the commissary-general, objecting to the quantity of charcoal for which requisitions were sent, and intimating that it would facilitate the service very much if he should be apprized of any new measure to be carried out by the commissariat before the general order was published, in order that the details might work satisfactorily. In reply to this letter, an answer of the 7th December was sent, of which a copy is handed in; and on the 8th December a general order was issued, restricting the issue of fuel to the troops encamped on the heights before Sebastopol. Being questioned whether this fuel was to be issued at Balaklava or at the camp, states that it was at Balaklava only, and consequently, that whether the men derived any benefit from it depended entirely upon their means of transport. Hands in a copy of the commissary-general's reply of the 8th December to the quarter-master general's letter of the 7th. Hands in a copy of a letter written by Lord Raglan's desire to the commissary-general, in continuation of the correspondence respecting fuel and light; and on the 10th December the scale of fuel and light was fixed by general order to be the same as ordered on the 28th May.

In consequence of the commissary-general's representations as to the excessive scale of issue thus authorized, the commander of the forces ordered, at his request, a board to assembled, to consider the scale, the result of which was an increase to the soldier from one ration to one and a half rations of fuel; but the scale for the officers was in most cases reduced to very nearly what had previously been the summer allowance.

On the 27th December the commissary-general was directed to issue fuel and light to the troops at and near Balaklava. (Letter produced.)

On 9th January the commissary-general was, in consequence of complaint, directed to send up charcoal for the troops to the commissaries of divisions, but it was found impossible to carry it out from want of transport.

On 10th January Lord Raglan directed that charcoal for every hospital should be sent up to camp.

On 12th January Sir Edmund Lyons was written to, to know if the navy could collect drift wood that was floating about for fire-wood.

In reply to the letter of the 10th, directing that the hospitals should be supplied with charcoal, the commissary-general suggested that the hospital pannier horse, used for bringing up medicines and medical comforts should be employed in carrying up charcoal for the hospitals, until more commissariat animals arrived; but Lord Raglan declined to give his consent.

On 17th January the commissary-general was written to, forwarding complaints of charcoal not having been issued. On the 18th his attention was called to the non-issue of fuel for the sick of the 4th division, notwithstanding the general order. On the 19th he was written to, to state what stock of fuel he had on hand; and in his reply of the 20th (produced), he stated that there remained in store, and landing ex "Medway," about 300,000 lbs. of charcoal, exclusive of a small quantity of patent fuel, and a large part of the charcoal received from the "Victoria" steamer, which, however, was of exceedingly bad quality, and could not be relied upon. In consequence of the limited quantity in store, a steamer was dispatched, on the requisition of the commissary-general, to bring up charcoal from Constantinople. On the 27th January the commissary-general was instructed to make arrangements to facilitate the issue of charcoal.

---

*Wednesday, 30th May.*

Examination of Colonel Gordon—*continued.*

With reference to the complaints which have been made by several officers of the defective condition of the camp equipage, states, that General Airey was appointed quarter-master-general on 1st September, while the army was embarking for the Crimea, and that he (Colonel Gordon) was appointed after the battle of Alma, consequently neither of them had any knowledge of the state of the stores up to that period. That when the army embarked at Varna he knows that it was complete in every article of camp equipment, and hands in a return of the quartermaster-general's stores which the commissary-general was instructed to embark with the troops as a reserve depôt. That until the army arrived at Balaklava, on 26th September, no opportunity occurred for inquiring into the state of this store. On the 3d October, however, a demand was made on the store for camp kettles, by the quartermaster general; but by the commissary-general's letter of that date, now produced, it appears that he had "no supply of camp kettles within reach of the army." On that day the quartermaster-general made the following memorandum: "We had better "ascertain all that we require in every way, including instruments, such as telescopes, "compasses, &c., and make an immediate requisition on the Quartermaster-general, Horse "Guards." But before that requisition was forwarded, a letter, dated 6th September, was received from the Quartermaster-general, Horse Guards, of which a copy is handed in, stating that the Board of Ordnance had given directions for an ample supply of stores being sent to Varna, to replace those which were destroyed by fire on the 10th August. Expecting the arrival of that supply, no immediate deficiency of such stores was anticipated, and it was not till the arrival of the "Prince," on the November, that he began to be alarmed at the inadequacy of the supply from this source, as appears from an extract of the invoice now handed in. In consequence, General Airey took immediate steps to obtain supplies, including tents, from the nearest places where they could be procured, Malta, Constantinople, Corfu, Varna, Sinope, Samsoun, and other places; and Captain Wetherall was despatched to Constantinople to procure these supplies, but no marquees were obtained.

On the 25th November a large requisition for camp stores for men was sent to England, of which a copy is handed in. 2,000 out of 3,000 bell tents then applied for have arrived at Balaklava this month, but no marquees. The remaining 1,000 of the bell tents has not yet arrived; and, so far as he can learn, not a single pickaxe or shovel has yet been received, and in the meantime the greatest inconvenience has been experienced, even in burying the dead, for want of them. The reply to the original requisition of 25th November was a letter from the Quartermaster-general, Horse Guards, covering one from the Under Secretary of State for War, pointing out, by the Secretary of State's desire, an informality in the mode of making the requisition, which he was of opinion had better be done according to the mode adopted during the Peninsular war, and stating that he had given directions for sending out the stores, with the exception of those which had already been anticipated. It had been arranged before the army left England, that a

IV. Papers delivered in by Colonel Gordon.

large reserve depôt of camp equipage was to be formed at Malta, from which the army would be supplied; but on sending there it was found that no such depôt had been formed.

Having been requested to explain the circumstances connected with the inconvenience experienced by the troops in consequence of being separated from their knapsacks on their first landing in the Crimea, Colonel Gordon states, that on the 1st of October Sir Edmund Lyons was requested to send a ship to collect the knapsacks of the army from the different transports. He appointed the "Orinoco" for this duty; but in consequence of the generals of divisions, with the exception of the Duke of Cambridge, preferring not to receive the knapsacks, there was some delay in sending her for them, and in the meantime many of the vessels went away on other duties. The question being put, whether, if the generals of divisions, in reply to the circular on the subject, had expressed a desire to get the knapsacks, the "Orinoco" could have collected them, and brought them to Balaklava, states that he has no doubt of it, with the exception of one or two ships which may have been sent away on duty.

In illustration of the frequent communications which were taking place between the quartermaster-general and various departments, relative to supplies of different kinds, Colonel Gordon submits the following summary of correspondence on such subjects from the beginning of October to the middle of December:—

On the 3d October, Sir Edmund Lyons was requested to land 150 chests of medical stores, and on the same date six hospital marquees were landed; and the principal medical officer was informed of the chests being on board the "Medway." On the 4th October permission was asked from Sir Edmund Lyons for the commissary-general to purchase tobacco and soap from the navy, for the use of the army. The answer was, that the limited supplies of these articles did not admit of it.

On the 6th October, Sir Edmund Lyons was requested to name transports to receive the sick and wounded, in order that they might be supplied with medical officers and medical stores.

On the 8th October, the principal medical officer was informed of the names of the ships selected and instructed to supply them.

On the 9th October, the commissary-general was instructed to send up all the blankets in store at Balaklava, Varna, and Scutari.

On 11th October, instructions were given to the commissary-general to bring up from Malta 283 bell tents in depôt there.

On 19th October, commissary-general was instructed to procure 3,000 yards of rope, for tents and picketing horses.

On 28th October, principal medical officer informed that lime juice had been landed for hospitals.

On 30th October, commissary-general and Captain Christie were written to relative to the number of blankets available.

On 4th November, Captain Christie was written to, to ascertain the number of blankets available on board different vessels, and to have them landed as soon as possible.

On 6th November, the officer commanding the navy at Balaklava was written to, requesting him to furnish the Royal Marines with blankets, according to the approval of Sir E. Lyons, as there were none in the army store.

On 8th November, commissary-general was requested to purchase carpenters' tools and building materials at Constantinople, for the use of the troops, according to the list forwarded to him.

Same day, commissary-general was requested to order 2,000 sets of horse cloths.

On 8th November, Lord Lucan was directed to make temporary stables, as he best could, till timber arrived; and on 12th November an engineer officer was placed at his disposal, for the purpose of assisting him.

On 11th November, commissary-general was directed to purchase some thousand wooden sabots for the use of the army.

On 12th November, the engineer's list of building materials, that day requested by Mr. Filder, was sent to him.

On 13th November, commissary-general was instructed to purchase 3,000 cooking kettles, of any size or shape, for the use of the men.

On 13th November, commissary-general was instructed to get Turkish horse-shoes and nails, and also nails for English horse-shoes.

On 14th November, commissary-general was instructed to preserve the hides of bullocks and other animals killed, for hutting.

On 15th November, commissary-general was requested to send an officer by a vessel to Constantinople, to bring clothing to replace that lost in the "Prince;" but afterwards, at the commissary-general's request, Major Wetherall was sent with the instructions, of which a copy is handed in.

On the 16th November, a working party was sent to be stationed at the road near the monastery, for the purpose of preparing and stacking fire wood for the army.

17th November, the commissary-general was instructed to ascertain what there was on board the "Ignis Fatuus" of clothing fit for the use of the army, to replace losses in the "Prince."

19th November, commissary-general requested to purchase 2,000 axes, of any pattern, and from any quarter, as soon as possible.

20th November, steps were taken to procure sheepskin coats from Varna.

22d November, letter was sent to commanding royal engineer, requesting that officers sent to purchase wood for hutting should be instructed to buy anything of that description they considered adapted for the purpose.

22d November, commandant at Balaklava requested to appropriate, in connection with Dr. Hall, any houses that might be fitted for the reception of the sick.

24th November, Turkish soldiers were ordered to build hospital huts for the sick, under the superintendence of the non-commissioned officers of Sappers.

26th November, Captain Christie was instructed to land the hay from all the transports.

26th November, General Codrington was written to, informing him that there were plenty of boots in store for all who wanted them.

28th November, Sir E. Lyons was written to, requesting him to prepare 1,000 nose-bags on board the fleet for the use of the cavalry.

On 28th November, an order was given to the commanding royal engineer, to repair the wharves at Balaklava.

On 29th, Captain Heath was applied to for 1,000 yards of rope, for hospital marquees.

On 1st December, commissary-general was directed to employ forty drivers of arabas sent to him by Lord Raglan in carrying provisions up to the camp, paying them any wages he finds necessary.

On 3d December, commissary-general was directed to purchase pack saddles at Constantinople.

On 4th December, mud scrapers, required for the roads, which Captain Dacre requested to have made on this day were reported ready.

On 7th December, arrangements were made for the employment of merchant seamen in the construction of cavalry and artillery stables near Balaklava.

On 8th December, commissary-general was written to, to know whether he had Turkish horse-shoes in store, and reminding him of the 13th November on that subject.

On 10th December, ration of rum ordered for the French soldiers employed in making the road near Balaklava.

On 11th December, the commissary-general was informed that Lord Raglan had placed at his disposal the horse transports, to bring up bât horses from the Bosphorus.

On 12th December, orders were given for 500 horses of the cavalry to be employed in carrying up provisions to the infantry camps.

On 13th December, Mr. Archer was instructed that requisitions for warm clothing were to be complied with, by issuing any stores on hand of the description required.

On 13th December, commissary-general was written to, requesting that an ample supply of English horse-shoe nails might be sent for; and a copy of his answer, dated 15th December, is handed in.

On 13th December, Mr. Filder was instructed that all horses were to receive full rations, according to general orders of May 28th and June 7th.

Being questioned whether this order was complied with, Colonel Gordon hands in a letter from the deputy-assistant-commissary-general at head quarters, showing that there had been a misunderstanding as to the rations of forage to be issued.

On 14th December, Lieut.-Colonel Haines, commanding at Balaklava, was instructed to arrange with the commissary-general a plan for roasting coffee with the coffee roaster supplied by Captain Heath, and to furnish fatigue parties to assist, as Lord Raglan attached great importance to that operation.

On 14th December, Lord W. Paulet, at Scutari, was written to, to apply to Lord Stratford for additional accommodation for the sick, if necessary.

14th December, Captain Christie was instructed to ascertain that every vessel had landed her cargo before she was permitted to leave the port of Balaklava, and to report the fact of her being clear in his report to the quarter-master-general.

15th December, engineer officer at Balaklava instructed to carry out Dr. Hall's suggestions for increasing the hospital accommodation at Balaklava.

---

(B.)

MEMORANDUM for Quartermaster General's Department.

The following are the chief points which appear to require explanation in the quarter-master-general's department, with regard to the supply of blankets, bedding, and warm clothing.

A large supply of rugs were forwarded for the use of the troops during the winter, of which 10,000 arrived in the end of November or early in December, 10,000 more in the course of December, a further supply of about the same extent in January; yet of these few or none have been used, except 4,500 sent to the general hospital, though a rug would have been very useful to place under each soldier when he was lying on the bare ground.

Palliasses were also sent out to the extent of 10,000 in November, and nearly as many more in the course of the following month, which, if issued in certain proportions to each tent, to put under the rug, would have been of much use, even though straw could not at the time be obtained to stuff them; yet none were issued, except to the hospitals, where only a small proportion of them were required.

Judging from the supply of blankets on hand in January, there would have been no difficulty in giving out early in that month a third blanket to each man, so as to have

IV. Papers delivered in by Colonel Gordon.

ensured the necessary degree of warmth at night. The sailors had that number, and they suffered comparatively little from cold. It remains to be explained why the soldier should not have enjoyed a similar advantage when there was a sufficient store in hand.

Nothing appears to have been more likely to add to the comfort of the soldier in his tent, than a warm dry great coat which he could have exchanged for his wet one when he came in from duty; or he might, in very cold weather, have worn it over the other when in the trenches; yet, though 12,000 of these were available in the month of November or early in December, and nearly 10,000 more in the course of the following month, and though the supply has since been increased to nearly 37,000, yet in very few corps were the men supplied with a second great coat, and then only in exchange for the old one.

It seems also that about 2,350 watch coats arrived in the end of November, and were ready for issue early in the following month; yet no more than the half of these were distributed, even so late as the end of December, though they are described as having been most useful as a protection to the men on duty.

About 6,000 militia coatees were also sent out so far back as 28th November, on the supposition that the uniform of the men was in a very ragged state, and did not afford the requisite warmth. Few or none of these, however, appear to have been issued; and of 6,000 trowsers sent out at the same time not above 1,000 pairs had left the store in December, and up to the end of March the total quantity had not exceeded 4,000 pairs.

Judging from the examinations of the regimental and divisional officers, all of them seem to have been ignorant of any such supplies being in store, otherwise they say they would have immediately made requisitions for them; but, according to the principles on which the distribution was regulated, they had no means of obtaining any information on such subjects.

Some explanation appears also to be necessary why 2,817 buffalo robes, which were of great importance to the comfort of the men in their tents, should have been allowed to remain on board the "Charity" till the 11th January, before any attempt was made to issue them, in consequence of which it was about the third week in January before the whole of that supply was made available, by which time 9,244 more had arrived by the "Gottenburg," nearly one half of which are, it is understood, still in store.

The ammunition boots too appear to have been issued very slowly, considering the large supply on hand, and the alleged sufferings of the men for want of them; but as there was a general order on the 29th November informing the officers of corps that they might have any quantity, it appears to have been their own fault if not obtained.

Balaklava, 26th May 1855.

---

(C.)

*Monday, 28th May* 1855.

Major Wetherall, assistant-quartermaster-general to the army in the Crimea, having been shown a memorandum hereto annexed, calling for explanation in regard to various supplies of warm clothing and stores for the winter which do not appear to have been applied to the use of the troops to such an extent as the supplies admitted, states, that he was charged with the duty of issuing these stores, and produces a return showing the quantity on hand of palliasses, rugs, blankets, trowsers, and great coats, and the issues in each week from the 2d December to the 28th April, made up from the returns furnished to him by Mr. Archer, the commissariat officer in charge of the store. Being questioned whether this return shows the total number received for the use of the army, states, that it does so only to the 25th January, as the supplies in the depôt at Kadikoi and on board the store ships appear to have been excluded. In regard to the rugs and palliasses not being issued, states, that he occasionally mentioned to the quartermasters of different corps that there were rugs in store, but they declined having them; and that, as regards the palliasses, he conceives that they would have been worse than useless, as it was impossible to get straw to fill them. That in regard to the non-issue of great coats he had distributed 10,739 up to the 31st March last, and that the old ones were allowed to remain in possession of the corps, and to be cut up for leggings or any covering the men chose to make of them. On being requested to explain why, out of about 12,000 great coats which had been received into store up to the 16th December, 2,376 only had been issued, states, that so far as he was aware it was never contemplated to give each soldier more than one regimental great coat, especially at a time when additional warm clothing was daily expected; and that he considered it absolutely necessary to keep a supply of great coats in store to meet the demands which might be made in the ordinary course of the service. A statement of receipts at the quartermaster-general's store at Balaklava, from the 5th December 1854 to 28th February 1855, prepared and signed by Mr. Archer, the commissariat officer in charge of the store, having been shown to Major Wetherall, from which it appears that upwards of 36,231 great coats had been received into that store up to the 28th February, of which only 8,246 had been issued, he states, that having referred to the books and documents in the quartermaster-general's office he finds the receipt of so large a number had not been reported to the quartermaster-general, and that there was in his office no information to show that more than 23,830 had been received up to that date. In like manner, the number of blankets stated by Mr. Archer to have been received into store from

Appendix A.

Appendix B.
Appendix C.
Appendix D. & E.

5th December to 28th February, amounting to 73,600, besides fifty-six packages of twenty-five each, having been brought under his notice, he states, that the number reported to the quartermaster-general as received between these dates appears, from the records of the office, to have been only 56,958, of which 43,272 had been issued up to the 2d March; thus showing a discrepancy in that item alone of about 80,000. In illustration of the difficulty of obtaining accurate returns of the contents of the quartermaster-general's store from the commissariat officers in charge of it, he hands in a letter, dated 24th December, by General Airey, to the commissary-general, as also another letter of 26th March, with the enclosed report and relative documents, also of two other letters, dated 28th December and 29th April last, from the quartermaster-general, all complaining of great inaccuracies in regard to the quantities reported to be in store, which of course increased the difficulty of making a proper distribution.

That with regard to the non-distribution of militia coatees, he finds that from the beginning of December there were 5,850 reported as being in store or on shipboard, but they were not issued, because the new clothing for each regiment was shortly expected; and that with regard to the militia trowsers, orders were given on 2d December for the issue to each regiment of 100 pairs, which exhausted 3,100 pairs, and about 2,000 have since been issued in special cases where found to be required. The coatees might probably have been issued at the same time, but their being in store was not reported.

That with regard to the distribution of the buffalo robes, the first shipment arrived in the harbour on 25th December, and the first issue which took place was 940 to the hospitals, on the 9th January, and on the 14th 2,020 were issued to the several divisions; a third issue took place out of the second shipment on the 18th, and a fourth on the 23d, which exhausted in all 7,585, leaving about 4,500 in store which were not wanted, as the men had already been supplied in the proportion of five buffalo robes to each tent.

---

No. 2.

Colonel Alexander Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, G.C.B.

Quartermaster-general's office,
Sir, Before Sebastopol, 4th June, 1855.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Colonel Tulloch's note, dated this day, forwarding copy of my evidence for correction, and requesting that it may be completed, with copies of the necessary documents alluded to, and returned to him at Kazatch Bay, to-morrow morning, a few hours before the mail starts, and requesting also that answers to the questions put to General Airey may be sent at the same time.

As these questions to General Airey are 52 in number, nearly every one of which contains an implied accusation of neglect or carelessness, he begs me to say that he cannot consent to answer them in this offhand way, but will examine each question, and prepare his replies as rapidly as the other duties of his department will permit, which you must be aware, from the evidence you have taken, are of a very extensive and varied nature.

I will endeavour to have my own evidence corrected and completed by to-morrow morning; but as I find it occupies 40 pages, the result of four days' examination, with a great number of papers to be annexed, I fear I shall be unable to have it ready by that time, being much occupied with other duties which cannot be entirely set aside for these inquiries. I may mention as an instance, that only yesterday I was on horseback for 17 hours on a reconnoissance of some importance with reference to our future operations in the field, and this morning has again brought us a great amount of urgent business.

If not ready by to-morrow, my evidence, as well as General Airey's replies, will be forwarded to you at the War Office in London.

I much regret that sickness has obliged you to bring your inquiries to so sudden a termination.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) Alex. Gordon,
Col. A. Q. M. G.

---

No. 3.

Colonel Alexander Gordon to the Judge-Advocate-General.

Sir, Horse Guards, 22d May, 1856.

I have the honour to forward herewith my reply to Colonel Tulloch's memorandum of the 16th instant, which I have to request may be laid before the Board of General Officers at Chelsea.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) Alex. Gordon,
Col. A. Q. M. G.

---

IV.
Papers delivered in by Colonel Gordon.

EXPLANATIONS submitted to the Board by Colonel TULLOCH relative to the evidence of Colonel GORDON and Colonel WETHERALL.

Colonel Tulloch is desirous of submitting to the Board the following explanations relative to the evidence of Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall, because he feels that, although no distinct charge has been made, the inference might be drawn from General Airey's remarks, that the evidence of these officers had been altered from improper motives. As the mere suspicion of such an act is most offensive, Colonel Tulloch trusts the Board will permit this statement to be submitted in his absence, as they are aware that illness alone prevents his attendance to do it himself.

In the examination of the 28th of May the evidence of Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall was taken conjointly, but it was afterwards decided to give each separately. For this purpose notes in pencil were made on the rough evidence of that day, and in accordance with these it was afterwards transcribed. The copy of the two evidences thus transcribed was sent on the 4th of June to Colonel Gordon, the senior officer, with a request that he would examine and alter it as he thought fit.

The Commissioners left the Crimea on the 7th of June, and Constantinople on or about the 13th. They were not then aware that Colonel Wetherall was at Buyukdare; but had they been so they could not have applied to him to revise his evidence, as that was in the possession of Colonel Gordon, to whom they trusted to see that the evidence had been properly separated, and that the facts, as regarded the quartermaster-general's department, were accurately stated, and who was requested to make such alterations as he thought proper.

Colonel Gordon retained Colonel Wetherall's evidence for upwards of a month, without taking any steps to obtain that officer's revision and signature. Colonel Tulloch, on his arrival in England on the 3d of July, found that the evidence had not been forwarded, and being anxious to get it, sent a telegraphic message on the 5th to the Crimea. On the 16th he received an answer, that "Colonel Gordon is on his way home with his evidence; started 3d July." On his arrival, Colonel Gordon sent the evidence to the War Office, without any intimation that any part was objected to, either by himself or Colonel Wetherall. It was shortly after sent to the printer by Colonel Tulloch, who intended to examine it with the other documentary evidence, when the first proofs came before him for revision. While it was being printed Colonel Tulloch went on duty to the north of Scotland, and when there received a letter from Colonel Gordon, requesting permission to revise the proof sheets with the manuscript when they came from the printer; an arrangement to which Colonel Tulloch at once assented. Colonel Gordon returned these papers about the 7th of September, with a note, in which, though various suggestions were made, there was no allusion whatever to the fact that Colonel Wetherall's evidence had not been revised or signed, nor was anything said about the omission of that paragraph which has since been so prominently brought before this Board; although, in a note on the margin of Colonel Wetherall's evidence, reference was made to two letters supposed to have been omitted in the appendix. The proofs, thus corrected by Colonel Gordon, were made use of by the Commissioners as the groundwork of that part of the Report which refers to clothing, on the assumption that it must necessarily be correct, having been revised by the authority most competent to ascertain its accuracy. The second proofs of the evidence of the officers of the quartermaster-general's department were also sent to Colonel Gordon, by his own desire, and were returned, as before, without any objections or observations relative to the state of Colonel Wetherall's evidence.

Thus, although the evidence was left so long in Colonel Gordon's hands in manuscript, and was afterwards revised by him twice in print, the Commissioners were not made aware that there were any objections taken to it, and were in entire ignorance that Colonel Wetherall's had not been signed, or that any part deemed of the least importance had been omitted, until these circumstances were so strongly commented upon by General Airey before this Board. It certainly appears strange that Colonel Gordon should have retained Colonel Wetherall's evidence in the Crimea for four weeks without communicating with him on the subject; and Colonel Tulloch submits that he cannot with justice be blamed for any error or omission which might have been so easily corrected, more especially as Colonel Gordon never gave any intimation that Colonel Wetherall had not seen and approved of his evidence.

The reason for the omission of the explanations on the margin of the memorandum attached to Colonel Wetherall's evidence will be seen at once, by a reference to the last paragraph of Colonel Gordon's evidence of the 28th May, page 169 of the report. He stated the return prepared from the evidence of quartermasters of regiments (being the one referred to in that memorandum) of the amount of stores received by their respective regiments to be totally at variance with the entries in his office of the amount authorized to be issued, and wished the Commissioners to go into a special inquiry on that subject. They, however, being quite willing to rely upon the explanations given by himself and Colonel Wetherall, at once expressed themselves to that effect, and seeing that the discrepancy had no doubt originated in error on the part of the regimental quartermasters, whose returns could not be relied on, they determined to go no further into that part of the inquiry, and accordingly struck out of the memorandum all that related to it. The memorandum was on a separate paper from the evidence; and after this part had been struck out, the remainder, as it now stands in the manuscript handed in to the

Board, was attached to Colonel Wetherall's evidence when sent to Colonel Gordon for revision.

With regard to the omission of the last paragraph of Colonel Wetherall's evidence, Colonel Tulloch has already stated to the Board (pp. 284–5 of Proceedings) what he thinks was a probable reason for its having been left out, but he cannot, after so long a time, feel sure that he is correct; nor indeed, as appears by his evidence above referred to, does he admit that it was struck out by him, as he has no recollection whatever of the circumstance.

Before concluding. Colonel Tulloch wishes to call attention to the alleged discrepancies in his evidence commented on by General Airey, pp. 282, 283, and 284 of the Proceedings, because it is there stated that no corrections whatever were made after the first minutes of evidence were taken, and that the evidence had subsequently been sent to and returned by all the witnesses; while it now appears that Colonel Gordon's and Colonel Wetherall's evidence was transcribed, and that of the latter officer returned and ultimately printed without being signed. But Colonel Tulloch submits that, considering the extent of the documents which the Commissioners had to collect and arrange, a general statement such as that referred to, which is strictly applicable to some hundreds of evidences, cannot be deemed incorrect merely because an exception necessarily took place in the case of two witnesses whose evidence was at first taken jointly, but it was afterwards found necessary to separate.

In authorizing Colonel Gordon to revise and alter the proofs of both these evidences, up to the period of final publication, Colonel Tulloch conceives, and he trusts that the Board will agree with him, that ample opportunity was afforded to have prevented any ground whatever of complaint relative to that evidence.

Submitted by
ALEX. R. TULLOCH,
Colonel.

Eaton Square,
16th May, 1856.

---

REMARKS of Colonel GORDON in reply to Colonel TULLOCH'S Memorandum of the 16th instant.

Colonel Tulloch commences by intimating his wish to submit certain explanations relative to the evidence of Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall; but the memorandum laid before the Board, and handed to me for reply, is entirely confined to the evidence of Colonel Wetherall. It contains no attempt to explain or contradict the statement I made on the 14th May 1856 (pages 349 and 350 of the printed Proceedings), respecting the omission and alteration of my evidence given on the 24th May 1855 in the Crimea, and the addition of matter to the notes of the examination on the 28th May 1855, supposed to be mine, but which the original notes, now produced, show that I did not give. From the silence of Colonel Tulloch on this subject, I may infer that he assents to the accuracy of what I have stated at pages 349 and 350.

My reply will therefore be confined to Major Wetherall's evidence.

The memorandum brought by the Commissioners on the 28th May 1855 to assist them in their examination of Major Wetherall and myself, relative to the details of issue, is a complete document of 14 paragraphs. Colonel Tulloch wrote down Major Wetherall's answers to some of the paragraphs on foolscap paper, in continuation of the regular evidence. His answers to the other paragraphs relative to blankets Colonel Tulloch wrote down on the margin of the memorandum itself. Colonel Tulloch calls that note of Colonel Wetherall's statement which was written on blank paper by the name of "evidence," and that note of Colonel Wetherall's evidence which was written (by Colonel Tulloch himself) on the margin of the memorandum he persists in treating, not as "evidence," but as part of the memorandum. The truth is, however, that *both* statements were alike memoranda taken by Colonel Tulloch of *the witness's* statement, and both papers, therefore, have exactly an equal claim to be described as "evidence."

Colonel Tulloch stated, questions 1,312 and 1,313, page 292 of Proceedings, that it was a private memorandum. So I considered it, and so I informed Sir Richard Airey long before the assembly of this Board, see page 237 of Proceedings, and this will account for Colonel Tulloch's not having sent me this memorandum along with Colonel Wetherall's evidence in the Crimea. There would have been no object in sending me the Commissioners' private memorandum.

Colonel Tulloch has suggested, page 285 of the proceedings, as a "reason" for the striking out of the omitted part of Major Wetherall's "*evidence*" relative to the watch coats, that that evidence was "totally different to what is stated in the return" (a Commissariat return supplied by another witness and another department) see page 285 of Proceedings.

If this was the "reason" which really led to the act, the process seems to have been this: that it was inferred from the discrepancy between two statements that there must be some mistake, *i. e.*, that if one witness, Mr. Archer, the commissariat clerk, was right, the other, Colonel Wetherall, must be wrong; and then the discrepancy was corrected by annulling Colonel Wetherall's evidence in order to make Mr. Archer's evidence conclusive.

However pleasing it may be to find, as the Commissioners state they did, page 2 of the Report, "a remarkable concurrence in the testimony as to matters of fact," it is surely

IV. Papers delivered in by Colonel Gordon.

desirable in an inquiry seeking the attainment of truth to encounter all the difficulty occasioned by the clashing of evidence, and to carry on the investigation with an endeavour to find out, if possible, which witness is right, and which witness is wrong.

Colonel Tulloch now gives in the paper under reply a similar reason to that above stated as the cause of the omission of that part of Major Wetherall's evidence respecting blankets, which was taken down on the margin of the Commissioners' private memorandum.

He says it was omitted because I informed the Commissioners that the returns prepared from the evidence of the quartermasters of regiments were erroneous, and that "they (the Commissioners) being quite willing to rely upon the explanations given by "himself (Colonel Gordon) and Colonel Wetherall, at once expressed themselves to that "effect, and seeing that the discrepancy had no doubt originated in error on the part of "the regimental quartermaster, whose returns could not be relied on, they determined to go "no further into that part of the inquiry, and accordingly struck out of the memorandum "all that related to it." Nothing could have been more fair than such a determination; but let us see whether it was really acted upon.

The paragraph of the memorandum relative to the non-issue of blankets was not struck out, as stated; it is the 3d paragraph of the memorandum, at page 166 of the evidence; and, in addition to the inaccuracy about the blankets for the army, it contains a misstatement relative to the sailors having three blankets, from which the Commissioners draw a comparison with the soldier unfavourable to the military authorities. The sailors had not three blankets, as stated by the Commissioners; they had only two per man, as shown by the evidence of Captain Lushington.

Neither have they struck out the erroneous returns framed from the evidence of the regimental quartermasters, which they themselves state "*could not be relied on.*" These returns are printed in full at pages 116 to 121 of the Appendix, for the information of Her Majesty's Government and the public, while the evidence of Major Wetherall, the accuracy of which they never doubted, has been withheld as being unimportant.

Let us now look to the London Report, and see how the Commissioners have acted on their *determination to go no further into the inquiry respecting the blankets.*

At page 31 of that Report these erroneous returns, which they state "could not be relied on," are not only referred to as documents from which authentic information is to be obtained, but they are stated to have been "obtained from officers commanding corps," thereby investing them with a peculiar degree of authenticity.

At page 26 of that Report, under the marginal heading of "blankets," it is stated that after the 24th and 27th of December there were 25,000 blankets in store, "more than sufficient to have "given a third blanket to every man," similar to the arrangement in the naval brigade, but that I assigned as a reason for not issuing them that I "conceived the men had enough."

I have already stated in this paper that the men of the naval brigade had not three blankets, so that the "beneficial arrangement" here alluded to is all imaginary; and if the Commissioners had read the evidence given to them by the naval officers with sufficient attention they might have found a reason for the sailors having been so much better off than the soldiers, in the fact that the former were three nights out of four in bed during the winter, while the latter were only one night out of two in bed, and not always that; and that the men of the naval brigade "never suffered from want of warm clothing."

I have already shown, at page 355 of the Proceedings of this Board, how utterly without foundation was the assertion of the Commissioners that blankets and rugs were not issued, because I thought the men had enough; and I will not repeat here what I there stated, but will only observe, that after having in the Crimea expressed themselves satisfied respecting the blankets to both Major Wetherall and myself, an opinion which they afterwards confirmed by not putting any question to General Airey upon the subject, thereby rendering us less regardful as to the evidence which might or might not be recorded, the Commissioners have, on their return to London, abandoned their original intention, and inserted in their Report two paragraphs respecting the blankets and rugs which would not have been borne out by the omitted evidence of Major Wetherall and myself.

With regard to the 25,000 blankets which were to supply the "third blanket to every man" after the 24th and 27th December, the Commissioners' own return, received from the Commissariat, pages 94 and 94 of the Appendix, shows that two thirds of these blankets were not received into store, and therefore not available, till after the middle of January, when, as the Commissioners themselves say, "the men had more than enough," and the whole of them had not been received into store until the 26th January.

(Signed) ALEX. GORDON,
Colonel, Deputy-Quartermaster-General.

22d May 1856.

No. 4.

SIR, H.M.S. "Hibernia," Malta, 31st March 1856.

IN reply to your letter of the 20th instant, this day received, with reference to the embarkation of the sick and wounded officers at Balaklava whilst I was on duty at the sick wharf there, I beg to state that medical officers accompanying sick officers from the camp for embarkation, brought with them an order stating to what ship the officer was to be sent. If he failed to do so, it was referred to the principal medical officer, to know whether the officer was in orders, when, if for treatment at Balaklava, he was immediately sent to the transport told off for their reception. The order was afterwards sent from the principal agent; but I do not remember any case of an officer seriously indisposed or sick being kept on the wharf. Boats were ever ready from early day until night at the wharf, waiting for any officers or men that might come down. It sometimes happened that sick officers arrived before their medical attendant, who, having charge of other sick men on the way, and attending to the worst cases, that were usually in the rear, may have had to wait a short time till his arrival.

On many occasions the sick came down by hundreds at a time; three or four hundred within an hour or two; sometimes six hundred. 1,059 sick and wounded men were put on board seven ships in three and a half hours on the 11th December 1854. On such occasions, as a very large proportion of the numbers stated were sent on board upon stretchers, it did occur that some of them waited a while upon the wharf, for it was impossible that so many men, who could not move of themselves, could be carefully put on board in a shorter time than they were. This was represented by myself and the principal medical officer on more occasions than one; and afterwards the sick were sent down in smaller numbers.

I beg to remark, that all sick reports accompanying officers from the camp were given to the staff assistant surgeon attending the embarkation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) THOMAS GOSS, Lieut. R.N.
Agent of Transports.

---

"Sir Robert Sale" Transport,
DEAR SIR, Balaklava, 7th April 1856.

IN answer to your letter of the 20th March, relative to Colonel Gordon's evidence before the Crimean Commission, I beg to state, that whenever a sick or wounded officer presented himself on the sick wharf, to be sent on board a hospital steamer, without the regular order to be received on board, he was taken into my hut, or sent on board the steamer, at his own option; and the practice was for me to send one of the sick boats for the regular order to you, which order was immediately handed to the officer when the boat returned. No officers have ever been kept on the beach since I have had the embarkation of the sick and wounded (from May 1855).

When Sir Richard Airey was about to leave the Crimea, he sent me a complimentary letter for the manner I had conducted the duties of the sick wharf, a copy of which letter I have appended for your further information.

I have, &c.
Captain Heath R.N., C.B. (Signed) CHAS. K. SCOTT,
H.M.S. "Seahorse." Lieut. R.N.

---

SIR, Head Quarters, Crimea, 17th November 1855.

I CONSIDER it my duty, previous to quitting the Crimea, to express to you the high sense I entertain of the manner in which you have conducted the service at Balaklava in the embarkation of the sick officers and men, at Balaklava; and it will afford me great pleasure in bringing the same to the notice of his excellency Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons.

I have, &c.
Lieut. Scott, R.N., (Signed) RD. AIREY,
Balaclava. Quartermaster-General.

---

EXTRACT from Instructions from Sir EDMUND LYONS to Captain HEATH, as Principal Agent of Transports.

YOU are to assume the charge and command of the various steam vessels and sailing transports which have been or may be hereafter chartered by the Admiralty for the conveyance of troops or military stores; and you will take care that these vessels are always kept in an efficient state, fully manned, in accordance with the charterparties, and at all times ready for service, and that the respective agents or masters in command perform their duties in a proper and attentive manner.

As the transports have been chartered for the special service of the army, it will be your duty to attend to all requisitions which you may receive from the commander-in-chief or

IV. Papers delivered in by Colonel Gordon.

officer in command of the troops, and to afford every assistance in your power to forward the military service. With this view, you will correspond direct with him on all subjects which relate to the embarkation, landing, or movement of troops or military stores by sea, keeping the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty as well as myself informed of the same, and if necessary, the rear-admiral's superintendents in the Bosphorus and at Malta. * * * * You will control the movement of all steam vessels and transports which are under your orders, and you will afford such assistance to me, and to the rear-admiral's superintendents in the Bosphorus and at Malta, as may be necessary for the conveyance of stores or provisions, when it does not in any manner interfere with military movements.

* * * * * *

You will be furnished with charts of the Mediterranean and Black Seas, also with the signal books of the fleet and those of Captain Maryatt, each transport having a copy and also the necessary flags.

Having confided to you this responible command, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty place the utmost confidence in your exertions to discharge the duties of your office in a satisfactory manner, and to whatever position the troops may be moved, you are to consider the nearest harbour as the proper rendezvous for the transports, and as your head quarters, or such other position as the commander-in-chief of the army, on consultation with you, may decide.

# V.

## *Papers delivered in by* Commissary-General Filder.

No. 1.—Copies of Correspondence given in evidence by Commissary-General Filder, 17th April 1856 - Page 528

No. 2.—General Return of the state of the Commissariat Transport on the 19th February 1855 - 531

No. 3.—Report of Proceedings of a Board of Survey on ammunition animals of 1st Division, dated 12th October 1854 - 532

No. 4.—Letter from Commissary-General Filder to Deputy Commissary-General Smith, dated Balaklava, 28th January 1855, urging supplies of forage to be forwarded by every practicable means - 533

No. 5.—Copies of Correspondence relating to the supply of lime-juice to the Army before Sebastopol, dated 15th, 16th, and 18th February, 1855 - 533

No. 6.—Copy of Certificate of the quantity of bread produced at Kadakoi from two ovens built by Colonel Tulloch - 534

No. 7.—Statement of the different articles of diet issued from the Commissariat Depôt at Balaklava, from the 1st to the 15th March 1855 - 534

No. 8.—Statement of the number of rations of rice or Scotch barley issued to the Troops in the Crimea from the 16th November to 27th December 1854 - 535

No. 9.—Statement of the quantities of salt and fresh meat issued by Commissariat to the Troops in the Crimea in the months of March, April, and May 1855 - 538

No. 10.—Statement of the number of cattle and sheep imported into the Crimea by the Commissariat from November 1854 to 31st March 1855, and of the number lost at sea - 539

No. 11.—Copy of Correspondence which Commissary-General Filder stated to the Board of General Officers would be given in in explanation of the measures taken by him for providing supplies and transport service of the British Army in Bulgaria - 540

No. 12.—Statement of Sir C. E. Trevelyan in explanation of the arrangements made by the Treasury in reference to the supply of forage for the Army in the Crimea - 544

No. 13.—Copy of a Letter from Commissary-General Filder, covering remarks on those parts of the Report of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch which relate to the duties of the Commissariat Department - 562

No. 14.—Extracts from semi-official letters, &c. quoted by Commissary-General Filder, C.B., before the Board of General Officers at Chelsea - 585

No. 15.—Letter from Sir Benjamin Hawes, dated War Department, 13th May 1856, transmitting Returns called for by Commissary-General Filder as to the shipments of hay for the Army in the East - 586

No. 16.—Letter from Captain Milne, R.N., dated Admiralty, 12th May 1856, transmitting books and correspondence relative to hay supplied to the Army in the East - 590

No. 17.—Letter, dated War Department, 7th May 1856, from Mr. Peel to the Judge Advocate General, transmitting a Correspondence between Commissary-General Smith and the War Department, relative to the defective arrangements for pressing Hay - 590

Letters from Mr. Filder to Sir C. Trevelyan :—

No. 18.—Dated 15th September 1854 - 594

No. 19.—Dated 8th October 1854 - 594

No. 20.—Dated 23rd October 1854 - 594

No. 21.—Dated 8th November 1854 - 595

No. 22.—Dated 13th November 1854 - 595

No. 23.—Dated 18th November 1854 - 596

No. 24.—Dated 27th November 1854 - 596

No. 25.—Dated 8th December 1854 - 596

No. 26.—Mr. Filder to the Under Secretary of State for War, dated 12th January 1855 - 597

No. 27.—Mr. Filder to the Under Secretary of State of War, dated 21nd Jauuary 1855 - 597

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

No. 1.

## Correspondence given in Evidence by Commissary General Filder. 17th April 1856.

---

Copy of a Letter, and its Enclosures, from Commissary General Filder to Field Marshal the Lord Raglan, relating to Part of the Evidence given by the Earl of Lucan before the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol.

My Lord, Commissariat, Crimea, Balaklava, 21st April 1855.

In the printed copy of the evidence given before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the army before Sebastopol, which your lordship was pleased to refer to me confidentially, I perceive it to have been stated by Lord Lucan, that no reply was given to the letter which he quotes in his answer to question No. 6371.

I had not observed this answer in the newspaper reports of the proceedings of the Committee, or I should have noticed it in the letter which I had the honour of addressing to your Lordship on the 29th ultimo, on another point of Lord Lucan's evidence.

An answer to his lordship's report was returned by me on the 6th February in a letter addressed to the quartermaster general, and which was referred by him to Lord Lucan.

It must therefore have escaped his lordship's recollection, not only that he received an answer, but also that he assembled the quartermasters of the different regiments composing the heavy brigade of cavalry, who had signed the certificate which accompanied my letter, and reprimanded them, I am informed, on the ground of what he deemed an informality in granting such a document.

I now beg to submit to your lordship a copy of the answer in question, as well as of the correspondence which preceded it; and if your lordship should see no objection to such a course, I would respectfully request that these papers may be transmitted to the Secretary of State for War, with a view to their being communicated to the Committee in such manner as may be deemed proper.

Field Marshal the Lord Raglan, G.C.B.

I have, &c.
(Signed) William Filder, C.G.

---

Sir, Cavalry Head Quarters, 15th December 1855.

In reference to the conversation you had with me, and the correspondence which has passed since, I am bound to say that you have not established against the dragoons, that, having the hay at their disposal, they left it on the quay to save themselves the trouble of removing it.

I have myself visited the landing wharf, and am quite satisfied that there has been a deficiency of hay landed, and that the troops have received short rations, and have severely suffered in consequence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) Lucan,
Lieut. General Commanding Cavalry Division.

The Commissary General, &c. &c. &c.

---

My Lord, Balaklava, 26th December 1855.

The inquiries which I deemed it proper to institute into the alleged deficiencies in the issues of forage to the cavalry division have caused a delay in returning an answer to the letter, under date of 16th instant, which I had the honour of receiving from your lordship on this subject.

As it would naturally occur that forage might be landed when your lordship was not present at the wharf, I considered it necessary to call for a return from the commissariat officers attached to the cavalry division of the quantity of corn and hay issued to the several regiments from the 4th to the 16th instant, which dates will, I believe, embrace the whole of the period during which you had visited the landing place, and I now beg to enclose, for your lordship's information, an abstract of these issues.

From this document it will be seen, that instead of a deficiency, the issues have been in excess to all the regiments, excepting the 5th Dragoon Guards and 1st Dragoons; and with respect to those two corps, I have to observe, that a deficiency occurred nearly every day throughout the whole of the period, although the same means were available to them for receiving their full allowance of forage as to the other regiments.

Up to the period when the conversation to which your lordship alludes took place, the forage was issued on the east side of Balaklava Harbour, and I had personally frequent

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G

opportunities of observing that hay remained over on the wharf unissued on days on which a deficiency was reported, a fact of which evidence can be produced. Such deficiencies, therefore, to whatever other cause they may be attributed, cannot have been owing to a sufficient quantity of hay not having been landed.

Lieut. General the Earl of Lucan, &c. &c. &c. (Signed) W. FILDER, C.G.

---

STATEMENT of FORAGE drawn by the several Regiments of the Cavalry Division from the 4th to 16th December 1854, inclusive.

| REGIMENT. | Total Number of Horses. | | Established Ration. | | Rations actually issued. | | Surplus. | | Deficient. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Chargers. | Bât. | Corn. | Hay. | Corn. | Hay. | Corn. | Hay. | Corn. | Hay. |
| | | | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. |
| 11th Hussars - | 1,203 | 172 | 15,914 | 10,688 | 15,674 | 14,288 | - - | 3,600 | 240 | — |
| 13th Light Dragoons | 1,142 | 65 | 14,289 | 9,536 | 16,884 | 12,511 | 2,595 | 2,975 | — | — |
| 4th „ „ - | 1,161 | 68 | 14,544 | 9,688 | 14,934 | 13,888 | 390 | 4,200 | — | — |
| 8th „ „ - | 1,088 | 98 | 13,920 | 9,320 | 14,970 | 11,694 | 1,050 | 2,374 | — | — |
| 17th Lancers - | 1,068 | 52 | 13,284 | 8,864 | 14,664 | 12,388 | 1,380 | 3,524 | — | — |
| 4th Dragoon Guards | 2,941 | 207 | 37,155 | 23,528 | 42,309 | 21,615 | 5,154 | - - | - - | 1,913 |
| Scots Greys - - | 2,873 | 216 | 36,420 | 22,984 | 46,003 | 24,779 | 9,583 | 1,795 | — | — |
| 6th Dragoons - | 2,124 | 130 | 26,658 | 16,992 | 32,028 | 14,957 | 5,370 | - - | - - | 2,035 |
| 5th Dragoon Guards | 2,131 | 367 | 28,875 | 17,048 | 24,034 | 15,561 | - - | - - | 4,841 | 1,487 |
| 1st Royal Dragoons | 2,014 | 377 | 27,561 | 16,112 | 22,220 | 14,271 | - - | - - | 5,341 | 1,841 |

Balaklava, 26th December 1854. (Signed) WM. FILDER, C.G.

---

(G. 3382.)

Sir,

Cavalry Camp, 10th January 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a statement of forage issued to the cavalry, referred to me by the Field Marshal's orders for my remarks.

I observe that the commissary general has cleverly enough taken a period of twelve days, from the 4th to the 16th ultimo, when the horses were foraged with extraordinary regularity and unprecedented liberality, the light cavalry brigade having been allowed, during a few days, to draw an unlimited amount of forage in discharge of the great arrears due to them, and to endeavour, as far as possible, to repair the emaciation, from positive starvation, which they were suffering; the heavy brigade were also allowed to draw some of the large quantity of forage owing to them. During these short twelve days there was no cause of complaint, and no complaint was made, and I was enabled, when expressing my regret of the necessity of giving the cavalry transport duties, to state, that the improvement in the condition of the horses from the time the cavalry had removed down the hill was incredibly great.

Undoubtedly the light cavalry brigade, which had been for a long period receiving short rations, and during some days none at all, were, after the 4th, for a very short time, as it was stopped by Mr. Filder's orders, drawing more than the daily allowance; and to some of the heavy regiments, though to a much less extent, was given some of the forage owing to them.

Copy of this statement had been laid by me before the Commander of the Forces.

(Signed) W. F.

Refer to Mr. Filder. If there are four commissaries attached to the cavalry, they ought to attend to the issues in turn.

(Signed) RAGLAN.

There has been for a long time past an officer appointed to this duty, one alternately from each brigade.

16th January. (Signed) W. F.

V
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

I am accepting the commissary-general's statement as correct; but I should remark, that the quantities of forage issued cannot be known correctly by the regimental officers attending, from the absence of all scales and measures; indeed nothing can be more irregular and disorderly than is the issue of forage; no commissariat officer attends; the duty is left entirely to issuers, a very low class of officer; and from the fact that no forage is ever in advance, there is great delay, great scrambling, and the greatest uncertainty what quantity of forage, and whether any at all, will be got.

If Commissary General Filder wishes to show by the statement before me that the incessant complaints I have been compelled to make are not founded in fact, I am bound to state, that the forage issued to the cavalry under my immediate observation, whether in Turkey or the Crimea, has been most irregular, and altogether insufficient. At Varna it was so irregular and uncertain, that I was driven to confine the duties of one of my aides-de-camp exclusively to the superintendence of the foraging of the regiments.

I have throughout felt the inconvenience of having no commissariat officer of rank; it certainly has appeared to me most extraordinary that the cavalry division, when the duties must be more important and onerous, it alone of all the divisions should be left without a responsible assistant commissariat general, whose opinions and recommendations would legitimately command more attention and respect than those of the young, inexperienced officers of the lowest rank, to whom the whole of the commissariat duties of the cavalry division have been confided.

Whenever the commissary general shall think it prudent broadly to affirm what I suppose this statement is intended to imply, that my many complaints are not well grounded, I shall be prepared to establish by the unanimous evidence of every individual of all ranks, in the cavalry division, that the foraging of the cavalry, perhaps excepting a few days, has been irregular and deficient, and that the troop and officers' horses have unhappily most severely suffered in consequence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LUCAN,

Lieutenant General Commanding Cavalry Division.

Quartermaster General,
&c. &c. &c.

---

Sir,

Balaklava, 6th February 1855.

Copy of this statement has been laid by me before the Commander of the Forces.—W. F.

I HAVE the honour to return herewith the statement of deficiencies in the issues of forage to the cavalry division for the 13 days comprised in the period from 4th to 16th December, which you transmitted to me with Lieutenant General the Earl of Lucan's letter of 10th January, also returned enclosed.

The above dates were selected by me because they embrace the period during which Lord Lucan stated that he had visited the wharves, and was satisfied that enough hay for the daily issues had not been landed, and that the cavalry were without rations in consequence.

As, however, his Lordship appears to consider that the period above mentioned exhibits an unusually favourable state of the issues, I called, on the receipt of his letter of 10th January, for statements of the deficiencies up to that date, and I now transmit, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, an abstract showing the result.

There no doubt was a deficiency of forage from about the 22d to 30th November, but that was owing to our having lost nearly all the hay we possessed in the hurricane of the 14th of that month, and for which, therefore, the Commissariat can in no degree be considered responsible.

The brigade of light cavalry experienced a deficiency of forage also on their being moved to the front, at a time when the roads were utterly impracticable for carts; and the cavalry horses were not allowed, either on account of the distance, or for some military reason, to be sent to Balaklava to bring up their own forage.

(Signed) WM. FILDER.

---

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

STATEMENT of FORAGE drawn by the several Regiments of the CAVALRY DIVISION, from 17th December 1854 to 10th January 1855, inclusive, embracing a period of 25 Days.

| REGIMENT. | Established Ration. | | Actually issued. | | Surplus. | | Deficient. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Corn. | Hay. | Corn. | Hay. | Corn. | Hay. | Corn. | Hay. |
| Light Cavalry : | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. | Lbs. |
| 11th Hussars | 26,783 | 19,528 | 26,665 | 16,473 | - - | - - | 118 | 3,055 |
| 13th Light Dragoons | 24,435 | 16,498 | 26,553 | 12,786 | 2,118 | - - | - - | 3,712 |
| 4th Light Dragoons | 32,869 | 23,040 | 32,679 | 18,226 | - - | - - | 190 | 4,814 |
| 8th Hussars | 25,676 | 17,488 | 27,083 | 16,649 | 1,407 | - - | - - | 839 |
| 17th Lancers | 23,161 | 15,960 | 29,901 | 16,009 | 6,740 | 49 | — | — |
| TOTAL | 132,924 | 92,514 | 142,881 | 80,143 | 10,265 | 49 | 308 | 12,420 |
| Heavy Cavalry : | | | | | | | | |
| 4th Dragoon Guards | - - | - - | - - | - - | - - | | | Nil. *Vide* Certificate and Explanation annexed. |
| Scots Greys | - - | - - | - - | - - | - - | | | |
| 6th Dragoons | - - | - - | - - | - - | - - | | - - | |
| 5th Dragoon Guards | - - | - - | - - | - - | - - | | | |
| 1st Royal Dragoons | - - | - - | - - | - - | - - | | | |

Balaklava, 6th February 1855. (Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

I certify, that between 17th December 1854 and the 10th January 1855 the full amount of forage was drawn.

When hay could not be obtained, an equivalent in barley, or chopped straw, was drawn.

(Signed) JOHN G. DRAKE,
Camp, Kadakoi, 29th January 1855. Quartermaster, 4th DragoonGuards.

J. W. BLOCKEY,
Quartermaster, 5th Dragoon Guards.

WILLIAM SCOTT,
Quartermaster, 1st Dragoons.

JAMES MARSHALL,
Quartermaster, 6th Dragoons.

(Signed) ROBERT IRVINE,
Paymaster-Sergeant Major, Scots Greys, Acting for Quartermaster M'Bean.

---

No. 2.

CHARLES WOODFORD, Major, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, to the COMMISSARY-GENERAL.

SIR, Balaklava, February 23, 1855.

I HAVE the honour to report, that two mules of those under my charge died last night, and that a third was shot by my orders, whilst in his death struggle, to spare the animal some torment, he having got cast in a ditch in the stable, and it being impossible to get him on his legs, which was tried ineffectually three times.

Feb. 26. 40, perhaps 60, now in sick stable, some of which will never recover. Mar. 2. 63 sick.

I have, &c,,
CHARLES WOODFORD, Major,
The Commissary-General. Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

V.
apers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

DAILY STATEMENT of the Commissariat Corps of Drivers, 19th February 1855.

| On what Service employed. | 1st Company. | | | 2nd Company. | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Superin- | Sub-Superintendents. | Drivers. | Superintendent. | Sub-Superintendents. | Drivers. |
| Conveying Stores to Naval Brigade | – | 1 | 10 | – | – | – |
| Do. Light Division | – | 1 | 5 | – | – | – |
| Do. Siege Train | – | – | 8 | – | – | – |
| On fatigue at store | – | – | 6 | – | – | – |
| Sick in hospital | – | – | 2 | – | – | – |
| Sick in barracks | – | – | 6 | – | – | – |
| Cooking | – | – | 6 | – | – | – |
| Office orderly | – | – | 1 | – | – | – |
| Attending sick | – | – | 2 | – | – | – |
| Present in barracks | – | – | | 1 | 2 | 43 |
| Total | 1 | 2 | 46 | 1 | 2 | 43 |

Transport Office,
Balaklava.

C. B. SMITH,
Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.

GENERAL RETURN of Transport in Depôt on the 19th February 1855.

| On what Service employed. | Serjeant Smith's Depôt. | | | | | | | | Cornet Gibson's Mule Train Stables. | | | | | | Invalid Depôt, Karrani. | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Horses and Mules. | Yuzbashee. | Oubashee. | Muleteers. | | | Farriers. | Harness Maker. | Mules. | Muleteers | | | Farriers. | Conductors. | Interpreter. | Horses and Mules. | Veterinary Surgeons. | Farriers. | Muleteers. | Interpreter. |
| | | | | Turks. | Tartars. | Poles. | | | | Spanish. | Maltese. | Turks. | | | | | | | | |
| General hospital | 6 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Conveying huts to the front under charge of Major Woodford | 22 | – | 1 | 5 | 6 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Depôt supplies | 6 | – | 1 | 6 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Conveying supplies to 63rd regiment | 5 | – | – | 2 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| 97th regiment | 6 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Scots Fusilier Guards | 4 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| On fatigue | – | – | 1 | – | 6 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Burying dead horses at Karrani | – | – | 2 | – | 16 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | – |
| Mustered in camp | 13 | 2 | 9 | 13 | 18 | 1 | 4 | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 142 | 1 | 1 | 24 | 1 |
| Total | 62 | 2 | 14 | 26 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 1 | – | – | – | – | – | – | – | 142 | 1 | 1 | 24 | 1 |

No statement received.

*Remarks.*—Major Woodford states that about 40 mules, of those under his charge, were unfit for work.—C. S., D.-A. C.-G.

Transport Office,
Balaklava.

C. B. SMITH,
Deputy Assistant Commissary-General.

No. 3.

## REPORT of PROCEEDINGS of a BOARD of SURVEY on AMMUNITION ANIMALS of First Division.

DUPLICATE RETURN of HORSES of the RESERVE AMMUNITION, FIRST DIVISION, inspected by and found to be unfit for further Military Service. In Camp before Sevastopol, this 20th day of October 1854.

| Number of Horses. | Cause of Unfitness for further Military Service. |
|---|---|
| Eight (8) horses of the Reserve Ammunition, First Division, paraded as totally unfit for further Service. | One glandered, and seven from incurable sore back, weakness, and fatigue. |

I have examined the above-named horses, and declare them to be unfit for service; and I recommend them to be destroyed.

Approved.
(Signed) GEORGE, Lieut.-General.

(Signed) MATTHEW T. HARPLEY, Vet^y-Surgeon. Royal Artillery.

True Copy.
(Signed) A. T. CUNNYNGHAME, Col., A.Q.M.G.

SIR,—THE above-mentioned horses having been paraded before His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., have been found unfit for service, and have been destroyed, and buried.

The Quartermaster-General,
Head Quarters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. T. CUNNYNGHAME.

TRIPLICATE RETURN of HORSES of the RESERVE AMMUNITION, FIRST DIVISION, inspected by and found unfit for further Military Service. In Camp before Sevastopol, this 12th day of October 1854.

| Number of Horses. | Cause of Unfitness for further Military Service. |
|---|---|
| Thirty-nine horses of the Small Arm Ammunition, First Division, paraded as totally unfit for Service. | Sore back, weakness, and fatigue. |

I have examined the above-named horses, and declare them unfit for service, and recommend them to be destroyed.

(Signed) MATTHEW T. HARPLEY, Veterinary-Surgeon, Royal Artillery.

Approved.
(Signed) GEORGE, Lieut.-General, Commanding First Division.

SIR,—THE above-mentioned horses having been paraded before His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, K.G., have been found unfit for service, and have been destroyed and buried.

The Quartermaster-General,
Head Quarters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. T. CUNNYNGHAME,
Col., A.Q.M.G.

No. 4.

Letter to D.C.G. SMITH, urging Supplies of FORAGE to be forwarded by every practicable means.

SIR, Balaklava, January 28th, 1855.

SHOULD you find it impracticable to obtain from the naval officer superintending the transport service in the Bosphorus a sufficient number of vessels for the conveyance of the forage, which at various times I have represented to you in my semi-official letters to be most urgently required for the army in the Crimea, you will engage hired vessels; either country or foreign ones, and send on all the chopped straw for which you can, by any means, procure freight.

You will apply to the naval officer to have the vessels towed by steamers, and when this assistance cannot be afforded, you will give orders that they proceed to their destination without it.

This army will in two days be totally without forage, unless fresh supplies should arrive; some unusual measures must, therefore, be had recourse to, to forward chopped straw and hay with the utmost despatch. If you should have forwarded any vessels laden with forage since the "Eveline," "Gomelza," and "Conciliator," you will be so good as to state the names and dates.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

No. 5.

CORRESPONDENCE relating to SUPPLY of LIME JUICE.

The COMMISSARY GENERAL to the ADJUTANT GENERAL.

SIR, Balaklava, 17th February 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, with reference to the General Order of the 16th inst., No. 1, that I have not the means of complying with that order, there not being more lime juice in charge of the commissariat at Balaklava than is sufficient for one day's rations at the rate mentioned in the order.

The commissariat does not provide lime juice for the army, it is merely consigned to the department, and we furnish the requisite transport for its conveyance.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

I would on this occasion beg to submit for the consideration of the Commander of the Forces, the inconvenience that may arise to the public service by an order being issued without previous communication with the department which has to carry it into effect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

---

Head Quarters, before Sebastopol,
18th February 1855.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Field Marshal requests you will be good enough to purchase a sufficient quantity of lime juice for the use of the army, to carry out the provisions of the General Order, No. 1, of the 16th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEX. GORDON,
Lt.-Col, A.Q.M.G. for Q.M.G.

William Filder, Esq., C.B.,
Commissary-General, &c. &c.
Balaklava.

---

Commissariat, Crimea,
Balaklava, 18th February 1855.

SIR,

IN reply to your letter of this date, I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the commander of the forces, that it will not be possible, I am apprehensive, to procure a supply of lime juice at Constantinople, or any place in the Black Sea. Every endeavour will be used to procure it, but I would suggest, as a more certain source, that application be made to the authorities at Malta, where, I believe, the navy have usually large quantities in store, or, in the event of their being unable to afford this assistance, a supply could, I am of opinion, be obtained through the consul at Messina, who might be instructed to forward it by the French steamer to Constantinople or the Crimea.

Should, however, the Neapolitan government object to supplies being shipped direct to this army, the lime juice might be forwarded, in the first instance, to Malta, thence sent on by steam conveyance to the Crimea. In the meantime, a small quantity might probably be obtained by application to the naval commander-in-chief.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

The Quartermaster General, &c. &c.

---

No. 6.

I CERTIFY that the following was the quantity of bread produced at Kadikoi from two ovens built by Colonel Tulloch, and handed over to the Commissariat:—

| | |
|---|---|
| From 17th to 31st May | 55,803 lbs. |
| From 1st to 30th June | 107,494 |
| From 1st to 31st July | 111,600 |
| Total | 274,897 |

274,897 lbs. during 76 days = 3,617 lbs. per diem,

or 2,412 rations of 1½ lbs. each,

Commissariat Bakery,
Kadikoi, 4th April 1856.

T. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Commisary-General.

---

No 7.

STATEMENT of the total QUANTITIES of all the different ARTICLES of DIET, issued by D. C. G. Drake, from the Depôt at Balaklava to the Commissariat-Accountants in charge of Issues to the Troops, from 1st to 15th March 1855, (required by Commissary-General Filder's letter dated 29th March 1856—559/56.)

| | |
|---|---|
| Biscuit | 638,957 lbs. |
| Salt Meat | 396,345 |
| Coffee | 34,711 |
| Sugar | 90,239 |
| Rice | 77,340 |
| Chocolate | 4,208 |
| Peas | 31,189 |
| Rum | 20,557 gallons |
| Scotch Barley | 720 lbs. |
| Lime Juice | 1,870 gallons. |
| Tea | 1,904 lbs. |
| Vegetables | 2,652 bags and tins. containing 394,762 lbs. |

Audit Office, April 1856.

R WHITESTONE, Acting Inspector.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

No. 8.

STATEMENT C.

STATEMENT of the NUMBER of RATIONS of RICE, or SCOTCH BARLEY, issued by the Commissariat to the five Divisions of Infantry, and the Cavalry Division of the Army in the Crimea, during each of the periods comprised between the 16th November and 27th December 1854; for which Ration Returns are made out, showing also the number of Rations to which the different Corps were entitled in those periods, as required by Commissary General Filder's letter, dated 25th March 1856.

| Division and Name of Accountant. | Period From. | Period To. | No. of Voucher. | No. of Rations. | Rice issued. | S. Barley issued. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1ST DIVISION. | 854 | | | | | |
| A.D. A.C.G. Blackwood, Guards. | Nov. 16 | Nov. 30 | 34 to 36 | 465 | 41 | |
| | „ — | „ 18 | 39 — 40 | 3,373 | 421 10 | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 54 — 57 | 8,189 | 1·023 11 | |
| | „ 28 | „ 30 | 59 — 62 | 8,158 | 1·019 13 | |
| | „ 29 | „ 30 | 63 & 64 | 132 | 16 8 | |
| | „ 28 | „ — | 66 – 67 | 5 | 10 | |
| | „ 20 | „ 30 | 70 | 11 | 1 6 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 18 | 75 | 42 | 5 4 | |
| | „ 19 | „ 21 | 76 | 39 | 5 4 | |
| | „ 22 | „ 24 | 77 | 36 | 4 8 | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 78 | 36 | 4 8 | |
| | „ 28 | „ 30 | 79 | 36 | 4 8 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 30 | 82 & 84 | 420 | 52 8 | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 21 | 1 to 45 | 29,400 | 3·682 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 27 | 63 — 65 | 170 | 22 | |
| D.A.C.G. Booth, Highland Brigade. | Nov. 19 | Nov. 30 | 1 — 21 | 29,902 | 3·732 4 | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 10 | 1 & 2 | 430 | 53 12 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 15 | 3 | 150 | 18 12 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 27 | 4 & 5 | 110 | 14 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 10 | 6 | 260 | 1 4 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 20 | 7 to 28 | 30,396 | 3·767 4 | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 55 | 2,370 | 296 | |
| A.D., A.C.G. H. Murray, Artillery. | Nov. 19 | Nov. 30 | 7 to 11 | 1,999 | 249 14 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 30 | 13 & 14 | 60 | 7 2 | |
| | „ 19 | „ 30 | 25 to 30 | 1,844 | 230 8 | |
| | „ 19 | „ 30 | 37 — 40 | 597 | 10 2 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 30 | 46 — 50 | 51 | 24 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 30 | 56 — 60 | 36 | 3 12 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 30 | 66 — 70 | 1,953 | 188 9 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 30 | 77 — 81 | 3,625 | 363 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 30 | 89 — 93 | 1,003 | 53 10 | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 21 | 1 — 10 | 3,257 | 406 12 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 15 | 14 — 18 | 2,211 | 276 6 | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 22 | 426 | 30 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 18 | 24 — 31 | 110 | 12 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 27 | 35 — 43 | 640 | 16 14 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 27 | 45 — 54 | 95 | 11 14 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 15 | 56 — 60 | 2,472 | 297 14 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 18 | 67 — 72 | 992 | 81 10 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 18 | 78 — 83 | 4,512 | 5·91 2 | |
| D.A.C.G. Rolleston. | Nov. 16 | Nov. 18 | 27 — 29 | 5,157 | 644 12 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 18 | 32 — 34 | 38 | 4 12 | |
| | December, no issue of rice or barley. | | | | | |
| 2ND DIVISION. | | | | | | |
| D.A.C.G. Thompson. | Nov. 16 | Nov. 24 | 62 to 91 | 12,057 | 1·507 | |
| | „ 22 | „ 30 | 92—131 | 20,380 | 2·231 | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 18 | 1 — 46 | 38,723 | 4·839 7 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 21 | 47 — 53 | 5,493 | 696 10 | |
| | „ 19 | „ 21 | 55 | 36 | 4 8 | |
| | „ 22 | „ 24 | 57 to 60 & 62 | 5,202 | 651 4 | |
| | „ 22 | „ 27 | 63 to 67 & 69 to 70 | 5,015 | 626 14 | |
| | „ 1 | „ 27 | 84 & 85 | 285 | 35 10 | |
| A.D.A.C.G. Gordon. | Nov. 16 | Nov. 18 | 46 | 27 | 3 6 | |
| | „ — | „ — | 50 | 4½ | 4½ | |
| | „ — | „ — | 52 | 307½ | 38 7 | |
| | „ 19 | „ 21 | 56 to 59 | 6,231 | 773 14 | |

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

| Division and Name of Accountant. | Period From. | Period To. | No. of Voucher. | No. of Rations. | Rice issued. | S. Barley issued. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1854 | | | | | |
| 2ND DIVISION.—*continued.* | | | | | | |
| A.D.A.C.G. Gordon—*continued.* | Nov. 22 | Nov. 24 | 64 — 67 | 6,110½ | 763 12 | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 72 | 30 | 3 12 | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 6 | 1 to 4<br>8 to 13 | 12,503 | 793 6 | |
| C.C. Colquhoun, Artillery. | Nov. 16 | Nov. 18 | 23 to 26 | 1,131 | 127 2 | |
| | „ 19 | „ 21 | 27 — 30 | 1,125 | 126 2 | |
| | „ 22 | „ 24 | 31 — 34 | 1,121 | 125 14 | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 35 — 38 | 1,122 | 125 | |
| | „ 28 | „ 30 | 39 — 42 | 1,113 | 124 14 | |
| | „ 29 | „ — | 43 & 44 | 35 | 4 6 | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 27 | 1 to 43 | 8,294 | 983 6 | |
| 3RD DIVISION. | | | | | | |
| D.A.C.G. Woodley. | Nov. 21 | Nov. 30 | 21 | 80 | 10 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 18 | 29 | 2,082 | 260 4 | |
| | „ 28 | „ 30 | 34 | 2,322 | 86 | |
| | „ 30 | „ — | 59 | 6,699 | 463 8 | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 1 | 2 | 1,740 | 217 8 | |
| | „ — | „ — | 10 | 80 | 10 | |
| | „ — | „ — | 12 | 100 | 12 8 | |
| | „ 4 | „ 4 | 62 to 18 | 6,197 | 579 8 | |
| | „ 7 | „ 7 | 21 — 24 | 6,043 | 556 12 | |
| | „ 10 | „ 10 | 28 | 1,809 | 226 8 | |
| | „ 11 | „ 11 | 37 | 110 | 13 12 | |
| | „ 13 | „ 13 | 41 | 1,812 | 226 8 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 16 | 47 | 1,773 | 221 10 | |
| | „ — | „ — | 48 | 4 | | |
| | „ 13 | „ 13 | 52 | 8 | 1 8 | |
| | „ 19 | „ 19 | 54 | 1,767 | 220 14 | |
| | „ 21 | „ 21 | 63 | 132 | 16 8 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 16 | 67 | 16 | 2 | |
| D.A.C G. Brownrigg. | Nov. 16 | Nov. 21 | 3 | 119 | 14 14 | |
| | „ — | „ 18 | 11 | 1,603½ | 200 7 | |
| | „ 19 | „ 22 | 12 | 1,579½ | 197 7 | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 27 | 1,727½ | 77 | |
| | „ — | „ — | 38 | 1,920 | 80 | |
| | Dec. 4 | Dec. 6 | 36 | 1,794 | 150 | |
| | „ 7 | „ 9 | 37 | 1,770 | 80 | |
| 4TH DIVISION. | | | | | | |
| D.A.C.G. Swain. | Nov. 18 | Nov. 20 | 62 to 65<br>67 — 70 | 4,757 | 584 10 | |
| | „ 21 | „ 23 | 73, 75, 76<br>78 to 81 | 4,643 | 572 | |
| | „ 24 | „ 26 | 83 | 72 | 9 | |
| | „ — | „ — | 85 & 86 | 3,931 | 491 6 | |
| | „ 18 | „ — | 69 | 69 | 1 2 | |
| | „ 24 | „ 26 | 88 to 91 | 675 | 74 4 | |
| | „ 27 | „ 30 | 97 | 2,434 | 304 14 | |
| | „ — | „ — | 99 | 474 | 59 6 | |
| | „ — | „ — | 101 | 9 | 1 2 | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 1 | 6 & 7 | 537 | 67 2 | |
| | „ 4 | - - | 13 | 1,899 | 237 6 | |
| | „ — | - - | 16 | 417 | 52 2 | |
| | „ 7 | - - | 26 | 426 | 53 2 | |
| | „ 10 | - | 32 | 1,971 | 246 6 | |
| | „ — | - - | 35 | 441 | 55 2 | |
| | „ 13 | - - | 41 & 42 | 4,152 | 519 | |
| | „ — | - - | 44 | 441 | 55 2 | |
| | „ 16 | - - | 50 | 1,824 | 228 | |
| | „ — | - - | 53 | 441 | 55 2 | |
| | „ 19 | - - | 59 | 1,824 | 228 | |
| | „ — | - - | 62 | 462 | 57 12 | |
| | „ 22 | - - | 69 | 1,746 | 218 4 | |
| | „ 25 | - - | 81 | 1,696 | 212 | |
| | „ — | - - | 85 | 444 | 55 8 | |
| C.C. Barlee. | Nov. 16 | Nov. 18 | 25 to 29 | 4,308⅓ | 513 9 | |
| | „ 19 | „ 21 | 31 — 35 | 8,686½ | 1·085 13 | |
| | „ 22 | „ 24 | 36 — 40 | 6,271½ | 784 | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 41 — 45 | 8,419½ | 1·052 7 | |

V. Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

| Division and Name of Accountant. | Period From. | Period To. | No. of Voucher. | No. of Rations. | Rice issued. | S. Barley issued. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1854. | | | | | |
| 4TH DIVISION—*continued* | | | | | | |
| C.C. Barlee—*continued.* | Nov. 28 | Nov. 30 | 46 — 50 | 8,416½ | 1·052[1] | |
| | „ 29 | „ 30 | 51 | 94 | 11[12] | |
| | Dec. | no isuse of rice or barley. | | | | |
| LIGHT DIVISION. | | | | | | |
| C.C. Baynes. | Nov. 19 | Nov. 21 | 55 | 1,652 | 206[8] | |
| | „ 16 | „ 30 | 97 | 45 | 2[13] | |
| | Dec. | no issue of rice or barley. | | | | |
| C.C. Clerk. Artillery. | Nov. 16 | Nov. 30 | 3 | 885 | 11[4] | |
| | „ 16 | „ 18 | 4 | 501 | 62[10] | |
| | „ 19 | „ 21 | 6 | 501 | 62[10] | |
| | „ 22 | „ 24 | 7 | 501 | 62[10] | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 8 | 510 | 63[12] | |
| | „ 28 | „ 30 | 9 | 522 | 65[4] | |
| | „ 16 | „ 20 | 12 | 28 | 3[8] | |
| | „ 15 | „ 30 | 13 | 45 | 5[10] | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 15 | 1 to 7 | 2,540 | 292[8] | |
| | „ 22 | „ 27 | 11 & 12 | 873 | 109[2] | |
| | „ 1 | „ 27 | 14 & 15 | 206 | 26 | |
| CAVALRY DIVISION. | | | | | | |
| D.A.C.G. Crookshank. | Nov. 19 | Nov. 21 | 40 to 45 | 2,286 | 280[8] | |
| | „ 22 | „ 24 | 46 | 441 | 55[8] | |
| | „ — | „ — | 47 to 51 | 1,809 | 220[14] | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 56 | 465 | 57 | |
| | „ 16 | „ 30 | 64 & 65 | 252 | 31[9] | |
| | „ — | „ — | 67 | 135 | 16[14] | |
| | Dec. | no issue of rice or barley. | | | | |
| D.A.C.G. J. W. Murray. | Nov. 16 | Nov. 16 | 55 to 57 | 742 | — | 46[13] |
| | „ 17 | - - | 58 — 61 | 810 | — | 50[10] |
| | „ 18 | - - | 62 — 64 | 747 | — | 46[17] |
| | „ 19 | - - | 65 — 68 | 811 | — | 50[11] |
| | „ 20 | - - | 69 | 251 | — | 15[11] |
| | „ — | - - | 70 & 71 | 494 | — | 30[14] |
| | „ 21 | - - | 72 | 64 | — | 4 |
| | „ — | „ 30 | 73 to 107 | 7,998 | 980[4] | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 11 | 1 to 35 | 7,946 | 993[4] | |
| | „ 12 | „ 16 | 36 — 54 | 3,906 | 488[4] | |
| A.D.A.C.G. Slade. | Nov. 16 | Nov. 16 | 28 | 60 | 7[8] | |
| | „ — | - - | 30 | 652 | 82[2] | |
| | „ 19 | - - | 32 | 57 | 7[2] | |
| | „ — | - - | 34 | 536 | 67[8] | |
| | „ 22 | - - | 36 to 38 | 1,191 | 148[4] | |
| | „ 25 | „ 29 | 40 — 48 | 2,458 | 307[5] | |
| | „ 30 | - - | 50 | 410 | 51[4] | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 25 | 1 to 28 | 11,008 | 1,464 | |
| A.D.A.C.G. De Gernon. Artillery. | Nov. 19 | Nov. 21 | 21 | 42 | 5[4] | |
| | „ 22 | „ 24 | 22 to 24 | 1,227 | 153[6] | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 25 & 26 | 1,168 | 146[4] | |
| | „ 25 | „ 30 | 27 | 84 | 10[8] | |
| | „ 28 | „ 30 | 28 & 29 | 1,167 | 145[14] | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 18 | 1 to 14 | 5,895 | 736[14] | |
| SIEGE TRAIN. | | | | | | |
| D.A.C.G. Cumming. | Nov. 16 | Nov. 18 | 53 | 267 | 33[6] | |
| | „ — | „ — | 54 | 363 | — | 22[11] |
| | „ — | „ — | 55 to 58 | 992 | — | 61[6] |
| | „ — | „ — | 59 — 62 | 1,185 | 148[2] | |
| | „ 19 | „ 21 | 63 | 363 | 45[6] | |
| | „ — | „ — | 64 & 65 | 671 | — | 42[2] |
| | „ — | „ — | 66 to 69 | 903 | 112[14] | |
| | „ — | „ — | 70 | 363 | — | 22[11] |
| | „ 22 | „ 24 | 71 to 73 | 955 | 119[6] | |
| | „ — | „ — | 74 — 79 | 1,541 | 192[8] | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 80 — 88 | 2,232 | 304 | |
| | „ 28 | „ 30 | 89 — 92 | 1,293 | 149[2] | |
| | „ — | „ — | 93 — 96 | 855 | 107[2] | |
| | „ 29 | „ 30 | 97 | 10 | 1[4] | |

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

| Division and Name of Accountant. | Period From | Period To | No. of Voucher. | No. of Rations. | Rice Issued. | S. Barley Issued. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SIEGE TRAIN—*continued* | | | | | | |
| D.A.C.G. Cumming—*continued.* | Nov. 28 | Nov. 30 | 98 | 354 | 44⁴ | |
| | Dec. 1 | Dec. 6 | 1 to 19 | 4,548 | 567⁴ | |
| | „ 4 | „ 12 | 20 — 38 | 4,673 | 584² | |
| | „ 10 | „ 15 | 39 — 55 | 4,246 | 529⁸ | |
| | „ 14 | „ 21 | 58 — 76 | 4,347 | 543⁶ | |
| | „ 19 | „ 21 | 77 — 81 | 1,758 | 219¹² | |
| | „ 2 | „ 24 | 85 — 89 | 1,179 | 146¹ | |
| | „ — | „ — | 91 & 92 | 675 | 84⁶ | |
| | „ 25 | „ 27 | 98 to 100 | 801 | 99² | |
| | „ — | „ — | 103 & 104 | 645 | 80¹⁰ | |
| | | | | 485,941½ | 56,689¹³ | |

Audit Office, April 1856.

R. WHITESTONE,
Acting Inspector.

RECAPITULATION.

| | Rations. | |
|---|---|---|
| Number of rations included in abstracts - - - - - - - | - - | 485,941½ |
| *Issued,—* | | |
| Rice, lbs. 56,689¹³, equal, at 2 oz. per ration, to - - - - | 453,518½ | |
| Scotch Barley, lbs. 394¹¹, equal, at 1 oz. per ration, to - - | 6,315 | |
| Total number of rations of rice and Scotch barley issued - - | - - | 459,833½ |
| Difference - Rations - | - - | 26,108 |

No. 9.

ISSUES of FRESH MEAT.—MARCH 1855.

Total quantity of *Fresh Meat* issued by the Commissariat to the troops in the Crimea during the month of March 1855, as shown by the *Abstracts of Issues* rendered by the Commissariat accountants, required by Commissariat-General Filder's letter, dated 29th March 1856, 559/56. - - - - - - lbs. 437,361¾

Audit Office, April 1856.

R. WHITESTONE, Acting Inspector.

ISSUES of SALT MEAT.—MARCH 1855.

Total quantity of *Salt Meat* issued by the Commissariat to the troops in the Crimea, during the month of March 1855, as shown by the *Abstracts of Issues* rendered by the Commissariat accountants, required by Commissariat-General Filder's letter, dated 29th March 1856, 559/56 - - - - - - lbs. 640,809½

20,671 lbs. salt meat, being 18½ days.
14,109 lbs. fresh meat, „ 12½ „

34,780 daily rations. 31

Audit Office, April 1856.

R. WHITESTONE, Acting Inspector.

ISSUES of FRESH MEAT.—APRIL 1855.

Total quantity of *Fresh Meat* issued by the Commissariat to the troops in the Crimea, during the month of April 1855, as shown by the *Abstracts of Issues* rendered by the Commissariat accountants, required by Commissary-General Filder's letter, dated 29th March 1856, 559/56. - - - - - - lbs. 536,162½

Audit Office, April 1856.

R. WHITESTONE, Acting Inspector.

ISSUES of SALT MEAT.—APRIL 1855.

Total quantity of *Salt Meat* issued by the Commissariat to the troops in the Crimea, during the month of April 1855, as shown by the *Abstracts of Issues* rendered by the Commissariat accountants, required by Commissary-General Filder's letter, dated 29th March 1856, 559/56. - - - - - - lbs. 538,330½

*Recapitulation.*

Salt meat, 538,330½ lbs.
Fresh meat, 536,162½ lbs. being issues on alternate days.

Audit Office, April 1856.

R. WHITESTONE, Acting Inspector.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

### Issues of Fresh Meat.—May 1855.

Total quantity of *Fresh Meat* issued by the Commissariat to the troops in the Crimea, during the month of May 1855, as shown by the *Abstracts of Issues* rendered by the Commissariat accountants, (required by Commissary-General Filder's letter, dated 29th March 1856, 559/56.) - - - - - - lbs. 669,091¼

Audit Office, April 1856. R. Whitestone, Acting Inspector.

### Issues of Salt Meat.—May 1855.

Total quantity of *Salt Meat* issued by the Commissariat to the troops in the Crimea, during the month of May 1855, as shown by the *Abstracts of Issues* rendered by the Commissariat accountants, (required by Commissariat-General Filder's letter, dated 29th March 1856, 559/56.) - - - - - - lbs. 539,076¼

*Recapitulation.*

Salt meat, 539,076¼ lbs.
Fresh ditto, 669,091¼ ,,

Total - 1,208,167½

Or daily 39,000 lbs. being 14 days salt meat, and
17 ,, fresh ditto.

31

Audit Office, April 1856. R. Whitestone, Acting Inspector.

No. 10.

### Statements (A.) and (B.)

Return of the total Number of Cattle and Sheep imported by the Commissariat into Balaklava in each of the Months from November 1854 to March 1855 inclusive, as shown by the Accounts of D. C. G. Drake, in charge of the Depôt, and of the Number issued by that Officer to Commissariat Sub-Accountants during the same period, together with a Statement of the Number of Cattle and Sheep remaining in the Charge of those Officers on 1st November 1854; also a Memorandum of the Number of Cattle and Sheep lost at Sea, as shown by the Accounts of D. C. G. Drake, from 1st November 1854 to 31st March 1855, as requested by Commissary-General Filder's letters, dated 25th and 29th March 1856 respectively.

### Statement (A.)

Return of the Number of Cattle and Sheep received and issued by D. C. G. Drake, Balaklava, between 1st November 1854 and 31st March 1855.

| D. C. G. Drake. | Cattle. | Sheep. | | Cattle. | Sheep. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | For Balance on 1st November 1854, *see* Statement B. | | |
| *Received*— | | | *Issued* to Commissariat Accountants in— | | |
| Nov. 1854 - - - | 1,007 | 2,889 | Nov. 1854 - - | 1,221 | 3,174 |
| Dec. ,, - - - | 754 | 3,703 | Dec. ,, - - | 691 | 2,345 |
| Jan. 1855 - - - | 1,894 | 2,385 | Jan. 1855 - - | 1,874 | 2,672 |
| Feb. ,, - - | 1,507 | 2,520 | Feb. ,, - - | 1,303 | 1,710 |
| March ,, - - - | 2,736 | 4,217 | March ,, - - - | 8,751 | 5,030 |
| Total received - | 7,898 | 15,714 | Total issued - | 7,840 | 14,931 |

Imported into Balaklava from 1st November 1854 to 31st March 1855:

| | lbs. |
|---|---|
| 7,898 head of cattle, at the average weight of 175 lbs. - - | 1,382,150 |
| 15,714 sheep, at 25 lbs. - - | 392,850 |
| Estimated to have produced fresh meat - - - | lbs. 1,775,000 |

W. F., *C. G.*

Audit Office, April 1856.
R. Whitestone, Acting Inspector.

N.B. The weight of the cattle and sheep is not specified in the Abstracts furnished by D.C.G. Drake.

Issued from the depôt to Commissariat Accountants attached to the troops in the Crimea, as above:—

| | lbs. |
|---|---|
| 7,840 head of cattle, at the average weight of 175 lbs. - - | 1,372,000 |
| 14,951 sheep, at 25 lbs. - - | 373,275 |
| Estimated quantity of fresh meat issued from depôt - - | lbs. 1,745,275 |

W.F., *C.G.*

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

STATEMENT (B.)

NUMBER of CATTLE and SHEEP remaining in the charge of the several Divisional Commissariat Officers in the Crimea on 1st November 1854.

| Name of Accountant. | Number of Cattle. | Number of Sheep. |
|---|---|---|
| D. A. C. G. Thompson, 2nd Division | 19 | 208 |
| „ Woodley, 3rd Division | 34 | 581 |
| D. C. G. Drake, Balaclava Depôt | 841 | 385 noted in separate statement. |
| A. D. A. C. G. Greenwood, Balaclava Depôt | 5 | 9 |
| C C. Baynes, Light Division | — | 186 |
| D. A. C. G. Crookshank, Light Cavalry | 2 | — |
| | 901 | 1,369 |

NUMBER of CATTLE and SHEEP lost at Sea, as shown by the Accounts of D. C. G. DRAKE, from 1st November 1854 to 31st March 1855.

| | | Cattle. | Sheep. |
|---|---|---|---|
| November 1854 | Vr. 77 | 97* | 38 |
| December „ | „ 8 | 26 | 231 |
| January 1855 | „ 9 | 345 | 270 |
| February „ | „ 9 | 139 | 146 |
| March „ | „ 11 | 172 | 66 |
| Total | | 779 | 751 |

* 157 head lost, in addition, on board the "Rip Van Winkle." The whole cargo having been lost, no part of it appears in the accounts of the Depôt Officer.

---

No. 11.

COPY of CORRESPONDENCE which Commissary-General FILDER stated to the BOARD OF GENERAL OFFICERS would be given in explanation of the measures taken by him for providing SUPPLIES and TRANSPORT for the SERVICE of the BRITISH ARMY in BULGARIA;

LETTER to SIR C. TREVELYAN of 3rd JUNE 1854, with Four Enclosures; and,

EXTRACT of LETTER to ditto of 20th JUNE 1854.

---

From Commissary-General FILDER, C.B. to Sir CHARLESE. TREVELYAN, K.C.B.

SIR, Commissariat, Constantinople, 3rd June, 1854.

I HAVE the honour to lay before you for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, copies of a correspondence and memoranda which have passed between Her Majesty's Ambassador, the Commander of the Forces, and myself, respecting the arrangements contemplated for providing supplies and transport for the service of the British army in its entrance into Bulgaria.

(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

---

From Lord RAGLAN to WILLIAM FILDER, Esq., C.B.

MY DEAR SIR, May 31st, 1854.

I ENCLOSE the extract of a letter from Lord Stratford, and its enclosure from Captain Simmons.

I beg you will prepare a memoranda of all you require, and place it in his Lordship's hands, with as little delay as possible, in order that he may be enabled when he attends the conference to urge the immediate compliance with all your requisitions.

I will assist you with the officers if you desire it, suggested by Captain Simmons for the collection of horses, &c.

Yours very faithfully,

Wm. Filder, Esq., C.B. (Signed) RAGLAN.

Let me have Captain Simmons' letter again.

---

EXTRACT of Letter from Lord STRATFORD to Lord RAGLAN, 31st May 1854.

"I WISH your people would let me know *en bloc* whatever remains to be required or done for the service of your army by the porte and its subalterns : I have asked for a conference with the whole cabinet, and Mr. Benedetti will accompany me. One object is to make them understand their duty, with respect to the allied powers, and to facilitate by some appropriate arrangement the practical enforcement of their orders.

By making the present demand in common, giving in a statement of requisitions, and appointing agents to see that they are really and promptly complied with in the several departments. I shall hope to obviate, in a great degree, the inconveniences, disappointments, and delays which seem to have been hitherto experienced by both armies, though not perhaps in equal proportion.

---

(Copy.)

MY LORD, Shumla, 28th May 1854.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter of the 23rd instant, and to inform your lordship that I presented Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Gem to Omar Pasha, who immediately complied with the request of the Commissary-General, and has attached Yousouf Effendi to the commissariat for the purpose of assisting that department in obtaining supplies and means of transport to facilitate the movements of the British forces.

I beg to inform your lordship that in order to secure an immediate supply for the troops about to occupy Devna, Omar Pasha has ordered 1,000 head of cattle to be forwarded from Tirnova, to be handed over to the commissariat at Devna, and 145 bât horses with a proportion of drivers to be consigned to the British Consul at Varna for temporary use by the troops.

His Highness has also ordered wheat to be issued as a temporary measure from the Government stores at Varna.

I beg to inform your lordship, that the Pasha has sent orders to the various districts under his command, directing the civil governor to ascertain the number of bât horses in their districts varying in price from 400 to 500 piastres, and to make known to the people that these horses will be purchased, and ready money paid for them for the use of the British army.

He has also taken upon himself to order a large supply of cattle to be forwarded to depôts in the Balkans.

These cattle have not, however, commenced to arrive, and moreover, the Turkish government have not the means of paying for them.

He suggests, therefore, that a number of officers should be sent round to purchase and pay for them and the bât horses.

He says that by so doing, and if the officers are instructed to see the proprietors as far as possible, and pay them instead of paying the local authorities, it will have a very good effect as regards the future operations of the army.

The peasantry will be contented, and having acquired confidence will be more willing to furnish supplies to the army.

The same officers might also make enquiries as to the supply of wheat, and if thought advisable to purchase.

Omer Pasha thinks that by this means the necessary supplies of transport and provisions may be procured.

A number of officers or agents will, however, require to be employed (probably 20), if the service is to be performed with expedition, and it will involve an organization of cattle drivers and commissariat conductors to conduct them to and from, and to take care of them at the depôts which might be established.

The best places for these depôts will probably be found in the Balkan, and country in rear of it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. L. A. SIMMONS,
Captain Royal Engineers.

His Excellency Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, G.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.

P.S. May I beg the favour of your Lordship to communicate this to Lord Raglan.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

MEMORANDUM submitted by the Commissary-General with reference to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's Letter to Lord Raglan of 31st ultimo, transmitting to Lord Raglan Copy of a Report from Captain Simmons, R.E., dated Shumla, 28th ultimo.

Referring to a former report from Captain Simmons to Lord Raglan, and also to a conference which I had with Marshal St. Arnaud respecting a proposition made by Omar Pasha and the Marshal, of dividing between the three armies the resources of the country about to be occupied in proportion to their different rates of consumption, and of paying for the supplies thus obtained at prices to be fixed by the Turkish government, I am of opinion that the carrying out of such a proposition can scarcely be made to work with the system of the British commissariat, of obtaining supplies by means of private enterprise.

As I could not allow any doubt to exist as to the supply of the British army on its arrival in Bulgaria, in cases when it was possible to provide against a deficiency, I have already entered into contracts for those articles of which provision can be made by means of private individuals, and the prices which the contractors will be obliged to pay in order to draw forth adequate supplies to meet their engagements will, I apprehend, interfere with those which the Turkish authorities may fix.

However, I will accept whatever proportion of all the different articles may be allotted to the share of the British army, and make use of them under our contract system in the best way I can.

But I am more particularly desirous that the Turkish authorities should provide us with forage and transport, which I fear cannot be procured by means of private enterprise in the circumstances in which we shall be placed. Live cattle, also, will be acceptable, as it is my intention to form depôts of cattle, the property of government.

Our consumption of forage when all the troops are collected at Devna, will be daily, 70,000 lbs. of chopped straw, and 80,000 lbs. barley.

A depôt should be immediately formed by the Turkish authorities, of these articles, at Devna, to meet this consumption.

Of transport we shall require 2,000 arabas and 1,200 pack horses or mules, in proportion as the different divisions arrive at Varna, including in this number those that may already have been provided for the light division. When the troops move in advance of Devna, the total number of arabas required will be 3,000.

The plan which Omar Pasha proposes, as stated in Captain Simmons' report to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, of providing waggons or pack horses, by sending out eight or ten officers to the most distant parts of the country, and purchasing the great mass of transport that will be required for the service of the British army immediately on its arrival in Bulgaria, would certainly not meet the present emergency. All provisions and forage furnished to the commissariat will be punctually paid for at whatever prices, and the transport at whatever rate of hire may be deemed remunerative, and sufficient to induce the peasantry to bring forward supplies.

It is important that a person of authority under the Turkish government, should be attached to the head quarters of the British army to enforce the requisitions of the commissariat, and to insure the supply of the troops.

It is stated in Captain Simmons' report, that Yousouf Effendi has been appointed to this duty. A person of this name was formerly attached to Deputy Commissary-General Smith, with this view, at Constantinople. If it is the same person he was found so inefficient that his assistance was dispensed with. He may probably have been selected on account of his knowledge of the English language, but this acquirement would be no compensation for the absence of other and more indispensable qualifications.

Commissariat, Constantinople, 1st June 1854.

---

MEMORANDUM submitted to the COMMANDER OF THE FORCES by the COMMISSARY-GENERAL.

31 May 1854.

The letter from Captain Simmons, Royal Engineers, to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, which I sent to Mr. Filder this morning, contains recommendations as to the mode of procuring transport which the Commissary-General will do well to act upon.

Omar Pasha is doing all he can for the British army, and it is better to trust to his exertions than to assail him with fresh requisitions, more particularly as Mr. Assistant-Commissary-General Gem is already in communication with him.

(Signed) RAGLAN.

The Commissary-General not having succeeded in his endeavours to procure hired transport for the service of the army on its taking the field, submits to the Commander of the Forces that letters should be despatched without delay to Omar Pasha, who appears, from Captain Simmons's report to Lord de Ros, to have at his sole disposal the whole of the transport of Bulgaria, requesting him to have ready for the use of the British army, 2,000 waggons and 1,200 pack horses or mules, to be sent to Varna in proportion as the divisions of the army may arrive at that place. The above number includes what may already have been applied to the light division.

(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

Commissariat,
Constantinople, 31st May 1854.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

Lieutenant-Colonel THOS. STEELE to Commissary-General W. FILDER.

Head-quarters, 1st June 1854.

Sir,—I have the honour to transmit to you an extract of a letter from Captain Simmons to Lord Raglan for your information.

I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) THOS. STEELE, Lieut.-Col.
Mil. Sec.

---

EXTRACT of a LETTER from Captain SIMMONS to Lord RAGLAN.

Shumla, 28th May 1854.

Upon the arrival of D. C. Gen. Gem, I introduced him to the Pasha, in compliance with the directions I received from the ambassador, and finding Major Dickson had remained at Varna to purchase bât horses, and fearing that he would not be able to collect a sufficiency before the arrival of the light division, I asked the Pasha to send some of his bât horses to Varna.

The Pasha immediately complied with my request, and ordered 154 horses to be sent to Colonel Neale for the use of the British troops. These horses ought to arrive at Varna on Wednesday, 2nd June.

On consulting with the Pasha as to the means of procuring a supply of meat for the troops, he informed me that he had given full permission to Colonel Neale to purchase and bring cattle and provisions from any part of his government for the British troops.

The Pasha had himself also foreseen the probable demands of the allied troops, prepared 2,000 animals at Tirnova, and upon his offering 1,000 head, after consulting with Deputy-Commissary-General Gem, I accepted them, and requested him to have them forwarded to Devna. They will begin to arrive in about a week.

The Turkish government not having yet paid for these cattle, the accounts for their purchase will be handed over to the Commissariat Department at Devna.

Omar Pasha has also given orders that the troops may receive supplies temporarily from the government stores in Varna.

On the subject of the purchase of horses and provisions, I have written a letter this morning to Lord Stratford, which I have requested his Lordship to communicate to your Lordship.

---

EXTRACT of a LETTER from Commissary-General FILDER to Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN, dated 20th June.

The army will be delayed in organizing transport, as well as from other causes. From the first, I reported to Lord Raglan, that, as regards the large mass of transport required for the conveyance of commissariat supplies, an army is wholly dependent on the resources of the country it may occupy, and that, if we entered Bulgaria, a certain time would be required for organizing that proportion of the transport. No conceivable efforts on our part would enable us to bring from other countries a quantity of transport equal to the 3,000 waggons and 2,000 or 3,000 mules we require for this service.

As all the transport in Bulgaria is entirely at the disposal of Omar Pasha, on the first day it was decided that the army was to move into that country, I despatched an officer to him, furnished with letters from the ambassador and other authorities, requesting him to cause transport to be provided for the service of the British army; and two days afterwards, firmans and letters from his government were forwarded to him to the same purport.

He sent down to Varna accordingly, 500 arabas, the number I had demanded, and some pack-horses, to meet the first division that arrived, but not being accompanied by Turkish soldiers, according to the custom of the country, a large proportion of it deserted. No transport has been sent, as I had requested it might be, to meet the subsequent divisions that arrived.

We are now attempting to organize the country transport on a better footing, and as Omar Pasha is, I am persuaded, as anxious as Lord Raglan can be, that our army should have the means of moving, I am in hopes we shall succeed. The transport certainly exists, and I have sent up to Schumla, officers, money, and interpreters to procure it. No expense will be spared with that view.

---

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

No. 12.

## Statement in Explanation of the Arrangements made by the Treasury in reference to the Supply of Forage for the Army in the Crimea.

As the Commissariat was under the superintendence of the Treasury until it was transferred to the War Department on the 22d December 1854, I beg to submit an explanation in reference to the following passages of Commissary-General Filder's Remarks on those parts of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Supplies of the British army in the Crimea which relate to the duties of the Commissariat:—

*Sir J. M'Neill's and Col. Tulloch's Report.*

From the evidence of the Commissary-General, it appears that this diversion of a part of the transport from commissariat to siege purposes prevented him from completing the formation of a depôt near headquarters, which he had commenced, and which was a measure of great importance to the army, as subsequent events too clearly proved. He was therefore, from the commencement of the operations against Sebastopol, aware that the transport he had collected was not all available for Commissariat purposes, and was not sufficient for all the purposes for which it was required. In answer to the question why, in those circumstances, he did not increase the transport in the Crimea, he states that he had as many animals as he could feed. The measure of the amount of transport to be provided for the army in the Crimea was not, therefore, what was required, but what the Commissariat could feed. The reason for not increasing the amount of transport was not that a greater number of animals was unnecessary, but that a greater number could not be fed in the Crimea. But if proper arrangements had been made to provide the army with forage for the winter, wherever it might be at that season, the forage would have been available for use in the Crimea.

*Commissary-General Filder's Observations.*

At the commencement, the transport, exclusive of what had been appropriated to siege operations, was sufficient for all Commissariat purposes. It was not till about the 18th or 20th of October, when, it having become obvious that the effect of our fire on the fortress was not such as had been expected, that I first contemplated forming a depôt in front. Up to that time the transport sufficed to carry, not only the daily rations of provisions and forage, but also extra rations of the former; and supplies in advance had been accumulated besides, and were in possession of the divisional Commissariats in camp. Afterwards, the number of animals that could be fed necessarily became the rule.

In answer to the alleged omission of timely arrangements for the provision of forage, I have to state that, so early as when there was full expectation of the army advancing to the Danube, I made a contract for about 3,500 tons of hay, to be delivered loose at different places in the neighbourhood of Constantinople; and I also desired the Commissariat officer there to form a depôt of chopped straw, in case the army should return and occupy cantonments in Turkey during the winter. I took those steps as a precaution, notwithstanding that supplies of chopped straw (the usual forage of the country) can be obtained to almost any amount along the shores of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Sea of Marmora; and these arrangements would have been equal to the object in view had the army been cantoned in those districts. Subsequently, when it became known that we were to proceed to the Crimea, the contractors, at my request, were willing to engage to deliver about 500 tons of the hay pressed, instead of loose; but learning, in the early part of September, when the army was on the way to the Crimea, that I could not rely on the fulfilment of this contract, I wrote to England, requesting that 2,000 tons of hay might be sent from thence. Of this demand only about one tenth was forwarded, and that portion reached Balaklava on 30th November; and although, on arriving before Sebastopol, I reported that we should be entirely dependent for this article on England, and from time to time made requisitions for further quantities, the consignments fell greatly short of my wants, the whole of the quantities forwarded from England during a period of six months not amounting to the 2,000 tons for which I first made a requisition for about two months' supply, according to the estimates I had transmitted home. Had my requisitions for hay been complied with, the deficiency in this respect which was felt throughout the winter would have been prevented, and I should have been enabled to maintain a sufficient transport establishment, and to replace the animals, which were rapidly destroyed or rendered unserviceable in attempting to struggle through impassable tracks, and from exposure.

No exertion on the part of the Commissariat could remedy the deficiency, it being impracticable to convey across the Black Sea chopped straw or hay loose in sufficient quantities, or to procure the means of pressing enough of either for the consumption of a large army; the latter plan was adopted to the utmost extent to which means could be procured. Notwithstanding that upwards of 25,000 tons of hay were collected by my directions during the last spring and summer at one port alone in the Black Sea, besides large quantities at other places, it is still found necessary to forward from England supplies of pressed hay, equal nearly to the whole of the consumption of that part of the army which is in the Crimea.

*Sir J. M'Neill's and Col. Tulloch's Report.*

The real cause of the deficiency of transport appears therefore to have been the want of forage, not the want of ships or of animals, and a similar failure to provide the requisite forage would again limit the number of animals available for the army in the Crimea. Whatever might be the number in possession of the Land Transport Corps, it may be hoped that the formation of that corps will prevent the recurrence of any similar calamities from the same cause.

*Commissary-General Filder's Observations.*

From the time that my requisitions for supplies of pressed hay from England were complied with, there has always been sufficient forage for the Land Transport Corps as well as for every other branch of the army, although the number of animals for which forage was drawn when I left the Crimea amounted to upwards of 23,000.

All Commissariat operations are based upon the principle of using the resources in the neighbourhood of the seat of war to the utmost pacticable extent; and this is especially applicable to the article of hay, on account of its great bulk. Even on the ground of expense, the shipment of hay from a distance is precluded, except under very special circumstances; and the occupation of a large proportion of the available freight of the country constitutes, perhaps, a still stronger objection. The original price of the hay sent to Turkey was increased fourfold* by the time it arrived at the seat of war; one ton of hay in a pressed state required about five tons measurement on board ship; and a ship of 1,000 tons burthen could not, therefore, in addition to the ballast

indispensable with so light a cargo, convey nearly so much as 200 tons of hay in its most portable shape. †

As soon as there was reason to expect that a British force would be sent to the East, Deputy Commissary-General Smith was sent to Constantinople to collect information of every kind required to furnish the basis of subsequent proceedings for the supply of the army; and he reported, on the 19th March 1854, that barley and chopped straw were the invariable food of Turkish horses, that they seemed to thrive admirably on this kind of forage, and that the prices were reasonable. This has been confirmed by subsequent experience. Lord Lucan, who commanded the cavalry division in the Crimea, stated in his evidence before the Sebastopol Committee that his horses thrived as well upon barley and chopped straw as upon any other kind of food, and that he considered it to be most foolish and mischievous that our cavalry should be entirely dependent upon England for its supplies.

D. C. G. Smith, Constantinople, 19 March 1854.

Questions 6,390 to 6,395.

In July and August 1854, Mr. Filder reported that he had entered into a contract for 8,000,000 lb. of hay for delivery on the Sea of Marmora, and requested that a hydraulic press, and a person to work it, might be sent from England; upon which the Treasury sent four hydraulic presses, with a new steam-engine and boiler, and four experienced persons to work them.‡

Sec. to Admiralty, 18 April 1854.
Messrs. Fairbairn and Sons, 1 April.
C. G. Filder, 29 July, with one enclosure from Lord Raglan and two from D. C. G. Smith.
D. C. G. Smith, 30 July, with copy of agreement.
C. G. Filder, 2 August.
A. C. G. Julyan, 16 August, with enclosure from Mr. Freeland of Manchester.
Treasury Minutes, 18 August.
A. C. G. Julyan, 22 August.
Treasury Minute, 22 August.
A. C. G. Julyan, 23, 24, 28, and 31 August.
Treasury Minute, 1 Sept.
A. C. G. Julyan, 5 Sept.
Treasury Minute, 8 Sept.
A. C. G. Julyan, 16 Sept.
Treasury Minute, 22 Sept.

But although dependence was chiefly placed on local sources of supply, it was considered right from the first to establish a reserve of English hay and corn, by arranging with the Admiralty that a stock should be laid in equal to six months' consumption of all the horses embarked for the East; that after the whole available space on board the transports had been filled, the remainder of the forage should be held in this country; and that an additional quantity of hay to the extent of 400 tons should be embarked on board a separate transport; all which was done, and the surplus quantity which remained in store was 2,441 tons of hay and 1,260 quarters of oats. Three Commissariat officers were placed at the disposal of the Admiralty, to assist in making these arrangements.

Sec. to Admiralty, 17 Feb. 1854.
Treasury Minute, same date.
Comptroller of Victualling and Transport, 28 March.
Treasury Minute, 31 March.
Treasury Minute, 18 April.
Sec. to Admiralty, 12 June.

On the 30th May and 5th June Commissary-General Filder reported that it might possibly become necessary to take a portion of the forage then on board the horse transports lying at Constantinople, to meet the current issues to the troops, and requested that orders might therefore be given for the shipment from England of 1,000 tons of oats and a like quantity of hay to replace the quantity that might be taken by the Commissariat from the transports, and arrangements were immediately made for these shipments. These requisitions were, however, countermanded by Commissary-General Filder, by a letter, dated Varna, 18th August, in which he stated—"The 1,000 tons of oats and "hay for which I made application were intended to replace the like quantities of those "articles which I was to receive from the horse transports; but Lord Raglan having "subsequently sanctioned the transfer unconditionally to the Commissariat of all the "surplus oats and hay on board vessels beyond what might be required for six weeks' "supply for the number of horses they could convey, it has not been necessary to replace "any of that which had been so transferred."

C. G. Filder, Constantinople, 30 May.
Treasury Minute, 13 June.
C. G. Filder, Constantinople, 5 June.
Treasury Minute, 20 June.

C. G. Filder, Varna, 18 August.

On the 14th May Commissary-General Filder reported, in reply to an inquiry which had been made of him by the Treasury, that it would not be advisable to enter into a contract for the supply of hay and straw for the use of the army in the East, to be purchased in France, Belgium, or the United Kingdom, beyond what might have already been ordered.

Sec. to Admiralty, 21 April 1854, with enclosures from Messrs. Phillips, Graves, and Phillips, on behalf of M. F. Berncastel, aîné, of Paris.
Treasury Minute, 25 April.
C. G. Filder, Constantinople, 14 May.
Treasury Minute, 7 June.
Sec. to Admiralty, 12 June.

In June and July the Admiralty called the attention of the Treasury, on two separate occasions, to the danger both to the stores and to the hay itself from the accumulation of such a large quantity as was then in depôt, from the probability of its becoming heated; and while reference was made in a third communication to the high rate of freight (about 11*l.* per ton weight) which would have to be paid if this forage were

Comptroller of Victualling, 19 July.

The same, 25 July.

---

* The following may be taken as a fair average:—

| | |
|---|---|
| Cost of hay, per ton of 2,240 lb. | £5 0 0 |
| Pressing, packing, carriage, &c. | 2 13 4 |
| Freight to the Crimea | 12 0 0 |
| Sea-risk and demurrage | 0 6 8 |
| | £20 0 0 |

† The disproportion between weight and measurement in the tonnage of hay is understood to have been diminished by the powerful machinery since brought into use by the contractors for hay sent to the Crimea; but at the time referred to it was as stated in the text.

‡ These four presses would have pressed from 16 to 20 tons a day, equal to 35,840 or 44,800 lbs.; the 1,300,000 lbs. reported on the 27th November (see the top of page 10,) to be required for the army, gives 46,428 lbs. a day for 28 days.

Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

sent to the East, the Treasury was informed that it would be "most inconvenient" to allow it to remain any longer in store. Upon this the Admiralty was requested to cause two shiploads of the surplus forage, including the whole of the oats, to be consigned to Mr. Filder with the least possible delay, and the remainder to be held until an answer could be received from him, and he was requested, on three separate occasions, to report his opinion "Whether the remainder of the hay should be forwarded "to the Black Sea, or be held in this country, to meet further requisitions from him, "or be disposed of to prevent its spoiling, there being no doubt that further quantities "could be purchased if they were required." Two letters were received in reply from Mr. Filder, in the first of which he stated, "I am of opinion that the remainder of the "hay need not at present be forwarded to this country," and in the second, dated from Varna on the 18th August, he reported, "Under existing circumstances, it will not, "I am of opinion, be necessary to forward to this country the quantity of hay remaining "in store in the United Kingdom." Upon the receipt of this letter the Treasury "wrote to the Admiralty, that it would be on every account expedient to sell all the "hay remaining in the naval magazines, at the highest price which can be obtained "for it, unless there should be reason to anticipate that more horses will have to "be embarked from this country for the seat of war within a reasonable time, in which "case a portion of it might with propriety be reserved."

Treasury Minute, 13 June.

Treasury Minute, 13 June. Do. 21 July. Do. 25 July.

C. G. Filder, Varna, 28 June 1854.

C. G. Filder, 18 August.

Treasury Minute, 1 Sept. 1854.

On the 13th September, while crossing the Black Sea to the Crimea, Mr. Filder wrote the following letter to the Treasury:—"Referring to my letter of the , I have "the honour to report for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's "Treasury, that the contractors having failed to provide the quantity of hay therein "adverted to of proper quality, and under the uncertainty of being able to procure in this "country a sufficient supply of forage for the great number of animals belonging to the "two allied armies, I have the honour to suggest that 2,000 tons of hay be forwarded "to Constantinople during the course of the autumn." On the 22d September, Mr. Filder reported that the part of the Crimea through which they had passed produced hay and forage corn in abundance, and that the Tartar population was well disposed towards the allies, but that these supplies could not be made available to any extent as the Cossack cavalry closed upon the rear of the army as fast as it advanced. On the 19th September, immediately on receiving from Constantinople intimation of the probability of a failure in the large contract which had been entered into at that place for hay, and previously to the receipt of either of the last-mentioned letters from Mr. Filder, the Treasury had requested the Admiralty to suspend for the present the measures recommended on the 1st September for the disposal by sale of the surplus quantities of hay remaining in the naval magazines; and on the 10th October the Admiralty was requested to take up a sailing vessel, and despatch it to the Crimea with as little delay as possible, with a full cargo of hay, and to keep the remainder in store until further advices were received from the Commissary-General; and Mr. Filder was informed accordingly, and desired to report whether steps should be taken for sending out the whole quantity referred to in his letter of the 13th September. The "Belgravia" transport, of 1,395 tons burden, was immediately engaged for this service; and the whole transaction was reported in detail to the Secretary of State for War, to whom copies of every important document relating to the supply of the army were habitually transmitted.

C. G. Filder, "Hope," off Sebastopol, 13 Sept. 1854.

C. G. Filder, Head Quarters, Camp, Alma River, 22 Sept.

Treasury Minute, 19 Sept. 1854.

Treasury Minute, 10 Oct.

Comptroller of Victualling, 12 and 13 Oct. 1854.

Treasury Minute, 20 Oct. 1854.

On the 8th October Commissary-General Filder reported:—"The forage of the "country within the limited space to which we are confined is nearly exhausted, but "the opportune arrival of the ships from England laden with the hay, of which a "large proportion may be appropriated to present use will, I anticipate, prevent any "serious inconvenience being experienced from this cause. It had been my intention "to transmit, for the information of their Lordships, a statement of the Commissariat "supplies on hand on the 30th ultimo; but the navy, in their desire to despatch the "vessels in which they were laden on other services, have taken out the stores an "distributed them amongst other transports, and I have as yet been unable to obtain "a correct statement of the quantities remaining, *but I believe them to be ample.*"

C. G. Filder, Balaklava, Oct. 1854.

On the 23d October Mr. Filder, writing under the uncertainty which existed as to the future operations and position of the army in consequence of the unsuccessful issue of the first bombardment, recommended that the shipment from England of 1,000,000 lbs. of biscuit per month should be continued for the present; and he added:— "With "regard to forage also, it is wholly impracticable, as I have already reported, to "procure either hay or straw in the country we now occupy. Pressed hay could "alone be brought from a distance; and it appears from the reports of Deputy Commissary-General Smith to be improbable that the contractors at Constantinople will be "able to deliver, under the agreement reported in my letter of the 25th July last,* "a sufficient quantity of hay of good quality to meet the consumption of the troops "in the Crimea. I would recommend, therefore, that shipments of this article from "England be also continued till the future position of the army, and the practicability of "making other arrangements for its supply, are known." Immediately on the receipt

C. G. Filder, Balaklava, 23 October 1854.

Treasury Minute, 7 Nov. 1854.

* The letter referred to is dated 29th July.

of this letter the Admiralty was requested to direct that a quantity of hay equal to that conveyed by the "Belgravia" might be shipped with as little delay as possible, to be followed by further shipments to a like extent, at intervals not exceeding fourteen days, until the local resources might become available. Upon this the Admiralty reported that the hay remaining in the naval magazines (estimated at between 1,500,000 and 2,000,000 pounds) would be despatched in the course of about two months, and suggested that if further quantities were required, the arrangement should be had recourse to which had been previously agreed upon, viz., that the hay should be purchased, and its preparation superintended by officers of the Commissariat, notice being given to the Naval Department, that shipping for its conveyance might be provided without delay. A copy of this letter was sent to Commissary-General Filder, with directions to report whether further supplies of hay beyond those about to be dispatched from the naval magazines in the course of the next two months were likely to be required, in order that timely measures might be taken for obtaining and shipping them.

Comptroller of Victualling, 14 Nov. 1854.

Treasury Minute, 18 April 1854.

Treasury Minute, 17 Nov. 1850.

On the 8th November Commissary-General Filder reported that it was probable that the army would winter in the Crimea, and that in such event it would be dependent on supplies sent from England for its subsistence, with the exception of fresh meat and *forage corn;* and he added, with respect to hay,—"Had the army wintered at Constantinople or its vicinity, it might have been supplied with the forage of the country, and it would have been necessary only to forward from England, as a measure of precaution, such a quantity of hay as would provide against the possibility of a scarcity; but if the army is to winter in the Crimea, it will be necessary that it should be entirely supplied with hay from England, as it would not be possible to convey by sea straw or hay loose in sufficient quantities for its consumption; and the hay which has been delivered under contract at Constantinople, and is now being pressed there, will last but for a short time." In the Treasury minute upon this letter it was observed:—"In regard to hay, Commissary-General Filder states "generally the grounds upon which he considers that it should be entirely supplied from England; but he does not state the quantities which he is likely to require, nor does he specify, even approximately, the number of rations upon which such a calculation might be based." The minute then proceeds to review the measures taken for dispatching supplies to the East, and in respect to hay it states: "Hay is an article respecting which Mr. Filder has experienced the disappointment of finding that the supplies contracted for at Constantinople were of an inferior quality, and not fit for issue, and therefore, with a small exception, they could not be received. On finding that this was the case, active steps were taken for sending forward supplies from England. The 'Belgravia' sailed on the 8th instant, having on board upwards of 400,000 lbs. There is, in the Admiralty storehouses, a further quantity of from 1,500,000 lbs. to 2,000,000 lbs., all of which it is expected will be shipped in the course of the next two months; and arrangements are being made by the Naval Department for despatching at least 750,000 lbs. by steam or sailing vessels before the middle of next month. It would seem to be desirable that the quantity to be shipped within that period should be increased to 1,000,000 lbs., and that the remainder should be sent forward as soon as possible afterwards. If it should be necessary to keep up this supply, purchases will have to be made by the Commissariat Department in time to prevent interruption of the shipments at short intervals." A copy of this minute was sent to Mr. Filder, whose attention was called to the absence of returns of his supplies in hand, and of estimates of the proportion of the different articles required from England; and another copy was sent to the Secretary of State for War, requesting that the urgency of the Commissary-General's demands for hay might be communicated to the Admiralty.

C. G. Filder, Balaklava, 8 Nov. 1854.

Treasury Minute, 28 Nov. 1854

On the 13th November, Mr. Filder transmitted an estimate of the supplies required for the army for three months from the 1st November. The total quantity of hay for consumption within that period is stated to be, 6,900,000 lbs.

but as he had on hand 1,080,000

5,820,000 lbs. remained to be furnished, being at the rate of 1,940,000 a month. In a subsequent letter, dated 27th November, Mr. Filder explained "that the issues of hay, when confined to the horses of the artillery and cavalry, officers' chargers, and transport animals, amount to 1,300,000 lbs. per month;" and he added, "In estimating the consumption of this army at 1,300,000 lbs. of hay per month, I have excluded baggage animals of every description from the calculation, as it may be possible, although attended with much inconvenience and expense, to bring to the Crimea from Turkey a supply of chopped straw for them sufficient for a diminished ration whilst they are not working." Upon receiving the original estimate the Treasury directed that a contract should be immediately entered into by the Commissariat in this country, for the delivery of 1,200 tons (2,688,000 lbs.) of pressed hay at Manchester, to be conveyed thence to Liverpool for shipment when the quantities remaining in the naval magazine should have been dispatched. This contract was entered into accordingly, and punctually executed.

C. G. Filder, Balaklava, 13 Nov. 1854.

C. G. Filder, Balaklava 27 Nov.

Treasury Minute, 5 Dec. 1854.

A. C. G. Julyan, 13 Dec. 1854, London; with articles of agreement with Mr. A. B. Freeland.

On the 18th November, Mr. Filder reported the losses caused by the hurricane of the 14th, among which were included 1,116,000 lbs. of forage corn, and 800,000 lbs. of hay;

Treasury Minute, 19 Dec. 1854.

C. G. Filder, Balaklava, 18th Nov. 1854.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

and he added: "The hay lost was all, with a trifling exception, that we had on hand "for the service of the army, either on shore or afloat, and was equal to about twenty "days' consumption, the issues being at present confined, owing to the scarcity of "forage, to the horses of the artillery and cavalry, officers' chargers, and Commissariat "Transport animals, and it might have been expected to last till the arrival from Eng- "land of the "Belgravia," laden with the hay advised by your letter of the 12th October. "The great loss we have sustained of forage corn precludes the possibility of increasing "the ration of that article as a substitute for the deficiency of hay. As it will be "impracticable, I am of opinion, to convey forage by sea in an unpressed state in "sufficient quantities to meet the consumption of this army, I am apprehensive that "this loss, and consequent deficiency of food* for the animals, will be attended with the "worst results, especially with respect to those belonging to the Commissariat Transport "establishment, upon which the supply of the army depends, several of them having "already died, although hitherto well fed, from exposure to wet and cold." Mr. Filder was informed, in reply, that every effort would be made to expedite the shipments of hay from this country, but that, of course, he would continue to draw as much sulla and clover from Malta as might be required, and could be had through the agency of Commissary-General Wild, in addition to the hay and chopped straw which might be procurable at Constantinople and its neighbourhood.

Treasury Minute, 12 Dec. 1854.

The shipments of hay actually made from England up to the end of January were as follows:—

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1854. | | | | |
| In June and July | 1,203,800 lbs. | = 537 tons, | in 5 | vessels. |
| In August and Sept. | 1,023,300 „ | = 457 „ | in 6 | „ |
| In November | 599,300 „ | = 267 „ | in 3 | „ |
| In December | 1,417,600 „ | = 633 „ | in 9 | „ |
| 1855. | | | | |
| In January | 800,100 „ | = 357 „ | in 7 | „ |

These shipments were exclusive of the hay on board the horse transports. What that precise quantity was is not known; but it is described as follows in the letter from the Secretary to the Admiralty, dated 12th June 1854:—"The transports conveying animals "have all been supplied with sufficient forage for the voyage, and with such additional "quantities as could be stowed in any available space on board;" and these additional quantities were so large that in the middle of August Mr. Filder reported that he might have drawn from the transports 1,000 tons, and still have left on board of them a supply equal to six weeks' consumption of the number of horses they could convey.

Secretary to Admiralty, 12 June 1854.

C. G. Filder, Varna, 18 Aug. 1854. See the top of page 5.

It has been seen from the foregoing statement that whatever expressions might have been used having a contrary tendency, both the Treasury and Mr. Filder were up to this time acting upon the established Commissariat principle, that the basis of the proceedings for the supply of the army was the resources of the countries in the neighbourhood of the seat of war, and that supplies ought to be furnished from England only to the extent to which they were not available from that neighbourhood. The real questions for consideration, therefore, are:—first, to what extent Mr. Filder might have been expected to avail himself of those resources; and, secondly, whether the Treasury made proper arrangements for supplying the remainder. Previously to the end of September, 2,227,100 lbs. of hay had been shipped from England, besides the surplus supplies in the transports, which had been stated by Mr. Filder at a much larger amount; and it was assumed at the Treasury that so long as local resources were available this stock would be held in reserve. As it was, 1,079,616 lbs. of hay remained in store at Balaklava on the 13th November, of which 800,000 lbs., the quantity lost in the hurricane on the following day, were, as stated at the time by Mr. Filder, equal to twenty days' consumption, and would, therefore, have been more than sufficient to last until the arrival of the "Belgravia" on the 30th of the same month. It was of course supposed that if the hay which was known to have arrived from England had not been landed and stacked, it was at any rate securely moored in the harbour, instead of being sent outside, in the face of a stormy sea and a rocky coast.

See page 10; also the last paragraph of Mr. Filder's letter to Lord Raglan at page 23, where the loss is stated at 21 days supply, and the second paragraph of his letter to the Quartermaster-general at page 24.

In order that a right judgment may be formed whether Mr. Filder availed himself of local resources to the extent which might have been expected, it is necessary to state briefly what those resources were.

The first of these was the stock of hay on board the transports, the whole or nearly the whole of which might, it was reasonably presumed, have been rendered available under the circumstances under which the army was then placed. What became of this hay has never been fully explained; but the following indications, derived from the demi-official correspondence which passed at the time, show that it was not used as a reserve, in the manner originally intended. "The hay from England arrived most opportunely. "... I owe very little to the transports in repayment of what the Commissariat "received from on board them at the commencement of the campaign; and by restricting

C. G. Filder, Balaklava, 23 Oct. 1854.

* It will hereafter be seen that there was never any deficiency of barley or chopped straw at Balaklava, either before or after the hurricane.

" the ration to 8 lbs., with which all parties seem well satisfied, instead of 10 lbs., it will " last some time."—" The forage on board our horse transports is in a very low state. " It does not seem to be anybody's business to attend to this mattter. I have spoken " of it several times. We have received very little forage from the transports, and only " what was not wanted at the time, or rather what they had not room for."—" I saw the " Captain of the 'Tynemouth' steamer at the Admiral's office yesterday, when he said " that a quantity of oats and hay he had on board could not be got rid of while at the " Crimea, although he made several applications to have them landed. He gave me to " understand that there were about 70 bales of hay and 300 bags of oats. This matter " is worth being inquired into. I do not believe that such a supply would have been " refused at the present time, when you [Commissary-General Filder] are making such " urgent requisitions upon me for forage; but the Captain's assertion was made a good " deal of by the Admiral, from whom I require so much assistance in the way of trans- " port." Upon which Commissary-General Filder wrote the following order, "Can you give any answer to this?" and Deputy Commissary-General Drake, his subordinate officer at Balaklava, wrote the following reply:—"No application was ever made to me " on this subject, nor was I aware that any hay was on board the 'Tynemouth,' " W. H. Drake, A.C.G., 16th November 1854."—" The forage which has been sent to " the Bosphorus on board the transports went from Eupatoria; not from this. It was " collected and dispatched by Captain Boys without our knowledge. Lord Raglan was " much annoyed at it."—" It is now nearly three weeks since you wrote to the admiral " for a steamer to tow up barley vessels, and full three weeks since he wrote to me " to say that he had collected (and it was ready to send) all the forage that was on " board the horse transports, yet nothing makes its appearance, and our stock is all " but gone."

C. G. Filder, Balaklava, Do. Do. 2 Nov.

D. C. G. Smith to C. G. Filder, Constantinople, 8 Nov. 1854.

C. G. Filder to D. C. G. Smith, 12 Dec. 1854.

Do. Do. 18 Dec.

The next resource on which we calculated was the supply of forage in the Crimea. According to all previous military experience, forage had been obtained from the country which was the seat of war; and rules are laid down in commissariat treatises for gathering in it, with the assistance of cavalry escorts or "foraging parties" of a strength suited to the occasion. As we had long been aware of the immediate neighbourhood of the fertile and extensive valley of Baidar, and the Russians were taken by surprise when the army arrived at Balaklava, and everything there, and no doubt also in the neighbouring valleys, was in its usual state, we supposed at the Treasury that the ordinary course of proceeding on such occasions would have been adopted. A large quantity of forage was found stacked within the lines; and Lord Lucan states in his evidence before the Sebastopol Committee that he represented to the Commissariat that it was being wasted by the infantry taking it to lie upon as bedding, and that an order was issued in consequence that all the divisions should post sentries over all the forage in their neighbourhood.

Q. 6419 to 6426.

The main resource upon which we calculated, however, was the supply of barley, hay, and chopped straw from Constantinople and the various ports of the Black Sea, the sea of Marmora, and the Mediterranean. These articles were to be had in unimlited quantities. An unlimited command of money had been placed at Mr. Filder's disposal; and he might have employed for the conveyance of forage any portion of the large number of transports attending upon the army which was not required for other purposes, and any amount of shipping besides which could have been taken up at Constantinople, Smyrna, or the other harbours of the Levant.

It will be remembered that in his letter to the Treasury of the 8th November, Mr. Filder mentioned forage corn as one of the articles for which he should not be dependent upon England; and this is an important point, because corn contains nourishment in a much more concentrated form than hay, and it is well-known that when horses are subjected to hard work and exposure, they will maintain their condition for a considerable period without hay, or with only a small proportion of it, provided they have plenty of corn. If the light cavalry horses, when they were picketed on the heights, had received twelve or fourteen pounds of barley instead of two and a half or three pounds, they would probably not have been the worse for their temporary deprivation of hay.

Page 8.

As regards hay, it has been shown that Mr. Filder applied on the 2d August 1854 for a hydraulic press, and that the Treasury sent him four; and more would have been sent if they had been asked for. On the 8th October, being the same day on which he reported to the Treasury that he believed his supplies to be ample, Mr. Filder made the following demi-official communication to Sir C. Trevelyan:—"You must not sup- " pose that because *all* the hay contracted for at Constantinople is not of proper quality, " none of it is, or that the expense of sending out the hydraulic press will be thrown " away. We shall probably even press the hay that is not of proper quality, as I fear, " with the number of animals we shall have to feed, of one sort or another, we shall " want all the forage we can get, only taking care not to pay for bad or inferior hay " the price of good." On the 11th October Mr. Filder wrote to Deputy Commissary-General Smith respecting this hay, as follows:—"Whilst all the sailing vessels which " were engaged for the voyage have arrived, not one of the Austrian and Turkish " vessels laden with Falanga's hay, and which are taken up by the month, have reached " us, although they left Constantinople first. It would be advisable not to engage

Page 4.

Page 7.

C. G. Filder, 8th Oct. 1854.

C. G. Filder to D. C. G. Smith, 11 Oct. 1854.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

"any more vessels by the day or month. Pray let the hydraulic presses be set to work "pressing the country hay; we want hay, good or bad; good if possible, but bad if not. "We have many animals to feed, some of which are not very particular as to the quality "of what they eat—the araba oxen for instance—for which we shall shortly have to "issue regular rations, or they will die, and we can ill spare them. Only instruct "Mr. Downes not to receive over from the contractors hay not coming reasonably up "to the condition of contract without making a corresponding reduction of price—let "the alternative be rejection. Pressed, the hay will not be an expensive ration. We "are now precisely in the circumstances with a view to which I made the contract."

D. C. G. Smith to Sir C. Trevelyan, 25 Oct. 1854.

And on the 25th of the same month Mr. Smith wrote to Sir C. Trevelyan as follows:—"I am sending on abundance of supplies for the army. Several vessels with hay, biscuit, "rice, salt meat, rum, porter, sugar, coffee, and medical comforts have arrived most "opportunely from England and Malta. The weather is fine, and the wind now fair "for sending them on, so that there is no fear of any want."

Chopped straw was less capable of being compressed than hay, but its bulk might have been much reduced by the simple expedient of pressing it after it had been placed in bags; and it was to be had in any quantity from the depôt at Constantinople within a few days after it was sent for. As regards the economizing of tonnage, a single ship plying between Constantinople and Balaklava would have done the work of many ships of the same size plying between England and Balaklava.

Page 10.

Allusion is made in the letter to Mr. Filder, dated 12th December 1854, to his obtaining supplies of sulla and clover from Malta, the resources of which station had been expressly placed at Mr. Filder's disposal as a reserve depôt. From the 15th November to the 18th December, Commissary-General Wild purchased at Malta by private agreement for the service of the army in the East, 23,807 lbs. of hay, 500,000 of dry sulla, and 100,000 lbs. of straw; of which, the whole of the hay, 73,680 lbs. of sulla, and 54,829 lbs. of straw were consigned to Commissary-General Filder on the 12th December on board the hired vessel "Conciliator;" and Mr. Filder might in like manner have obtained similar supplies from any other Mediterranean or Black Sea port at which there was a British Commissariat officer, consul, or any trustworthy private agent.

Commissary-General Wild, Malta, 15 Dec. 1854.
Do. Do. 18 Dec. 1854.

*Independently of the reserve of oats and hay in the horse transports, the Commissariat was never without a sufficient supply of forage corn at Balaklava; and, with the exception of a few days after the hurricane, when Mr. Filder borrowed the necessary quantity from the French Intendant-Général, the same remark applies to chopped straw.*

It is true that the Commissariat transport animals and the cavalry horses perished in great numbers; it is also true that, as regards the cavalry horses, this destruction was in part owing to their having been insufficiently fed. *But nevertheless, forage for the horses—like rice, tea, and lemon juice for the soldiers—was at that same time at Balaklava in abundance.*

The statement made in the last two paragraphs is fully supported by the extracts in the Appendix from what must in this case be allowed to be the highest description of evidence, viz., *the reports made from day to day, while the events were in progress, by Mr. Filder and the officers serving under him.*

It will be seen from these documents, that so far from attributing the destruction of the animals to a deficiency of forage at Balaklava, Mr. Filder repeatedly and emphatically denied that there was any such deficiency. It will also be seen how he accounted at the time when the events were passing under his eyes, and when his statements were capable of being immediately subjected to an unerring test, for the fact that the forage was neither brought to the horses nor the horses to the forage.

At a subsequent period Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch reported that the reason for not increasing the amount of transport was, that proper arrangements had not been made to provide the army with forage for the winter, wherever it might be at that season; to which Mr. Filder replied by throwing the whole burden of the defective arrangements upon the superintending department in England.

To this I answer,

First.—That the superintending department, acting according to the established and correct principle of administration in such cases, gave every practicable facility to the Commissary-General for obtaining supplies of forage in the neighbourhood of the seat of war, and also sent from England such additional quantities as according to the information furnished from time to time, appeared to be required.

Secondly.—That, notwithstanding the loss in the hurricane of the 14th November of 1,116,000 lbs. of forage corn and 800,000 lbs. of hay, which could not have been anticipated or calculated upon in England, there was constantly a supply of forage at Balaklava, and that the destruction of transport and cavalry horses was owing to other causes than the absence or presence of a sufficient supply of forage at that port.

Thirdly.—That the first estimate received from Mr. Filder of the probable consumption of forage in the Crimea was dated 13th November 1854, *and that it was not until the 27th of the same month that he reported what portion of that amount would be required from England.* These letters were received in December, and it has been shown that during that and the following month of January 2,217,700 lbs. of hay were shipped from England.

Page 9.
Pages 9 and 10.
Page 11.

Fourthly.—That the total number of animals in the Crimea which were fed by the Commissariat on the 1st November 1854, previously to the hurricane, amounted to 7,250. After that calamity many died, and the importations during the next four months about kept pace with the casualties, and the number rationed on the 28th February was 7,198. At no period did Mr. Filder express in his correspondence with the Treasury any intention or desire to increase the number of transport animals beyond the above-mentioned standard; on the contrary, it will be seen by a comparison of his two memorandums submitted to Lord Raglan, dated 5th October 1854 and 16th February 1855, that he considered the transport he had in the Crimea within a fortnight after his landing sufficient, and treated the remainder of the animals in depôt at Varna as an excess above the wants of the army while it remained in its position before Sebastopol.*

Pages 38 and 39.

The three papers noted in the margin were submitted to Lord Raglan for the express purpose of accounting for the deficiency and inefficiency of the Commissariat transport animals; and no reference whatever is made in them to a deficiency of forage as one of the reasons for the deficiency of transport animals. What those reasons were will be seen by a perusal of the papers themselves. The only conclusions that can be drawn from them are, that the difficulty of arranging for the conveyance of animals across the Black Sea under the actual circumstances of the time were so great, as to prevent even the replacing of the animals which had died; that the state of the available ground around Balaklava Harbour offered insurmountable obstacles to the use of a much greater number of pack animals than was then employed; and that Commissary-General Filder had not foreseen the necessity for more animals until it had become impossible to import them in time.

Report of A. C. G. C. Bagot Smith, the officer in charge of the Commissariat Transport, with remarks upon it by C. G. Filder and C. G. Adams, 11, 16, and 17 Jan. 1855, p. 29.

Report from C. G. Filder to the Quartermaster General, 16 Jan. 1855, p. 27.

Memorandum submitted by C. G. Filder to Lord Raglan, 16 Feb. 1855, p. 37.

In February 1855 the War Department, finding that the animals to be collected in the Crimea would be greatly increased by the extensive purchases which were being made for the Land Transport Corps, as well as by the horses sent out to reinforce the artillery and cavalry, took measures for greatly increasing the quantity of hay sent from England. A different class of circumstances had therefore arisen from that which the Treasury had to consider and provide for. It is obvious that the assistance required from England towards feeding 7,000 animals, was of a widely different kind from that which became indispensable when 23,000 were to be fed, the number stated by Mr. Filder to have been in the Crimea in July 1855.

Although my statements are based upon the explanations furnished while the events were in progress, and before any person had been formally placed on his defence, and I have herefore abstained from alluding to the evidence subsequently given before Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, I am prepared to show that my statements are abundantly confirmed by that evidence.

Treasury, 15th April 1856. C. E. TREVELYAN.

* See also Mr. Filder's letter to the Quartermaster General at page 27.—"Whilst the roads to the Camp were "passable, the Commissariat Transport was more than sufficient for the wants of the army in its present position;" and his letter to Sir C. Trevelyan, dated the 13th November 1854, quoted at page 47 of the 3d Report of the Sebastopol Committee:—"I am full of apprehension as to our power of keeping this army supplied during the coming winter, "not from want of supplies *or of Transport*; but in this crowded little harbour," &c.

## APPENDIX.


| No. | | Page |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | General After Order, 14 November 1854 | 21 |
| 2. | Commissary-General Filder to Sir C. Trevelyan, 18 November 1854 | 21 |
| 3. | Commissary-General Filder to Sir C. Trevelyan, 27 November 1854 | 22 |
| 4. | Commissary-General Filder to Sir C. Trevelyan, 3 December 1854 | 22 |
| 5. | Commissary-General Filder to Lord Raglan, 6 December 1854 | 22 |
| 6. | Commissary-General Filder to Sir C. Trevelyan, 13 December 1854 | 23 |
| 7. | Commissary-General Filder to the Quartermaster-General, 14 December 1854 | 24 |
| 8. | Commissary-General Filder to Captain Christie, R. N., 18 December 1854 | 25 |
| 9. | Memorandum submitted by the Commissary-General to Lord Raglan, 4 January 1855 | 26 |
| 10. | Commissary-General Filder to the Under Secretary of State, 19 January 1855, with | 26 |
| | Report to the Quartermaster-General, 16 January 1855, and | 27 |
| | Report of D. A. Commissary-General C. Bagot Smith to the Commissary-General, 11 January 1855, with remarks by Commissary-General Filder and Deputy Commissary-General Adams | 29 |
| 11. | Commissary-General Filder to the Military Secretary, 17 January 1855 | 32 |
| 12. | Commissary-General Filder to the Under Secretary of State for War, 19 January 1855 | 33 |
| | D. C. G. Smith to C. G. Filder, 15 January 1855 | 34 |
| 13. | Memorandum submitted by Commissary-General Filder to Lord Raglan, 27 January 1855 | 34 |
| 14. | Statement respecting deficient Rations in the Second Division | 35 |
| | Ditto Third Division | 36 |
| | Ditto Fourth Division | 37 |
| | Extracts from a Memorandum submitted, with the preceding statements, by Commissary-General Filder to Lord Raglan, 16 February 1855 | 37 |
| 15. | C. G. Filder to Sir C. Trevelyan, 8 October 1854, with | 38 |
| | Memorandum submitted by the Commissary-General to Lord Raglan, 5 October 1854, and his Lordship's order upon it | 39 |


### (1.)

### GENERAL AFTER ORDER.

Head Quarters before Sebastopol, 14 November 1854.

*The roads in the neighbourhood of the encampment of the troops, and especially that between Balaklava and the lines, having become so bad as to render it impossible*

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. B.

*to convey provisions to the troops*, it is necessary that immediate steps be taken to repair them. For that purpose the Turkish troops at Balaklava are at this moment most available; they will therefore be so employed, and will receive a pecuniary allowance of 3*d.* per diem, under a captain, who will receive 1*s.* per diem, provided the stipulated quantity of work is accomplished, otherwise not, to be determined by the superintending officer.

The Turkish troops employed in the trenches will receive 3*d.* by day and 4*d.* by night, under the same conditions in respect to exertion as is mentioned above.

By order,
T. B. B. Estcourt, Adj. Gen.

---

(2.)

Commissary-General Filder to Sir C. Trevelyan.

Balaklava, 18 November 1854.

Notwithstanding that we can purchase in this country plenty of forage corn, or at least have been able to do so as yet, a cargo of oats from England in sacks is exceedingly acceptable occasionally, for what with the impossibility of procuring labourers here, and the want of every sort of convenience, not having even magazines on shore, we find it impossible to sack the corn we buy in bulk sufficiently fast to meet the consumption of the army. At this moment, for instance, when everybody is occupied in repairing the damages done to the shipping in the harbour after the hurricane, the cavalry and artillery would be without corn, were it not for the opportune arrival of the "Roman Empress" with a cargo of oats in sacks from England. These occasional arrivals have the further good effect of alarming the holders of barley at Constantinople, who, not knowing to what extent they may be expected, lower their prices immediately.

---

(3.)

Commissary-General Filder to Sir C. Trevelyan.

Balaklava, 27 November 1854.

The issue of rice to this army as forming part of the ration having only been a temporary measure, it ceased to be supplied to the troops from 15th instant.

It had been my intention to propose to Lord Raglan that this extra allowance should be continued whilst the army occupied its present position, and the siege of Sevastopol was going on, but *in consequence of the death, from exposure to the wet and cold, of many of the transport animals, and of the breaking down of the arabas and mule carts, owing to the almost impassable state of the roads*, I am unable, whilst the interior of the country is closed to us, to provide conveyance for more than for the articles composing the fixed ration.

I would suggest, therefore, that the shipments of rice advised by your letter of the 6th instant should be discontinued for the present, as the quantity in depôt at Constantinople and on the way from England will be sufficient for a considerable time for the issues to the Turkish troops, who will continue to receive rice as part of their regular ration.

---

(4.)

Commissary-General Filder to Sir C. Trevelyan.

Balaklava, 3 December 1854.

Up to a very recent period the troops have been abundantly supplied with provisions of excellent quality, having had extra allowances of all the more essential articles of diet, viz., of biscuit, fresh meat, rum, and rice; but latterly, *owing to a continuance of bad weather*, many of our transport animals, *exposed without shelter to the wet and cold*, have, in common with the horses of the artillery and cavalry, died, and *the roads having become from the same cause impassable for wheeled carrriages, and nearly so for pack animals when loaded*, a portion of the troops have experienced a deficiency of meat, and in a less degree of rum.

---

(5.)

Commissary-General Filder to Lord Raglan.

Balaklava, 6 December 1854.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of 5th instant, respecting the deficiencies that have occurred in the rations of the troops, and inquiring whether my arrangements were such as would ensure a regular supply of provisions for the future.

See the preceding letter.

The enclosed extract of a report which I have recently addressed to the Lords of the Treasury on this subject will, I trust, convey to your Lordship the information desired.

In addition, however, to what I have there stated, I would beg to submit to your Lordship's consideration other circumstances arising out of the occupation of Balaklava, as our shipping port and the depôt for our supplies, which impede the Commissariat service, and expose our arrangements to irregularity.

Whenever the wind blows with violence from the south, our cattle vessels cannot get out of the harbour, in consequence of its narrow entrance; and when it blows from any westerly point they cannot take in cargo at Eupatoria. The vessels have recently experienced obstructions from both these causes, which, by preventing the arrival of live cattle, has created an additional demand upon our transport for the conveyance of salt meat to the camp.

Another impediment is, that we have no suitable magazines for the stores of so large an army, and as the supplies cannot be exposed on the quay to the wet and in the mud, they can for the most part only be landed as the transport from the divisions arrives, which requires a combination of arrangements with respect to boats, &c. very liable to fail, and to cause unavoidable delays in the issues.

With regard to the deficiency of 1,732 lbs. hay to the heavy cavalry, on the 3d instant, I would observe that the regiments send a portion of their horses into Balaklava for their forage, and I have already mentioned to Lord Lucan that they do not come provided with sufficient means for carrying out their proper ration when they might draw it, for there was no deficiency on the 3d instant.

The representations which have been made respecting the artillery waggons of the Light Division having been sent to Balaklava for hay without being loaded, and which have been referred to me, relate, with one exception, to a period before we had in any degree recovered from the loss we had sustained of 21 days' supply of that article by a hurricane. The batteries in question refused to receive wet hay with, in the first instance, a portion of dry, and subsequently without any of the latter, whilst other batteries accepted it in that state.

---

(6.)

Commissary-General FILDER to Sir C. TREVELYAN.

Balaklava, 13 December 1854.

The state of affairs with respect to the supply of the troops, I regret to have to inform you, continues as reported in my letter of the 3d instant, *the roads being still impassable*, and the steam vessel which was sent to Constantinople to bring up additional transport animals having been delayed there for repairs, although none were stated to be necessary before she left the fleet.

Had she returned with the animals in the time in which the voyage is usually performed, or the Admiral Superintendent at Constantinople been able to substitute another vessel for her, seeing the urgency of the service, no deficiencies of provisions would have occurred in the issues to the army.

See the preceding page.

*I may mention in proof of the state of the roads, and that it is not the Commissariat transport alone that is unable to contend against it, that a waggon of the Royal Artillery with ten horses was unable to reach the camp, having a load of only* 1,400 *lbs. of forage corn.*

The necessity of converting draught mules into pack mules to meet this condition of the roads has diminished our transport power by two-thirds, *besides the losses by death from exposure and fatigue*, and the animals, moreover, now take two days to do what they before performed in one.

---

(7.)

Commissary-General FILDER to the QUARTERMASTER GENERAL.

Balaklava, 14 December 1854.

I have now the honour to report, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, that these deficiencies relate to a period shortly after the hurricane of 14th November, on which occasion nearly all the hay in the possession of the Commissariat was lost; a small quantity of it, however, was recovered, wet, and issued in the first instance with a portion of dry hay, and subsequently without any of the latter; but Captain Morris' battery refused to receive it in that state, whilst other batteries accepted it. There was only one of the days included in the period mentioned on which no forage was offered to Captain Morris' battery, viz. the 1st December, when, although there was a vessel laden with chopped straw in the harbour, it was found impossible to land it in time.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dacres would appear not to be aware that a ship containing nearly all the hay in the possession of the Commissariat (amounting to 20 days' supply), having been ordered out of the harbour of Balaklava, was lost, with many other Commissariat vessels, in the hurricane of 14th ultimo. Such a loss, in a country where no forage is to be obtained, must necessarily cause a deficiency, for which the Commissariat cannot be considered in any degree responsible.

I would observe, however, that the deficiencies in the issues of hay to this particular battery up to the period of the hurricane have been trifling. From 28th September, when the army arrived at Balaklava, to the 22d November, when the effect of the loss of hay by the hurricane was felt, there have only been five days, viz. from 11th to 15th October, on which it has not received a full ration; and on those days 6 lbs. or 8 lbs. per horse per diem of English hay was issued to it.

In pursuance of the orders of the Commander of the Forces, communicated to me by your letter of the 24th October, I sent to every place in the Black Sea where it was

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

likely that hay could be procured, but at only one of them could any be obtained, and there only a small quantity. *Of chopped straw we have a depôt at Constantinople, from which place it can most readily be shipped, and there is at all times a supply of this article at Balaklava;* but it is not possible, by any means of transport available with this army, to convey from a distance by sea forage (either hay or straw) in an unpressed state, in sufficient quantities to meet its consumption. A vessel of 600 tons will not contain more than 50 tons of unpressed hay; nor, if it were possible to convey them, could sufficient quantities of forage in an unpressed state be issued for the vast number of animals belonging to this army from one depôt, where the Commissariat is not provided with the requisite magazines and sheds on shore for its reception; and it can consequently only be issued in proportion as it is landed from the ships.

I have to add, that from a few days after the date of your letter of the 24th October up to the period of the hurricane, and from 2d December up to the present time, all the horses of the artillery have received full rations of pressed hay.

---

(8.)

Commissary-General FILDER to Captain CHRISTIE, R.N.

Balaklava, 18 December 1854.

I beg to acquaint you that the interruption caused by the sudden withdrawal of the means of landing supplies is at all times attended with very serious consequences, and, under existing circumstances, should not on any account be done without a previous reference to or communication with this department.

From the want of sufficient magazines the army are entirely dependent on being furnished daily with some article or another from the shipping; and yesterday the appropriation of the long-boat of the "Lady Valiant" to another service caused a serious interruption to the supply of barley; and one of the regiments of cavalry, after waiting for it the greater part of the day, was obliged to return to camp without any. This will probably be attributed to the want of arrangement or otherwise of the Commissariat, and will no doubt be the cause of serious complaint; and when called upon for explanation by the Commander of the Forces, the real cause of the deficiency must be stated.

---

(9.)

MEMORANDUM submitted by the Commissary-General to Lord RAGLAN.

Balaklava, 4 January 1855.

The Commissary-General deems it his duty to bring to the notice of the Commander of the Forces the obstructions which the state of the road along the quay at Balaklava causes to the forwarding of supplies to the camp, and which have now reached such a point that there is reason to apprehend that, unless the road is speedily mended, the service must come to a stand.

The road is in many parts impassable, and everywhere many inches deep in mud, so that the soldiers and civilian drivers who attend with animals to be loaded have to wait, owing to the want of all the necessary accommodation for the quick despatch of supplies, several hours standing in the wet and cold up to their knees in mud.

To this, more than to any other single cause, may be attributed, I am of opinion, the great mortality and sickness that have taken place amongst the Commissariat storekeepers and labourers employed on the wharf, and it is to be supposed that it must have occasioned a proportionate sickness amongst the soldiers.

The suffering they experience from this cause is also, no doubt, the motive of the many desertions that take place amongst the Commissariat labourers, who seize every opportunity of a foreign vessel leaving the harbour to hide themselves on board and abscond.

---

(10.)

Commissary-General FILDER to the UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE.

Commissariat, Balaklava, 19 January 1855.

I have the honour to transmit to you, for the information of his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, copy of a correspondence which has taken place between the Quartermaster-General of this army and myself respecting the state of the Commissariat transport.

I would beg to add, in further explanation, that at the time the vessel alluded to in the correspondence (the "Jason") was sent to Constantinople to bring up more transport animals, the deficiency of 279 horses, as shown in the report of Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Smith, the officer in charge of the transport, had not taken place, nor could so unprecedented a loss have been anticipated by me. The number of effective animals with the army before this deficiency took place, and including those to be brought by the "Jason," would have amounted to 962, which is quite sufficient for carrying to the camp the daily ration of provisions, and for the new service of conveying fuel, and is as many as can, in addition to the vast number of animals for which rations are already drawn, be provided for in the Crimea, seeing that a considerable proportion of unpressed forage has to be brought from a distance by sea, and that a vessel of 600 tons can only convey 50 tons of hay or straw in that state.

On learning this deficiency, however, I immediately made the application adverted to in my letter of 16th instant for other vessels to bring up more animals.

A great proportion of the horses lost will, I have no doubt, be recovered by the aid of the military authorities; although the circumstance of there being three different armies on the spot will add, I fear, somewhat to the difficulty of accomplishing this object.

---

Commissary-General FILDER to the QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL.

Balaklava, 16 January 1855.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant, requesting to be furnished, for the information of the Commander of the Forces, with a statement of the transport at the disposal of the Commissariat, and the means the department possesses of conveying up from Balaklava to the camp the huts, timber, buffalo robes, and other stores expected shortly from England, and informing me also that a great extent of storage would be required for these articles.

I accordingly transmit herewith a return, showing the means of conveyance of every description in possession of the Commissariat, with its appropriation, and a report from Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Smith, the officer in charge of the transport depôt, on the state of the transport service, to which I have added some remarks. This latter document I beg to lay before the Commander of the Forces, with the view of bringing under his notice the system of horse lifting which prevails, and the losses we have sustained in consequence.

As the transport service is one of the utmost importance to this army, I may be permitted briefly to advert to the circumstances which have brought it to its present state of inefficiency.

*Whilst the roads to the camp were passable, the Commissariat transport was more than sufficient for the wants of the army in its present position;* it was not only equal to the conveyance to the camp of all the regulated rations, but of extra rations also. A portion of it was likewise employed daily, from the commencement of the siege, in carrying up stores to the trenches; and in addition to this, 150 mules, with a proportion of carts which had been appropriated for the purpose of forming a depôt of provisions on the high ground at head-quarters, near the camp, as a precautionary measure against bad weather and bad roads, were employed during several days immediately after the battle of Inkerman in carrying up musket ammunition to the camp; *but when the roads became impassable, both men and beasts perished in great numbers, owing to the fatigue they underwent in struggling to get through with the supplies, and from exposure to the wet and cold.* This, as respects the animals, took place not merely with the small horses of the country, but the finest mules which had been imported from Spain for the transport service suffered equally.

*On perceiving that the transport animals required to be relieved alternately,* and before any material casualties had occurred, *I made application* for a steam transport to be sent to Constantinople *to bring up more horses* from the depôt there, and applications have been subsequently made by me for other transports for the same purpose; *but on every occasion delays have taken place* in despatching the vessels from causes beyond my control, *and the animals have not arrived in time.*

A large importation of horses was, as observed by you, recently received by the Commissariat, but great losses instantly occurred, as explained in the report above mentioned of Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Smith, of which a large proportion was owing to the practice of horse-stealing, to which I have before adverted.

*The ordinary transport* establishment of an army, however complete and efficient it might be, *would be quite inadequate to the conveyance,* in addition to the usual supplies, of indefinite quantities of wooden houses, timber, and other *various stores enumerated by you.* It could only be provided by having recourse to extraordinary measures; and the transport of this country not being available to us, and the roads being impassable for wheeled carriages, *it would be necessary to purchase and import pack animals to an amount which could not be collected and transported by sea,* particularly at this season of the year, *under a period of several months.*

*The available ground around Balaklava Harbour* is moreover already totally inadequate to the vast amount of business that has to be transacted in landing and forwarding guns, ammunition, engineer stores, fascines, and gabions, camp equipage, Quartermaster-General's stores, and Commissariat supplies for so large an army, and *offers insurmountable obstacles to the use of a much greater number of pack animals than is at present employed.* This want of space and wharfage for landing the stores, together with the total absence of suitable magazines, give rise to irregularities and delays in despatching the transport, which are unavoidable.

And with respect to the ample storage which you pointed out in your letter of 26th ultimo as being necessary to prepare, I would beg to observe, that there are no magazines in Balaklava, the hovels that have been given over to the Commissariat to serve as such being undeserving of the name, and the most valuable property consequently now lies on the wharf, or in the adjoining yards in the mud, for the want of store room.

These combined causes give rise to numerous complaints respecting the issue of stores, although the fault lies in most cases, particularly as regards Quartermaster-General's

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

stores, with the parties making them, and is owing to their not being furnished with orders signed according to the form which has been prescribed, not by the Commissariat, but by the military authorities, for the protection of the army, and without the observance of which one regiment might be supplied with necessaries to the detriment of another.

With respect also to the steps which I may have taken for completing the spare ammunition animals and the regimental bât horses, upon which you desire information, I have the honour to state that the steam ship "Jason" was sent to Constantinople *on 29th ultimo* for horses for these purposes, but has been detained there with sick on board. Application was likewise made by me on 10th instant, for additional means of conveyance for bringing up a further number of transport animals from Constantinople, but it has not yet been complied with.

*In conclusion, I would beg to be permitted to observe, that the Commissariat did not foresee, any more than other departments, that the army would be in its present situation, otherwise precautionary measures might have been taken to mitigate some of the evils and inconveniences now experienced.* In these circumstances, therefore, it only remains for the Commissariat to make every exertion to meet the difficulties in which the army is placed, and to carry on the service to the best of their ability.

---

D. A. Commissary-General C. Bagot Smith to the Commissary-General.

Transport Office, Balaklava,
Sir, 11 January 1855.

I beg to submit for your information the enclosed statement of transport under my charge this day, embracing the receipts and issues since my return from Constantinople on 16th December last.

The deficiency of animals, you will perceive, is very great, and it is to the causes which have led thereto that I would beg to advert.

They may be justly attributed, in my opinion—

1st. *To the unfitness of the Turks as muleteers.* On this point I would observe, that, notwithstanding I have adopted every means in my power, and endeavoured to establish a proper chain of responsibility throughout the transport service under my charge, I have failed in accomplishing the end in view, as I find, and have found ever since my arrival in Turkey, that it is utterly impossible to exercise effectual control over the Turkish muleteers, who are so incorrigibly idle, and in all other respects so totally useless, that no satisfactory result can be obtained from their employment.

2d. *The severity of the weather* of late has increased the natural apathy of the Turks, and has caused the death of a great many animals; but it has been found quite impossible to ascertain, either from the "onbanshees" (Turkish conductors), or the muleteers, the particulars of such loss; a still greater number have been abandoned *en route* to and from the camp.

The difficulties which exist in loading the daily supplies, owing to *the crowded and filthy state of the wharf*, prevents most of the animals being despatched until the afternoon, at an hour which does not admit of their reaching their destination until very late at night, or their return to the depôt until near morning on the following day; the delay thus occasioned, the fatigue the men have to undergo, the wretchedness and misery they are subject to from having to stand about all day in the cold wet mud, the distance they are obliged subsequently to travel, over a most difficult country in all weathers, renders them not only still more inefficient from exhaustion, but utterly careless and indifferent to their charge, which they abandon, laden or otherwise, the moment they escape from the surveillance of those placed over them, and either return to their tents or else desert.

16 January 1855.

It was not foreseen that the army would be in its present situation, but as soon as it was perceived that these men could not withstand the cold to which they would be exposed, and that they were in other respects unsuited to the service, I applied for an organized corps of drivers from England, and a portion of the men were ready for embarkation towards the end of December.

The Commissariat transport horses have been overworked. No horses could stand being worked daily over nearly impassable roads; but the public bât animals attached to the regiments which were furnished from the Commissariat depôt, as well as horses the private property of officers, show that the horses of the country which have not been overworked are hardier, and retain their condition under adverse circumstances, better than English horses.

(Signed) William Filder, C.G.

The horses suffer equally with the men. Those which are not lost have to remain nearly the whole day without food, and are consequently in a few days completely unserviceable. Such as are abandoned are rarely ever recovered, as it is impossible to obtain correct evidence of the misfortune.

Another reason why so many horses soon become inefficient is, that those which arrived from Constantinople were in very miserable condition, and quite unfit for more than one week's hard work in the present season of the year.

3d. A very material point in explanation of our disasters is, *the deplorable state of the roads leading to the front.* For the last two months they have been almost wholly impassable; they are now so thoroughly out of repair, and beset with so many obstacles, that is only by the greatest possible exertion on the part of man and horse that the supplies are transported to the camps. In the attempt the men are completely worn out, and the horses are not unfrequently left to die in the mud, from which they are unable to extricate themselves.

4th. Very many horses have been found in the possession of individual soldiers and entire regiments; *horse-lifting has become quite a practice here*, and, as bearing upon the subject, I beg to enclose for your information a copy of a letter received by me from Lieutenant Nixon, in charge of the horse depôt, and a statement of one of my storekeepers, whom I sent some time ago with sick horses to the depôt, at Karani. The recovery of the latter cost me considerable trouble and annoyance.

Repeated instances of complaint against soldiers possessing themselves of Commissariat horses have been brought to me; but, beyond admonishing the delinquents, and retaining the horses, I have not had time to enter into the particulars of each case.

The practice has become so general, that a horse left for five minutes in any part of the town without its rider is sure to disappear.

I am perfectly satisfied that a great many horses which do not belong to them are in the possession of regiments; and I would submit, that some effectual steps be taken to prevent the continuance of a practice so detrimental to the public interests, and to enforce the return of such horses as may be improperly detained, or the possession of which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for.

It will be found, however, a difficult matter to identify many of the horses as being public property, as the Commissariat mark is either overgrown, or has been purposely defaced, and the number of a regiment substituted on another part of the body. Some of the horses which came from Eupatoria were not branded, owing partly to the pressure which existed for their employment in conveying provisions to the front the moment they were disembarked, and the impossibility of afterwards having it done.

The Commissary-General having referred the annexed report to me as principal Deputy Commissary-General with this army, and superintending officer, I beg to submit the following remarks:—

Nearly all the available transport animals are at present stationed at Balaklava, and come to the wharf immediate after being fed; it is not necessary, therefore, that they should be fed again before they have done any work. When they were kept at the village of Karani, and came down to Balaklava, they were invariably fed while waiting to be loaded.

Since D. A. C. G. Smith resumed the charge, nearly all the animals have been apportioned to the divisions, and the rule is, that the transport of each division should attend in rotation; but the officers, in their anxiety to get the supplies up to the front, do not always observe it; indeed, *the delays which frequently occur prevent every effort to establish regularity and arrangement. The different articles cannot always be landed in sufficient time and quantity. Ships become jammed in, and cannot be approached. If rum and salt meat are required, they cannot sometimes be got at until lighter articles and biscuit are removed from above them; and many other obstructions and delays occur, which baffle the most anxious and strenuous exertions to overcome them; they are altogether beyond our power of control.*

There is another serious obstacle to the landing of the supplies, *the want of sufficient boats*, on board of steamers especially, and the plea frequently set forth is, that the charter-party only requires the crew of the vessel to deliver the packages alongside. This was not the practice during the last war, when every transport was provided with a sufficient long boat, and all boats could be employed in discharging any vessel. On Sundays, too, the crews often refuse to work, and fatigue parties cannot always be obtained.

The boats of the men-of-war are often engaged in embarking the sick and wounded, and landing ordnance and ammunition, and can only afford limited assistance to the Commissariat.

*But the greatest of all our obstacles is the totally inadequate space, and the want of magazines in Balaklava for such vast operations, and the badness and impassability of the roads, if roads they can be considered.*

(Signed) D. Adams, D. C. G.

17 January 1855.

In conclusion, I would beg to observe, that, under existing difficulties, it would be quite impossible to maintain an efficient transport establishment sufficient to meet the wants of this army without the aid of an enlisted corps of drivers, properly officered, and governed upon military principles. The men should be furnished with a suitable uniform, otherwise they would not be recognized by those for whom they labour. The absence

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

of an acknowledged uniform in any branch of the service in connexion with the army gives rise to much inconvenience, and I have found it frequently the case in reference to my superintendents and other subordinate persons, whose authority is often questioned and held in contempt, although they may be in performance of important duties, and thus the public service suffers.

The proportion of drivers should be with horse and mule transport one to every two animals.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. Bagot Smith, D.A.C.G.

---

(11.)

Commissary-General Filder to the Military Secretary.

Balaklava, 17 January 1855.

I am sorry that Lord Raglan should have determined upon relinquishing the chopped straw without ordering a communication to be made to me on the subject, as I am apprehensive that we may, in consequence, experience a deficiency of forage.

Immediately after the hurricane of 14th November, when we lost all our hay, General Canrobert offered us three vessels of chopped straw, and I accepted the assistance, but did not remove the vessels from Kamiesch Bay, hoping that I should be able to carry on the service without availing myself of it until the arrival of the regular consignments of hay from England; *for as yet we have never been without a supply of chopped straw in Balaklava Harbour.* But the continued prevalence of contrary winds lately made me uneasy, and about two weeks ago I sent to order the vessels round from Kamiesch Bay to Balaklava; when I received a letter from the Intendant-General, saying, that affairs were very much changed since the straw was first offered to me, and that the French army now required forage, but that nevertheless he would give me two vessels instead of three. Thereupon I immediately wrote to Sir Edmund Lyons to request he would order them to be towed round as soon as the weather permitted. It is to this last offer, I presume, that General Canrobert must allude, for I accepted the first offer in writing, and it took place two months ago; and with respect to the second offer, there has been no other delay than that caused by the weather; indeed I think that, after having accepted in writing the three vessels, they should have been considered mine.

It is indispensable, and very urgent, that one vessel at least, if not both of them, should be recovered without delay, or we shall be deficient of forage.

---

(12.)

Commissary-General Filder to the Under Secretary of State, War Department.

Balaklava, 19 January 1855.

With regard to the statement that the laundry of the hospital at Scutari is choked up with chopped straw, whilst the horses are said to be starving in the Crimea, I have called upon the Commissariat officer at Constantinople for an explanation of the first part of the allegation; and with respect to the latter part I have the honour to state that *at no time, from a few days subsequent to the hurricane, have we ever been without two or three vessels in the harbour of Balaklava laden with chopped straw. So uniformly has this been the case, that I have not found it necessary, until now, that a long continuance of contrary winds has retarded the arrival of further supplies from Constantinople, to avail myself of the offer which General Canrobert made of three vessels of chopped straw, which he placed at our disposal immediately after the loss of all our forage by that event. Previous to the hurricane we had always a large supply of English hay on hand.*

*That there should be any deficiency in the issues of forage, whilst there is a supply in the harbour, arises from the circumstance that, either on account of the state of the weather or from some other unexpected occurrence, a sufficient quantity for the issues of the day cannot be landed. There are no suitable magazines on shore in which the forage can be stored, and it cannot be left without shelter in the mud and rain.* A large proportion of the hay or straw also, in the absence of pressed hay from England, being unpressed, it adds very much to the difficulty of landing and issuing it in sufficient quantities, for which service, indeed, we are almost wholly dependent upon the boats of the navy.

As soon as it became obvious that we should be obliged to winter in our present position, I sent to Constantinople for deals and artificers, for the purpose of erecting sheds, which are now in course of construction.

---

[The explanation referred to at the commencement of the preceding letter was subsequently received from Deputy Commissary-General Smith, the Commissariat officer in charge at Constantinople, and was as follows:—]

Deputy Commissary-General Smith to Commissary-General Filder.

Commissariat, Constantinople, 15 January 1855.

The building referred to as a laundry was lent by the Turkish Government to our first contractors, Messrs. Falanga and Co., and handed over by them several months ago to

this department, in compliance with your own request, *expressly for a reserve depôt of chopped straw.* It is situated between the barracks and hospital. Was never, that I can learn, previously used as a laundry or supposed to be wanted for such a purpose, but the moment an application was made for it in furtherance of very recent hospital arrangements, I directed Assistant Commissary-General Potgieter, the officer in local charge at Scutari, to effect the removal of the straw, which he has been doing as far as the means at his disposal will admit of.

*Without having recourse to this depôt there has been an abundance of straw more easily available for shipment to the Crimea,* and I have caused cargoes of it to be forwarded to the utmost extent to which the means of transport afforded me would admit of. If, therefore, the supply of hay or straw has not been regularly maintained in the Crimea, it has been caused either by adverse weather, or the difficulties we have had to contend with for want of proper shipping arrangements, difficulties which I have repeatedly brought under your notice, and which are so notorious as to require no elucidation on the present occasion.

*At all events, there has never been any want of barley or other forage corn at Balaklava.*

It may be necessary to add that straw is an article most difficult of transit in this country, where it is always broken up, cannot be pressed, and has to be shipped in bulk, so that even a large vessel can stow but a comparatively small quantity of it.

(13.)

MEMORANDUM submitted by Commissary-General FILDER to Lord RAGLAN.

Balaklava, 27 January 1855.

Irregularity in the arrival of supplies at the camp is owing to circumstances beyond the control of the Commissariat. With the crowded state of the harbour of Balaklava, the confined space for landing supplies and loading and despatching the transport, and with roads in which the animals tumble into deep holes at every few paces, it is quite impossible to ensure regularity in this respect.

*With respect to forage, I would observe, that with the exception of a few days after the hurricane (that is, from about the 21st to 30th November,) we have never been without a supply of hay or straw at Balaklava; but the state of the weather, the appropriation of the men-of-war's boats (upon which we are dependent) to the landing of guns and ammunition and embarkation of sick and wounded, or other circumstances, have occasionally prevented a sufficient quantity from being brought on shore;* and in some instances the cavalry have declined receiving chopped straw when landed. The brigade of light cavalry also experienced a deficiency, the most important one that has occurred, when it was stationed in front, the roads having been at that time wholly impassable for carts, and the distance having been considered by the military authorities to be too great for the horses to be sent to Balaklava to bring up their own forage.

*In proof that the death of horses has been owing to exposure, and, in the case of the transport animals, to great fatigue in addition, it may be stated, that all horses of this army which are under shelter are almost without exception in good condition, although they have received no greater allowance of food than other horses.*

(14.)

STATEMENT respecting deficient RATIONS in the SECOND DIVISION.

No deficiencies occurred in the issue of Commissariat supplies to the Second Division previously to the month of November, and none have occurred since the end of December.

The transport of supplies during the above period was a work of extreme labour, anxiety, and uncertainty, *owing to the severity of the weather, the casualties among the horses and mules, the almost universal desertion of the Maltese, Tartars, and Turkish drivers, and the terrible state of the roads, which precluded the use of carts.* From the latter cause an entirely new description of transport had to be organized, at a time when everything tended to render the undertaking most difficult. The supplies at the same time had to be kept up, and which, with the exceptions noted in the annexed return, was accomplished in spite of numerous casualties and losses, which sometimes in one night exceeded the total quantity of the deficiencies noted. The total deficiency with reference to the strength only amounted to one third of a pound of meat to each man in a period of two months, at the worst season of the year. The other articles are in still smaller proportions.

Fuel and candles have been always procurable at Balaklava, by sending the regimental bât horses for a supply. *Hay, since the tempest on the 14th November, has sometimes been deficient; but chopped straw or bran was always procurable in lieu of it.* Rice, noted as deficient by Lieutenant-Colonel Patullo, was no part of the ration after the 15th November, but it was, nevertheless, frequently issued under instructions from the Commissary-General.

W. TYRONE POWER, A.C.G.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

26 January 1855.

I entirely concur in the above statement. The deficiency on the supply of the ration has been very small, and quite unavoidable; and the exertions of the Assistant Commissary-General of the division have been most praiseworthy and remarkable.

G. Buller, M. General,
Commanding the Second Division.

---

Statement respecting deficient Rations in the Third Division.

| Date. | Particulars. | Commissariat Reasons. |
|---|---|---|
| 1854. | | |
| Dec. 19 | The 3d Division received all the rations yesterday, with the exception of the full quantity of rum. | This arose from a supply of rum having been lost in transit in the dark, the drivers having lost their way. |
| „ 20 | The 1st Brigade received their rations, with the exception of their entire allowance of rum.<br>The 2d Brigade did not receive their full quantity of meat or rum. | *A supply of rum and salt meat was left on the road owing to the inclemency of the weather and impassable state of the roads.* An extra ration of rice was issued on the occasion to supply deficiencies. |
| „ 25 | The 3d Division received its rations, with the exception of the half ration of meat. | Owing to the loss of cattle by the guard. —*Vide* Report made on the subject by me. |
| „ 28 | The 1st Brigade only received half ration of meat.<br>The 2d Brigade was deficient of the following:—<br>4th Regiment - 240 lbs. meat.<br>9th „ - 200 „<br>28th „ - 254 „<br>44th „ - ½ lb. per man. | On this occasion *the native drivers attached to the transport depôts positively refused to work, owing to the severity of the weather;* thus the full supplies did not arrive from Balaklava in time. |
| „ 29 | The 1st Brigade received only half rations of meat yesterday; and the 2d Brigade was deficient of the following:—<br>4th Regiment - 240 lbs. meat.<br>9th „ - 190 „<br>28th „ - 254 „ / 31 lbs. coffee. / 55 lbs. sugar.<br>44th „ - 280 lbs. meat. | Deficient owing to want of transport from Balaklava, *arising from the loss of horses, through exposure and bad weather.* |

25 January 1855. Edw. B. de Fonblanque, A. C. G.

---

Statement respecting Deficiency of Rations in the Fourth Division.

The deficiencies in the issues have been caused by the insufficiency of the transport of the division, *so many animals having died from the severity of the weather, and been knocked up in consequence of the impassable state of the roads.* Many horses were also lost between Balaklava and the camp, owing to the negligence of the escort, and the insufficient number of men attached to the transport establishment; and on one occasion an escort of the 63d Regiment lost 26 horses laden with biscuit between Balaklava and the camp; and although every effort was made to trace them, neither horses or biscuit were ever found. These horses would have been sufficient to have brought up from Balaklava all the deficiencies shown in this statement.

26 January 1855. Henry Bartlett, D. A. C. G.

---

Extracts from a Memorandum submitted, with the preceding Statements, by Commissary-General Filder to Lord Raglan, 16 February 1855.

That the deficiencies have not been greater may, no doubt, be attributed in part to the troops having been marched down to Balaklava during a portion of the period in question to carry up rations. That this measure was had recourse to was owing to its having been necessary, when the roads became impassable for wheeled carriages, to convert all the draught into pack animals, by which two-thirds of their transport power was lost, a mule being capable of drawing 600 lbs., but of carrying only 200, and also to the country waggons being rendered useless or destroyed in the attempt to drag them through impassable roads. To this may be added the fact of the steam-ship "Jason," which was sent to Constantinople for more transport animals, having been absent on that service three weeks. Had she returned within the usual period, it would have been unnecessary for the troops to carry up any portion of their rations, as they ceased to do so shortly after the animals she brought became available, with the exception of a few regiments of the Light Division, which continued to send down men that were off duty to carry up provisions, with the view of forming "Reserve Regimental Depôts."

Another circumstance which tended to cause a deficiency in the rations was, that the Commissariat transport was employed in conveying the sick from the camp to Balaklava, and was generally detained, at both places, so long as to greatly impede and retard the forwarding of supplies.

And a further cause of deficiency was, that, *owing to the state of the roads, the transport occupied two days in performing what it had done, whilst the roads were passable in one.* At the same time the losses of animals *by death from fatigue and exposure* were numerous.

Any one of the foregoing causes would account for a much greater amount of deficiencies than has actually taken place.

Within little more than a fortnight from the time of our landing, I had imported into the Crimea—

| | |
|---|---|
| 216 carts, with 216 Spanish or Maltese mules, capable of conveying each 600 lbs., or | 129,000 |
| And 266 pack animals, capable of conveying 200 lbs. each, or | 53,000 |
| Total conveyed by means of public transport | 182,000 |
| There were at that time, in addition, in the employment of the Commissariat— | |
| 193 hired country waggons, capable of conveying each 700 lbs. | 135,100 |
| Equal to the conveyance of | Lbs. 317,300 |

*Which is much more than is required for the British army in respect of Commissariat supplies whilst in its present position.*

The public transport in possession of the Commissariat *before the animals were destroyed by fatigue in attempting to struggle through impassable roads, and exposure to wet and cold,* was equal, positively, in amount to that of the French army, and relatively to the respective forces of the two armies much greater.*

(15.)

Commissary-General FILDER to Sir C. TREVELYAN.

Balaklava, 8th October 1854.

The depôt at Varna is to be broken up, and the Commissariat transport animals *in excess of the number required for the service of the army in the Crimea* have been ordered overland to Constantinople, there to remain lest their services should hereafter again be required. I enclose copy of a memorandum which was submitted by me to Lord Raglan on this subject, and of his Lordship's decision thereon.

MEMORANDUMS.

6 October 1854.

IT being impossible to say what may be the next operation, and *there being no reason to suppose that the war is near its termination, it appears to me that the most prudent course will be to send the Commissariat horses and mules in excess of our present wants* from Varna to Constantinople by land, and have them kept in that neighbourhood upon such rations of forage as animals doing nothing may seem to require.

I think the buffaloes should not be sold.

They might either be left at Varna or sent into Rumelia travelling towards Constantinople at a slow rate.

(Signed) RAGLAN.

Balaklava, Crimea, 5 October 1854.

The Commissary-General solicits instructions respecting the disposal of the Commissariat transport animals still remaining at Varna.

*The number he now has with the army, with some few more of the most efficient of the animals that might be brought from Varna, would, he is of opinion, be adequate to the transport service of this army, should its operations be confined within a limited sphere, as at present.* If any greater number were to be brought over than would suffice for this object they would only add to the difficulty of feeding the horses and baggage animals already in the Crimea.

*There would in that case remain between* 2,000 *and* 3,000 *animals in excess of any present want, and to be disposed of.*

As the depôt at Varna is about to be broken up, and the military withdrawn, *there appears to be no other mode of disposing of such excess than either by sale or by sending the animals to Constantinople,* if possible, overland, *there to remain in depôt in case they should be wanted for any future service.* If the former course were to be adopted the animals would fetch little or nothing, even if only a small proportion of them were to be sold, the original cost of those purchased in Bulgaria not having exceeded 4*l.* 10*s.* upon the average; and if the latter, a

* This interesting Memorandum will be found in extenso at pp. 429–432 of the Appendix of the Third Report of the Sebastopol Committee.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G

great number of them are not worth the cost of their maintenance during the winter.

*On the other hand, if the operations of the army should hereafter be on a more extended scale in this country, a considerable proportion of the* 2,000 *or* 3,000 *animals which would be in excess under the foregoing supposition would require to be brought over from Varna.*

Instructions also are solicited with respect to the disposal of the buffaloes remaining to Varna.

Major Adye has stated that they will not be required here for the artillery service.

They might be sold probably at Varna, but would fetch little, whilst at Constantinople animals of this description are much more valuable. If to be sent to the latter place, it would be necessary that a transport should be appropriated for their conveyance, as they could not travel that distance overland.

(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

Lord Raglan, G.C.B.,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 13.

COPY of a LETTER from Commissary-General FILDER, covering remarks on those parts of the REPORT of Sir JOHN M'NEILL and Colonel TULLOCH which relate to the Duties of the Commissariat Department.

Commissary-General FILDER to Mr. PEEL.

SIR, London, February 27, 1856.

Observing that Lord Panmure is reported to have stated in the House of Peers, that any representation which might be made by officers who felt themselves aggrieved by the Report of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch would be presented to Parliament, I have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed remarks on those parts of that document which relate to the duties of the Commissariat, and request you will have the goodness to obtain Lord Panmure's sanction to their being laid before the House of Commons.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER.

REMARKS on those parts of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Supplies of the British Army in the Crimea which relate to the Duties of the Commissariat.

The animadversions contained in the Report of the "Commission of Inquiry" recently laid before Parliament, so directly and heavily impugn my conduct in the charge lately held by me, that I am compelled to offer, in my own vindication, the following remarks on those parts of the Report which relate to the Commissariat duties. Though placed at a manifest disadvantage in being driven to this course, since there are neither distinct charges alleged against me, such as could be decided upon by a judicial tribunal, either civil or military, nor have I had any preparatory notice of the intention to put me thus on my defence, I yet hope to be able to show that my proceedings have not rendered me justly liable to the censure cast upon them. That under such a mass of difficulties as I had to contend with, they should have been altogether exempt from error, is a merit that I will not venture to claim; but, after a careful review, I still believe them to have been in the main correct, as far as the then existing circumstances could guide my judgment; and if less success attended them than I was led to expect, and was to be desired, any failure arising from causes beyond control ought not to be imputed to defect of zeal or ability on my part, or that of the meritorious body of officers acting under my direction.

The Commissioners have not, indeed, done us the injustice committed by some, less well informed of facts, of expressly denying to us the praise of having endeavoured to do our duty according to the measure of our ability; but they have, nevertheless, sought to reduce this measure, short as it may be, below its real limits, and by bringing together such a number of alleged instances of improvidence, omission, mismanagement, and even wilful disregard of the best interests of the service, as would, if substantiated, go far towards disproving their own admission in our favour. These instances are given in a scattered form, interspersed with their own general observations and suggestions, and cannot easily be collected together, under specific heads. I must, therefore, answer them in detail, as they stand in the Report; but as they partly arise out of a misconception of the extent of my power and responsibility as head of the Commissariat, it is necessary to the proper under-

standing both of the passages in the Report and of my explanations in reply to them, that I should premise a few remarks on the nature of the duties which the Commissariat had to perform with the army in the East, during the time of my charge, to which I will add some general notice of the means I had at my disposal for carrying them out. This, and all other needful information, could better have been furnished to the Commissioners on the spot, and would, whether sought or not, have been given by me, had they intimated the probability of any such accusations being brought against me or the Department; but this I was in no way led to expect, and the first knowledge I have of them is derived from the publication of the Report itself, more than seven months after its date, when I am far removed from the official records of my proceedings, as well as from officers whose more immediate acquaintance with facts and details would materially assist me in explaining and justifying them.

The Commissariat has the duty, by the regulations of the service, of raising, of holding, and of paying the funds necessary to meet the whole of the army expenditure, and of making all purchases required for the service of its own or any other Department. It is responsible for keeping up the supplies of provisions, forage, fuel, and light, according to the regulated scales of allowance, with such additions as may be specially authorized by the Commander of the Forces, but the Commissary-General has no authority to alter, nor has he, except so far as his opinion may be asked or deferred to, any influence in altering the established ration or other allowances in the most minute particular. With respect to supplies of any other kind, such as Quartermaster-General's and hospital stores, the Commissariat, during the time I was in charge of it, only held them on behalf of the Departments, at whose respective disposal they were, and issued them on their requisitions. Stores of this description with the army in the East have recently been given over to storekeepers of the Ordnance Department; but it was, and is still, the duty of the Commissariat, in case of any deficiency in the supply sent out from England, or of any emergency rendering necessary articles of a description not ordinarily in use, to purchase them on the authorized requisition of the proper Departments, the heads of those Departments being responsible for the extent and nature of their demands.

The Commissariat had, likewise, till it was transferred to a separate and independent establishment, the duty of providing all the Land Transport required for the service of the army.

To carry on these extensive and onerous duties, which, indeed, embrace all the civil administration of the army excepting the hospitals, and have since been divided amongst three separate Departments, I had from the first an insufficient establishment both of officers and subordinate employées, which was still further weakened by the great amount of sickness and mortality which prevailed, owing to the nature and excessive labour of the duties to be performed. No one of the subordinate establishments absolutely necessary to the efficiency of a field Commissariat existed at the outbreak of the war, and even the officers had to be collected from the most distant parts of the empire, from Sierra Leone, the Cape of Good Hope, and New South Wales, and of course by slow degrees. In the meantime I had to carry on the duties, with the temporary assistance of gentlemen furnished from other public Departments, and wholly without experience in Commissariat service. This inefficient state of the Department when I took charge of it, necessarily diverted much of my attention from the more important general arrangements of the service to the regulation of details; but I notice it less for the purpose of accounting for my own possible errors and omissions, than with the object of meeting the comparison which has been frequently made elsewhere, and is partially made use of in this Report between the success of the French and British Commissariat operations. That the success has been uniformly on the side of the former, is far from being established; but that generally it ought to be so is quite clear, inasmuch as there is the greatest possible advantage on that side, in the completeness of the establishments on which so much of Commissariat success depends. These are not, as with us, discarded at the termination of a period of active warfare, and wholly neglected during the continuance of peace, but are constantly kept up in an effective, even if a reduced state, and are considered as necessary an accompaniment of every body of detached troops as any other portion of the army, and thus give a facility of action to a French force at the outset, which can be acquired by an English army only after long, and perhaps disastrous, as well as costly experience. I do not presume here to enter into the question, whether or not a similar system ought to be adopted in our service; but the fact that no such system does exist in it should be taken into consideration in estimating the exertions of the British Commissariat officers, who usually, like myself, are thrown at once upon their own slightly aided resources, and compelled to occupy themselves in creating the means of action at the moment when action is already needed.

A further and, as regards my own immediate responsibility, a yet more important difficulty under which I laboured, was the uncertainty of the intended or probable position of the army during the approaching winter. The supply of a large force in that season requires in almost any country, subject to alternations of climate, timely and extensive previous arrangements, but in a situation like that of the besieging force before Sebastopol, it demanded attention as early even as when the army first landed. I had, indeed, before that expedition was known to be projected, and when it was generally supposed that the troops would be put into cantonments near Constantinople, applied to Lord Raglan for instructions to guide my preparations. I repeated my application when the expedition was

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

on its way, and renewed it in the early part of October; but it was not till the 12th of that month that his Lordship was able to give me any orders whatever on the subject. They then went no further than directions to lay in a stock of fuel at Scutari, and it was only on the 8th November, when winter had already commenced, that I learnt that the army would remain in the Crimea, and received orders to make provision accordingly. The Commissioners, though apparently aware of these facts, represent, as a defect of intelligence and foresight on my part, that I did not, of my own authority, and on my own responsibility, take measures from which the officer in chief command withheld his sanction, and they assume, contrary to the fact that through adherence to established, but inapplicable usages, I omitted to avail myself of the resources within my reach, by which the extraordinary and unforeseen exigencies of the service might have been met. My replies to their specific allegations will show how far they have misjudged my actual proceedings; but I may here observe that they have widely miscalculated my power of enlarging the bounds of them, without the risk of exposing myself to condemnation, which I had more cause to dread than their censure. Neither the Regulations nor the general character of our service give to the head of a Commissariat establishment the unlimited range of discretion which they presume; and although he may in solicitude for the ultimate benefit of the service venture far on his personal responsibility, it is hardly to be expected of a subordinate officer, that his zeal should carry him beyond the point which his immediate superior declines to overstep.

See Papers annexed hereto, marked A, B, and C.

| Observations of Commissioners. | Remarks. |
|---|---|
| *Quantities in Store.* | |
| But the ration of biscuit having, on the 15th of October, been increased by General Order to 1⅓lb. in consideration of the severe labour to which the troops were subjected, it was reduced on the 7th of November to 1lb., on the express ground of the "supply of biscuit being insufficient to furnish the increased ration, lately authorized." | The established ration for all troops in the field was not reduced: but the *extra* allowance was discontinued. It was a matter of notoriety that 1⅓ lb. of biscuit was more than the men could eat, and that they sold or gave away a part of what they received to the French troops who frequented our lines. This was before the storm or any deficiencies had occurred. My motive for recommending the discontinuance, under such circumstances, of the extra allowance was, that its issue impeded the progress of the depôt which I was then forming in front, that object being, at the same time, further impeded by the appropriation of a part of the Commissariat Transport for the conveyance of ammunition.<br>Had the extra quantity of biscuit issued to the troops in camp been allowed to accumulate in depôt there, the animals, which during the winter were occupied in transporting that article, might have been employed in carrying up other supplies which were then so much needed; the extra quantity issued very greatly exceeded all the deficiencies of biscuit which incurred throughout the winter.<br>I did not see the General Order before it was issued, or I should have objected to the wording of it. |
| Having heard that there had been such a deficiency, or apprehended deficiency, of salt-meat as to make it necessary to apply, on the 21st of January, to the Navy for assistance, we inquired into the circumstances: from the returns handed to us by the Commssary-General, and from his statements, it appears that although the Commissariat had at that time in store sufficient for several days' consumption, there was still (in consequence of some mistake, it is stated on the part of the Commissariat officers at Constantinople) cause for considerable anxiety lest the whole army should be left without salt meat, at a time when no | The Commissioners have omitted to state what is shown by the evidence annexed to their Report, p. 158, that the salt meat received from the navy, only replaced the quantity which had been supplied from the Commissariat stores for seaman and marines serving on the shore. This supply from the navy was not, therefore, a loan, but a restitution of a loan. |

| Observations. | Remarks. |
|---|---|
| other articles of food were available except biscuit, rum, and the ordinary groceries. The arrival of a vessel with a supply of salt meat before that which had been obtained from the navy was issued, relieved the Commissary-General from the anxiety which he had previously felt upon that subject. | |
| *Short Rations.* | |
| On those stations, (foreign) however, in addition to 1lb. of soft bread, the troops had, at all times, either 4 oz. of rice or half-a-pint of peas daily; besides which, a portion of their pay was expended in purchasing vegetables in the markets: whereas, in the Crimea, during the greater part of November and December, and also in a great measure during January and part of February, the soldier was confined exclusively to biscuit in addition to his salt meat. | Notwithstanding that rice was not a ration from 16th November to 27th December, the Commissariat officers issued it by my orders during that period whenever they could get it conveyed to the front. I will advert to this hereafter,<br>In January, rice had again become a ration, and during the whole of the month it was issued regularly to all the army, with the exception of the 4th Division, which, as stated by the preceding paragraph in the Commissioners' Report, did not receive any "for the first ten days, nor for three other days, and part of the Light Division, which, for six days of the month received only half rations." The extent of the deficiencies to those corps is shown in Paper No. 45 printed in the Appendix to the Commissioners' Report. There was, also, issued to the troops in January, 59,824 lbs. preserved and dried vegetables, and 77,250 lbs. fresh vegetables; total, 137,074 lbs.<br>In the month of February, all the troops, without exception, received regular rations of rice; more vegetables, also, were issued to them in that month, that is, before the arrival of the Commissioners in the Crimea, than in the month preceding their departure, when, according to their Report, the diet of the soldiers was better than any army had, in any former campaign, been supplied with.<br>*Vegetables issued.*<br>February, fresh - - 559,000 lbs.<br>„ preserved - 3,780 „<br>562,780,,<br>Average number of troops drawing rations, 32,300, being 17 lbs. per man. (See Appendix, page 13.)<br>May, fresh - - - 435,000 lbs.<br>„ preserved - - - 53,540 „<br>488,540 „<br>Average number drawing rations, 42,000, being 11½ lbs. per man. As shown by the vouchers now at the Audit Office. The troops were not, therefore, as asserted by the Commissioners, confined exclusively to biscuit, in addition to their salt meat, during the period stated. |
| *Fresh Meat.* | |
| A return was also furnished at our request by the Commissary-General, from which it appears that the average quantity of fresh meat issued to each man of the five divisions comprising the army, including the sick in camp, was in December, 6 lbs.; January, 9 lbs.; February, 8½ lbs. | The return shows that the average quantity of fresh meat supplied by the Commissariat during the five winter months, from November to March, was nearly 10 lbs. per man per month, exclusive of that furnished for the troops on board hospital ships in harbour, the aggregate force being 158,617 men, and the quantity of fresh meat issued |

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

OBSERVATIONS.

REMARKS.

by the Commissariat, 1,525,949 lbs. The issues in December fell greatly below the average, that is, to 6½ lbs. per man, in consequence of the cattle vessels, which had been damaged in the hurricane, being still under repair during that month.

That the healthy did not receive the ration which these figures would indicate, was unfortunately owing to the large numbers of sick, who in some divisions received full rations of fresh meat daily, in others, five days a week, thus curtailing the rations of the rest of the troops.

The French troops, during the greater part of the winter, received a ration of 10 oz. of fresh meat one day in three, or 6¼ lbs. per month, sometimes less.

The French suffered no losses from the hurricane of the 14th November, nor were the operations of their Commissariat ever impeded, as ours constantly were during the winter, by the occupation of a narrow and confined harbour, which prevented vessels from coming in or going out when the wind blew with any violence, or from discharging their cargoes.

I at no time ceased to make every exertion to increase the supply of fresh meat, and before the month of August last, when I was obliged to resign the charge of the Commissariat on account of ill health, I had brought the issues up to five times a week, which is as much, considering its inferior quality, as the military authorities think desirable.

*Vegetable Food.*

When the original order for the issue of 2 oz. of rice per man expired on the 30th of September, the Commissary-General states that, finding there was a sufficient quantity in store, and that bowel complaints still continued to prevail, he suggested as a measure beneficial to the health of the army, the extension of the order to the 15th of November. It is much to be regretted that, when he subsequently found himself unable, from want of transport, to carry the 2 oz. of rice in addition to the salt meat, he was not induced by the same motives to inform the General commanding, that he had still enough of rice in store to continue the issue, which had become even more necessary than on the 30th September, and that he did not call for a decision as to whether the army, then suffering not only from bowel complaints, but also from scurvy, should be deprived of the only vegetable food besides biscuit, which was immediately available, or should submit to a reduction of 2 oz. in the daily supply of salt meat, which a large proportion of the men did not consume.

Had Lord Raglan's attention been called to the stores of rice and other farinaceous and other vegetable food at his command, or had there been any officer on his staff who could be held responsible for the proper application of the available supplies, there can be no reasonable doubt that the men would have received in lieu of 2oz. of the salt meat, which many of them could not eat,

I have nowhere stated, as here alleged by the Commissioners, that the prevalence of bowel complaints was a motive for my recommending the continued issue of rice. That would be for the consideration of the medical officers. I recommended its continuance, as is stated in my evidence, because there was a sufficient quantity in store, and I had transport for its conveyance.

Lord Raglan could not attribute the discontinuance of rice to there being none in store; and his Lordship was perfectly well aware that further supplies could at any time be procured on short notice from Constantinople.

If, however, any misapprehension on this point did occur, it was of the less importance; for although I could not recommend, as I had done on a former occasion, that the issue of rice should be continued as a regular ration, when I had not the transport to carry it up, I gave orders to the Commissariat officers to issue it whenever they could find the means of conveying it to the camp, and the receipts from the regiments, now lying at the Audit Office, will show that a considerable proportion of the troops received it during a great part of the period when its issue as a ration had ceased. There was, therefore, no pretext for assuming that there was no rice in store, and if it had been thought preferable to make the substitution here suggested, it was for the military and medical officers to propose it.

| Observations. | Remarks. |
|---|---|
| *Vegetable Food.* | |
| an equal weight of food that would have been both more acceptable, and infinitely more beneficial. | The Commissariat has no knowledge of the particular articles of diet which are best suited to the troops. This is within the peculiar province of the military and medical officers who are living amongst them, and inspect them daily; and it is upon the representations of these officers that changes in the rations having reference to the health of the men are ordered by the General Commanding. |
| The deficiency of transport, which is assigned as the reason why these supplies were not conveyed to the front, need not have affected the corps in and around Balaklava, which were suffering from the same diseases, though not to the same extent. | The period during which rice ceased to form part of the ration, was 42 days. The Highland Brigade, which was stationed in the neighbourhood of Balaklava, received rice during the whole of that period excepting 15 days. I am unable to explain, in the absence of the Commissariat officer attached to the brigade, why it was discontinued during that time.<br>The Cavalry Division also, which was stationed not far from Balaklava, received rice, with some occasional irregularities, throughout the whole of the period. |
| *Lime-juice.* | |
| A more unaccountable, and still more unfortunate failure to apply to the use of the army stores of which it stood in the most urgent need, occurred in regard to lime-juice. On the 10th of December, 278 cases, containing nearly 20,000lbs., arrived by the "Esk," for the purpose of being issued generally to the troops. Small quantities obtained from the purveyor, and also, it is understood from the navy, had been issued to the hospitals for the cure of scurvy during the previous month, but no measures had been taken to counteract the tendency to that disease, which was rapidly spreading. The necessity for issuing lime-juice as a prophylatic, had been stated in many of the medical reports to the Inspector-General, and had been especially pointed out in those which he transmitted to the Adjutant-General for the months of November and December. In these he anticipates the speedy arrival of a supply that would admit of the issue generally to the troops, of what they so much needed. Yet from the 10th of December the lime-juice brought by the "Esk," was lying in the Commissariat stores at Balaklava, and none of it was issued till the first week in February, an interval during which the sufferings of the army, from scurvy, were probably at their height. Had the General Commanding been informed of the arrival of that supply, it cannot be doubted that it would have been issued to that part of the army which most required it nearly two months earlier. | Lime-juice had never been supplied by the Commissariat for general issue to the troops, nor had I received any intimation that it was to be so for the future. The quantity here mentioned was sent out from England by desire of the Director-General of the Medical Department, consigned to the Commissariat, but was considered (no special instructions having been received to the contrary) as in all cases of stores forwarded by the Medical Department at home to be intended for the Hospitals. The Medical Department in the Crimea was apprised of the arrival of this supply, and if no demand was made upon the Commissariat for it, it may be concluded that the purveyor at Balaklava was provided with a sufficient quantity for the use of the hospitals.<br>It is clear from the Report of Dr. Hall, the Inspector-General, dated 2nd January, which was in the possession of the Commissioners, and is printed in the appendix, p. 167, No. 6, that at the time referred to, the providing and issuing of this article were entirely regulated by the Medical Department—that Dr. Hall knew of the quantity in store, and that which was expected from England, and that he did not think proper to recommend, with only 10 days' supply in the custody of the Commissariat, an issue to the army generally, until the arrival of further quantities.<br>It is to be regretted that on a matter which the Commissioners considered of such vital importance, they did not ascertain by questions put to Dr. Hall, or to me, the cause of the non-issue of lime-juice to the troops generally* It was not till the 29th January that I received a letter from the Adjutant-General, accompanied by one from Dr. Hall, dated the 27th, informing me that |

* The Report of Dr. Hall appears to be the Monthly Memorandum submitted by him to Lord Raglan through the Adjutant-General, his Lordship must have, therefore, known that there was lime-juice in store.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

| Observations. | Remarks. |
|---|---|
| *Lime-juice.* | the issue of lime-juice was to become general.<br>When shortly afterwards it was directed that lime-juice should in future be a regular ration, and that the Commissariat was to provide it, steps were promptly taken to procure a supply from Malta and Sicily, the nearest points from which any large quantity could be obtained, and from that time the issues to the troops have been regularly maintained under arrangements made by the Commissariat. Appendix to Commissioners' Report, page 76, No. 25, B. |
| *Fresh Bread.*<br>Shortly after our arrival, an arrangement was made with those establishments, by Lord Raglan's directions, by which they engaged to supply the purveyor with a certain quantity daily for the use of the hospitals, to be issued on requisition as a medical comfort. | The demands for the army hospitals being unlimited and uncertain, the Commissariat only provides supplies for that service on special requisitions. When a requisition for bread for the General Hospital at Balaklava was first presented to the Commissariat, immediate arrangements were made for supplying it to the full extent of the demand.<br>Shortly afterwards I received a communication from Lord Raglan, transmitting a representation from Dr. Hall on the subject, when I informed his Lordship that the necessary measures had already been taken for supplying the hospital with bread on the usual requisition of the purveyor. |
| We are not aware of any sufficient reason why soft bread might not have been baked at any time for the use of the sick, and also for the whole army. The French army has been regularly supplied with fresh bread, and the erection of a sufficient number of ovens, was not an operation involving any great expense, or requiring much skill or much time, if it had been undertaken by the proper public departments. There were bakers enough in the neighbourhood to have worked many more ovens than were required to supply the whole army; and if these could not be spared from their military duties, there was no difficulty in procuring bakers from Constantinople. But there appears to have been an indisposition to make the attempt (see Colonel Tulloch's Memorandum, Appendix, page 20) the Commissary-General understood that a floating bakery had for several months been in preparation in England, and it was considered unnecessary or impossible to do anything till it arrived. | The French army moved to the East with the portable ovens and the military bakers, by means of which it had been supplied with bread in France or Algeria. "The Intendant Général" had no new establishments to create, nor any change to make. It was only necessary to let things go on in their ordinary course; indeed, whilst the French troops are stationary and close to the sea board, there is little or no difference between the manner in which they are supplied at home and abroad. When the French army became too numerous to be supplied with bread by means of the portable ovens, or the ovens had been worn out, 50 artificers were furnished by the "Corps d'Arts et Metiers" for building permanent ones, and at the same time 150 men from the line were furnished, for constructing magazines and sheds at Kamiesch Bay. I could obtain no such assistance from the British army.<br>I was not indisposed to furnish the troops with fresh bread instead of biscuit. I had purchased three months' supply of flour for the army at the commencement of the winter for that purpose, but bread requires fifty per cent. more of transport for its conveyance than biscuit, and it would have been impossible in the then state of the roads and of the transport, to have found the means of carrying it up to the camp during the winter. I had received a semi-official letter from the War Department dated in January, informing me that the floating mill and bakery for which I had applied would leave the Thames about the 13th February, and being fitted up in steam vessels, I had every reason to expect they would arrive about the middle of March. They were delayed, however, in England, and the vessel with the bakery did not reach the Crimea till the 12th of May. |

| Observations. | Remarks. |
|---|---|
| *Fresh Bread.* | In the meantime, as soon as the roads had become passable, and the state of the transport had improved, the experiment was made by order of Lord Raglan, of bringing bread sufficient for an issue twice a week to the whole of the army from Constantinople, which answered so long as the weather was cool. It was not, therefore, deemed unnecessary or impossible, as alleged by the Commissioners, to do anything till the floating bakery arrived.<br>When, on its arrival, I ascertained that its capabilities were insufficient, the construction of ovens was commenced, and I at the same time applied to England for an additional number of bakers, so that when I resigned the charge of the Commissariat, there were the means of baking bread for an issue to the troops on three days of the week.<br>There were several small ovens in the neighbourhood of Balaklava, which might have been used by the Commissariat, but as we could not convey bread to the front, it must have been issued, had we taken possession of the ovens, to the troops near Balaklava, to the exclusion of those in camp before Sebastopol. Lord Raglan, when I pointed this out to him, disapproved of any measure which would have that effect, for by allowing the ovens to remain in possession of private traders, the regiments in front and officers individually, by sending down their bât horses and servants, had the benefit of the supply. The bakers were encouraged by the Commandant, Lieut.-Colonel Harding, under whose control they were, to extend their business by every means in their power. |
| *Green Coffee.*<br>When the difficulty about fuel to roast the coffee began to be seriously felt in December, there were 2,705 lbs. of tea (equal to 173,000 rations) lying in the Commissariat stores at Balaklava. This would have afforded the usual quantity of a quarter of an ounce per man daily to the corps in front, where the greatest difficulty was experienced in making use of the coffee till a supply could be obtained from Constantinople or other quarters, sufficient to make the issue a general one. A temporary supply, too, might probably have been obtained from the navy, as there are generally large stores of tea on board. Nothing of this kind, however, appears to have been attempted, and the coffee continued to be issued in a green state to the men in front till the month of February, though much of it was not used, in consequence of the difficulty of preparing it. | This quantity of tea was reserved for the use of the hospitals, and considering the vast number of sick, it was not more than it was prudent to keep on hand for that purpose. However, as I have stated, all changes of diet which have regard to the health of the troops, are made by order of the Commander of the forces, on the representations of military and medical officers. Lord Raglan never expressed to me a wish that the troops should have tea instead of coffee, not even after it had become usual to furnish him with returns of all supplies in possession of the Commisariat, and when he must have known that there was a large quantity of tea in store at Balaklava, although I believe it was not the practice to furnish him with this information until after the troops had commenced to receive rations of roasted coffee regularly, that is, from 24th January. When I did receive an order from the War Department to supply tea on alternate days, the issues commenced immediately, being made from the quantity which had been reserved for the hospitals, and I was able to obtain from Constantinople sufficient to last till further supplies could be procured from England. |
| It appears, from the statements of a great majority of the medical and other officers | Military men differ very much amongst themselves as to what is best suited to the |

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

OBSERVATIONS.

*Green Coffee.*

examined, that tea would, on the whole, be preferable to coffee, especially on a march, provided the ration of sugar were increased by one quarter of an ounce, that is, from $1\frac{3}{4}$ oz. to 2 oz. That change would somewhat diminish the weight to be carried, always an important consideration, and would materially diminish the cost of the ration. It was objected by the Commissary-General that tea is more likely to be damaged than coffee, especially on a march; but as the whole of the tea used in Russia, and in some countries of Asia, where it is largely consumed, is carried overland from China, there can hardly be any serious difficulty in carrying a supply with an army.

REMARKS.

troops. Coffee was fixed upon by a Board of General officers and Commanding officers of regiments, of great experience, and both military and medical officers were examined by the Board, of which I was also a member. The evidence was so much in favour of the use of coffee, that Sir George Brown, who was President, and who objected to coffee, felt himself constrained to give up his opinion.

The object for which the Board met was to ascertain which of the different articles the Commissariat was then supplying to the troops, to be paid for by them at cost price, should constitute a fixed ration. In deciding upon coffee, the Board well knew that it was sold to the troops in a green state.

Subsequently a small quantity of roasted coffee was sent out from England as an experiment, upon which I was desired to report, but although ordered in July, it did not reach the army till towards the end of September, when we were on the march from Kalamita Bay to Sebastopol, and as soon as I learnt that it was approved of, I recommended that coffee should be sent out roasted, but none arrived till about the 24th of January, from which date green coffee ceased to be issued to the troops. In the meantime a few large coffee-roasters were made by the engineer of the "Sanspareil," by order of Captain Heath, Royal Navy, and I believe at his suggestion, out of the damaged funnels of steam-vessels in possession of the navy, by means of which a considerable quantity of coffee was roasted, under the superintendence of the Commissariat, for the use of the tooops.

The precautions used in carrying tea overland from China to Russia as an article of merchandise, proves its great liability to damage, and at the same time furnishes the strongest contrast to the usage which tea as an article of Government stores would receive with an army in the field, and the exposure it would then inevitably undergo. The difference is as great as that between peace and war.

*Fuel.*

The Commissariat maintained that it was not the practice of the service to issue fuel to the troops in the field. That a soldier was not entitled to a ration of fuel, unless in barracks. Lord Raglan, however, on the 11th of November, instructed the Commissary-General to provide a sufficient supply of fuel for the ensuing winter, and by a General Order, dated the 4th of December, directed the issue of rations of fuel to the troops. But although it appeared that even long before the 11th of November the Commissary-General had provided a depot of fuel at Scutari for the use of the army when in barracks, he was not prepared to issue fuel in the field when it was ordered on the 4th of December.

To provide and issue fuel was no doubt a considerable addition to the duties of the Commissariat, and the difficulties arising from the deficient state of the Land Trans-

No such opinion is expressed in my evidenee, or in that of any other Commissariat officer. The Commissioners would, therefore, appear to have taken the opinions of the Commissariat from the evidence of other parties. I may have stated that fuel had never before been issued to an army in the field, as a reason why I was not prepared with transport for its conveyance; but I have never maintained that the troops were not to be supplied with fuel by the Commissariat, if they were so circumstanced that they could not provide themselves with it. On the contrary, there is a paper from me, printed in the Appendix. p. 79, No. 35, in which I point out the difference in this respect between the troops in the Peninsula, which were on one occasion encamped in the winter, but could provide themselves with fuel, and those in the Crimea, and it was only mentioned there to show that issues

OBSERVATIONS.

*Fuel.*

port, the narrow space for landing stores at Balaklava, and the great amount of labour which the other duties of that Department involved in the peculiar circumstances of the army may have led the Commissary-General to insist upon the alleged previous practice in the Peninsula and elsewhere, of leaving troops in the field to find their own fuel. But the circumstances of the army before Sebastopol were obviously exceptional, and an appeal to precedent was out of the place. In consequence of the representations of the Commissary-General, however, the order of 4th of December appears to have been modified, and it was not until the 29th of December that the troops in and near Balaklava received rations of fuel.

REMARKS.

never having been made in the field, the Commissariat had no guide by which to regulate the allowance to officers. The only scale that had been authorized for the army in the east, was applicable to troops in barracks and quarters, and if adopted in the field the highest ranks might have been supplied to the prejudice of the rest of the army; for the fuel which had been ordered up from Constantinople having been forwarded in sailing vessels, the period of its arrival was uncertain. It had long before been settled, that is, early in November, that the Commissariat was to supply the troops with fuel when they could no longer provide themselves with it, and we were quite prepared to commence the issues whenever ordered. 800,000 rations of charcoal, which had been brought up in steamers by the navy, at the request of Lord Raglan, and given over to the Commissariat early in November, remained untouched up to the 4th December, when the order was given to commence the issues. When that order appeared, notice was immediately sent by me to the Commissariat officers attached to the divisions in front that the troops could receive rations of charcoal from the depôt at Balaklava. The only delay was with respect to the issues to the officers of the staff and departments, for whom no scale had been fixed; but I, at the same time, gave orders that officers in camp before Sebastopol might receive what was necessary for their immediate use, pending the decision, on this point, of the Commander of the forces, as stated in the memorandum addressed by me to Lord Raglan, which is printed at page 80 of the Appendix to the Commissioners' Report. Between the 4th of December, when the issues commenced, and the end of that month, part of the fuel I had ordered to be sent up from Constantinople, having arrived, there was in the possession of the Commissariat, on the last day of that month, nearly a million of rations for an army consisting, at that time, of about 26,000 men.* But had the Commissariat not been prepared then to commence the issue, it would have been owing to my not having received the order to provide fuel sooner, that is, to bring it up from Constantinople, where Lord Raglan knew I had laid in a store. The day following that on which I received the first intimation of the description of fuel that was to be provided (in respect to which there had been some previous discussion as to what was most suitable for troops in tents), and which was only five days after it had become certain that the army would winter in the Crimea, and I had received directions to purchase materials for hutting the troops, I dispatched the order to Constantinople, to send up the charcoal that had been laid in there in consequence of orders from Lord Raglan.

The troops stationed in the neighbourhood of Balaklava were not excluded by the

* Exclusive of a large portion of the charcoal which had been received from the navy, and which remained unissued.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

OBSERVATIONS.

*Fuel.*

This apparent want of alacrity on the part of the Commissariat to provide fuel for the army in the field, could not have arisen from any difficulty in procuring firewood. The southern coast of the Black Sea is wooded down to the shore for hundreds of miles; firewood could have been procured there in unlimited quantity; but the resources of that coast had not then been explored. Wood has more recently been obtained thence at little more than one-fourth of the price paid for it during the winter at Scutari and Constantinople. Unfortunately, after fuel had been provided at Balaklava, the want of land transport made it impossible to carry it to the front, except in small quantities for the use of the hospitals, and being issued only in the vicinity of Balaklava, it was of no use to the soldier on the heights unless he could find the means of carrying it to the regimental camp.

*Abundance of Cattle.*

In December, when scarcely any but salt meat was issued, the Commissary General says that he had 8,000 head of cattle secured; he attributes the deficiency in the camp to the want of sea transport, the difficulties of the winter navigation, and the delays caused by the use of Balaklava as the port of the army.

All these circumstances, doubtless, increased the difficulty of bringing forward a sufficient number of cattle; but looking to the amount of sea transport at his command, after the 11th of December, when the sailing horse-transports were placed at his disposal, for another purpose to which they were not applied, and could have been made available for the conveyance of cattle, in addition to the steam-vessels already at his disposal, and, considering the vicinity of Samsoon, and other ports on the southern shore of the Black Sea, where cattle could not only have been procured, but were actually tendered to him in December, and rejected; we are forced to the conclusion that the Commissary-General was not then sufficiently alive to the importance of that article of food; and that the quantity might have been considerably increased during the months of December, January, and February, if proper measures had been taken for that purpose.

The time is not very remote when armies depended upon sailing vessels for all the supplies transported by sea, but the Commissary-General was deterred from using such vessels for the conveyance of cattle by what he describes as the "frightful" proportion of casualties. This does not appear

REMARKS.

modified General Order from the issue of fuel at my suggestion, but because they could still provide themselves with it, which is the rule with armies in the field.

The fuel was, in the first instance, obtained from Constantinople, because a supply had been laid in there, and was ready for shipment. It could not have been obtained with equal dispatch from any part of the Black Sea where it had not been previously prepared. All subsequent supplies were obtained from the neighbourhood of Sinope.

There was never, at any time, a want of fuel at Balaklava. The only difficulty was to find the means of conveying it to the front. Irregularities, no doubt, may have occurred in the issue of it at Balaklava, owing to the total want of the accommodation and of space necessary for transacting the business of a large army. This inevitably led to extreme confusion. But it should be observed, that the want of fuel was as much owing to the soldiers of the British army being overworked as to the deficiency of transport, for neither the French nor Turkish troops were ever supplied with fuel by their Commissariat. They cut it themselves throughout the whole of the winter, and for the most part in the immediate vicinity of the English encampments.

I was at all times fully alive to the importance of providing fresh meat for the use of the troops, and employed to the utmost all the suitable vessels I could obtain (see paper annexed hereto marked D.), but I consider sailing vessels to be unsuitable for the service in winter, particularly in the Black Sea. Of all the cattle which were forwarded in sailing transports from Varna at the end of October and beginning of November, more than one third were lost. Even on board steamers which were not fitted up as cattle vessels, the casualties were very great.

To have continued the use, therefore, of sailing vessels, would have been to destroy the supplies of the army, and must have led to a deficiency, for in winter it would have been impracticable to obtain large supplies of cattle from the interior of Turkey to replace such losses.

A contractor who had engaged to deliver cattle in the winter failed to perform his agreement. The offer of a small number of cattle, 300 head, little more than one day's supply, here alluded to, deliverable at Samsoon, was rejected among other reasons, because Samsoon is an open roadstead, where in winter vessels may lie many days without being able to take in cargo. Constantinople, where I had plenty of cattle, is, at that season, nearer to the Crimea, in point of time, than Samsoon.

I know of no large army that has at any former time been dependent upon supplies brought by sea in sailing vessels.

When the army in the Peninsula was cooped up within the lines of Torres Vedras,

OBSERVATIONS.

*Abundance of Cattle.*

to us to be a sufficient reason. 3,000 additional bullocks in the three months above mentioned, would, on the average, have given the whole army fresh meat every alternate date; and we cannot persuade ourselves that three or four of the sailing horse-transports could not have landed that number in three months, in addition to all that were brought by steam vessels chiefly from the Bosphorous.

If there was difficulty in bringing the additional cattle alive, they might have been slaughtered, and at that season of the year the meat might have been carried without much loss. In short, it appears to us that fresh meat in much larger quantities might have been, and ought to have been supplied to the army.

*Importance of Fresh Meat.*

But the highest price that has been paid per pound for fresh meat, including freight and casualties, was 5*d.* or 6*d.* and, therefore, less than the lowest price at which salt meat has been put into store in the Crimea, and if the casualties which in the winter voyage from the Bosphorus in steam vessels, are variously stated at from 14 to 20 per cent. had been double that amount, or even a larger proportion, that would not have been a sufficient reason for leaving the army without an adequate supply of what was necessary to preserve the health of the troops.

Considering the preference which has been shown, not only in the present, but in other campaigns, particularly those in the Burmese and Chinese empires, for issuing to the troops salt meat and biscuit, instead of fresh meat and bread, notwithstanding the alarming extension of diseases of the bowels, which usually manifests itself in military operations, there seems reason to apprehend that the facility of obtaining and distributing the former description of supplies, may not unfrequently have had an influence in causing too extensive a use of them.

The duties of the Commissariat are, then, in campaigns when salt meat and biscuit are supplied instead of fresh meat and bread, in a great measure confined to maintaining an ample store of these in the general depôt by

REMARKS.

its communication with the fertile country south of the Tagus was open to it. The greater part also of the cattle of the country lying between the Mondego and the Tagus, had been driven by the inhabitants into the lines before the retreating army; and there may have been the means in the cases alluded to by the Commissioners of replacing the losses caused by such a mode of conveyance, but in Turkey, this, as before observed, would have been impracticable in winter.

Slaughtered meat was sent by the cattle vessels during the winter, in addition to their cargoes of live cattle, notwithstanding that the plan in a climate where the variations of temperature are so extreme, was attended with much loss. It was possible for the Commissioners to have inquired into the manner in which this important service had been conducted by the Commissariat, and they would have discovered that their suggestion had been anticipated by our practice.

The Commissioners cannot, it is presumed mean that slaughtered meat should have been forwarded in sailing transports, as vessels of that class were often in winter nearly a month in performing the voyage from the main land.

In the circumstances in which the army was placed, the question of expense was never taken into consideration. What was deemed best for the troops was purchased without regard to cost. This is stated in the written answers sent in to the Commissioners by the Quartermaster-General, who consulted me on this point.

I am not aware of any such preference having been shown in any former campaign, except as a result of necessity, so far at least as concerns the British Commissariat. In the two instances specified, the charge of supplying the troops was in the hands of the East India Company's officers, and I know neither the fact stated, nor the reasons for it which may have existed. Biscuit was certainly the habitual ration of the army under the Duke of Wellington's command in the Peninsula, but only when the means of obtaining fresh bread were wanting; and salt meat was never issued to that part of the army which was in motion, and sparingly, if at all, to the troops stationary near the coast. The sea-ration may have been a common resource at the commencement of our maritime expeditions, but even in those cases only during the period which intervened between the landing of the troops and the resources of the country becoming accessible. I do not believe that a case similar in all its circumstances to that of the army in the Crimea can be cited.

As there was a large number of cattle collected in depôts at the commencement of the winter, and the animals were shipped to the fullest extent to which suitable vessels could be obtained, no consideration of this

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

OBSERVATIONS.

*Importance of Fresh Meat.*

shipments from home, which involves little trouble; and the distribution of this supply, according to the numbers in each division, merely involves the simplest operation of arithmetic, but when cattle have to be sought out and purchased, often in remote provinces; have to be fed and cared for, and kept in condition before shipment; when transport has to be provided, forage obtained for the voyage, and subsistence thereafter till they are given over to the troops, the measure, however useful, is one which must necessarily be attended with much extra trouble, great complication of accounts, and no small personal exertion.

The preparation for soft bread, in like measure involving, as it does, the purchase of wheat, its conversion into flour, the building of ovens, the hiring of bakers, and extensive superintendence, requires a very different amount of trouble and responsibility from what would be created by the receipt and issue of a certain number of bags of biscuit daily. It is, perhaps, but natural, under such circumstances, that those who have the charge of supplying the troops should cling to a system which tends so materially to relieve their difficulties during a protracted campaign.

But as experience has shown that this saving of trouble in the first instance can only be effected at the risk of great suffering, vast expense, and tenfold trouble in the end, the dependence on a diet of salt meat and biscuit only should in future be confined to cases in which the General Officer in command has satisfied himself as to the impossibility of procuring other supplies, and therefore directs in General Orders the issue of that description of food. The restriction to this ration should then be communicated immediately to the home authorities, in order that they may send out supplies of preserved meats and vegetables to counteract its sameness and innutritious quality.

*Supplies of Vegetables could be obtained.*

The deficiency in the supply of vegetables is even more objectionable, and more unaccountable than that of the fresh meat. If the army was to be fed on salt meat, a sufficient quantity of vegetable food was known to be indispensable to the maintenance of health. The Turkish provinces could have furnished, and at a later and more unfavourable season did furnish a considerable amount.

REMARKS.

kind could have influenced the operations of the Commissariat.

The supposed extra labour would, of course, require extra hands to perform it, and would, therefore, add little to the trouble of those otherwise employed, who, being always rather under than over their work, could not, without such extra assistance, perform that and the supposed additional work also. In most cases, however, the unworthy motive assumed by the Commissioners would not exist, even according to their hypothesis, for while salt meat requires transport, and a greater detail of distribution, cattle carry themselves, and the trouble of slaughtering the animals and distributing the carcases is commonly undertaken by the troops.

The papers which I have appended to these remarks will show that I was fully sensible of the importance of supplying the troops with fresh bread, and that I had no desire to save the Commissariat the additional labour and accountability here alluded to. The employment, also, of the floating steam mill and bakery, for which the Commissioners knew I had applied, necessarily involved all these details. But the real obstacle to the regular issue of fresh bread, is the entire absence, in our service, of anything in the nature of a field bakery establishment. In all instances within my knowledge, the local means of supplying the troops with fresh bread have been used to the fullest available extent; but a moving army can never be regularly thus supplied, except by a properly organized establishment for the purpose, attached to the army, like that in the French service, and no such establishment has, I believe, ever been formed in our service.

The suggestion here made is only a recommendation of that which has been the long-established practice of the service, the composition of the ration, when differing from that in ordinary use, being always regulated by General Order. With regard to preserved meat and vegetables, the supply of the latter as part of the ration has never before been customary, nor I believe needful. As to the former, I received advice that supplies had been ordered to be shipped from England, but they never arrived.

As I have before observed, it formed no part of the duty of the Commissariat to provide vegetables, which had always been supplied under regimental arrangements, the troops paying for them.

On the 24th October, on account of the appearance of scurvy among the troops, I received for the first time an order from Lord Raglan, to send a vessel with a Commissariat

| Observations. | Remarks. |
|---|---|
| *Supplies of Vegetables could be obtained.*<br>There are several varieties which can safely be carried by sea, and which will keep several months, of which potatoes and onions are perhaps the best, and the different varieties of preserved vegetables are available at all seasons and at a moderate cost. | officer to purchase vegetables, and on the same day the "Harbinger" was dispatched for that purpose to Constantinople, as being the place where a supply could be obtained with the greatest certainty and dispatch.<br>It can scarcely have been owing to the long continuance of the use of salt meat that this disease broke out, for at that period the troops had been less than four weeks before Sebastopol, and had received a large proportion of fresh meat; they had been able also, during the earlier part of the period to procure vegetables in the Crimea. As at that time our communications were frequent with the north coast of the Black Sea, Lord Raglan, without my knowledge, desired the Commandant at Varna to forward supplies of vegetables to the army, and every vessel coming from thence brought a proportion, but the quantity that can be obtained from any part of Turkey, on the shores of the Black sea, is inconsiderable, as compared with the wants of a large army, as I subsequently found, when it having become the duty of the Commissariat to provide vegetables for the troops, I attempted to procure supplies from Samsoon, for they were soon exhausted.<br>When also in the month of April or May 1855, I urged the Consul at Trebizond, to forward supplies from thence, he was unable to undertake to do so till the month of November.<br>The vegetables received by the "Harbinger" having been shipped (owing to the anxiety of the Commissariat officer to meet the urgency of the occasion,) in wet and boisterous weather a large proportion of them arrived bruised and damaged. This was in November—in December, vegetables which had been ordered by Government to be forwarded from Trieste and Venice, arrived, but a portion of these also were in a damaged state. But for these losses there would probably have been no deficiency in this respect, as in addition, large quantities of onions and potatoes had been brought to Balaklava for sale in good condition by private individuals. During November and December also, preserved potatoes had been offered to the troops by the Commissariat, but were refused by them.<br>Up to the 10th December the troops paid for their vegetables, whether sent out by Government or procured from other sources, but when from that date they were ordered to be issued gratuitously it became obvious that the supply must be wholly undertaken by Government, I accordingly took means for procuring them, and from the time that my arrangements came fully into operation, aided by the consignments which had been ordered by Government and were already on the way from Trieste and Venice, large quantities have always been issued to the troops. It being, however, difficult at certain seasons to procure sufficient supplies of fresh vegetables, I sent a telegraphic message to England for preserved ones, in order to ensure a regular and uniform issue of vegetables (preserved or fresh) to the troops, but it was not I believe practicable at that |

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

OBSERVATIONS.

*Supplies of Vegetables could be obtained.*

As a reason for not issuing the preserved potatoes during the winter when they would have been so useful in preventing scurvy, the Commissary-General states that the men rejected them, and returned into store several cases that had been issued. On investigating the circumstances, however, it appeared that they had been returned into store at a time when the troops had a sufficient supply of fresh meat, and when they understood that they were to pay for one pound of the preserved the price of four or five pounds of the fresh potatoes; when they were afterwards issued gratis, and the men had learnt here to cook them, they became exceedingly popular.

*Note*

Among the reserve supplies at Scutari, which were not brought over to the Crimea at a time when they might have been of the utmost service to troops labouring under scurvy and insufficient nourishment, were 147,088 gallons of porter, which remained in store there from the 1st December 1854, till April or May last. It might have been impossible, considering the inadequate means of transport to carry any portion of this porter to the head-quarters camp, but there appears no reason why there should not have been issued to the troops in the vicinity of Balaklava, as well as the numerous parties sent there from the camp on fatigue duties, which would by degrees have extended the supply throughout the force in front without the trouble of carriage. It was one of the hardest consequences of the fatigue duty to Balaklava that the men had often to remain there for the greater part of the day without food: a pint of porter and a biscuit would have obviated this, and been of material benefit to their health: such a supply would also have been most valuable for the sick.

*Supplies of Food now abundant.*

At a future time we shall be prepared to submit some suggestions as to the rations of troops in the field. Meanwhile we have the honour and satisfaction to report, that before our departure the supplies of food to the army in the Crimea were abundant, and the diet of the soldier, in the opinion of those

REMARKS.

time to obtain in England or France sufficient quantities for the purpose.

No reference is given in the Report to this investigation, but the following copy of a memorandum from the Commissariat officer in charge of the depôt at Balaklava, who must have been best acquainted with what had taken place in the matter, will show that no such information could have been obtained from him, and that the preserved potatoes which arrived from Varna in November having been offered to the troops both in that month and December, they were rejected as they had been on former occasions.

(Copy.)

Preserved potatoes. 32,468lbs. were landed from Varna in November 1854. Though frequently offered, none were taken either in November or December. A further supply was received from England in January 1855, and in that month the troops first began to take them. The issues were as follows:—

January 53,474 lbs.
February 3,780 ,,

during the latter month 558,925 lbs. of fresh vegetables being issued.

(Signed) W. H. DRAKE,
22*nd May* 1854. *D.C.G.*

Conveyance could not during the winter have been provided for bulky casks of porter, even to the camps of the Cavalry and the Highland Brigade, without appropriating for the purpose transport which was required for more urgent wants. When at a later period I learnt that the use of the porter had been recommended by the medical officer of the Highland Brigade, I ordered a supply to be forwarded from Constantinople, and it was issued to such of the troops near Balaklava as preferred it. Notwithstanding, however, that when it arrived the railroad had been laid down as far as the Col de Balaklava, it was found impossible to obtain conveyance for more than a small proportion of it to the front. The troops that came down to Balaklava on fatigue duty must have received from the commissariat in camp their ration of biscuit and rum, and no doubt brought with them such proportion of it as they pleased. I never, however, received any intimation that it was desirable that porter should be issued to them at Balaklava.

Although the Commissioners were required by their instructions only to offer suggestions to Lord Raglan, one of them, Colonel Tulloch, was so good as to undertake to build two ovens, which when delivered over to the Commissariat were found capable of baking about 2,000 rations of

| Observations. | Remarks. |
|---|---|
| *Supplies of Food now abundant.* | |
| who are best able to judge, better than any army in the field has in any former campaign been regularly supplied with. We are able to state, that in their entire satisfaction with the rations now issued the men concur with their officers. | bread daily towards the consumption of an army drawing, exclusive of Turks and Sardinians, 42,000. With this exception, the favourable state of the supplies here described was brought about by the ordinary operations of the Commissariat when they ceased to be impeded by the impassable roads and continuous storms. The supplies issued to the troops were indeed in all respects the same when the Commissioners arrived in the Crimea, or within four or five days of my having had any communication with them, and consequently before it was practicable to have made any new arrangements, as when they departed, excepting that in the interval the arrival from England of the steam floating bakery for which I had applied, with the assistance of the two ovens above mentioned built by Colonel Tulloch, enabled the Commissariat to issue a greater proportion of fresh bread to the troops. Salt and pepper had also been added in the interval to the ration; but that was done on the recommendation of a Board of which I was myself a member. I here allude to the issues to the army generally. I have no knowledge of what may have taken place with respect to the hospitals. |
| The only objection, so far as we can ascertain, is to the inferior condition of the cattle, and as the animals are daily improving in condition upon the new grass, which is now abundant in the grazing countries; but as the natives of those countries are not in the habit of winter feeding their cattle they will begin to fall off after the month of October, unless arrangements are made by the Commissariat to have been properly fed and kept in condition. Such arrangements, instead of increasing the cost of meat, would probably produce a considerable saving, for the oxen, if so attended, would yield nearly double the quantity and of better quality. We anticipate no dificulty in maintaining, or, if necessary, in largely increasing the supplies of cattle, and also of vegetables from the Turkish provinces. | It is necessary to commence such arrangements early in the year for the following winter. In the month of February, that is, before the arrival of the Commissioners, I ordered the Commissariat officer at Constantinople to apply for firmans from the Ottoman Government to secure all the hay of the approaching harvest in the districts in which cattle depôts were to be established, and when I left the army fodder had been collected, and sheds constructed at the different shipping places in the Black Sea, by my directions, for feeding and sheltering many thousand head of cattle, and it is from the depôts there formed that the troops in the Crimea are now being supplied with fresh meat. The suggestion of the Commissioners had, therefore, been anticipated by me. |
| *Land Transport.* | |
| From a return prepared by the Commissariat there appears the startling fact that in January 1855, the whole number of effective animals belonging to that department was 333 pack-horses and mules, and 12 camels. The Commissary-General had considered it necessary before the army should move from Varna to have transport at his disposal equal to about 14,000 pack animals. | The transport was in this state for a few days only; but in addition to this number of efficient working animals in possession of the Commissariat, the public bât animals attached to regiments, and those appropriated for the conveyance of ammunition, both of which now form part of the general transport corps of the army, were available and employed in carrying up rations, and though these establishments were incomplete, the number of animals amounted to several hundreds. The number of 14,000 pack animals, or waggons and pack animals equal to that number, was considered necessary by me for all the different services of the army, for the regimental establishment of bât animals, conveyance of ammunition and Commissariat transport, and the estimate had reference to the movement of the troops through Bulgaria to the Danube, a much |

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

OBSERVATIONS.
*Land Transport.*

more extensive scene of operations than the Crimea.

That the efficient transport was for a few days reduced to this low state was owing to the great number of animals which were daily destroyed, or rendered unserviceable, in attempting to struggle, when laden with supplies, through a morass. The transport of the French army did not suffer from this cause. The road from their camp to Kamiesch lay over downs the whole of the way, till it abruptly terminated close to the bay. When one track became impassable, another was used. Nor had its transport to carry up any fuel or huts, with the exception of what might be required for their divisional hospitals in camp. It therefore remained available for the conveyance of the ordinary field rations of the troops.

From the evidence of the Commissary-General, it appears that this diversion of a part of the transport from Commissariat to siege purposes prevented him from completing the formation of a depôt near head-quarters, which he had commenced, and which was a measure of great importance to the army, as subsequent events too clearly proved. He was therefore, from the commencement of operations against Sebastopol, aware that the transport he had collected was not all available for Commissariat purposes, and was not sufficient for all the purposes for which it was required. In answer to the question why, in those circumstances, he did not increase the transport in the Crimea, he states that he had as many animals as he could feed. The measure of the amount of transport to be provided for the army in the Crimea was not, therefore, what was required, but what the Commissariat could feed. The reason for not increasing the amount of transport was not that a great number of animals was unnecessary, but that a greater number could not be fed in the Crimea. But if proper arrangements had been made to provide the army with forage, for the winter, wherever it might be at that season, the forage would have been available for use in the Crimea.

At the commencement, the transport, exclusive of what had been appropriated to siege operations, was sufficient for all Commissariat purposes. It was not till about the 18th or 20th of October, when, it having become obvious that the effect of our fire on the fortress was not such as had been expected, that I first contemplated forming a depôt in front. Up to that time the transport sufficed to carry, not only the daily rations of provisions and forage, but also extra rations of the former; and supplies in advance had been accumulated besides, and were in possession of the divisional commissariats in camp. Afterwards, the number of animals that could be fed necessarily became the rule.

In answer to the alleged ommission of timely arrangements for the provision of forage, I have to state that, so early as when there was full expectation of the army advancing to the Danube, I made a contract for about 3,500 tons of hay, to be delivered loose at different places in the neighbourhood of Constantinople; and I also desired the Commissariat officer there to form a depôt of chopped straw, in case the army should return and occupy cantonments in Turkey during the winter. I took those steps as a precaution, notwithstanding that supplies of chopped straw (the usual forage of the country) can be obtained to almost any amount along the shores of the Bosphorus, the Dardannelles, and the Sea of Marmora; and these arrangements would have been equal to the object in view had the army been cantoned in those districts. Subsequently, when it became known that we were to proceed to the Crimea, the contractors, at my request, were willing to engage to deliver about 500 tons of the hay pressed instead of loose; but learning, in the early part of September, when the army was on the way to the Crimea, that I could not rely on the fulfilment of this contract, I wrote to England, requesting that 2,000 tons of hay might be sent from thence. Of this demand only about one-tenth was forwarded, and that portion reached Balaklava on 30th November; and although, on arriving before Sebastopol, I reported that we

OBSERVATIONS.

*Land Transport.*

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C.G.

should be entirely dependent for this article on England, and from time to time made requisitions for further quantities, the consignments fell greatly short of my wants, the whole of the quantities forwarded from England during a period of six months not amounting to the 2,000 tons for which I first made a requisition for about two months' supply, according to the estimates I had transmitted home. Had my requisitions for hay been complied with, the deficiency in this respect which was felt throughout the winter would have been prevented, and I should have been enabled to maintain a sufficient transport establishment, and to replace the animals, which were rapidly destroyed or rendered unserviceable in attempting to struggle through impassable tracks, and from exposure.

No exertion on the part of the Comissariat could remedy the deficiency, it being impracticable to convey across the Black Sea chopped straw or hay loose in sufficient quantities, or to procure the means of pressing enough of either for the consumption of a large army; the latter plan was adopted to the utmost extent to which means could be procured. Notwithstanding that upwards of 25,000 tons of hay were collected by my directions during the last spring and summer at one port alone in the Black Sea, besides large quantities at other places, it is still found necessary to forward from England supplies of pressed hay, equal nearly to the whole of the consumption of that part of the army which is in the Crimea.

*Supply of Hay.*

The Commissary-General has indeed concluded a contract for about 1,000,000 pounds or about 800 tons of hay, to be made at Buyuek Tchakmedge, on the sea of Marmora, and hydraulic presses were sent out from England to compress it for shipment. The contractors failed, it is said, to complete their contract, and only about 600 or 700 tons of hay were made. They appear to have been men without capital, who borrowed money at a high rate of interest to carry out their various contracts with the Commissariat. At length the hay was secured to the British Commissariat. But in the meantime the hydraulic presses had been erected in the vicinity of Constantinople, more than fifteen miles from the place where it had been collected; and it became necessary to carry the loose hay that distance either by land or water before it could be pressed.

This operation could not be carried on in bad weather, and thus, by defective arrangements throughout the whole transaction, the only provision for supplying the army with hay which had been made in Turkey, and which was rendered nugatory at a time when 600 or 700 tons in the Crimea would have been invaluable. The Commissary-General admits that if the presses had been erected at the place where the hay was made, he could have fed more animals, and there can be little doubt that every addition

The contractors here alluded to were recommended by the Embassy to Deputy Commissary-General Smith, on his first arrival at Constantinople, as competent persons; and they have held several important contracts which, on the whole, they have executed satisfactorily, with the exception of this one for hay. The quantity of 500 tons of pressed hay was to be in lieu of an equal quantity of loose hay, part of the 3,500 tons already alluded to, which the contractors had engaged to deliver in the neighbourhood of Constantinople; and the superintendence of this service, and the erection of the hydraulic presses, were necessarily left to the Commissariat officer at that place. In his absence, and in the absence of my official papers, I am unable to explain the particulars of the transactions as regards the delivery of the hay; but with respect to the erection of the presses, Mr. Smith took the precaution of sending two Commissariat officers to select the most eligible place for putting them up; and it was upon their recommendation that the site was chosen, on account I believe, of its affording some facilities for repairing and working the engines. When it was made known to me that the presses were separated from the hay, I strongly censured the arrangement; but to have altered it then would have caused still greater delay in dispatching the forage to the army. These

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C.G.

OBSERVATIONS.

*Supply of Hay.*

to the transport in the Crimea saved the lives of the men.

At this time, however, he only contemplated bringing up 250, and the "Jason" sailed for that purpose on the 26th of November, and returned to Balaklava on the 16th of December, having been absent twenty days. The average passage at that season, including coaling, watering, &c., appears to have been about fifteen days. The "Jason" thus exceeded the average time by a few days, of which two may be accounted for by the time occupied in sending for and bringing the mules from Tchakmedge, where they were recovering from the effects of the journey from Varna. They had been badly cared for, and many were utterly useless; a certain number, however, arrived at Constantinople in very bad condition, about the end of November; 250 of the most servicable were selected to be shipped in the "Jason," but even these appear to have hardly been considered effective by the Commissariat officers when they arrived at Balaklava.

On the 11th of December, the sailing horse transports of the army were placed at the disposal of the Commissary-General to bring up transport animals, but were not employed for that purpose. On the 24th he applied for a steam vessel, which appears to have been immediately ordered. On the 28th he applied especially for the "Jason," which had then discharged her cargo of animals, &c.. and in pursuance of orders given on the 24th, she was immediately placed at his disposal, and sailed on the 29th for Constantinople; he makes it a ground of complaint, with reference to the reinforcements of the transport in the Crimea, that, having sick on board for Scutari, she was detained till the 7th of January landing them; but having been questioned on the subject, he admitted that, after landing the sick at Scutari, she was sent by the Commissariat, though not by his order, to the Sea of Marmora to take in a cargo of fuel, and he could not say that she might not have been absent a week or ten days for that purpose. The deficiency in the land transport of the army cannot, therefore, be accounted for, on the ground that he could not obtain sufficient sea transport to convey the animals he was desirous of bringing to the camp.

The real cause of the deficiency of transport appears therefore to have been the want of forage, not the want of ships or of animals,

REMARKS.

are mistakes in details, however, for which the Commissary-General in the Crimea cannot be answerable.

The number of horses sent for, was 350, (see Appendix page 61), which was as many as the vessel was supposed to be capable of carrying. The captain informed the Commissariat officer at Constantinople that he could only convey 250, but when he had shipped that number, he found that his vessel could take 100 more. The Commissariat officer very properly, in the circumstances in which the army was placed, dispatched the steamer without waiting till more could be brought up from the depot at Buyuk Tchekmedge.

The number of days quoted by the Commissioners, as the average length of the voyage includes the time occupied in cleaning boilers and repairing machinery, which was usually done when steamers went to Constantinople and swells the average. Steam-vessels not requiring repairs that have been dispatched for cargoes of animals which walk on board, have performed the voyage in eight days, and the "Jason" might have done it in the same time instead of twenty days, had she not undergone repairs. It was during her prolonged stay that the army suffered most, and that some of the troops came down to Balaklava. When she returned, they ceased doing so.

Sailing transports might have been nearly two months on the voyage going and returning, it was therefore expedient to wait for a steamer.

The "Jason" must on this occasion have reached Constantinople on the 30th or 31st of December, and it is certain that seven or eight days after her arrival there she still had sick on board, when I had understood that she was to be entirely at my disposal for the conveyance of transport animals. This delay, therefore, was in addition to any that may have been caused by her having been sent to the Sea of Marmora for wood.

From the time that my requisitions for supplies of pressed hay from England were complied with, there has always been suffi-

| Observations. | Remarks. |
|---|---|
| *Land Transport.* | |
| and a similar failure to provide the requisite forage would again limit the number of animals available for the army in the Crimea Whatever might be the number in possession of the Land Transport Corps, it may be hoped that the formation of that corps will prevent the recurrence of any similar calamities from the same cause. | cient forage for the Land Transport Corps as well as for every other branch of the army, although the number of animals for which forage was drawn when I left the Crimea amounted to upwards of 23,000. |
| At this time (14th November to 1st January) several hundred quarters of buck wheat and millet seed, which had been taken at the capture of the town, were lying in a large stone building close to the town under the cattle wharf, and might, it is presumed, have been available for some of the horses of baggage animal when there was a difficulty in landing corn from the ships, but it remained in this store during the whole of winter, and was still there when we left Balaklava in June, thus unnecessarily occupying a building which might have been valuable as a store for other purposes, besides allowing a most useful supply for horses or cattle to go to waste. | The destitute inhabitants of Balaklava, Karani, and other villages within our lines, who had remained in their houses on our arrival, but who were not permitted by the military authorities to go into Sebastopol or the interior of the country after siege operations had once commenced, were relieved throughout the winter from the store of captured grain here alluded to. Subsequently, and I believe during the time the Commissioners were at Balaklava, these people were regularly rationed by the French and British Commissariats alternately; the issues from the store may therefore have been less frequent at that period, but assistance from it was still occasionally given to them. |
| A man of comprehensive views might probably have arisen superior to these disadvantages, and created an organization suited to the circumstances. He would doubtless at once have perceived that the established practice of procuring all supplies by tenders and contracts is not calculated to draw forth the resources of Turkey, or to make them available when required. Finding that his supplies must be drawn from provinces of the resources of which he had little knowledge, and to the inhabitants of which he was unable even to communicate his wants in any language which they could understand, he would probably have turned to good account the knowledge of the country and its resources possessed by a large and respectable body of public servants, Her Majesty's Consuls, and he would then have found those resources more ample and more easily made available than till lately they were believed to be. But it is unreasonable to expect that every man who may rise to the head of so limited a department, even after a long course of meritorious service, is to display, whenever the occasion may demand it, inventive resources and administrative capacity of a very high order. | The Commissioners have here assumed that I obtained no supplies except by means of contracts and tenders, and that I had only followed the beaten tract. I am unable to say whence they have derived the opinion, but, however derived, it is inconsistent with the fact. I obtained supplies by every variety of mode in which it was possible to procure them, that is, by means of agents having a knowledge of the resources of the country and of the language and habits of the people, by direct purchases made by Commissariat officers from the parties holding the supplies without either written tender or agreement, by public competition and by special tender, and, when necessary, by requisition on England. I should have supposed, indeed, that Sir John M'Neill must have known that I was employing agents for the purpose, as Mr. Guarracino, the Vice-Consul at Samsoon, a gentleman who has been long resident in Turkey and is well informed of its resourses, was engaged by me to make purchases on commission, both at that place and in the interior of Anatolia: and when he came to Balaklava, on the business of his agency, he usually called on Sir John M'Neill, with whom he had been previously acquainted. Mr. Guarracino had been employed by me in the same manner in the preceding year (1854), and I also employed other Consuls, but the result was not always satisfactory. Large purchases were also occasionally made at Constantinople on commission. When offers of supplies are made to Commissariat officers who are stationary, as at Constantinople and Balaklava, they are very properly put in writing in the shape of a tender, to establish the terms and prevent dispute, and whenever we are in a position to do so we also attach a penalty to the non-performance of the agreement. Even if the regulations |

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C.G.

| Observations. | Remarks. |
|---|---|
| *Land Transport.* | |
| | restricted the mode of proceeding in the way described by the Commissioners, which is not the case, I should not have hesitated, with the sanction of the Commander of the Forces, to disregard them had their observance in any way interfered with the supply of the troops. |
| The purely executive duties of the department appear to be well performed. The officers attached to divisions and brigades are generally intelligent and efficient; several of them are men of considerable capacity. The Generals commanding divisions and brigades, with few exceptions, expressed their satisfaction with the exertions and services of those officers, and used terms of high commendation in speaking of some of them, especially of Mr. Power, attached to the Second Division, who was absent on duty, and whom we therefore did not see. | I have at all times borne testimony to the great zeal and ability displayed by the Commissariat officers who served under my orders with the army in the East, and to their exertions during the winter in getting up supplies for their divisions from the depôt at Balaklava, under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty. As a body of officers, they are not, in point of integrity, gentlemanly demeanour, and intelligence, inferior to those of any department of Government. |

I trust that I have now shown that the general conclusions of the Report are far from being established by the arguments or the evidence adduced; and--

That although some partial deficiencies in the established allowances of food did unfortunately take place, they were caused by no want of effort on the part of the Commissariat to prevent them, and were not of sufficient amount, as is indeed admitted by the Commissioners, to have any important effect on the health of the troops.

That the nature of the food supplied to the troops in no degree depends upon Commissariat regulation, and although it may in the present case have been a source of disease, greatly to be lamented, it was not owing to any defect of practicable exertions or arrangement on my part that the injurious quality of food was for some time incapable of being remedied; and also that during the period when the troops were without those articles, such as vegetables and lime-juice, which might have corrected the deleterious effects of the diet, the Commissariat had not been ordered to provide them, and that when afterwards it became the duty of the Commissariat to do so, the issues of both were regularly maintained as soon as the necessary arrangements could be brought into operation.

That I have never maintained, as alleged by the Commissioners, that the troops when in the field were not to be supplied by the Commissariat with fuel if they were so circumstanced that they could not provide it themselves; and that there was neither neglect nor indisposition on my part to provide the supply, but that it was furnished as soon as I had the necessary orders to that effect to the full extent to which the means of conveying could be procured.

That the measures necessary to insure a sufficient supply of fodder for animals were taken by me, and only failed of success through causes which it was not in my power to prevent.

That although the Land Transport was for some time inadequate to the wants of the army, and the insufficiency unfortunately became a source of suffering, the failure was attributable to causes beyond my control, which could neither have been foreseen or guarded against by me.

And finally, that however unequal may have been my ability to cope with the unprecedented difficulties of my position, I did not neglect or overlook any means of overcoming them, which were within my reach, and certainly did not allow any consideration of mere form or usage to interfere with the fullest application of those means.

WILLIAM FILDER,

*London, February* 26, 1856. *Commissary-General.*

---

## A

*Memorandum submitted by the Commissary-General for the consideration of the Commander of the Forces.*

I will speak to Mr. Filder.

(Signed) R.

If it should be intended that the army, or any part of it, is to winter in this country, it would be desirable that arrangements for lodging and provisioning the troops should be commenced without delay. With this view the positions to be occupied, and the number of troops to be stationed at each, should be determined upon.

It would be necessary to construct convenient to the barracks, ovens capable of baking bread for the probable number of troops to be cantoned at each station. If Scutari is to be occupied, reliance could not be placed on the communication being kept up during the winter with Pera, from whence the troops were supplied with bread when they were at Scutari in the spring.

It would be requisite that slaughter houses and sheds for the public animals belonging to the Commissariat and Transport service, should also be constructed.

For these purposes the assistance of the Engineer Department would be required.

The work might be done by contract under their supervision.

The provision of fuel is a matter of great importance. I do not apprehend there will be any difficulty in laying in an adequate supply of wood, but it would require time, and it may be for consideration whether coals obtained from the mines at Heraclia, which are now in the possession of the British Government, might not be made available, and be deemed preferable; in the one case the barrack-rooms would have to be fitted up with stoves, and in the other with chimnies.

The stoves and grates must be sent from England.

It might also be desirable that proper persons should be sent from the Tower to repair the tents and camp equipage in charge of the Commissariat, it being doubtful whether men perfectly competent to the business could be obtained from the regiments.

(Signed)

WILLIAM FILDER, *C.G.*

*Varna, Aug.* 1, 1854.

---

## B.

*Memorandum.*

I cannot give these orders at the present moment.

(Signed) RAGLAN.

The Commissary-General begs reference to the memorandum submitted by him on the 1st of August, respecting the arrangements that it would be necessary to make for, for lodging and provisioning the troops if it should be determined that they are to be cantoned in Turkey, during the winter.

The period has arrived, when there is barely sufficient time left before the termination of the present expeditionary service to complete these arrangements, particularly for laying in a store of wood, the construction of ovens, and the necessary preparations for executing the more important contracts.

Instructions are respectfully solicited on this subject, together with information as to the force for which provision is to be made at the different cantonments.

(Signed) WM. FILDER, *C.G.*

*At sea, steamship "Hope,"*

13*th September* 1854.

---

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C.G.

*Memorandum.*

(No. 292.)

*Commissariat, Pera,*

Sir, 30*th September* 1854.

Not having received any instruction as to providing a winter supply of firewood and charcoal at Scutari, and not being aware whether such a supply will be required to any considerable extent, I take the liberty of bringing the matter under your notice in order that if required, arrangements may be made for the purpose, while there is a prospect of procuring the articles on comparatively reasonable terms. The season I fear already advanced rather far.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. Smith, *D.C.G.*

Commissary-General Filder, *C.B.*

&c. &c.

C.

*Balaklava, 8th October* 1854.

I brought this subject under the consideration of the Commander of the Forces, as far back as 1st August, and again more recently, but he is unable in the present state of the military operations to give any definitive orders in the matter.

(Signed) Wm. Filder, *C.G.*

I think it will be better at once to make arrangements for a supply of firewood for 20,000 or 25,000 men.

(Signed) Raglan.

Submitted 12th October,

(Signed) W. F., *C.G.*

---

D.

(D 651.)

*Memorandum.*

I have no objection, provided Captain Christie can send another steamer to Baltjick, instead of the "Emperor," but that condition is imperative.

R.

In consequence of the difficulty in the present state of the roads of conveying a sufficient quantity of salt meat for the troops from Balaklava to the camp, it has become of the utmost importance that the supply of live cattle should be increased by every means, and that every available steam vessel should be appropriated to their conveyance.

There is at present lying in the harbour of Balaklava the steamer "Emperor," well adapted to the transport of cattle, and ready for sea, which is about to proceed to Baltjick in consequence of orders from the Commander of the Forces, but which it is submitted, if the conveyance of cattle should, under present circumstances, be deemed of more importance, might be appropriated to that service.

There are other steamers it is understood in the harbour, equally well adapted for the service on which the "Emperor" is about to proceed, but not for carrying cattle.

William Filder, *C. G.*

*Balaklava, November* 30, 1854.

---

E.

*Memorandum.*

Commissary-General Filder, at the recent interview with which he was honoured by Lord Panmure, omitted to mention to his Lordship, as it had been his intention to do, that Mr. Guarracino, the Vice-consul at Samsoon, who has been employed in purchasing supplies on commission in Anatolia for the Commissariat, informed Mr. Filder immediately before his (Mr. Guarracino's) departure for England, that proposals had been made to him by the "Intendant Général," to undertake a similar engagement for the French army.

As the Commissariat occupied the district of Samsoon before the French Intendance, and the resources of that part of the country are required for the British army, such an engagement would be prejudicial to our

interests, and would seem also to be incompatible under present circumstances with Mr. Guarracino's duty to the British Government.

Mr. Filder would beg to submit for consideration, therefore, the expediency of a communication being made by the Foreign Office to Mr. Guarracino, who is now, Mr. Filder believes, in England, enjoining him on the grounds above mentionad not to accept any proposal of the nature alluded to, that may be made to him by the French Administration.

57, *Eaton Square*,
*September* 10, 1855.

---

No. 14.

EXTRACTS from Semi-official LETTERS, &c., quoted by Comm.-Gen. FILDER, C.B. before the Board of General Officers at Chelsea.

" Treasury, 13th June 1854.—Since I commenced this letter I have received from the " Admiralty the official letter relating to the surplus forage in this country, and have " ordered two ship-loads to be sent at once to Varna, including all the oats, and the rest " as you may determine. If you are not certain to want it, it will be far better to sell " it; for, within my Commissariat experience, I have known great losses from holding " over hay. We can always get more, and perhaps better, if we want it.

(Signed) " C. E. TREVELYAN."

---

" Treasury, 18th September 1854.—The hydraulic press, with all appurtenances " complete, and four men to work it, left Liverpool by the Melita on the 13th; but, " however desirable it may be to obtain so bulky an article as forage on the spot, we have " been sensible of the importance of your having a reserve; and therefore, besides sending " forward all the surplus oats and part of the surplus hay provided for the transports, " we have requested the Admiralty to hold the remainder of the hay at our disposal, in " case it should be wanted for Turkey.

(Signed) " C. E. TREVELYAN."

---

" Treasury, 9th October 1854.—The only point which appears, at the present moment, " particularly to require our attention is the article of hay. It is a possible contingency, " as conjectured by you, that the allied army may be hemmed in round Sevastopol, or " elsewhere, by a superior force of Russian cavalry, in which case you would have to draw " your supplies of forage from beyond sea. I was glad to hear that a vessel laden with " oats and hay, part of the surplus quantity originally provided for the transports, had " been passed on to you from Constantinople, where exertions were also being made to " send forward supplies of hay under the local contracts which had been made under your " directions. We have, however, considered it safe to request the Admiralty to dispatch " a ship-load of English hay to the Crimea without any delay, and we shall forward further " quantities according to the advices received from you. As you appear to have an " abundant and cheap supply of barley at Constantinople, we shall not send any oats " unless you ask us to do so.

" Will not the valley of Baidar, and the other productive-valleys to the south-east of " Sevastopol, furnish you with considerable resources? As that is a country of high " mountains and narrow passes, the Russian cavalry will not have the same advantages as " on the steppes.

(Signed) " C. E. TREVELYAN."

---

" Treasury, 13th October 1854.—In the imperfect state of our information, we have " felt somewhat at a loss what to do about sending you supplies of hay, an article of great " bulk, for which, more than any other, local sources of supply are ordinarily depended on. " You will see, by an official letter from me of to-day's date, that a large cargo is being

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C.G.

" sent with all speed from Deptford; and if the early arrival of this ship is of importance " to you, you will, no doubt, be able to make arrangements for her being towed from " Constantinople, or even from Malta. Our further proceedings in this matter will be " regulated by advices from you. If operations are commenced in the interior after the " taking of Sevastopol you will again be brought in contact with the resources of the country. " It is hardly to be conceived that such an army as that of the allies in the Crimea, after " such successes, can be cooped up so as not to be able to obtain the most ordinary local " supplies.

(Signed) " C. E Trevelyan."

---

" Treasury, 18th November.—To return to the subject of forage, I do not clearly " understand whether you object to the defective arrangements on board the horse trans- " ports, as standing in the way of your obtaining from them the supplies which you might " expect, or as endangering the regular supply of any horses that may have been embarked; " but, in either case, the duty belongs to the masters of the transports, and the naval " authorities will, no doubt, on your application, see that they perform their duty. It will " be our part to send from this country, on your requisitions, whatever may be necessary " to supplement the supply from local sources. You will, of course, get what you can at " or in the neighbourhood of the seat of war, and ask us for the remainder.

(Signed) " C. E. Trevelyan."

---

" Treasury, 23d November '54.—On receiving your private letter of the 8th November, " I again wrote to Mr. Grant urging on him the great importance of the early dispatch of " a further quantity of hay, and I enclose his answer. You may depend upon regular and " ample supplies being sent from this country until you can again obtain sufficient " quantities from the seat of war.

(Signed) " C. E. Trevelyan."

Certified Extracts.

Alex. Crookshank, A.C.G.

---

No. 15.

Sir B. H. Hawes to the Judge Advocate-General.

War Department, 13th May 1856.

Sir,—In compliance with the request made by your letter dated the 8th instant, I am directed by Lord Panmure to transmit to you, for the information of the Board of General Officers appointed to consider so much of the report on the supplies to the British Army in the Crimea as animadverts upon the conduct of certain officers in Her Majesty's army:

Copy of a contract entered into with Mr. A. B. Freeland in December 1854 for 1,200 tons of pressed hay;

A return of the shipments of hay made from England for the service of the army in the East, between 1st January 1855 and 31st March 1856;

Also of the quantities shipped from Trieste.

I am, &c.
B. Hawes.

The Judge Advocate-General.

---

Return showing the monthly Shipments of Hay from Trieste, Venice, and Fiume, by Mr. Erichsen, for the Service of the Army in the East, between the 1st January, 1855 and 31st March, 1856.

| Date of Shipment | Name of Vessel. | Quantity shipped, English weight. |
|---|---|---|
| 1855. | | lbs. |
| Total shipped during January - | | Nil. |
| Total shipped during Feb. 1855 | | Nil. |
| March 5 | Morocco - - | 124,509 |
| „ 6 | Niufa - - - | 60,405 |
| „ 10 | Cattarina - - | 94,685 |
| „ 10 | Clara Zoe - - | 67,230 |
| 1855. | | lbs. |
| March 12 | Pezagno - - | 109,892 |
| „ 17 | Accorto - - | 80,722 |
| „ 17 | Paolina - - | 118,389 |
| „ 20 | Maria Eugenia - | 114,182 |
| „ 28 | Vittorioso - - | 93,244 |
| „ 28 | Stavomir - - | 92,657 |
| „ 28 | Erceq - - - | 73,843 |
| Total shipped during March 1855 | | 1,029,758 |

Return of monthly Shipments of Hay, &c.—*continued.*

| Date of Shipment. | Name of Vessel. | Quantity shipped, English weight. |
|---|---|---|
| 1855. | | lbs. |
| April 2 | Tedenstwo | 57,256 |
| „ 2 | Minosse | 87,880 |
| „ 4 | Pefrica | 82,398 |
| „ 4 | Marizza | 70,127 |
| „ 7 | Assidua | 212,656 |
| „ 7 | Ciriaco | 98,941 |
| „ 13 | Roy | 72,591 |
| „ 19 | Teresa Hanni | 102,986 |
| „ 19 | Amico | 65,761 |
| „ 19 | Rosa Gaspari | 90,184 |
| „ 23 | Nuova Pieta | 83,064 |
| „ 23 | Adelaide | 110,375 |
| „ 23 | Mariana | 99,825 |
| „ 27 | Arpadina | 107,486 |
| „ 27 | Zanetto | 76,332 |
| Total shipped during April 1855 | | 1,417,863 |
| May 2 | Philemon Aline | 63,684 |
| „ 4 | Wagram | 71,572 |
| „ 8 | Carlino | 64,166 |
| „ 14 | Minatore | 60,225 |
| „ 14 | Maria | 112,263 |
| „ 25 | Regolo | 105,134 |
| „ 25 | Angiolina | 84,456 |
| Total shipped during May 1855 | | 561,500 |
| June<br>July<br>August<br>September | | Nil. |
| October 26 | Conte Hartig | 158,974 |
| Total shipped during Oct. 1855 | | 158,974 |
| November 9 | Whilhelmina Frederika. | 140,498 |
| „ 14 | Ghita | 226,409 |
| „ 16 | Ellena C. | 145,282 |
| „ 16 | Adolar | 115,565 |
| November 24 | Giacomina G. | 111,492 |
| „ 21 | Rimedio | 215,221 |
| Total shipped during Nov. 1855 | | 954,467 |
| December 1 | Nuova Silfide | 147,858 |
| „ 4 | Ellena | 168,679 |
| „ 5 | Europa | 232,444 |
| „ 12 | Australia | 161,337 |
| „ 14 | Gerolamo | 161,288 |
| „ 22 | Frederico | 112,000 |
| „ 17 | Anna | 226,442 |
| „ 28 | Minosse | 63,500 |
| „ 28 | Sono Fratelli | 44,807 |
| Total shipped during Dec. 1855 | | 1,318,355 |
| 1856. | | |
| January 4 | Milinka | 99,207 |
| „ 4 | Mio Zio | 72,666 |
| „ 7 | Buon Padre | 14,195 |
| „ 17 | Accorto | 105,929 |
| „ 18 | Teofild | 127,188 |
| „ 18 | Uredan | 163,208 |
| „ 23 | Lucinda Sears | 140,191 |
| „ 24 | Cupid | 91,840 |
| „ 28 | Barend | 125,728 |
| Total shipped during Jan. 1856 | | 940,152 |
| February 1 | Teja | 183,562 |
| „ 1 | Nicol Angelo | 181,115 |
| „ 9 | Stipan | 226,887 |
| „ 9 | Juno | 144,458 |
| „ 9 | Oreste | 226,693 |
| „ 18 | Adelina | 98,493 |
| „ 20 | Consigliere Jenny | 188,241 |
| „ 26 | Paolo Maria | 99,516 |
| „ 29 | Naviesnick | 132,176 |
| Total shipped during Feb. 1856 | | 1,481,141 |
| Total shipped during March 1856 | | Nil. |

RETURN showing the monthly Shipments of HAY from England, for the Service of the Army in the East, between the 1st January 1855 and the 31st March 1856, distinguishing the Shipments of the Deliveries made by Mr. FREELAND of Manchester, in fulfilment of his Contract for 1200 Tons, dated the 9th December 1854.

*Note.*—Shipments on account of Mr. Freeland distinguished by *.

| Date of Shipment. | Name of Vessel. | Quantity. |
|---|---|---|
| 1855. | | lbs. |
| 8 January | Meteor | 115,325 |
| 10 „ | Isabella and Ann | 87,685 |
| 19 „ | Veloz | 408,453 |
| 19 „ | Harlequin | 20,256 |
| 19 „ | Zealous | 44,475 |
| 23 „ | Rio | 22,761 |
| 24 „ | Lizzy | 101,151 |
| Total shipped during Jan. 1855 | | 800,106 |
| 1855. | | |
| 2 February | Stork | 23,203 |
| *4 „ | Bess Grant | 363,970 |
| *18 „ | Lancashire | 1,038,267 |
| 27 „ | Swan | 14,630 |
| Total shipped during Feb. 1855 | | 1,440,070 |
| *2 March | Swordfish | 383,345 |
| 2 „ | Dominion | 9,327 |

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C.G.

Return of monthly Shipments of Hay, &c.—*continued.*

| Date of Shipment. | Name of Vessel. | Quantity. |
|---|---|---|
| 1855. | | lbs. |
| 3 March | Queen of Clippers | 773,553 |
| 5 „ | Arlington | 694,981 |
| 14 „ | Pudyona | 676,861 |
| 9 „ | Runo | 24,343 |
| *28 „ | Simoom | 612,937 |
| 30 „ | Sarepta | 30,584 |
| 30 „ | Mandarin | 398,142 |
| Total shipped during March 1855 | | 3,604,073 |
| 4 April | John Merrick | 945,227 |
| 3 „ | Swift | 116,321 |
| 18 „ | Finchley | 706,721 |
| 9 „ | Teutonia | 557,043 |
| *19 „ | Syria | 351,115 |
| 21 „ | Elizabeth | 159,696 |
| 26 „ | Diadem | 262,924 |
| 28 „ | Dunbar | 149,640 |
| 30 „ | John Beynon | 237,003 |
| Total shipped during April 1855 | | 3,485,690 |
| 9 May | Chapiu | 1,010,332 |
| 14 „ | Wild Wave | 96,992 |
| 19 „ | Ralph Thompson | 478,449 |
| 21 „ | Murzapore | 579,911 |
| 26 „ | Henry Warburton | 115,731 |
| 30 „ | Alice Walton | 948,800 |
| Total shipped during May 1855 | | 3,230,315 |
| 8 June | Balaklava | 624,068 |
| 15 „ | Concordia | 1,124,301 |
| 18 „ | Rother | 210,433 |
| 20 „ | Globe | 373,967 |
| 25 „ | Jemima | 492,773 |
| 26 „ | Maria | 255,876 |
| 29 „ | Ringdove | 528,250 |
| Total shipped during June 1855 | | 3,609,668 |
| 4 July | Isabel | 84,543 |
| 7 „ | Catherine Morrison | 461,244 |
| 7 „ | Rapid | 174,171 |
| 9 „ | Columbia | 1,349,655 |
| 10 „ | Bloomer | 1,067,489 |
| 11 „ | South Picton | 185,963 |
| 13 „ | Doncaster | 273,015 |
| 21 „ | Bomarsund | 749,339 |
| 21 „ | Warrior Queen | 275,742 |
| Total quantity shipped in July/55 | | 4,621,168 |
| 2 August | Boadicea | 1,224,668 |
| 4 „ | Lady Westmorland | 1,225,044 |
| 4 „ | Undaunted | 352,234 |
| 5 „ | Carrick-Fergus | 210,815 |
| 8 „ | Superb | 462,572 |
| 12 „ | Clermont | 472,744 |
| 19 „ | Azoff | 311,156 |
| 28 „ | Owenwarra | 253,919 |
| 30 „ | Isis | 428,778 |
| Total shipped during Aug. 1855 | | 4,941,930 |
| 1 Sept. | Courier | 1,237,209 |
| 4 „ | Kitty Cordes | 1,295,280 |
| 4 „ | Garland | 21,500 |
| 11 „ | Penelope | 442,160 |
| 12 „ | Pandora | 335,042 |
| 20 Sept. | Ocean Queen | 249,356 |
| 22 „ | John Owens | 1,099,484 |
| 26 „ | John Romilly | 271,334 |
| 30 „ | Tantivy | 1,362,646 |
| Total shipped during Sept. 1855 | | 6,314,011 |
| 3 October | Ocean | 483,015 |
| 7 „ | Ava | 700,110 |
| 13 „ | Leibnitz | 532,611 |
| 15 „ | Ajax | 480,295 |
| 17 „ | Athole | 466,696 |
| 30 „ | Sutton Bridge | 298,823 |
| Total shipped during Oct. 1855 | | 2,961,550 |
| 7 November | Coromandel | 543,524 |
| 8 „ | St. Vincent | 773,461 |
| 10 „ | Constantine | 340,807 |
| 3 „ | Thebes | 426,797 |
| 10 „ | Edinburgh | 550,571 |
| 12 „ | Alice Gill | 348,512 |
| 14 „ | Ina | 376,043 |
| 15 „ | Breadalbane | 694,433 |
| 15 „ | Ottawa | 481,270 |
| 24 „ | British Queen | 1,357,935 |
| 26 „ | Lord Gough | 278,079 |
| 29 „ | Royal Arthur | 443,034 |
| Total shipped during Nov. 1855 | | 6,614,466 |
| 7 December | Ann Sanderson | 397,911 |
| 14 „ | Sally | 454,483 |
| 15 „ | Marathon | 886,914 |
| 20 „ | Barbara | 183,409 |
| 20 „ | Prince of Orange | 483,488 |
| 24 „ | Bessie | 65,876 |
| 31 „ | Paramatta | 463,678 |
| Total shipped during Dec. 1855 | | 2,935,759 |
| 1856. | | |
| 1 January | Arab | 243,610 |
| 7 „ | Amphitrite | 604,386 |
| 8 „ | General Charre | 934,572 |
| 9 „ | Dœdalus | 572,203 |
| 11 „ | Antagonist | 380,350 |
| 12 „ | Wilhelm August | 406,079 |
| 12 „ | Record | 311,563 |
| 19 „ | Exchange | 336,485 |
| 19 „ | Attala | 1,156,092 |
| 31 „ | Persian | 535,260 |
| Total shipped during Jan. 1856 | | 5,480,600 |
| 6 February | Reliance | 364,819 |
| 11 „ | Klanwiffer | 733,309 |
| 12 „ | British American | 1,160,218 |
| 16 „ | Lady Franklin | 384,912 |
| 16 „ | Infanta | 440,801 |
| 19 „ | Messenger | 479,324 |
| 20 „ | Royal Charlie | 352,048 |
| 22 „ | Brilliant | 364,770 |
| 23 „ | Warratah | 553,724 |
| 25 „ | Anne | 599,191 |
| 28 „ | Queen of the Ocean | 601,267 |
| 29 „ | Falcon | 296,209 |
| Total shipped during Feb. 1856 | | 6,330,592 |

Return of monthly Shipments of Hay, &c.—*continued.*

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C.G.

| Date of Shipment. | Name of Vessel. | Quantity. | Date of Shipment. | Name of Vessel. | Quantity. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1856. | | lbs. | 1855. | | lbs. |
| 3 March | Fleetwood & Francis | 696,276 | 22 March | Energy - - | 373,343 |
| 6 „ | Thomas Gowland - | 338,514 | 22 „ | Hindu - - - | 372,685 |
| 1 „ | Alice and Theodor | 736,242 | 22 „ | Number Three - | 238,229 |
| 11 „ | Evangeline - - | 468,678 | 31 „ | Catherine - - | 301,200 |
| 12 „ | Florist - - | 353,790 | 31 „ | Baronet - - | 540,138 |
| 14 „ | Security - - | 762,232 | 31 „ | Tam O'Shanter - | 499,578 |
| 15 „ | Albert St. Paul - | 409,758 | | | |
| 19 „ | Ann Wilson - | 664,948 | Total shipped during March 1856 | | 7,168,759 |
| 20 „ | William - - | 413,148 | | | |

ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT entered into this ninth day of December one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four, between Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Penrose G. Julyan, acting on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, on the one part, and Alexander Bankier Freeland, of South Parade Mills, Back South Parade, in the city of Manchester, on the other part, witnesseth that the said A. B. Freeland doth hereby for himself, his heirs, executors, and administrators, covenant, contract, and agree with the said Penrose G. Julyan, and his successors in office for the time being, to supply and deliver, or cause to be supplied and delivered, at his or their own proper costs and charges, one thousand two hundred tons of upland meadow hay, subject to the terms and conditions herein-after set forth, that is to say:— Total quantity.

The whole of the said hay shall be what is commonly called "upland meadow," of the best quality and of English growth, tops and bottoms excluded, and subject to the inspection and approval or rejection of such person or persons as the Government shall appoint to examine it; such inspection to take place at the time and immediately previous to packing. Quality. Inspection.

All damp hay, of whatever quality, to be rejected forthwith. Damp hay.

Condemned hay to be removed from the packing sheds or premises without delay. Condemned hay.

Truss bands, whether of hay or straw, to be carefully excluded from the bales. Truss bands.

Neither rye-grass, clover, or ever hay will be admissible. Rye grass and ever.

The trusses to be cut out of the rick as nearly as possible of uniform size, adapted for packing. Trussing.

The hay to be compressed by hydraulic power into bales of four hundredweights each, or thereabouts, and the cubic contents of such bales, when finished, shall not exceed on the average 24 feet, say 3 ft. 4 in. × 3 ft. 3 in. × 2 ft. 3 in. each. To what extent compressed.

Every bale shall be bound transversely with four hoops, placed equidistant, made of the best iron, 1¼ inches broad, and painted or varnished black. Iron bound.

The ends of the bales to be cut straight and smooth, the sides, tops, and bottoms neatly trimmed, and the packages finished as nearly at right angles as possible, for the greater convenience and advantage of stowing. Finishing of packages.

The very short cuttings from the ends of bales, partaking of the nature of chopped hay, shall be altogether excluded. Short-cuttings.

A daily or periodical certificate shall be produced by the contractor, stating the number of bales completed according to the foregoing conditions, bearing the signature of the officer, non-commissioned officer, or other person authorized to inspect the hay, and overlook the process of packing. Certificates.

The hay so packed and approved shall be conveyed from the place of packing to Liverpool, and there well and properly stored, at the contractor's cost and risk, for a period not exceeding two months after such delivery. Carriage and storage.

The contractor also engages to mark, in a clear and legible manner, the broad arrow (↓) and the weight of the hay exclusive of hoops, in black figures of six inches long, on both ends of each and every bale. The weighing and marking to be performed in store or warehouse at Liverpool; and the subsequent delivery out of such store, for shipment, all to be at contractor's expense. Marking, weighing, and delivering.

Payment shall be made for the said hay on the due delivery into the aforesaid store or warehouse, agreeably to the foregoing conditions, of each and every one hundred tons, at and after the rate of seven pounds and fifteen shillings per ton of 2,240 lbs. Payment and price.

The deliveries shall commence at the expiration of three weeks after the date of this agreement, at the rate of 75 tons per week for the two weeks next following, and 100 tons per week for every succeeding week, until the whole 1,200 tons shall have been delivered. Deliveries when to be made.

In the event of the said A. B. Freeland, contractor, failing to deliver, in any one or more weeks, the quantities of hay herein expressed, he shall forfeit and pay to Her Majesty the sum of 5*l.* per cent. on the full amount which would have become due to him in such week or weeks, had he fully performed the conditions of this contract; the said penalty to be deducted from any sum that may be then due, or shall afterwards become due, to the said contractor. Penalty.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C.G.

The said contractor further agrees to pack two bales as samples both of the quality of the hay and mode of packing, one of which he shall deposit in the custody of the aforesaid P. G. Julyan, and the other shall be retained at the place of pressing, for the guidance of all concerned, the former at Liverpool and the latter at Manchester; and all subsequent packing shall conform as nearly as practicable with the sample bales, after they shall have been approved of as samples by the contracting parties on both parts.

In witness whereof, the said parties have hereunto set their hands and seals, the day and year first before written.

(Signed) P. G. Julyan, D.A.C.G.
A. B. Freeland.

Witness to the signature of both parties.

(Signed) C. G. Probyn, D.A.C.G.

---

No. 16.

Captain Milne to the Judge Advocate General.

Sir, Admiralty, 12th May 1856.

With reference to my evidence before the Board of General Officers at Chelsea, on the 6th instant, and to the question which was put to me respecting several horse transports said to have been short of forage, when conveying the cavalry from Varna to Old Fort, in September 1854; I beg to acquaint you for the information of the Board of General Officers, that after full inquiry I cannot find that any complaint was ever made to the Admiralty of any such deficiency, nor was I ever aware of any such circumstance having occurred, until it was mentioned on the 6th. I enclose for the information of the Board, a series of letters which passed between the Board of Admiralty and the Treasury on the subject of the supply of hay for service in the East, by which it will be seen that the Admiralty first raised the question of the supply of hay on the 17th February 1854. The horse transports which sailed from England took out as much as they could possibly carry, and many vessels were likewise sent from England entirely loaded with forage. This I have reason to believe was landed at Scutari and Varna, and in an order dated the 25th June 1854, issued by Captain Christie, who was in command of the transports, a copy which is sent with the series of papers No. 2, it will be seen that six weeks' forage and provisions were to be retained on board of every transport, so that they might be ready for any immediate service. Amongst these papers will likewise be found several requisitions, in July and August 1854, from the Commissariat Department, for a supply of spare forage from the transports. It appears therefore to be most probable that, when some of the last transports arrived at Varna from the Mediteranean, immediately previous to the embarkation of horses for the Crimea, that the spare stock may have been exhausted by supplies thus furnished to the shore. The death of Rear-Admiral Boxer and Captain Christie, and the absence of other officers who were at Varna in September 1854, has precluded me at this distance of time from obtaining authentic information; but a letter has been addressed to the owners of the "Simla," requesting information, and under what circumstances so small a supply as only eight days' forage was said to be on board that ship. I have the honour herewith to forward—

1. The Instructions for an Agent of Transports.
2. Do. for a Master of a Transport.
3. Regulations in chartering Ships.

I have, &c.
Alex. Milne, Captain, R.N.

---

No. 17.

Mr. Peel to the Judge Advocate-General.

Sir, War Department, 7th May 1856.

I am directed by Lord Panmure to transmit to you, with a view to its being laid before the Board of General Officers assembled at Chelsea, copy of a correspondence between Commissary-General Smith and this department, relative to the defective arrangements made by the Commissariat at Constantinople for pressing hay for the use of the horses in the Crimea.

I am, &c.
F. Peel.

The Judge Advocate-General.
&c. &c. &c.

---

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

Letter from Deputy Commissary General John W. Smith to the Under Secretary of State for War.

Commissariat, Constantinople,
25th February 1856.

Sir,

Having just seen for the first time the report of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, I beg to state, with reference to that part of it which animadverts upon the arrangements for pressing hay in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, that those gentlemen are palpably wrong, both as to matters of fact and the conclusions they have drawn therefrom.

The evidence on which the report is based has not yet reached me, but I have no hesitation in saying that it must have emanated from prejudiced parties, ignorant of the real state of the case. I was absent on account of sickness when the inquiry took place, but Assistant Commissary-General Edwards, and Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Downes, who were immediately responsible for what was done with regard to the hay, were on the spot, and could have afforded not only a full explanation but a justification of the proceedings adopted under their recommendation had they been called upon to do so, or known that those proceedings were so directly questioned.

My reason for the present allusions is that the affair of the hay occurred within the sphere of my general responsibility, and that if the report were correct a serious charge of mismanagement would certainly be against the establishment under my orders. I distinctly and positively deny the charge, and am ready to disprove it if Lord Panmure should require me to do so. But in the absence of such requirement I refrain from entering into lengthy particulars, under the impression that his Lordship must be aware of the immeasurable difference between carrying out practical arrangements for the service at a period of unparalleled difficulty, and a deliberate review of them afterwards, when there was nothing to do but hear imperfect or garbled evidence, and to form theoretical conclusions as to what ought or what ought not to have been done if certain circumstances had been anticipated.

There is in the report another point, which I may, perhaps, be excused for noticing. I I allude to the "Jason" when sent for a second draught of transport animals; and the evidence on this point seems to be at least very imperfect. She arrived, I think, on a Friday, with orders from Mr. Filder to take up a supply of firewood, as well as horses, but nothing could be done with her until after Monday, because the state of the weather would not admit of the sick being landed from her sooner.

The same reason as to weather prevented the shipment of wood at Scutari, so that, with the concurrence of the captain, and every one else consulted, she was sent to Ismid, where, including the extra distance, she was loaded in one half the time it would have occupied here; although even this time was protracted unfortunately by a violent gale of wind and snowstorm, which intervened. At all events she was only gone about four or five days, and came back with six hundred tons of fuel, said to have been as much wanted as even the animals, but for the conveyance of which there was no other vessel available at the time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) John W. Smith, D.C.G.

---

Letters from the Under Secretary of State for War, to General Smith, C.B.

War Department,
17th March 1856.

Sir,

I have received, and laid before Lord Panmure, your letter of the 25th ultimo, expressing your dissent from the observations of Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch, in their report on the supplies to the British army in the East, upon the arrangements made for pressing hay in the neighbourhood of Constantinople.

As you state that the opinion which you have expressed upon this subject, has been formed without a perusal of the evidence on which the Commissioners have framed their report, I am to transmit therewith, for your information, a copy of the parliamentary paper containing the report and evidence in question; and I am to acquaint you that Lord Panmure will be prepared to give attention to any observations which you may feel called upon to make on the subject, after you shall have perused the evidence upon which the Commissioners have arrived at the conclusion that the arrangements for pressing the hay were defective.

See page 17 and 157.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. C. Mundy.

---

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

Deputy Commissary-General J. W. Smith to the Under Secretary of State for War.

Sir,

Commissariat, Constantinople,
2nd April 1856.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th ultimo, and to tender an expression of my best thanks for your courtesy in sending me a copy of the parliamentary paper therein referred to.

The only recorded evidence upon which Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch appear to have founded their animadversions as to the arrangements for pressing hay in the neighbourhood of Constantinople seems to be that of Commissary-General Filder, who states that the delay in forwarding supplies to the Crimea arose from the hydraulic presses being erected at a distance from the place where the hay was, and that if the presses had been near the hay, it would have enabled him to feed a larger number of animals.

Now Mr. Filder was fully informed of the reasons why the presses could not be erected in the immediate vicinity of the hay, and although he may have forgotten them at the time, still, I cannot but regret his failure to refer the Commissioners for further information to this station, where, instead of negligence or incapacity, they would have found that the arrangements were really the best and most advisable that could have been adopted under the peculiar circumstances of the case.

I was absent from ill-health at the time, but Assistant Commissary-General Edwards and Deputy Assistant Commissary-General Downes, who were immediately responsible for what was done, were here upon the spot, and could have furnished the requisite explanation. But neither these officers nor any one else indirectly inculpated were asked a single question on the subject. All seems to have been taken for granted that told against this unfortunate department, whose general success amidst its overwhelming duties, and under circumstances of unparalleled difficulty, was, I respectfully submit, worthy of more generous feeling.

No tangible data is given by the Commissioners for what they have stated with regard to the failure of the contractors,—to their being men without capital, dependent upon bankers,—to the objection made as to delivery of the hay,—to its having been offered for sale to the French, and to the application said to have been made to the Porte to compel its subsequent delivery. I have reason, however, to believe that these remarks originated from the evidence, or rather gossip, of incompetent and irresponsible parties whose names are not divulged. At all events no explanation upon the points in question was called for in the proper quarter; and while a general denial of their accuracy may thus suffice, still some of them will probably be sufficiently met by the observations which I have to submit on those of a more precise nature.

The important fact seems to have been altogether overlooked that there were *two depôts of hay*, one at Kootchook and the other at Booyookcheckmedgee, the former about thirteen and the latter twenty-six miles from Constantinople. It was estimated by the officers I sent for the purpose, that there would be nearly as much good hay at one place as the other, and in concurrence with an officer of the Board of Works they recommended, after full discussion of the question, that the only available set of presses we had should be erected as near as possible to Kootchookcheckmedgee, namely, at Macriqui, where, although about five miles distant by land, over a good road, an excellent building was procurable, with every convenience, both for the machinery and shipment of the hay when pressed.

It was utterly out of my power to make a personal inspection, so that I at once adopted this recommendation. The erection took place accordingly, and in about three weeks the presses were at work, whereas it would have taken three months if the arrangements had been made either near to Kootchook or at Booyook-checkmedgee, where no building of a suitable description could be had. It was thus the absence of proper accommodation for the steam engine and presses which prevented their erection nearer to the hay—accommodation which was absolutely essential, but which in a country like this, wholly destitute, locally, of all materials and mechanics, could not I was assured have been prepared in less than the time mentioned, namely, about three months. I enclose a copy of the agreement for putting up the presses at Macriqui, which bears Mr. Filder's approval, although he appears to have forgotten it when writing a recently published paper, in which it is stated that he strongly censured the arrangement.

If there had been any proper means by which the presses could have been placed close to the hay at either place, it would have stamped every one concerned with extreme culpability, if such means had not been taken advantage of, but from what my officers assure me I deny that even a mistake was made, or that anything better could have been done *for the exigency of the moment*, and I cannot withold an expression of my regret that the cause so easily explained did not suggest itself to the Commissioners before they dealt in a sweeping and unmerited condemnation of the proceedings.

Every possible exertion was made to bring the resources of both depôts into immediate use, and considering the practicable difficulties, which can only be appreciated by those who have had to encounter them, the results were as successful as could reasonably be expected. The hay was brought in from Kootchook to Macriqui as fast as it could be pressed and

shipped, although the quantity fell short of the estimate and did not realise more than about two hundred tons. An officer was sent to Booyookcheckmedgee, from which place four large ships, "Istriaima," "Lady McNaughten," "Timandra," and "Belgravia," besides some small country vessels, were loaded for the Crimea, the hay being pressed by hand into boxes made for the purpose in the case of some of the vessels.

Subsequently the remaining hay at the latter place was brought to Macriqui, and there compressed by the steam machinery when the supply at Kootchook was exhausted, an operation which, though unavoidable, was attended with much expense, waste, and interruption from the weather, and which, viewed in this isolated and limited form, appears to have been unfairly and erroneously applied by the Commissioners to the whole proceedings from beginning to end.

Mr. Filder has been induced to admit the truism, that if there had been more hay in the Crimea he could have fed a great number of horses, but, from the whole of the evidence taken before the Commissioners, it is clearly established, that there was always more hay or chopped straw on board ship in the harbour at Balaklava than could be landed and used; a state of things which alone seems sufficient, not only to exonerate from blame this branch of the department upon which the maintenance of those supplies depended, but to have ensured it positive credit from impartial judges, considering the extreme difficulties with which we had to contend in the memorable winter of 1854-55.

With respect to the original formation of depôts of hay, it should be observed, that so early as the latter part of June, 1854, an officer was sent into that part of the country where it was understood hay would be available, and that he reported favourably of the resources, but, notwithstanding repeated applications, no instructions for carrying this arrangement into effect could be obtained until some time afterwards, when these resources were otherwise appropriated, and when the officer referred to had been ordered away to Varna. I, however, immediately relieved Assistant Commissary-General Willan from the duties of cash accountant, and placed him in charge of the hay arrangements. As the Turkish authorities stated that there was no other hay favourable, he was much at a loss how to act when Saumaudgee Oglau and Fallanga came forward and expressed their willingness to enter into a contract for eight million pounds. I doubted their ability to carry out the engagement at such an advanced period, although I entered into it, with Mr. Filder's approval, in the hope that a portion of the hay might be forthcoming. They were the only parties who could be induced to make the trial, and although their funds might have passed through the hands of a banker, still they were in receipt of very large sums, as the proceeds of other contracts, which were satisfactorily fulfilled.

It was certainly not for want of funds that their failure was caused, but they were in the hands of local agents, who cheated them and neglected their interests, so that the collection and stacking of the hay proceeded most slowly and unsatisfactorily. It is, in fact, a business which is both unusual and not understood in this country, where the only people who could be employed are so idle and stupid as to render all endeavours to coerce them impracticable. During the most critical part of the time I was without any proper person to superintend the operations, Mr. Willan having been ordered away to join the head-quarters of the army. Seeing, therefore, as the rainy season advanced, that but little if any dependence could be placed upon hay resources of a local nature, I wrote to Mr. Filder on the 2nd September, most earnestly suggesting that immediate supplies should be ordered from England. He did so accordingly, applying for 2,000 tons, a very small portion of which was sent, although there was ample time for the purpose; and if any want of hay existed in the Crimea, I venture to submit that it was attributable not to this branch of the department, but to the non-compliance with Mr. Filder's requisition from England.

A voluminous correspondence took place on the subject of the hay arrangement, which it would probably be superfluous to transmit on the present occasion, as I believe all the leading points have been herein adverted to.

I beg to annex a letter from Messrs. Edwards and Downes, expressive of their full concurrence in the views I have stated with regard to them, and to the matters with which they were connected on the occasion referred to.

Begging that you submit the foregoing explanation to Lord Panmure, and trusting that it may be considered satisfactory in as far as the Board of Commissariat is concerned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) Jno. W. Smith, D. C. G.

---

(Copy.)

I hereby undertake and agree to erect and put into complete working order, within three weeks from this time, a steam-engine and hay-presses, according to plans and specifications with which I have been furnished.

I also undertake to convey the same from the arsenal in the Golden Horn to the place which has been selected for them to be placed in at Macrequi.

V
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

In consideration of this service, I require to be paid the sum of two hundred and twenty pounds sterling, two-thirds in advance as required, and the remaining third on the final completion of the work to the satisfaction of the Commissariat officer in local charge.

Constantinople, 28th Oct. 1854.

(Signed) G. W. Wood.

Witness

(Signed) FitzJames E. Watt.

True Copy.

(Signed) J. Short, C. C.

Approved

(Signed) William Filder, C. G.

---

Copy.

Commissariat, Pera,
2nd April 1846.

Sir,

Having carefully perused your letter, No. 327, of this date, to Colonel Mundy, on the subject of erecting hay presses, we beg to express our full concurrence in all that is stated with regard to us and to the matters with which we were connected on the occasion referred to.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) A. Edwards, A. C. G.

(Signed) A. W. Downes, A. G. A. C. G.

Deputy Commissary-General Smith, C.B., Pera.

---

No. 18.

Commissary-General William Filder, to Sir C. E. Trevelyan,

Steam Ship "Hope," off Sevastopol,
13th September 1854.

Sir,

Referring to my letter, No. , I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of H. M. Treasury, that the contractors having failed to provide the quantity of hay, therein adverted to, of proper quality, and under the uncertainty of being able to procure, in this country, a sufficient supply of forage for the great number of animals belonging to the allied armies, I have the honour to suggest that 2,000 tons of hay be forwarded to Constantinople during the course of the autumn.

I have, &c.

(Signed) William Filder, C.G.

---

No. 19.

Extract of Letter from Commissary-General Filder to Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, dated Commissariat, Balaklava, Crimea, 8 October 1854.

"In like manner, also, the forage of the country within the limited space to which we are confined is nearly exhausted, but the opportune arrival of the ships from England laden with the hay, of which a large proportion may be appropriated to present use, will, I anticipate, prevent any serious inconvenience being experienced from this cause.

"It had been my intention to transmit, for the information of their Lordships, a statement of the Commissariat supplies on hand on 30th ult., but the Navy, in their desire to despatch the vessels in which they were laden on other services, have taken out the stores and distributed them amongst other transports, and I have as yet been unable to obtain a correct statement of the quantities remaining, but I believe them to be ample."

---

No. 20.

Extract of Letter from Commissary General Filder to Sir Charles E. Trevelyan, dated Commissariat, Crimea, Balaklava, 23 October 1854.

"With regard to forage, also, it is wholly impracticable, as I have already reported, to procure either hay or straw in the country we now occupy. Pressed hay could alone be brought from a distance; and it appears, from the reports of Deputy Commissary-general Smith, to be improbable that the contractors at Constantinople will be able to deliver, under the agreement reported in my letter of 25th July last, a sufficient quantity of hay of good quality to meet the consumption of the troops in the Crimea. I would recommend, therefore, that shipments of this article from England be also continued till the future position of the army and the practicability of making other arrangements for its supply are known."

---

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

No. 21.

EXTRACT of LETTER from Commissary-General FILDER to Sir CHARLES E. TREVELYAN, dated, Commissariat, Balaklava, 8 November 1854.

"With respect to hay, also; had the army wintered at Constantinople or its vicinity, it might have been supplied with the forage of the country, and it would have been necessary only to forward from England, as a measure of precaution, such a quantity of hay as would provide against the possibility of a scarcity; but if the army is to winter in the Crimea, it will be necessary that it should be entirely supplied with hay from England, as it would not be possible to convey by sea straw or hay loose in sufficient quantities for its consumption; and the hay which has been delivered under contract at Constantinople, and is now being pressed there, will last but for a short time."

No. 22.

Commissary-General FILDER to Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN.

SIR, Commissariat, Balaklava, 13 November 1854.

I HAVE the honour to transmit, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, an estimate of the provisions required for the use of this army for a period of three months, made out according to the form prescribed by the Commissariat regulations.

Although there is a sufficient supply of coffee in store, I would beg to suggest that, during the present season, and in consideration of the scarcity of fuel wood, roasted coffee should continue to be sent out from England as requested in my letter of 18th October, and the unroasted coffee in depôt be reserved for consumption during the summer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G

ESTIMATE of PROVISIONS, &c., required from ENGLAND for the use of the ARMY in the EAST, for Three Months, from 1 November 1854.

| Number and Description of Troops. | Number of Rations daily. | Rations. | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cavalry - - - - 2,325<br>Infantry - - - 29,018<br>Artillery and Engineers - 3,671<br>Staff and Departments - 1,366<br>Turkish Infantry - - 6,599<br>Commissariat Transport - 2,379<br>Total - - - 45,304 | 36,500 full rations.<br>2,400 ditto, except rum.<br>6,600 Turkish Infantry.<br>10,679 rations of forage. | 1 lb. biscuit<br>1 lb. salt meat.<br>$\frac{1}{32}$ gallon of rum.<br>$1\frac{1}{4}$ oz. sugar.<br>1 oz. coffee.<br>2 oz. rice.<br>Forage, 10 lbs. hay.<br><br>or Turkish Infantry:<br>1 lb. biscuit.<br>5 oz. rice. | Estimated daily, to provide against casualties.<br><br>3,427 Commissariat transport animals at Scutari not included for hay. |

| | Biscuit. | Salt Meat. | Rum. | Sugar. | Coffee. | Rice. | Hay. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Lbs.* | *Lbs.* | *Gallons.* | *Lbs.* | *Lbs.* | *Lbs.* | *Lbs.* | |
| For numbers as above - - | 4,186,000 | 3,578,800 | 104,936 | 391,432 | 223,675 | 637,100 | 6,900,000 | Consignments per "Choice," "Rockliff" "True Briton," "Columbia," and "Belgravia," from London, "Franz Alois," "Aurora G," and "Boabab," from Malta, advised, but not taken into account. |
| Deduct,— | | | | | | | | |
| Remains in store and afloat - | 8,395,668 | 1,324,275 | 42,735 | 191,132 | 218,291 | 138,636 | 1,079,686 | |
| Consignments arrived, but not received into charge,— | | | | | | | | |
| "Il Malti," transhipped from "Ercole," from Corfu - | - - | 331,968 | — | — | — | — | — | |
| "Lion," from London - - | 528,080 | 94,016 | 7,312 | - - | 39,534 | 50,000 | — | |
| Total to be deducted - - | 1,923,748 | 1,750,259 | 50,047 | 191,132 | 257,825 | 188,636 | 1,079,686 | |
| Net Quantity required - | 2,262,252 | 1,828,541 | 54,891 | 200,300 | - - | 448,464 | 5,820,314 | |

Commissariat, Crimea, Balaklava, 13 November 1854.

WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

V.
Papers delivered in by Mr. Filder, C. G.

No. 23.

Commissary-General FILDER to Sir CHARLES TREVELYAN.

SIR, Commissariat, Balaklava, 18 November 1854.

IT is with much regret that I have to report to you, for the information of the Lord, Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, that since I addressed you on the 8th instant, respecting the state of the supplies of this army, seven of the vessels laden with provisions and forage for the commissariat have been wrecked whilst at anchor off Balaklava harbour during a hurricane which occurred on the 14th instant.

I enclose a return of the vessels and supplies lost on this occasion.

Subsequent arrivals of provisions from England have relieved me of any present anxiety with respect to the food of the troops, but the hay lost was all, with a trifling exception, that we had on hand for the service of the army, either on shore or afloat, and was equal to about 20 days' consumption, the issues being at present confined, owing to the scarcity of forage, to the horses of the artillery and cavalry, officers' chargers, and commissariat transport animals, and it might have been expected to last till the arrival from England of the "Belgravia," laden with the hay advised by your letter of 12th October. The great loss we have sustained of forage corn precludes the possibility of increasing the ration of that article as a substitute for the deficiency of hay.

As it will be impracticable, I am of opinion, to convey forage by sea in an unpressed state in sufficient quantities to meet the consumption of this army, I am apprehensive that this loss and consequent deficiency of food for the animals will be attended with the worst results, especially with respect to those belonging to the commissariat transport establishment, upon which the supply of the army depends, several of them having already died although hitherto well fed, from exposure to wet and cold.

---

No. 24.

Copy of Letter from Commissary-General FILDER to Sir CHARLES E. TREVELYAN.

SIR, Commissariat, Balaklava, 27 November 1854.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, with reference to the last paragraph of your letter, No. 443, of 9th instant, by which you inform me that directions had been given to ship from England every 14 days a quantity of hay equal to that conveyed by the "Belgravia." viz., 400,000 lbs., that the issues of hay to this army, when confined to the horses of the artillery and cavalry, officers' chargers and transport animals, amount to 1,300,000 lbs. per month.

As the ship "Progress," which was lost in the late hurricane, brought out a consignment from England of nearly 900,000 lbs. of hay, two vessels per month would nevertheless convey the requisite supply.

In estimating the consumption of this army at 1,300,000 lbs. hay per month, I have excluded baggage animals of every description from the calculation, as it may be possible, although attended with much inconvenience and expense, to bring to the Crimea from Turkey a supply of chopped straw for them, sufficient for a diminished ration whilst they are not working.

The estimate transmitted with my letter of 13th instant will show the quantity of hay which would be required for all the animals of the army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

---

No. 25.

Commissary-General FILDER to Sir C. E. TREVELYAN.

SIR, Commissariat, Balaklava, 8th December 1854.

THE commander of the forces having given directions that all the baggage animals of this army should, in future, receive a full ration of hay or straw, as well as of corn, I request, with reference to my letter of the 27th ultimo, that the quantity of pressed hay included in the estimate transmitted by me on the 13th November, may be sent out from England by periodical shipments.

B. 432.
B. 409.

It is impracticable to convey, by sea, unpressed forage, in sufficient quantities to meet this consumption, or in the absence of all accommodation for storing and issuing it, to make the deliveries to the troops of forage in that condition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

---

No. 26.

Commissary-General FILDER, to HENRY ROBERTS, Esq., Under Secretary of State for War.

SIR, Commissariat, Balaklava, 12th January 1855.

THE inclosed return of the quantity of hay which has been advised as having been shipped from the United Kingdom for the service of the army in the Crimea, but not yet arrived, I request you will be pleased to lay before His Grace, the Secretary of State for War.

The period during which the shipments have been made embraces nearly the whole of the month of December, whilst the quantity shipped does not amount to half the monthly consumption of this army, according to the estimate transmitted with my letter, to Sir Charles Trevelyan, of 13th November. I am apprehensive, consequently, that we shall be deficient of the requisite supply.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

STATEMENT of HAY advised as Shipped from the United Kingdom, but not yet arrived in the Crimea.

| Date and Place of Shipment. | Vessel. | Quantity. |
|---|---|---|
| | | *lbs.* |
| London, 8th December 1854 | Elizabeth | 80,365 |
| Liverpool, 7th „ „ | British Lion | 265,157 |
| London, 2nd „ „ | Helen | 88,459 |
| „ 11th „ „ | John Bull | 108,272 |
| Cork „ „ „ | Britannia | 98,726 |
| London, 22nd „ „ | Glance | 66,818 |
| „ „ „ „ | Tellor and Jose | 111,697 |
| | Total | 819,494 lbs |

Commissariat, Crimea, Balaklava, 12th January 1855.
(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G

No. 27.

Commissary-General FILDER to the Under Secretary of State for War.

SIR, Commissariat, Balaklava, 22nd January 1855.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for War, with reference to your letter of the 5th instant, that a shipment of 400,000 lbs. of hay every fortnight from England, exclusive of the quantity of forage that it may be practicable to obtain here from the surrounding countries, will not suffice for the wants of the army.

Since the date of that letter, the baggage animals of the army have been placed, as stated in my report of the 8th December, on full rations of forage, and their number has been greatly increased by the arrival of many that had been left behind at Varna, and of which many more are yet to follow, and by the importation also of an additional number of commissariat transport animals to meet the requirements for the new service of conveying fuel to the army in camp, the warm clothing, wooden houses, and other unusual stores.

With the exception of a small quantity, equal to about two days' consumption, by the "Esk," no hay has been received from England since the 400,000 lbs. that was shipped on the 8th November by the "Belgravia," which vessel arrived here on 30th November. The loss therefore of 800,000 lbs. by the wreck of the ship "Progress," in the hurricane of the 14th of that month, has never been replaced, and I have, in consequence, experienced great difficulty in keeping up a supply of forage for the troops, by obtaining, wherever practicable, pressed hay, and unpressed hay and straw. The resources of the country with respect to hay in the former shape, appear to be pretty nigh exhausted, and I have pointed out, in former letters, the almost insurmountable obstacles of conveying from a distance by sea an adequate supply of forage unpressed.

In these circumstances, it is of the utmost consequence that 8 or 900,000 lbs. of hay every fortnight should be made from England for the service of the army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER, C.G.

# VI.

## *Papers delivered in by* Colonel Tulloch.

VI. Papers delivered in by Colonel Tulloch.


Page

No. 1.—Letter from Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch to the Right Honourable Lord Panmure, dated 21st February 1846, with reference to a Letter from the Earl of Cardigan - - - - - - - - - - - 598

Letter from the same to the same, dated 16th February 1856, in answer to a Letter from the Earl of Lucan - - - - - - - - - 599

No. 2.—Comparison of the number of men and horses of the Heavy Brigade employed on commissariat duties and in conveyance of sick from the front, as shown by the Returns of Major Connolly and Colonel Hodge - - - - - - 602

No 3.—Letter from Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, dated Quartermaster-General's Office, before Sebastopol, 4th June 1855, given in evidence by Colonel Tulloch, 25th April 1856 - - - - - - - 604

No. 4.—Letter from Thomas Phinn, Esq., dated 13th May 1856, enclosing statement relative to the number of spare sails and quantity of sailcloth supplied to Her Majesty's ships in the Black Sea - - - - - - - - - - 605

No. 5.—Letter from Colonel Tulloch to F. Peel, Esq. M.P., dated 17th April 1856, with reference to Lord Palmerston's approval of the Report of the Crimean Commissioners; with Mr. Peel's Reply, dated 18th April 1856 - - - - 605


### No. 1.

Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch to the Right Hon. Lord Panmure.

My Lord, London, February 21, 1856.

In reply to the letter of Lord Cardigan, dated 13th current, of which you have forwarded to us a copy, we have the honour to observe, that the only objection taken by his Lordship to our Report appears to be that we relied upon the evidence of the officers of his own Brigade as to the horses having been for some days in the end of November 1854 on an extremely short allowance of barley, and without hay or straw.

We submit that nothing could be more conclusive than the testimony on this point, consisting as it does of the corroborative evidence of three commanding officers, in addition to that of the Deputy Assistant Commissary General, who had the best means of knowing what the issues of forage usually were during the period in question.

The fact of representations having been made to Lord Cardigan of the state of the horses, and the expediency of sending some of them to Balaklava for barley to save the lives of the remainder is so clearly established by the evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Mayon, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas, and Colonel Shewell, that we must be excused for giving ample credence to it.

That the officers commanding should not have made any representations on the subject of forage in their letters of the 16th November, will not excite surprise, when it is considered that the first day on which there was a total cessation of hay was after the storm of the 14th, and that the officers were not likely to make any strong complaint on that subject when they had only been exposed to the inconvenience for a single day, especially when, in consequence of that storm, so many other matters connected with the state of their men demanded immediate attention.

The only other point to which it appears necessary to refer is his Lordship's statement that "it is notorious that the mortality of the horses in the Heavy Brigade, during the month of November 1854, was greater than that of the Light Brigade, though they were so much better supplied with forage." Had this been the case, it perhaps ought to have attracted our attention, though, even if correct, it would afford no justification for leaving the horses with so inadequate an amount of food, if there was a possibility of providing it.

On referring to the Regimental Returns, however, what is stated "to be notorious," is found to be not a fact, but an error, as frequently happens in regard to alleged facts assumed to be true only on the ground of notoriety.

The loss of the Light Brigade in November was 12 per cent., while in the Heavy Brigade it was only 10, and in December, when the consequences were likely to be most severely felt, it was 26 per cent. in the Light Brigade and only 20 in the Heavy, as will be seen from the following extracts of the Returns transmitted to the War Office:

VI. Papers delivered in by Colonel Tulloch.

NOVEMBER.

| | Light Brigade. | | | | | | Heavy Brigade. | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 4th Dragoons. | 8th Dragoons. | 11th Dragoons. | 13th Dragoons. | 17th Dragoons. | Total. | 1st Dragoons. | 2nd Dragoons. | 4th Dragoon Guards. | 6th Dragoons. | 5th Dragoon Guards. | Total. |
| Strength of Horses. | 43 | 135 | 126 | 144 | 110 | 658 | 182 | 215 | 220 | 189 | 196 | 1,002 |
| Deaths - | 18 | 11 | 16 | 20 | 12 | 77 | 14 | 20 | 22 | 29 | 19 | 103 |
| (Being the ratio of 12 per cent. of the strength for that month.) | | | | | | | (Being in the ratio of 10 per cent. of the strength for that month.) | | | | | |

DECEMBER.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strength of Horses. | 135 | 124 | 116 | 111 | 101 | 577 | 168 | 195 | 198 | 161 | 177 | 889 |
| Deaths - | 38 | 15 | 42 | 34 | 19 | 148 | 33 | 28 | 35 | 29 | 56 | 181 |
| (Being in the ratio of 26 per cent. of the strength for that month.) | | | | | | | (Being in the ratio of 20 per cent. of the strength for that month.) | | | | | |

His Lordship has obviously committed the mistake of comparing merely the total number of deaths in the two brigades, without adverting to the great difference in the strength of these months. It should also be kept in view that the mortality in one or two of the Heavy Cavalry corps in December was much increased by an infectious disease for which many of the horses, particularly in the 5th Dragoon Guards, had to be destroyed, whereas the Light Brigade did not suffer from the same cause, or, at least, not to any corresponding extent.

As to the validity of His Lordship's reasons for declining to send horses down to Balaklava, it is not our province to offer an opinion, but if it was not practicable it is very strange that so many suggestions should have been made to that effect by officers who were capable of knowing what work their horses could perform.

On the importance of his Lordship's services with the army on the several occasions adverted to in his letter it is unnecessary to offer an opinion, as they appear to have no connexion with any question which we are called upon to discuss.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MC NEILL.
ALEX. M. TULLOCH, Col.

---

Sir JOHN MCNEILL and Colonel TULLOCH to the Right Hon. Lord PANMURE.

My Lord, London, February 16, 1856.

WITH reference to the letter of Lord Lucan, dated the 7th instant, of which you have forwarded to us a copy, we have the honour to submit the following observations.

His Lordship first denies the accuracy of our statement, in regard to the loss among the cavalry being greater than that among the Commissariat transport animals, but he gives no further reason for his doing so, than that "it is notoriously inconsistent with the fact."

In the absence of any evidence on the part of his Lordship to support so strong an assertion, we can only state that, so far as regards the Cavalry, our information on this subject is derived from the returns of the officers commanding the several regiments under his Lordship's orders in the Crimea, of which an abstract is given in the Appendix, p. 193; and, so far as regards the transport animals, from the following return annexed to the evidence of Deputy Commissary General Adams, the officer in charge of them:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Transport animals imported into the Crimea from 14th September 1854, to date of his examination in April - - - | | 2,329 |
| Of which were handed over to the Land Transport Corps about - | 1,200 | |
| Issued for regimental and other purposes - - - - | 160 | |
| In possession of commissariat storekeepers, &c. - - - - | 80 | |
| | | 1,440 |
| Remain casualties - - - | | 889 |
| These casualties are accounted for by him as follows:— | | |
| Died at sick depôt at Karani since 1st January 1855 - - | | 200 |
| Died from severity of weather, fatigue, and exposure - - | | 689 |
| Total, as before - - - - - | | 889 |

VI.
Papers delivered in by Colonel Tulloch.

This loss of 889 includes, there is good reason to believe, a very considerable proportion of animals missing, whose deaths are only inferred from their non-appearance, though many may have been stolen or strayed.

The originals of all these returns are in our possession, and may be referred to by his Lordship if he wishes to do so; they show the mortality to have been 38 per cent. in the Light, 47 in the Heavy Brigade, and 38 among the Commissariat Transport Animals, calculated in each case upon the maximum number landed in the Crimea, which appears to be a sufficiently near approximation for the comparison we proposed.

Lord Lucan also questions the accuracy of our statement as to the proportion of men employed daily in the conveyance of the sick and the carriage of Commissariat Stores to the front, but had he referred to pages 1 to 3 of Appendix he would have seen that this statement is founded on returns obtained by us from the Brigadier commanding the Heavy Cavalry and the Assistant Quarter Master General of the Light Brigade, (the number of men employed in the latter, being assumed at half that of the horses, as the returns show to have been the case in the Heavy Brigade.) If Lord Lucan will compare the number engaged in this duty, as thus ascertained, with the strength of his division at the time referred to, he will find that, so far from the proportion of men thus employed being greater than we had alleged, it was, in fact, little more than one half of what we stated it to be.

His Lordship further alleges that it is inferred in the report, and without foundation, "that the Cavalry only commenced the construction of the stables at the end of January or beginning of February, and only terminated in the middle of March." This, however, we observe, has arisen from a misconception for which his Lordship is not responsible. The paragraph referred to merely gives the substance of the answers by the officers commanding the Cavalry corps to the query noted in margin,* and bears reference only to the huts of the men, as the concluding words "particularly when they are described as having suffered so much in their tents," plainly show, the horses never having been in tents, the paragraph could obviously not refer to them.

* "At what date did you commence to hut your corps, and when were they all hutted." This query was addressed to all "officers commanding in the Crimea," whether Cavalry or Infantry.

We regret that the accidental displacement of the words "shelter for horses" in the running margin from the succeeding paragraph, which alone relates to that subject, and in which no date is mentioned, should have given Lord Lucan the trouble to disprove what has never been asserted.

By the annexed extracts from the evidence of General Airey and Colonel Gordon it will be seen that Lord Lucan was directed to provide temporary shelter for his horses so early as the 8th November, and that on the 12th November an engineer officer was placed at his disposal for the purpose of assisting in that work.

His Lordship alleges that the construction of the stables commenced early in December, but the officer commanding 1st Dragoons states "that no means of providing cover for "the horses was supplied until about Christmas-day," and it will be observed that throughout the evidence of the Cavalry officers on that subject not one of them alludes to the erection of cover for the horses having commenced in December; the officers of the 13th and 11th Light Dragoons assert that it was even as late as the 26th January and 1st February. Nor do all the horses appear to have been under cover by the 11th February, as alleged by his Lordship, for Colonel Doherty states that in the 13th Dragoons it was so late as the 22d February, and, considering that the 11th Hussars only commenced on the 1st February, their stabling was not likely to have been completed much earlier.

The question on which his Lordship is at issue with us appears to be, whether, between the 24th November, when he admits that it had been decided to take up a permanent winter camp at Kadekoi, or between the 8th of November, when he was first directed to provide temporary shelter, and the middle of February, at which date the whole of the horses were, according to his statement, finally placed under cover, temporary shelter of any kind could not have been provided for them, to prevent the very serious loss which occurred in the interval, amounting, as appeared by the War Office return, to 664, or about two-thirds of the total loss by sickness between October 1854 and April 1855.

On this point we may indeed have come to a different conclusion from his Lordship, but having formed our opinion after careful investigation and an impartial consideration of the circumstances and evidence, we see no reason to alter it.

The only remaining objection by Lord Lucan is to the inference we have drawn from a statement by Colonel Griffiths in the following terms:

"Immediately after the 14th November stated to Lord Lucan that his horses were "beginning to suffer from the inclemency of the weather, and that he was afraid he should "lose a great many if something was not done to protect them; and that if he could hold "out any encouragement to his men to the effect that they were to remain any length of "time in the camp they then occupied, that he could get them to erect some sort of "covering to save them, when his Lordship threatened to place him under arrest for "presuming to suggest such a thing. This occurred in the presence of Colonel Hodge, "Lord William Paulet, and others, and if that suggestion had been acted upon, has no "doubt that he should have saved many of the horses which were lost."

The passage in the report consequent on this statement, and to which Lord Lucan objects, is as follows:

"Experience has now proved that even a very moderate degree of shelter would have "been sufficient to save the lives of many of the horses, if not to maintain them in a "serviceable condition, and it must be presumed that such measures were considered

VI.
Papers delivered in by Colonel Tulloch.

" practicable, for a proposal to erect, with the assistance of his men, some sort of cover for " the horses of the corps, appears to have been made by the officer commanding the Scots " Greys, but the manner in which it is stated to have been received by the Lieutenant- " General commanding the Cavalry was calculated to deter other officers from making any " similar proposal."

That the manner in which the proposal " is stated " to have been received, was calculated to have this effect was so obvious that the inference was inevitable. The main fact that Colonel Griffiths was threatened with arrest on the occasion when he urged the necessity of erecting shelter for his horses is admitted by Lord Lucan, and Colonel Griffiths certainly made no allusion to any other ground of offence than " his presuming to suggest such a thing." The Commissioners could not doubt that statement, deliberately made by a distinguished officer in regard to a matter within his own knowledge and subsequently adhered to, and signed by him after an interval of several days. If Lord Lucan questions its accuracy, any further discussion on the subject must, it appears to us rest, between him and that officer, who has been for some time past and still is in London, if his Lordship wishes to refer to him.

Lord Lucan makes it a ground of charge against us that we did not examine him, or otherwise allow him an opportunity of contradicting the evidence of Colonel Griffiths; but the inquiry which we were directed to conduct was closed before our return to England, and our instructions did not give us authority to summon witnesses in this country, nor was that proceeding, so far as we know, ever contemplated; neither could we, with every desire to act fairly by all parties, undertake to ascertain and communicate with every gentleman who might consider himself affected by our report, or the testimony of some one or more witnesses. That report, with evidence and the documents on which it is founded, was accessible to Lord Lucan almost as soon as it was presented to the Secretary of State, and he had thus an opportunity at the earliest time at which it could be known to any one of controverting its statements.

His Lordship availed himself of that opportunity, so that his complaint of inaccuracy in the report followed immediately on its distribution.

It cannot be alleged, therefore, that his Lordship was suffering in public estimation from statements which he had no opportunity of answering.

The examination of Lord Lucan in regard to Commissariat supplies, as proposed by him, could not, it is believed, bring out any information of public importance upon that subject, beyond what has been furnished by the Officers commanding all the Regiments that were under his Lordship's orders in the Crimea.

If Lord Lucan should, on that occasion, make any new statement, it would be necessary according to his Lordship's own view, to give the Commissariat a similar opportunity of answering it.

And if that course should be pursued in regard to Lord Lucan and the Commissariat, there is no reason why it should not be extended indefinitely to every one else who is interested, and may desire it. This would, in fact, be to re-open in England the inquiry that was closed in the Crimea.

The question, therefore, appears to be, whether it is expedient by complying with Lord Lucan's request, to enter upon a course that may probably lead to such a result.

We have, &c.,

(Signed) JOHN MC NEILL,
ALEX. M. TULLOCH,
Col.

---

EXTRACT from Examination of Colonel the Hon. A. Gordon, page 179 of Evidence.

" On the same day (8th November) Lord Lucan was directed to make temporary stables as he best could till timber arrived, and on the 12th November an Engineer Officer was placed at his disposal for the purpose of assisting."

---

EXTRACT from Examination of Major-General Airey, page 187 of Evidence.

Q. " As Quartermaster General for the Army, is it not your duty to provide shelter for the Cavalry horses in winter quarters? Will you state what steps you took with that view, when you found they would have to winter in the Crimea?

A. " Where there are towns and villages it is the duty of the Quartermaster-General to provide shelter for the Cavalry horses in winter quarters. Here there was not any such shelter; I, however, obtained all the planking and timber necessary from Sinope and Constantinople, and procured the assistance of 200 Turkish troops from Rustem Pasha, which encamped within the Cavalry lines, for the purpose of constructing huts for the men and horses of the Cavalry, and an Engineer Officer was placed at the disposal of the Earl of Lucan on the 12th November 1854 to superintend the work."

---

VI.
Papers delivered in by Colonel Tulloch.

No. 2.

COMPARISON of the NUMBER of MEN and HORSES of the HEAVY BRIGADE employed on Commissariat Duties, as shown by the Return of Major CONNOLLY and Colonel HODGE.

| Date. | MEN. | | | | HORSES. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | By Major Connolly. | By Colonel Hodge. | Excess in Colonel Hodge's Return. | Deficiency in Colonel Hodge's Return. | By Major Connolly. | By Colonel Hodge. | Excess in Colonel Hodge's Return. | Deficiency in Colonel Hodge's Return. |
| Dec. 13 | 246 | 62 | — | 184 | 491 | 122 | — | 369 |
| „ 14 | 248 | 62 | — | 186 | 496 | 122 | — | 374 |
| „ 15 | 248 | 62 | — | 186 | 496 | 122 | — | 374 |
| „ 16 | 248 | 62 | — | 186 | 496 | 122 | — | 374 |
| „ 17 | 248 | 62 | — | 186 | 496 | 122 | — | 374 |
| „ 18 | 248 | 62 | — | 186 | 496 | 122 | — | 374 |
| „ 19 | 190 | 180 | — | 10 | 370 | 360 | — | 10 |
| „ 20 | 190 | 180 | — | 10 | 370 | 360 | — | 10 |
| „ 21 | 190 | 180 | — | 10 | 370 | 360 | — | 10 |
| „ 22 | 190 | 180 | — | 10 | 370 | 360 | — | 10 |
| „ 23 | 190 | 180 | — | 10 | 370 | 360 | — | 10 |
| „ 24 | 190 | 180 | — | 10 | 370 | 360 | — | 10 |
| „ 25 | 190 | — | — | 190 | 370 | — | — | 370 |
| „ 26 | — | 180 | 180 | — | — | 360 | 360 | — |
| „ 27 | 156 | — | — | 156 | 302 | — | — | 302 |
| „ 28 | — | 112 | 112 | — | — | 224 | 224 | — |
| „ 29 | 110 | — | — | 110 | 210 | — | — | 210 |
| „ 30 | 110 | 112 | 2 | — | 210 | 224 | 14 | — |
| „ 31 | 110 | 112 | 2 | — | 210 | 224 | 14 | — |
| Jan. 1 | 110 | 112 | 2 | — | 210 | 224 | 14 | — |
| „ 2 | 110 | 112 | 2 | — | 210 | 224 | 14 | — |
| „ 3 | 110 | 112 | 2 | — | 210 | 224 | 14 | — |
| „ 4 | 97 | 95 | — | 2 | 188 | 190 | 2 | — |
| „ 5 | 97 | 95 | — | 2 | 188 | 190 | 2 | — |
| „ 6 | 97 | 95 | — | 2 | 188 | 190 | 2 | — |
| „ 7 | 81 | 92 | 11 | — | 157 | 184 | 27 | — |
| „ 8 | 81 | 92 | 11 | — | 157 | 184 | 27 | — |
| „ 9 | 81 | 92 | 11 | — | 157 | 184 | 27 | — |
| „ 10 | 81 | — | — | 81 | 157 | — | — | 157 |
| „ 21 | 81 | 95 | 14 | — | 157 | 190 | 33 | — |
| „ 22 | 81 | 95 | 14 | — | 157 | 190 | 33 | — |
| „ 25 | 68 | 63 | — | 5 | 131 | 126 | — | 5 |
| Total - | 4,477 | 3,118 | 363 | 1,722 | 8,760 | 6,224 | 807 | 3,343 |
| Difference - | 1,359 | | 1,359 | | 2,536 | | 2,536 | |

From this comparison it will be found, that, so far as regards the commissariat duties, the difference between the returns of Colonel Hodge and Major Connolly, even supposing the latter to be accurate and the former in error, is only equivalent to the employment of 1,359 men and 2,536 horses for one day, or an average of 45 men and 79 horses daily in the whole division, during the 32 days over which the duty extended.

And from the annexed comparison it will be found that, as regards the duty of conveyance of sick from the front, the difference is confined to 180 men and 597 horses for one day, or 7 men and 23 horses daily, during the 26 days over which this duty extended.

Neither of these average differences, however, are sufficient to affect the rough estimate made by the Commissioners at page 36 of their Report, that the proportion of men thus employed did not amount to more than a fifth part of the whole.

VI.
Papers delivered in by Colonel Tulloch.

COMPARISON of the NUMBER of MEN and HORSES of the HEAVY BRIGADE employed in the Conveyance of Sick from the Front, as shown by the Returns of Major CONNOLLY and Colonel Hodge.

| Date. | MEN. | | | | HORSES. | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | By Major Connolly. | By Colonel Hodge. | Excess in Colonel Hodge's Returns. | Deficiency in Colonel Hodge's Returns. | By Major Connolly. | By Colonel Hodge. | Excess in Colonel Hodge's Returns. | Deficiency in Colonel Hodge's Returns. |
| Dec. 25 | — | 140 | 140 | — | — | 400 | 400 | — |
| „ 26 | 102 | — | — | 102 | 306 | — | — | 306 |
| „ 28 | 77 | — | — | 77 | 231 | — | — | 231 |
| Jan. 10 | — | 53 | 53 | — | — | 159 | 159 | — |
| „ 11 | 64 | — | — | 64 | 185 | — | — | 185 |
| „ 12 | 70 | 65 | — | 5 | 200 | 180 | — | 20 |
| „ 13 | 70 | 65 | — | 5 | 200 | 180 | — | 20 |
| „ 14 | 70 | 65 | — | 5 | 200 | 180 | — | 20 |
| „ 15 | 70 | 65 | — | 5 | 200 | 180 | — | 20 |
| „ 16 | 70 | 65 | — | 5 | 200 | 180 | — | 20 |
| „ 17 | 70 | 65 | — | 5 | 200 | 180 | — | 20 |
| „ 18 | 70 | 65 | — | 5 | 200 | 180 | — | 20 |
| „ 20 | 70 | 65 | — | 5 | 200 | 180 | — | 20 |
| „ 23 | 60 | 55 | — | 5 | 170 | 150 | — | 20 |
| „ 24 | 44 | 37 | — | 7 | 124 | 107 | — | 17 |
| „ 28 | 4 | 38 | — | 6 | 124 | 104 | — | 20 |
| „ 29 | 44 | 38 | — | 6 | 124 | 104 | — | 20 |
| „ 30 | 44 | 38 | — | 6 | 124 | 104 | — | 20 |
| „ 31 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Feb. 1 | 43 | 38 | — | 5 | 122 | 104 | — | 18 |
| „ 2 | 43 | 37 | — | 6 | 122 | 100 | — | 22 |
| „ 3 | 43 | 37 | — | 6 | 122 | 100 | — | 22 |
| „ 4 | 43 | 37 | — | 6 | 122 | 100 | — | 22 |
| „ 9 | 40 | 35 | — | 5 | 110 | 95 | — | 15 |
| „ 14 | 40 | 29 | — | 11 | 110 | 77 | — | 33 |
| „ 22 | 37 | 30 | — | 7 | 101 | 86 | — | 15 |
| „ 25 | 37 | 30 | — | 7 | 101 | 86 | — | 15 |
| „ 28 | 37 | 30 | — | 7 | 101 | 86 | — | 15 |
| Total - | 1,402 | 1,222 | 193 | 373 | 3,999 | 3,402 | 559 | 1,156 |
| Difference | 180 | | 180 | | 597 | | 597 | |

REMARKS on MAJOR CONNOLLY'S Returns of Duties performed by the Heavy Brigade.

According to the information supplied to the Board by Major Connolly, it now appears possible to make up an approximation to the various duties performed by the cavalry at different periods, and to the number likely to be available for the erection of shelter for the horses, as follows :—

I. From 12th November, the date of the order to provide shelter, to the 5th December, when the division was united at the Valley of Kadekoi. At this time the light brigade being detached, the following calculation only bears reference to the heavy brigade :—

| | Men. |
|---|---|
| The picket is stated prior to 11th December to have required about - - | 100 |
| The conveyance of forage required one fourth of the number of horses within the lines daily : these, according to the average of the strength in November and December, by War Office Returns, would be 953, one fourth of which would be 238 horses ; and Major Connolly states that there was one man to every two horses, thus employing men - - - - - - - - | 119 |
| The number employed on guards, and as butchers, cooks, armourers, hospital sergeants, saddlers, commissariat guard, farriers, clerks, &c., is stated by Major Conolly at - - - - - - - - - - - - | 119 |
| The hospital orderlies, according to the proportion of sick, could not have exceeded | 15 |
| Total - | 353 |
| The total strength of the heavy brigade, taken on the average for November and December, was, exclusive of sick and officers' servants, about - - - | 906 |
| Remains - | 553 |

VI. Papers delivered in by Colonel Tulloch.

Supposing that for the duties of cutting wood, fetching water, and the quartermaster's fatigues referred to by Major Connolly, including the charge of extra horses, even so many as 100 men were required, there would remain during this period of three weeks about one half of the strength of the brigade available for the providing of shelter, except the time required for grooming, feeding, and watering their horses and cleaning their accoutrements.

II. The next period I shall refer to is that from 5th to 13th December, when the commissariat duties began.

| | Men. |
|---|---|
| The total daily employed in the heavy brigade would then be as before - - | 353 |
| The number of horses for forage in the light brigade, which had then joined, was in December 577; the horses to be sent down $\frac{577}{4}$ or 144; and the number of men required, on the same principle as in the heavy brigade, one half of the horses - - - - - - - - - - | 72 |
| And I shall assume the number employed on guards and as butchers, cooks, saddlers, farriers, &c., to be the same as in the other brigade - - - | 119 |
| Also the hospital orderlies - - - - - - | 15 |
| Total - - | 559 |

The pickets were not increased on the addition of the brigade.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| At this time the strength of the division, exclusive of sick present, officers' servants, and about 35 men on detached duty in the light brigade, was—Heavy - - - - - - - - | 866 | |
| Light - - - - - | 560 | |
| | | 1426 |
| Remains - | | 867 |

Suppose that even 150 or 160 were struck off for the fatigues and other duties before referred to, there would remain a balance equal to about one half of the force, available for providing shelter, except in so far as they may have been occupied with the care of their own horses, &c., as before.

III. The third period is from the 13th December to the beginning of January, when the erection of shelter began to make some progress, as stated by the officers in their evidence in the Report.

The results for this period will be the same as the last, subject to about 60 fewer men being required for picket, and from 248 to 110 more for the commissariat duties.

The average of the latter is about 190 for the above period, from which deducting 60 fewer on picket, leaves an excess of duty during that period of 130 men or thereabouts; so that, except so far as they were occupied with the care of their own horses, a very considerable proportion, amounting to about two fifths, was apparently available for the construction of shelter, even at the time when the duties pressed heaviest on the cavalry.

Yet, *according to the evidence of the officers before the Commissioners*, nothing was done towards permanent shelter during any of these periods; and nothing has yet been ascertained as having been done up to that date, except the depôt or hospital stables erected by Lord Lucan.

As a large number of pensioners and other persons have been employed in this country, during the past year, in taking charge of cavalry horses and their appointments, and who usually attend to three horses each, it may not unfairly be assumed, that one third of the time of the cavalry before referred to as available for providing shelter would be occupied with their horses; but even were a longer portion so occupied, great progress might obviously have been made before the 1st January, or the stables might have been completed altogether by that date, so far at least as the question of labour was concerned.

Submitted for consideration of the Board.

ALEX. M. TULLOCH, Col.

---

No. 3.

Colonel GORDON to Sir JOHN M'NEILL.

Quartermaster General's Office,
Before Sebastopol, June 4, 1855.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of Colonel Tulloch's note, dated this day, forwarding copy of my evidence for correction, and requesting that it may be completed, with copies of the necessary documents alluded to, and returned to him at Kazatch Bay, to-morrow morning, a few hours before the mail starts, and requesting also that answers to the questions put to General Airey may be sent at the same time.

As these questions to General Airey are 52 in number, nearly every one of which contains an implied accusation of neglect or carelessness, he begs me to say that he

VI. Papers delivered in by Colonel Tulloch.

cannot consent to answer them in this offhand way, but will examine each question, and prepare his replies as rapidly as the other duties of his department will permit, which you must be aware, from the evidence you have taken, are of a very extensive and varied nature.

I will endeavour to have my own evidence corrected and completed by to-morrow morning; but as I find it occupies 40 pages, the result of four days' examination, with a great number of papers to be annexed, I fear I shall be unable to have it ready by that time, being much occupied with other duties which cannot be entirely set aside for these inquiries. I may mention as an instance, that only yesterday I was on horseback for 17 hours on a reconnoissance of some importance with reference to our future operations in the field, and this morning has again brought us a great amount of urgent business.

If not ready by to-morrow, my evidence, as well as General Airey's replies, will be forwarded to you at the War Office in London.

I much regret that sickness has obliged you to bring your inquiries to so sudden a termination.

I have,
(Signed) Alex. Gordon,
Col. A. Q. M. G.

---

No. 4.

Thomas Phinn, Esq., to the Right Hon. C. P. Villiers, M. P.

Sir, Admiralty, May 13, 1856.

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to enclose to you, for the information of the Board of General Officers appointed for the purpose of considering so much of the Report on the supplies to the British army in the Crimea as animadverts upon the conduct of certain officers in Her Majesty's army, the return called for by Colonel Tulloch, filled up and certified as requested.

I am, &c.
(Signed) Thos. Phinn.

---

Statement showing the Number of spare Sails and Quantity of Sailcloth supplied to the under-mentioned Ships, which were stationed at Kazatch Bay and Neighbourhood of Sevastopol, on 15th December 1854.

| Name of Ship. | Number of spare Sails supplied to each Ship. | Number of Yards contained therein. | Number of Yards of Canvas supplied to each Ship. | | Total Number of Yards of spare Canvas on board each Ship. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | New. | Old. | |
| Agamemnon | 18 | 10,372 | 960 | 315 | The number of sails and quantities of canvas shown in the preceding columns are the established or authorized "Sea Store" supplied to each ship respectively when commissioned, and on board when completed for service at sea, exclusive of the sails actually in use. |
| Algiers | 18 | 10,104 | 960 | 315 | |
| Beagle | Nil | Nil | 100 | 25 | |
| Curaçoa | 16 | 6,129 | 740 | 250 | |
| Firebrand | 9 | 2,775 | 350 | 220 | |
| Furious | 7 | 2,007 | 350 | 220 | |
| Hannibal | 20 | 10,952 | 960 | 315 | |
| Lynx | Nil | Nil | 100 | 50 | |
| Megæra | 13 | 3,698 | 350 | 220 | |
| Miranda | 12 | 3,208 | 350 | 220 | |
| Rodney | 18 | 8,416 | 960 | 315 | |
| Sidon | 7 | 2,176 | 350 | 220 | |
| Sphynx | 7 | 1,686 | 350 | 220 | |
| Spitfire | 7 | 785 | 275 | 190 | |
| Swallow | 10 | 1,750 | 275 | 190 | |
| Terrible | 13 | 5,377 | 410 | 340 | |
| Tribune | 12 | 5,235 | 740 | 250 | |
| Valorous | 6 | 1,931 | 350 | 220 | |
| Vengeance | 19 | 8,854 | 960 | 315 | |

May 13, 1856.

John Jones Dyer,
Chief Clerk, Admiralty.

---

No. 5.

Colonel Tulloch to F. Peel, Esq., M.P.

Sir, War Department, April 17, 1856.

I have the honour to state that when under examination to-day before the Court I was questioned as to whether I had any evidence to show that the Report of Sir John M'Neill and myself had been approved by Lord Panmure and Her Majesty's Government.

VI. Papers delivered in by Colonel Tulloch.

I replied, that I understood the publication of the Report inferred such approval, as also that Lord Palmerston had expressed it in the House, but as neither of these assertions seemed to be sufficient, and the only evidence I have on the subject is to be inferred from private memoranda, it would be of much service and save discussion if you could forward to me a letter to the Board of General Officers early to-morrow, stating that the Report was approved by Her Majesty's Government before being made public.

I will answer the letter relating to legal advice in the course of to-morrow when I see whether the proceedings in regard to Lord Lucan's complaint are likely to come soon to a close.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ALEX. M. TULLOCH.

---

F. PEEL, Esq., M.P. to Colonel TULLOCH.

SIR, War Department, April 18, 1856.

HAVING laid before Lord Panmure your letter of the 17th instant, requesting that a letter may be addressed to the Board of General Officers through you expressing the approval of Her Majesty's Government of the Report of the Crimean Commissioners, I am directed by his lordship to remark to you that all communications with that Board have hitherto passed through the Judge Advocate General, a course from which Lord Panmure does not think it desirable to depart. You have already been informed that all documents in the War Department are at your service, and had there been any formal documentary approval of the Report of the Crimean Commissioners on record it would be furnished to you according to your request. There is, however, no such document, but the speech of Lord Palmerston to which you refer is as authoritative a statement upon the subject as can be made. It is printed in Hansard's Debates, Vol. 140, page 1658, and Lord Panmure is of opinion that you may appropriately refer to it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. PEEL.

# VII.

VII.
Papers received subsequently to close of the Inquiry.

## Documents forwarded to the Board subsequently to the Close of the Inquiry.

1. Note, dated Moorhurst, Dorking, Surrey, 22nd May 1856, from Captain Heath, R. N., respecting his having an office on shore - - - - - - 607
2. Letter, dated War Department, 23rd May 1856, from Sir J. F. Burgoyne to General Sir Alexander Woodford, submitting a communication from Brigadier Hall - - 607
3. Memorandum, dated Kertch, April 29th, 1856, from Brigadier Hall - - - - 607
4. Letter, dated War Department, 23rd May, from Mr. Peel to the Judge Advocate-General, requesting copy of a letter from Sir John McNeill may be laid before the Board. - 608
5. Letter, dated Granton House, Edinburgh, May 12th, 1856, from Sir John McNeill to Lord Panmure, as to the preliminary Report of 9th June being sent to Lord Raglan, and referring also to Colonel Gordon's and Colonel Wetherall's evidence before the Commissioners - - - - - - - - - - 609
6. Letter, dated London, June 4th 1856, from Mr. Filder, to the Judge Advocate General, with a memorandum attached, which was submitted to the Commander of the Forces as to the formation of depôts for hay at Kulalie and Scutari - - - 610

No. 1.

SIR, Moorhurst, Dorking, Surrey, May 22, 1856.

I SHOULD be glad to refer to a point on which I see I have offered no explanation, viz., that of my not having had an office on shore. I would have stated that the proposal was made to me on one occasion only, and that was in a note from General Airey, offering to build a hut, half of which should be for Admiral Boxer's and half for my office. Admiral Boxer did not accept the offer, and I presume for the same reason as myself, that I could at that time but ill spare an officer. Admiral Freemantle has a much larger staff than I had. I can quite understand that the having an officer on shore would have been convenient to the quartermaster-general's department if I had not established the communication between the Baraguay d'Hilliers and the Triton, but that arrangement seemed to me to take away all difficulty.

I should be glad to annex the above explanatory note to any evidence.

I have, &c.

L. G. HEATH.

No. 2.

Sir J. F. BURGOYNE, L.G.F., to Gen. Sir ALEXR. WOODFORD, G.C.B.

SIR, 23rd May 1856, War Department, Pall Mall.

WITH reference to the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry at Chelsea, of which you are President, I beg to submit a communication, which, I have received from Brig' Hall, an officer of the Honble. E. I. Company's Service, who, having then the rank of major, served as assistant engineer in the Crimea with great zeal and intelligence, and who conceives that his conduct is reflected on in some of the evidence given to the Court.

Feeling every confidence that there was no neglect in the department of Royal Engineers during the service in the Crimea, nor that the Court could have formed any impression that there was, I trust that this appeal is unnecessary, but I do not think that I should be justified in withholding it.

I have, &c.

J. F. BURGOYNE, L.G.F.

No. 3.

MEMORANDUM. Kertch, April 29th, 1856.

ON the 2d of December 1854 I was ordered by Sir John Burgoyne, amongst other duties, to attend to the shelter for horses, both cavalry and artillery.

I discussed with him the best method of making the means at our disposal available, and received from Lieutenant Lennox, R.E. (who had been previously named for the duty), the plans that he had proposed to adopt. The brigade major, Captain Bourchier, gave me complete information on all further details.

VII. Papers received subsequently to close of the Inquiry.

On the 5th of December, having previously submitted the proposed plans of stabling to Lord Lucan, I commenced to show and discuss them with each commanding officer of a cavalry regiment.

There was no delay in directing the sappers to lay out the ground, which was done by a (corporal) carpenter and a mason, both thoroughly qualified. These men were camped in the ground adjoining Lord Lucan's quarters.

Lord Lucan wished me to give my undivided attention to the work, and also that I should personally direct the Turkish labour. I showed him my instructions, and represented to him that in addition to the stabling of cavalry and artillery, I was just then employed in laying down the line of the telegraph, and constructing wharfage for the embarkation of the wounded and sick; but that I would superintend and visit the work *daily*, and make every arrangement in my power to prevent delay in the issue of materials.

This I continued to do until the completion of the work.

The supply of materials failed from Lieutenant Ranquhill, R.E., being unable to obtain transport at Constantinople to forward it. On the 15th of December the cavalry horses were employed in taking provisions to the front, and so continued until the 20th of January; so that during that period even the supply on hand could with difficulty be carried up.

Lord Lucan states in his evidence on the 10th that he was guided by the engineer in first completing the depôt. This could not have been by me, as I had expressed my opinion to him, that if the artificers of the cavalry were left with the regiments, and the Turkish labour divided amongst them, it would be better supervised; which latter duty I considered should have been done under instructions of the deputy assistant quartermaster-general of the cavalry.

Lord Lucan, however, was most anxious to have the depôt stables first completed.

With regard to the employment of sails, spars, and tarpaulins, I find that the day following the proposal forwarded by me to Sir John Burgoyne, viz., 8th of December, I received authority to commence the stabling of the troop of horse artillery, and did so.

The late Captain Christie, R.M., suggested this method to Major M'Kenzie, quartermaster-general's department, and myself. Difficulty attended the obtaining any large supply of spars and sail cloth, a portion of which was applied by me to cover the general hospital stores and some baggage animals of the Royal Engineers, which were indispensably necessary for the prosecution of the siege. The stabling for the troop of horse artillery, as that also for the Alicant mules, commenced on the 9th of January, and was carried out by the valuable assistance and labour provided by Captain Heath, R.N.; the plan, as with the cavalry, being prepared by the Royal Engineer department, and work superintended.

I would here observe, in the state of the public transport at that time (with reference to the weight of canvass and spars necessary for its support), that the principle could not have been applied at a distance from Balaklava, even had material been procurable, which it was not.

I cannot admit that any want of forethought was shown in not applying for the carpenters, spare spars, and canvass of the fleet off Eupatoria, the Katchka, and Sevastopol harbour. The hutting, rationing, and discipline of the carpenters at a distance from their ships, even could they have been spared in time of war and during the stormy season, would have reasonably been urged as objections to such a measure.

Every available transport carpenter at Balaklava was daily mustered by Commander Derryman, of the "Caradoc," for employment on the hospital hutting in the neighbourhood of the harbour.

The above statement replies to the evidence published in the *Times* up to the 11th of April, which is the latest date that news from England has reached Kertch.

G. Hall, Brigadier.
Commanding Field Artillery,
Turkish Contingent.

(Late) R. Engineer, Assistant.

---

No. 4.

F. Peel, Esq. to the Judge Advocate General.

Sir, War Department, 22nd May 1856.

I am directed by Lord Panmure, to request that you will lay before the Commissioners of Inquiry at Chelsea, the following copy of a letter from Sir J. McNeill, dated 12th May:—

Lord Panmure has been furnished through the intervention of Dr. Balfour, with the proof sheets of Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall's evidence, to which Sir J. McNeill alludes, and I am to request that you will call the attention of the Court of Inquiry to those passages which show that they were perused and corrected by Colonel Gordon.

I am, &c.,

F. Peel.

VII.
Papers received subsequently to close of the Inquiry.

(Copy.) No. 5.

From Sir JOHN MCNEILL to the Right Hon. the Lord PANMURE, G.C.B.

MY LORD, Granton House, Edinburgh, May 12, 1856.

MY attention has been called to a report in the "*Times*" of the 3rd May, of the proceedings before the Board of General Officers sitting at Chelsea on the preceding day.

I find that Sir Richard Airey is there stated to have referred to a preliminary report by the Commissioners of whom I was one, dated 9th June 1855, which was sent to Lord Raglan who put it into his (Sir R. Airey's) hands. He comments upon the tenor and substance of that report, and describes it as a document which "purported to be the result of a completed inquiry," and to be favourable to the military authorities, and says, that after seeing it, he of course looked upon the queries addressed to him by the Commissioners as divested of their practical importance.

As the preliminary report of the 9th June was a confidential document addressed to your lordship, you must have been greatly surprised to find it publicly commented upon by Sir Richard Airey, and may very naturally have inferred that the Commissioners had fallen into the grave error of sending to Lord Raglan a communication that might be publicly used, a document which they had transmitted to your lordship under the seal of confidence. I think it necessary therefore, in my own justification, to explain that the copy sent to Lord Raglan was also a confidential document, as will appear from the enclosed copy of the letter in which Lord Raglan acknowledges having received it.

The employment of the term "preliminary," might have been supported sufficiently to indicate that the Report was not intended to be final, but the intentions of the Commissioners in that respect were not left to be inferred, they were distinctly stated. The last paragraph of the Preliminary Report, was not attended to by Sir Richard Airey; it contains nothing that could at any time have been considered *confidential* in its character, and I beg leave to direct to it your Lordship's particular attention; it is there stated that the evidence in regard to some of the subjects of the inquiry had not yet been corrected by the officers last examined having been sent to them for that purpose, only the day before the departure of the Commissioners from Balaklava, and that when the Commissioners received that evidence and the answers to queries transmitted at the same time, they would have the honour of reporting to your Lordship upon the matters to which they related.

With reference to that paragraph, I have to state, that minutes of the evidence of Colonel Gordon and of Colonel Wetherall, the last officers examined, were sent for correction on the 4th June, the day before our departure from Balaklava, and the queries addressed to Sir Richard Airey, and referred to in Colonel Gordon's letter of the 4th June, were transmitted at the same time.

Your Lordship will, therefore, I hope, be of opinion that if Sir Richard Airey was misled in the manner he states, by the preliminary report of the 9th of June, it was not from any fault of the Commissioners who framed it.

I have also seen the report in the "*Times*" of the 7th May, of the proceedings at Chelsea on the 6th, from which the Board appears to have been of opinion, that the statements made by Sir Richard Airey as to the alleged suppression by Col. Wetherall, and a similar statement with reference to the evidence of Col. Gordon, were made with the object of impugning the good faith of the Commissioners. Sir Richard Airey is reported to have previously stated, that "in addition to the change made in the evidence of Col. Wetherall, "which was brought before the notice of the Board on the preceding day, he found that "great alterations had been made in the evidence of Col. Gordon, as it appeared in the "Commissioners report, which Col. Gordon was prepared to say he had never authorized."

I have reason to believe that the printer's "proofs" of Col. Gordon's evidence, corrected in his own hand, will be found amongst the documents of the Commission in Col. Tulloch's office at the War Department; and that the "proof" of Col. Wetherall's evidence bearing marks in Col. Gordon's own hand of its having been revised by him, and of his having noticed an omission connected with that evidence, which appears to have been supplied on his demand, is also to be found in Col. Tulloch's office.

These documents would prove that in regard to the cases that have been adduced for the purpose, as it appeared to the Board, of impugning the good faith of the Commissioners, there is not a shadow of any ground on which to found even a suspicion. I have no doubt that Dr. Balfour, who has been assisting Col. Tulloch, would be able at once to produce those documents if he were directed to do so, and I leave it to your Lordship to consider, whether such documents, being at the War Department, they ought not to be employed to exonerate the Commissioners and especially Col. Tulloch, from a suspicion so offensive, and in a manner as public as those statements were made, which appeared to the Board to involve the imputation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JOHN MCNEILL.

VII. Papers received subsequently to close of the Inquiry.

GENTLEMEN, Camp before Sevastopol, June 19th, 1855.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your letter of the 9th inst., marked *confidential*, transmitting a copy of a confidential preliminary report which you had addressed to Lord Panmure, and I beg to offer you my best thanks for communicating this important document to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) RAGLAN.

Sir John McNeill, G.C.B.
Colonel Tulloch.

A true copy. (Signed) JOHN MCNEILL.

---

No. 6.

Com. Gen. FILDER to the JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL.

SIR, London, June 4th, 1856.

I HAVE the honour to request that the annexed copy of a memorandum, which was submitted by me to the Commander of the Forces, respecting the formation of depôts of hay in the spring of 1854, for the service of the army in the East, and of the reply thereto, may, with the sanction of the Board of General Officers, be appended to the statement made by me in answer to the allegations of the Crimean Commissioners.

I have, &c.

WILLIAM FILDER.

---

(Copy.)

MEMORANDUM submitted to the COMMANDER of the FORCES.

The season for making hay will commence about the beginning of June. The Commissary-General is of opinion that it would be desirable that depôts of this article should be formed, as a measure of security, if it can be done without any very great expense, as he believes it might be. The hay might be procured in various directions, but all at some distance from Constantinople. It would be desirable, therefore, that the direction in which these depôts should be formed should be pointed out, as the conveyance of so bulky an article, if the supply were laid in at a distance from the cantonments of the cavalry, would be attended with considerable expense, unless the depôts were accessible to water conveyance.

(Signed) WILLIAM FILDER.
Commissariat, Constantinople,
15th May 1854.

At this moment I can only recommend that depôts of hay should be formed at Kulalic and Scutari.

(Signed) RAGLAN.

# VIII.



## Letter ordered by the Board to be printed in the Appendix.

The Deputy Judge Advocate-General to the Adjutant-General.

Sir, Board Room, Chelsea, 4th July 1856.

By the desire of the Board of General Officers, I have to return you the letters herewith inclosed, viz.,

A Letter addressed by the Earl of Lucan to the Adjutant General of the Army in the Crimea, bearing date, Camp, near Balaklava, September 30th, 1854, relating to the circumstances under which Deputy Assistant Commissary General Crookshank was placed by the Earl of Lucan under arrest on the previous day.

A Letter addressed by Commissary General Filder to the Adjutant-General in the Crimea, bearing date, Balaklava, Crimea, 4th October 1854, on the same subject, containing Lord Raglan's remarks in the margin.

A Letter addressed by Deputy Assistant Commissary General Crookshank to Commissary General Filder, bearing date, Cavalry Camp, Balaklava, 30th September 1854.

Also, A Letter addressed by the Earl of Lucan to yourself, bearing date, Hanover Square, July 2nd, 1856.

The Board desire me to acquaint you for the information of the Earl of Lucan, that they proposed to append the three first-mentioned letters to their proceedings, and would have done so, had they not been informed by the Deputy Judge Advocate General, in the absence of the Judge Advocate General, that, under the circumstances of the case, such a proceeding on their part would have been, in his opinion, contrary to the principles of justice by which proceedings are regulated in ordinary courts of law.

I have, &c.

S. C. Denison,

The Adjutant-General. Deputy Judge Advocate-General.

LONDON:
Printed by GEORGE E. EYRE and WILLIAM SPOTTISWOODE,
Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty.
For Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

# INDEX

TO

# REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GENERAL OFFICERS

APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE

## STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE REPORTS

OF

## SIR JOHN M'NEILL AND COLONEL TULLOCH,

AND THE

## EVIDENCE TAKEN BY THEM RELATIVE THERETO.

*(PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT BY COMMAND OF HER MAJESTY.)*

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
29 *July* 1856.

# ANALYSIS OF INDEX.

ALPHABETICAL and CLASSIFIED LIST of the PRINCIPAL HEADINGS in the following INDEX, with the Page at which the same will be respectively found.


PAGE

*ACCOUNTS* - 1

*Adjutant-general* - 1
*Gordon, Hon. Colonel Alexander* - 44

*Admiralty* - 1
*Milne, Captain* - 70
*Sea Transport* - 86

*Agent for Transports* - 1
*Balaklava Harbour* - 13
*Boxer, Admiral* - 15
*Constantinople* - 27
*Heath, Captain* - 48

*Allied Forces* - 9
*French Cavalry* - 42

*Alma, Battle of the* - 9

*Ambulance Service* - 9
*Sick and Wounded* - 88
*Transport Service* - 95

*Ammunition Boots* - 9
*Boots and Shoes* - 15

*Ammunition Ponies* - 9
*Baggage Animals* - 12
*Bat Horses* - 13

*ANIMALS:*
1. *Mortality of Animals* - 10
2. *Transport Animals* - 10
*Baggage Animals* - 12
*Cavalry Horses* - 21
*Horses* - 50
*Mortality of Horses* - 70
*Mules* - 71
*Transport Service* - 95

*Apportionment of Stores* - 10
*Issues of Stores* - 54

*Army in the East* - 10
*Allied Forces* - 9
*British Army* - 16
*Commanding Officers* - 23

*Army in the East*—continued. PAGE
*Generals of Division* - 43
*Sufferings of the Army* - 92

*Army Works* - 10
*Artificers* - 11
*Carpenters* - 19
*Huts and Hutting* - 52
*Labour of Soldiers* - 56
*Shelter for Horses* - 87
*Stabling* - 90

*ARTILLERY:*
1. *Food for Horses* - 11
2. *Mortality of Horses* - 11
*Horses* - 50
*Siege Train* - 86

*Assault upon Sebastopol* - 11

*Attack* - 11

*Bad Roads* - 11
*Balaklava to the Front* - 13
*Land Transport* - 56
*Roads* - 82

*BAGGAGE ANIMALS:*
1. *Care and Treatment* - 12
2. *Mortality* - 12
3. *Commissariat Department* - 12
4. *Field Service* - 12
*Ammunition Ponies* - 9
*Bat Horses* - 13
*Cavalry Horses* - 21
*Horses* - 50
*Mules* - 71
*Transport Service* - 95

*Bakery* - 12
*Fresh Bread* - 42
*Ovens* - 73

*BALAKLAVA:*
1. *Defence of the Position* - 12
2. *Stores for the Army* - 12
3. *Forage for the Cavalry* - 12
4. *Village of Balaklava* - 12

PAGE

*Balaklava, Battle of* - 13

*Barley* - 13
- *Forage* - 39
- *Linseed* - 58

*Base of Operations* - 13

*Bat Horses* - 13
- *Animals* - 10
- *Baggage Animals* - 12

*Blame* - 14
- *Commissary-general* - 26
- *Generals of Division* - 43
- *Quartermaster-general* - 76
- *Shelter for Horses* - 87
- *Short Rations* - 88

*Blankets* - 14
- *Rugs* - 83
- *Warm Clothing* - 101

*Boots and Shoes* - 15
- *Ammunition Boots* - 9

*Bread* - 16
- *Fresh Bread* - 42
- *Ovens* - 73

*British Army* - 16
- *Army in the East* - 10
- *Bulgaria* - 16
- *Cavalry* - 20
- *Huts and Hutting* - 52
- *Sufferings of the Army* - 92
- *Supplies* - 93
- *Transport Service* - 95

*Buffalo Robes* - 16
- *Warm Clothing* - 101

*Building Materials* - 16
- *Boards and Planks* - 15
- *Carpenters* - 19
- *Engineering Tools* - 32
- *Huts and Hutting* - 52
- *Nails* - 72
- *Scantling* - 85
- *Shelter for Horses* - 87

*Bulgaria* - 16
- *Adrianople Road* - 1
- *Varna* - 100

*Camp Equipage* - 17
- *Marquees* - 69
- *Tents* - 94

*Canvas:*
1. *Shelter for Horses* - 17
2. *Nosebags for Horses* - 17

- *Sailcloth* - 84
- *Spars and Sails* - 90

*Carpenters:*
1. *Construction of Stabling for the Cavalry* - 19
2. *Erection of Storehouses* - 19
3. *Repairs of Ships* - 19

- *Artificers* - 11
- *Shipwrights* - 88

*Cattle* - 20
- *Live Stock* - 59
- *Sheep* - 87

*Cavalry:*
1. *Crimean Commissioners' Report* - 20
2. *Heavy Cavalry* - 20
3. *Hutting the Men* - 20
4. *Shelter for the Horses* - 20
5. *Transport Service* - 20
6. *Disposable Men* - 20
7. *Duties of Cavalry Soldiers* - 20
8. *Removal of the Cavalry* - 21
9. *Divisional Generals' Orders* - 21
10. *Light Brigade* - 21
11. *Supply of Forage* - 21

- *Artillery* - 11
- *Baggage Animals* - 12
- *Cardigan, Lord* - 19
- *Constantinople* - 27
- *Enniskillen Dragoons* - 32
- *Entrenching Tools* - 32
- *Forage* - 39
- *Heavy Cavalry* - 48
- *Horses* - 50
- *Huts and Hutting* - 52
- *Inkermann* - 53
- *Kadekoi* - 54
- *Light Cavalry* - 57
- *Lucan, Earl of* - 65
- *Mayow, Colonel* - 69
- *Mortality of Horses* - 70
- *Pits* - 75
- *Shelter for Horses* - 87
- *Stabling* - 90
- *Transport Service* - 95

*Cavalry Horses:*
1. *Mortality* - 21
2. *Employment on Transport Duties* - 21
3. *Deficiency of Forage* - 21
4. *Temporary Shelter* - 21

- *Barley* - 13
- *Forage* - 39
- *Horses* - 50
- *Mortality of Horses* - 70
- *Shelter for Horses* - 87
- *Stabling* - 90

*Cholera* - 22

*Clothing* - 22
- *Buffalo Robes* - 16
- *Distribution of Stores* - 30
- *Great Coats* - 45
- *Issue of Stores* - 54
- *Warm Clothing* - 101
- *Watch Cloaks* - 101

*Commander-in-Chief:*
1. *Shelter for the Cavalry* - 23
2. *Employment of Cavalry on Transport Service* - 23
3. *Crimean Commissioners' Report* - 23
4. *Duties of Quartermaster-general* - 23

- *Codrington, General Sir William* - 23
- *Hardinge, Lord* - 46
- *Raglan, Field Marshal Lord* - 79
- *Simpson, General Sir James* - 88

*Commanding Officers:*
1. *Assemblage of Cavalry Officers* - 23
2. *Employment of Cavalry on Transport Duty* - 24

COMMANDING OFFICERS—continued. PAGE

3. *Hutting of the Cavalry* - - - 24
4. *Monthly Returns* - - - - - 24
5. *Issue of Stores* - - - - - 24

COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT:

1. *Administration of Affairs* - - - 24
2. *Organisation of the Department* - - 24
3. *Duties of the Department* - - - 24
4. *Supplies for the Army* - - - - 25
5. *Officers of the Commissariat* - - 25
6. *Staff* - - - - - - - - 25
7. *Cavalry Brigade* - - - - - 25
8. *Transport Service* - - - - 25
9. *Depôt at Malta* - - - - - 25
10. *Seizure from the Enemy* - - - 25

*Army in the East* - - - - - - 10
*Baggage Animals* - - - - - - 12
*Crimea* - - - - - - - - 28
*Crookshank, Mr.* - - - - - - 28
*Delays* - - - - - - - - 29
*Extra Clothing* - - - - - - 33
*Filder, Mr. Commissary-general* - - - 34
*Forage* - - - - - - - - 39
*Fresh Bread* - - - - - - - 42
*Horses* - - - - - - - - 50
*Huts and Hutting* - - - - - 52
*Inexperienced Youths* - - - - - 53
*Issue of Stores* - - - - - - 54
*Land Transport* - - - - - - 56
*Land Transport Corps* - - - - - 56
*Lime Juice* - - - - - - - 58
*Magazines and Storehouses* - - - - 68
*Murray, Mr.* - - - - - - - 72
*Pack Animals* - - - - - - - 74
*Stores* - - - - - - - - 92
*Supplies* - - - - - - - - 93
*Transport Service* - - - - - - 95

COMMISSARY-GENERAL:

1. *Consideration of Case* - - - - 26
2. *Appointment and Instructions* - - 26

*Commissioners of Inquiry* - - - - - 26
*Errors of the Commissioners* - - - - 32
*M'Neill, Sir John* - - - - - - 68
*Reports of the Commissioners of Inquiry* - - 80
*Tulloch, Lieutenant-colonel Alexander Murray* 98

CONSTANTINOPLE:

1. *Cavalry Horses* - - - - - 27
2. *Supply of Carpenters* - - - - 27
3. *Commissioners of Inquiry* - - - 27
4. *Commissariat Depôt* - - - - 27

*Contracts* - - - - - - - - - 27
*Forage* - - - - - - - - 39
*Hay* - - - - - - - - - 47
*Live Stock* - - - - - - - 59

*Corn* - - - - - - - - - 27
*Barley* - - - - - - - - 13
*Indian Corn* - - - - - - - 53
*Linseed* - - - - - - - - 58
*Oats* - - - - - - - - - 73

*Covering for Horses* - - - - - - 27
*Clothing* - - - - - - - - 22
*Shelter for Horses* - - - - - - 87
*Stabling* - - - - - - - - 90

CREWS OF VESSELS: PAGE

1. *Black Sea Fleet* - - - - - - 28
2. *Merchant Service* - - - - - 28
3. *Transport Vessels* - - - - - 28

*Artificers* - - - - - - - - 11
*Carpenters* - - - - - - - - 19
*Fatigue Parties* - - - - - - 33
*Shelter for Horses* - - - - - - 87
*Shipwrights* - - - - - - - - 88

*Daily Returns* - - - - - - - - 29

*Deficiency of Forage* - - - - - - 29
*Hay* - - - - - - - - - 47
*Short Rations* - - - - - - - 88

DELAYS:

1. *Delays occurring in England* - - - 29
2. *Delays in drawing Forage* - - - 29
3. *Delays in the issue of Stores* - - - 29

*Forage* - - - - - - - - - 39
*Ordnance Department* - - - - - 73
*Treasury* - - - - - - - - 97

*Depôts for Hay* - - - - - - - - 30

*Deserters* - - - - - - - - - 30

*Disembarkation of Troops* - - - - - 30
*Landing Troops* - - - - - - 57

*Distribution of Stores* - - - - - - 30
*Issue of Stores* - - - - - - 54
*Supplies* - - - - - - - - 93
*Warm Clothing* - - - - - - 101

*Divisional Orders* - - - - - - - 30
*Generals of Division* - - - - - 43

*Dragoons* - - - - - - - - 31
*Cavalry* - - - - - - - - 20

*Dress of Officers* - - - - - - - 31

*Duties of Soldiers* - - - - - - - 31
*Fatigue Parties* - - - - - - 33
*Shelter for Horses* - - - - - - 87

*Enemy, The* - - - - - - - - - 31
*Alma, Battle of the* - - - - - - 9
*Engagements with the Enemy* - - - - 32
*Inkermann, 2* - - - - - - - - 53

*Engineering Tools* - - - - - - - 32

*Errors of the Commissioners* - - - - - 32
*Reports of the Commissioners of Inquiry* - - 80

*European Wars* - - - - - - - - 32
*Peninsular War* - - - - - - 75

*Eupatoria* - - - - - - - - - 32

*Extra Clothing* - - - - - - - - 32
*Great Coats* - - - - - - - - 45
*Warm Clothing* - - - - - - - 101

*Fatigue Parties* - - - - - - - - 33
*Balaklava to the Front* - - - - - 13
*Supplies* - - - - - - - - 93

*Fleet, The* - - - - - - - - - 39
*Artificers* - - - - - - - - 11
*Black Sea Fleet* - - - - - - - 14
*Carpenters* - - - - - - - - 19
*Crews of Vessels* - - - - - - 28
*Naval Brigade* - - - - - - - 72
*Shipwrights* - - - - - - - - 88

PAGE

*Forage:*
1. *Employment of Cavalry on Forage duty* - 39
2. *Deficiency of Supplies* - 40
3. *Horse Transports* - 40
4. *Supplies from England* - 40
5. *Pressed Hay* - 41
6. *French Cavalry* - 41
7. *Russian Army* - 41
8. *Papers laid before the Board* - 41

*Ammunition Ponies* - 9
*Barley* - 13
*Cavalry* - 20
*Chopped Straw* - 22
*Commissariat Department* - 24
*Deficiency of Forage* - 29
*Hay* - 47
*Horses* - 50
*Linseed* - 58
*Oats* - 73

*French Army* - 42
*Canrobert, General* - 17
*St. Arnaud, Field-Marshal* - 84

*French Cavalry* - 42
*Forage* - 39

*Fresh Bread* - 42
*Bakery* - 12
*Ovens* - 73

*Fresh Meat* - 42
*Cattle* - 20
*Slaughtered Meat* - 89

*Fuel* - 43
*Cooked Victuals* - 27

*Firewood* - 38
*Wood* - 104

*General Orders* - 43
*Divisional Orders* - 30

*Generals of Division* - 43
*Cathcart, Sir George* - 20
*Evans, Sir De Lacy* - 33
*Lucan, Lieutenant-general the Earl of* - 59

*Great Coats* - 45
*Clothing* - 22
*Issue of Stores* - 54
*Requisitions* - 82
*Warm Clothing* - 101

*Green Coffee* - 45

*Guards* - 46
*Grenadier Guards* - 45
*Scots Fusilier Guards* - 85

*Hay:*
1. *Supply from England* - 47
2. *Allowance for Horses* - 47
3. *Deficiency of the Supply in the Crimea* - 47
4. *Commissariat Contracts* - 47
5. *Pressed Hay* - 47
6. *Papers laid before the Board* - 47

*Cavalry Horses* - 21
*Deficiency of Forage* - 29
*Forage* - 39

*Head Quarters* - 47
*Raglan, Lord* - 79

PAGE

*Health of Troops* - 47
*Medical Department* - 70
*Warm Clothing* - 101

*Heavy Cavalry;*
1. *Arrival in the Crimea* - 48
2. *Management and Care of Horses* - 49
3. *Employment on Transport Duties* - 49
4. *Mortality amongst Horses* - 49
5. *Shelter for Horses* - 49
6. *Disposable Men* - 49
7. *Papers laid before the Board* - 49

*Forage* - 39
*Shelter for Horses* - 87
*Transport Service,* 3 - 96

*Horses:*
1. *Sickness and Mortality* - 50
2. *Light Cavalry* - 50
3. *Shelter for Horses* - 50
4. *Transport Duty* - 51
5. *Royal Artillery* - 51
6. *Commissariat Animals* - 51
7. *Clothing for Horses* - 51
8. *Supply of Food* - 51
9. *Divisional Orders* - 51

*Ammunition Ponies* - 9
*Bat Horses* - 13
*Cavalry Horses* - 21
*Forage* - 39
*French Cavalry* - 42
*Mortality of Horses* - 70
*Nosebags* - 72
*Oats* - 73
*Oil Cake* - 73
*Shelter for Horses* - 87
*Stabling* - 90

*Hospital Stores* - 51

*Hospitals* - 52
*Army Hospitals* - 10
*Marquees* - 69

*Hurricane* - 52

*Huts and Hutting:*
1. *Cavalry Brigade* - 52
2. *Building Materials* - 53
3. *Construction of Huts* - 53
4. *Supply of Huts from England* - 53
5. *Weight of Huts* - 53

*Carpenters* - 19
*Cavalry,* 3 - 20
*Shelter for the Troops* - 87
*Timber* - 95

*Infantry* - 53
*Cavalry* - 20

*Inkermann:*
1. *Heights of Inkermann* - 53
2. *Battle of Inkermann* - 54

*Balaklava to the Front* - 13
*Cavalry* - 20

*Invasion of the Crimea* - 54
*Landing Troops* - 57

*Investigation of Charges* - 54
*Reports of the Commissioners of Inquiry* - 80

PAGE

*Issues of Stores* - 54
*Clothing* - 22
*Great Coats* - 45
*Paillasses* - 74
*Quartermaster-general's Department* - 77
*Warm Clothing* - 101

*Kadekoi* - 54

*Knapsacks:*
1. *Separation of the Men from their Knapsacks* - 55
2. *Contents of Soldiers' Knapsacks* - 55
3. *Carriage of Knapsacks* - 55

*Labour of Soldiers* - 56
*Fatigue Parties* - 33
*Working Parties* - 104

*Land Transport* - 56
*Commissariat Department* - 24
*Transport Service*, 4 - 96

*Land Transport Corps:*
1. *Formation of the Corps* - 56
2. *Sufferings of the Corps* - 56

*Landing Troops* - 57
*Invasion of the Crimea* - 54

*Light Cavalry:*
1. *State of the Brigade* - 57
2. *Command of the Brigade* - 57
3. *Disposable Men* - 57
4. *Strength of the Brigade* - 57
5. *Quarters of the Brigade* - 58
6. *Forage for the Horses* - 58
7. *Transport Duty* - 58
8. *Mortality amongst the Horses* - 58
9. *Shelter for Horses* - 58
10. *Reconnaissance in the Dobrudscha* - 58

*Cardigan, Lord* - 19
*Cavalry Horses* - 21
*Inkermann*, 1 - 53
*Mortality of Horses* - 70
*Shelter for Horses* - 87
*Transport Service* - 95

*Lime Juice* - 58

*Live Stock* - 59
*Fresh Meat* - 42

*Loss of Horses* - 59
*Mortality of Horses* - 70

*Magazines and Storehouses (Commissariat)* - 68

*Malta* - 68
*Reinforcements* - 80

*Maps and Plans* - 69

*Marquees* - 69
*Camp Equipage* - 17
*Tents* - 94

*Meat* - 69
*Cattle* - 20
*Fresh Meat* - 42
*Slaughtered Meat* - 89

*Minister of War:* PAGE
1. *Report of the Commissioners* - 70
2. *Production of Papers* - 70

*Newcastle, Duke of* - 72
*Panmure, Lord* - 74

*Mortality of Horses:*
1. *Cavalry Brigade* - 70
2. *Commissariat and Transport Service* - 71
3. *Royal Artillery* - 71

*Baggage Animals* - 12
*Cavalry Horses* - 21
*Horses* - 50
*Mules* - 71
*Transport Service* - 95

*Moveable Column* - 71

*Mules* - 71
*Shelter for Horses* - 87
*Spanish Mules* - 89

*Navy* - 72
*Fleet, The* - 39

*Newspapers* - 72
*Press, The* - 76
*"Times" Newspaper* - 95

*Nosebags* - 72

*Officers* - 73
*Commanding Officers* - 23
*Generals of Division* - 43

*Orders* - 73
*Divisional Orders* - 30
*General Orders* - 43

*Ordnance Department:*
1. *Supply of Camp Equipage* - 73
2. *Conveyance of Stores* - 73

*Wood, Mr. J.* - 104

*Ovens* - 73
*Bakery* - 12
*Fresh Bread* - 42

*Overwork* - 73
*Fatigue Parties* - 33
*Labour of the Soldiers* - 56

*Pack Animals* - 74
*Baggage Animals* - 12

*Paillasses* - 74

*Palmerston, Lord* - 74

*Peninsular War* - 75
*European Wars* - 32

*Pickets* - 75
*Cavalry* - 20

*Pits* - 75
*Horses* - 50
*Shelter for Horses* - 87

*Ponies* - 75
*Ammunition Ponies* - 9
*Baggage Animals* - 12

*Preliminary Report* - 75
*Reports of the Commissioners of Inquiry* - 80

*Prime Minister* - 76
*Palmerston, Lord* - 74

PAGE

*Quartermaster-general* - - - - - - - 76
*Airey, Major-general Sir Richard* - - - 2

*Quartermaster-general's Department:*
1. *Duties of Officers* - - - - - 77
2. *Commissioners of Inquiry* - - - 77
3. *Selection of Officers* - - - - 77
4. *Approval of Conduct of Officers* - - 77
5. *Issue of Stores* - - - - - 77
6. *Army Works* - - - - - 78
7. *Papers laid before the Board* - - 78

*Camp Equipage* - - - - - - 17
*Distribution of Stores* - - - - - 30
*Huts and Hutting* - - - - - - 52
*Issue of Stores* - - - - - - 54
*Landing Troops* - - - - - - 57
*Quartering Troops* - - - - - - 76
*Requisitions* - - - - - - - 82
*Shelter for Horses* - - - - - - 87
*Warm Clothing* - - - - - - 101

*Quartermaster-general's Stores* - - - - 78

*Quartermasters of Regiments:*
1. *Examination before the Commissioners of Inquiry* - - - - - - 78
2. *Supply of Stores and Clothing* - - 78
3. *Forage for Cavalry* - - - - 78

*Raglan, Lord* - - - - - - - - - 79

*Rations* - - - - - - - - - - 80
*Deficiency of Forage* - - - - - 29
*Short Rations* - - - - - - - 88

*Regimental Clothing* - - - - - - 80

*Reinforcements* - - - - - - - 80
*Landing Troops* - - - - - - 57

*Removal of Troops* - - - - - - - 80

*Reports of the Commissioners of Inquiry:*
1. *Generally* - - - - - - - 80
2. *Earl of Lucan's Case* - - - - 81
3. *Earl of Cardigan's Case* - - - 81
4. *Sir Richard Airey's Case* - - - 81
5. *Colonel Gordon's Case* - - - - 81
6. *Commissary-general Filder's Case* - - 81
7. *Approval by Government* - - - 81
8. *Want of Correctness* - - - - 81
9. *Exclusion of Matter* - - - - 81
10. *Preliminary Report* - - - - 81
11. *Quartermaster-general's Department* - 81

*Errors of the Commissioners* - - - - 32
*Preliminary Report* - - - - - - 75
*Queries of the Commissioners* - - - - 78

*Requisitions:*
1. *Issue of Stores and Clothing* - - - 82
2. *Supplies from England* - - - - 82
3. *War Office Forms* - - - - 82

*Distribution of Stores* - - - - - 30
*Issue of Stores* - - - - - - - 54
*Quartermaster-general's Department* - - - 77
*Warm Clothing* - - - - - - 101

*Reserve Stores* - - - - - - - - 82

PAGE

*Resignation of Command* - - - - - - 82
*Cardigan, Lord* - - - - - - - 19

*Returns* - - - - - - - - - - 82

*Rifle Brigade* - - - - - - - - - 82

*Roads* - - - - - - - - - - 82
*Balaklava to the Front* - - - - - 13
*Kamiesh* - - - - - - - - - 55

*Rugs* - - - - - - - - - - 83
*Blankets* - - - - - - - - - 14

*Russian Army* - - - - - - - - 84

*Sailcloth:*
1. *Shelter for Horses* - - - - 84
2. *Supplies of Sailcloth* - - - - 84

*Canvas* - - - - - - - - - 17
*Fleet, The* - - - - - - - - 39
*Shelter for Horses* - - - - - - 87

*Sappers and Miners* - - - - - - - 85

*Sardinian Cavalry* - - - - - - - - 85

*Scots Fusilier Guards* - - - - - - - 85

*Scots Greys:*
1. *Arrival in the Crimea* - - - - 85
2. *Shelter for Horses* - - - - 85
3. *Disposable Men* - - - - - 85

*Griffiths, Colonel Darby* - - - - - 46

*Sea Transport* - - - - - - - - 86
*Agent for Transports* - - - - - - 1
*Sailing Vessels* - - - - - - - 84
*Shipping* - - - - - - - - 88
*Transport Service* - - - - - - 95

*Sebastopol* - - - - - - - - - 86
*Assault upon Sebastopol* - - - - - 11

*Shelter for Horses:*
1. *Cavalry Brigade* - - - - - 87
2. *Construction of Shelter* - - - - 87

*Canvas* - - - - - - - - - 17
*Cavalry Horses* - - - - - - - 21
*Horses* - - - - - - - - - 50
*Pits* - - - - - - - - - 75
*Sailcloth* - - - - - - - - 84
*Stabling* - - - - - - - - - 90
*Temporary Shelter* - - - - - - 94

*Shelter for the Troops* - - - - - - 87
*Huts and Hutting* - - - - - - 52

*Shipping:*
1. *Damage by Storm* - - - - 88
2. *Transport Service* - - - - 88
3. *Conveyance of Troops* - - - - 88

*Sailing Vessels* - - - - - - - 84
*Sea Transport* - - - - - - - 86

*Shipwrights* - - - - - - - - - 88
*Carpenters* - - - - - - - - 19

*Sick and Wounded* - - - - - - - 88
*Ambulance Service* - - - - - - 9
*Medical Department* - - - - - 70

*Slaughtered Meat* - - - - - - - 89
*Cattle* - - - - - - - - - 20
*Fresh Meat* - - - - - - - - 42

PAGE

*Soldiers:*
1. *Infantry* - 89
2. *Cavalry* - 89
3. *Labour of the Soldiers* - 89
*Knapsacks* - 55
*Short Rations* - 88
*Sufferings of the Army* - 92
*Spanish Mules* - 89
*Baggage Animals* - 12
*Spare Sails* - 90
*Fleet, The* - 39
*Shelter for Horses* - 87
*Squad Bags* - 90
*Knapsacks* - 55

*Stabling:*
1. *Construction of Stabling* - 90
2. *Completion of Stabling* - 90
3. *French Cavalry* - 91
*Huts and Hutting* - 52
*Shelter for Horses* - 87

*Staff Officers:*
1. *Composition of the Staff* - 91
2. *Performance of Duties* - 91
3. *Commissariat Department* - 91
4. *Quartermaster-general* - 91
*Adjutant-general* - 1
*Commissary-general* - 26
*Quartermaster-general's Department* - 77
*Stealing Stores* - 91
*Stores* - 92
*Distribution of Stores* - 30
*Issue of Stores* - 54
*Quartermaster-general's Stores* - 78
*Requisitions* - 82
*Reserve Stores* - 82
*Warm Clothing* - 101
*Sufferings of the Army* - 92
*Exposure to the Weather* - 33
*Overwork* - 73

*Supplies:*
1. *Issue of Supplies* - 93
2. *Seizures from the Enemy* - 93
3. *Importation of Supplies* - 93
4. *Supplies on Hand* - 93
*Suppression of Evidence* - 93
*Temporary Shelter* - 94
*Canvas* - 17
*Cavalry Horses* - 21
*Horses* - 50
*Sailcloth* - 84
*Stabling* - 90
*Tents* - 94
*Bell Tents* - 14
*Camp Equipage* - 17
*Marquees* - 69
*Theatre of War* - 94

PAGE

*Timber* - 95
*Building Materials* - 16
*Huts and Hutting* - 52
*Scantling* - 85

*"Times" Newspaper:*
1. *Complaint of Lord Lucan* - 95
2. *Letter of Colonel Yorke* - 95
*Tools* - 95
*Engineering Tools* - 32
*Entrenching Tools* - 32

*Transport Service:*
1. *Generally* - 95
2. *Mortality and Loss of Transport Animals* 96
3. *Employment of Cavalry Horses on Transport Duty* - 96
4. *Commissariat Department* - 96
5. *Quartermaster-general's Department* - 96
6. *Conveyance of Stores* - 96
7. *Fleet of Transports* - 97
8. *Contracts* - 97
9. *Peninsular and European Wars* - 97
10. *Papers laid before the Board* - 97
*Agent for Tansports* - 1
*Cavalry Horses* - 21
*Commissariat Department* - 24
*Horse Transports* - 49
*Land Transport* - 56
*Land Transport Corps* - 56
*Sea Transport* - 86
*Treasury* - 97
*Trevelyan, Sir Charles* - 97
*Turks* - 100
*Varna* - 100
*Vegetables* - 100
*Preserved Potatoes* - 77
*Wants of the Men* - 101
*Clothing* - 22
*Knapsacks* - 55
*Warm Clothing* - 101
*Distribution of Stores* - 30
*Great Coats* - 45
*"Prince," The* - 76
*Rugs* - 83
*Watch Cloaks* - 101
*Water* - 102
*Winter of* 1854-55 - 103
*Wood* - 103
*Firewood* - 38
*Scantling* - 85
*Timber* - 95
*Wooden Huts* - 104
*Huts and Hutting* - 52
*Working Parties* - 104
*Fatigue Parties* - 33

# INDEX

TO

REPORT of the BOARD of GENERAL OFFICERS appointed to inquire into the Statements contained in the REPORTS of SIR JOHN M'NEILL and COLONEL TULLOCH, and the EVIDENCE taken by them relative thereto, animadverting upon the Conduct of certain OFFICERS on the GENERAL STAFF, and others in the ARMY, together with the MINUTES of EVIDENCE taken by the BOARD, and an APPENDIX.

*N.B.*—In this Index the *Numerals* following ***Rep.*** refer to the page of the Report, and the *Figures* following *p.* and ***App.*** refer to the Minutes of the Proceedings and Appendix respectively.

## A.

*Accounts.* Observations upon the incorrectness of the accounts furnished by the Commissioners of Inquiry respecting the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190——Cause of the incorrectness in the returns forwarded to the Quartermaster-general by Mr. Archer, *Boyd, p.* 313.

*Adams, Deputy Commissary-general.* Return furnished by Deputy Commissary-general Adams, of the losses of Commissariat animals in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 9——Circumstance of Mr. Commissary-general Adams claiming certain bullock carts and arabas that had been captured from the enemy, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237.

*Adjutant-general.* Occasion of Lord Raglan stating to the home authorities in England that the Adjutant-general had nothing to do with the transport or supplies of the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237——Copies of correspondence with the Adjutant-general relating to the supply of lime-juice to the Army before Sebastopol, dated 15th, 16th, and 18th February 1855, *App.* 533, 534.——*See* also *Estcourt, General.*

*Administration of the Army.* Duties of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field in matters connected with the administration of the army, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235, 236.

*Admiralty.* Occasion of application being made to the Admiralty to send out more carpenters to the Black Sea fleet, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 149——Nature of the supplies furnished the Commissariat Department by the Admiralty, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 376——Letter from Captain Milne, R. N., dated Admiralty, 12th May 1856, transmitting books and correspondence relative to hay supplied to the army in the East, *App.* 590.

*See* also *Milne, Captain Alexander, R. N.* *Transport Service,* 8.

*Adrianople Road.* State of the horses of the cavalry brigade when encamped on the Adrianople Road, near Varna, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 38.

*Agent for Transports.* Occasion of the Quartermaster-general applying to the agent for transports to collect all the sails and awning that could be obtained, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 98——It was the duty of the principal naval agent of transports to see that the forage was on board the horse transport vessels, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 292——Detail of the duties of the agent for transports at Balaklava, as contained in his instructions from the Admiralty, *Captain Heath, p.* 394——Denial that the sick and wounded suffered any inconvenience from the agent for transports residing on board ship, *ib.* 395——Reason of the agent for transports at Balaklava taking up his position in Cossack Bay in preference to anchoring in Balaklava Harbour, *ib.* 398.

Letter from Sir Richard Airey, dated 17 November 1855, complimenting theagent for transports on the manner in which he had conducted the service at Balaklava, *Captain Heath, p.* 395——Manner in which the business of the department of agent for transports at Balaklava was conducted, *Colonel Gordon, p.* 396, 397——Importance of the agent for transports having an office on shore; sufferings of the sick and wounded from the omission, *ib.* 397——Inconvenience of the agent for transports at Balaklava residing on board a man of war off the harbour, *ib.*——Refusal of the agent for transports at Balaklava to report to the Assistant Quartermaster-general, *ib.* 399.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Agent for Transports*—continued.

Letters from Lieutenant Goss to Captain Heath, R. N., Malta, 31st March 1856; from Lieutenant Scott to Captain Heath, Balaklava, 7th April 1856; Sir R. Airey to Lieutenant Scott, Crimea, 17th November 1855; and an extract from instructions from Sir Edmund Lyons to Captain Heath as principal agent of transports, *App.* 525——Letter from Captain Heath, R. N., dated Moorhurst, Dorking, Surrey, 22d May 1856, respecting the agent for transports having an office on shore, *App.* 607.

*See* also *Boxer, Admiral.* *Christie, Captain.* *Heath, Captain.*

*Airey, Major-general Sir Richard, K. C. B.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Frequency of applications of Lord Lucan to Lord Raglan and the Quartermaster-general on subjects regarding the shelter of the cavalry, *p.* 31, 32——Exertions of Lord Lucan in forwarding the erection of stables for the cavalry horses under his command, *p.* 32, 33. 96——Reason assigned by the commanding officer of the Royal Engineers for not appointing an engineer officer to superintend the erection of the cavalry stables, *p.* 32——Great complaints of the want of forage for animals in the Crimea of every description; means resorted to in order to obtain supplies, *p.* 33——Disappointment of the Commissary-general in not receiving a quantity of pressed hay from England, which had been promised, *ib.*——Offer of the Commissary-general of a supply of barley for the use of the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *ib.*——Letter from Captain Christie, stating that he had ordered all the small spars, sails and awnings to be placed at the disposal of the cavalry for the covering of the stables, *ib.*

[Second Examination.]—Occasion of the Commander-in-Chief issuing orders to Lord Lucan to provide temporary shelter for the cavalry horses, *p.* 85, 86——Reason of the cavalry regiments in the Crimea being badly off for entrenching tools, *p.* 86. 91——Further examination of Major-general Sir Richard Airey upon the subject of affording shelter for the cavalry, *p.* 87——Occasion of Captain Gordon receiving orders to place an engineer officer at Lord Lucan's disposal, *p.* 90——Circumstance of Lord Panmure sending a telegraphic message to the Quartermaster-general in the Crimea to say that he wanted his answers to be sent by the next mail, *p.* 92.

Objection to canvas as shelter for horses; reason why it would not have been practicable for the cavalry, on the hill above Kadekoi, *p.* 92, 93——Opinion that the cavalry did not omit to do their duty; under the circumstances in which they were placed, they did all they could, *p.* 93, 94——Circumstances under which the Crimean Inquiry took place; the Commissioners should have gone further into the evidence on the spot, *p.* 94——Prevalence of cholera and sickness in the Crimea at the time the Commissioners' Inquiry was going on, *ib.*——Had the Commissioners gone further into the evidence in the Crimea, there would have been no occasion for the present investigation, as far as concerns the Quartermaster-general's department, *ib*——Date of the publication of the Crimean Commissioners' Report; occasion of witness's attention being called to the charges contained in the Report, *p.* 94, 95.

Occasion of witness expressing to the Commander-in-Chief his wish to remain in England to have an opportunity of giving explanations upon the Commissioners' Report, *p.* 95——The Report of the Commissioners was never brought officially before the Quartermaster-general till the present inquiry, *ib.*——How the duties of the cavalry soldier interfered with his being employed in the erection of shelter and stabling for the horses, *p.* 95, 96——Circumstance of Lord Lucan remonstrating with Lord Raglan against employing the cavalry horses on the transport and ambulance services, *p.* 96——Substance of the orders given to Lord Lucan to provide shelter for the cavalry horses, *p.* 97——Reason why sailcloth could not have been made available for covering of stables for the cavalry in the Crimea, *ib.*——Grounds of objection to the evidence of Mr. Bracebridge and Mr. Rawlinson upon the subject of providing shelter for the cavalry horses, *ib.*

Frequency of communications between Lord Stratford de Redcliffe at Constantinople and Lord Raglan in the Crimea, *p.* 97——Frequency of Admiral Lyons' visits to the camp in the Crimea, *ib.*——Difficulties attending dealings with Turkish officials, *ib.*——Reason why the paillasse covers could not be made available as covering for cavalry horses, *p.* 98——Occasion of the Quartermaster-general applying to the agent for transports to collect all the sails and awning that could be obtained, *ib.*——Use made of the skins of the animals slaughtered in the Crimea, *ib.*——Great want in the town of Balaklava of warehouses for the Quartermaster-general's and Commissariat stores, *p.* 98, 99.

[Third Examination.]—Orders issued by the Quartermaster-general to preserve the skins of all animals slaughtered for the army in the Crimea, *p.* 100——Use made of the skins of animals in preparing shelter for the troops, *ib.*——No desire to cast censure upon the Commissioners' Report in any way, *ib.*——Inapplicability of the queries submitted by the Commissioners to the Quartermaster-general's Department, *p.* 100, 101——Telegraphic message from Lord Panmure, desiring the Quartermaster-general to send in his answers forthwith, *p.* 101——No wish on the part of the Quartermaster-general to withhold any information from the Commissioners, *ib.*

Arrival of the huts from England; duty of the Quartermaster-general's department with

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Airey, Major-general Sir Richard,* K. C. B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

with reference to their distribution, *p.* 101, 102——Code of regulations and instructions for conducting the duties of the Commissariat department, *p.* 102——Appointment of Captain Keane, of the Royal Engineers, to take charge of the huts sent out to the Crimea, *ib.* ——Reason of the hutting of the troops not progressing so rapidly as was desired, *p.* 102, 103 ——Deficiency of land transport in the Crimea, *p.* 103——Object for which the Commissioners were sent out to the Crimea, *ib.*——Opinion that the Commissioners overstepped the boundaries of their original instructions, *ib.*——High terms expressed by Sir John M'Neill of Lord Raglan, *ib.*

Application made to Captain Christie to furnish artificers and hands from the ships in harbour to assist in hutting the troops, *p.* 104——Reason why not practicable or politic to take the crews of vessels out of the ships lying in Balaklava Harbour to go on with the public works of the army in the Crimea, *ib.*——The removal of the cavalry to Kadekoi till December was prevented by military operations, *ib.*——Shelter for the horses might have been provided on the heights had the means existed of bringing up the materials, *ib.*—— Destitute state of the French cavalry from want of shelter; loss of 70 horses in two nights out of 120, *ib.*——Period of the Quartermaster-general transmitting to England his answers to the Commissioners' queries, *ib.*

[Fourth Examination.]—There was always a great apprehension of an attack by the Russians on our extreme right, *p.* 218——Constant applications from Sir De Lacy Evans for a reinforcement of the division of the army under his command, *ib.*——Reason of Lord Raglan for sending the Light Cavalry Brigade to the position which they occupied on the heights of Inkermann, *ib.*——Reasons assigned by General Canrobert for the Light Cavalry Brigade occupying the position on the heights of Inkermann, *ib.*——Reluctance of Lord Raglan to send the Light Cavalry Brigade to the position which they occupied on the heights of Inkermann, *ib.*——Reason why the Light Cavalry Brigade had no pickets or patrol when occupying the position upon the heights, *ib.*

Precautions taken in order to prevent any sudden attack of the Russians upon the extreme right, *p.* 218, 219——Lord Cardigan could not have detached any portion of his force to bring up forage without obtaining the previous sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, *p.* 219——Strength of the Light Cavalry Brigade at the period they occupied the position on the heights of Inkermann, *ib.*——Inconvenience of the Crimean Commissioners having no shorthand writer to take down the witnesses' evidence, *p.* 220.

[Analysis of his Statement.]—Observations upon the letter produced in court by Colonel Tulloch from Colonel Gordon, *p.* 229——Nature of the instructions issued to the Commissioners on the 19th February 1855, upon proceeding to the Crimea, *ib.*——Observations on Sir John M'Neill's letter to Lord Raglan, upon the subject of the Crimean Inquiry, *p.* 229, 230——Inconvenience attending upon civilians interfering in military affairs, *p.* 230—— Inconvenience attendant upon the Crimean Commissioners being unaccompanied by a shorthand writer, *ib.*——Manner in which the evidence taken before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea was taken down and recorded, *p.* 230, 231.

Unfair manner in which Colonel Tulloch examines witnesses before this Board, as instanced in Major Thompson's examination, *p.* 231——Omission of the Crimean Commissioners to examine General Estcourt, the Adjutant-general, *ib.*——Omission of the Crimean Commissioners to examine Colonel Wakeman, Assistant Adjutant-general, *ib.* ——Omission of the Crimean Commissioners to examine Colonel Chapman upon the business of his department, *p.* 232——Opinion that the Commissioners of Inquiry, when in the Crimea, did not intend to cast blame upon the Quartermaster-general's department, *ib.*——Circumstance of the Crimean Commissioners retiring to Constantinople from the Crimea, in consequence of sickness making its appearance, *ib.*——Until the Report of the Commissioners was laid before Parliament, no idea prevailed that an inquiry was going on respecting the Quartermaster-general's department, *ib.*

Observations upon a memorandum printed at page 166 of the evidence taken before the Crimean Commissioners, affecting the Quartermaster-general's department, *p.* 232 ——Observations upon the queries submitted by the Commissioners of Crimean Inquiry to the Quartermaster-general, *p.* 232, 233——Manner in which the London Report of the Crimean Commissioners was drawn up, *p.* 234——Circumstance of the Secretary for War appointing a special tribunal to investigate the composition of the general staff of the army in the Crimea, *ib.*——Copy of General Simpson's report to Lord Raglan, dated 26 April 1855, on the composition of the staff of the army in the Crimea, *p.* 234, 235 ——Approval of General Sir William Codrington of witness's services as Quartermaster-general of the army in the Crimea, *p.* 235——High opinion entertained by Lord Raglan of witness's services as Quartermaster-general of the army in the Crimea, *ib.*

Copy of general Order of Sir William Codrington, dated 17 November 1855, acknowledging the services of Sir Richard Airey as Quartermaster-general of the army in the Crimea, *p.* 235——Duties of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field, *ib.*——Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field with respect to obtaining the most accurate surveys of the country which is the theatre of war, *ib.*——

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Airey, Major-general Sir Richard,* K. C. B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the strength, the position, the resources, and the contemplated operations of the enemy, *p.* 235——Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an armyin the field with respect to enforcing all camp regulations, *ib.*—— Concurrence in opinion with Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, that the sufferings of the army, during the winter of 1854-55, are traceable to two causes, overwork and want of transport, *p.* 236.

Copy of order issued by Lord Raglan, in May 1854, for forming and maintaining a grand depôt on the Bosphorus, *p.* 236——Duties of the Commissary-general of an army in the field, as laid down and defined by the Treasury Code of 1st March 1852, *ib.*—— Duties of the Commissariat department, as laid down by Sir Randolph Routh, in his observations on the Commissariat service, *ib.*——Uncertainty entertained by the Commissary-general as to the situation which the British army would occupy during the winter of 1854-5, *ib.*——From the commencement of the War, until the formation of the Land Transport Corps, the transport for all branches of the service was invariably supplied by the Commissariat, *ib.*——Formation of the Land Transport Corps of the army in the East, in January 1855, *ib.*

So entirely was the work connected with the transport considered to be distinct from military business, that when the Commissariat found it necessary to require the aid of officers or soldiers for attending to the operation of the transport, the officers and men so employed received extra pay at a rate fixed by the Commissary-general, *p.* 236, 237—— Circumstance of Lord Raglan stating to the Home authorities in England that the Adjutant-general and Quartermaster-general had nothing to do with the transport or supplies of the army in the East, *p.* 237——Notion entertained that the Commissariat duty is confined to such operations as are affected by the disbursements of the public money, from the fact of its having been a branch of the Treasury, *ib.*

Case where the Commissariat laid claim and took possession of a convoy of carts and bullocks that had been captured from the enemy, *p.* 237——No instance ever heard or known of Mr. Commissary-general Filder objecting to supply transport on the ground that the duty was not within his department, *ib.*——Extract from Sir Charles Trevelyan's evidence before the Sebastopol Committee relative to the duties of the Commissariat in providing land transport, *ib.*——There never was the slightest disposition among the officers on the general staff in the East to narrow the field of their respective functions by raising a discussion as to the department by which any duty should be performed, *p.* 237, 238.

Observations upon the division of labour in a modern European army, *p.* 238——Difficulties which the Commissariat had to encounter from the want of fatigue parties to assist in carrying up supplies to the camp, *ib.*——The mortal illness of Marshal St. Arnaud at the critical moment of the invasion of the Crimea, and the heavy reinforcements afterwards received by the enemy, brought the allied forces under circumstances of great difficulty, and certainly very rare in the annals of war, *ib.*——Observations upon the enormous magnitude of the Commissariat operations in the Crimea; the annals of war do not furnish another instance of such an undertaking having been executed, or even attempted, *ib.*

In the Peninsular, and in all former European wars conducted by this country on a scale of magnitude, the means of transport had been obtained either by purchases or requisitions made in the districts occupied by the forces, *p.* 238——In the Crimea, nothing could reach the army except what was supplied by importation, *ib.*——The delays which actually occurred, and which occasioned the extraordinary sufferings of the British Army in the East, have now been traced to England, *ib.*——Delay in sending out hay from England to the seat of war in the month of November 1854, *ib.*——In war, it is the constant practice to rely upon the labour of the soldier as one of the means by which the wants of the army are supplied; in the Crimea this resource partly failed, and failed from the stress of military events, *ib.*

The British infantry were so constantly employed with the vital work of defending all against the enemy, that men for other duties could hardly be spared, *p.* 238——From the morning of the 25th October 1854, when the battle of Balaklava began, until after the close of the winter, there was going on with the enemy in front and flank a kind of protracted engagement, *ib.*——The most obvious method of supplying the want of fatigue parties was by importing workmen from the Euxine and the Bosphorus, *ib.*——Manner in which the officers serving under the Quartermaster-general in the Crimea were selected, *p.* 239——Lord Raglan almost invariably left the nomination of the officers of the Quartermaster-general's department to witness, *ib.*

Admirable manner in which the maps and plans were executed by the officers attached to the Quartermaster-general's department in the Crimea, 239——If the Quartermaster-general desired to have any work done, which can be performed by the unskilled strength of the men, he would make his requisition upon the Adjutant-general for fatigue parties, *ib.* ——If the Quartermaster-general saw the advantage of hutting the troops, he would first obtain from the Engineer department a list of materials requisite for the purpose, and would send a copy of such list to the Commissariat, with a requisition to have the required materials supplied, *ib.*

Observations

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Airey, Major-general Sir Richard,* K. C. B. (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Observations upon the over-work exacted of the officers and of the several departments of the army in the East, *p.* 239——Impossibility of employing a sufficient number of men to make the road from Balaklava to the front, and at the same time to carry on the military operations in which the army was engaged, *ib.*——Great delusion prevailing in this country with respect to the construction of the road from Balaklava to the front, *p.* 239, 240——Reason of the camp equipage supplied to the army in the East being deficient in quality, *p.* 240——Reason of the tents supplied to the army in the East being of an inferior quality, *ib.*——Application made by Lord De Ros, then Quartermaster-general of the Forces, for additional camp equipage for the use of the army in the East, *ib.*

Arrangement made with Admiral Houston Stewart for a supply of camp equipage for the army in the East, from Malta, *p.* 240——Extract from the London Report of the Crimean Commissioners relative to the supply of wooden huts from England for the army in the East, *ib.*——Determination of the Government at home to make a descent upon the enemy's coast, and to attempt a rapid military enterprise against the stronghold of Sebastopol, *p.* 241——The allied army, upon landing in the Crimea, would be more properly called a moveable column; distinction between the two descriptions of force, *ib.*——It was estimated that the transport required for the whole of the forces which landed in the Crimea would amount to 28,000 animals, *ib.*——The French landed in the Crimea with no transport animals at all, except for their ambulance, and they only obtained a small number in the country, near the landing-place, *ib.*

It was estimated that, to move as an army, the British force alone would require 14,000 beasts of transport, and that the French would require a like number, *p.* 241——Nature of the drawbacks to the employment of a moveable column which do not apply to a regular army, *ib.*——Particulars as to the landing of the expeditionary force in the Crimea on the beach at Old Fort, *ib.*——It was not until the month of February 1855, when the conflict in the Crimea had been raging for several months, that the Home Government duly formed a base of operations at Balaklava for the supply of the British army, *ib.*——In a regular war, the formation of a base of operations is the first step; it often precedes even the declaration of hostilities, and it always precedes the opening of a campaign, *ib.*

Opinion that the responsibility of the general and the officers engaged in the invasion of the Crimea was not a responsibility of the same description as that which attaches to the conduct of an ordinary warfare, *p.* 241——At first it was intended to advance without tents; but the discomfort occasioned to the troops by the dreadful night of the 14th November, induced Lord Raglan to order that the tents should be landed, *ib.*——The weight of the huts has been much underrated by the Commissioners of Inquiry; instead of being 2,500 tons they were 3,750 tons, *ib.*——Account of the exertions made by Lord Raglan to give shelter to the troops in the Crimea, during the winter of 1854-55, and the difficulties which he had to contend with, *p.* 241, 242——Occasion of Lord Raglan ordering the tents to be brought together in a mass on the beach, and carried back on board ship, *p.* 242.

Success of the Quartermaster-general in bringing up from Varna twenty of the reserve hospital marquees which lay there in store, *p.* 242——It was nothing but the disastrous explosion in the French batteries that prevented the assault upon Sebastopol on the 17th October 1854, *ib.*——Success of the first cannonade against the outworks of Sebastopol, on the part of the British Artillery, *ib.*——Nobody ever calculated when the allies landed in the Crimea, the encamping upon the heights before Sebastopol, and being constantly engaged, during the whole winter, with an enemy vastly superior in force, *ib.*——Period when it was first determined that the British army should winter in the Crimea, *ib.*

On the day after the battle of Inkermann was fought, a protracted consultation, as to the further conduct of the campaign, took place between the Generals; and the result was, the determination to persevere in holding the ground then occupied by the allies, and to fortify our position on the Inkermann heights, *p.* 242——Position which the enemy would have taken up, had the allied armies abandoned the heights after the battle of Inkermann, and neglected to defend the advanced trenches, *ib.*——Measures taken by the Quartermaster-general for affording shelter to the troops, immediately that it was determined to winter on the heights, *p.* 242, 243——Despatch of ships to Sinope, in the early part of November 1854, to procure planking for huts for the army in the East, *ib.*

Observations of Sir Edward Lyons on the exertions of the British army to meet the difficulties with which it was surrounded, *p.* 243——The evil in the Crimean campaign was, that one man was doing the work of three, and then comes the recommendation that this one man should do the work of six, *ib.*——Extract from the London Report of the Commissioners of Crimean Inquiry, touching the supply of wood to the army in the East, for hutting purposes, *ib.*——Extract from the London Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea, touching the supply of boards for building purposes, to the army in the East, *ib.*——Issue of an order from the Quartermaster-general's office,

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Airey, Major-general Sir Richard, K. C. B.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

on 14th November 1854, directing that the hides of all slaughtered animals should be preserved, to be made serviceable as covering for roofs, *p.* 244.

Circumstance of the Quartermaster-general obtaining 11,699 pieces of scantling, for building purposes, in November 1854, for the use of the army in the East, *p.* 244——Circumstance of the Quartermaster-general obtaining materials for hutting, comprising 46,365 boards and planks, and 11,699 pieces of scantling, *ib.*——Impossibility of obtaining fatigue parties to bring up the timber and planks from Balaklava, for building the huts for the troops, in November 1854, *ib.*——Account of the destruction of the tents and marquees by the storm of the 14th November in the Crimea, *ib.*——Report of Dr. Hall, the head of the Medical Department, on the damage done to the hospital marquees by the storm of the 14th November, *ib.*——Circumstance of Colonel Wetherall, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-general, being despatched to Constantinople, on the 16th November 1854, to purchase warm clothing and necessaries, *ib.*

Copies of despatches, showing the causes which delayed all compliance with the requisition of the Quartermaster-general for camp equipage and engineering tools to be supplied from England, *p.* 244——Circumstance of the Quartermaster-general sending a requisition to England on the 28th of November 1854 for a supply of camp equipage and engineering tools for the army in the East, *p.* 244, 245——Letters from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 18th and 23d April 1855, stating the cause of the delay in complying with the requisition of the Quartermaster-general, dated in November 1854, for a supply of engineering tools, *ib.*——Letter from Colonel Mundy, dated 8th May 1855, to Mr. Wood, of the Ordnance, complaining of the very injurious procrastination which has occurred in complying with the Quartermaster-general's requisition for a supply of camp equipage and engineering tools for the army in the East, *p.* 245.

Letter from Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, dated 5 May 1855, stating the progress made in complying with the requisition of the Quartermaster-general of the army, dated in November 1854, *p.* 245——Even with all the resources of London, an order for 3,000 tents could not be executed without a delay of several months, *p.* 246——Resort had to the merchant shipping lying in Balaklava Harbour for the services of ship carpenters and seamen, to assist in the erection of huts, and constructing shelter for the horses of the cavalry, *ib.*——Description of the terrific storm that visited the Crimea on the 14th November 1854, and its effects, *ib.*——Account of the damage done to the shipping in Balaklava Harbour by the storm, *ib.*

Description of the scene in Balaklava Harbour during the storm of the 14 November 1854, *p.* 246——Injury sustained by the shipping upon that occasion, *ib.*——Sufficiency of the supply of camp equipments of the army in the East at starting, with a reserve in proportion to the scale and character of the expedition, *p.* 247——The whole of the British encampment was swept to the ground by the hurricane which visited the Crimea on the 14 November 1854, *ib.*——The Quartermaster-general had no legitimate base of operations to draw upon nearer than London, and there the source was so distant, and the difficulties even there existing so great, that articles did not arrive till some months after they were ordered, *ib.*

Promptitude of Sir Henry Ward, and Sir William Read, Governors of the Ionian Islands and Malta, in sending reinforcements to the Crimea, upon hearing of the battle of Inkermann, *p.* 247——So many men were wanted day and night for defence against the enemy, that few could be spared for labour, *ib.*——Letter from Colonel Gordon to Sir John M'Neil, dated 4th June 1855, upon the subject of the queries submitted to the Quartermaster-general Airey by the Commissioners of Inquiry, *p.* 251——Circumstance of Colonel Tulloch desiring the answers to the queries submitted to the Quartermaster-general to be sent to Kazatch Bay, *ib.*——Occasion of the Quartermaster-general placing at Lord Lucan's disposal an engineer officer and some Turkish workmen to assist in the construction of shelter for the horses, *p.* 251, 252.

Circumstance of Sir John M'Neil and Colonel Tulloch making a preliminary report of their inquiries in the Crimea, *p.* 252, 253——Separation of the men from their knapsacks on landing in the Crimea; active measures subsequently taken to restore them, *p.* 253——Desire of the Duke of Cambridge to obtain the knapsacks for the men in his Royal Highness's division, *ib.*——Disinclination of the other generals of division that the knapsacks should be restored to the men, *ib.*——Contents of the knapsack of a soldier on active field service, *ib.*——Description of the squad bags, in which the superfluous part of a man's kit is kept, and which would make his knapsack too heavy for actual field service, *ib.*

Experience of General Sir Willoughby Gordon as Quartermaster-general for many years of the British army, *p.* 253——Answers of Sir Willoughby Gordon to queries submitted to him by the Commissioners on the civil administration of the army in 1837 relative to Quartermaster-general's stores, *p.* 253, 254——Error of the Commissioners of Inquiry in supposing that the Quartermaster-general issues stores from his department, *ib.*——Manner in which the distribution or apportionment of stores becomes part of the duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field, *p.* 254——Duty of the Quartermaster-general with respect to countersigning the requisitions by which the stores are drawn

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Airey, Maior-general Sir Richard, K. C. B.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

drawn from the Commissariat department, *p.* 254——Duty of the Quartermaster-general's department with respect to countersigning requisitions for the distribution of great coats to the men, *ib.*

Ability and zeal displayed by Colonel Wetherall in discharging the duties of the sub-department of the Quartermaster-general's office in the Crimea, *p.* 255——Measures adopted by Assistant Quartermasters-general to ensure a speedy and regular delivery of clothing and necessaries to the army in the East, *ib.*——Means adopted in the Quarter-master-general's office to acquaint the officers and men of the articles of extra clothing lying ready in the Commissariat storehouse, *ib.*——Duty of the Quartermaster-general's department with respect to countersigning requisitions on the Commissariat for stores, *ib.*——Station of Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie, Assistant Quartermaster-general, at Balaklava, with full discretionary powers to approve of all requisitions on the spot in case of pressure, *ib.*

Plan adopted in the Quartermaster-general's office in case of a requisition being filled up with a wrong description of the article of clothing required, *p.* 255——Means devised in the Quartermaster-general's office for supplying the wants of the men with regularity and despatch, *p.* 255, 256——Means devised by the Quartermaster-general's department for the prevention of delay in the delivery of clothing to the men of the army in the East, *p.* 256——Measures taken by the Quartermaster-general's department to ensure a speedy and regular supply of great coats to the army in the East, *ib.*——Sufferings of the men of Sir George Cathcart's division in the Crimea from having no public bat-horses for the transport of stores and clothing, *ib.*

Steps taken by the Quartermaster-general's office to prevent any delay in the distribution of warm clothing and camp necessaries to the men, *p.* 256——Complaint made by Colonel Waddy, of the 50th regiment, of his inability to obtain a supply of blankets for his men from the Commissariat stores, *ib.*——Complaint of Lieutenant-Colonel Lysons of being told that he was not to make requisitions for articles for his men, as when the articles arrived they would be distributed, *ib.*——Reason of the privations of the men being so mainly experienced by the Fourth Division of the army in the East, *p.* 256, 257.——Physical difficulty of bringing up bales of goods from the sea shore to the camp pitched on the hills at a distance of several miles, as was the case in the Crimea, 257——Reason assigned by Colonel Yea for not making any requisition on the Quartermaster-general for camp necessaries and extra clothing for his men, *ib.*

Position of the 7th Fusileers with the army in the East, and manner in which they were supplied with clothing and camp necessaries, *p.* 257——Evidence of Colonel Yea respecting the men of the 7th Fusileers becoming frostbitten from want of serviceable boots, *ib.*——Bad quality of the trousers supplied to the 7th Fusileers, *ib.*——Advice given by Mr. Romaine to the managers of the Crimean Army Fund, which was sent out from England, as to the best means of carrying out the object of the subscribers, *p.* 257, 258——Unceasing exertions of Mr. Egerton and Mr. Tower in the distribution of stores to the soldier, provided for his comfort by the bounty of Lord Ellesmere, *p.* 258——Observations upon the elaborate description of the War Office form of requisition for obtaining a new great coat; error of the Commissioners of Inquiry in supposing that the same form was requisite in the Crimea, *p.* 258.

Error of the Commissioners of Crimean Inquiry, with regard to the quantities of stores lying in the Commissariat storehouses in Balaklava, *p.* 258——Difficulties and delays in landing of heavy goods sent out from England to the Crimea, from the want of hands, *ib.*——Comparison of the issue of stores in the Crimea, upon requisitions of the Quarter-master-general, with that of unpresented cheques on a banker, *p.* 258, 259——Inconvenience arising from want of sufficient warehouse room in Balaklava for the storage of goods sent out from England, *ib.*——Enormous loss of warm clothing occasioned by the loss of the "Prince," *p.* 259——There never was at any moment the smallest difficulty in obtaining an approved requisition for the coats and blankets required for the soldiers; the difficulty was to carry them up to the front, *ib.*

Evidence of Colonel Cobb with respect to the supply of warm clothing to the troops through requisitions of the Quartermaster-general's department, *p.* 259——Reason of the troops remaining without their warm clothing so long after the order had been given for them to be supplied, *ib.*——In the month of December alone no less than 22,740 blankets were issued by the Quartermaster-general's department, though only 17,323 were carried away, *ib.*——The requisitions duly sanctioned by the Quartermaster-general's department were thousands in advance of the deliveries, *p.* 260——Reason why the paillasses were of no service to the troops in the Crimea, *ib.*——The rugs were never brought into general use for the troops, but they were issued to the Turks and other followers of the army, *ib.*

Account of the distribution of watch cloaks to the army in the East, upon the authority of the Quartermaster-general's department, *p.* 260——Errors of the Commissioners with respect to the number of great coats and watch cloaks remaining in store at Balaklava in December and January 1854-55, *ib.*——Impossibility of the Commissioners forming a fair

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Airey, Major-general Sir Richard, K. C. B.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

opinion upon what could or could not be done by the army in the Crimea, placed in a position of straits and difficulties beyond human conception, *p.* 261——Observations upon the privations and sufferings of the men during the winter of the first campaign of the army in the East in the Crimea, *ib.*——Degree of completeness and precision shown by Lord Raglan in the mastery of all military business, *ib.*——Approval of the conduct of all the officers in the Quartermaster-general's office in the Crimea, *ib.*——Strong position of the enemy in their fortress of Sebastopol, and in the lines extending from the sea to the Mackenzie ridge, and again from the Mackenzie ridge along the line of the Tchernaya, *ib.* ——Efforts of the late Emperor of Russia in bringing the resources of his vast empire to bear upon the great object of crushing the invasion with a force vastly superior in number, *p.* 261, 262.

Strength of Prince Menchikoff's position within the entrenched camp of Sebastopol, *p.* 261, 262——Before the autumn of 1854, the Russian stacks of forage were miles and miles in length; for the allies, after the 25th of October, there was not one load of hay, but what had to be brought with infinite delay and difficulty from distant shores, *ib.* ——Strong position of the enemy's forces under General Liprandi, *ib.*——Calm courage and high resolve of Lord Raglan throughout the difficulties of the campaign, *ib.*—— Superiority of the enemy's forces at the battle of Inkermann, *ib.*——Accumulation of difficulties which Lord Raglan had to contend against; alacrity with which he undertook the great and hazardous enterprise, *p.* 263——Indomitable courage of the British soldiers throughout their difficulties, *ib.*

[Fifth Examination.]—Sickness of the troops on board ship which caused the necessity for their landing as light as possible, *p.* 263——It was the opinion of Lord Raglan that it would be better to let the men land in the Crimea in as light marching order as possible, *ib.*——In Bulgaria the men had to march short distances and change the camp; their knapsacks were carried on pack animals or in the arabas of the country, *ib.* ——Orders as to the men landing in the Crimea with their knapsacks, and reason why that order was not carried out, *p.* 263, 264.

Inconvenience which arose from the ships after they had landed one body of men in the Crimea, being obliged to return to Varna to fetch others, and being a considerable time before they returned to Balaklava, *p.* 264——The men would have suffered very much on the first night of landing if they had only had the great coat without the blanket, *ib.*——Advantage of the manner in which French soldiers carry their weight over the plan adopted by the English, *ib.*——Reserve depôt intended to be formed at Malta; this was not carried out; number of tents obtained from thence, *ib.*——Extract from correspondence between Sir R. Airey and General Freeth, the Quartermaster-general in England, on the subject of the reserve depôt for camp stores supposed to be formed at Malta, *p.* 264, 265.

Observations upon that part of the Commissioners' Report which charges that the separation from the knapsacks not merely affected the comfort of the soldier, but also was the cause of the destitute state of the sick and wounded on their arrival at Scutari, *p.* 265—— Reasons for doing away with the old clothing chests, and substituting squad bags, *ib.* ——Colonel Booth of the 43d and witness were the first officers who proposed breaking up the clothing chests, and substituting squad bags, *ib.*——It was not until just before the army embarked for the Crimea that Lord Hardinge took up the principle of the squad bags, *ib.*——Arrangement as to the contents of the squad bags; they were not to accompany the regiments on active service, but to be kept in cantonments, *ib.*—— How far the generals of division had the means of getting the knapsacks if they had pleased, *ib.*

Memorandum showing that Sir De Lacy Evans declined obtaining the knapsacks for his division, *p.* 265——Circumstances which caused the flank march; re-establishment of the communication with the fleet, *p.* 266——It was only when the troops were on the Belbek that it was found they could not communicate with the fleet, *ib.*——If the operation were to be performed again, with present experience it would be advisable to take the knapsacks, but in the then state of ignorance as to future operations the least evil was chosen, *ib.* ——The unloading vessels in the Harbour of Balaklava, and the storing the articles of clothing in the town, rested entirely with the Commissariat and the Naval authorities, *ib.* ——Nature of the duties performed by the officers of the Quartermaster-general's department during the unloading the vessels in Balaklava Harbour, *ib.*——Arrangement as to the contents of the soldiers' knapsacks, *ib.*

Reply of Sir Richard Airey on the evidence taken before the Board, and on the charges in the report of the Commissioners, *p.* 337-343——Extract from Lord Palmerston's speech on 16 February 1855, on sending out the Civil and Military Commissioners to the Crimea, *p.* 338——Further statement as to the means taken by the Quartermaster-general to shelter the horses; difficulties which he had to encounter, *p.* 339——Statement regarding the Issue Department for stores at Balaklava under the direction of the Quartermaster-general, *p.* 341.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Airey, Major-general Sir Richard.* Consideration of Sir Richard Airey's case by the Board of General Officers; grounds for arriving at the conclusion that the Quartermaster-general was not justly chargeable with mismanagement or neglect in the performance of his duties, *Rep.* ix–xv——Letter from General Airey to Sir John M'Neill, dated 4th June 1855, relative to the questions propounded to him by the Commissioners, and the preparation of his replies thereto, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 163——Observations upon Sir Richard Airey's evidence relative to the shelter of the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 166——Letter from the Earl of Lucan to Brigadier-general Airey, dated Camp before Sebastopol, 2d November 1854, as to the removal of the troops, *App.* 415——Memorandum by Sir R. Airey, as to removal of Cavalry Brigade to Windmill Heights, 2d November 1854, *ib.*——General Order, Sebastopol, 17th November 1855, on Sir Richard Airey's leaving the Crimea, *ib.* 467.

Letter from Major-general Sir Richard Airey to the Right Honourable C. P. Villiers, dated Horse Guards, 22d May 1856, transmitting a paper showing the two Reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, dated Constantinople 9th and Constantinople 10th June 1855, and a memorandum upon the responsibility for the original supply of camp equipage, *App.* 472-498——Memorandum by Sir Richard Airey, dated 22d May 1856, upon the subject of the supply of camp equipage to the British army in the Crimea, *ib.* 499-501——Letter of Colonel Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, given in evidence by Colonel Tulloch, dated Quartermaster-general's Office, Sebastopol, 4th June 1855, upon the subject of returning Sir Richard Airey's evidence, *ib.* 521——Letter from Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, dated Quartermaster-general's Office, before Sebastopol, 4th June 1855, given in evidence by Colonel Tulloch, 25th April 1856, *ib.* 604.

*See* also *Quartermaster-general.*

*Alexander, Dr.* Observations upon the evidence of Dr. Alexander, taken before the Commission of Inquiry in the Crimea, respecting the duties performed by the cavalry soldier, *Col. Tulloch, p.* 172.

*Allied Forces.* The mortal illness of Marshal St. Arnaud at the critical moment of the invasion of the Crimea, and the heavy reinforcements afterwards received by the enemy, brought the allied forces under circumstances of great difficulty, and very rare in the annals of war, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238——Nobody ever calculated when the allies landed in the Crimea, the encamping upon the heights before Sebastopol, and being constantly engaged during the whole winter with an enemy vastly superior in force, *ib., p.* 242.

*See* also *French Cavalry.*

*Alma, Battle of.* Complaint made to Lord Raglan on the morning of the battle of the Alma of the men and horses having been left deficient of both food and forage, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 39, 40——On the day of the battle of Alma the horses could not have been out much less than twelve or fourteen hours, *ib., p.* 40——Assistance rendered by the navy to the sick and wounded after the battle of the Alma, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 152, 153.

*Ambulance Service.* Employment of cavalry horses from the 13th December 1854, in bringing down the sick from the front, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 96——Formation of the ambulance corps for the conveyance of the sick and wounded in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 179. Letter, dated War Department, 19th May 1856, from Sir B. Hawes to the Judge Advocate General, enclosing a return of transport and ambulance animals foraged in the Crimea, *App.* 459——Statement of the number of ambulance animals foraged in the Crimea, as shown by the forage returns transmitted with the Commissariat accounts, between September 1854 and March 1855, *App.* 460.

*Ammunition.* Ammunition and food were considered of more consequence for the troops to be supplied with than clothing, as men could not be spared for both, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 271——Copy of divisional orders of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 29 May 1854, ordering the cavalry to carry a certain amount of ammunition, *App.* 415.

*Ammunition Boots.* Condemnation of the ammunition boots by a Board of Survey, *Rep.* xii——Evidence of Colonel Yea respecting the flimsy quality of the ammunition boot supplied to the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 257——Answer to the charge in the Commissioners' Report as to the non-issue of ammunition boots, *Col. Wetherall, p.* 284——Only ten pair were found available out of eighty; the remaining barrels were sent on board and sent away, and it is supposed that barrels of boots were being carried backwards and forwards, up and down the Black Sea, while the troops were in want of them, *Boyd, p.* 310.

*Ammunition Ponies.* Circumstance of the Duke of Cambridge being obliged to give orders for the destruction of 21 ammunition ponies, in consequence of having no means of feeding them, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 206; *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 385, 386——Report of Proceedings of a Board of Survey on ammunition animals of 1st Division, dated 12th October 1854, *App.* 532, 533.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*ANIMALS:*

1. *Mortality of Animals.*
2. *Transport Animals.*

1. *Mortality of Animals:*

Proportion which the loss of Commissariat animals bore to the loss of cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 8, 9——Instead of the losses of the transport animals being smaller, they were very much greater than what the cavalry suffered, *ib., p.* 11——Comparison of the loss of cavalry horses with the hard-worked baggage animals, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 53——Expediency of having a return of the number of transport and ambulance animals landed in the Crimea, and what has become of them, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 59——Observations with regard to the mortality amongst the Commissariat animals during the winter of 1854-55, *ib., p.* 179.

2. *Transport Animals:*

It was estimated that to move as an army, the British force alone would require 14,000 beasts of transport, and that the French would require a like number, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241——Return of transport animals received by Deputy Assistant Commissary-general Smith, in the Crimea, from the 1st to the 10th October 1854, and from 12th December 1854 to 31st March 1855, as shown by a statement furnished by that officer, *App.* 460——Statement of the number of transport, ambulance, and Government baggage animals foraged in the Crimea, as shown by the forage returns transmitted with the Commissariat accounts, at the following dates, viz., on the first issue of forage after the landing of the army in September 1854, and on the 1st October, and on the 1st of the five subsequent months, *App.* 460.

*See* also *Ammunition Ponies. Bat Horses. Horses. Mortality. Mules. Shelter for Horses. Transport Service.*

*Apportionment of Stores.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general's department with respect to the apportionment of stores to an army in the field, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 254.

*See* also *Issue of Stores.*

"*Arabia,*" *The Ship.* Despatch of the "Arabia" to Sinope in the early part of the month of November 1854 to procure planking for huts for the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242.

*Archer, Assistant Commissary-general.* This gentleman was not in communication with the Quartermaster-general's department; he received his orders from the Commissary-general, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 269——The Commissioners have apparently founded their Report on this gentleman's return, *ib.*

*Army in the East.* The delays which actually occurred, and which occasioned the extraordinary sufferings of the British army in the East, have now been traced to England, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 120——Uncertainty entertained by the Commissary-general as to the situation which the British army would have during the winter of 1854-5, *ib. p.* 236——Observations upon the enormous magnitude of the commissariat operations in the Crimea; the annals of war do not furnish another instance of such an undertaking having been executed or even attempted, *ib.* 238——At the time of embarkation, and from that time up to 17th October, there was no expectation of having to winter in the Crimea; and no final determination to do so was formed until after the Battle of Inkermann, *ib. p.* 241——Number of men and horses given in to the Commissary-general as the number to be provided for, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 376——Summary (extracted from the War Office Monthly Returns) showing the number of all ranks, excluding officers, of the Cavalry serving in the Crimea, *App.* 413, 414.

*See* also *British Army. Commanding Officers. Sufferings of the Army.*

*Army Hospitals.* Commencement of the inquiry of the Commissioners of Inquiry at the hospitals at Constantinople as to the causes of the sickness and sufferings of the troops, *Commissary-general Filder,* 357.

*Army Works.* If an army be moving, and it is wished that a bridge should be thrown over a river, the Quartermaster-general of the forces makes a requisition upon the officer commanding the engineers, and requests that he will cause the work to be duly executed, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 239.

*ARREST:*

1. *Colonel Griffiths.*
2. *Assistant Commissary-general Crookshank.*

1. *Colonel Griffiths:*

Occasion of Lord Lucan threatening to place Colonel Griffiths under arrest, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 27-29. 31——Denial of the truth of the statement that any officer was threatened with arrest for making a proposal, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 109——Circumstances attending

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*ARREST*—continued.

1. *Colonel Griffiths*—continued.

attending the altercation with Colonel Griffiths when witness threatened to place him under arrest, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 176.

2. *Assistant Commissary-general Crookshank:*

Circumstances attending the placing of Mr. Assistant Commissary-general Crookshank under arrest, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 222, 223——Circumstances attending Mr. Crookshank being placed under arrest by Lord Lucan, *Crookshank, p.* 225, 226; *App.* 611.

*Artificers.* Great difficulty in getting artificers to come to Balaklava to build store-houses, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 289——Inconvenience from want of artificers in the Crimea, *Major Keane, p.* 304.——*See* also *Carpenters. Shipwrights.*

*ARTILLERY:*

1. *Food for Horses.*
2. *Mortality of Horses.*
3. *Stabling for Horses.*

1. *Food for Horses:*

Circumstance of the artillery horses being allowed ten pounds of hay per day, whilst the cavalry were restricted to eight pounds, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 41.

2. *Mortality of Horses;*

Observations with regard to the mortality amongst the horses of the artillery during the winter of 1854–55, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 177, 178——Statement showing the loss of horses in the artillery during the winter of 1854–55 in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 178——Evidence of Mr. Commissary-general Filder respecting the mortality amongst the horses of the artillery from starvation, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 202.

3. *Stabling for Horses:*

A part of the crews of the vessels in Balaklava were spared to construct stables for 300 or 400 convalescent horses of the artillery, *M'Kenzie, p.* 293.

*Asia Minor.* Despatch of ships to the shores of Asia Minor, in the early part of the month of November 1854, to procure planking for huts for the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242.

*Assault upon Sebastopol.* It was nothing but the disastrous explosion in the French batteries which prevented the intended assault upon Sebastopol on the 17th of October 1854, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242.

*Assistant Quartermasters-general.* Measures adopted by the Assistant Quartermasters-general to ensure a speedy and regular delivery of clothing and necessaries to the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 255.

*Assistant Quartermaster-general's Boat.* At one time boats' crews were so scarce, that the Assistant Quartermaster-general's boat had to be manned by two or three soldiers lent as a crew, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 293.

*Assistant Quartermasters of Divisions.* They collected the requisitions or wants of every regiment in their division daily, sent them to the Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-general, and afterwards saw the Quartermaster-general, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 285——Nature of their duties, their communication with Generals of Division and the Quartermaster-general, *ib. p.* 314.

*Attack.* Precautions taken in order to prevent any sudden attack of the Russians upon the extreme right, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 218, 219——Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field to acquire the fullest information that he can of the best positions for attack and defence, *ib. p.* 235.

*Austrian Vessels.* Difficulties in the way of obtaining Austrian vessels for transport, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 291.

B.

*Bad Roads.* How the want of a road between Balaklava and the camp operated in causing the difficulties and disasters that ensued, *Rep.* xxix. *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 359——General after order, dated Head-quarters before Sebastopol, 14 November 1854, respecting the badness of the roads between Balaklava and the lines, *App.* 551, 552.

*See* also *Balaklava to the Front. Land Transport. Roads.*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Baggage Animals:*

1. *Care and Treatment.*
2. *Mortality.*
3. *Commissariat Department.*
4. *Field Service.*

1. *Care and Treatment:*

Injustice of the comparison of the means of accommodation of the cavalry horses with the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 20——Description of the shelter afforded to the baggage ponies of the Sappers and Miners in Balaklava, *ib.* 181——Nature of the shelter that is asserted to have saved the horses of the Sappers and Miners, *Major Keane, p.* 304, 305.

2. *Mortality:*

Observations with respect to the mortality amongst the baggage animals attached to the Commissariat Department during the winter of 1854-55, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 179——The rapid destruction of transport animals was mainly attributable to exposure and overwork, not from want of forage, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 360——Mortality of pack animals from the badness of the road leading from Balaklava to the front, *ib. p.* 359.

3. *Commissariat Department:*

Account of the number of baggage animals purchased by Mr. Commissary-general Filder whilst in Turkey, and likewise the number purchased in Spain, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 179, 180——Of the Commissariat horses at Varna, to the extent of 3,000 or 4,000 of them were stolen, and the Government got no account of them, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 180——Description of animals purchased at Eupatoria for the Commissariat transport by Lord Raglan's order, *Commissary-general Filder,* 391.

4. *Field Service.*

Copy of Lord Lucan's divisional order, dated 29 May 1854, directing commanding officers of corps to provide baggage animals necessary for the field service, *App.* 415——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 9 June 1854, directing baggage animals to be furnished for cavalry regiments, *ib.* 417.

*See* also *Cavalry.*

*Bakery.* Application made by the Commissary-general for a floating mill and bakery to be sent out from England, *Rep.* xxv; *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 375——Want of a field bakery in the British army, to supply the troops with fresh bread, *ib.*

*See* also *Fresh Bread. Ovens.*

*Balaklava:*

1. *Defence of the Position.*
2. *Stores for the Army.*
3. *Forage for the Cavalry.*
4. *Village of Balaklava.*

1. *Defence of the Position:*

Opinion that the safety of Balaklava depended upon General Vinois, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 45——Order from head quarters, dated 17 December 1854, to Sir Colin Campbell, relative to an expected attack on Balaklava, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 271.

2. *Stores for the Army:*

Crowded state of the Quartermaster-general's stores in the town of Balaklava, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 98, 99——Means adopted by the Quartermaster-general's office to acquaint the service of the articles of camp equipage and extra clothing in the Commissariat storehouse at Balaklava, *ib. p.* 255—— The unloading vessels in the harbour of Balaklava and the storing the articles of clothing in the town rested entirely with the Commissariat and the naval authorities, *ib. p.* 266——There was constant understanding on the part of the Quartermaster-general's department and the naval officer in charge of the harbour, *ib.*——Orders by General Airey at the commencement of the winter that an officer of his department should go down every day to Balaklava to facilitate the issue of stores, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 269.

3. *Forage for the Cavalry:*

Difficulty of obtaining forage and supplies from Balaklava had the troop horses of the Light Brigade been employed to fetch them, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 204, 205——Precautions taken by the Commissioners that no delay should take place at Balaklava in the supply of the cavalry with forage, *Crookshank, p.* 209——Nature of the delays at Balaklava in the delivery of forage and supplies to the cavalry, *General Scarlett, p.* 214——Complaint made to the Quartermaster-general of the delay in the drawing of the forage for the cavalry from Balaklava, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 223.

4. *Village*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*BALAKLAVA—continued.*

4. *Village of Balaklava:*

The village was appropriated by the Quartermaster-general's department, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 292——Peculiar position of Balaklava; how it tended to the misfortunes and embarrassments that occurred to the army in the East, *ib. p.* 359.

*Balaklava to Constantinople.* Average voyage by sailing and steam vessels between Balaklava and Constantinople, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 291.

*Balaklava, Battle of.* Excellent condition of the cavalry horses at the battle of Balaklava, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 40——The Light Cavalry Brigade lost 397 horses at the battle of Balaklava, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 199——State of the Light Cavalry Brigade at the battle of Balaklava, *ib. p.* 208.

*Balaklava Harbour.* Difficulties in landing supplies owing to the peculiarities of Balaklava Harbour, *Rep.* xxix——Description of the scene in Balaklava Harbour during the storm of the 14th November 1854, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 246——The smallness and crowded state of the harbour caused great delay to the ships in discharging their cargoes of stores, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 282.——Nature of the harbour, showing why it was impossible to land anything without the construction of wharves, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 293.

*Balaklava Hospital.* Perfect state of the large Russian hospital at Balaklava, as discovered when the troops arrived there, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 295.

*Balaklava to the Front.* Impossibility of employing a sufficient number of men to make the road from Balaklava to the front, and at the same time to carry on the military operations in which the army was engaged, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 239, 240——No man went from Balaklava to the front while witness was Assistant Quartermaster-general at the stores, without two blankets, and extra warm clothing, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 292——Number of men who arrived at Balaklava in the months of December and January, and who were disembarked by witness, and passed to the front all complete, with warm clothing, *ib. p.* 293——The engineers had no difficulty in getting their supplies well up to the front, *Colonel Chapman, p.* 320——General after order, dated Head Quarters before Sebastopol, 14 November 1854, respecting the badness of the road between Balaklava and the lines, *App.* 551, 552.——*See* also *Land Transport. Roads.*

*Balfour, Dr.* Evidence of Dr. Balfour respecting the inability of Colonel Tulloch to attend the inquiry on account of serious illness, *p.* 288. 299.

*Banker's Account.* Comparison of the issue of stores in the Crimea upon requisitions of the Quartermaster-general with that of unpresented cheques on a banker, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 258, 259.

*Barker, Captain.* Statement showing the mortality amongst the artillery horses of Captain Barker's battery during the winter of 1854-55, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 178.

*Barley.* Offer of the Commissary-general of a supply of barley for the use of the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 33——Objections to feeding horses constantly upon barley, *Bracebridge, p.* 84——The Commissariat could have supplied the Light Cavalry Brigade fully with barley on the heights of Inkermann after the 16th November 1854, *Crookshank, p.* 224——Barley is the forage of the country; nothing else was asked for, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 291.

*Barrack-kit.* It consists of the articles not included in the field-kit, and is left in the squad bags in the rear of the army, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 265.

*Base of Operations.* It was not until the month of February 1855, when the conflict in the Crimea had been raging for several months, that the Home Government duly formed a base of operations at Balaklava for the supply of the British army, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241——The Quartermaster-general had no legitimate base of operations to draw upon nearer than London, and there the source was so distant, and the difficulties even there existing so great, that articles did not arrive till some months after they were ordered, *ib. p.* 247.——Difficulty of supplying a large army whose basis of operations is suddenly changed, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 357.

*Bashi Bazouks.* Description of the shelter afforded the horses of the Bashi Bazouks, *General Beatson, p.* 74.

*Bât Horses.* Sufferings of the fourth division of the army in the Crimea from being deprived of any public bât horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 256, 257——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 13 July 1854, directing the accounting for the Government bât horses daily in the morning states, *App.* 418——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 27 July 1854, relative to the cavalry regiments supplying themselves with bât horses, *App.* 420.

*Beards.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 23 May 1854, forbidding officers and men in the cavalry to wear beards, *App.* 416.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Beatson, General William Ferguson.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Date of landing in the Crimea with the heavy cavalry, *p.* 73——Bad condition of the cavalry horses in the Crimea, from being picketted in the open air, *ib.*——Opinion with respect to affording temporary shelter to the cavalry horses in the Crimea under canvas, *p.* 73, 74——Description of the shelter afforded the horses of the Bashi Bazouks, *p.* 74——Objection to the sheltering horses under canvas on the plateau where the cavalry were encamped, *ib.*——Reason of the cavalry horses being in so low a condition upon the landing of the Heavy Brigade in the Crimea, *p.* 75.

*Beatson, General.* Objection of General Beatson to placing horses under canvas on the plateau, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 183.

*Belbek.* It was only when the troops were on the Belbek that it was found they could not communicate with the fleet, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 266.

"*Belgravia,*" *The Ship.* Letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, announcing the shipment of hay to the Crimea in the "Belgravia," *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 370.

*Bell Tents.* Order issued by the Quartermaster-general for bringing up from Malta 283 bell tents in store there, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242.

*Benson, Major.* Evidence of Major Benson relative to the hutting of the horses of the 17th Lancers during the winter of 1854–55 in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 14——Answer of Major Benson of the 17th Lancers respecting the period of the commencement and completion of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 51——Observations upon the evidence of Major Benson respecting the shelter afforded to the cavalry horses of the Light Brigade during the winter of 1854–55, *ib. p.* 172.

*Berkeley, General Sir George,* M.P. Appointment of Sir George Berkeley as a member of the Board in the room of Sir Thomas M'Mahon, *p.* 2.

*Bingham, Lord.* Extract from Lord Bingham's journal respecting the repeated applications made for Turks to assist in the construction of cavalry stables, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 12——Desire of Lord Lucan to put in Lord Bingham's journal as evidence, *p.* 22.

*Biscuit.* Remarks of the Board upon the supply of biscuit to the army in the Crimea through the Commissariat department, *Rep.* xxi.——*See* also *Short Rations.*

*Black Sea Fleet.* Number of ships and vessels of war stationed in the Black Sea in November 1854, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 150, 151.

*Blame.* Exoneration from blame of all the officers implicated in the inquiry, *Rep.* vi–xxx——Opinion that there was no blame to the people in the Crimea that two-thirds of the cavalry horses were dead, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 93——In every indication as to where blame appeared to rest, the Commissioners endeavoured to frame the report in the most guarded manner, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 174——Opinion that the Commissioners of Inquiry, when in the Crimea, did not intend to cast blame upon the Quartermaster-general's department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 232——Attachment of blame to the Commissariat for not taking measures for which the officer in chief command of the army witheld his sanction, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 358——It seemed both the business and the functions of the Commissioners of Inquiry to fix blame somewhere, *ib. p.* 357——Letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, dated 2 April 1855, exonerating the Commissariat from all blame in the supply of forage to the army in the East, *ib. p.* 372.

*Blankets.* Remarks of the Board upon the issue of rugs and blankets to the troops in the Crimea through the Quartermaster-general's department, *Rep. p.* xi——Measures taken by the Quartermaster-general's department to insure a speedy and regular supply of blankets to the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 256——In the month of December alone no less than 22,740 blankets were issued by the Quartermaster-general's department, though only 17,323 were carried away, *ib. p.* 259——There never was at any moment the smallest difficulty in obtaining an approved requisition for the blankets required; the difficulty was to carry them up to the front, *ib. p.* 259.

Blankets were substituted for the knapsack on landing in the Crimea; advantage of the arrangement, as the men could not have both, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 264——Explanation of certain evidence supposed to have been given before the Commissioners, accounting for the apparent irregular supply of blankets to various regiments, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267——The explanatory part of the evidence as to the supply of blankets has been omitted from the printed evidence taken before the Commissioners, *ib. p.* 268——Number of blankets in store in November to January, *ib. p.* 282——Reasons for not issuing a third blanket to the troops, *ib.*

*Board of Survey.* Report of proceedings of a Board of Survey on ammunition animals of 1st Division, dated 12 October 1854, *App.* 532.——*See* also *Boots and Shoes.*

*Board of General Officers.* Proceedings of the Board of General Officers, upon the receipt of the Royal Warrant directing the present inquiry, *Rep.* i, ii.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Boarded Floors.* Boarded floors could not be obtained for the tents, as not even fuel could be got to cook the food, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 282, 283.

*Boards and Planks.* Extract from the London Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea, touching the supply of boards for building purposes to the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 243——Circumstance of the Quartermaster-general obtaining 46,345 boards and planks for building huts, in the month of November 1854, *ib. p.* 244.

*See* also *Building Materials. Hutting. Stabling.*

*Boats for the Sick.* There were eight or ten boats well manned, and always ready to embark the sick, from nine o'clock in the morning till dark, in Balaklava Harbour, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 293.

*Booth, Colonel.* Colonel Booth, of the 43d, and Sir R. Airey, were the first officers who proposed breaking up the clothing chests, and substituting squad bags, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 265.

*Boots and Shoes.* Observations of the Board upon the quality of the boots and shoes issued to the men in the Crimea, *Rep.* xii——Report of a Board of Survey on the unfitness of the boots issued to the men of the 19th regiment, *ib.*——There were a great quantity of boots in store, but so small as to be unserviceable; in one instance ten casks, containing eighty pairs each, were opened before 150 pairs could be selected, *Boyd, p.* 309——Bad manufacture and improper size of the boots in store, *ib. p.* 313.

*See* also *Ammunition Boots.*

*Bosphorus.* Order issued by Lord Raglan, in May 1854, for forming and maintaining a grand depôt on the Bosphorus, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 236.

*Boxer, Admiral.* Admiral Boxer was the naval agent of transports at Constantinople, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 292——Zeal and activity displayed by Admiral Boxer in forwarding all things connected with the Commissariat Department, *ib. p.* 381——Complaint of the Assistant Commissary-general, at Constantinople, of Admiral Boxer not finding transports for the conveyance of provisions and forage to the Crimea, *ib. p.* 360, 361.

*Boxer, Captain.* Construction of wharves at Balaklava, by Captain Boxer, alongside of which the largest steamers could come, and land their cargoes, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 154.

*Boyd, Samuel.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Chief storekeeper in the Commissariat Department in the Crimea, *p.* 308——Description of the storehouses at Balaklava, *ib.*——Plunder of stores by Maltese and others, *ib.*——Crowded state of the village of Balaklava, *ib.*——Want of means of access to the Commissariat storehouses; want of hands to unload stores and supplies, upon arrival at Balaklava, *ib.*——Weekly returns were furnished the Quartermaster-general of all stores on hand, *p.* 309——When approved requisitions were presented, the stores were delivered as quickly as possible; the storekeeper was too glad to get rid of the parties and the stores, in order to make room for others, *ib.*——Men would not take the great coats when they could get sheepskins; there was no want of sheepskins; 1,000 remained after all were supplied, between December and the end of January, *ib.*——Great coats were given to any men who asked for them; there was a quantity of coats came from Varna that had been in wear, *ib.*——There was a great quantity of boots in store, but so small as to be unserviceable; in one instance ten casks, containing eighty pairs each, were opened before 150 pairs could be selected, *p.* 309——Description of the rugs in store at Balaklava; they were purveyor's stores, in fact hospital stores; they were unfit for the soldier in the field or in quarters, *ib.*——There never was any difficulty in seeing the Quartermaster-general or his officers when wanted; there was always some officer or other on the spot lending assistance, *ib.*——The quartermasters of regiments were constantly in the stores at Balaklava; they might have had what they wanted that was in store; they refused rugs as unserviceable, *ib.*——Informality in requisitions did not stop the delivery of stores; they were often issued without requisition sooner than cause delay, *ib.*——Reason why the Commissariat did not issue the boots in store at Balaklava, *p.* 309, 310——Requisitions were sometimes brought down days after the stores had been delivered, *p.* 310——Refusal of quartermasters of regiments to take rugs when blankets were not in store, *ib.*——The quartermasters of regiments refused soiled blankets, *ib.*

*Bracebridge, Charles Holte.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Length of witness's stay in the Crimea, *p.* 82——Exposed situation of the plateau upon which the British army was encamped, *ib.*——Opportunities offered of affording temporary shelter to the horses of the cavalry on the plateau above Kadekoi, *p.* 82–84——Facilities of obtaining food for horses from Constantinople, when short of hay in the Crimea, *p.* 83, 84——Excellence of linseed as food for horses, *ib.*——Degree of ingenuity shown by the Sardinian cavalry upon taking up their quarters in the Crimea, *p.* 84——Objections to feeding horses constantly with barley, *ib.*——Refusal of the Commissariat to issue linseed to the cavalry quartered at Constantinople, *ib.*——Facility of obtaining carpenters at Constantinople for

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Bracebridge, Charles Holte.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

for the construction of temporary shelter for the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *p.* 83-85 ——English carpenters were sent out to Constantinople by the Minister of War to assist in the construction and repairs of Scutari Hospital, *p.* 85.

*Bracebridge, Mr.* Opinion that Mr. Bracebridge's evidence is not worth having, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 97, 98——Observations upon the evidence of Mr. Bracebridge respecting the means of affording shelter to the horses of the Cavalry Brigade during the winter of 1854-55, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 168, 169——Observations upon Mr. Bracebridge's evidence with respect to the use of canvas for the shelter of horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 183——Observations upon Mr. Bracebridge's evidence with respect to obtaining a supply of carpenters from Constantinople for the purpose of constructing stables for the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 184.

*Bread.* Observations of the Board on the means adopted by the Commissariat to supply the army in the East with fresh bread during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* xxiv, xxv—— Means devised by the Commissariat to supply the troops in the Crimea with fresh bread, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 375——Copy of certificate of the quantity of bread produced at Kadekoi from two ovens built by Colonel Tulloch, *App.* 534.

*See* also *Bakery. Fresh Bread. Ovens.*

*Brigade Duties.* Return of brigade duties performed by the Heavy Cavalry Brigade, between the 13th December 1854 and the 28th February 1855, *App.* 458, 459.

*Brigade Majors.* Observations upon the neglect of the Commissioners of Inquiry to examine the two Brigade Majors of Cavalry in the Crimea, whose evidence might have been relied on, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190.

*British Army.* Observations upon the disadvantages which the British army before Sebastopol had to contend against, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 261——Uncertainty of the British troops having to winter in the Crimea; impediment to prospective arrangements on the part of the Commissariat in consequence, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 358——Number of men and horses given in to the Commissary-general as the number to be provided for upon the expedition to the Crimea, *ib. p.* 376.

*See* also *Army in the East. Bulgaria. Cavalry. Huts and Hutting. Sufferings of the Army. Supplies.*

*Brown, Sir George.* Plan adopted by Sir George Brown for affording shelter for his horses in the Crimea, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 156; *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 170.

*Buffalo Robes.* Issue of buffalo robes to the troops on the 9th of January; these were preferred to blankets, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 282——Period when they were actually issued, and period stated by the Commissioners, *ib. p.* 284.

*Building Materials.* Observations upon the want of building materials for the erection of cavalry stables for the horses in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 183, 184——Difficulty in obtaining timber and building materials for the construction of the depôt stabling for the cavalry, *ib. p.* 188, 189——On the 8th November instructions were given for the immediate purchase at Constantinople, or elsewhere, of the materials and implements necessary for building huts, according to a list which the officer commanding the Royal Engineers had prepared, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242.

*See* also *Boards and Planks. Carpenters. Engineering Tools. Huts and Hutting. Scantling.*

*Bulgaria.* State of the horses of the cavalry when quartered in Bulgaria, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 37——Statement of the number of horses belonging to the Cavalry Brigade landed in Bulgaria, *ib. p.* 180——In Bulgaria the men had to march short distances and change the camp; their knapsacks were carried on pack animals or in the arabas of the country, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 263——Satisfactory manner in which the British army was supplied by the Commissariat during the time it was stationed in Bulgaria, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 358——Copy of correspondence which Commissary-general Filder stated to the Board of General Officers would be given in, in explanation of the measures taken by him for providing supplies and transport service of the British army in Bulgaria, *App.* 540-543.

*Burgoyne, General Sir John Fox,* G.C.B. Letter from General Sir J. F. Burgoyne to General Sir Alexander Woodford, dated War Department, 23d May 1856, submitting a communication from Brigadier Hall, *App.* 607.

C.

*Calvert, Mr.* Account of the effects of the storm of the 14th November 1854, upon the tent occupied by Mr. Calvert, the chief interpreter, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 246.

*Cambridge, H. R. H. Duke of.* Circumstance of his Royal Highness being obliged to kill twenty-one ammunition ponies which he had not the means of feeding, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 206; *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 385, 386. 391, 392.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Camp Equipage.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field with respect to fixing the proportions of camp equipage, to be divided between the different regiments, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235——Reason of the camp equipage supplied to the army in the East being deficient in quality, *ib. p.* 240——Letters from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 18th and 23d April 1855, stating the cause of the delay in complying with the requisition of the Quartermaster-general, dated in November 1854, for a supply of camp equipage for the army in the East, *ib. p.* 244, 245——Letter from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 23d April 1855, stating the cause of the delay in sending out the camp equipage to the army in the East, *ib. p.* 245.

Means adopted in the Quartermaster-general's office to acquaint the army of the available stores in the Commissariat department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 255——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 30th June 1854, relative to regiments of cavalry leaving articles of camp equipment under the care of the Royal Artillery at Varna, *App.* 418——Memorandum by Sir Richard Airey, dated 22d May 1856, upon the subject of camp equipage supplied to the British army in the Crimea, *App.* 499–501.

*Camp Equipment Stores.* Manner in which difficulties might have arisen in obtaining camp equipment stores through young officers being appointed acting Quartermasters, and not knowing the requisite forms; means taken to obviate these difficulties, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 285——Sufficiency of the supply of camp equipments of the army in the East at starting, with a reserve in proportion to the scale and character of the expedition, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 247.

*Camp Kettles.* Further evidence on requisition sent from the Crimea in November 1854, and not noticed till April 1855; correspondence on the subject, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 287.

*Camp Regulations.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field, with respect to enforcing all camp regulations, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*Campbell, Sir Colin.* Application was repeatedly made to Sir Colin Campbell to furnish Turks to assist in the construction of cavalry stables, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 12——Daily application made to Sir Colin Campbell to supply Turks to assist in the construction of the cavalry stables, *ib. p.* 189——Impossibility of his denuding his position to supply working parties to carry up stores to the front, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 270——This officer was on the spot where the extra stores were, consequently there was little delay in his men getting them; his troops were not in the trenches at all, *ib. p.* 289.

*Cannon, General.* Circumstance of communicating to General Cannon the refusal of Lord Lucan to allow the troop horses of the Light Brigade to be employed in fetching forage, *Crookshank, p.* 219.

*Cannonade of Sebastopol.* Success of the first cannonade against the outworks of Sebastopol on the part of the British artillery, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242.

*Canrobert, General.* Offer made by General Canrobert to supply the British Cavalry Brigade with forage upon certain conditions, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 43——Occasion of General Canrobert pointing out in detail the importance of the presence of the Light Cavalry Brigade on the heights of Inkermann, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 199. 213——Reasons assigned by General Canrobert for the Light Cavalry Brigade occupying the position on the heights of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 218.

*CANVAS:*

1. *Shelter for Horses.*
2. *Nosebags for Horses.*

1. *Shelter for Horses:*

Offers made by the captains of transports to provide shelter for the cavalry horses under canvas, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 30——It would not have been safe to have placed any horse under canvas on that plateau where the cavalry were quartered, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 36——Observations upon the opportunities of affording shelter for horses under canvas in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 55——Success of the plan of placing horses under canvas as a means of affording them temporary shelter, *Major Thompson, p.* 57——Opinion with respect to affording temporary shelter to the cavalry horses in the Crimea under canvas, *General Beatson, p.* 73, 74——Facilities for affording shelter for the cavalry horses under canvas in the Crimea, *Rawlinson, p.* 81; *Bracebridge, p.* 83.

Objection to canvas shelter for horses; reason why it would not have been practicable for the cavalry on the hill above Kadekoi, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 92, 93——Occasion of the Quartermaster-general's attention being called to the question of providing canvas for shelter for the cavalry horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 182——Grounds of objection to the use of canvas on the plateau, *ib. p.* 183——Reason why canvas could not have been obtained from captains of transport vessels, *ib. p.* 185——Repudiation of the idea of sheltering the troops under canvas in the Crimea during the winter, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 243

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*CANVAS*—continued.

1. *Shelter for Horses*—continued.

——Difficulties in the way of forming canvas shelter in consequence of the severity of the wind in a mountainous country, *Major Keane, p.* 302——Impossibility of obtaining canvas at Constantinople, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 331; *Major Hackett, p.* 332.

2. *Nosebags for Horses:*

Difficulty of procuring canvas for corn-bags for the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Colonel Low, p.* 70.

*See* also *Shelter for Horses.*

*Capture of a Convoy.* Circumstance as attending the capture of a convoy of carts from the enemy on landing in the Crimea, and the Commissary-general laying claim to them, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237.

*Cardigan, Major-General the Earl of.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Observations with respect to the wording of the Royal Warrant by which the Board of General Officers is constituted, *p.* 197——Removal of the Light Cavalry Brigade from the valley adjacent to Balaklava to the windmill near Inkermann, *p.* 197. 199——List of places at which the Light Cavalry were quartered in Turkey and Bulgaria, and length of time they remained at each station, *p.* 198——Application of Lieutenant-Colonel Mayow to Lord Cardigan for the cavalryhorses to fetch hay from Balaklava, *ib.*——Small loss sustained by the Light Cavalry Brigade from cholera when quartered near Varna, *ib.*——Difficulty of procuring forage for the Light Cavalry Brigade when stationed at Inkermann, *ib.*——The Light Cavalry Brigade lost 397 horses at the battle of Balaklava, *p.* 199.

Occasion of General Canrobert pointing out in detail the importance of the presence of the Light Cavalry Brigade on the heights of Inkermann, *p.* 199. 213——Statement of Lord Raglan that he was privately bound to the French to keep the Light Cavalry Brigade in their position on the heights of Inkermann, *p.* 199——Evidence of Lord Lucan before the Sebastopol Committee, touching the state of the Light Cavalry Brigade quartered on the heights of Inkermann, *p.* 200——Evidence of Mr. Commissary-general Crookshank respecting the impossibility of supplying hay to the Light Cavalry Brigade stationed on the heights of Inkermann, *p.* 200, 201——Evidence of Commissary-general Filder and Captain Shakespeare respecting the bad state of the roads between Balaklava and the heights of Inkermann, after the storm of the 14th November 1854, *p.* 201.

Reports of the Brigade-Major, Colonel Mayow, on the 18th, 19th, 21st, and 22d November 1854, on the deficiency of the supply of hay and corn for the Light Cavalry, *p.* 201——Error in Colonel Douglas's evidence before the Crimean Commissioners, touching the deficiency of the supply of forage to the Light Cavalry Brigade in the latter part of the month of November 1854, *p.* 201, 202——Evidence respecting the sufferings of the Land Transport Corps after the storm in November 1854, *p.* 201. 205——Occasion of Lord Raglan giving permission to Lord Cardigan to sleep on board his yacht, *p.* 202——Appointment of Colonel Doherty to the command of the Light Cavalry Brigade on the resignation of Lord Cardigan, *ib.*——Inconvenience and loss sustained from want of nosebags for the Light Cavalry Brigade, *ib.*——Date of Lord Cardigan's resignation of the command of the Light Cavalry Brigade, *ib.*

Comparative statement of the loss of horses in the Heavy Brigade, Artillery, and Light Brigade, between October 1854 and March 1855, *p.* 202——Evidence of Mr. Commissary-general Filder respecting the mortality amongst the Artillery horses from starvation, *ib.*——Report of Colonel Mayow, dated 24 November 1854, suggesting the employment of the troop horses of the Light Brigade in fetching forage from Balaklava, *p.* 203——Reasons for refusing to allow the horses of the Light Cavalry to be employed on the transport service, *p.* 203-208——Observations on the conflicting statements put forth by the Commissioners of the mortality amongst the horses of the Light Cavalry Brigade, *p.* 204——Difficulty of obtaining forage and supplies from Balaklava had the troop horses of the Light Brigade been employed to fetch them, *p.* 204. 205——Evidence respecting the wretched state of the roads leading from Balaklava to Inkermann after the storm in November 1854, *p.* 205.

Reasons assigned by Lord Lucan before the Sebastopol Committee for not sending the horses of the Light Brigade to fetch forage from Balaklava, *p.* 206—Circumstance of His Royal Highness being obliged to kill 21 ammunition ponies which he had not the means of feeding, *ib.*——Opinion of the Duke of Wellington with respect to the limit of distance which cavalry horses should be sent to collect their forage, *p.* 207——Evidence of Colonel Douglas respecting the state of exhaustion of the horses of the Light Brigade upon leaving the heights of Inkermann for Kadekoi, *p.* 207——Arduous service performed by the Light Cavalry when sent on a reconnaissance to the Dobrudscha, *p.* 207, 208——State of the Light Cavalry Brigade at the period of the battle of Balaklava, *p.* 208——Number of horses and men of the Light Brigade requisite for bringing forage from Balaklava had they been employed, *p.* 219.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*CARDIGAN, LORD:*

1. *Consideration of his Lordship's Case.*
2. *Employment of the Light Cavalry Brigade on Transport Duty.*
3. *Resignation of Command.*
4. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Consideration of his Lordship's Case:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers on the case of Major-general the Earl of Cardigan, and grounds for arriving at the conclusion that his Lordship was justified in refusing to send the Light Cavalry horses to fetch forage from Balaklava, *Rep.* vi-viii.

2. *Employment of the Light Cavalry Brigade on Transport Duty:*

Refusal of Lord Cardigan to issue the order of the 28th November 1844 to the Light Brigade, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 47——Circumstance of application being made to Lord Cardigan to allow the troop horses of the Light Brigade to be sent down to Balaklava for forage, and his Lordship's refusal, *Crookshank, p.* 208, 209——Reason for not making application to Lord Cardigan for leave for the troop horses of the Light Brigade to be sent to Balaklava for forage, *Colonel Doherty, p.* 216, 217——Lord Cardigan could not have detached any portion of his force to bring up forage without obtaining the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 219——Lord Cardigan had no power to send down troop horses for forage without the sanction of a superior authority, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 229.

3. *Resignation of Command:*

Date of Lord Cardigan resigning the command of the Light Cavalry Brigade, and it being assumed by his successor, *Rep.* viii; *Colonel Doherty, p.* 217.

4. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Copy of a Report of Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 18th November 1854, on the state of the Light Brigade, *App.* 461——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 18th November 1854, calling attention to Lord Lucan's visit to the camp, *ib.* 462——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 21st November 1854, reporting the state of the Light Brigade, *ib.* 463——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 25th November 1854, enclosing states and reports, *ib.* 464——Letter from Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch to the Right Honourable Lord Panmure, dated 21st February 1846, with reference to a letter from the Earl of Cardigan, *p.* 598.

*CARPENTERS:*

1. *Construction of Stabling for the Cavalry.*
2. *Erection of Storehouses.*
3. *Repairs of Ships.*

1. *Construction of Stabling for the Cavalry:*

Opportunities offered of obtaining carpenters from the men-of-war to erect stabling for the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 55——Facility of obtaining carpenters at Constantinople for the construction of temporary shelter for the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Bracebridge, p.* 83-85——English carpenters were sent out to Constantinople by the Minister of War to assist in the construction and repairs of Scutari Hospital, *ib. p.* 85——Application made to Captain Christie to furnish carpenters from the merchant vessels lying in Balaklava Harbour, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 104——Engagement of the services of carpenters of ships lying in Balaklava Harbour to assist in constructing huts and shelter for the horses, *ib. p.* 246.

Inability of the admiral to spare carpenters from the fleet to assist in the erection of shelter for the horses of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 148, 149——Want of carpenters for the purpose of constructing cavalry stables for the horses in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 184, 185——Reasons why it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to have obtained carpenters from Constantinople, *Admiral Deans Dundas, p.* 307——Great difficulty in hiring carpenters to go to the Crimea from Constantinople; high rate of wages given, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 331; *Major Hackett, p.* 332.

2. *Erection of Storehouses;*

Carpenters could not be obtained in sufficient numbers at Constantinople to proceed to Balaklava to build storehouses, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 289——Carpenters at Balaklava were exhausted for other services than the Commissariat, *ib. p.* 290——Difficulty of procuring carpenters at Balaklava, *Major Keane, p.* 304.

3. *Repairs of Ships:*

The people on the plateau were deprived of their carpenters, who went to Balaklava to repair the shipping, *Admiral Deans Dundas, p.* 306.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Cathcart, Sir George.* Sufferings of the men of Sir George Cathcart's division in the Crimea from having no public bât horses for the transport of stores and clothing, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 256——Reason of Sir George Cathcart's division remaining so long without their warm clothing after the order had been given to supply it, *ib. p.* 259.

*Cattle.* Observations of the Board upon the abundance of cattle provided by the Commissary-general for the wants of the army during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* xxiii——Loss of live cattle sent for the use of the troops in the Crimea, from Varna, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 360——Inability of the parties who had contracted for supplying cattle for the army in the East during the winter, to fulfil their engagements, *ib. p.* 361.

Circumstance of the British Commissariat officer at Eupatoria giving over the cattle which he had in charge to the French and Turkish troops, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 362——Bad quality of the cattle obtained from Sinope; superiority of the live stock procured from Wallachia and Moldavia, *ib.*——Statement of the number of cattle and sheep imported into the Crimea by the Commissariat from November 1854 to 31 March 1855, and of the number lost at sea, *App.* 539, 540.

*See* also *Live Stock. Sheep.*

*CAVALRY:*

1. *Crimean Commissioners' Report.*
2. *Heavy Cavalry.*
3. *Hutting the Men.*
4. *Shelter for the Horses.*
5. *Transport Service.*
6. *Disposable Men.*
7. *Duties of Cavalry Soldiers.*
8. *Removal of the Cavalry.*
9. *Divisional Generals' Orders.*
10. *Light Brigade.*
11. *Supply of Forage.*

1. *Crimean Commissioners' Report:*

Errors committed by the Commissioners of Crimean Inquiry when speaking of the cavalry in their Report, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 8, 9——Abandonment of the charge by Colonel Tulloch of blame being attachable particularly to the cavalry, *ib.* 177——Errors of the Commissioners in all matters of accounts and returns relating to the cavalry, *ib.* 190.

2. *Heavy Cavalry:*

State of the heavy cavalry on their arrival in the neighbourhood of Kadekoi, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 11——Morning state of the 2d Cavalry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier-general the Honourable J. Y. Scarlett, 3 October 1854, *App.* 412.

3. *Hutting the Men:*

Period when the cavalry commenced hutting their men, and when it was finished, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 26, 27.

4. *Shelter for the Horses:*

Copy of order issued by the Lieutenant-general commanding the cavalry in the camp before Sebastopol, 28 November 1854, to commanding officers of regiments and brigadiers, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 47——Opinion that the cavalry did not omit to do their duty under the circumstances in which they were placed; they did all they could, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 93, 94——Observations upon the charge preferred against the Divisional General of the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea of want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising some plan for affording shelter to the cavalry horses, during the winter of 1854-55, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 181-195——Letter from Sir J. F. Burgoyne to General Sir Alexander Woodford, dated War Department, 23 May 1856, submitting a communication from Brigadier Hall, upon the subject of the erection of stabling for the cavalry, *App.* 607.

5. *Transport Service:*

Justification of Lord Cardigan in refusing to send the troop horses down to Balaklava for forage, *Rep.* vii, viii——Reason for permitting the cavalry soldiers to ride their horses to and from Balaklava when employed on transport duty, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 186——Comparison of the number of men and horses of the Heavy Brigade employed on Commissariat duties and in conveyance of sick from the front, as shown by the Returns of Major Conolly and Colonel Hodge, *App.* 602-604.

6. *Disposable Men:*

Statement showing the number of disposable men in each cavalry regiment of the Heavy and Light Brigade, and how the men were employed on the 16th December 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 186, 187——Summary (extracted from the War Office Monthly Returns) showing the number of all ranks, excluding officers, of the cavalry serving in the Crimea, *App.* 413, 414.

7. *Duties of Cavalry Soldiers:*

Observations with respect to the duties of the cavalry soldier, preventing him from doing anything towards erecting the stabling for the horses in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172——Statement of the duties expected of an available dragoon of a cavalry regiment in the field, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 187——Return of brigade duties performed by the Heavy Cavalry Brigade between the 13th December 1854 and the 28th February 1855, *App.* 458, 459.

8. *Removal*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*CAVALRY*—continued.

8. *Removal of the Cavalry:*

Memorandum from Sir R. Airey as to removal of Cavalry Brigade to Windmill Heights, 2d November 1854, *App.* 415——Letter from the Earl of Lucan to Brigadier-general Airey, of 2d November 1854, as to the removal of the troops, *ib.*

9. *Divisional General Orders:*

Copies of the Earl of Lucan's divisional orders and correspondence whilst in command of the English cavalry in the army in the East, *App.* 415–457.

10. *Light Brigade:*

Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated Camp, near Sebastopol, 10th November 1854, reporting the state of the Light Brigade, *App.* 461——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 19th November 1854, enclosing returns and daily states of the cavalry, *ib.* 462——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 21st November 1854, reporting the state of the Light Brigade, *ib.* 463.

11. *Supply of Forage:*

Statement of forage drawn by the several regiments of the cavalry division, from 17th December 1854 to 10th January 1855, inclusive, embracing a period of 25 days, *App.* 531——Similar statement from 4th to 16th December 1854, inclusive, *ib.* 529.

*See* also *Artillery. Baggage Animals. Canvas. Cardigan, Lord. Constantinople*, 1. *Engineering Tools. Enniskillen Dragoons. Forage. Heavy Cavalry. Horses. Huts and Hutting. Inkermann. Kadekoi. Light Cavalry. Lucan, Earl of. Mayow, Colonel. Mortality of Horses. Pits. Raglan, Lord*, 2. 3. *Sailcloth. Shelter for Horses. Stabling. Transport Service.*

*CAVALRY HORSES:*

1. *Mortality.*
2. *Employment on Transport Duties.*
3. *Deficiency of Forage.*
4. *Temporary Shelter.*

1. *Mortality:*

Number of cavalry horses killed in action or died of disease in the Crimea, *Rep.* ii; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 9——It is estimated that above 400 horses were sacrificed by the transport from Varna to Balaklava, *ib. p.* 47——Statement of the losses of cavalry horses in the Crimea up to the 16th January 1855, *ib. p.* 180.

2. *Employment on Transport Duties:*

Reasons for refusing to allow the troop horses to be sent down to Balaklava for forage, *Rep.* vii, viii; *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 203–208——Letter from Lord Lucan to Lord Raglan complaining of the employment of the cavalry horses and men on transport duties, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 15, 16——Disposition by Lord Lucan of 500 cavalry horses; incorrectness of returns in Commissioners' Report, *ib. p.* 111——Extent to which the mortality amongst the cavalry horses is to be attributed to their employment on transport duty, *ib. p.* 186. 193.

3. *Deficiency of Forage:*

Reasons assigned for the deficiency of forage supplied to the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 49.

4. *Temporary Shelter:*

Denial of want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising means of temporary shelter for cavalry horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 108, 109——Officer who is responsible for providing shelter or cover for cavalry horses in the field, *ib. p.* 113——Why the cavalry horses could not have been sheltered in the same way as the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners, *Major Keane, p.* 305——Extent of covering that would have been required for the cavalry horses on the plateau; the shelter for the mules of the Sappers forms no comparison, *Colonel Chapman, p.* 319.

*See* also *Forage. Horses. Mortality of Horses. Shelter for Horses. Stabling. Transport Service.*

*Chapman, Colonel Frederick.* Never heard of Captain Chapman having been employed in erecting stables for the cavalry horses, *Colonel Gordon, p.* 22, 23——Occasion of Captain Chapman of the engineers calling on witness, and going over the ground marked out for the cavalry stables, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 188——Omission of the Crimean Commissioners to examine Colonel Chapman upon the business of his department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 232.

Examination of Colonel Frederick Chapman of the engineers before the Board of General Officers, relative to the extent of covering that would have been required for the cavalry horses on the plains, *p.* 318, 319.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Charcoal.* Supply of the troops in the Crimea with charcoal by the Commissariat in December 1854, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 363.

*"Charity," The Ship.* Arrival of the "Charity" at Balaklava on the 25th December, with buffalo robes, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 282.

*Chasseurs d'Afrique.* The Chasseurs d'Afrique never thought of putting their horses behind a trench until it was paved, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 185——Expectation of Lord Raglan that the Chasseurs d'Afrique had been sheltered, at the period of giving directions to the British Cavalry Brigade to provide shelter for their horses, *ib. p.* 188.

*Chief of the Staff.* Letter, dated War Department, 19 February 1855, from Lord Panmure to Major-general Simpson, defining the duties to be performed on his appointment to be Chief of the Staff, *App.* 467.

*Cholera.* Prevalence of cholera and sickness in the Crimea at the time the Commissioners' inquiry was going on, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 94——Small loss sustained by the Light Cavalry Brigade from cholera when quartered near Varna, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 198.

*Cholera Belts.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 31 July 1854, directing officers and privates to wear cholera belts, *App.* 421.

*Chopped Straw.* Remarks of the Board upon the supply of chopped straw furnished by the Commissariat for the animals of the army in the Crimea, during the winter of 1854–55, *Rep.* xxvii——Recourse had to chopped straw to forage the cavalry and baggage horses in the Crimea, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 366——Sufficiency of the supply of chopped straw at Balaklava, but difficulty in landing it, *ib. p.* 389.

*Christie, Captain.* Letter from Captain Christie, stating that he had ordered all the small spars, sails, and awnings to be placed at the disposal of the cavalry for the covering of the stables, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 33——Application made to Captain Christie by the Quartermaster-general for artificers and carpenters from crews of vessels lying in Balaklava Harbour, to assist in erecting temporary shelter for the cavalry, *ib. p.* 104——Captain Christie was the naval agent of transports at Balaklava, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 292——Directions were given to Captain Christie to place the horse transports at Balaklava at the service of the Commissary-general, *ib. p.* 392.

*Civilians.* Inconvenience attending upon civilians interfering in military affairs, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 230.

*Clerks of Works.* Circumstance of the Minister of War and the Ordnance department each sending out a Clerk of the Works to the Crimea to look after sixteen carpenters, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 184.

*Climate.* Duty of a Quartermaster-general of an army in the field to acquire the fullest information that he can of the climate of the country which is the theatre of war, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*Cloaks.* Statement of watch cloaks actually drawn from the stores during the months of November, December and January 1854–5, *App.* 472.

*Cloth.* Evidence of Colonel Yea respecting the bad quality of cloth supplied to the men of the 7th Fusileers, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 257.

CLOTHING:

1. *Cavalry Horses.*
2. *Warm Clothing for the Men.*
3. *Issue of Great Coats.*

1. *Cavalry Horses:*

Occasion of application being made to Lord Raglan for clothing for the horses of the cavalry brigade in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 188.

2. *Warm Clothing for the Men:*

Observations of the Board upon the issues and distribution of warm clothing to the army in the East through the Quartermaster-general's department, *Rep.* x, xi. xviii, xix—— Omission of the Crimean Commissioners to put any questions to the Quartermaster-general upon the subject of the issue of clothing, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 232——Means adopted in the Quartermaster-general's office to acquaint the service of the articles of camp equipage and extra clothing in the Commissariat storehouse at Balaklava, *ib. p.* 255——Means devised by the Quartermaster-general's Department for the prevention of delay in the delivery of clothing to the men of the army in the East, *ib. p.* 256——Observations upon the inference drawn by the Crimean Commissioners of there being clothing in Balaklava, and that the men were prevented from getting it by official mismanagement, *ib. p.* 258—— There never was at any moment the smallest difficulty in obtaining an approved requisition for the coats and blankets required; the difficulty was to carry them up to the front, *ib. p.* 259——Statement showing the quantity of warm clothing and stores for which orders had been given to regiments to the 15th January 1855, *App.* 472.

3. *Issue*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

CLOTHING—continued.

3. *Issue of Great Coats:*

Tabular statement of great coats issued and received by the regiments of the army in the East, *App.* 471——Form of requisition for new great coats for the men, *ib.* 469.

*See* also *Distribution of Stores. Great Coats. Requisitions. Issue of Stores. Warm Clothing. Watch Cloaks.*

*Clothing Chests.* Reasons for doing away with the old clothing chests, and substituting squad bags, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 265.

*"Clyde," The Ship.* Explanation respecting the detention of the "Clyde" at Constantinople, laden with stores and forage for the army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 370.

*Coatees.* Observations of the Board upon the issue of coatees to the men through the Quartermaster-general's office, *Rep.* xii.

*Coats.* Tabular statement of great coats issued and received by the soldiers of the army in the East, *App.* 471.——*See* also *Requisitions.*

*Cobb, Colonel.* Evidence of Colonel Cobb with respect to the supply of warm clothing to the troops through requisitions of the Quartermaster-general's department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 259.

*Codrington, General Sir William.* High opinion entertained by General Sir William Codrington of witness's services as Quartermaster-general of the army in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*Coffee.* Remarks of the Board upon the supply of coffee to the army in the East through the Commissariat during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* xxv.

*Coffee Mills.* Purchase of coffee mills by the Commissariat for the use of the troops in the Crimea, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 386, 387.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1. *Shelter for the Cavalry.*
2. *Employment of Cavalry on Transport Service.*
3. *Crimean Commissioners' Report.*
4. *Duties of Quartermaster-general.*

1. *Shelter for the Cavalry:*

Occasion of the Commander-in-Chief issuing orders to Lord Lucan to provide temporary shelter for the cavalry horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 85, 86——The Commander-in-Chief of the army is responsible for providing shelter or cover for cavalry horses in the field, if it is possible to do so, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 113.

2. *Employment of Cavalry on Transport Service:*

Lord Cardigan could not have detached any portion of his force to bring up forage without obtaining the previous sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, *Rep.* vii, viii; *Sir R. Airey, p.* 219.

3. *Crimean Commissioners' Report:*

Occasion of the Quartermaster-general mentioning to the Commander-in-Chief that he thought it desirable to remain in England, to give explanations upon the Crimean Commissioners' report, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 95.

4. *Duties of Quartermaster-general:*

Duties of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field, with respect to affording information upon various subjects to the Commander-in-Chief, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*See* also *Codrington, General Sir William. Hardinge, Lord. Raglan, Field Marshal Lord. Simpson, General Sir James.*

COMMANDING OFFICERS:

1. *Assemblage of Cavalry Officers.*
2. *Employment of Cavalry on Transport Duties.*
3. *Hutting of the Cavalry.*
4. *Monthly Returns.*
5. *Issue of Stores.*

1. *Assemblage of Cavalry Officers:*

Occasion of the assembling of the commanding officers of the cavalry regiments to discuss the question of the hutting, and supply of necessaries in the field, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 12. 189——No recollection of being present at any meeting of commanding officers of cavalry regiments in the front, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 28, 29.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Commanding Officers*—continued.

2. *Employment of Cavalry on Transport Duties:*

Objections urged by the commanding officers of cavalry regiments against the supply of horses for the transport service, *Rep.* vii; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 17, 18.

3. *Hutting of the Cavalry:*

Answers of the commanding officers of cavalry regiments in the Crimea to questions relative to the date of the commencement and completion of the hutting of the cavalry, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 51.

4. *Monthly Returns:*

Issue of an order by Lord Lucan to commanding officers of regiments, calling for monthly returns, giving an account of the health and condition of the men and horses, as also how the troops have been supplied with food and forage, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 223.

5. *Issue of Stores:*

How far commanding officers of regiments had knowledge of what stores were available for their regiments, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 284–286——In what manner the quantity of articles in store was notified to the commanding officers, *ib. p.* 285——What caused the delay of commanding officers in sending for extra stores, after notice of their being ready, *ib. p.* 288.

*Commissariat Department:*

1. *Administration of Affairs.*
2. *Organisation of the Department.*
3. *Duties of the Department.*
4. *Supplies for the Army.*
5. *Officers of the Commissariat.*
6. *Staff.*
7. *Cavalry Brigade.*
8. *Transport Service.*
9. *Depôt at Malta.*
10. *Seizure from the Enemy.*

1. *Administration of Affairs:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers on the administration of the Commissariat in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, with reasons for arriving at the conclusion that that department was not responsible for the disasters that occurred, *Rep.* xx-xxix ——Remarks upon the misrepresentations contained in Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch's Report on the Commissariat department, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 356, 357——General censure of the Commissioners upon the Commissariat department for mismanagement and improvidence, for want of energy to repair disasters, and indifference to the best interest of the service, and the welfare of the troops, *ib. p.* 357——Omission of the Commissioners of Inquiry to take into account the unforeseen circumstances which it was not in human power to mitigate, *ib.*——Omission of the Commissioners of Inquiry to examine the Commissary-general or his officers upon matters affording them an opportunity of clearing up any misapprehension that might exist, *ib.*——Repeated applications were made to Lord Raglan for instructions to guide the Commissariat in their operations during the approaching winter, *ib. p.* 358——The Commissariat were blamed for not taking measures for which the officer in chief command withheld his sanction, *ib.*——Strenuous exertions of the Commissariat department to overcome the difficulties that presented themselves, *ib. p.* 359.

2. *Organisation of the Department:*

Account of the present organisation of the Commissariat Department, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 385.

3. *Duties of the Department:*

Duties of the Commissariat Department as laid down by Sir Randolph Routh in his observations on the Commissariat service, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 236——Notion entertained that the Commissariat duty is confined to such operations as are affected by the disbursements of the public money, from the fact of its having been a branch of the Treasury, *ib. p.* 237——It was hardly to be expected that operations so vast should all proceed smoothly and without embarrassment, *ib. p.* 238——Observations upon the enormous magnitude of the Commissariat operations in the Crimea; the annals of war do not furnish any other instance of such an undertaking having been executed, or even attempted, *ib.*——Nature of the duties which the Commissariat had to perform with the army in the East, and means which they possessed of carrying them out, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 357, 358——The duties of the Commissariat in the Colonies, and with an army in the field, are quite different, *ib. p.* 379——Satisfactory manner in which the officers of the Commissariat Department discharged their duties in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 383——Injustice of the charge preferred against the Commissariat Department by the Commissioners, *ib. p.* 383, 384 ——Copy of a letter from Commissary-general Filder, covering remarks on those parts of the Report of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch which relate to the duties of the Commissariat Department, *App.* 562-584.

4. *Supplies*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*COMMISSARIAT DEPARTMENT*—continued.

4. *Supplies for the Army:*

Imperative necessity of timely and extensive previous arrangements for the supply of a large force, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 358——Impediments to prospective arrangements on the part of the Commissariat, in consequence of the uncertainty which prevailed of the British troops wintering in the Crimea, *ib.*——Disappointment experienced by the Commissariat in the receipt of supplies of forage from the authorities in England, *ib. p.* 372——Letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, dated 2d April 1855, exonerating the Commissariat from all blame in the supply of forage to the army in the East, *ib.*——Number of men and horses given in to the Commissary-general as the number to be provided for with the army in the East, *ib. p.* 376——Extracts from semi-official letters, &c., from Sir Charles Trevelyan, quoted by Commissary-general Filder, C.B., before the Board of General Officers at Chelsea, relative to sending out supplies from England for the use of the army in the East, *App.* 585.

5. *Officers of the Commissariat:*

The Commissariat officers were chiefly young men, and very few with any experience whatever, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 38, 39——Letter from Lord Lucan to the Quartermaster-general, dated 29 September 1854, complaining of the Commissariat duties being entrusted to youths altogether without experience, *ib. p.* 40——Names of the Commissariat officers in the Crimea who had had previous service with an army in the field, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 379.

6. *Staff:*

Insufficiency of the Commissariat establishment in the Crimea with which to carry on most extensive and onerous duties, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 357. 377, 378——Until the army is certainly provided with a Commissariat establishment in England, you never will be prepared for expeditions, *ib. p.* 378——Frequent representations were made to the Home authorities of the inadequacy of the Commissariat staff in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 379——Proportion of Commissariat officers required for each division of infantry, and each brigade of cavalry of an army in the field, *ib. p.* 384——Number of Commissariat officers employed in the Peninsula, *ib.*

7. *Cavalry Brigade:*

Reason assigned by the Commissioners of Crimean Inquiry for not examining Lord Lucan upon the subject of Commissariat supplies, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 8; *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 48——Confusion created by the young men of the Commissariat department riding about the country bidding against each other for supplies, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 38——Letter from Lord Lucan to the Quartermaster-general, dated 29 September 1854, complaining of the Commissariat arrangements, and the defective manner in which the duties are carried on in the cavalry division, *ib. p.* 40. 179——Letter from Lord Lucan to the Adjutant-general, dated September 30th, 1854, complaining of the neglect of the Commissariat in supplying the cavalry with forage and corn for the horses, *ib. p.* 222——Power of the Commissariat to have supplied the Light Cavalry Brigade with corn and forage on the heights of Inkermann, *Crookshank, p.* 224——Difficulties which the Commissariat had to encounter from the want of fatigue parties to assist in carrying up supplies to the camp, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238——Means adopted by the Commissariat department to ensure a supply of hay for the army in the Crimea, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 365——Strenuous endeavours made by the Commissariat to procure a sufficient supply of forage for the army before Sebastopol, and how frustrated, *ib. p.* 373.

8. *Transport Service:*

Return furnished by Deputy Commissary-general Adams of the losses of the Commissariat animals in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 9——Estimated loss of baggage animals and mules attached to the Commissariat department in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, *ib. p.* 179——General return of the state of the Commissariat transport on the 19th February 1855, *App.* 532.

9. *Depôt at Malta:*

Reason why the Commissariat depôt at Malta was never established, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 385.

10. *Seizure from the Enemy:*

Case where the Commissariat laid claim, and took possession of a convoy of carts and bullocks that had been captured from the enemy, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237.

*See* also *Animals. Army in the East. Baggage Animals. Crimea. Delays. Extra Clothing. Filder, Mr. Commissary-general. Horses. Huts and Hutting. Inexperienced Youths. Issue of Stores. Land Transport. Land Transport Corps. Lime-juice. Lucan, The Right Hon. the Earl of. Magazines and Storehouses (Commissariat). Mortality of Horses. Murray, Mr. "Orient," The Ship. Pack Animals. Stores. Supplies. Transport Service.*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Commissary-General:*

1. *Consideration of Case.*
2. *Appointment and Instructions.*
3. *Duties of the Office.*
4. *Forage for Cavalry Horses.*
5. *Supply of Lime-juice to the Army.*
6. *Transport Service.*
7. *Returns of the Commissary-general.*

1. *Consideration of Case:*

Adjudication of the Board on the Commissary-general's case; grounds for considering that officer's conduct in the management of his department was not justly liable to the unfavourable animadversion which is conveyed in the Crimean Commissioners' Report, *Rep.* xx-xxix——Observations upon the harsh treatment of the Commissary-general at the hand of the Commissioners of Inquiry, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 384.

2. *Appointment and Instructions:*

Appointment of the Commissary-general to the army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 377——The instructions to the Commissary-general were to obey all orders that might be issued by Lord Raglan, *ib. p.* 376——Communications had by the Commissary-general with the Treasury and the Duke of Newcastle previous to leaving England, *ib.*——Minute of the Treasury under which the Commissary-general received his instructions, *ib. p.* 379.

3. *Duties of the Office:*

Opinion that the Commissary-general is only a subordinate officer to a Quartermaster-general of an army, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 44——Duties of the Commissary-general of an army in the field as laid down by Sir Randolph Routh in his observations on the Commissariat service, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 236——The army stores are entirely and completely under the Commissary-general, *Colonel Wetherell, p.* 269.

4. *Forage for Cavalry Horses:*

Reasons assigned by the Commissary-general for not supplying the cavalry with forage for the horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 33.

5. *Supply of Lime-juice to the Army:*

Letter from the Commissary-general to the Adjutant-general, stating that it was not the department of the Commissariat to provide lime-juice for the army, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 375.

6. *Transport Service:*

No instance ever heard or known of Mr. Commissary-general Filder objecting to supply transports on the ground that the duty was not within his department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237.

7. *Returns of the Commissary-general:*

Manner in which the Quartermaster-general's department depended entirely on these returns as to the stores available for the troops; subsequent proof that these returns were incorrect, though at the time they could not possibly be doubted, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 269.

*Commissioners of Inquiry.* Errors of the Commissioners of Inquiry in all matters of accounts and returns relating to the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190——Reason of the Commissioners of Crimean Inquiry declining to examine Lord Lucan upon the subject of Commissariat supplies, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 48——The object of the instructions to the Commissioners was to confine their inquiry to the Commissariat supplies, and they exceeded their duty when they went beyond it, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 113——Circumstance of the Crimean Commissioners being obliged to leave the Crimea, and remain at Constantinople, in consequence of sickness, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 232.

Arrival of the Commissioners in the Crimea, when the difficulties of the Commissariat were at an end, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 383——Injustice of the charge preferred against the Commissariat department by the Commissioners, *ib.* 383, 384——Letter from Major-general Sir Richard Airey to the Right Honourable C. P. Villiers, dated Horse Guards, 22d May 1856, transmitting a paper showing the two Reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, dated Constantinople 9th and Constantinople 10th June 1855, and a memorandum upon the responsibility for the original supply of camp equipage, *App.* 472.

Copy of preliminary report of the Commissioners, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, dated Constantinople, 9th June 1855, *App.* 502–510——Letter from Frederick Peel, Esq., M.P., to Colonel Tulloch, dated 18th April 1856, with reference to Lord Palmerston's approval of the Report of the Crimean Commissioners, *App.* 605.

*See* also *Errors of the Commissioners.* *Reports of the Commissioners.*

*Completion*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Completion of Orders.* Table showing the periods of time occupied in the execution of orders required to be executed in England, *App.* 468.

*Conduct of Officers.* Statement that the Commissioners had no power to inquire into the conduct of officers, but merely into facts which were likely to have affected the distribution of supplies, *p.* 114.

*Conolly, Major James.* Examination of Major James Conolly, brigade major of the heavy cavalry in the autumn and winter of 1854–55, relative to the care and management of the troop horses in the Crimea, and efforts made by the Divisional General, Lord Lucan, to afford them shelter, and procure them forage and corn, *p.* 154–160.

Application made to Major Conolly to furnish documentary evidence of the period when the cavalry commenced hutting their horses, and when it was finished, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 26——Observations on the evidence of Major Conolly relative to certain incorrect returns of Colonel Hodge and Lieutenant-colonel Mayow, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 173.

CONSTANTINOPLE:

1. *Cavalry Horses.*
2. *Supply of Carpenters.*
3. *Commissioners of Inquiry.*
4. *Commissariat Depôt.*

1. *Cavalry Horses:*

State of the horses of the Cavalry Brigade when quartered at Constantinople, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 38.

2. *Supply of Carpenters:*

Reason why a sufficient supply of carpenters could not be obtained from Constantinople for the services of the army and fleet, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 150.

3. *Commissioners of Inquiry:*

Circumstance of the Crimean Commissioners retiring to Constantinople from the Crimea, in consequence of sickness making its appearance, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 232.

4. *Commissariat Depôt:*

Establishment of a Commissariat depôt at Constantinople, and depôts of forage in the immediate neighbourhood, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 378——Advantage of Constantinople for a Commissariat depôt, over Malta, *ib. p.* 385.

*Contracts.* Failure of the contract system for the supply of the army in the Crimea with forage for the horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 33.

*Conveyance of Sick.* Comparison of the number of men and horses of the Heavy Brigade employed on Commissariat duties, and in conveyance of sick from the front, as shown by the returns of Major Conolly and Colonel Hodge, *App.* 602–604.

*Cooked Victuals.* Inconvenience which the officers and men suffered from not having their provisions ready cooked, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 377.

*Coopers.* Engagement of coopers to go to Balaklava, their subsequent refusal to go, and commitment to prison at Constantinople, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 289.

*Corn.* Deficiency of corn for the horses of the cavalry upon landing in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 39, 40——After the great fire at Varna in the month of August, by which a vast amount of corn was lost, it became necessary to have recourse a little more to the standing crops of the country, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 117.

*Corps of Drivers.* General return of the state of the Commissariat corps of drivers on 19 February 1855, *App.* 532.

*Cossack Bay.* Inconvenience of the Agent for Transports at Balaklava, residing in a man-of-war lying in Cossack Bay. *Colonel Gordon, p.* 398——Reason of the Agent for Transports taking up his position in Cossack Bay in preference to anchoring in Balaklava Harbour, *Captain Heath, p.* 398.

*Cossacks.* Account of an attack upon a body of Cossacks with a large convoy, and capture of a quantity of bullock carts laden with flour, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237.

*"Cottingham," The Ship.* On the 8th November, the "Cottingham" was despatched to Sinope to procure planking for huts, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242.

*Countersigning Requisitions.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general's department with respect to countersigning requisitions on the Commissariat for stores, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 255.

*Covering for Horses.* Reason why palliasse covers could not be made available as covering for the cavalry horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 98, 99.——*See* also *Clothing.*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Crews of Vessels:*

1. *Black Sea Fleet.*
2. *Merchant Service.*
3. *Transport Vessels.*

1. *Black Sea Fleet:*

Lord Raglan was extremely particular when applying for the artificers and crews of vessels belonging to the fleet to assist the army on shore, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 149 —— As men-of-war's men they are not bound to serve wherever they are ordered, but they never refuse to do it if fairly treated and paid extra, *Admiral Deans Dundas, p.* 307.

2. *Merchant Service:*

Observations upon the evidence of the witnesses respecting the employment of crews of vessels lying in Balaklava Harbour in the construction of stabling for the cavalry horses, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 171——Extent to which the Quartermaster-general availed himself of the services of the crews of vessels lying in Balaklava Harbour in the construction of huts and shelter for horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 104. 246——Limited extent to which the services of the crews were available, *ib. p.* 104. 246, 247——Manner in which the crews of the merchantmen and transports were fully employed in Balaklava Harbour, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 293——Every man belonging to the transport crews at Balaklava was fully employed, *ib.*

3. *Transport Vessels:*

Nature of the employment of the crews of vessels in Balaklava Harbour, *Major Keane, p.* 304——They are usually wanted on board their own ships when they come into port; if they are wanted for land service, they never refused to go, but they must be paid extra, *Admiral Deans Dundas, p.* 307——Lord Raglan agreed that if any of the men were wounded in landed or in any service under the Crown, that those belonging to the transport service should be paid as men-of-war's men were, *ib.*

*See* also *Artificers. Carpenters.*

*Crimea.* Observations upon the enormous magnitude of the Commissariat operations in the Crimea; the annals of war do not furnish any other instance of such an undertaking having been executed or even attempted, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238——In the Crimea nothing could reach the army except what was supplied by importation, *ib.*——Nobody ever calculated that when the allies landed in the Crimea the encamping upon the heights before Sebastopol, and being constantly engaged during the whole winter with an enemy vastly superior in force, *ib. p.* 242——Observations upon the disadvantages which the British army in the Crimea had to contend against, *ib. p.* 261——Difficult position occupied by the army in the Crimea, and manner in which it affected the supply of stores to the troops, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 270.

*Crimean Army Fund.* Advice given to the Crimean Army Fund which was sent out to the Crimea as to the best means of carrying out the object of the subscribers, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 258.

*Crimean Inquiry.* Errors of the Commissioners of Inquiry when speaking of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 8——Circumstances under which the Crimean Inquiry took place; opinion that the Commissioners should have gone further into the evidence, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 94.——*See* also *Reports of the Commissioners.*

*Crookshank, Assistant Commissary-general.* Letters from Mr. Commissary-general Crookshank to Lord Lucan, upon the subject of foraging the Light Cavalry Brigade at Inkermann, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 42——Letter from Mr. Crookshank to Lord Cardigan upon the same, *ib.*——Letter from Mr. Crookshank to Colonel Mayow, respecting the difficulty of keeping up the supply of forage in the Light Brigade, *ib. p.* 43.

Examination of Mr. Assistant Commissary-general Crookshank relative to filling up ration returns and charging issues in the accounts, *p.* 125——Evidence of Mr. Commissary-general Crookshank before the Crimean Commissioners, respecting the difficulty of transport of forage and provisions from Balaklava to the heights of Inkermann, where the Light Cavalry were quartered, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 200—— Examination of Mr. Commissary-general Crookshank relative to his making application to Lord Lucan for the horses of the Light Cavalry Brigade to be sent dow to Balaklavan to fetch forage and supplies, *p.* 208-213.

Circumstances attending Mr. Assistant Commissary-general Crookshank being put under arrest, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 222——Denial of Mr. Crookshank that Lord Raglan expressed his disapprobation of his conduct when placed nuder arrest by Lord Lucan, *Crookshank, p.* 226 —— Examination of Assistant Commissary-general Crookshank touching the means of the Commissariat of supplying the Light Cavalry Brigade with food and forage on the heights of Inkermann, *ib. p.* 224–226.

Occasion of Mr. Commissary-general Crookshank applying for the troop horses of the Light Brigade to be sent to Balaklava to bring up forage, *Colonel Low, p.* 227, 228—— Desire of Mr. Commissary-general Crookshank for the production of the letter, said by Lord

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Crookshank, Assistant Commissary-general*—continued.

Lord Lucan to have been written by Lord Raglan upon the occasion of Mr. Crookshank's arrest, *Ev. p.* 248——Communications with Lord Raglan on the subject of this officer's arrest; witness never received any expression of Lord Raglan's disapprobation; his Lordship did not think it expedient that an inquiry should be made, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 274——Letter from the Adjutant-general to Lord Lucan, conveying Lord Raglan's orders for Mr. Crookshank's release, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 274, 275.

Letter from the Deputy Judge Advocate-general to the Adjutant-general, dated 4 July 1856, enclosing certain letters relating to the circumstances under which Deputy-Assistant Commissary-general Crookshank was placed by the Earl of Lucan under arrest, *App.* 611.

D.

*Daily Returns.* Difficulty in a campaign of exacting from the officers very strict daily returns, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 10.

*Dead Horses.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 11 July 1854, directing the burial of dead horses, *App.* 418.

*Defence and Attack.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field, to acquire the fullest information that he can of the best positions for attack and defence, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*Deficiency of Forage.* Cause of the deficiency of forage supplied to the cavalry quartered in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 48——Repeated representation made to the Brigade-major, Colonel Mayow, of the deficiency of forage for the horses of the Light Cavalry Brigade, *Colonel Doherty, p.* 217——Evidence of the commanding officers of the Light Cavalry Brigade, of the deficiency of the supply of forage for the horses in November 1854, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 220, 221——Deficiency of forage of the Light Cavalry Brigade after the storm in November 1854, *Colonel Douglas, p.* 226.

Cause of the alleged deficiency in the supply of forage to the troops and horses in December 1854, explained, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 359——Letters from the Commissary-general to the Treasury and War Department, stating the deficiency of the supplies of forage for the army in the East, *ib.* 368, 369——Difference in the quantity of hay stated by Sir Charles Trevelyan to have been sent out to the Crimea, and the quantity received by the Commissariat, *ib. p.* 371——Had the requisitions of the Commissary-general for hay been complied with, the deficiency of forage throughout the winter would have been prevented, *ib.*——Deficiency of forage for the use of the army in the East, owing to the requisitions of the Commissary-general upon the Treasury at home not having been complied with, *ib. p.* 388, 389.

*See* also *Delays.*

*Delays:*

1. *Delays occurring in England.*
2. *Delays in drawing Forage.*
3. *Delays in the Issue of Stores.*

1. *Delays occurring in England:*

The delays which actually occurred, and which occasioned the extraordinary sufferings of the British army in the East, have now been traced to England, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238——Account of the delay in sending out a supply of hay from England to the seat of war, *ib.*——Copies of despatches showing the causes which delayed all compliance with the requisition of the Quartermaster-general for camp equipage and engineering tools to be supplied from England, *ib. p.* 244.

2. *Delays in drawing Forage:*

Reason for believing that there would have been delay at Balaklava had the troop horses of the Light Brigade been sent down for forage, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 204, 205——Precautions taken by the Commissariat to ensure that no delay should take place at Balaklava in the supply of forage and supplies to the cavalry, *Crookshank, p.* 209——Frequency of delays of the Heavy Brigade foraging parties in Balaklava in getting their forage, *General Scarlett, p.* 214——Complaint made to the Quartermaster-general of the delay in the drawing of the forage from Balaklava for the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 223.

3. *Delays in the Issue of Stores:*

There was not any obstruction in the Quartermaster-general's department in the issue of clothing and camp necessaries to the men; the delay was occasioned by other causes, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 256——Answer to the charge of delay in the issue of warm clothing, as given in evidence before the Commissioners, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 272——Nature and causes of the delays on the part of commanding officers, in sending for extra stores after notice of their arrival, *ib. p.* 288——There were great delays in issuing and conveying stores from Balaklava, in consequence of the position of the enemy, and Sir Colin Campbell being obliged continually to turn the whole force out, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 293.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Denison, S. C.* Letter from S. C. Denison, Esq., Deputy Judge Advocate-general, to the Adjutant-general, dated 4th July 1856, returning certain letters relating to the circumstances of Mr. Crookshank being placed under arrest by Lord Lucan, *App.* 611.

*Depôts for Hay.* Memorandum submitted to the Commander of the Forces by Commissary-general Filder, on 15th May 1854, upon the formation of depôts of hay for the service of the army in the East, *App.* 610.

*Deserters.* Statement of great coats which have been lost by deserters from the army in the East, *App.* 470.

*Devno.* State of the horses of the Light Cavalry when quartered at Devno, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 39.

*De Ros, Lord.* Application made by Lord De Ros, then Quartermaster-general of the Forces, for additional camp equipage for the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 240.

*Derriman, Captain Samuel Hoskin, R. N.* Commander of the "Caradoc" steamer; examination before the Board on the subject of the hiring and employment of artificers in the Crimea, *p.* 332, 333.

*Diet.* Statement of the different articles of diet issued from the Commissariat Depôt at Balaklava, from the 1st to the 15th March 1855, *App.* 534.

*Disembarkation of the Troops.* Particulars respecting the disembarkation of the cavalry in the Crimea; length of time which it took, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 39, 40——Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field with respect to directing and superintending the disembarking troops, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235——The disembarkation of the troops in the Crimea was effected without confusion and without the loss of a man, *ib. p.* 241.

*Displacement of Words.* Observations with respect to the displacement of words in a marginal note of the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 180.

*Disposable Men.* Statement showing the number of disposable men in the different regiments of the cavalry brigade on the 16th December 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 186, 187.

*Distribution of Stores.* Manner in which the distribution of stores becomes part of the duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field, *Rep.* x, xi; *Sir R. Airey, p.* 254.

*Division of Labour.* Observations upon the division of labour in a modern European army, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238.

*Divisional Generals.* Inconvenience of a divisional general not being furnished with documentary evidence in cases like the present, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 19, 20——Degree of responsibility attaching to a divisional general, *ib. p.* 20.

*Divisional Orders.* Copies of the Earl of Lucan's divisional orders and correspondence whilst in command of the English cavalry in the army in the East, *App.* 415–457.

*Dobrudscha.* Arduous service of the Light Cavalry Brigade when sent on a reconnaissance to the Dobrudscha, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 207, 208.

*Documentary Evidence.* Inconvenience of the system of Generals of Division carrying on the army service without any documentary proof, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 19, 20.

*Doherty, Colonel.* Observations upon Colonel Doherty's evidence relative to hutting of the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 15——Issue of the order of 28th November 1854 to the Light Cavalry Brigade by Colonel Doherty, the senior officer in command, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 46——Answers of Lieutenant-colonel Doherty of the 13th Light Dragoons, respecting the date of the commencement and completion of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 51——Examination of Colonel Charles Doherty of the 13th Light Dragoons, touching the condition of the cavalry horses in the Crimea in December 1854, and means devised for affording them temporary shelter, *p.* 65–67——Observations upon the evidence of Colonel Doherty respecting the means taken for affording shelter to the horses of the Cavalry Brigade during the winter of 1854-55, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 167——Error of Colonel Doherty with respect to the period of the completion of the stables of the 13th Light Dragoons, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190——Appointment of Colonel Doherty to the command of the Light Cavalry Brigade on the resignation of Lord Cardigan, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 202——Further examination of Lieutenant-colonel Charles Doherty, respecting his reasons for not applying for the Light Cavalry horses to be allowed to fetch forage from Balaklava, *ib. p.* 216–218.

*Douglas, Colonel.* Examination of Colonel John Douglas before the Board, touching the condition of the cavalry horses in the Crimea, in the month of December 1854, and means resorted to in order to afford them temporary shelter, *p.* 60–64——Examination relative to the shelter given to horses in the Crimea, and also as to forage, *p.* 144–146——Error in Colonel Douglas's evidence before the Crimean Commissioners, touching the deficiency of the supply of forage to the Light Cavalry Brigade, in the latter part of the month of November 1854, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 201, 202——Evidence of Colonel Douglas respecting the state of exhaustion of the horses of the Light Brigade upon leaving the heights of kermann for Kadekoi, *ib. p.* 207.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Dragoons.* It would have been most improper to have allowed any dragoon to walk the distance for carrying up Commissariat supplies in the state of the roads at that time, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 116——Statement of the duties of an available dragoon with an army in the field, *ib. p.* 187.

*Drains.* Advantage of digging drains in the front and rear of the cavalry horses; reason why not adopted, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 30, 31.

*Drake, Deputy Commissary-general.* Report of Deputy Commissary-general Drake on the damaged cargoes of vegetables that arrived in Balaklava Harbour, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 373.

*Dress of Officers.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 29th May 1854, upon the subject of officers' dress, *App.* 416.

*Drivers.* Daily statement of the Commissariat corps of drivers, on 19th February 1855, *App.* 532.

*Drummond, Captain.* Opinion of Captain Drummond, of Her Majesty's ship "Retribution," on the uselessness of putting up canvas on the plateau as a means of shelter, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 148.

*Dundas, Vice-Admiral J. W. Deans.* Desire of Lord Lucan to put in the answers of Admiral Dundas to the queries submitted to him, *p.* 163——Examination of Vice-Admiral J. W. Deans Dundas respecting the assistance rendered by the navy to the operations of the army in the Crimea, *p.* 306, 307.

*Duties of Soldiers.* Observations with respect to the regimental duties of the cavalry soldier in the Crimea preventing him from doing anything towards erecting the stabling for the horses, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172——Statement showing the duties of an available dragoon in a cavalry regiment, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 187.

E.

*Egerton, Mr.* Unceasing exertions of Mr. Egerton in the distribution to the soldiers of the stores provided by the bounty of Lord Ellesmere, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 258.

*Eighteenth Regiment.* Number of blankets received by this regiment on landing; answer to evidence on that subject before the Commissioners, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

*Eighth Hussars.* Period at which the first hospital hut was finished, and the last of the troop huts, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 112——Statement showing the number of disposable men of the 8th Hussars on the 16th December 1854, *ib. p.* 187.

*Eighty-eighth Regiment.* Evidence of Dr. Alexander before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea, respecting the fatigue duty performed by the 88th Regiment of Foot in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172——Quantity of blankets obtained by this regiment; evidence thereon before the Commissioners; explanation thereof, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

*Eighty-ninth Regiment.* Explanation of the cause of this regiment not receiving its warm clothing until after they were marched to the trenches, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 270.

*Eleventh Hussars.* Statement showing the number of disposable men of the 11th Hussars on the 16th December 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 187.

*Ellesmere, Lord.* Distribution of the stores and comforts for the troops sent out in Lord Ellesmere's yacht, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 258.

*Embarking of Troops.* Duty of a Quartermaster-general of an army in the field with respect to directing and superintending the embarking of troops, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*Emperor of Russia.* Efforts of the late Emperor of Russia in bringing the resources of his vast empire to bear upon the great object of crushing the invasion with a force vastly superior in number, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 261, 262.

*Encamping Troops.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field with respect to directing and superintending the encampment of troops, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*Encampment of the British.* The whole of the British encampment was swept to the ground by the hurricane which visited the Crimea on the 14th November 1854, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 247.

*Enemy, The.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field to inform the Commander-in-Chief of the strength, the position, the resources, and the contemplated operations of the enemy, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235——Position which the enemy would have taken up had the allied armies abandoned the heights after the battle of Inkermann, and neglected to defend the advanced trenches, *ib. p.* 242.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Engagements with the Enemy.* From the morning of the 25th of October 1854, when the battle of Balaklava began, until after the close of the winter, there was going on with the enemy in front and flank a kind of protracted engagement, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238.

*Engineer Officer.* Want of an engineer officer to superintend the construction of stabling for the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 11——Appointment of an officer of the engineers to superintend the erection of the stables for the cavalry under the command of Lord Lucan, *Colonel Gordon, p.* 22, 23——Reason assigned by the commanding officer of the Royal Engineers for not appointing an engineer officer to superintend the erection of the cavalry stables, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 32——Occasion of an engineer officer being placed at the disposal of Lord Lucan, *ib. p.* 88-90——Occasion of application being made for an engineer officer, and the Quartermaster-general giving directions for one to attend, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 188——Occasion of the Quartermaster-general giving directions that an engineer officer should be placed at Lord Lucan's disposal to assist in the construction of shelter for the horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 251, 252.

*See* also *Chapman, Colonel Frederick. Hall, Major. Lennox, Lieutenant. Stokes, Lieutenant.*

*Engineering Tools.* Occasion of application being made to Captain Chapman of the Engineers to furnish engineering tools to the cavalry for the purpose of constructing stabling for the horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 188——Letters from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 18th and 23d April 1855, stating the cause of the delay in complying with the requisition of the Quartermaster-general, dated in November 1854, for a supply of engineering tools for the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 244, 245.

*Enniskillen Dragoons.* On the 1st October 1854, the head quarters were in the Crimea, but one troop was on board the "War Cloud," *Colonel Yorke, p.* 106——Monthly return of this regiment, dated Head-quarters, Balaklava, Crimea, 1st October 1854, signed John Yorke; this return was signed under peculiar circumstances, it having been kept open for signature, there being no one else to sign it, *ib. p.* 107——Date of the Enniskillen Dragoons arriving in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 177.

*Entrenching Tools.* Limited supply of entrenching tools to the cavalry regiments stationed in the Crimea, *Colonel Douglas, p.* 61, 62; *Colonel Doherty, p.* 65; *Colonel Low, p.* 68; *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 75——Reason of the cavalry regiments in the Crimea being badly off for entrenching tools, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 86——Bad quality of the entrenching tools furnished to the Heavy Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea, *Major Conolly, p.* 156, 157.

*Errors of the Commissioners.* Manner in which the errors of the Commissioners with regard to the cavalry horses arose, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 9——Error of the Commissioners as to the period of the commencement of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 16, 17——Error of the Commissioners with regard to the distance of the head quarters of the cavalry from the stores at Balaklava, *ib.* 17——Opinion that it was an error of the Commissioners in not going far enough into the evidence on the spot, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 94——Errors of the Commissioners in all matters of accounts and returns relating to the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190.

Observations on the conflicting statements put forth by the Commissioners of the mortality amongst the horses of the Light Cavalry Brigade, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 204——Errors of the Commissioners of Inquiry into the British Army in the Crimea, in supposing that the War Office form of requisition for a new great coat existed in Lord Raglan's army, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 258——Error of the Commissioners with respect to the number of great coats and watch cloaks remaining in store at Balaklava in December and January 1854-55, *ib. p.* 260——Error of the Commissioners of Crimean Inquiry with regard to the quantities of stores lying in the Commissariat storehouses in Balaklava, *ib. p.* 258.

"*Esk,*" *The Ship.* Statement of the quantity of hay shipped in the "Esk" during the months of October and November 1854, *Rep.* xxvii——Report of the Commissariat officer at Balaklava, on the arrival of a cargo of lime-juice by the "Esk," *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 374.

*Estcourt, General.* Omission of the Crimean Commissioners to examine General Estcourt, the Adjutant-general, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 231——Occasion of Lord Raglan stating to the Home Authorities in England that General Estcourt had nothing to do with the transport or supplies of the army in the East, *ib. p.* 237.

*Eupatoria.* Occasion of the British Commissariat officer at Eupatoria giving over to the French and Turkish troops all the live cattle which he had in charge, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 362——Despatch of a party of officers, by Lord Raglan, to Eupatoria, to purchase transport animals for the army before Sebastopol, *ib. p.* 389.

*European Wars.* In the Peninsular and in all former European wars conducted by this country on a scale of magnitude, the means of transport had been obtained either by purchases or requisitions made in the districts occupied by the forces, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Evans, Sir De Lacy.* Constant applications from Sir De Lacy Evans for a reinforcement of the division of the army under his command, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 218——Memorandum showing that Sir De Lacy Evans declined obtaining the knapsacks for his division, *ib. p.* 265.

*Evidence before the Commissioners.* Manner in which the evidence taken before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea was taken down and recorded, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 230, 231——Manner in which the evidence was taken before the Commissioners, and opportunities given to the witnesses to make alterations, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 278, 279——Collection of a mass of evidence, by the Commissioners of Inquiry, at Balaklava, not strictly to be relied on, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 357——Letter from Colonel Gordon to the Judge Advocate-general, 22d May 1856, forwarding Colonel Tulloch's memorandum of the 16th May, and remarks by Colonel Gordon in reply thereto, relative to Colonel Gordon's and Colonel Wetherall's evidence having been altered from the original, *App.* 521–524.

*Examination of Witnesses.* Objection raised by Lord Lucan to Colonel Tulloch's mode of examination of witnesses, *p.* 58——Manner in which the examination of witnesses was conducted by the Crimean Commissioners, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 230, 231——Observations upon the neglect of the Commissioners of Inquiry to examine those witnesses respecting the cavalry, whose evidence they might have relied on, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190——Unfair manner in which Colonel Tulloch examined witnesses before this Board, as instanced in Major Thompson's examination, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 231.

*Execution of Orders.* Delay in the execution of orders in England for the service of the army in the East in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 247——Table showing the periods of time occupied in the execution of orders required to be executed in England, *App.* 468.

*Exigencies of the Campaign.* In the great business of war it must be left to the sagacity of some public functionary to form an estimate as well as he can of the exigencies of the campaign; and in the British service it was to the Commissariat that this very anxious and difficult duty was entrusted, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237.

*Exposure to the Weather.* When animals are exposed to the weather they require more food than they do at any other time, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 37.

*Extra Clothing.* Means adopted in the Quartermaster-general's office to acquaint the officers and men of the articles of extra clothing lying ready in the Commissariat storehouse, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 255——After the 15th January regiments were applying to the Commander-in-Chief for permission to sell extra clothing sent out by the regimental clothiers, and they were bought in several cases by the Commissary-general, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 284——Manner in which it was notified to the troops that extra clothing had arrived and requisitions given out for their supply, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 297——Manner in which the arrival and readiness to issue extra stores was made known to the different regiments, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 288.

F.

*Failure of Contractors.* Inability of the parties who had contracted for supplying cattle for the army during the winter months to comply with their contract, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 361.

*Farm Horses.* Rate of allowance of hay to farm horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 43.

*Farr, Dr.* Consultation of Dr. Farr, Superintendent-general of the Statistical Department in the Registrar-general's office, as to the method of calculating the mortality of the cavalry horses, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 164. 173.

*Farriers.* Copy of Divisional Orders of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 29 May 1854, directing the appointment of farriers and assistant farriers to cavalry regiments, *App.* 415.

*Fatigue Duty.* Evidence of Dr. Alexander before the Commissioners of Inquiry respecting the fatigue duties performed by the infantry soldiers of the army in the East, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172.

*Fatigue Parties.* The British infantry were so constantly employed with the vital work of defending all against the enemy, that men for other duties could hardly be spared, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238——Impossibility of obtaining fatigue parties to bring up the timber and planks from Balaklava, for building the huts for the troops in November 1854, *ib.* p. 244——So many men were wanted day and night for defence against the enemy, that few could be spared for labour, *ib. p.* 247——Evidence of Colonel Yea respecting the employment of fatigue parties to fetch up stores from Balaklava for the 7th Fusileers, *ib. p.* 257——About the 17th December for five days there was no fatigue party at all at Balaklava, *M'Kenzie, p.* 293——Frequent difficulty in getting fatigue parties, in consequence of the movements of Sir Colin Campbell caused by the pressure of the enemy, *Boyd, p.* 310.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Fergusson, General.* Arrangement with General Fergusson for a supply of camp equipage to the army in the East from Malta, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 240——Letter, dated Horse Guards, 28th February 1854, to Lieutenant-general Fergusson, respecting the articles to be carried in the knapsacks and squad bags, *App.* 466.

*Field Equipment.* A return of field equipment was sent in monthly; what it contained, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 285.

*Field Kit.* The field kit comprises the very articles with which the troops did land in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 265.

*Fifth Dragoon Guards:*

1. *Hutting of the Regiment.*
2. *Disposable Men.*

1. *Hutting of the Regiment:*

Date of commencement and completion of the hutting of this regiment, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 112.

2. *Disposable Men:*

Statement showing the number of disposable men of the 5th Dragoon Guards on the 16th December 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 186.

*Fifty-seventh Regiment.* Reason of the 57th Regiment remaining without their warm clothing so long after the order had been given to supply it, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 259——Supply of blankets to the 57th Foot; evidence before the Commissioners; explanation thereof, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

*Filder, Commissary-general.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Observations on the misrepresentations contained in the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry affecting the Commissariat department, *p.* 356, 357——Imputations cast upon the Commissariat of having supplied the troops with expensive and unhealthy food, *p.* 356——General censure of the Commissioners upon the Commissariat department for mismanagement and improvidence, for want of energy to repair disasters, and indifference to the best interests of the service and the welfare of the troops, *p.* 357——Difficulty of supplying a large army whose basis of operations was suddenly changed, *ib.*——Insufficiency of the Commissariat establishments with which to carry on most extensive and onerous duties, *ib.*——Omission of the Commissioners to take account of the unforeseen circumstances which it was not in human power to mitigate, *ib.*——It seemed the business and functions of the Commissioners to fix blame somewhere, *ib.*

Commencement of the Commissioners' inquiry at the hospitals in Constantinople as to the causes of the sickness and sufferings of the troops, *p.* 357——Collection of a mass of evidence at Balaklava by the Commissioners, not strictly to be relied upon, *ib.*——Omission of the Commissioners to examine the Commissary-general or his officers upon matters affording them an opportunity of clearing up any misapprehension that might exist, *ib.*——The Commissioners' Report is a mere statement of what was not done, and not a careful and dispassionate investigation of the causes and circumstances to which the shortcomings might be justly and fairly attributed, *ib.*——The Report is a misrepresentation in many parts and exaggeration in others, *ib.*——Nature of the duties which the Commissariat had to perform with the army in the East, and means of carrying them out, *p.* 357, 358.

Uncertainty of the troops wintering in the Crimea; impediment to prospective arrangements in consequence, *p.* 358——Imperative necessity of timely and extensive previous arrangements for the supply of a large force, *ib.*——Repeated applications made to Lord Raglan for instructions to guide the Commissariat in their operations, *ib.*——Directions given by Lord Raglan to lay in a stock of fuel at Scutari, *ib.*——Attachment of blame to the Commissariat for not taking measures for which the officer in chief command withheld his sanction, *ib.*——Satisfactory manner in which the army was supplied during the time it was stationed in Bulgaria, *ib.*——Supply of fresh meat to the troops, *ib.*——Efficiency of the Commissariat transport in Bulgaria, *ib.*——Loss of pressed hay by the great storm of 14 November 1854, *p.* 359——Impediments to transport both by sea and by land by the entire break up of the weather, *ib.*

Wretched state of the road from Balaklava to the camp, *p.* 359——Mortality of pack animals from the badness of roads, *ib.*——Peculiar position of Balaklava; how it tended to the misfortunes and embarrassments that occurred, *ib.*——Strenuous exertions of the Commissariat to overcome the difficulties that presented themselves, *ib.*——Escape of the French army at Kamiesh from the infliction of badness of roads, *ib.*——How the want of a road between Balaklava and the camp operated in causing the difficulty and disaster that ensued, *ib.*——Cause of the alleged deficiency in the supply of rations to the troops in December 1854 explained, *ib.*——Condemnation by Lord Raglan of the system of returns sent in by commanding officers of regiments, of supplies obtained from the Commissariat, *ib.*——The rapid

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Filder, Commissary-general.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

rapid destruction of transport animals is mainly attributable to exposure and overwork; not from want of forage, *p.* 360.

Observations upon the question of sea carriage, *p.* 360——Means devised by the Commissariat for the supply of the troops in the Crimea with fresh meat, *ib.*——Loss of live cattle forwarded in sailing vessels from Varna, *ib.*——Superintendence of the Sea Transport Service by Admiral Boxer, *ib.*——Letter from Mr. Smith, the Deputy Commissary-general at Constantinople, in November 1854, stating the difficulty in procuring sailing transports for forage, owing to the recent disasters at sea, *p.* 360, 361——Complaint of the Assistant Commissary-general at Constantinople of Admiral Boxer, and of the masters and captains of vessels engaged by the Commissariat in the conveyance of provisions and forage to the army in the East, *ib.*——Difficulty of inducing owners of private ships to take freight for the Crimea after the storm of the 14th November, *p.* 360.

Inability of the parties who had contracted for supplying cattle for the army in the East, during the winter, to fulfil their engagements, *p.* 361——Letter from the Commissariat officer at Constantinople, dated 13 February 1855, stating the inability of the firm of Gamandgé and Falanza to fulfil their contract, *p.* 361, 362——Offer of the contractors to supply sheep in lieu of oxen, *p.* 362——Circumstance of the British Commissariat officer at Eupatoria giving over the cattle which he had in charge to the French and Turkish troops, who had arrived there in December without any supplies of fresh meat, or the means of providing any, *ib.*——Endeavours of the Commissariat to obtain supplies of cattle from Samsoon and Sinope, *ib.*——Bad quality of the cattle obtained from Sinope, *ib.*——Superiority of the cattle obtained from Wallachia and Moldavia, *ib.*——Importation of slaughtered meat, as well as live cattle, by the Commissariat, *p.* 362, 363.

Misapprehension of the Commissioners with regard to the supply of the troops in the Crimea with fuel, *p.* 363——Supply of the troops with charcoal by the Commissariat in December 1854, *ib.*——In all matters relating to fuel, the Commissary-general of an army in the field has only to obey the orders of the General Commanding-in-Chief, *ib.*——Impediment offered to obtaining supplies of firewood from the southern coast of the Black Sea, *ib.*——There never was at any time a want of fuel at Balaklava; the only difficulty was the means of conveying it to the front, *ib.*——Letter from Lord Raglan, dated 18 January 1855, directing the mules imported from Alicant and Malta to be employed in carrying up huts to the front, *ib.*——Had it not been for the appropriation of the mules, the quantity of fuel that they could have conveyed to the front would have been sufficient for the troops, *ib.*

Reasons of the deficiency of Commissariat transport animals in the Crimea for the service of the army, *p.* 363, 364——Necessity for long previous preparation to procure a transport power sufficient for a force such as the army in the East, *p.* 364——Manner in which the French provided themselves with fuel in the Crimea, *ib.*——Inability of the navy to meet the pressing demands upon them for the conveyance of fuel and forage for the army in the East, *ib.*——Degree of care and attention paid the Spanish mules belonging to the Commissariat department, *ib.*——Mortality among the Spanish mules from exposure and overwork, *ib.*——Dislike of the mules to carry huts, *ib.*——Contract entered into by the Commissariat for the supply of hay to be delivered in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, *p.* 365——Means adopted to ensure a supply of hay for the army in the Crimea on their proceeding thither, *ib.*

Dates of the requisitions and letters of the Commissary-general acquainting the Treasury of the deficiency of forage, and difficulty of obtaining it from Constantinople, *p.* 365——Evidence of Sir Charles Trevelyan before the Sebastopol Committee upon the subject of a supply of forage to the army in the East, *ib.*——Neglect of the Treasury to send out a sufficient supply of pressed hay to the Crimea, *p.* 366——Recourse had to chopped straw to forage the cavalry and baggage animals, *ib.*——Loss of 357 tons of hay in the hurricane of the 14 November, *ib.*——Extract from Sir Charles Trevelyan's pamphlet, relative to the supply of forage to the army in the East, *ib.*——Average consumption of hay per month of the army in the East, *p.* 367——Allusion made by Sir Charles Trevelyan as to the sufficiency of the supplies and stores shipped for the army in the East, *ib.*——Letter of the Commissary-general to the Treasury, dated 8th October 1854, urging them to send supplies of forage to the army in the East, *ib.*

Letter from the Commissary-general acquainting the Treasury of the loss of forage sustained by the storm of 14 November, and impracticability of obtaining a sufficient supply from Turkey, *p.* 368——Letter to the Treasury, dated 8th December, urging the shipment of pressed hay to the East, *ib.*——Letter from the Commissary-general to Sir Richard Airey, dated 14th December 1854, stating the impossibility of obtaining a sufficient supply of forage from Constantinople for the service of the army, *p.* 368, 369——Letter from the Commissary-general to the Under Secretary for War, dated 12th January 1855, representing the deficiency of the supply of forage for the army in the East, *p.* 369——Letter, dated 22d January, acquainting the Minister of War of the deficiency of the supplies of forage, and urging upon him to send a supply from England, *ib.*——Account given by Sir Charles Trevelyan of the quantity of hay shipped and sent out to the army in the East, *ib.*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Filder, Commissary-general.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Quantity of pressed hay received by the Commissariat in the Crimea up to the end of January 1855, *p.* 370——The shipments of hay ought to have been consecutive and immediate, and allowance should be made for the time occupied in the voyage, *ib.*——Accounts rendered the Commissary-general of arrival of shipments of stores and supplies at Constantinople, *ib.*——Explanation of the detention of the "Clyde" and "Helen" off Constantinople, laden with stores and forage for the army in the East, *ib.*——Exertions of Assistant Commissary-general Smith in forwarding supplies from Constantinople, *ib.*——Letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, dated 18th November 1854, announcing the shipment of hay in the "Belgravia," and promising a continuous supply, *ib.* Letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, dated 23d November 1854, intimating that dependence might be placed upon regular and ample supplies of hay and forage being sent out to the army in the East, *p.* 371——Difference in the quantity of hay stated by Sir Charles Trevelyan to have been sent out to the army in the East, and the quantity received by the Commissariat, *ib.*

Extent to which the supply of forage fell short of the demand contained in the requisitions of the Commissary-general, *p.* 371——Difficulty of landing other forage than compressed hay at Balaklava; the chopped straw was useless, as it could not be landed in sufficient time, *ib.*——Deficiency of storehouses at Balaklava, from the army having reached there before the supplies, *ib.*——Had the requisitions for hay been complied with, the deficiency of forage throughout the winter would have been prevented, *ib.*——Desire of Lord Raglan to have as much transport in the Crimea as possible; how prevented by the difficulty of feeding the animals during the winter, *p.* 372——Disappointment experienced by the Commissariat in the receipt of supplies of forage from the authorities in England, *ib.*——State of the supply of the troops up to the period of the storm of the 14th November, *ib.*——Impossibility of transporting unpressed forage for the use of the army in the Crimea, *ib.*——Importation of hydraulic presses and screw field presses from England for pressing and for loading forage from Constantinople, *ib.*

So far from being able to procure supplies of forage in the Black Sea, it was found necessary to send fodder from Constantinople for the cattle which were in depôt at Sinope, *p.* 372.——Inability of the Consul at Samsoon to furnish a supply of forage from the demand of the Turkish troops at Batoom having exhausted the supply, *ib.*——Contract made with the house of Valsamachy Brothers of Constantinople for a supply of chopped straw for the British army, *ib.*——It was the duty of the superintending department in England to have forwarded the supplies of forage in conformity with the requisitions of the Commissary-general, *ib.*——Letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, dated 2d April 1855, exonerating the Commissariat from all blame in the supply of forage to the army in the East, *ib.*——The season for making suitable arrangements for a supply of forage for the army had gone by, before it was determined that the troops should be encamped before Sebastopol for the winter, *p.* 373.

Strenuous endeavours made by the Commissariat to procure a sufficient supply of forage for the army in the East, and how frustrated, *p.* 373——Means taken by the Commissariat to supply the troops with vegetable food in the Crimea, *ib.*——Despatch of the "Harbinger" to Constantinople; reason of her cargo being damaged on arrival with supplies at Balaklava, *ib.*——Report of Deputy Commissary-general Drake on the damaged cargoes of vegetables that arrived in Balaklava Harbour, *ib.*——Large quantities of vegetables imported from Trieste and Venice, *ib.*——Unwillingness of the troops to take preserved potatoes when offered them, *p.* 373, 374——Cause of the non-issue of lime-juice to the troops generally, *p.* 374——Knowledge of Dr. Hall of the arrival of lime-juice from England, *ib.*——Steps taken to procure a supply of lime-juice from Malta and Sicily, *ib.*——Report of the Commissariat officer at Balaklava on the arrival of a cargo of lime-juice by the "Esk," *ib.*

Circumstance of the purveyor of medical stores taking away part of the cargo of lime-juice from the beach where it was landed, *p.* 375——Letter from the Commissary-general to the Adjutant-general, stating that it was not the department of the Commissary to provide lime-juice for the army, *ib.*——Desire of Lord Raglan that the Commissariat should in future provide lime-juice for the troops, *ib.*——Means devised by the Commissariat for supplying the troops with fresh bread, *ib.*——Want of a field bakery in the British army, *ib.*——Manner which the French provide their troops with fresh bread, *ib.*——Application made by the Commissary-general for a floating mill and bakery to be sent out from England to the Crimea, *ib.*——Copy of memorandum of the Commissary-general of the 6th November 1854, upon the necessity of securing a supply of flour for the winter, *p.* 375, 376.

Letter of the Commissary-general to the Commissariat officer at Constantinople, dated 6th November 1854, directing him to lay in a stock of flour to provide the troops with fresh bread during the winter, *p.* 376——The instructions to the Commissary-general, were to obey all orders that might be issued by Lord Raglan, *ib.*——Communications had with the Treasury and the Duke of Newcastle previous to leaving England, *ib.*——Number of men and horses given in to the Commissary-general as the number to be provided for, *ib.*——Nature of the supplies furnished by the Admiralty, *ib.*——The Commissariat

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Filder, Commissary-general.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Commissariat relied upon the forage of the country when the army arrived at Constantinople, *p.* 376——There was no difficulty in foraging the army up to the 14th November 1854, *p.* 376, 377——Refusal of the 49th Regiment to carry even a day's rations, *p.* 377——Authority given the Commissary-general by Lord Raglan to take all the forage from the transports except for a certain consumption, *ib.*

Inconvenience which the officers suffered from not having their provisions ready cooked, *p.* 377——Appointment of the Commissary-general to the army in the East, *ib.*——Insufficiency of the Commissariat staff under the Commissary-general in the Crimea, *p.* 377, 378——Desire of Sir Charles Trevelyan to keep up a Commissariat Establishment in England, *p.* 378——Until the army is certainly provided with a Commissariat in England, you never will be prepared for expeditions, *ib.*——Establishment of a Commissariat depôt at Constantinople, and depôts of forage in the immediate neighbourhood, *ib.*——The Commissariat had nothing whatever to do with the siege train beyond furnishing the ammunition animals, *ib.*——The French cavalry got pressed hay from Algeria, but they were 20 days without any forage at all, *ib.*——There was more hay and chopped straw on board ship in Balaklava harbour than could be landed and used, *ib.*——Minute of the Treasury under which the Commissary-general received his instructions, *p.* 379.

Frequent representations were made of the inadequacy of the Commissariat staff in the Crimea, *p.* 379——Names of the Commissariat officers in the Crimea who had had previous service with an army in the field, *ib.*——The duties of the Commissariat in the field and in the Colonies are quite different, *ib.*——After the battle of Balaklava the Commissariat were obliged to give up their spare transport to convey ammunition to the troops, *ib.*——Zeal and activity displayed by Admiral Boxer in forwarding all things connected with the Commissariat, *p.* 381——Quantity of forage forwarded by the War Department to the Crimea by order of Lord Panmure, *ib.*——Use made of the hydraulic and screw presses sent out from England to Turkey, *ib.*——Issue of supplies of tea to the troops from the Commissariat stores, *p.* 381, 382——Reason of the separation of the presses from the hay at Constantinople, *p.* 382——Issue of rice to the troops from the Commissariat stores; quantity issued, *ib.*——Excellent state of the Commissariat supplies in the Crimea in March 1855, *p*, 382, 383.

Erection of two ovens by Colonel Tulloch whilst in the Crimea, *p.* 383——State of the Commissariat supplies during the period of the Commissioners' stay with the army in the East, *ib.*——Issue of porter to the troops from the Commissariat stores, *ib.*——Arrival of the Commissioners in the Crimea when the difficulties of the Commissariat were at an end, *ib.*——Satisfactory manner in which the officers of the Commissariat discharged their duties in the Crimea, *ib.*——Injustice of the charge preferred against the Commissariat department by the Commissioners, *p.* 383, 384——Harsh treatment of the Commissary-general by the Commissioners, *p.* 384——Proportion of Commissariat officers required for each division of infantry, and each brigade of cavalry, *ib.*——Number of Commissariat officers employed in the Peninsula, *ib.*——Frequency of communications between Lord Raglan and the Commissary-general, *ib.*——Supply of salt meat furnished to the army in the East by the navy, *p.* 384, 385——Knowledge of Lord Raglan of the state of the Commissariat supplies of the army in the East, *p.* 385——Statement of salt meat received and issued by the Commissariat, *ib.*

Account of the present organisation of the Commissariat department, *p.* 385——Reason why the depôt at Malta was never established, *ib.*——Advantage of Constantinople as a depôt over Malta, *ib.*——Circumstance of the Duke of Cambridge ordering twenty-one ammunition ponies to be killed, as he had no means of feeding them, *p.* 385, 386——Means adopted by the Commissariat to keep possession of the stacks of forage on their arrival before Sebastopol, *p.* 386——Degree of responsibility attaching to the Commissariat department for the custody of Quartermaster-general's stores; articles coming under that denomination, *ib.*——Purchase of coffee-mills by the Commissariat for the troops in the Crimea, *p.* 386, 387——Delay in sending out roasted coffee to the army in the East from England, *p.* 387——Accessibility of the Commissary-general to Lord Raglan upon all occasions, *ib.*——Denial of the Commissary-general of drawing largely upon the Quartermaster-general's stores in the Crimea, *p.* 387, 388.

Occasion of the Quartermaster-general's stores being turned over to the custody of the Commissariat, *p.* 388——How issues were made from the Commissariat to the troops in the Peninsula, *ib.*——Advantage of a separate storekeeper's department for Quartermaster-general's stores in the Crimea, *ib.*——Deficiency of forage for the army in the East owing to the requisition of the Commissary-general to the Treasury at home not having been attended to, *p.* 388, 389——Sufficiency of the supply of chopped straw at Balaklava, but difficulty of landing it, *p.* 389——Process of landing chopped straw; bales were made for the purpose, *ib.*——Comparison of the supplies of forage sent out by Sir Charles Trevelyan and the supplies sent out by the War Office, *ib.*——Lord Raglan was constantly urging the necessity for more transport for the Commissariat, *ib.*——Despatch of a party of officers to Eupatoria to purchase transport animals, *ib.*——Reason of the Commissariat being unable to keep up an efficient transport, *p.* 389,390.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Filder, Commissary-general.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Want of horse transports for the conveyance of animals from Constantinople and Varna, *p.* 390——Mode of obtaining sea transport by the Commissariat department, *ib.*——Constant complaint of the Commissary-general of being unable to get forage from England, *p.* 390, 391——Description of animals purchased at Eupatoria by Lord Raglan's orders, *p.* 391——Endeavour made to procure Indian corn straw from Malta, *ib.*——Difference in the tonnage measurement required for pressed hay, and for unpressed hay, *ib.*——Despatch of a set of presses by Sir Charles Trevelyan for the use of the army in the East, *ib.*——Assurance given by Sir Charles Trevelyan that ample supplies of hay should be sent out to the Crimea, *ib.*——There was no difficulty in sending out hay when Lord Panmure came into office, *p.* 391, 392——Directions given to Captain Christie to place the horse transports at Balaklava at the service of the Commissary-general, *p.* 392.

Cognisance taken by the Commissariat department of hospital stores for the service of the army, *p.* 392——Sufficiency of the transport animals in the Crimea up to the period of the storm of 14th November 1854, *p.* 392——Animals could have been obtained after that period could the Commissariat have found transport for them and food for them, *p.* 392, 393.

*Filder, Commissary-general:*

1. *Consideration of his Case.*
2. *Supply of the Cavalry Brigade.*
3. *Papers laid before the Board of General Officers.*

1. *Consideration of his Case:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers on Mr. Commissary-general Filder's case, with reasons for arriving at the conclusion that his conduct in the management of his department was not justly liable to the unfavourable animadversion, either expressed or implied, which is conveyed in the Report of the Commissioners, *Rep.* xx-xxix.

2. *Supply of the Cavalry Brigade:*

Admission of Mr. Commissary-general Filder, that the baggage animals were fed before the other animals belonging to the army, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 10——Dissatisfactory manner in which Mr. Commissary-general Filder supplied the horses of the cavalry with forage, *ib. p.* 38, 39——Occasion of Mr. Commissary-general Filder representing to Lord Raglan that the Heavy Cavalry Brigade had actually left the fodder on the wharf, when they could have removed it, *ib. p.* 44——Refusal of Mr. Commissary-general Filder to allow any arrears of food to be made good to the cavalry, *ib.*

Statement of Mr. Commissary-general Filder in reply to the observations made by Lord Lucan of the neglect of the Commissary-general to supply the Cavalry Brigade with forage, *p.* 117, 125——Request of Mr. Commissary-general Filder that answers to letters written by Lord Lucan to various officers should be laid before the Board, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 117——Statement of Mr. Commissary-general Filder as to the extent of forage rations supplied for the chargers and baggage animals belonging to Lord Lucan and his staff in the month of August, *ib. p.* 117——No instance ever heard or known of Mr. Commissary-general Filder objecting to supply transports on the ground that the duty was not within his department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237.

3. *Papers laid before the Board of General Officers:*

Copies of correspondence given in evidence by Commissary-general Filder, 17th April 1856, *App.* 528——Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Deputy Commissary-general Smith, dated Balaklava, 28th January 1855, urging supplies of forage to be forwarded by every practicable means, *ib.* 533——Copies of correspondence relating to the supply of lime-juice to the army before Sebastopol, dated 15th, 16th, and 18th February 1855, *ib.* 533, 534——Extracts from semi-official letters, &c., quoted by Commissary-general Filder, C. B., before the Board of General Officers at Chelsea, *ib.* 585——Copy of a letter from Commissary-general Filder, covering remarks on those parts of the Report of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch which relate to the duties of the Commissariat Department, *ib.* 562-584——Letters from Commissary-general Filder to Sir C. Trevelyan, urging the necessity of sending out hay, &c., from England, *ib.* 595–597.

*See* also *Commissariat Department. Commissary-general.*

*Fire at Varna.* The great fire at Varna occurred in August, by which a vast amount of corn was lost, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 117.

*Firewood.* Impediment to obtaining a supply of firewood from the southern coasts of the Black Sea, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 363.

*First Dragoon Guards.* Complaint by Colonel Tulloch as to a paragraph in the "Times," as to the date at which this regiment was in the Crimea, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 105.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*First (Royal) Dragoons:*

1. *Arrival in the Crimea.*
2. *Supply of Warm Clothing.*
3. *Hutting of the Men.*

1. *Arrival in the Crimea:*

A portion of the regiment was at Balaklava on the 1st October 1854, but the head quarters did not arrive till the 5th, *Colonel Yorke, p.* 106——Extract of letter published in the "Times" relative to the landing of the Royal Dragoons, and the Enniskillen Dragoons in the Crimea, *Colonel Yorke, p.* 107.

2. *Supply of Warm Clothing:*

Reason of the First Dragoons remaining without their warm clothing so long after the order had been given for them to be supplied, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 259——Date of order for supply of blankets to the First Dragoons; cause of delay, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 268.

3. *Hutting of the Men:*

Date of commencement and completion of hutting of the First Royal Dragoons, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 112.

*Flank March.* Circumstances which caused the flank march; re-establishment of the communication with the fleet cut off, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 266.

*Fleet, The.* Opportunities of obtaining sail-cloth and ships' sails from the fleet in the Black Sea to shelter the cavalry horses, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 54, 55; *Rawlinson, p.* 80; *Bracebridge, p.* 83——Evidence of Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons relative to the assistance rendered the army in the Crimea by the fleet off Sebastopol, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 147–154——The portion of the fleet under witness's command was fully manned, *Admiral Deans Dundas, p.* 306——Number of ships of the line at Kazatch Bay, Balaklava, and Eupatoria, *ib. p.* 307.

*See* also *Artificers. Black Sea Fleet. Carpenters. Naval Brigade.*

*Floating Mill.* Application made by the Commissary-general for a floating mill and bakery to be sent out from England to supply the troops in the Crimea with fresh bread, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 375.

*Flour.* Copy of memorandum of the Commissary-general, dated 6 November 1854, upon the necessity of securing a supply of flour for the winter, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 375, 376——Letter from the Commissary-general to the Commissariat office at Constantinople, directing him to lay in a stock of flour, *ib.* 376.

*Food.* Imputations cast upon the Commissariat of having supplied the troops with expensive and unhealthy food, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 356——Statement of the different articles of diet issued from the Commissariat depôt at Balaklava, from the 1st to the 15th March 1855, *App.* 534.

*See* also *Biscuit. Bread. Fresh Meat. Preserved Potatoes. Rations. Rice. Salt Meat. Slaughtered Meat. Vegetables.*

*Forage:*

1. *Employment of Cavalry on Forage Duty.*
2. *Deficiency of Supplies.*
3. *Horse Transports.*
4. *Supplies from England.*
5. *Pressed Hay.*
6. *French Cavalry.*
7. *Russian Army.*
8. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Employment of Cavalry on Forage Duty:*

Circumstances attending the refusal of Lord Cardigan to allow the horses of the Light Brigade to fetch up forage from Balaklava, *Rep.* vi–viii; *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 203–208.

Employment of the cavalry horses of the Heavy Brigade on forage duty, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 26——Reason for not sending the troop horses of the cavalry for forage, *Colonel Doherty, p.* 34——Difficulty of obtaining forage and supplies at Balaklava had the troop horses been sent to fetch them, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 204, 205——Circumstance of application being made to Lords Lucan and Cardigan to allow the troop horses of the Light Cavalry to be sent down to Balaklava to fetch forage, and refusal, *Crookshank, p.* 208, 209.

Denial of Lord Lucan that Mr. Commissary-general Crookshank ever applied to him for permission for the troop horses of the Light Brigade to be sent down to Balaklava for forage, *Crookshank p.* 210——Parties were constantly sent from the Heavy Brigade into Balaklava for forage, *General Scarlett, p.* 214——Circumstance of application being made to send down the troop horses of the Light Brigade to bring up forage from Balaklava, *Colonel*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*FORAGE*—continued.

1. *Employment of Cavalry on Forage Duty*—continued.

*Colonel Low, p.* 227, 228——Reason for not making any application for the Light Cavalry Brigade to be sent to Balaklava for forage, *Colonel Doherty, p.* 216, 217——Lord Cardigan could not have detached any portion of his force to bring up forage, without first obtaining the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 219.

2. *Deficiency of Supplies:*

Observations of the Board upon the deficiency of fodder for the animals of the army in the Crimea during the winter of 1854–55, *Rep.* xxvi, xxvii——Complaint made to Lord Raglan on the morning of the battle of the Alma of the cavalry horses having been left deficient of forage, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 40——Great complaints of the want of forage for animals in the Crimea of every description, and means resorted to in order to obtain supplies, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 33——Insufficiency of the supply of forage for the cavalry horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 38——Suggestion of Lord Lucan to Mr. Commissary-general Filder, with a view of procuring forage for the cavalry horses, *ib. p.* 38, 39——Difficulty attending the foraging of the Light Cavalry Brigade at Inkermann from the great distance from the stores, *ib. p.* 42.

Opinion of Lord Lucan that the horses of the cavalry were not properly fed any one day that they were under his command, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 37——Refusal of Mr. Commissary-general Filder to allow arrears of food to the cavalry to be made good, *ib. p.* 44——Facilities of obtaining food for horses from Constantinople when short of hay in the Crimea, *Bracebridge, p.* 83, 84——Reasons assigned for the deficiency of forage supplied to the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 48, 49——Full rations were issued for the chargers and baggage animals belonging to Lord Lucan and his staff throughout the entire month of August, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 117, 118——Difficulty of procuring forage for the Light Cavalry Brigade when stationed at Inkermann, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 198——Evidence of Mr. Commissary-general Crookshank, respecting the impossibility of supplying hay to the Light Cavalry Brigade stationed on the heights of Inkermann, *ib. p.* 200, 201.

Reports of the Brigade Major, Colonel Mayow, on the deficiency of the supply of hay and corn for the Light Cavalry Brigade in November 1854, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 201——Loss among the horses in the cavalry and artillery from deficiency of forage and other privations, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 108——For the Allies, after the 25th October, there was not one load of hay but what had to be brought, with infinite delay and difficulty, from distant shores, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 262——State of the supply of the troops with forage up to the period of the storm of the 14th November 1854, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 372——There was more hay and chopped straw on board ship in Balaklava harbour than could be landed and used, *ib.* 378.

3. *Horse Transports:*

Examination as to the supply of forage on board the horse transports, *Captain Milne, p.* 315–318——Evidence upon Lord Raglan's order for appropriating the surplus forage on board the transports beyond six weeks' supply to the use of the army, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 326——It was the duty of the principal naval agent of transports to see that the forage was on board the horse transport vessels, *ib. p.* 292——Authority given the Commissary-general by Lord Raglan to take all the forage from the transports, except for a certain consumption, *ib.* 377.

4. *Supplies from England:*

The forage of the Levant being chiefly chopped straw, an article not compressible for sea transport, the Commissary-general was obliged to rest much upon England for hay, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238——The grievous hardships and the loss of the winter of 1854–55 would have been averted, had the hay ordered from England in the early part of September been duly forwarded upon the receipt of the requisition, *ib.*——Letter from the Commissary-general to the Treasury, dated 8th October 1854, urging them to send out a supply of forage to the army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 367.

Disappointment experienced by the Commissariat in the receipt of supplies of forage from the authorities in England, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 372——So far from being able to procure supplies of forage from ports in the Black Sea, it was found necessary to send fodder from Constantinople for the cattle which were in depôt at Sinope, *ib. p.* 372——It was the duty of the superintending department in England to have forwarded supplies of forage in conformity with the requisitions of the Commissary-general, *ib.*

The season for making suitable arrangements for a supply of forage for the army in the East had gone by before it was determined that the troops should winter before Sebastopol, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 373——The Commissariat relied upon the forage of the country when the army arrived at Constantinople; there was no difficulty in foraging the troops up to the 14th November 1854, *ib. p.* 376, 377——Quantity of forage forwarded by the War department to the Crimea, by order of Lord Panmure, *ib. p.* 381.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Forage*—continued.

4. *Supplies from England*—continued.

Comparison of the supplies of forage sent out to the army in the East by Sir Charles Trevelyan, and the supplies sent out by the War department, *Commissary-general, Filder, p.* 389——Constant complaint of the Commissary-general of being unable to get forage from England, *ib. p.* 390——Assurances given by Sir Charles Trevelyan that ample supplies of hay should be sent out to the Crimea, *ib. p.* 391.

5. *Pressed Hay:*

Difficulty of landing other forage than compressed hay at Balaklava; the chopped straw was useless, as it could not be landed in sufficient time, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 371——Impossibility of transporting unpressed forage for the use of the army in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 372.

6. *French Cavalry:*

The French cavalry got pressed hay from Algeria; but they were 20 days without any forage at all, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 378.

7. *Russian Army:*

Before the autumn of 1854 the Russian stacks of forage were miles and miles in length, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 262.

8. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Statement of forage drawn by the several regiments of the cavalry division from the 4th to 16th December 1854, inclusive, *App.* 529——Similar statement from the 17th December 1854 to 10th January 1855, *ib.* 531——Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Deputy Commissary-general Smith, dated Balaklava, 28th January 1855, urging supplies of forage to be forwarded by every practicable means, *ib.* 533——Statement of Sir C. E. Trevelyan in explanation of the arrangements made by the Treasury in reference to the supply of forage for the army in the Crimea, *ib.* 544-551.

*See* also *Ammunition Animals. Barley. Cavalry. Chopped Straw. Commissariat Department. Deficiency of Supplies. Hay. Horses. Linseed. Oats. Pressed Hay. Transport Service. Trevelyan, Sir Charles.*

*Forest, Colonel.* Answers of Colonel Forest, of the 4th Dragoon Guards, respecting the period of the commencement and completion of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 51.

*Forms.* Sir Richard Airey distinctly impressed upon witness the necessity of not being bound by any forms of duty in the issue of warm clothing, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 268.

*Forty-ninth Regiment.* Refusal of the 49th Regiment to carry even a day's rations, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 377.

*Forty-sixth Regiment.* Blankets supplied to; explanation of Evidence before the Commissioners thereon, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

*Fountains.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 28 July 1854, prohibiting women belonging to the regiments of cavalry washing in the troughs near the different fountains, *App.* 421.

*Fourth Division:*

1. *Privations of the Men.*
2. *Supply of Blankets.*

1. *Privations of the Men:*

Reason of the privations of the men being so mainly experienced by the Fourth Division of the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 256.

2. *Supply of Blankets:*

Explanation of the Evidence given before the Commissioners as to the supply of blankets to this division, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.——*See* also *Cathcart, Sir George.*

*Fourth Dragoon Guards:*

1. *Hutting of the Men.*
2. *Mortality amongst the Horses.*
3. *Disposable Men.*

1. *Hutting of the Men:*

Commencement and completion of the hutting this regiment, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 51; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 112.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Fourth Dragoon Guards*—continued.

2. *Mortality amongst the Horses:*

During the twelve days that followed their marching down to Kadekoi the 4th Dragoon Guards did not lose a single horse, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 114.

3. *Disposable Men:*

Statement showing the number of disposable men of the 4th Dragoon Guards on the 16th December 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 186.——*See* also *Forest, Colonel.*

*Fourth Light Dragoons:*

1. *Hutting of the Men.*
2. *Disposable Men.*
3. *Completion of Stabling.*

1. *Hutting of the Men:*

Date at which the hutting commenced and at which all were hutted, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 112.

2. *Disposable Men:*

Statement showing the number of disposable men of the 4th Light Dragoons on the 16th December 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 187.

3. *Completion of Stabling:*

Doubts as to the period of completion of the stables of the 4th Light Dragoons; how accounted for, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190.

*Freeth, General.* Extract from correspondence between Sir R. Airey and General Freeth, the Quartermaster-general in England, on the subject of the reserve depôt for camp stores supposed to be formed at Malta, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 264——Extract of a letter from Major-general Freeth to Lord De Ros, dated Horse Guards, 8 June 1854, with reference to the reserve stores of the army in the East, *App.* 500.

*French Army.* The French landed in the Crimea with no transport animals at all, except for their ambulance, and they only obtained a small number in the country near the landing-place, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241——Advantage of the manner in which French soldiers carry their weight over the plan adopted by the English, *ib. p.* 264——Peremptory instructions received from home to bring up the French troops immediately; many vessels went at once, taking the knapsacks with them, *ib. p.* 266——Escape of the French army, at Kamiesch from the infliction of bad roads, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 359——Manner in which the French army provided their troops with fresh bread in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 375.

*French Batteries.* It was nothing but the disastrous explosion in the French batteries that prevented the assault upon Sebastopol on the 17th October 1854, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242.

*French Cavalry.* Means adopted by the French Cavalry to afford temporary shelter to their horses, *Colonel Douglas, p.* 60——Unsheltered state of the French Cavalry in the Crimea; loss of 70 horses in two nights out of 120, *Sir R. Airey p.* 104——Manner in which the French Cavalry treated their troop horses in the Crimea, *Major Conolly, p.* 156——Employment of the French Cavalry in carrying paving stones to pave the stables of the troop horses, *Colonel Low, p.* 160——The French Cavalry got pressed hay from Algeria, but they were twenty days without any forage at all, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 378.——*See* also *Chasseurs d'Afrique.*

*Fresh Bread.* Observations of the Board of General Officers on the supply of Fresh bread, by the Commissariat, for the use of the army in the Crimea, during the winter of 1854–55, *Rep.* xxiv, xxv.——*See* also *Bakery. Bread. Floating Mill. Ovens.*

*Fresh Meat.* Remarks of the Board upon the supply of fresh meat by the Commissariat for the army in the East, during the winter of 1854–55, *Rep.* xxiii, xxiv——Supply of the troops with fresh meat during the period of their stay in Bulgaria, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 358——Means devised by the Commissariat for the supply of the troops in the Crimea with fresh meat, *ib. p.* 360.

Inability of the parties at Constantinople, who had contracted to supply the army with live cattle during the winter, to fulfil their engagements, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 361——Circumstance of the British Commissariat officer at Eupatoria making over to the French and Turkish troops the live cattle which he had in charge, *ib. p.* 362——Statement of the quantities of salt and fresh meat issued by Commissariat to the troops in the Crimea, in the months of March, April, and May 1855, *App.* 538, 539.

*See* also *Cattle. Live Stock. Slaughtered Meat.*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Frost.* Injury done to the cavalry horses by the frost in the Crimea, *Colonel Griffiths*, *p.* 30——Evidence of Colonel Yea respecting the men of the 7th Fusiliers becoming frost-bitten from their want of serviceable boots, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 257.

*Fuel.* Observations of the Board of General Officers on the supply of fuel to the troops in the Crimea, during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* xxv, xxvi——Fuel could not be obtained to cook the men's food, *Colonel Wetherall*, *p.* 282, 283——Directions given to the Commissary-general, by Lord Raglan, to lay in a stock of fuel at Scutari, *Commissary-general Filder*, *p.* 358——Misapprehension of the Commissioners of Inquiry with regard to the supply of the troops in the Crimea with fuel, *ib. p.* 363——In all matters relating to fuel, the Commissary-general has only to obey the orders of the General Commanding-in-chief, *ib.*

Had it not been for the appropriation of the mules, the quantity of fuel that they could have conveyed to the front would have been sufficient for the troops, *Commissary-general Filder*, *p.* 363——There never was at any time a want of fuel at Balaklava; the only difficulty was the means of conveying it to the front, *ib. p.* 363——Manner in which the French army provided itself with fuel in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 364——Copy of Divisional Order of Major general the Earl of Lucan, dated 27 June 1854, directing the cavalry to be supplied with the best fuel that can be procured, *App.* 417.

*See* also *Charcoal.* *Firewood.* *Wood.*

G.

*Gamandge & Falanza, Messrs.* Letter from the Commissariat-office at Constantinople, announcing the inability of Messrs. Gamandge & Falanza to fulfil their engagements, *Commissary-general Filder*, *p.* 361.

"*Gauntlet*," *The Ship.* Letter from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 18 April 1855, stating that blankets and camp equipage for 2,000 tents had been put on board the "Gauntlet," on the point of sailing for Balaklava, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 245.

*General Orders.* How far the notification of extra clothing, &c., being in store was made the subject of a general order, *Colonel Wetherall*, *p.* 289——Copy of general order, Sebastopol, 17 November 1855, on Sir Richard Airey's leaving the Crimea, *App.* 467——Copy of general after order, dated Head Quarters, before Sebastopol, 14 November 1854, upon the subject of the badness of the roads between Balaklava and the lines, *ib.* 552.

*General Staff.* Copy of General Simpson's report to Lord Raglan, dated 26 April 1855, on the composition of the general staff of the army in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 234, 235——Letter, dated Head Quarters, Crimea, 26 April 1855, from Major-general Simpson to Field Marshal Lord Raglan, as to the composition of the general staff, *App.* 467, 468.

*Generals of Division:*

1. *Soldiers' Knapsacks.*
2. *Issue of Stores.*

1. *Soldiers' Knapsacks:*

Disinclination of the Generals of Division that the knapsacks should be restored to the men, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 253——How far they had the means of getting the knapsacks if they had pleased, *ib. p.* 265.

2. *Issue of Stores:*

Manner in which the quantities of stores drawn by the troops depended on the Generals of Division, and as to their being able to spare their men for the purpose, *Colonel Wetherall*, *p.* 269, 270.

*See* also *Cathcart, Sir George.* *Divisional Orders.* *Documentary Evidence.* *Lucan, Lieutenant-general the Earl of.*

*Geography.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field to acquire the fullest information that he can as to the geography of the country which is the theatre of war, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 235.

*Gordon, Captain, R. E.* Occasion of Lord Lucan applying to Captain Gordon to supply an engineer officer to superintend the construction of cavalry stables, *Colonel Gordon*, *p.* 23; *Earl of Lucan*, *p.* 188——Reason assigned by Captain Gordon for not being able to spare an engineer officer to superintend the erection of stables for the cavalry, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 32——Occasion of Captain Gordon receiving orders to place an engineer officer at Lord Lucan's disposal, *ib. p.* 90.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Gordon, Colonel the Honourable Alexander, C. B.* Examination of Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon, C.B., before the Board of General Officers, respecting the placing at the disposal of Lord Lucan an engineer officer to assist in the construction of stabling for the cavalry horses, during the winter of 1854-55, in the Crimea, *p.* 23, 24——Further examination of Colonel Gordon as to a previous examination with regard to temporary stables and hutting in the Crimea, *p.* 105, 106.

Further examination of Colonel Gordon with reference to Colonel Wetherall's evidence, *p.* 379, 380——Letter from Colonel Tulloch, dated 16 August 1855, upon the subject of printing the evidence taken before Commissioners, *p.* 380.

Further examination relative to horse transports being placed at the disposal of the Commissary-general of the Army in the East, *p.* 392.

Further statement of Colonel Gordon in answer to Captain Heath's statement relative to the manner in which the business of the department of Agent for Transports at Balaklava was conducted, *p.* 396, 397——Importance of the Agent for Transports having an office on shore; sufferings of the sick and wounded from the omission, *p.* 397——Opinion in favour of an Agent for Transports being of the merchant service rather than the navy; evidence of Admiral Dundas in support of that opinion, *ib.*

Inconvenience to which General Airey was put from the Agent for Transports at Balaklava residing on board of a man-of-war, *p.* 397——Difficulty of access to the Agent for Transports on board a man-of-war, in Cossack Bay, *p.* 398——Application made to Captain Heath, Agent for Transports at Balaklava, for a vessel, on the day of the attack on the Mamelon, and the White Works, and the Quarries, *p.* 399——Refusal of Captain Heath to report to the Assistant Quartermaster-general, *ib.*——Circumstances under which the evidence, complaining of the Agent for Transports at Balaklava, was given before the Commissioners, *p.* 401.

GORDON, COLONEL THE HONOURABLE ALEXANDER, C. B.:

1. *Consideration of his Case.*
2. *Evidence given before the Commissioners of Inquiry.*
3. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Consideration of his Case:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers on the case of Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon; the alterations of his evidence given before the Commissioners, and insertion of statements in the report of the Commissioners which he never made, *Rep.* xv-xix.

2. *Evidence given before the Commissioners of Inquiry:*

Explanation given by Colonel Gordon of the correction of Colonel Wetherall's evidence taken before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea, *p.* 249, 250——Letter from Colonel Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, dated 4 June 1855, upon the subject of General Airey's evidence, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 251.

Statement by Colonel Tulloch that Colonel Gordon, having Colonel Wetherall's evidence sent to him for correction, did not communicate with that officer, but sent the evidence back in the same state without remark, leaving the Commissioners to imagine that it had been corrected, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 277——Statement of Colonel the Hon. Alexander Gordon relative to his correction of his own and Colonel Wetherall's evidence taken before the Commissioners, *p.* 343-356.

3. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Letter from Colonel Gordon to the Judge Advocate-general, 22 May 1856, returning the original notes of the examination of Colonel Wetherall and Colonel Gordon, *App.* 512——Letter of Colonel Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, given in evidence by Colonel Tulloch, dated Quartermaster-general's Office, Sebastopol, 4 June 1855, *App.* 521——Remarks of Colonel Gordon in reply to Colonel Tulloch's memorandum of 16 May 1856, *ib.* 523——Letter from Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, dated Quartermaster-general's Office, before Sebastopol, 4 June 1855, given in evidence by Colonel Tulloch, 25 April 1856, *ib.* 604, 605.

*Gordon, General Sir Willoughby.* Experience of General Sir Willoughby Gordon as Quartermaster-general for many years of the British army, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 253——Answers of Sir Willoughby Gordon to queries submitted to him by the Commissioners on the Civil Administration of the Army in 1837, relative to Quartermaster-general's stores, *ib. p.* 253, 254.

*Goss, Lieutenant, R. N.* Services performed by Lieutenant Goss, of the Royal Navy, in superintending the embarkation of the sick and wounded, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 153——Letter from Lieutenant Goss, of H. M. Ship "Hibernia," dated 31st March 1846, with reference to the embarkation of the sick at Balaklava, and the attention of the agent for transports to their wants, *Captain Heath, p.* 395, 396——Letters from Lieu-

tenant

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Goss, Lieutenant,* R. N.—continued.

tenant Goss to Captain Heath, R. N., Malta, 31st March 1856; from Lieutenant Scott to Captain Heath, Balaklava, 7th April 1856; Sir R. Airey to Lieutenant Scott, Crimea, 17th November 1855; and an extract from Instructions from Sir Edmund Lyons to Captain Heath as principal Agent of Transports, *App.* 525.

*GOVERNMENT:*

1. *Approval of the Commissioners' Report.*
2. *Sacrifice of the Army.*

1. *Approval of the Commissioners' Report:*

Approval of Government of the Report of Sir J. M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch on the Crimean Inquiry, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 48——Examination of Colonel Tulloch relative to his statement of the Government approving of the Report of the Commissioners, *ib. p.* 147——Approval expressed by the head of Her Majesty's Government of the conduct of the Commissioners throughout their investigations, *ib. p.* 174.

2. *Sacrifice of the Army:*

The object of the Crimean Commissioners' Report was to absolve the Government from the charge of sacrificing the finest army that ever left England, through their apathy and negligence, and real want of ingenuity and promptitude, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 193.

*See* also *Palmerston, Lord.* *Panmure, Lord.*

*GREAT COATS:*

1. *Requisitions for Great Coats.*
2. *Supply of Great Coats.*
3. *Climate of the Crimea.*
4. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Requisitions for Great Coats:*

Remarks of the Board of General Officers upon the issue of great coats to the men of the army in the Crimea, through the Quartermaster-general's office, *Rep.* xii——Duty of the Quartermaster-general's department with respect to countersigning requisitions for the distribution of great coats to the men, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 254, 255——The requisitions duly sanctioned by the Quartermaster-general's department were thousands in advance of the deliveries, *ib. p.* 260——There never was at any moment the smallest difficulty in obtaining an approved requisition for the great coats required; the difficulty was to carry them to the front, *ib. p.* 259——Observations upon the elaborate description of the War Office form of requisition for obtaining a new great coat; error of the Commissioners of Inquiry, that the same form was requisite in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 258.

2. *Supply of Great Coats:*

Measures taken by the Quartermaster-general's department to ensure a speedy and regular supply of great coats to the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 256——Answer to the charge in the Commissioners' Report as to the non-issue of great coats in November and December, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 288——Great coats were given to any man who asked for them; there was a quantity came from Varna that had been in wear, *Boyd, p.* 309——No recollection of great coats being at any time refused; old coats, not taken into store, were issued, *ib. p.* 313.

3. *Climate of the Crimea:*

The men would have suffered very much on the first night of landing if they had only had the great coat without the blankets, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 264.

4. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Form of requisition for new great coats for the army, *App.* 469——Statement of great coats which have been lost by deserters from the army in the East, *ib.* 470——Return of great coats which have been lost or destroyed by neglect, and the value charged, *ib.*——Tabular statement of great coats issued and received by the regiments of the army in the East, *ib.* 471.

*Greeks.* The Greeks were known to be disaffected to our cause, *Filder, p.* 289——Almost all the artificers at Constantinople were Greeks, who were prohibited from coming to Balaklava, *ib.*

*Green Coffee.* Observations of the Board upon the circumstance of the troops in the Crimea being supplied with coffee in a green state, *Rep.* xxv.

*Grenadier Guards.* Answer to evidence before Commissioners as to supply of blankets to the men of the Grenadier Guards, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

*Grey, Admiral.* Circumstance of Admiral Grey being obliged to send to Malta for ships' carpenters for the Black Sea fleet, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 149, 150.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*GRIFFITHS, COLONEL DARBY:*

1. *Examination before the Board.*
2. *Threatened Arrest.*
3. *Hutting of the Troops.*
4. *Shelter for Horses.*

1. *Examination before the Board:*

Declined to be examined before the Board of General Officers without certain papers to refer to, to refresh his memory, *p.* 21——Further examination of Colonel Darby Griffiths respecting the condition of the cavalry horses on 5 December 1854, and the means resorted to in order to afford them temporary shelter, *p.* 75-77.

2. *Threatened Arrest:*

Circumstance of Lord Lucan threatening to place Colonel Griffiths under arrest for complaining of the state of the cavalry stores, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 27-31——Unfair inference that what passed between the Earl of Lucan and Colonel Griffiths had the effect of deterring other cavalry officers from doing their duty, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 108——His statement ought to have been supported by Lord William Paulett, Colonel Hodge, and others, *ib. p.* 109——Had the Commissioners entered into the charge of Colonel Griffiths against the Earl of Lucan, they would have exceeded their instructions by inquiring into the conduct of officers, *ib. p.* 115——Circumstances attending the altercation with Colonel Griffiths, when witness threatened to place him under arrest, *ib. p.* 176.

3. *Hutting of the Troops:*

Answer of Lieutenant-colonel Griffiths, of the Second Dragoons, respecting the period of the commencement and completion of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 51.

4. *Shelter for Horses:*

Observations upon the evidence of Colonel Griffiths relative to the means taken for affording shelter to the horses of the cavalry during the winter of 1854-55, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 168, 169. 173——Observations with respect to the statement of the Commissioners, that Colonel Griffiths proposed to erect, with the assistance of his men, some sort of cover for the horses of his corps, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 181.

*Guards.* Number of guards in the trenches, and with working and covering parties in the middle of December, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 270.——*See* also *Grenadier Guards.*

## H.

*Hacket, Major John.* Evidence upon the difficulty of procuring artificers for the Crimea, and upon the impossibility of getting canvas, *p.* 331, 332.

*Hair.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 29 May 1854, respecting officers and men wearing their hair, *App.* 416.

*Hall, Dr.* Report of Dr. Hall, the head of the medical department, on the damage done to the hospital marquees by the storm of the 14th November, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 244——Knowledge of Dr. Hall of the arrival of lime-juice from England, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 374.

*Hall, Major.* Appointment of Major Hall, of the Engineers, to superintend the construction of stables for the cavalry in the Crimea, during the winter of 1854-55, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 11. 188——Readiness with which materials were supplied through Major Hall for the construction of the cavalry stables, *ib. p.* 15——Memorandum from Brigadier Hall, dated Kertch, 29 April 1856, *App.* 607.

*"Harbinger," The Ship.* Despatch of the "Harbinger" to Constantinople for vegetables for the troops in the Crimea; reason of the cargo being damaged on arrival with supplies at Balaklava, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 373.

*Hardinge, Lord.* It was not until just before the army embarked for the Crimea that Lord Hardinge took up the principle of the squad bags, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 265.

*Harpley, Matthew T.* Report of Matthew T. Harpley, veterinary surgeon of the Royal Artillery, on the state of the ammunition animals, *App.* 533.

*Hawes, Sir Benjamin, K.C.B.* Letter dated War Department, 19 May 1856, from Sir B. Hawes to the Judge Advocate-general, enclosing a return of transport and ambulance animals foraged in the Crimea, *App.* 459——Letter from Sir Benjamin Hawes, dated War Department, 13 May 1856, transmitting Returns called for by Commissary-general Filder as to the shipments of hay for the army in the East, *ib.* 586.

Report, 1856—*continued*.

*Hawkins, Lieutenant, R.N.* Valuable assistance rendered by Lieutenant Hawkins, of the Royal Navy, in forwarding ammunition to the front, under peculiar difficulties, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 153.

*HAY*:

1. *Supply from England.*
2. *Allowance to Horses.*
3. *Deficiency of the Supply in the Crimea.*
4. *Commissariat Contracts.*
5. *Pressed Hay.*
6. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Supply from England:*

Account of the shipments of hay actually made from England up to the end of January 1855, *Rep.* xxviii——Disappointment of the Commissary-general in not receiving a quantity of pressed hay from England, which had been promised, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 33——Delay in sending out hay from England to the seat of war, in the month of November 1854, *ib. p.* 238——It was not till the month of June 1855 that the requisition for 2,000 tons of hay in the early part of September previous was completely complied with, *ib.*——Difference in the quantity of hay stated by Sir Charles Trevelyan to have been sent out to the army in the East, and the quantity received by the Commissariat, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 371——Had the requisitions of the Commissary-general for hay been complied with, the deficiency of forage throughout the winter would have been prevented, *ib.*——There was no difficulty in sending out hay to the troops in the Crimea when Lord Panmure came into office, *ib. p.* 391, 392.

2. *Allowance to Horses:*

Circumstance of the artillery being allowed 10 lbs. of hay per day whilst the cavalry were restricted to 8 lbs., *Earl of Lucan, p.* 40, 41——Rate of allowance of hay to the cavalry and artillery horses in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 43——Average consumption of hay per month of the army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 367.

3. *Deficiency of the Supply in the Crimea:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers upon the deficiency in the supply of hay to the army in the East during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* xxvi, xxvii——There was no hay in Balaklava for some time after the 14th November, therefore it would have been useless to send the horses down for it, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 228——Hay or straw could not be procured to stuff the paillasses, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 282——Means taken in 1855 to secure hay from the landed proprietors in the different districts; it was too late for that operation in 1854; quantity accumulated in one place, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 291.

4. *Commissariat Contracts:*

Contract entered into by the Commissariat for the supply of hay to be delivered in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 365.

5. *Pressed Hay:*

Loss of pressed hay by the great storm of 14 November 1854, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 359. 366——Account of the quantity of pressed hay received by the Commissariat in the Crimea up to the end of January 1855, *ib. p.* 370——Difference in the tonnage measurement required for pressed hay and for unpressed hay, *ib. p.* 391.

6. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Statement of Sir Charles Trevelyan in explanation of the arrrangements made by the Treasury in reference to the supply of hay for the army in the Crimea, *App.* 544-551——Letter from Sir Benjamin Hawes, dated War Department, 13 May 1856, transmitting Returns called for by Commissary-general Filder as to the shipments of hay for the army in the East, *ib.* 586——Letter from Captain Milne, R.N., dated Admiralty, 12 May 1856, transmitting books and correspondence relative to hay supplied to the army in the East, *ib.* 590.

*See* also *Commissariat Department. Deficiency of Supplies. Forage. Trevelyan, Sir Charles.*

*Head Quarters.* It was anticipated that during the winter the British army would have the head-quarters in the neighbourhood of the Bosphorus, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241.

*Health of Troops.* Order issued by Lord Lucan, requiring a monthly report from the commanders of regiments of the state of the health and condition of the troops, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 223——Illness of the troops on board ship, which caused the necessity for their landing as light as possible, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 263.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Heath, Captain:*

1. *Consideration of Case.*
2. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Consideration of Case:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers on the case of Captain Heath, R. N., *Rep.* xxix——Letter from Captain Heath to Lord Raglan, dated 6th December 1854, offering to roast coffee for the army on board the "Sanspareil," *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 153——Offer of Captain Heath to build stabling for the Spanish mules recently landed in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 154; *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 170, 171——The difficulty of obtaining carpenters at Balaklava is shown by Captain Heath employing his boatswain to build stables for mules, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 290——Refusal of Captain Heath to report to the Assistant Quartermaster-general, *Colonel Gordon, p.* 399.

2. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Letters from Lieutenant Goss to Captain Heath, R. N., Malta, 31st March 1856; from Lieutenant Scott to Captain Heath, Balaklava, 7th April 1856; Sir R. Airey to Lieutenant Scott, Crimea, 17th November 1855; and an extract from instructions from Sir Edmund Lyons to Captain Heath as principal agent of transports, *App.* 525——Letter from Captain Heath, dated Moorhurst, Dorking, Surrey, 22d May 1856, respecting the agent for transports having an office on shore, *App.* 607.——*See* also *Agent for Transports.*

*Heath, Captain Leopold Adolphus, C. B., R. N.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Observations upon Colonel Gordon's evidence before the Crimean Commissioners with regard to the agent for transport at Balaklava living on board of man of war in Cossack Bay, *p.* 394——Detail of the duties of the agent for transports as contained in his instructions from the Admiralty, *ib.*——Ready communication between the Quartermaster-general's department and the agent for transports at Balaklava, *p.* 395——Denial that the sick and wounded officers suffered any inconvenience at the hands of the agent for transports, *ib.*——Letter from Lieutenant Scott of the Sir Robert Sale transport, dated 7th April 1856, upon the subject of treatment and embarkation of sick and wounded officers at Balaklava, *ib.*——Letter from Sir Richard Airey, dated 17th November 1855, complimenting the agent for transports on the manner in which he had conducted the service at Balaklava, *ib.*

Letter from Lieutenant Goss of Her Majesty's ship "Hibernia," dated 31st March 1846, with reference to the embarkation of the sick at Balaklava and the attention of the agent for transports to their wants, *p.* 395, 396——Circumstances under which Lieutenant Hutchinson came to sign the reports sent into the Quartermaster-general's office of the arrivals and sailings of ships to and from Balaklava, *p.* 396——Difficulty in finding sufficient accommodation in transports for officers wishing to leave the Crimea, *p.* 397——Omission of the signature of the agent for transports to the report of arrivals and departures from Balaklava of vessels containing troops and stores to the Quartermaster-general, *p.* 397, 398——Reason of the agent for transport taking up his position in Cossack Bay in preference to anchoring in Balaklava Harbour, *p.* 398.

Letters from Captain Gordon complaining of certain vessels not having been reported to the Quartermaster-general's office, *p.* 398, 399——Office held by Lieutenant Hutchinson under the agent for transports at Balaklava, *p.* 399——Occasion of refusal to act upon the orders of the Assistant Quartermaster-general upon the ground of exceeding his instructions, *p.* 399, 400——Desire of Colonel Gordon to be furnished with copies of the bill of lading of every ship arriving in Balaklava Harbour, *ib.*——Letter addressed to General Airey assigning a reason for not reporting to the Assistant Quartermaster-general, *p.* 400——Observation of General Airey on the want of tact of Colonel Gordon, *ib.*——Substance of the instructions of the agent for transports relating to the embarkation, landing or movement of troops, *ib.*——Degree of authority exercised by Lord Raglan over the transports, *p.* 400, 401.

*Heavy Cavalry:*

1. *Arrival in the Crimea.*
2. *Management and Care of Horses.*
3. *Employment on Transport Duties.*
4. *Mortality amongst Horses.*
5. *Shelter for the Horses.*
6. *Disposable Men.*
7. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Arrival in the Crimea:*

Denial of Lord Lucan that any heavy cavalry were landed in the Crimea on 1st October 1844; returns of commanding officers to the War Office, bearing date on that day, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 49.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Heavy Cavalry*—continued.

2. *Management and Care of Horses:*

Evidence of the Brigade Major of the Heavy Cavalry respecting the great attention shown by the regimental officers to their stable duties, and the management and care of their troop horses during the winter of 1854-55 in the Crimea, *Major Conolly, p.* 154-160.

3. *Employment on Transport Duties:*

Employment of the Heavy Cavalry Brigade in the performance of Commissariat transport duties in the Crimea, *Colonel Low, p.* 160-162——Frequency of employment of the Heavy Brigade in fetching forage and supplies from Balaklava, *General Scarlett, p.* 214——Nature of the duties which devolved on the Heavy Cavalry Brigade on the 16th November 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 228——Comparison of the number of men and horses of the Heavy Brigade employed on Commissariat duties, and in conveyance of sick from the front, as shown by the returns of Major Conolly and Colonel Hodge, *App.* 602-604.

4. *Mortality amongst Horses:*

Statement showing the loss of horses in the Heavy Cavalry Brigade by sickness or casualties other than killed in action, *Rep.* ii; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 177——Extent to which the mortality amongst the horses of the Heavy Cavalry Brigade is to be attributed to their employment on transport duty, *ib. p.* 186. 192.

5. *Shelter for the Horses:*

Observations upon the charge preferred against the Divisional General of the Cavalry Brigade of want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising some means of affording temporary shelter for the horses of the heavy cavalry, *Rep.* ii-vi; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 181-195.

6. *Disposable Men:*

Statement showing the number of disposable men of the Heavy Cavalry Brigade on the 16th December 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 186——Summary (extracted from the War Office Monthly Returns) showing the number of all ranks, excluding officers, of the cavalry serving in the Crimea, *App.* 413, 414.

7. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Morning state of the 2d Cavalry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier-general the Honourable J. Y. Scarlett, 3d October 1854, *App.* 412——Return of brigade duties performed by the Heavy Cavalry Brigade, between the 13th December 1854 and the 28th February 1855, *ib.* 458, 459——Statement of forage drawn by the several regiments of the Heavy Brigade from 4th to 16th December 1854, inclusive, *ib.* 529——Similar statement from 17th December to 10th January 1855, inclusive, *ib.* 531.

*See* also *Forage. Shelter for Horses. Transport Service.*

*Heavy Goods.* Difficulties and delays in landing of heavy goods sent out from England to the Crimea from the want of hands, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 258.

*Heel Ropes.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 14th July 1854, relative to the supply of the cavalry regiments with heel ropes for the horses, *App.* 419.

"*Helen*," *The Ship.* Explanation respecting the detention of the "Helen" at Constantinople, laden with supplies and stores for the army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 370.

*Hides.* Use made of the hides of animals slaughtered in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 98. 100——Issue of an order to the Commissary-general to preserve all sheepskins and hides of animals slaughtered for the army in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 100——Issue of an order from the Quartermaster-general's office, on 14th November 1854, directing that the hides of all slaughtered animals should be preserved, to be made serviceable as covering for roofs, *ib. p.* 244.

"*Himalaya*" *Steamer.* Account of the embarkation of the cavalry for the Crimea in the "Himalaya" Steamer, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 39.

*Hodge, Colonel.* Colonel Hodge had not been in command of his brigade a week when he was examined; he was a regimental officer, and therefore incapable of furnishing returns with regard to the duties of his brigade for the months preceding, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 111. ——Reason why he was not examined relative to the charge of Colonel Griffiths against the Earl of Lucan, *p.* 115——Expression of regret of Colonel Hodge at having signed a return that was totally incorrect, *Major Conolly, p.* 158, 159.

*Horse Transports.* Regulations as to the quantity of forage that horse transports should have on board; how far this was carried out, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 297——It was the duty of the principal naval agent of transports to see that the forage was on board the transport

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Horse Transports*—continued.

vessels, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 292——Want of horse transports for the conveyance of animals from Constantinople and Varna to Balaklava, *ib. p.* 390——Directions were given to Captain Christie to place the horse transports at Balaklava at the service of the Commissary-general, *ib. p.* 392.

*Horses:*

1. *Sickness and Mortality.*
2. *Light Cavalry.*
3. *Shelter for the Horses.*
4. *Transport Duty.*
5. *Royal Artillery.*
6. *Commissariat Animals.*
7. *Clothing for Horses.*
8. *Supply of Food.*
9. *Divisional Orders.*

1. *Sickness and Mortality:*

Statement showing the loss of horses of the cavalry and artillery during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* ii——Denial of Lord Lucan of the charge preferred against him of having occasioned the loss of the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 8——Statistics of the sickness and mortality of the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 8, 9——The losses in the transport and ambulance services in the Crimea far exceeded that of the cavalry, *ib. p.* 11——Account of the mortality among the horses of the cavalry brigade employed in the transport service, *ib. p.* 18——Cause of the great mortality amongst the horses from the time that the Cavalry Division was under the command of Lord Lucan, *ib. p.* 37.

Number of horses of the cavalry lost on the passage from Varna to Balaklava, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 46——Statement of the mortality amongst the horses of the Heavy Cavalry, Light Cavalry, and Artillery in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 50——Comparison of the loss of cavalry horses with the hard-worked baggage animals, *ib. p.* 53——Expediency of having a return, showing what has become of the horses that were landed in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 59.

Statement showing the loss of horses of the Cavalry Brigade by sickness or casualties other than killed in action, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 177——Statement of the loss of horses in the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea up to the 16th January 1855, *ib. p.* 180——Comparison of the loss of horses of the Heavy Brigade of cavalry and the Light Brigade between October 1854 and March 1855, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 202.

2. *Light Cavalry:*

Want of forage in the Light Cavalry Brigade during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* vi-viii——Damaged state in which the horses of the Light Cavalry Brigade landed in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 47——State of exhaustion of the horses of the Light Brigade upon their leaving the heights of Inkermann for Kadekoi, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 207——Period when the Light Cavalry horses began to deteriorate in condition, *Colonel Doherty, p.* 216——Several horses died from exhaustion on the march down from the heights of Inkermann, *ib. p.* 217.

Comparative mortality of the horses of the Light Cavalry Brigade and the Heavy Brigade, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 221——Account of the sufferings which the horses of the Light Brigade endured after the storm in November 1854, *Colonel Low, p.* 228——After the battle of Balaklava, and after the battle of Inkermann, no horses left the plateau at all; they were detained there by the orders of Sir Richard Airey, *ib. p.* 228.

3. *Shelter for the Horses:*

Observations of the Board upon the charge preferred against Lord Lucan of want of promptitude or ingenuity in providing shelter for the cavalry horses during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* iv-vi——Frequency of applications of Lord Lucan to Lord Raglan and the Quarter-master-general for materials and assistance to afford shelter to the cavalry, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 32——Opportunities offered for affording shelter to the cavalry horses in the Crimea, had the commanding officers liked to avail themselves of them, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 55——Opportunities offered of affording temporary shelter to the horses of the cavalry on the plateau above Kadekoi, *Rawlinson, p.* 79-81; *Bracebridge, p.* 82-84——Charge in the Report of the Commissioners of want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising means of temporary shelter for cavalry horses, *Rep.* iii; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 109, 110.

Means resorted to in order to afford shelter to the horses of the Heavy Cavalry Brigade during the winter of 1854-55 in the Crimea, *Major Conolly, p.* 156-160——Statement of Colonel Tulloch in support of the charges preferred against Lord Lucan of neglect in providing shelter for the troop horses of the cavalry during the winter of 1854-55, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 164-174——Observations upon the charge preferred against the Divisional General of the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea, of want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising some plan for affording temporary shelter to the horses during the winter of 1854-55, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 181-195——Order issued by the Divisional General, entreating commanding officers of cavalry to endeavour by every means in their power to give shelter to their horses, *ib. p.* 189——Sketch of the hutting of two horses of the Cavalry in the Crimea, *App.* 457.

4. *Transport*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Horses*—continued.

4. *Transport Duty:*

Observations of the Board with reference to the employment of the cavalry horses on transport duty, *Rep.* vi-viii——Order given by Lord Raglan for the Cavalry Brigade to furnish 500 effective horses for the transport service, of the army, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 13 Letter from Lord Lucan, complaining of the mortality among the cavalry horses since their employment in the transport service *ib. p.* 15, 16——Manner in which the cavalry horses engaged in the transport service of the army were actually employed, *ib. p.* 26——Employment of the horses of the Heavy Cavalry Brigade in the performance of Commissariat transport duties in the Crimea, *Colonel Low, p.* 160-162.

Extent to which the mortality amongst the horses of the cavalry is to be attributed to their employment on transport duty in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 186. 193——Reasons for refusing to allow the horses of the Light Cavalry Brigade to be employed on the transport service, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 203-208——In carrying up the Commissariat supplies, every soldier rode one horse, and led another, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 116——Number of horses and men of the Light Brigade requisite for bringing forage from Balaklava, had they been employed, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 219.

Number of horses required for the transport of forage from Balaklava to the quarters of the Light Brigade on the heights of Inkermann, *Crookshank, p.* 224——Refusal of Colonel Mayow to allow the troop horses of the Light Cavalry Brigade to be sent to Balaklava to bring up forage, *Colonel Douglas, p.* 227——Number of horses of the Light Brigade which would have been required to bring up forage from Balaklava to the heights of Inkermann, *ib. p.* 227.

5. *Royal Artillery:*

Statement showing the loss of horses in the Artillery, in the Crimea, during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* ii; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 178; *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 50——Evidence of Mr. Commissary-general Filder respecting the mortality amongst the artillery horses from starvation, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 202.

6. *Commissariat Animals:*

Comparison of the losses of Commissariat animals and cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 9, 10——Of the horses at Varna, to the extent of 3,000 or 4,000, were stolen, and the Government got no account of them, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 180——The better class of animals were obtained from the upper parts of Bulgaria, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 291——Circumstance of the Duke of Cambridge ordering 21 ammunition ponies to be killed, as he had no means of feeding them, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 206; *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 385, 386. 391, 392——The rapid destruction of transport animals was mainly attributable to exposure and overwork, not from want of forage, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 360——Return of transport animals in charge of Deputy-assistant Commissary C. Bagot Smith, in the Crimea, on the 30th September 1854, *App.* 459, 460——Report of proceedings of a Board of Survey on ammunition animals of First Division, dated 12th October 1854, *App.* 532, 533.

7. *Clothing for Horses:*

Occasion of application being made to Lord Raglan for a supply of clothing for the horses of the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 188.

8. *Supply of Food:*

Admission of Commissary-general Filder that the baggage animals were fed before the other animals of the army, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 10——Circumstance of the Heavy Cavalry horses only receiving 8 lbs. of hay per day, whilst the artillery horses were getting 10 lbs., *ib. p.* 43.

9. *Divisional Orders:*

Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 28 June, directing commanding officers of regiments to have their troop horses marked by scissors, *App.* 418——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 13 July 1854, directing commanding officers to send in lists detailing every casualty in the horses of their regiments, *ib.*——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 13 July 1854, directing commanding officers to maintain the efficiency of the horses of the cavalry regiments, *ib.* 418, 419.

*See* also *Ammunition Ponies. Bât Horses. Cavalry Horses. Forage. French Cavalry. Linseed. Mortality of Horses. Nose Bags. Oil Cake. Railway Contractors. Raines, Major. Shelter for Horses. Stabling.*

*Hospital Stores.* Cognizance taken by the Commissariat Department of the hospital stores for the service of the army in the Crimea, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 392.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Hospitals*:

1. *Huts.*
2. *Marquees and Tents.*
3. *Accommodation at Balaklava.*

1. *Huts*:

Every regiment had one hospital hut erected in January, and some more, *Earl of Lucan*, *p.* 112.

2. *Marquees and Tents*:

Success of the Quartermaster-general in bringing up from Varna twenty of the reserve hospital marquees which lay there in store, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 242——Account of the damage done to the hospital marquees by the storm of the 14th November in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 244——Superiority of a marquee to a bell tent for hospital service, *ib. p.* 247.

3. *Accommodation at Balaklava*:

Extent of hospital accommodation for the sick and wounded at Balaklava, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 295.

*House of Commons.* Opinion that the Government laying the Commissioners' Report on the Table of the House involves the approval of it, *Colonel Tulloch*, *p.* 113.

*Hurricane.* Account of the hurricane in the Crimea on 14th November 1854, and the damage done on that occasion, *Sir R. Airey*, *p* 246 —— Wretched state of the ground occupied by the cavalry after the storm of the 14th November, *Colonel Griffiths*, *p.* 27, 28——Effects of the storm on the 14th November at Vinois Hill and Balaklava Harbour, *Major Keane*, *p.* 302——After the storm of the 14th November, and for a month or two, nothing couldinduce owners of private ships to go to Balaklava, *Commissary-general Filder*, *p.* 291.

*See* also *Storm of 14th November.*

*Hutchinson, Lieutenant.* Circumstances under which Lieutenant Hutchinson came to sign the reports sent in to the Quartermaster-general's office of the arrivals and sailings of ships to and from Balaklava, *Captain Heath*, *p.* 396——Office held by Lieutenant Hutchinson under the agent for transports at Balaklava, *ib. p.* 399.

*Huts and Hutting*:

1. *Cavalry Brigade.*
2. *Building Materials.*
3. *Construction of Huts.*
4. *Supply of Huts from England.*
5. *Weight of Huts.*

1. *Cavalry Brigade*:

Observations of the Board of General Officers upon the subject of hutting; date of the arrival of the huts in the Crimea, *Rep.* xiii-xv——Date at which the hutting of the cavalry commenced in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan*, *p.* 11——Copy of orders issued by the Lieutenant-general commanding respecting the hutting of the cavalry horses at Kadekoi, *ib. p.* 13——Arrival of the men's huts in the Crimea early in the month of January, *ib. p.* 19——Employment of the cavalry in bringing up the huts from Balaklava, *ib. p.* 20.

Period when the cavalry commenced hutting their horses, and when it was finished, *Earl of Lucan*, *p.* 26, 27——Date of the completion of the hutting of the horses of the 13th Light Dragoons, *Colonel Doherty*, *p.* 34——Return made by the commanding officers of the period of the commencement and completion of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch*, *p.* 51——Date at which the hutting of the cavalry horses commenced in the Crimea, and was completed, *Colonel Douglas*, *p.* 62, 63.

Reference to Commissioners' Report as to delay in hutting of the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan*, *p.* 110——Intention of Report of Commissioners to convey an impression that the delay in hutting cavalry was attributable to what passed between the Earl of Lucan and Colonel Griffiths, *ib. p.* 108——Huts were not erected for the men before the end of January or the beginning of February, *ib. p.* 112——Order by the Lieutenant-general commanding the cavalry, directing the completion of the huts for the horses after a hospital hut had been carried for each regiment, *ib.*

Observations with respect to the delay in obtaining hut accommodation for the men of the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea, during the winter of 1854-55, *Colonel Tulloch*, *p.* 174——Exertions made to construct hutting for the troops of the Cavalry Brigade, in the early part of December 1854, *Earl of Lucan*, *p.* 188——Extract from the Crimean Commissioners' (London) Report upon the subject of hutting the troops in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 240——Memorandum by Brigadier-general Hall, of the Royal Engineers, dated Kertch, 29th April 1856, upon the subject of hutting the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *App.* 607, 608——Sketch of the hutting of two horses of the cavalry in the Crimea, *ib.* 457.

2. *Building*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Huts and Hutting*—continued.

2. *Building Materials:*

There was nothing in the world on that plateau that offered materials for hutting, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 36.

3. *Construction of Huts:*

If the Quartermaster-general saw the advantage of hutting the troops, he would first obtain from the Engineer Department a list of materials requisite for the purpose, and would send a copy of such list to the Commissariat, with a requisition to have the required materials supplied, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 239——Extract from the London Report of the Crimean Commissioners, relative to the supply of wood and timber for hutting purposes, *ib. p.* 243——The want of transport and human labour delayed the construction of the huts for several weeks, *ib. p.* 247——Measures taken by the Quartermaster-general for hutting and sheltering the troops, immediately that it was determined to winter on the heights, *ib. p.* 242, 243——Causes of delay in constructing huts, *Major Keane, p.* 301.

4. *Supply of Huts from England:*

Occasion of the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Hardinge consulting Colonel Tulloch with respect to making arrangements as to huts for the soldiers in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 182.

5. *Weight of Huts:*

Insufficiency of the Land Transport to carry the huts up to the front, *Rep.* xiii——The weight of the huts has been much underrated by the Commissioners of Inquiry; instead of being 2,500 tons, they were 3,750 tons. *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241——Extract from the London Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea respecting the number of men required to carry a single hut from Balaklava to the front, *ib. p.* 243.

*See* also *Carpenters. Cavalry*, 3. *Shelter for the Troops. Timber.*

*Hydraulic Presses.* Importation of hydraulic presses by the Commissariat, from England, for pressing hay, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 372——Use made of the hydraulic presses sent out from England to Turkey, *ib. p.* 381——Reason of the separation of the presses from the hay at Constantinople, *ib. p.* 382.

## I.

*Importation.* In the Crimea nothing could reach the army except what was supplied by importation, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238.

*Indian Corn.* With proper precautions as regards water, Indian corn is good forage for horses, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 291——Endeavours made by the Commissariat Department to procure Indian corn straw for the use of the army from Malta, *ib. p.* 391.

*Inexperienced Youths.* Confusion created by the young men of the Commissariat department riding about the country bidding against each other for supplies, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 38, 39——Letter from Lord Lucan to the Quartermaster-general, dated 29 September 1854, complaining of the Commissariat duties being entrusted to youths altogether without experience, *ib. p.* 40.

*Infantry.* Evidence of Dr. Alexander respecting the duties performed in the trenches by the infantry soldiers of the army in the East, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172——The British infantry were so constantly employed with the vital work of defending all against the enemy, that men for other duties could hardly be spared, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238.

*Inkermann:*

1. *Heights of Inkermann.*
2. *Battle of Inkermann.*

1. *Heights of Inkermann:*

Ill condition of the Light Dragoons to do much harassing work for a few days when they came down from the heights of Inkermann, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 13——Occasion of the Light Cavalry Brigade being ordered to Inkermann from Balaklava; difficulty of foraging the horses at so great a distance, *ib. p.* 41——Circumstance of the occupation of the heights of Inkermann by the Light Cavalry Brigade, *Earls of Lucan and Cardigan, p.* 214, 215——Reason of Lord Raglan for sending the Light Cavalry Brigade to the position which they occupied on the heights of Inkermann, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 45; *Sir R. Airey, p.* 218.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*INKERMANN*—continued.

2. *Battle of Inkermann:*

On the day after the battle of Inkermann was fought, a protracted consultation as to the further conduct of the campaign took place between the generals, and the result was, the determination to persevere in holding the ground then occupied by the allies, and to fortify our position on the Inkermann heights, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242.

*See* also *Balaklava to the Front. Cavalry.*

*Inspection of Troops.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 13 July 1854, relative to the duration of troop and regimental inspections, *App.* 419.

*Invasion of the Crimea.* At the time of embarkation, and from that time up to the 17th October, there was no expectation of having to winter in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241.

*Investigation of Charges.* Peculiar nature of the present inquiry; unusual difficulties with which it is surrounded, *Rep.* i, ii.

*Ionian Islands.* Promptitude of Sir Henry Ward, Governor of the Ionian Islands, in sending reinforcements to the Crimea upon hearing of the battle of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 247.

"*Iron Aye,*" *Steamer.* Letter from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 18th April 1855, stating that 1,000 huts had been shipped to the Crimea in the "Iron Aye" steam vessel, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 245.

*Issues of Stores.* Observations of the Board of General Officers upon the issues of warm clothing to the troops in the Crimea through the Quartermaster-general's department, *Rep.* x ——Measures adopted by the Quartermaster-general's department to issue supplies of camp equipage and extra clothing to the army in the East, with regularity and dispatch, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 255——It was not the mere possession of stores, but the command of transport labour that enabled the parties to distribute the immense stores to the soldier, provided for his comfort through the bounty of Lord Ellesmere, *ib. p.* 258——Paper of the parts erased from memorandum of replies of Colonel Wetherall, relative to the issue of stores to the troops in the Crimea, *App.* 471——Statement of the different articles of diet issued from the Commissariat depôt at Balaklava, from the 1st to the 15th March 1855, *App.* 534.

*See* also *Ammunition Boots. Clothing. Great Coats. Quartermaster-general's Department. Paillasses. Warm Clothing.*

J.

"*Jason,*" *Transport.* Number of horses brought by the "Jason" for the transport service in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 10——Account of the embarkation of the cavalry for the Crimea in the "Jason," *ib. p.* 39.

*Judge Advocate-general.* Letter from Colonel Gordon to the Judge Advocate-general, 22d May 1856, returning the original notes of the examination of Colonel Wetherall and Colonel Gordon, *App.* 512-520——Letter from Colonel Gordon to the Judge Advocate-general, 22d May 1856, forwarding Colonel Tulloch's memorandum of the 16th May, and remarks by Colonel Gordon in reply thereto, *ib.* 521.

*See* also *Villiers, Right Hon. Charles Pelham, M. P.*

"*Jura,*" *The Ship.* This ship with rugs went to Kamiesch; her stores could not be disembarked there, but she had to come to Balaklava for that purpose, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 282.

K.

*KADEKOI:*

1. *State of the Cavalry.*
2. *Construction of Stabling.*
3. *Geological Structure of Country.*
4. *Supply of Stores.*

1. *State of the Cavalry:*

State of the Heavy Cavalry on their arrival in the neighbourhood of Kadekoi, *Rep.* iv; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 11.

2. *Construction of Stabling:*

Means resorted to in order to construct stabling for the cavalry at Kadekoi, and impediments offered to the execution of the work, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 12——How far it would have been possible to have constructed canvas shelter at Kadekoi, *Major Keane, p.* 302.

3. *Geological*

*KADEKOI*—continued.

3. *Geological Structure of Country:*

Geological structure of the country above Kadekoi, upon which the cavalry were encamped, *Rawlinson, p.* 79, 80.

4. *Supply of Stores:*

Stores sent to Kadekoi were not entered as issues by the Quartermaster-general; the formation of that depôt rested with the Commissariat, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 284—— Erection of huts at Kadekoi for the stores on the application of Sir R. Airey, *Boyd, p.* 308——Copy of certificate of the quantity of bread produced at Kadekoi from two ovens built by Colonel Tulloch, *App.* 534.

*Kamiesch.* Number of sail of the line lying at Kamiesch during the late war, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 148——Escape of the French army at Kamiesch from the infliction of badness of roads, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 359——*See* also "*Jura*," *The Ship.*

*Kazatch Bay.* Number of vessels of war lying in Kazatch Bay during the last war with Russia, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 148——Circumstance of Colonel Tulloch desiring the answers to the queries submitted to the Quartermaster-general to be sent to him at Kazatch Bay, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 251.

*Kean, Captain.* Date of the arrival of Captain Kean, an officer of the engineer department, in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 19.

*Keane, Major Fane.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Officer in charge of the hutting for the army in the East, *p.* 301——Strength of the staff under witness's orders, *ib.*——Difficulties that arose in the harbour of Balaklava in landing the huts, *ib.*——Causes of delay in constructing huts, *p.* 301, 302——An adequate number of sappers and miners were to have been provided for constructing huts; this arrangement was not carried out, *p.* 301——Difficulties in the way of forming canvas shelter, in consequence of the severity of the wind in a mountainous country, *p.* 302——Effects of the storm of the 14th of November at Vinois Hill and in Balaklava Harbour, *ib.*——Impossibility of constructing canvas shelter on the plateau, *ib.*——Erroneous opinions entertained by Messrs. Bracebridge and Rawlinson on that point, *ib.*——Letter from Mr. Rawlinson to Lord Panmure, relative to damming up a streamlet in the neighbourhood of Balaklava, to supply the hospital with water, *p.* 303, 304——Difficulty of procuring carpenters at Balaklava, *p.* 304—— Nature of the employment of the crews of vessels in Balaklava Harbour, *p.* 304—— Description of the shelter that is asserted to have saved the horses of the Sappers and Miners, *p.* 304, 305——Reason why the cavalry horses could not have been sheltered in the same way as the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners, *p.* 305.

*Kits.* Means resorted to by Lord Lucan to provide the officers and men of the cavalry with kits and necessaries, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 35——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 8 August 1854, directing commanding officers to make a return of the number of spare horse kits in their possession, *App.* 421.

*KNAPSACKS:*

1. *Separation of the Men from their Knapsacks.*
2. *Contents of Soldiers' Knapsacks.*
3. *Carriage of Knapsacks.*

1. *Separation of the Men from their Knapsacks:*

Circumstance of the separation of the men from their knapsacks on landing in the Crimea, and delay in recovering knapsacks from the transports, *Rep.* ix, x——Separation of the men from their knapsacks on landing in the Crimea; active measures subsequently taken to restore them, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 253——Orders as to the men landing in the Crimea with their knapsacks, and reason why that order was not carried out, *ib. p.* 263, 264——The army could not have marched with both knapsack and blanket, *ib. p.* 264 ——Opinion upon that part of the Commissioners' Report, which charges that the separation from the knapsacks not merely affected the comfort of the soldier, but was the cause of the destitute state of the sick and wounded on their arrival at Scutari, *ib. p.* 265—— Memorandum sent round to general officers of divisions to say that the knapsacks were at Balaklava, *ib.*——If the operation were to be performed again, with present experience, it would be advisable to take the knapsacks, but in the then state of ignorance as to future operations, the least evil was chosen, *ib. p.* 266.

2. *Contents of Soldiers' Knapsacks:*

Contents of the knapsack of a soldier on active field service, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 253—— Arrangement as to the contents of the knapsacks, *ib. p.* 266——Letter, dated Horse Guards, 28 February 1854, to Lieutenant-general Fergusson, respecting the articles to be carried in the knapsacks and squad bags, *App.* 466.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*KNAPSACKS*—continued.

3. *Carriage of Knapsacks:*

Objection to the manner in which British soldiers carry the knapsack, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 264——In the usual equipment of British soldiers they are only prepared for carrying their knapsack and great coat, or their knapsack and blanket, *ib.*

*Kulalie.* Letter, dated London, 4 June 1856, from Mr. Filder to the Judge Advocate-general, with a memorandum attached, which was submitted to the Commander of the Forces, as to the formation of depôts for hay at Kulalie and Scutari, *App.* 610.

L.

*Labour of the Soldiers.* The Quartermaster-general has nothing to do with the apportioning of the labour of the men of an army in the field, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 236——In war it is the constant practice to rely upon the labour of the soldier as one of the means by which the wants of the army are supplied; in the Crimea this resource partly failed, and failed from the stress of military events, *ib. p.* 238——In the Crimea there was not an interval of repose, never an interval at which large fatigue parties could be supplied by withdrawing any number of men from the actual presence of the enemy, *ib.*

*See* also *Fatigue Parties. Working Parties.*

*LABOURERS:*

1. *Balaklava.*
2. *Trebisonde.*

1. *Balaklava:*

The crews of the ships were employed as labourers on shore at Balaklava, in breaking stones from the heights; there were no soldiers available, *M'Kenzie, p.* 293.

2. *Trebisonde:*

High rate of wages of labourers at Trebisonde, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 289.

*See* also *Artificers. Carpenters. Shipwrights. Turks.*

*LAND TRANSPORT:*

1. *Commissariat Department.*
2. *Want of, between Balaklava and the Camp.*
3. *Baggage Animals.*

1. *Commissariat Department:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers on the insufficiency of the land transport of the Commissariat department in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* xxvi——The Commissariat had the duty of providing all the land transport required for the service of the army till it was transferred to a separate and independent establishment, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237——Duties of the Commissariat Department with respect to providing land transport for an army in the field, *ib.*

2. *Want of, between Balaklava and the Camp:*

Extract from the London Report of the Crimean Commissioners, respecting the want of land transport between Balaklava and camp, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 240.

3. *Baggage Animals:*

There was more than a sufficient number of pack animals at Varna, but he Commissary-general could not venture to bring the animals to Balaklava because he had no forage for them, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238——It was estimated that to move as an army, the British force alone would require 14,000 beasts of transport, and that the French would require a like number, *ib. p.* 241.

*See* also *Commissariat Department. Roads. Transport Service.*

*LAND TRANSPORT CORPS:*

1. *Formation of the Corps.*
2. *Sufferings of the Corps.*

1. *Formation of the Corps:*

Formation of the Land Transport Corps of the army in the East in January 1855, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 236.

2. *Sufferings of the Corps:*

Evidence of Mr. Commissary-general Filder respecting the sufferings of the Land Transport Corps after the storm in November 1854, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 201-205——Causes to which the mortality amongst the horses of the land transport service is to be attributed, *Crookshank, p.* 224.

*Landing*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Landing Cargoes.* Duty of the masters of transports as to landing of cargoes, *Captain Milne, p.* 315.

*Landing Huts.* Difficulties that arose in the harbour of Balaklava in landing the huts, *Major Keane, p.* 301.

*Landing Places.* Construction of wharfs and landing places at Balaklava, alongside which the largest steamers could come and land their cargoes, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 154

*Landing Stores.* The landing of stores in Balaklava Harbour rested entirely with the naval authorities, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 292——Manner in which the stores were landed; whose duty it was to land them, *Boyd, p.* 311, 312——Further evidence as to landing stores, and as to whose duty it was, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 320, 321.

*Landing Troops.* Account of the landing of the cavalry in the Crimea; length of time which it took, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 39——Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field to ascertain the right spots for landing and embarking troops, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235——Assistance rendered by the navy in landing troops upon the occasion of the invasion of the Crimea, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 152, 153——Particulars of the landing of the British troops in the Crimea in the neighbourhood of Old Fort, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241.

*Leahy, Lieutenant.* Activity displayed by Mr. Leahy in sending up supplies to the front for the Engineers, *Colonel Chapman, p.* 320.

*Lennox, Lieutenant.* Appointment of Lieutenant Lennox, of the Engineers, specially to superintend the construction of cavalry stables, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 11; *Colonel Gordon, p.* 23——Occasion of Lieutenant Lennox presenting himself to witness, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 188.

*Letters.* Reason assigned by Lord Lucan for not forwarding Lord Cardigan's letter, and those of five commanding officers, for Lord Raglan's consideration, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 35.

*Light Cavalry:*

1. *State of the Light Brigade.*
2. *Command of the Brigade.*
3. *Disposable Men.*
4. *Strength of the Brigade.*
5. *Quarters of the Brigade.*
6. *Forage for the Horses.*
7. *Transport Duty.*
8. *Mortality amongst the Horses.*
9. *Shelter for Horses.*
10. *Reconnaissance in the Dobrudscha.*

1. *State of the Light Brigade:*

State of the Light Cavalry Brigade upon their arrival in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 48——Copy of a Report of Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 18th November 1854, on the state of the Light Brigade, *App.* 461——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 19th November 1854, enclosing returns and daily states of the Light Cavalry Brigade, *ib.* 462——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated, Camp, near Sebastopol, 20th November 1854, reporting the state of the Light Brigade, *ib.* 462, 463——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 21st November 1854, reporting the state of the Light Cavalry Brigade, *ib.* 463.

2. *Command of the Brigade:*

Occasion of Lord Lucan receiving an order from Lord Raglan on no account whatever to exercise any authority over the Light Brigade, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 215——Circumstance of Lord Lucan receiving instructions from Lord Raglan not to interfere with the Light Cavalry Brigade, *ib. p.* 222.

3. *Disposable Men:*

Statement showing the number of disposable men of the Light Cavalry Brigade on the 16th December 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 187.

4. *Strength of the Brigade:*

Strength of the Light Cavalry Brigade at the period they occupied the position on the heights of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 219——Summary (extracted from the War Office Monthly Returns) showing the number of all ranks, excluding officers, of the cavalry serving in the Crimea, *App.* 413, 414.

5. *Quarters of the Brigade:*

Removal of the Light Cavalry Brigade from the valley adjacent to Balaklava to the windmill, near Inkermann, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 197. 199——List of places at which the Light Cavalry were quartered in Turkey and Bulgaria, and length of time they remained at each station, *ib. p.* 198——Reason of Lord Raglan for sending the Light Cavalry Brigade to the position which they occupied on the heights of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 218——Statement of Lord Raglan that he was privately bound to the French to keep the Light Cavalry Brigade in their position on the heights of Inkermann, *Earl of Cardigan,*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Light Cavalry*—continued.

5. *Quarters of the Brigade*—continued.

*p.* 198——Order issued to the Light Brigade to occupy the heights of Inkermann, near the windmill, *Earls of Lucan and Cardigan, p.* 215——Reluctance of Lord Raglan to send the Light Cavalry Brigade to the position which they occupied on the heights of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 218.

6. *Forage for the Horses:*

Difficulties attending the foraging of the Light Cavalry Brigade when quartered at Inkermann, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 42——Occasion of application being made to Lords Lucan and Cardigan for the troop horses of the Light Brigade to be sent down to Balaklava to fetch forage, and refusal, *Crookshank, p.* 208, 209——Denial of Lord Lucan that Mr. Commissary-general Crookshank ever applied to him for permission for the Light Cavalry horses to be sent down to Balaklava to fetch forage, *ib. p.* 210——Reason for not making any application for the Light Cavalry horses to be sent to Balaklava for forage, *Colonel Doherty, p.* 216, 217——Statement of forage drawn by the several regiments of the Light Brigade from 4th to 16th December 1854, inclusive, *App.* 529——Similar statement from 17th December to 10th January 1855, inclusive, *ib.* 531.

7. *Transport Duty:*

No horses of the Light Cavalry were sent on sick and provision duty till the 18th or 19th December, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 110——Reasons for refusing to allow the horses of the Light Cavalry Brigade to be employed in the transport service, *Rep.* vii–viii, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 203–208——Lord Cardigan could not have detached any portion of his force to bring up forage without first obtaining the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 219——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 24th November 1854, relative to sending the troop horses of the Light Brigade to fetch up barley, *App.* 464.

8. *Mortality amongst the Horses:*

Statement showing the loss of horses in the Light Cavalry Brigade by sickness or casualties other than killed in action, *Rep.* ii; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 177.

9. *Shelter for Horses:*

Observations upon the charge preferred by the Commissioners of Crimean Inquiry against the General of Division commanding the Cavalry in the Crimea of want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising some means of temporary shelter for the horses, *Rep.* v; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 181–195.

10. *Reconnaissance in the Dobrudscha:*

Arduous service performed by the Light Cavalry when sent on a reconnaissance to the Dobrudscha, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 207, 208.

*See* also *Cardigan, Lord. Cavalry Horses. Inkermann. Mortality of Horses. Raglan, Lord. Shelter for Horses.*

*Light Division.* Explanation of evidence given before the Commissioners as to the supply of blankets to the Light Division, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

*Lime Juice.* Observations of the Board upon the supply of lime-juice for the use of the troops in the Crimea during the winter of 1854–55, *Rep.* xxiv——Evidence of Colonel Yea relative to the supply of lime-juice to the army hospitals in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 257——Difference in the opinion of medical men whether lime-juice ought to be a medical or a Commissariat store, *ib. p.* 298——Examination with regard to the supply of lime-juice; it was at first considered only a medical store; date when it was ordered to be issued as a Commissariat store, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 374, 375.

Reason for not issuing lime-juice to the troops generally, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 374——Steps taken to procure a supply of lime-juice from Malta and Sicily, *ib.*——Circumstance of the purveyor of medical stores at Balaklava taking away part of the cargo of lime-juice from the beach where it was landed, *ib. p.* 375——Letter from the Commissary-general to the Adjutant-general, stating that it was not the department of the Commissariat to provide lime-juice for the army, *ib.*——Desire of Lord Raglan that the Commissariat should in future provide lime-juice for the troops, *ib.*

Copies of correspondence relating to the supply of lime-juice to the army before Sebastopol, dated 15th, 16th, and 18th February 1855, *App.* 533.

*Linseed.* Observations upon the excellence of linseed as food for horses, *Bracebridge, p.* 83, 84——Refusal of the Commissariat to issue linseed to the cavalry quartered at Constantinople when called for, *ib. p.* 84.

*Liprandi's Corps.* Strong position of the enemy's forces under General Liprandi, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 262——The situation of this corps prevented arrangements being made for carrying up stores until the 8th or 9th December, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 270.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Live Stock.* Loss of live stock forwarded to the Crimea in sailing vessels from Varna, *Rep.* xxiii; *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 360——Circumstance of the cattle in charge of the Commissariat at Eupatoria being given up to the French and Turks, *Rep.* xxiii; *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 362——Inability of the parties who had contracted for supplying the British army with live cattle during the winter to fulfil their engagements, *ib. p.* 361——Offer of the contractors to supply sheep in lieu of oxen, *ib. p.* 362——Statement of the number of cattle and sheep imported into the Crimea by the Commissariat from November 1854 to 31st March 1855, and of the number lost at sea, *App.* 539, 540.

*See* also *Cattle. Sheep. Slaughtered Meat.*

*Loading Vessels in England.* Objectionable manner in which the vessels were loaded in England; half a vessel's cargo sometimes taken out and put on board other vessels before the stores could be got at that were immediately wanted, *M'Kenzie, p.* 293.

*London.* Even with all the resources of London, an order for 3,000 tents could not be executed without a delay of several months, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 246.

*Loss of Horses.* Statement of the loss of horses of the cavalry and artillery of the army in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* ii——It was notorious in the army in the Crimea, that the losses in the transport and the ambulance services far exceeded those of the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 11——The loss of horses in the cavalry was not very great for ten days in December, *ib. p.* 114——Letter to Lord Raglan of 17 January, stating, that if the transport duties continued a few days longer, the force would cease to exist, *ib.*

*See* also *Mortality of Horses.*

*Low, Colonel Alexander:*

1. *Examination before the Board of General Officers.*
2. *Completion of the Cavalry Stables.*

1. *Examination before the Board of General Officers:*

Examination of Colonel Alexander Low, respecting the condition of the horses of his regiment in December 1854, and means resorted to to afford them temporary shelter, *p.* 67-70——Further examination of Colonel Alexander Low, touching the sheltering of the horses temporarily till the completion of the cavalry stables, *p.* 71-73——Further examination of Colonel Low respecting the Commissariat transport duties performed by the Heavy Cavalry Brigade, during the winter of 1854-55, in the Crimea, *p.* 160-162——Further examination of Colonel Alexander Low relative to sending the troop horses of the Light Brigade to Balaklava for forage, *p.* 227, 228.

2. *Completion of the Cavalry Stables:*

Answer of Lieutenant-colonel Low, of the 4th Light Dragoons, respecting the date of the commencement and completion of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 51——Observations upon the evidence of Colonel Low relative to the measures adopted for affording shelter to the horses of the Cavalry Brigade during the winter of 1854-55, *ib. p.* 169——Error of Colonel Low as to the date of the completion of the stabling for the horses of the 4th Light Dragoons, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190.

*Lucan, Lieutenant-general the Earl of.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Errors committed by the Commissioners of Crimean Inquiry in their Report when speaking of the cavalry, *p.* 8, 9——Manner in which the errors of the Commissioners with regard to the mortality of the cavalry horses arose, *p.* 9——Number of cavalry horses killed in action or died of disease in the Crimea, *p.* 8, 9——Comparison of the losses of Commissariat animals and cavalry horses in the Crimea, *p.* 9, 10——Difficulty in a campaign of exacting from officers very strict daily returns, *p.* 10——Inconvenience of the practice of the brigade and regimental states accompanying the divisional states, *ib.*——Admission of Mr. Commissary-general Filder that the baggage animals were fed before the other animals belonging to the army, *ib.*——Circumstance of Lord Raglan giving over to the cavalry the charge of looking after 270 mules, *p.* 10, 11——It was notorious in the army in the Crimea that the losses in the transport and the ambulance services far exceeded those of the cavalry, *p.* 11.

State of the Cavalry Brigade on their arrival in the neighbourhood of Kadekoi, *p.* 11——Order of the Lieutenant-general for the construction of stabling for the cavalry in the neighbourhood of Kadekoi, *ib.*——Impediments offered to the construction of stabling, *ib.*——Application to the Quartermaster-general for Turks to assist in the construction of cavalry stables, *ib.*——Appointment of Lieutenant Lennox and Major Hall to give assistance in the erection of shelter for the cavalry horses, *ib.*——Extract from Lord Bingham's journal, respecting the repeated applications made for Turks to assist in the construction of cavalry stables, *p.* 12——Applications made to Osman Pasha and Roostum Pasha to furnish Turks to assist in the construction of cavalry stables, *p.* 12. 189.

Period of the completion of the cavalry stables at Kadekoi; degree of energy shown by the officers and men in their construction, *p.* 12, 13.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Lucan, Lieutenant-general the Earl of.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Occasion of Lord Raglan giving orders for the cavalry to supply 500 effective horses for the transport service of the army, *p.* 13——Occasion of the clerk of the 4th Dragoon Guards addressing a return respecting the cavalry to Lord Raglan by mistake, *p.* 14——Observation upon Colonel Doherty's evidence relative to hutting of the cavalry, *ib.*——The whole of the stabling was completed on the 11th of February, *ib.*——Observations made by Colonel Shute, with respect to the completion of the hutting of the cavalry horses, *ib.*——Readiness with which materials were supplied through Major Hall for the construction of the cavalry stables, *p.* 15.

Difficulty of procuring timber in the Crimea for the construction of the cavalry stables, *p.* 15——Deficiency of the supply of nails for construction of stables, *ib.*——Letter from Lord Lucan to Lord Raglan, dated 17th January 1855, complaining of the employment of the cavalry horses on transport duty, and pointing out the fearful consequences that are likely to ensue, *p.* 15, 16——Error of the Commissioners as to the period of the commencement of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *p.* 16——As also, with regard to the distance of the head quarters of the cavalry from the stores at Balaklava, *p.* 17—— Objections urged by the commanding officers of cavalry regiments against the supply of troop horses for the transport service, *ib.*——Number of cavalry horses employed on transport and foraging duty, *ib.*——Objections urged by General Scarlett against the supply of the cavalry horses for the transport service, *p.* 17, 18.

Account of the mortality among the horses of the Cavalry Brigade employed in the transport service, *p.* 18——Observation of Lord Raglan when appealed to respecting the employment of the cavalry horses on transport duties, *p.* 18——Inconvenience of a divisional general not being furnished with documentary evidence, to show how he carries on his duty, *p.* 19——Date of the arrival of the men's huts in the Crimea, *ib.*——Assistance rendered by Captain Kean in erecting temporary hospitals for the Cavalry Brigade, *ib.* ——Employment of the cavalry in bringing up the huts from Balaklava, *ib.*——Want of storage for the saddlery of the horses that had died, *ib.*——Degree of responsibility attaching to a divisional general, *p.* 20——Injustice of the comparison of the care and treatment of the baggage ponies of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava with the horses of the Cavalry Brigade at the heights of Inkermann, *ib.*

Opportunities which the engineers had of affording shelter to their baggage animals that the cavalry were deprived of, *p.* 20——Impossibility of constructing temporary stabling on the plateau, in the Crimea, of sufficient strength to resist the violent storms of the country, *p.* 21——Alleged offer of Colonel Griffiths to erect shelter for the Scots Greys on the plateau, *ib.*——Omission of the Commissioners to examine Lord William Paulet, *ib.*——Observations on the Commissioners' Report touching the provision of covering for the horses of the Scots Greys by the commanding officer of that regiment, *ib.* Communications had by the Commissioners with Lord William Paulet at Constantinople, *ib.*——Complaint of an appearance of an article in the "Times" newspaper touching the present inquiry, *p.* 25——Letter from the Quartermaster-general, dated 12 December 1854, directing the employment of the horses of the cavalry on transport duty, *ib.*

Want of pack-saddles for the use of the horses of the cavalry employed on transport duty, *p.* 26——Employment of the cavalry horses on forage duty as well as upon the transport duty, *ib.*——Manner in which the cavalry horses engaged in the transport service of the army were actually employed, *ib.*——Period when the cavalry commenced hutting their men, and when it was finished, *p.* 26, 27——Reason for not forwarding for Lord Raglan's consideration the letter of Lord Cardigan and those of five commanding officers, complaining of the cavalry being short of necessaries, *p.* 35——Means resorted to in order to provide the officers and men of the cavalry with kits and necessaries, *ib.*—— Duty of commanding officers with respect to the construction of trenches for the shelter of their horses, *ib.*——There was nothing in the world on the plateau that offered materials for hutting, *p.* 35, 36.

It would not have been safe to have placed any horse under canvas on the plateau where the cavalry were quartered, *p.* 36——Further complaint respecting an article which appeared in the "Times" newspaper, *p.* 37——Cause of the great mortality amongst the horses of the cavalry, *ib.*——Opinion that the horses of the cavalry were not properly fed any one day, *ib.*——When animals are exposed to the weather they require more food than they do at any other time, *ib.*——State of the horses of the Cavalry Brigade when quartered in Bulgaria and at Constantinople, *p.* 37, 38——Appointment of Mr. Murray of the Commissariat Department to the cavalry service, *p.* 38——Employment of Captain Walker to attend to the foraging of the cavalry regiments, *ib.*——The Commissariat officers were chiefly young men, and very few with any experience whatever, *ib.*

Dissatisfactory manner in which Mr. Commissary-general Filder fed the horses of the cavalry, *p.* 38—— Confusion created by the young men of the Commissariat department riding about the country bidding against each other for supplies, *ib.*—— Suggestion made to Mr. Commissary-general Filder with a view of procuring forage for the cavalry horses, *p.* 38, 39——State of the horses of the Light Cavalry when quartered at Devno, *p.* 39 ——Circumstance

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Lucan, Lieutenant-general the Earl of.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

——Circumstance of the officer of the "Simla" acquainting the Divisional General that there was no forage on board for the horses, *p.* 39——Circumstance of the transport steamers that conveyed the cavalry to the Crimea being short of provisions, *ib.*——Account of the embarkation of the cavalry for the Crimea in the "Trent," "Simla," "Jason," and "Hymalaya," steamers, *ib.*

Particulars respecting the disembarkation of the cavalry in the Crimea; length of time which it took, *p.* 39——Deficiency of corn for the horses of the cavalry upon landing in the Crimea, *p.* 39, 40——Shortness of water for the cavalry upon arrival in the Crimea; some of the horses were without water thirty hours, *p.* 39——Orders given for the cavalry to march, and take up their quarters at Steneskoi, on their arrival in the Crimea, *ib.*——Description of stacks found in the Crimea when the cavalry first landed, *ib.*——Complaint made to Lord Raglan on the morning of the battle of the Alma, of both men and horses having been left deficient of both food and forage, *p.* 40——Remarks of Lord Raglan upon the occasion of complaint being made to him of the men and horses of the cavalry having been left deficient of both food and forage, 40.

On the day of the battle of the Alma the horses of the cavalry could not have been out much less than twelve or fourteen hours, *p.* 40——Letter from Lord Lucan to the Quartermaster-general, dated 29 September 1854, complaining of the Commissariat arrangements, and the defective manner in which the duties are carried on in the cavalry division, *ib.*——Means adopted to secure fodder for the horses of the Cavalry Brigade when stationed near Varna, *ib.*——Excellent condition of the cavalry horses at the battle of Balaklava, *ib.*——Circumstance of the artillery being allowed ten pounds of hay per day, whilst the cavalry were restricted to eight pounds, *p.* 40, 41——Occasion of the Light Cavalry Brigade being ordered to Inkermann from Balaklava; difficulty of foraging at so great a distance, *p.* 41.

Occasion of communication being made to Lord Raglan of the difficulty of foraging the Light Cavalry Brigade at Inkermann, *p.* 41——Arrangement made by the Duke of Wellington, in the Peninsula, with respect to the cavalry foraging themselves, where the distance did not exceed three miles, *ib.*——Difficulty attending the foraging of the Light Cavalry Bridade at Inkermann, from the great distance from the stores, *p.* 42——Letters from Mr. Commissary-general Crookshank to Lord Lucan, upon the subject of foraging the Light Cavalry Brigade at Inkermann, *ib.*——Letter from Mr. Crookshank to Lord Cardigan, upon the same, *ib.*——Letter from Mr. Crookshank to Colonel Mayow, respecting the difficulty of keeping up the supply of forage in the Light Brigade, *p.* 43——Rate of allowance of hay to farm horses, *ib.*——Rate of allowance of hay to the cavalry and artillery horses in the Crimea, *ib.*

Offer made by General Canrobert to supply the British Cavalry Brigade with forage, upon certain conditions, *p.* 43——Conditions upon which Colonel Martimprey consented to supply the British Cavalry with forage, *ib.*——Occasion of Mr. Commissary-general Filder representing to Lord Raglan that the Heavy Cavalry Brigade had actually left the fodder on the wharf, when they could have removed it, *p.* 44——Occasion of the Heavy Cavalry being blamed for leaving fodder on the wharf when they could have removed it, *ib.*——Refusal of Mr. Commissary-general Filder to allow any arrears of food to be made good to the cavalry, *ib.*——Opinion that the Commissary-general is only a subordinate officer to a Quartermaster-general of an army, *ib.*——Reason assigned for sending the Light Cavalry Brigade to Inkermann, *ib.*

Circumstances under which General Vinois' brigade was sent to Balaklava, *p.* 45——Opinion that the safety of Balaklava depended upon General Vinois, *ib.*——Occasion of the dreadful state of the Cavalry Brigade being represented to Lord Raglan; answer of his Lordship upon that occasion, *ib.*——Colonel Wardell lost all his chargers on the passage from Varna to Balaklava, *p.* 46——Account of the mortality amongst the horses of the cavalry on the passage from Varna to Balaklava, *ib.*——It is estimated that above 400 horses were sacrificed by the transport from Varna to Balaklava, *ib.*——Copy of order issued by the Lieutenant-general commanding the cavalry in the camp before Sebastopol, 28 November 1854, to commanding officers of regiments and brigadiers, *ib.*——Issue of the order of 28th November 1854 to the Light Cavalry Brigade by Colonel Doherty, the senior officer in command, *p.* 47.

Refusal of Lord Cardigan to issue the order of the 28th November 1854 to the Light Brigade, *p.* 47——State of the Light Cavalry Brigade when in camp at Steneskoi, *ib.*——Order issued to the Light Cavalry Brigade on 18th September 1854, when in camp at Steneskoi, *ib.*——State of the Light Cavalry Brigade upon their arrival in the Crimea, *ib.*——Expediency of having a return, showing what has become of the horses that were landed in the Crimea, *p.* 59——Loss of Commissariat animals by deaths, according to a return furnished by Deputy Commissary-general Adams for six months, from October 1854 to March 1855, *p.* 108——Loss by deaths of horses in the heavy cavalry, light cavalry, and artillery, for six months, from October 1854 to March 1855, *ib.*

Loss among the horses in the cavalry and artillery from deficiency of forage, and other privations, *p.* 108——Total want of correctness in the figures in everything stated by the

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Lucan, Lieutenant-general the Earl of.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

the Commissioners, *p.* 108——Intention of Report of Commissioners to convey an impression that the delay in hutting cavalry was attributable to what passed between the Earl of Lucan and Colonel Griffiths, *ib.*——Unfair inference that what passed between the Earl of Lucan and Colonel Griffiths had the effect of deterring other cavalry officers from doing their duty, *ib.*——Denial of the truth of the statement that any officer was threatened with arrest for making a proposal, *p.* 109——His statement ought to have been supported by Lord William Paulet, Colonel Hodge, and others, *ib.*

Occasion of witness threatening to place Colonel Griffiths under arrest, *p.* 108, 109. 176——Charge in the Report of the Commissioners of want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising means of temporary shelter for cavalry horses, and to whom that charge may apply, *p.* 109, 110——Reference to Commissioners' Report as to delay in hutting of the cavalry, *p.* 110——Proportion of cavalry employed in bringing down sick, and carrying up provisions to the front, *ib.*——Incorrectness of certain returns furnished by Colonel Hodge and Colonel Mayow as to the proportion of men employed in bringing down the sick, and carrying up provisions, *ib.*——No horses of the light cavalry were sent on sick and provision duty till the 18th or 19th December, *p.* 110, 111——The Quartermaster-general is not the officer to give a return of duties, *p.* 111.

Colonel Hodge had not been in command of his brigade a week when he was examined; he was a regimental officer, and therefore incapable of furnishing returns with regard to the duties of his brigade for the months preceding, *p.* 111——Disposition by Lord Lucan of 500 cavalry horses; incorrectness of returns in Commissioners' Report, *ib.*——It is incorrect to state that the distance was a mile from the stores, *p.* 112——It is incorrect to state that the carrying up provisions to the front occupied only one-fifth part of the whole, *ib.*——Periods at which the various cavalry regiments were hutted, *ib.*——Order by the Lieutenant-general commanding the cavalry, directing the completion of the huts for the horses, after a hospital hut had been carried for each regiment, *p.* 115.

The object of the instructions to the Commissioners was to confine their inquiry to the Commissariat supplies, and they exceeded their duty when they went beyond it, *p.* 113——The Commander-in-Chief of the army is responsible for providing shelter or cover for cavalry horses in the field, if it is possible to do so, *ib.*——Expression of the Prime Minister of his full approval of the Commissioners' Report, *p.* 114——It is the duty of the Quartermaster-general of the army, having previously obtained the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief, to provide, as far as he can, shelter for the horses under any and every circumstance, *ib.*——Period when it was decided that the cavalry were to be stationed in winter quarters; this had no reference to the altercation with Col. Griffiths, *ib.*

During the twelve days that followed their marching down to Kadekoi the Fourth Dragoon Guards did not lose a single horse, *p.* 114——Want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising shelter for the horses might apply to either or all the officers, and not to one in particular *ib.*——The loss of horses in the cavalry was not very great for the first ten days in December, *ib.*——Number of horses lost between the 12th December and the 17th January, which is attributed to the Commissariat transport, and not to the want of shelter, *ib.*——Letter to Lord Raglan of the 17th January, stating that if the transport duties continued a few days longer the force would cease to exist, *ib.*——It would have been a great object to have saved the cavalry from transport duties, if seamen could have been hired, or labourers obtained, from Constantinople for that purpose, *ib.*

Reason why Colonel Hodge and Lord W. Paulet were not examined relative to the complaint made by Colonel Griffiths, *p.* 118——In carrying up the Commissariat supplies every soldier rode one horse and led another, *p.* 115——It would have been most improper to have allowed any dragoon to walk those distances for carrying up Commissariat supplies in the state of the roads at that time, *ib.*——Observations upon the motives of Colonel Tulloch in preferring the charges against the General of Division of the Cavalry Brigade of the army in the Crimea, *p.* 175——Reluctance of witnesses to come forward upon the present occasion, and cause, *ib.*——Eager and vehement support given to the Crimean Commissioners' Report by the press, *ib.*——Circumstance of the press ridiculing and misrepresenting the evidence of Sir Edmund Lyons, *ib.*

Statement of Lord Lucan in reply to the charges preferred against him by Colonel Tulloch, of neglect in affording shelter to the horses of the cavalry brigade during the winter of 1854-55, *p.* 175-196——Assistance rendered Colonel Griffiths by the Zouaves and Turks in constructing stabling for the Scots Greys, *p.* 176——Circumstances attending the altercation with Colonel Griffiths, when witness threatened to place him under arrest, *ib.*——Abandonment of the charge by Colonel Tulloch of blame being attachable particularly to the cavalry, *p.* 177——Date of the Scots Greys landing on the Katcha to join the army in the East, *ib.*——Statement showing the mortality amongst the horses of the Heavy Brigade and the Light Brigade by sickness or casualties other than killed in action, *ib.*

Date of the arrival of the Royal Dragoons and Enniskillens in the Crimea, *p.* 177——Observations

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Lucan, Lieutenant-general the Earl of.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

——Observations on the praise bestowed upon Colonel Wood of the Artillery for the care and treatment of his horses during the winter of 1854-55, *p.* 177, 178——Observations with regard to the mortality amongst the horses of the artillery during the winter of 1854-55, *ib.*——Opinion that the army ought to feel gratitude to Colonel Tulloch for coming forward in the manly way he has done, to uphold the Report of the Crimean Commissioners, *ib.*——Statement showing the mortality amongst the horses of the Royal Artillery in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, *p.* 178——Observations with respect to the mortality amongst the mules and baggage animals attached to the Commissariat department in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, *p.* 179.

Occasion of the formation of ambulance corps for the conveyance of the sick and wounded in the Crimea, *p.* 179——Circumstance of Mr. Stockley of the artillery being employed to purchase pack animals at Eupatoria for the Commissariat, *ib.*——Account of the number of baggage animals purchased by Mr. Commissary-general Filder whilst in Turkey, and likewise the number purchased in Spain, *p.* 179, 180——Statement of the losses of horses in the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea up to the 16th January 1855, *p.* 180——Statement of the number of horses belonging to the Cavalry Brigade landed in Bulgaria, *ib.*——Observations with respect to the displacement of words in a marginal note of the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry, *ib.*——Observations on the statement made that the officer commanding the Scots Greys, proposed to erect, with the assistance of his men, some sort of cover for the horses of the corps, *p.* 181.

Description of the shelter afforded to the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners in Balaklava, *p.* 181——Observations upon the charges preferred against the Divisional General of the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea of want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising some plan for the shelter of the horses during the winter of 1854-55, *p.* 181-195——Occasion of the Quartermaster-general's attention being called to the question of providing canvas for shelter for the cavalry horses, *p.* 182——Grounds of objection to the use of canvas on the plateau, *p.* 183——Occasion of the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Hardinge consulting Colonel Tulloch with respect to making arrangements as to huts for the soldiers in the Crimea, *p.* 182——Objection of General Beatson to placing horses under canvas on the plateau, *p.* 183.

Opinion of General Scarlett upon the use of canvas for shelter of cavalry horses on the plateau, *p.* 183——Observations upon Mr. Bracebridge's evidence with respect to the use of canvas for the shelter of horses, *ib.*——Observations upon Mr. Rawlinson's evidence respecting the shelter of the cavalry horses on the plateau, *ib.*——Importance of the cavalry keeping as near the colline as possible, for the purpose of filling up the intervals between the other troops, *ib.*——Observations upon the want of building materials for the erection of cavalry stables for the horses in the Crimea, *p.* 184——Evidence of Sir Edmond Lyons relative to the means at the disposal of the fleet for affording shelter to the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *ib.*

Circumstance of the Minister of War and the Ordnance each sending out a clerk of the works to the Crimea, to look after 16 carpenters, *p.* 184——Observations upon Mr. Bracebridge's evidence with respect to obtaining a supply of Carpenters from Constantinople for the purpose of constructing stables for the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *ib.*——Objections to the plan of digging trenches and sheltering horses therein, *p.* 184, 185——Impolicy of employing the men in digging trenches for the cavalry, *p.* 185——Want of carpenters for the purpose of constructing cavalry stables for the horses in the Crimea, *p.* 184, 185——Observations upon Mr. Rawlinson's plan of digging trenches or pits to afford shelter to horses, *ib.*——Deficiency of the British soldier in the execution of spade work, *ib.*——Difficulty of draining pits sufficiently to admit of horses being placed in them, *p.* 185.

Objection to the plan adopted by the Sardinian Cavalry of digging trenches for their horses, *p.* 185——Opinion that the 10th Hussars showed far more judgment to let their horses stand in the open air than behind trenches, *ib.*——The Chasseurs d'Afrique never thought of putting their horses behind a trench until it was paved, *ib.*——The Russians never thought of putting their horses behind trenches, *ib.*——Reason why spare sails could not have been obtained from the merchant shipping lying in Balaklava Harbour, *ib.*——Reason for permitting the cavalry soldiers to ride their horses to and from Balaklava when employed on transport duty, *p.* 186——Statements showing the number of disposable men of various cavalry regiments on the 16th December 1854, *p.* 186, 187——Extent to which the mortality amongst the cavalry horses is to be attributed to their employment on transport duty, *p.* 186. 193.

Statement of the duties expected of an available dragoon of a cavalry regiment in the field, *p.* 187——Occasion of application being made to Lord Raglan for clothing for the horses of the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea, *p.* 188——Occasion of Lord Raglan giving directions for the Cavalry Brigade to prepare shelter for the horses, *ib.*——Expectation of Lord Raglan that the Chasseurs d'Afrique had been sheltered at the period of giving directions to the British Cavalry Brigade to provide shelter for their horses, *ib.*——

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Lucan, Lieutenant-general the Earl of.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Occasion of application being made for an engineer officer, and the Quartermaster-general giving directions for one to attend, *p.* 188——Occasion of Captain Chapman, of the engineers, calling on witness, and going over the ground marked out for the cavalry stables, *ib.*——Occasion of Mr. Stokes, an engineer officer, reporting himself as being sent to assist in constructing stables, *ib.*

Occasion of application being made to Captain Gordon, of the Royal Engineers, to furnish an engineer officer to assist in the construction of stabling for the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea, *p.* 188——Occasion of application being made to Captain Chapman, of the engineers, to furnish engineering tools to the cavalry for the purpose of constructing stabling for the horses, *ib.*——Promise made by Captain Chapman, of the Royal Engineers, to furnish tools to enable the cavalry to erect stabling for the shelter of their horses, *ib.*——Appointment of Major Hall to the duty of constructing stabling for the cavalry horses in the Crimea during the winter of 1854–55, *ib.*——Occasion of Lieutenant Lennox presenting himself to witness, *ib.*——Exertions made to construct hutting for the troops of the Cavalry Brigade in the early part of December 1854, *ib.*——Exertions made by the cavalry regiments to construct the depôt stabling, and how prevented by want of nails, *ib.*

Difficulty in obtaining timber and building materials for the construction of the depôt stabling for the cavalry, *p.* 188, 189——Order issued by the Divisional General, entreating commanding officers of cavalry to endeavour by every means in their power to give shelter to their horses, *p.* 189——Readiness and despatch shown by the Quartermaster-general's department in supplying means and materials for the construction of shelter for the cavalry horses, *ib.*——Difficulty of getting a sufficient number of Turks to assist in building the depôt stabling for the cavalry, *ib.*——Daily application made to Sir Colin Campbell to supply Turks to assist in the construction of the cavalry stables, *ib.*——Occasion of Major Shute congratulating witness on the completion of the stabling for the cavalry horses, *ib.*

Cause of the difference of opinion with respect to the period of completion of the stables of the 13th Dragoons, *p.* 189——Error of Colonel Doherty with respect to the period of the completion of the stables of the 13th Light Dragoons, *p.* 190——Error of Colonel Low as to the date of the completion of the stabling for the horses of the 4th Light Dragoons, *ib.*——On the 11th February every horse of the cavalry division that had survived was under cover, and that in the very depth of winter, *ib.*——Doubts as to the period of completion of the stables of the 4th Light Dragoons; how accounted for, *ib.*——Observations upon the incorrectness of the accounts furnished by the Commissioners of Inquiry respecting the cavalry, *ib.*——Errors of the Commissioners of Inquiry in all matters of accounts and returns relating to the cavalry, *ib.*

Neglect of the Commissioners of Inquiry to examine those witnesses respecting the cavalry whose evidence might have been relied on, *p.* 190——Circumstance of the Commissioners of Inquiry commencing their examination of the regimental quartermasters, and only concluding with that of the general officers, *ib.*——Observations upon the neglect of the Commissioners of Inquiry to examine the two brigade majors of cavalry in the Crimea whose evidence might have been relied on, *ib.*——Observations upon the neglect of the Commissioners to examine Lord Raglan and his staff before they closed their inquiry in the Crimea, *ib.*——Constant conferences and communications held between the Minister of War and the Commissioners with regard to their Report, *p.* 190, 191——Denial that the Minister of War interfered in drawing up the Report of the Commissioners, *p.* 191, 192.

Unfitness of Colonel Tulloch, from his connexion with the War Office and Civil departments of the army, to undertake the office of Commissioner of Inquiry, *p.* 191——The Report is the joint production of Lord Panmure and the two Commissioners, and therefore cannot claim that respect which a report differently circumstanced would be entitled to, *p.* 193——The object of the Crimean Commissioners' Report was to absolve the Government from the charge of sacrificing the finest army that ever left England, through their apathy and negligence, and real want of ingenuity and promptitude, *ib.*——Circumstance of the occupation of the heights of Inkermann by the Light Cavalry Brigade, upon which occasion Lord Lucan received an order from Lord Raglan on no account whatever to exercise any authority over the Light Brigade, *p.* 215.

Circumstance of Lord Lucan receiving instructions from Lord Raglan not to interfere with the Light Cavalry Brigade, *p.* 222——Circumstances attending Mr. Assistant Commissary-general Crookshank being put under arrest, *ib.*——Letter from Lord Lucan to the Adjutant-general, dated 30 September 1854, complaining of the neglect of the Commissariat in supplying the cavalry with forage and corn for the horses, *ib.*——Circumstances attending the placing of Mr. Assistant Commissary-general Crookshank under arrest, *p.* 222, 223——Complaint made to the Quartermaster-general of the delay in the drawing of the forage for the cavalry from Balaklava, *p.* 223.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Lucan, Lieutenant-general the Earl of.* (Analysis of his Evidence)—*continued.*

Issue of an order by Lord Lucan to commanding officers of regiments, calling for monthly returns, giving an account of the health and condition of the men and horses, also how the troops have been supplied with food and forage, *p.* 223——Nature of the duties which devolved on the Heavy Cavalry Brigade on the 16th November 1854, *p.* 228——Letter from the Adjutant-general to Lord Lucan, conveying Lord Raglan's orders for Mr. Crookshank's release, *p.* 274, 275.

*LUCAN, THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF:*

1. *Consideration of his Lordship's Case by the Board.*
2. *Evidence before the Sebastopol Committee.*
3. *Supply of Forage for Cavalry Horses.*
4. *Construction of Cavalry Stables.*
5. *Employment of the Cavalry on Transport Duty.*
6. *Altercation with Colonel Griffiths.*
7. *Complaints of Commanding Officers.*
8. *Commissariat Department.*
9. *Commissioners of Inquiry.*
10. *Visits to the Camp.*
11. *Case of Mr. Crookshank.*
12. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Consideration of his Lordship's Case by the Board:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers on the case of Lieutenant-general the Earl of Lucan, with the grounds for arriving at the conclusion that his Lordship was not chargeable with neglect in the performance of the important duties attached to his command, *Rep.* ii-vi——Desire of the Earl of Lucan to have his case considered and decided separately, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 5, 6——Application of his Lordship for twenty-four hours to consider before going into the case against him, *ib. p.* 6——Refusal of his Lordship to accept the twenty-four hours' delay when granted, *ib. p.* 7——Intention of Lord Lucan to enter a protest against not being heard separately, *ib.*——Course of proceeding of his Lordship before the Board in refutation of the charges preferred against him, *ib. p.* 8.

2. *Evidence before the Sebastopol Committee:*

Evidence of Lord Lucan before the Sebastopol Committee, touching the state of the Light Cavalry Brigade quartered on the heights of Inkermann, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 200——Reasons assigned by Lord Lucan, before the Sebastopol Committee, for not sending the horses of the Light Brigade to fetch forage from Balaklava, *ib. p.* 206——Copy of letter from Commissary-general Filder to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, relating to part of the evidence given by the Earl of Lucan before the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol, *App.* 598, 599.

3. *Supply of Forage for Cavalry Horses:*

Letter from the Earl of Lucan to the Quartermaster-general, dated 10 January 1855, relative to the supplies of forage to the several regiments of the Cavalry Division of the army in the East, *App.* 529, 530——Letter from Lord Lucan to the Commissary-general, dated 15 December 1854, complaining of deficiency of rations of forage for the cavalry, *App.* 598.

4. *Construction of Cavalry Stables:*

Letter from Lord Lucan to the Quartermaster-general, complaining of the want of Turks to assist in the construction of cavalry stables, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 12——Orders given to Lord Lucan to erect temporary stables for the cavalry horses, *Colonel Gordon, p.* 23——Issue of orders to Lord Lucan on the 8th and 12th November 1854 to provide shelter for his horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 85, 86——Copy of divisional order issued by Lord Lucan, calling upon the commanding officers of the Cavalry Brigade to give the strictest attention to their stable duties, and the management and care of their troop horses, *Major Conolly, p.* 155——Statement of Lord Lucan in reply to the charges preferred against him by Colonel Tulloch of neglect in affording shelter to the horses of the Cavalry Brigade during the winter of 1854-55, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 175-196——Occasion of the Quartermaster-general placing at Lord Lucan's disposal an engineer officer and some Turkish workmen to assist in the construction of shelter for the horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 251, 252.

5. *Employment of the Cavalry on Transport Duty:*

Letter of Lord Lucan to Lord Raglan of 17 January 1855, under the head of cavalry transport, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 15, 16——Circumstance of Lord Lucan remonstrating with Lord Raglan against employing the cavalry horses on the transport and ambulance service, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 96——Application of witness to Lord Lucan to allow the troop horses of the Light Brigade to be sent down to Balaklava to fetch forage, *Crookshank, p.* 208-210——Denial of Lord Lucan, that Mr. Commissary-general Crookshank ever applied to him for permission for the troop horses of the Light Cavalry to be sent to Balaklava for forage, *ib. p.* 210.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*LUCAN, THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF*—continued.

6. *Altercation with Colonel Griffiths:*

Occasion of Lord Lucan threatening to place Colonel Griffiths under arrest, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 27-31; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 108, 109. 176.

7. *Complaints of Commanding Officers:*

Reason of Lord Lucan for not forwarding the letters of the commanding officers of cavalry regiments to Lord Raglan, complaining of being short of necessaries, *Colonel Doherty, p.* 35.

8. *Commissariat Department:*

Letter from Lord Lucan to the Quartermaster-general, complaining of Commissary-general Filder's neglect of the cavalry, *p.* 40——Reason of the Crimean Commissioners not examining Lord Lucan in regard to Commissariat supplies, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 48.

9. *Commissioners of Inquiry:*

Remarks upon Lord Lucan calling the Crimean Commissioners of Inquiry, the one a statistical clerk of the War Office, and the other a Commissioner of Poor-laws, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 52——Denial that Lord Lucan had been animadverted upon by the Crimean Commissioners in their Report, *ib. p.* 53.

10. *Visits to the Camp:*

Frequency of Lord Lucan's visits to the camps of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Douglas, p.* 64; *Colonel Doherty, p.* 67——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 18 November 1854, calling attention to Lord Lucan's visit to the camp, *App.* 462.

11. *Case of Mr. Crookshank:*

Letter from Lord Lucan to the Adjutant-general, of 30 September 1854, stating that one of the Commissariat staff had been placed under arrest, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 222, 223 ——Occasion of Lord Lucan placing Assistant Commissary-general Crookshank under arrest, *Crookshank, p.* 225, 226——Mr. Crookshank made several representations of the language he had received from Lord Lucan, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 274.

12. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Copies of the Earl of Lucan's divisional orders and correspondence whilst in command of the English cavalry in the army in the East, *App.* 415-457——Letter from Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch to Lord Panmure, dated 16 February 1846, in answer to a letter from the Earl of Lucan, *ib.* 599——Letter from the Earl of Lucan to Brigadier-general Airey, dated Camp before Sebastopol, 2 November 1854, as to the removal of the troops, *ib.* 415.

*See* also *Cavalry, Cavalry Horses. Forage. Huts and Hutting. Shelter for Horses. Stabling.*

*Lushington, Captain Sir Stephen.* Assistance rendered the army in the Crimea by the Naval Brigade under the command of Sir Stephen Lushington, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 148——Erection of 200 huts for the army by Captain Lushington, with the carpenters at his disposal, *ib. p.* 154.

*LYONS, ADMIRAL SIR EDMUND, K.C.B., G.C.H.*

1. *Examination before the Board of General Officers.*
2. *Visits to the Camp.*
3. *Relief of the Sick and Wounded.*
4. *Scarcity of Sailcloth in the Fleet.*
5. *Attacks of the Press.*
6. *Shelter of Cavalry Horses.*
7. *Exertions of the British Army.*
8. *Instructions to the Agent for Transports.*

1. *Examination before the Board of General Officers:*

Commanded the English Fleet in the Black Sea, in the winter of 1854, *p.* 147——No application was ever made for sails or canvas to shelter the cavalry horses, *p.* 147, 148 ——Opinion of Captain Drummond, of Her Majesty's ship "Retribution," on the uselessness of putting up canvas on the plateau as a means of shelter, *p.* 148——Number of vessels of war lying at Kamiesch, and in Kazatch Bay during the war, *ib.*——Assistance rendered by

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Lyons, Admiral Sir Edmund, K.C.B., G.C.H.*—continued.

1. *Examination before the Board of General Officers*—continued.

by the Naval Brigade to the army in the Crimea, *p.* 148——Error of Colonel Tulloch with respect to the number of ships' carpenters available for land service, *ib.*——Inability of the Admiral to spare carpenters from the fleet to assist in the erection of shelter for the horses of the cavalry in the Crimea, *p.* 148, 149——Lord Raglan was extremely particular when applying for the artificers and crews of vessels belonging to the fleet to assist the army on shore, *p.* 149——Occasion of application being made to the Admiralty to send out more carpenters to the Black Sea fleet, *ib.*——Circumstance of Admiral Grey being obliged to send to Malta for ships' carpenters for the Black Sea fleet, *p.* 149, 150——Reason why a sufficient supply of carpenters could not be obtained from Constantinople for the service of the army and the fleet, *ib.*

Number of ships and vessels of war stationed in the Black Sea in November 1854, and how employed, *p.* 150, 151——Means devised by Colonel David Wood of the artillery, and Sir George Brown, for affording shelter for their horses, *p.* 152——Assistance rendered by the navy in landing troops upon the occasion of the invasion of the Crimea, *p.* 152, 153——Assistance rendered by the navy to the sick and wounded after the battle of the Alma, *ib.*——Services performed by Lieutenant Goss of the Royal navy, in superintending the embarkation of the sick and wounded, *p.* 153——Valuable assistance rendered by Lieutenant Hawkins of the Royal navy in forwarding ammunition to the front, under peculiar difficulties, *ib.*

Letter from witness to the Secretary of the Admiralty, dated 7 April 1855, stating the measures taken for the relief of the sick and wounded, and the supply of the army with cartridges, *p.* 153—— Letter from Captain Heath to Lord Raglan, dated 6 December 1854, offering to roast coffee for the army on board the "Sanspareil," *ib.*——Offer of Captain Heath to build stabling for a lot of Spanish mules recently landed in the Crimea, *p.* 154——Erection of 200 huts for the army, by Captain Lushington, with the carpenters at his disposal, *ib.*——Construction of wharfs and landing-places at Balaklava, alongside which the largest steamers could come and land their cargoes, *ib.*

2. *Visits to the Camp:*

Frequency of Admiral Lyons' visits to the camp in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 97.

3. *Relief of the Sick and Wounded:*

Letter from Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons to the Secretary of the Admiralty, dated 7 April 1855, stating the measures taken for the relief of the sick and wounded, and the supply of the army with cartridges, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 153.

4. *Scarcity of Sailcloth in the Fleet:*

Observations on the statement of Sir Edmund Lyons in regard to the apparent want of sailcloth in the British fleet, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 170.

5. *Attacks of the Press:*

Circumstance of the press ridiculing and misrepresenting the evidence of Sir Edmund Lyons, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 175.

6. *Shelter of Cavalry Horses:*

Observations on the evidence of Sir Edmund Lyons relative to the means at the disposal of the fleet for affording shelter to the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 184.

7. *Exertions of the British Army:*

Observations of Sir Edmund Lyons on the exertions of the British army to meet the difficulties with which it was surrounded, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 243.

8. *Instructions to the Agent for Transports:*

Extract from instructions from Sir Edmund Lyons to Captain Heath, the principal agent for transports in the Crimea, *App.* 525, 526.

*Lysons, Colonel:*

1. *Capture of a Convoy from the Enemy.*
2. *Requisitions for Stores and Clothing.*

1. *Capture of a Convoy from the Enemy:*

Circumstance of Colonel Lysons, of the 23d, capturing a convoy of carts protected by a body of Cossacks, from the enemy, on landing in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237.

2. *Requisitions for Stores and Clothing:*

Complaint of Lieutenant-colonel Lysons, of being told that he was not to make requisitions for clothing for his men, as when the articles arrived, they would be distributed, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 256.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

M.

*M'Kenzie, Colonel:*

1. *Examination before the Board of General Officers.*
2. *Distribution of Stores at Balaklava.*

1. *Examination before the Board of General Officers:*

Assistant Quartermaster-general at Balaklava; examination as to the duties of that officer in the embarkation of the sick, and disembarkation of all troops arriving; employment of the crews of the merchantmen or transport service, *p.* 292, 293——Bad state of the regimental clothing of the troops in the early part of the winter, *p.* 294–297.

Regulations as to forage on board the horse transports; means taken to notify to the troops the arrival of articles of extra clothing, *p.* 297——Further examination as to landing stores at Balaklava, *p.* 320, 321——Examination relative to the duties performed by Captain Heath, and how far inconveniences arose from his living afloat, *p.* 402–404. 407, 408.

2. *Distribution of Stores at Balaklava:*

Statement of Lieutenant-colonel Mackenzie, Assistant Quartermaster-general at Balaklava, with full discretionary powers to approve of all requisitions on the spot in case of pressure, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 255——This officer was stationed at Balaklava, with authority to give orders for stores, and whose signature was equally valid as witness's; how far the zeal of some commanding officers might have caused them to take advantage of this, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 285, 286.

*M'Kinnon, Dr.* Opinion of Dr. M'Kinnon, of the 21st Regiment, that from the wet state of the ground, straw or hay, if procurable, would not have been of service to the men, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 282.

*M'Mahon, Sir Thomas.* Inability of Sir Thomas M'Mahon to serve on the Commission, on ground of ill-health, *p.* 2.

*M'Neill, Sir John.* Observations on Sir John M'Neill's letter to Lord Raglan upon the subject of the Crimean inquiry, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 230——Application of Sir Richard Airey to the Board to procure the attendance of Sir John M'Neill, *ib. p.* 327, 328——Answer of Sir John M'Neill, declining to attend the Board of General Officers, *p.* 329——Letter from Sir John M'Neill to Field Marshal Lord Raglan, dated Balaklava Harbour, 15th March 1855, upon the subject of the Crimean inquiry, *App.* 511——Letter of Colonel Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, given in evidence by Colonel Tulloch, dated Quartermaster-general's Office, Sebastopol, 4th June 1855, *ib.* 521——Letter from Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch to the Right Honourable Lord Panmure, dated 21st February 1846, with reference to a letter from the Earl of Cardigan, *ib.* 598.

Letter from Sir John M'Neill to the Right Honourable Lord Panmure, dated 16th February 1846, in answer to a letter from the Earl of Lucan, *App.* 599——Letter from Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, dated Quartermaster-general's Office, before Sebastopol, 4th June 1855, given in evidence by Colonel Tulloch, 25th April 1856, *ib.* 604, 605——Letter, dated Granton House, Edinburgh, 12th May 1856, from Sir John M'Neill to Lord Panmure, as to the preliminary report of 9th June being sent to Lord Raglan, and referring also to Colonel Gordon's and Colonel Wetherall's evidence before the Commissioners, *ib.* 608——Letter from Mr. Peel to the Judge Advocate-general, dated War Department, 23d May, requesting a copy of a letter from Sir John M'Neill may be laid before the Board, *ib.*——Letter from Sir John M'Neill to Lord Panmure, dated 12th May 1856, respecting the preliminary Report of the Commissioners sent to Lord Raglan, *ib.* 608, 609.

*See* also *Commissioners of Inquiry. Reports of the Commissioners.*

*Magazines and Storehouses* (*Commissariat*). The Commissariat stores at Balaklava were erected by the Commissary-general; it was no use applying to the engineers, whose duty it was to have done it, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 292.

*Malta:*

1. *Camp Equipage and Stores.*
2. *Reinforcements of Troops.*
3. *Commissariat Depôt.*

1. *Camp Equipage and Stores:*

Arrangements made by the Quartermaster-general for a supply of camp equipage and stores for the service of the army in the East, from Malta, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 240——Reserve intended to be formed at Malta; this was not carried out; number of tents obtained from thence, *ib. p.* 264.

2. *Reinforcements*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*MALTA*—continued.

2. *Reinforcements of Troops:*

Promptitude of Sir William Reed, the Governor of Malta, in sending reinforcements to the Crimea upon hearing of the battle of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 247.

3. *Commissariat Depôt.*

Reason why the depôt of the Commissariat at Malta was never established, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 385.

"*Manilla*," *The Ship.* Date of the arrival of this ship, and of its discharging cargo; cause of the delay, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 282.

*Maps and Plans.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field with respect to obtaining the best available maps and plans of the country which is the theatre of war, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235——Admirable manner in which the maps and plans were executed by the officers attached to the Quartermaster-general's department in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 239.

*Marching of Troops.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field, with respect to directing and superintending the marching of troops, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*Marquees.* Observations with regard to the supply of marquees for the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 240——Many of the marquees, being old when sent out, had suffered from wear and tear in Bulgaria, and from the repeated process of being landed and embarked, *ib. p.* 242 —— Account of the destruction of the marquees and tents by the storm of the 14th November in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 244——Account of the damage done to the hospital marquees by the storm of 14th November, *ib.*

*Martimprey, Colonel.* Conditions upon which Colonel Martimprey consented to supply the British cavalry with forage, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 43.

*Masons.* Difficulty in procuring masons at Constantinople to proceed to Balaklava to build storehouses, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 289.

*Mattresses.* Remarks on the charge by the Commissioners as to deficiency in mattresses, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 284.

*MAYOW, COLONEL G. WYNELL:*

1. *Employment of Troop Horses on Transport Duty.*
2. *Deficiency of Forage for Horses.*
3. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Employment of Troop Horses on Transport Duty:*

Application of Lieutenant-colonel Mayow to Lord Cardigan for the cavalry horses to fetch hay from Balaklava, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 198——Report of Colonel Mayow, dated 24th November 1854, suggesting the employment of the troop horses of the Light Brigade in fetching forage from Balaklava, *ib. p.* 203——Occasion of a representation being made to Colonel Mayow, of the necessity of sending troop horses down to Balaklava to bring up forage, *Colonel Douglas, p.* 226, 227.

2. *Deficiency of Forage for Horses:*

Reports of the Brigade-major, Colonel Mayow, on the 18th, 19th, 21st, and 22d November 1854, on the deficiency of the supply of hay and corn for the Light Cavalry, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 201——Repeated representations made to the Brigade-major, Colonel Mayow, of the deficiency of forage for the horses of the Light Brigade, *Colonel Doherty, p.* 217.

3. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Copy of a report of Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 18th November 1854, on the state of the Light Brigade, *App.* 461——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 18th November 1854, calling attention to Lord Lucan's visit to the camp, *ib.* 462——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 19th November 1854, enclosing returns and daily states, *ib.*——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated, Camp, near Sebastopol, 20th November 1854, reporting the state of the Light Brigade, *ib.*

Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 21st November 1854, reporting the state of the Light Cavalry, *App.* 463——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 22d November 1854, on the same, *ib.*——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 24th November 1854, relative to sending the troop horses of the Light Brigade to fetch up barley, *ib.* 464——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 25th November 1854, enclosing states and reports, *ib.*

*Meat.* Statement of the quantities of salt and fresh meat issued by Commissariat to the troops in the Crimea in the months of March, April, and May 1855, *App.* 538, 539—— Importation of slaughtered meat by the Commissariat as well as live cattle for the use of the army in the Crimea, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 362, 363.

*See* also *Diet. Fresh Meat. Salt Meat. Slaughtered Meat. Supplies. Medical*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Medical Department.* Hospital arrangements are within the jurisdiction of the Medical Department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 295.

*Memorandum.* Observations upon a memorandum printed at p. 166 of the evidence taken before the Crimean Commissioners, affecting the Quartermaster-general's department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 232——Paper of the parts erased from memorandum of replies of Colonel Wetherall, *App.* 471——A memorandum upon the responsibility for the original supply of camp equipage for a British army in the field by Sir Richard Airey, Quartermaster-general to the army in the East, *App.* 499–501.

*Menchikoff, Prince.* Strength of Prince Menchikoff's position within the intrenched camp of Sebastopol, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 261, 262.

*Merchant Service.* Importance of an agent for transports being of the merchant service rather than the navy; opinion of Admiral Dundas in support thereof, *Colonel Gordon, p.* 397.

*Merchant Shipping.* Resort had to the merchant shipping lying in Balaklava Harbour, for the services of ships' carpenters and seamen to assist in the erection of huts, and constructing shelter for the horses of the cavalry, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 246.

*Methuen, Captain.* Offer made by Captain Methuen to put up a temporary shelter for the cavalry horses, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 30.——*See* also *Crews of Vessels.*

*Militia Coatees.* These articles being useless to the troops, is the answer to the charge by the Commissioners for their non-issue, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 283, 284.

*Milne, Capt. Alexander,* R. N. Examination of Captain Alexander Milne, R. N., before the Board of General Officers, as to the contracts by the Admiralty for the transport service, *p.* 314–318——Letter from Captain Milne, R. N., dated Admiralty, 12th May 1856, transmitting books and correspondence relative to hay supplied to the army in the East, *App.* 590.

*Minister-of-War:*

1. *Report of the Commissioners.*
2. *Production of Papers.*

1. *Report of the Commissioners:*

Occasion of Lord Lucan addressing the Minister-of-War upon the subject of the Crimean Commissioners' Report, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 8——Constant conferences and communications held between the Minister-of-War and the Commissioners with regard to their report, *ib. p.* 190, 191——Denial that the Minister-of-War interfered in drawing up the report of the Commissioners, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 191.

2. *Production of Papers:*

Authority of the Minister-of-War for all papers and documents required to be produced by Colonel Tulloch, *p.* 106.

*See* also *Newcastle, Duke of.* *Panmure, Lord.*

*Minutes of Evidence.* Manner in which the Minutes of Evidence were taken and recorded by the Commissioners on the Crimean Inquiry, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 223, 224; *Sir R. Airey, p.* 230, 231.——*See* also *Shorthand Writer.*

*Modern Warfare.* In a regular war, the formation of a base of operations is the first step; it often precedes even the declaration of hostilities, and it always precedes the opening of a campaign, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241.

*Monthly Returns.* Occasion of Lord Lucan issuing an order calling for monthly returns from commanding officers of regiments, giving an account of the health and condition of the men and horses, also how the troops have been supplied with food and forage, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 223.

*Mortality of Horses:*

1. *Cavalry Brigade.*
2. *Commissariat and Transport Service.*
3. *Royal Artillery.*

1. *Cavalry Brigade:*

Statement of the number of deaths of cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Rep.* ii; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 9——Cause of the great mortality amongst the horses of the cavalry, *ib. p.* 37——Account of the mortality amongst the horses of the cavalry on the passage from Varna to Balaklava, *ib. p.* 46——Account of the mortality among the horses of the 5th Dragoon Guards in the Crimea, *Major Thompson, p.* 78.

Loss, by deaths, of horses in the Heavy Cavalry, Light Cavalry, and Artillery, for six months from October 1854 to March 1855, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 108——Causes to which the

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*MORTALITY OF HORSES*—continued.

1. *Cavalry Brigade*—continued.

the loss of horses, not killed in battle, is to be attributed, *Major-general Scarlett, p.* 144——Statement showing the mortality amongst the horses of the Heavy Brigade and the Light Brigade by sickness or casualties, other than killed in action, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 177——Statement of the losses of horses in the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea up to the 16th January 1855, *ib. p.* 180.

Extent to which the mortality of the cavalry horses in the Crimea is to be attributed to their employment on transport duty, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 186. 193——Comparative statement of the loss of horses in the Heavy Brigade, Artillery, and Light Brigade, between October 1854 and March 1855, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 202——Comparison of the mortality of the troop horses of the Light Brigade and the Heavy Brigade, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 221.

2. *Commissariat and Transport Service:*

Loss of Commissariat animals by deaths, according to a return furnished by Deputy Commissary-general Adams for six months from October 1854 to March 1855, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 108——Number of horses lost between the 12th December and the 17th January, which is attributed to the Commissariat transport, and not to the want of shelter, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 114——Observations with respect to the mortality amongst the mules and baggage animals attached to the Commissariat department during the winter of 1854–55, *ib. p.* 179——Causes to which the mortality amongst the horses of the transport service is to be attributed, *Crookshank, p.* 224——The rapid destruction of transport animals was mainly attributable to exposure and overwork, not from want of forage, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 360.

3. *Royal Artillery:*

Statement showing the mortality amongst the horses of the Royal Artillery in the Crimea during the winter of 1854–55, *Rep.* ii; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 178.

*See* also *Baggage Animals. Cavalry Horses. Horses. Mules. Transport Service.*

*Mortality of Labourers.* Account of the mortality amongst the workmen imported into the Crimea by the Commissariat department from the Euxine and the Bosphorus, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238——Great mortality of labourers imported from Constantinople, Trebizond, Bulgaria, &c., into the Crimea, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 290.

*Moveable Column.* The allied army, upon landing in the Crimea, would more properly be called a moveable column; distinction between the two descriptions of force, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241——Nature of the drawbacks to the employment of a moveable column which do not apply to a regular army, *ib.*

*Mud.* The mud in the men's tents was over their shoes, and the paillasses, which were only cotton bags, trampled by fifteen men daily into that mud would not have added to their comfort, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 282.

*MULES:*

1. *Supply of Mules.*
2. *Mortality.*
3. *Cavalry Brigade.*

1. *Supply of Mules.*

Circumstance of Lord Raglan giving up 270 mules to officers and non-commissioned officers of Cavalry on January 20th, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 11——Mules were obtained from Candia, Cyprus, and Smyrna, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 291——Return of transport animals in charge of Deputy Assistant Commissary C. Bagot Smith, in the Crimea, on the 30th September 1854, *App.* 459, 460.

2. *Mortality:*

Observations with respect to the mortality amongst the mules and baggage animals attached to the Commissariat department in the Crimea during the winter of 1854–55, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 179——Statement with regard to the mortality among the Spanish mules used for transport purposes, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 364.

3. *Cavalry Brigade:*

Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 24th July 1854, directing particular care to be taken with the mules supplied for the forge carts, *App.* 420.

*See* also *Sappers and Miners. Spanish Mules.*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Mundy, Colonel G. C.* Letter from Colonel Mundy, dated 8 May 1855, to Mr. Wood, of the Ordnance, complaining of the very injurious procrastination which has occurred in complying with the Quartermaster-general's requisition for a supply of camp equipage and engineering tools for the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 245——Letter from Colonel Mundy, dated War Department, December 26, 1854, to Major-general Yorke, relative to the supply of camp equipage to the army in the East, *App.* 500, 501——Letter from Colonel Mundy to the Judge Advocate-general, dated War Department, 13th May 1856, transmitting the Preliminary Report of the Commissioners, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, *ib.* 502.

*Murray, Mr.* Appointment of Mr. Murray, of the Commissariat Department, to the Cavalry service, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 38.

## N.

*Nails.* Failure of the supply of nails for the construction of the cavalry stables, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 15. 188——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 11th July 1854, relative to the cavalry regiments laying in a supply of horse nails, *App.* 418.

*Naval Brigade.* Assistance rendered by the Naval Brigade to the army in the Crimea, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 148.——*See* also *Lushington, Captain Sir Stephen.*

*Naval Officers.* How far officers in charge of transport ships were authorised to dispose of sail cloth for the use of the troops, *Captain Milne, p.* 315.

*Navy.* Evidence of Sir Edmund Lyons, relative to the assistance rendered the army in the Crimea by the Black Sea fleet under his command, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 147–154—— Admirable arrangements and zealous exertions of the British navy in the disembarkation of the troops in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242——Wish of every man in the navy to do all he could to assist the army in the state they were in, *Admiral Deans Dundas, p.* 306.——*See* also *Fleet, The.*

*Necessaries.* Reason of Lord Lucan for not forwarding for Lord Raglan's consideration the letter of Lord Cardigan and those of five commanding officers, complaining of the cavalry being short of necessaries, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 35.——*See* also *Supplies.*

*New Great Coats.* Form of requisition for new great coats for the troops, *App.* 469.

*Newcastle, Duke of:*

1. *Hutting for the Troops in the Crimea.*
2. *Land Transport.*

1. *Hutting for the Troops in the Crimea:*

Occasion of the Duke of Newcastle sending for witness, to see whether he could assist in getting the hutting for the troops, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 182.

2. *Land Transport:*

Evidence of the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of State for War, before the Sebastopol Committee, relative to the duties of the Commissariat to provide land transport for an army in the field, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237.

*Newspapers.* Expression of opinion of the Board of General Officers, with respect to the publication of their proceedings in the daily papers pending the inquiry, *p.* 34——Eager and vehement support given to the Crimean Commissioners' Report by the Press, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 175.——*See* also *" Times" Newspaper.*

*Nineteenth Regiment.* Evidence of Dr. Alexander, before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea, respecting the number of hours the 19th Regiment were in the trenches, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172——Number of blankets supplied to this regiment; explanation of evidence before the Commissioners on that subject, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

*Nosebags.* Inconvenience and loss sustained from want of nosebags for the Light Cavalry Brigade, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 202——Occasion of canvas being procured from Balaklava to patch up the nosebags of the cavalry horses, *Colonel Douglas, p.* 227——Number which left England on the 5th April, having been asked for in November; in the meantime some had been made on board ship out of sail cloth, and others had been obtained from Constantinople, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 288——Difficulty of getting at those in store, *Boyd, p.* 313.

O

*Oats.* Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Sir Charles Trevelyan, dated 18 November 1854, requesting a cargo of oats from England to be sent out to the Crimea, *App.* 552.

*Officers:*

1. *Generally.*
2. *Quartermaster-general's Office.*

1. *Generally:*

List of names of officers demanding inquiry into their conduct before the Board of General Officers, *p.* 3——Difficulty in a campaign of exacting from officers very strict daily returns, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 10.

2. *Quartermaster-general's Office:*

Approval of the conduct of all the officers in the Quartermaster-general's Office in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 261——Manner in which the officers serving under the Quartermaster-general in the Crimea were selected, *ib. p.* 239.

*See* also *Naval Officers. Staff.*

*Oil Cake.* Occasion of General Codrington ordering the mules belonging to the army in the Crimea to be fed on oil cake, *Bracebridge, p.* 84.

*Old Fort.* Particulars as to the landing of the expeditionary force in the Crimea on the beach at Old Fort, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241.

*Orders.* Copy of order issued by the Lieutenant-general commanding the cavalry in the camp before Sebastopol, dated 28 November 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 46, 47——Order issued to the Light Cavalry Brigade, on 18 September 1854, when in camp at Steneskoï, *ib. p.* 47——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 8th August, directing the order in which the cavalry shall turn out, *App.* 421.

*See* also *Divisional Orders. General Orders.*

*Ordnance Department:*

1. *Supply of Camp Equipage.*
2. *Conveyance of Stores.*

1. *Supply of Camp Equipage:*

Letter from the Secretary of the Board of Ordnance, dated 18 April 1855, stating the reason of the delay in supplying camp equipage and engineering tools to the army in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 244, 245.

2. *Conveyance of Stores:*

Extract of letter from the Ordnance Department, signed by Mr. Poignaud, to the Under Secretary of State, dated 9 May, on the subject of conveyance of stores requisitioned for in the previous November, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 288.

*See* also *Wood, Mr.*

"*Orient,*" *The Ship.* Quantity of trousers found on board this ship, they having been transhipped by the naval authorities without reference to either the Commissariat or Quartermaster-general's Departments, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 284.

*Osman Pasha.* Repeated applications made to Osman Pasha to furnish Turks to assist in the construction of cavalry stables, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 12. 189.

*Ovens.* Erection of ovens by Colonel Tulloch whilst in the Crimea, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 383——Copy of certificate of the quantity of bread produced at Kadekoi from two ovens built by Colonel Tulloch, *App.* 534.

*Overwork.* Concurrence in opinion with the Crimean Commissioners that the sufferings of the army, during the winter of 1854–55, are traceable to overwork, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 236——Observations upon the overwork exacted of the officers and of the several departments of the army in the East, *ib. p.* 239——The resolution of the allied generals to hold the advanced trenches, and to maintain an attitude of attack, imposed upon the troops great sufferings, and labour beyond their strength, *ib. p.* 242——The evil in the Crimean campaign was that one man was doing the work of three, and then comes the recommendation that this one man should do the work of six, *ib. p.* 243.

P.

*Pack Animals.* Observations with respect to the mortality amongst the pack animals attached to the Commissariat department in the Crimea, during the winter of 1854-55, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 179——Mortality of pack animals from the badness of the road between Balaklava and the British camp, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 359.

*See* also *Baggage Animals.*

*Eack Saddles.* Want of pack saddles for the use of the horses of the cavalry employed on ansport duty, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 26.

*Paget, Lord George.* Occasion of Lord George Paget complaining of the 4th Light Dragoons being kept without their rations, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 222.

*Paillasses.* Reason why the paillasse covers sent out to the Crimea could not be made available, *Rep.* xiii; *Sir R. Airey, p.* 98——They were not issued because they would have added to the discomfort of the men, as they were not stuffed; they were however used for the wounded after the battle of Inkermann, *Watson, p.* 334——Reason why the paillasses were of no service to the troops in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 260——Answer to the charge in the Commissioners' Report of not issuing paillasses, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 282, 283.

*Palmerston, Lord.* Expression of Lord Palmerston of his approval of the Commissioners' Report on the British Army in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 114; *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 147——Extract from Lord Palmerston's speech on 16 February 1855, on sending out the Civil and Military Commissions to the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 239——Letter from Frederick Peel, Esq., M.P., to Colonel Tulloch, dated 18th April 1856, with reference to Lord Palmerston's approval of the Report of the Crimean Commissioners, *App.* 605.

*PANMURE, LORD:*

1. *Board of General Officers.*
2. *Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry.*
3. *Preliminary Report of the Commissioners.*
4. *General Staff of the Army in the East.*
5. *Supplies of Stores to the Army.*
6. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Board of General Officers:*

Letter from Lord Panmure to Lord Hardinge, communicating Her Majesty's commands respecting the report and proceedings of the Board of General Officers, *p.* 3.

2. *Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry:*

Circumstance of Lord Panmure sending a telegraphic message to witness, to say that he wanted his answers to be sent by the next mail, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 92——His approbation of the Commissioners' Report expressed to Colonel Tulloch and Sir John M'Neill at the time he perused it, *p.* 113——Approval of Lord Panmure of the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry into the British Army in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 147.

3. *Preliminary Report of the Commissioners:*

Circumstance of the Private Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry being sent to Lord Panmure in pieces for his Lordship's approval, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190, 191—— Denial of the interference of Lord Panmure in the production of the Commissioners' Report, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 191, 192.

4. *General Staff of the Army in the East:*

Circumstance of Lord Panmure appointing General Simpson to investigate the composition of the general staff of the army in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 234.

5. *Supplies of Stores to the Army:*

Letter from Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, dated 5th May 1855, stating the progress made in complying with the requisition of the Quartermaster-general of the army, dated in November 1854, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 245——Extract of letter from Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, dated 29th May, on the subject of stores for which requisition had been sent in the previous November, *ib.* 287.

6. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Letter, dated War Department, 19th February 1855, from Lord Panmure to Major-general Simpson, defining the duties to be performed on his appointment to be Chief of the Staff, *App.* 467——Letter from Sir J. M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch to the Right Hon. Lord Panmure, dated 21st February 1846, with reference to a letter from the Earl of Cardigan, *ib.* 598——Letter from Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch to Lord Panmure, dated 16th February 1846, in answer to a letter from the Earl of Lucan, *ib.* 599.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Parades.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 27th June 1854, directing parades to be held not less than three times a week, *App.* 417.

*Patrol.* Reason why the Light Brigade had no patrol duty when occupying the position upon the heights of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 218.

*Paulet, Lord William.* Communications had by the Commissioners with Lord William Paulet at Constantinople, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 21——Reason why he was not examined by the Commissioners relative to the charge by Colonel Griffiths against Lord Lucan, *ib. p.* 115——Occasion of Lord William Paulet releasing Assistant Commissary-general Crookshank from arrest, *Crookshank, p.* 225, 226.

*Peel, Frederick,* M.P. Letter from Frederick Peel, Esq., M.P., to Colonel Tulloch, dated 18th April 1856, with reference to Lord Palmerston's approval of the Report of the Crimean Commissioners, *App.* 605——Letter from Mr. Peel to the Judge Advocate-general, dated War Department, 23d May, requesting a copy of a letter from Sir John M'Neill may be laid before the Board, *ib.* 608.

*Peel, General.* Memorandum by Sir Richard Airey upon question submitted by General Peel with reference to the provision of camp equipage for an army in the field, *App.* 499-501.

*Peninsular War.* In the Peninsular War, and in all former European Wars conducted by this country on a scale of magnitude, the means of transport had been obtained either by purchases or requisitions made in the districts occupied by the forces, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238——How issues of supplies were made to the troops by the Commissariat Department in the Peninsula, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 388.

*Periodical Reports.* Issue of an order by Lord Lucan calling for periodical reports from commanding officers, giving an account of the health and condition of the men and horses, also of the drills and duties performed, and how the troops have been supplied with food and forage, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 223.

*Phinn, Thomas.* Letter from Thomas Phinn, Esq., dated 13th May 1856, enclosing statement relative to the number of spare sails and quantity of sailcloth supplied to Her Majesty's ships in the Black Sea, *App.* 605.

*Pickets.* Reason why the Light Brigade had no pickets or patrol when occupying the position upon the heights of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 218——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 29th May 1854, directing the manner in which squadrons of cavalry are to be picketed, *App.* 415——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 14th July 1854, directing the picket lines to be carried by the dragoons alternately, *ib.* 419.

*Pits.* Plan suggested of affording temporary shelter to the cavalry horses in the Crimea by digging pits and covering them with sailcloth, *Rep.* v; *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 55, 56——Success of the plan of pits for affording temporary shelter to the cavalry horses, *Major Thompson, p.* 57, 58. 78——Opinion with respect to affording temporary shelter for cavalry horses in pits, *Colonel Low, p.* 67, 68——Objections to the plan of placing horses in pits as a means of shelter, *Rep.* v; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 184, 185——Difficulty of draining pits sufficiently to admit of horses being placed in them, *ib. p.* 185.——*See* also *Shelter for Horses.*

*Plans and Maps.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field with regard to obtaining the most accurate plans and maps of the country which is the theatre of war, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235——Admirable manner in which the plans and maps were executed by the officers attached to the Quartermaster-general's department in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 239.

*Plunder of Stores.* Bales of stores frequently were cut open, and the stores plundered, by Maltese and others, *Boyd, p.* 308.

*Ponies.* Letter from Lord Lucan to Lord Raglan urging the purchase of baggage ponies for the transport service, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 15, 16——Injustice of the comparison of the cavalry horses with the baggage ponies of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava, *ib. p.* 20——Description of the ponies attached to the transport service of the Commissariat Department in the Crimea, *Crookshank, p.* 224.

*See* also *Ammunition Ponies. Baggage Animals.*

*Porter.* Issue of porter to the troops in the Crimea from the Commissariat stores, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 383.

*Preliminary Report.* Circumstance of the private Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry being sent to Lord Panmure in pieces for his Lordship's approval, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190, 191——Denial of the interference of Lord Panmure in the production of the Commissioners' Report, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 191, 192——Circumstance of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch making a preliminary report of their inquiries in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey,*

*Preliminary Report*—continued.

*p.* 252, 253——Remarks and correspondence relative to the non-production of the Preliminary Report of the 9th June, *p.* 329, 330——Copy of the Preliminary Report of the Commissioners, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, dated Constantinople, June 9th, 1855, *App.* 502-510——Letter dated Granton House, Edinburgh, 12th May 1856, from Sir John M'Neill to Lord Panmure, as to the Preliminary Report of 9th June being sent to Lord Raglan, *ib.* 608——Letter from Sir John M'Neill to Lord Panmure, dated 12th May 1856, relative to the Preliminary Report of the Commissioners which was sent to Lord Raglan, *ib.* 608, 609.

*Preserved Potatoes.* Unwillingness of the troops to take preserved potatoes when procured for them, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 373, 374.

*Press, The.* Eager and vehement support given to the Crimean Commissioners' Report by the Press, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 175.——*See* also *"Times" Newspaper.*

*Presses.* Importation of hydraulic presses, and screw field presses from England, for pressing and forwarding forage from Constantinople, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 372——Use made of the hydraulic and screw presses sent out from England, *ib. p.* 381, 382——Despatch of a set of presses for the use of the army in the East, by the authorities at home, *ib. p.* 391.

*Prime Minister.* Expression of the Prime Minister of his full approval of the Commissioners' Report, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 114; *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 147.

*See* also *Palmerston, Lord.*

*"Prince," The Ship.* Enormous loss of warm clothing by the loss of the "Prince," *Sir R. Airey, p.* 259.

*Privations of the Men.* Observations on the privations of the men belonging to the army in the East during the first winter of the campaign, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 261.

*See* also *Sufferings of the Army.*

*Proceedings of the Board.* Proceedings of the Board of General Officers upon receiving Her Majesty's warrant, ordering the present inquiry, *Rep.* i.

*Provisions.* It is incorrect to state that the carrying up provisions to the front occupied only one-fifth part of the whole, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 112.——*See* also *Supplies.*

## Q.

*Quartering of Troops.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field in directing and superintending the quartering of the troops, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL:*

1. *Duties of the Office.*
2. *Transport and Supplies of the Army.*
3. *Shelter for the Cavalry Horses.*
4. *Employment of Cavalry on Transport Duty.*
5. *Queries submitted by the Commissioners of Inquiry.*
6. *Services of Sir R. Airey.*
7. *Removal of the Cavalry.*

1. *Duties of the Office:*

Observations upon the duties of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field, *Rep.* ix-xv; *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235——The Quartermaster-general is not the officer to give a return of duties, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 111——The Quartermaster-general heard from two sources what were the wants of the army; that is, from the Assistant Quartermasters of divisions of what they could not get, and from witness of what he could not supply them with, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 285——The Quartermaster-general only authorises the issues; he has no control over the conveyance or delivery, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 286——Sir Richard Airey was daily at Balaklava, in all weathers, and sometimes after dark; much of his business with the superintendent of transports was done in the open streets, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 293, 294.

2. *Transport and Supplies of the Army:*

Occasion of Lord Raglan stating to the home authorities in England that the Quartermaster-general had nothing to do with the transport or supplies of the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237——The Quartermaster-general has no control over the stores of the army, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 269.

3. *Shelter for the Cavalry Horses:*

Application made to the Quartermaster-general for Turks to assist in the construction of cavalry stables, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 11——It is the duty of the Quartermaster-general of the army, having previously obtained the sanction of the Commander-in-chief, to provide,

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL*—continued.

3. *Shelter for the Cavalry Horses*—continued.

vide, as far as he can, shelter for the horses under any and every circumstance, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 114——Readiness and despatch shown by the Quartermaster-general's department in supplying means and materials for the construction of shelter for the cavalry horses, *ib. p.* 189.

4. *Employment of Cavalry on Transport Duty:*

Letter from the Quartermaster-general, dated 12 December 1854, directing Lord Lucan to supply 500 horses for the transport duty of the army, *p.* 25.

5. *Queries submitted by the Commissioners of Inquiry:*

Nature of the queries submitted to the Quartermaster-general by the Crimean Commissioners; their relation to other departments of the service, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 232, 233.

6. *Services of Sir R. Airey:*

General order of Sir William Codrington, dated 17 November 1855, acknowledging the services of Sir Richard Airey as Quartermaster-general of the army in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235; *App.* 467.

7. *Removal of the Cavalry:*

Memorandum from Sir R. Airey, Quartermaster-general, as to removal of Cavalry Brigade to Windmill Heights, 2 November 1854, *App.* 415.

*See* also *Airey, Major-general Sir Richard.*

*QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT:*

1. *Duties of Officers.*
2. *Commissioners of Inquiry.*
3. *Selection of Officers.*
4. *Approval of Conduct of Officers.*
5. *Issue of Stores.*
6. *Army Works.*
7. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Duties of Officers:*

Observations of the Board on the administration of the Quartermaster-general's department in the Crimea, with reasons for considering the staff free from blame, *Rep.* x–xv ——Nature of the duties performed by the officers of this department during the unloading the vessels in Balaklava Harbour, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 266——There never was any difficulty in seeing the Quartermaster-general or his officers when wanted; there was always some officer or other on the spot lending assistance, *Boyd, p.* 309.

2. *Commissioners of Inquiry:*

Had the Commissioners gone further into the evidence in the Crimea there would have been no occasion for the present investigation, as far as concerns the Quartermaster-general's department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 94——Desire of witness to peruse the minutes of examination of all the subordinate officers in the Quartermaster-general's department, *ib. p.* 229——Observations upon the memorandum of the Commissioners of Inquiry for the Quartermaster-general's department, relative to the supplies of warm clothing sent out to the East, *ib. p.* 232.

Opinion that the Crimean Commissioners, when in the East, did not intend to cast blame upon the Quartermaster-general's department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 232——Colonel Tulloch did not ask witness for an inspection of his books; he might have seen them, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 281——Animadversions by the Commissioners on the Quartermaster-general's department, without comparing the returns upon which they came to that conclusion, *ib.*

3. *Selection of Officers:*

Principle upon which the officers of the Quartermaster-general's department in the Crimea were selected, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 239.

4. *Approval of Conduct of Officers:*

Approval of the conduct of all the officers in the Quartermaster-general's office in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 261.

5. *Issue of Stores:*

The signature of an officer of this department was necessary as a voucher to the Commissariat for the issue of certain stores, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 269——The constant communication between this department and the Naval authorities and the Commandant at Balaklava, caused an impression that the officers of that department had the control of the stores, which was not the fact, *ib.*——The Quartermaster-general can only be held responsible for the quantities of stores ordered to be issued, and not for the quantities drawn, *ib.*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT*—continued.

5. *Issue of Stores*—continued.

Steps taken by the Quartermaster-general's office to prevent any delay in the distribution of warm clothing and camp necessaries to the men, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 256——Regiments made their requisition on the Quartermaster-general for what they wanted; he signed those requisitions and was not further responsible for their issue, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 281.

6. *Army Works*:

Remarks of the Board of General Officers with regard to the subject of hutting the troops in the Crimea during the winter of 1854–55, and extent to which the Quartermaster-general's department fulfilled their duties in respect thereto, *Rep.* xiii, xiv—— The Quartermaster-general's department does not execute any kind of army works; it is only by requisitions that this department can operate in this direction, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 239.

7. *Papers laid before the Board*:

Letter from Colonel Gordon to the Judge Advocate-general, 22d May 1856, returning the original notes of the examination of Colonel Wetherall and Colonel Gordon, *App.* 512–519——Letter from Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, dated Quartermaster-general's office, before Sebastopol, 4th June 1855, given in evidence by Colonel Tulloch, 25th April 1856, *ib.* 604.

*See* also *Airey, Major-general Sir Richard, K.C.B. Camp Equipage. Clothing. Delays. Distribution of Stores. Extra Clothing. Great Coats. Hospitals. Huts and Hutting. Issue of Stores. Labour of the Soldiers. Landing Troops. Lucan, the Right Honourable the Earl of. M'Kenzie, Colonel. Maps and Plans. Officers. Panmure, Lord. Quartering Troops. Raglan, Lord. Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry. Requisitions. Rugs. Scantling. Shelter for Horses. Staff Officers. Stores. Supplies. Tools. Transport Service. Tulloch, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Murray. Turks. Warm Clothing. Watch Cloaks. Winter of* 1854–55. *Wood. Work.*

*Quartermaster-general's Stores.* Error of the Commissioners of Inquiry in supposing that the Quartermaster-general issues stores from his department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 253, 254——Meaning of the term Quartermaster-general's stores; description of the stores to which it relates, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 269——Answer to charges in the Commissioners' Report as to the restrictions in the Quartermaster-general's department on the issue of stores, *ib. p.* 284–286.

Degree of responsibility attaching to the Commissariat department for the custody of Quartermaster-general's stores, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 386——Description of articles coming under that denomination, *ib.*——Denial of the Commissary-general of drawing largely upon the Quartermaster-general's stores in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 387, 388—— Occasion of the custody of the Quartermaster-general's stores being turned over to the Commissariat, *ib. p.* 388——Advantage of a separate storekeeper's department for Quartermaster-general's stores, *ib.*——Statement of watch cloaks actually drawn from the stores during the months of November, December, and January, 1854–55, *App.* 472.

*See* also *Issue of Stores. Quartermaster-general's Department.*

*QUARTERMASTERS OF REGIMENTS:*

1. *Examination before the Commissioners of Inquiry.*
2. *Supply of Stores and Clothing.*
3. *Forage for Cavalry.*

1. *Examination before the Commissioners of Inquiry*:

Circumstance of the Commissioners of Inquiry commencing their examination of the regimental quartermasters, and only concluding with that of the general officers, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190.

2. *Supply of Stores and Clothing*:

They were constantly in the stores at Balaklava; they might have had what they wanted that was in store; they refused rugs as unserviceable, *Boyd, p.* 309.

3. *Forage for Cavalry*:

Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 16 July 1854, directing the regimental quartermasters to accompany parties proceeding for forage for the cavalry, *App.* 419.

*Queries of the Commissioners.* Observations upon the queries submitted by the Commissioners of Crimean Inquiry to the Quartermaster-general, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 232, 233—— Letter from Colonel Gordon to Sir John M'Neill, dated 4 June 1855, upon the subject of the queries submitted to the Quartermaster-general Airey by the Commissioners of Inquiry, *ib. p.* 251.

R.

*RAGLAN, LORD:*

1. *His Plans relative to the Army in the Crimea.*
2. *Cavalry Brigade.*
3. *Shelter for the Horses.*
4. *Quartermaster-general and Commissariat Departments.*
5. *Commission of Inquiry.*
6. *Roasted Coffee.*
7. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *His Plans relative to the Army in the Crimea:*

Resolution of Lord Raglan to hold the advanced trenches, and to carry forward the approaches to the enemy's lines, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242——Degree of completeness and precision shown by Lord Raglan in the mastery of all military business, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 261——His opinion that it would be better to let the men land in the Crimea in as light marching order as possible, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 263.

2. *Cavalry Brigade:*

Circumstance of Lord Raglan giving the cavalry charge of 270 mules, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 10, 11——Occasion of the clerk of the 4th Dragoon Guards addressing a return respecting the cavalry to Lord Raglan by mistake, *ib. p.* 14——Observation of Lord Raglan when appealed to respecting the employment of the cavalry horses on transport duties, *ib. p.* 18 ——Remark of Lord Raglan upon the occasion of complaint being made to him of the men and horses of the cavalry having been left deficient of both food and forage, *ib. p.* 40.

Occasion of communication being made to Lord Raglan of the difficulty of foraging the Light Cavalry Brigade at Inkermann, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 41——Occasion of the dreadful state of the Cavalry Brigade being represented to Lord Raglan; answer of his Lordship upon that occasion, *ib. p.* 45 —— Statement of Lord Raglan, that he was privately bound to the French to keep the Light Cavalry Brigade in their position on the heights of Inkermann, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 199.

Order issued to the Light Brigade to occupy the heights of Inkermann, near the windmill, *Earls of Lucan and Cardigan, p.* 215——Reluctance of Lord Raglan to send the Light Cavalry Brigade to the position which they occupied on the heights of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 218——Occasion of Lord Raglan giving orders for the Cavalry Brigade to supply 500 effective horses for the transport service of the army, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 13.

3. *Shelter for the Horses:*

Frequency of applications of Lord Lucan to Lord Raglan for means and assistance to afford shelter for the horses of the cavalry, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 32——Occasion of Lord Raglan giving directions for the Cavalry Brigade to prepare shelter for the horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 188.

4. *Quartermaster-general and Commissariat Departments:*

Opinion entertained by Lord Raglan of witness's services as Quartermaster-general of the army in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235——Lord Raglan was in constant and almost daily personal communication with the Commissary-general of the army in the East, *ib. p.* 236——Occasion of Lord Raglan stating to the Home authorities in England that General Estcourt and General Airey had nothing to do with the transport or the supplies, *ib. p.* 237——Lord Raglan almost invariably left the nomination of the officers of the Quartermaster-general's department to witness, *ib. p.* 239——Repeated applications were made to Lord Raglan for instructions to guide the Commissariat in their operations, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 358——Letter from Lord Raglan, dated 18 January 1855, directing the employment of the Spanish mules recently imported, in carrying up huts to the front, *ib. p.* 363.

5. *Commission of Inquiry:*

Observations upon the neglect of the Commissioners to examine Lord Raglan and his staff before they closed their inquiry in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190.

6. *Roasted Coffee:*

Remarks of Lord Raglan upon receiving Captain Heath's offer to roast coffee for the army on board the "Sanspareil," *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 153, 154.

7. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Letter, dated Head Quarters, Crimea, 26th April 1855, from Major-general Simpson to Field Marshal Lord Raglan, as to the composition of the general staff, *App.* 467, 468 ——Letter from Sir John M'Neill to Field Marshal Lord Raglan, dated Balaklava Harbour, March 15, 1855, upon the subject of the Crimean Inquiry, *ib.* 511 —— Letter from Field

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*RAGLAN, LORD*—continued.

7. *Papers laid before the Board*—continued.

Field Marshal Lord Raglan to Sir John M'Neill, dated 15 March 1855, intimating his desire to afford the Commissioners every assistance in the prosecution of their inquiry, *App.* 511.——Letter from Lord Raglan to William Filder, esq., dated May 31st, 1854, relative to providing supplies and transport for the British army in Bulgaria, *ib.* 540, 541——Letter from Lord Raglan to Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, dated June 19th, 1855, thanking them for transmitting a copy of their Preliminary Report to his Lordship, *ib.* 609.

*Railway Contractors.* No railway contractor would have lost one-twentieth part of the horses, under the same conditions, if they had been stuck on that very ground, from the same causes that the cavalry horses were lost from, *Rawlinson, p.* 81, 82.

*Raines, Major.* Extract from the Report of Major Raines of the 95th, relative to shelter of the horses of the Sappers and Miners, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 305.

*Rations.* Extent of soldiers' rations; insufficiency thereof when not near towns or villages; alterations made therein, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 298——Cause of the alleged deficiency in the supply of rations to the troops in December 1854 explained, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 359——Means devised by the Commissariat to supply the troops in the Crimea with fresh meat, *ib. p.* 360.——Statement of the number of rations of rice or Scotch barley issued to the troops in the Crimea from the 16th November to 27th December 1854, *App.* 535-538.

*Rawlinson, Robert.* Examination of Mr. Robert Rawlinson, a civil engineer, and one of the members of the Sanitary Commission sent to the Crimea, relative to the opportunities for providing temporary shelter for the horses of the cavalry on the plateau above Kadekoi, *p.* 79-82.

Grounds of objection to Mr. Rawlinson's evidence with respect to providing shelter for the cavalry horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 97——Observations upon the evidence of Mr. Rawlinson, relative to the means devised for affording shelter to the horses of the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 169——Observations upon Mr. Rawlinson's evidence respecting the shelter of the cavalry horses on the plateau, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 183——Observations upon Mr. Rawlinson's plan of digging trenches or pits to afford shelter to horses, *ib. p.* 184, 185.——*See* also *Forage. Short Rations.*

*Read, Sir William.* Promptness of Sir William Read in dispatching troops from Malta to the Crimea upon hearing of the battle of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 247.

*Re-coaling Ships at Balaklava.* All the vessels that came out from England or from Malta had to re-coal at Balaklava; this was a tedious operation, and occupied much of the time of the boats' crews, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 293.

*Regimental Clothing.* Bad state of the regimental clothing in the early part of the winter, and reasons why a fresh supply was not sent out, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 294——Further evidence as to a requisition to England for regimental clothing in October; date when it arrived, and how distributed, *ib. p.* 295-297.

*Regimental Quartermasters.* See *Quartermasters of Regiments.*

*Regiments.* Statement showing the quantity of warm clothing and stores for which orders had been given to regiments on the 15th January 1855, *App.* 472.

*See* also *Cavalry. Infantry.*

*Reinforcements.* Promptitude of the Governors of Malta and the Ionian Islands in sending reinforcements to the Crimea after hearing of the battle of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 247.

*Removal of Troops.* Letter from the Earl of Lucan to Brigadier-general Airey of 2d November 1854, as to the removal of the troops, *App.* 415.

*See* also *Windmill Heights.*

*Replies to Queries.* Paper of the parts erased from memorandum of replies of Colonel Wetherall, *App.* 471.

*REPORTS OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF INQUIRY:*

1. *Generally.*
2. *Earl of Lucan's Case.*
3. *Earl of Cardigan's Case.*
4. *Sir Richard Airey's Case.*
5. *Colonel Gordon's Case.*
6. *Commissary-general Filder's Case.*
7. *Approval by Government.*
8. *Want of Correctness.*
9. *Exclusion of Matter.*
10. *Preliminary Report.*
11. *Quartermaster-general's Department.*

1. *Generally:*

Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch made two Reports, dated respectively, Constantinople, 10 June 1855, and London, January 1856, *Rep.* i.——Letter from Major-general

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Reports of the Commissioners of Inquiry*—continued.

1. *Generally*—continued.

general Sir Richard Airey to the Right Honourable C. P. Villiers, dated Horse Guards, 22d May 1856, transmitting a paper showing the two Reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, dated Constantinople 9th and Constantinople 10th June 1855, *App.* 472-498.

2. *Earl of Lucan's Case.*

Observations of the Board of General Officers upon the charges preferred against Lieutenant-general the Earl of Lucan in the Reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, *Rep.* ii-vi.

3. *Earl of Cardigan's Case:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers upon the charges preferred against Major-general the Earl of Cardigan in the Reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, *Rep.* vi-viii.

4. *Sir Richard Airey's Case:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers upon the charges preferred against Major-general Sir Richard Airey, Quartermaster-general to the army in the East, in the Reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, *Rep.* ix-xv.

5. *Colonel Gordon's Case:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers upon the charges preferred against the Honourable Colonel Gordon in the Reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, *Rep.* xv-xix.

6. *Commissary-general Filder's Case:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers upon the charges preferred against Commissary-general Filder, in the Reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, *Rep.* xx-xxix.

7. *Approval by Government:*

How far the Report of the Commissioners has been approved of by the Government, *p.* 113——Constant communications and conferences held between Lord Panmure and the Commissioners with reference to their Report, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190, 191——Denial of the interference of Lord Panmure, Minister of War, in the production of the Report of the Commissioners, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 191, 192——The Report is the joint production of Lord Panmure and the two Commissioners, and therefore cannot claim that respect which a report differently circumstanced would be entitled to, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 193——Obervations upon the manner in which the London Report of the Crimean Commissioners was drawn up, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 234——Letter from Frederick Peel, Esq., M. P., to Colonel Tulloch, dated 18th April 1856, with reference to Lord Palmerston's approval of the Report of the Crimean Commissioners, *App.* 605.

8. *Want of Correctness:*

Total want of correctness in the figures in everything stated by the Commissioners, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 108——The Commissioners' Report is a mere statement of what was not done, and not a careful and dispassionate investigation of the causes and circumstances to which the shortcomings might be justly and fairly attributed, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 357——The Report is a misrepresentation in many parts, and exaggeration in others, *ib.*

9. *Exclusion of Matter;*

Exclusion of some parts of the Report originally made to the Secretary for War from that laid before Parliament, on the ground that the Commissioners had no authority for going into such points, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 174.

10. *Preliminary Report:*

Circumstances attending the Commissioners of Crimean Inquiry making a Preliminary Report, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 252, 253——Copy of the Preliminary Report of the Commissioners, Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, dated Constantinople, 9th June 1855, *App.* 502-510——Letter from Sir John M'Neill to Lord Panmure, dated 12th May 1856, respecting the Preliminary Report of the Commissioners sent to Lord Raglan, *ib.* 608, 609.

11. *Quartermaster-general's Department;*

Until the Report of the Commissioners was laid before Parliament, no idea prevailed that an inquiry was going on respecting the Quartermaster-general's department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 232——Impossibility of the Commissioners forming a fair opinion upon what could or could not be done by the army in the Crimea, placed in a position of straits and difficulties beyond human conception, *ib. p.* 261.

*See* also *Errors of the Commissioners. Preliminary Report.*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Requisition Book.* Description of this book, and nature of the entries made therein, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 269.

*REQUISITIONS:*

1. *Issue of Stores and Clothing.*
2. *Supplies from England.*
3. *War Office Forms.*

1. *Issue of Stores and Clothing:*

The Quartermaster-general countersigns the checks which are called the requisitions, by which the stores are drawn from the Commissariat department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 254——Plan adopted in the Quartermaster-general's office in case of a requisition being filled up with a wrong description of the article of clothing required, *ib. p.* 255——System adopted in the Quartermaster-general's department on receiving requisitions for clothing, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 268——The charge in the Commissioners' Report that rugs, paillasses, and other articles remained undistributed for which requisitions would have been made if the commanding officers had known they had been in store, is not supported by evidence, *ib. p.* 285.

No requisitions for warm clothing or camp equipment were refused by witness from informality, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 292——When approved requisitions were presented to witness the stores were delivered as quickly as possible; witness was too glad to get rid of the parties and the stores to make room for others, *Boyd, p.* 309——Informality in requisitions did not stop the delivery of stores; they often issued without requisition sooner than cause delay, *ib.*——Requisitions were sometimes brought down days after the stores had been delivered, *ib. p.* 310.

2. *Supplies from England:*

Circumstance of the Quartermaster-general sending a requisition to England, on the 28th of November 1854, for a supply of camp equipage and engineering tools to the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 244, 245——Table showing the periods of time occupied in the execution of orders required to be executed in England, *App.* 468.

3. *War Office Forms:*

Elaborate description of the War Office form of requisition for obtaining a new great coat; error of the Commissioners of Inquiry in supposing that the same form ruled in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 258——Form of requisition for new great coats for the army, *App.* 469.

*See* also *Distribution of Clothing. Issue of Stores. Quartermaster-general's Department. Warm Clothing.*

*Reserve Stores.* Memorandum by Sir Richard Airey, dated 22d May 1856, upon the subject of the provision of reserve stores for the army in the field, *App.* 499–501.

*Resignation of Command.* Date of Lord Cardigan's resignation of the command of the Light Cavalry Brigade, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 202.

*Resources of a Country.* Duty of a Quartermaster-general of an army in the field to acquire the fullest information that he can as to resources of the country which is the theatre of war, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*Responsibility.* Opinion that the responsibility of the general and the officers engaged in the invasion of the Crimea, was not a responsibility of the same description as that which attaches to the conduct of an ordinary warfare, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241.

*Returns.* Observations upon the incorrectness of the returns made by the Commissioners of Inquiry in all matters relating to the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 190——Condemnation by Lord Raglan of the system of returns sent in by commanding officers of regiments, of supplies obtained from the Commissariat, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 359.

*Rice.* Cause of the discontinuance of the rice rations; resumption of the issue, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 298——Examination on the issue of rice rations to the troops, from the Commissariat stores, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 382——Statement of the number of rations of rice or Scotch barley issued to the troops in the Crimea from the 16th November to 27th December 1854, *App.* 535–538.

*Rifle Brigade.* Evidence of Dr. Alexander before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea, respecting the number of hours the Rifle Brigade were in the trenches, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172——Supply of blankets to the First Battalion Rifle Brigade; evidence before the Commissioners thereon, and answer thereto, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

*Roads.* How far the Quartermaster-general was responsible for keeping in repair the road from Balaklava to the front, *Rep.* xiv——Impediments to the due conduct of the Commissariat service from the breaking up of the road to the front, *ib.* xxix——Evidence of

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Roads*—continued.

of Commissary-general Filder and Captain Shakespeare respecting the bad state of the roads between Balaklava and the heights of Inkermann after the storm of the 14th of November 1854, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 201——Evidence respecting the wretched state of the roads leading from Balaklava to Inkermann after the storm in November 1854, *ib.* 205——Great delusion prevailing in this country with respect to the construction of the road from Balaklava to the front, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 239, 240——Wretched state of the road leading from Balaklava to the front, *Commissary-general Filder,* 359——How the want of a road between Balaklava and the camp operated in causing the difficulties and disaster that ensued, *ib.*

*See* also *Balaklava to the Front. Kamiesch.*

*Roasted Coffee.* Observations of the Board of General Officers on the supply of roasted coffee to the troops in the Crimea by the Commissariat, *Rep.* 25——Circumstance of Captain Heath, of the Royal Navy, undertaking to roast coffee for the army in the Crimea on board the "Sanspareil," *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 153——Delay in sending out roasted coffee to the army in the East from England, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 387.

*Robes.* See *Buffalo Robes.*

*Romaine, Mr.* Advice given by Mr. Romaine to the managers of the Crimean Army Fund which was sent out from England, as to the best means of carrying out the object of the subscribers, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 257, 258.

*Roostum Pasha.* Application made to Roostum Pasha to furnish Turks to assist in the construction of cavalry stables, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 12. 189.

*Rope.* There were several bales of small rope, which was freely issued, *Boyd, p.* 313.

*Routh, Sir Randolph.* Extract from a work by Sir Randolph Routh defining the duties of the Commissary-general, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 236.

"*Royal Albert,*" *H. M. S.* Occasion of the "Royal Albert" losing her rudder in a gale off Sebastopol, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 149.

*Royal Dragoons:*

1. *Arrival in the Crimea.*
2. *Disposable Men.*

1. *Arrival in the Crimea:*

Date of the arrival of the Royal Dragoons in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 177.

2. *Disposable Men:*

Statement showing the number of disposable men of the Royal Dragoons on the 16th December 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 186.

*Royal Engineers.* Their duties were not so severe as those of the infantry, *Colonel Chapman, p.* 319.

*Royal Warrant.* Copy of Royal warrant appointing the Board of General Officers, *p.* 1——Observations with respect to the wording of the Royal warrant, by which the Board of General Officers is constituted, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 197.

*Rugs.* Observations of the Board upon the issue of rugs and blankets to the army in the East, through the Quartermaster-general's department, *Rep.* xi——The reason the rugs were not drawn for was, that the regiments had the option between rugs and blankets, and they preferred the latter, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 259——The rugs were never brought into general use for the troops, but they were issued to the Turks and other followers of the army, *ib. p.* 260——Explanation of charge, that sufficient rugs were not supplied in November and December, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 272——Answer to remarks in the Commissioners' Report, showing why rugs could not have been substituted for blankets, and that there was no necessity for it, *ib. p.* 281, 282.

Number of rugs in store, November to January; date of the first arrival, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 287——Erroneous statement in the Commissioners' Report, as to the supply of rugs, as shown by the returns of Mr. Archer and Mr. Hayter, *ib. p.* 282——Description of them; they were purveyors' stores, in fact, hospital stores; they were unfit for the soldier in the field or in quarters, *Boyd, p.* 309——Refusal of quartermasters of regiments to take rugs when blankets were not in store, *ib. p.* 310——These were hospital stores, and never ought to have been included in the Quartermaster-general's stores, *ib. p.* 313.

*Rules.* Copy of rules for the conduct of proceedings before the Board of General Officers, *p.* 4.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Russian Army.* Great apprehension of an attack by the Russians on our extreme right, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 218——Strong position of the enemy in their fortress of Sebastopol, and in the lines extending from the sea to the Mackenzie Ridge, and again from the Mackenzie Ridge along the line of the Tchernaya, *ib. p.* 261, 262——Before the autumn the Russian stocks of forage were miles and miles in length, *ib. p.* 262.

*Russian Cavalry.* The Russians never thought of putting their horses behind trenches, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 185.

S.

*Saddlery.* Want of storage for the saddlery of the cavalry horses that had died, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 19.

*SAILCLOTH:*

1. *Shelter for Horses.*
2. *Supplies of Sailcloth.*

1. *Shelter for Horses:*

Opportunities offered for sheltering horses in the Crimea under ships' sails, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 55——Opinion that sailcloth on the plateau would have been worse than useless, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 151, 152——Observations on the testimony of the witnesses in favour of the use of sailcloth in an emergency, for affording shelter to horses, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 167-171——Opinion with respect to affording temporary shelter of the cavalry horses under sailcloth, *Colonel Douglas, p.* 63, 64; *Colonel Doherty, p.* 67; *Colonel Low, p.* 71, 72.

Reason why the construction of temporary shelter for the cavalry horses of sailcloth would not have been practicable, *Colonel Low, p.* 70——Opinion with respect to the construction of temporary shelter for the cavalry horses in the Crimea under sailcloth, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 75-77——Manner in which sailcloth might have been made available for the shelter and covering of the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Bracebridge, p.* 83, 84——Reason why sailcloth could not have been made available for covering of stables for the cavalry in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 97.

2. *Supplies of Sailcloth:*

How far officers in charge of transport ships were authorised to dispose of sailcloth for the use of the troops, *Captain Milne, p.* 315——Facilities of obtaining sailcloth from the shipping in Balaklava Harbour for affording temporary shelter to the cavalry horses, *Rawlinson, p.* 80; *Bracebridge, p.* 83——Reason for not sending to Constantinople for sailcloth for covering of stables for the cavalry horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 98.

Observations on the statement of Sir Edmund Lyons in regard to the apparent want of sailcloth in the British fleet, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 170——Observations on the evidence of Sir E. Lyons relative to the means at the disposal of the fleet for affording shelter to the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 184——Letter from Thomas Phinn, Esq., dated 13 May 1856, enclosing statement relative to the number of spare sails and quantity of sailcloth supplied to Her Majesty's ships in the Black Sea, *App.* 605.

*See* also *Canvas. Shelter for Horses.*

*Sailing Vessels.* Difficulty of procuring sailing vessels on freight to the Crimea, after the storm of 14 November 1854; complaint of Deputy Commissary-general Smith thereupon, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 360, 361.

*St. Arnaud, Field Marshal.* Determination of Marshal St. Arnaud to make a descent upon the enemy's coast, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241——Mortal illness of Field Marshal St. Arnaud at the critical moment of the invasion of the Crimea, *ib. p.* 238.

*Salt Meat.* Remarks of the Board of General Officers upon the supply of salt meat to the troops in the Crimea through the Commissariat department, *Rep.* xxii——Supply of the salt meat for the use of the army in the East, by the navy, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 384, 385——Statement of the salt meat received and issued to the Commissariat in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 385——Statement of the quantities of salt and fresh meat issued by Commissariat to the troops in the Crimea in the months of March, April, and May 1855, *App.* 538, 539.

*Samsoun.* Despatch of ships to Samsoun in the early part of November 1854, to procure planking for huts for the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242——Endeavours of the Commissariat department to procure live cattle from Samsoun for the use of the army in the Crimea, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 362——Inability of the consul at Samsoun to furnish a supply of forage for the army in the East, from the demands of the Turkish troops at Batoom having exhausted the supply, *ib. p.* 372.

*Sappers and Miners.* Description of the stabling constructed by the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 77.——Description of the shelter afforded to the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners in Balaklava, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 181——Witness was to have taken out an adequate number of Sappers and Miners with him for constructing huts; this arrangement was not carried out, *Major Keane, p.* 301.

*Sardinian Cavalry.* Proceedings of the Sardinian cavalry upon their arrival in the Crimea, *Rawlinson, p.* 82——Degree of ingenuity shown by the Sardinian cavalry upon taking up their quarters in the Crimea, *Bracebridge, p.* 84——Objection to the plan adopted by the Sardinian cavalry of digging trenches for their horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 185.

*Scantling.* Want of scantling for the purpose of erecting shelter for the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 183, 184——Circumstance of the Quartermaster-general obtaining 11,699 pieces of scantling for building purposes in November 1854, for the use of the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 244.

*Scarlett, Major-General J. Yorke:*

1. *Examination before the Board of General Officers.*
2. *Heavy Cavalry Brigade.*
3. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Examination before the Board of General Officers:*

Examination of Major-general J. Yorke Scarlett relative to the cause of the loss of cavalry horses in the Crimea, *p.* 144——Further examination of Major-general Scarlett relative to the employment of the Heavy Brigade in fetching forage and supplies from Balaklava, *p.* 214, 215.

2. *Heavy Cavalry Brigade:*

Objections urged by General Scarlett against the supply of Light Cavalry horses for the transport service, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 17——Circumstance of General Scarlett purchasing huts of the Turks for the cavalry horses, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 30——Opinion of General Scarlett upon the use of canvas for shelter of cavalry horses on the plateau, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 183.

3. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Morning state of the 2d Cavalry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier-general the Honourable J. Y. Scarlett, 3 October 1854, *App.* 412.

*Scotch Barley.* Statement of the number of rations of rice or Scotch barley issued to the troops in the Crimea, from 16 November to 27 December 1854, *App.* 535-538.

*Scots Fusileer Guards.* Date at which the supply of additional blanket was completed to this regiment; remarks on evidence given before the Commissioners thereon, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 268.

*Scots Greys:*

1. *Arrival in the Crimea.*
2. *Shelter for the Horses.*
3. *Disposable Men.*

1. *Arrival in the Crimea:*

Date of the Scots Greys landing on the Katcha to join the army in the East, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 177.

2. *Shelter for the Horses:*

Observations on the Commissioners' Report touching the provision of covering for the horses of the Scots Greys by the commanding officer of that regiment, *Rep.* iii; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 21——Assistance rendered Colonel Griffiths by the Zouaves and Turks in constructing stabling for the Scots Greys, *ib. p.* 176——Observations on the statement made that the officer commanding the Scots Greys proposed to erect, with the assistance of his men, some sort of cover for the horses of the corps, *ib. p.* 181.

3. *Disposable Men:*

Statement showing the number of disposable men of the Scots Greys on the 16th December 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 186, 187.

*See* also *Griffiths, Colonel Darby.* *Shelter for Horses.*

*Scott, Lieutenant.* Letter from Lieutenant Scott, of the "Sir Robert Sale" transport, dated 7 April 1846, upon the subject of treament and embarkation of sick and wounded officers at Balaklava, *Captain Heath, p.* 395——Letters from Lieutenant Scott to Captain Heath, Balaklava, 7th April 1856; Sir R. Airey to Lieutenant Scott, Crimea, 17th November 1855; and an extract from Instructions from Sir Edmund Lyons to Captain Heath as principal agent of transports, *App.* 525.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Scutari.* Directions given by Lord Raglan for the Commissariat to lay in a stock of fuel at Scutari, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 358——Letter from Commissary-general Filder to the Judge Advocate-general, dated 4th June 1856, with a memorandum attached, which was submitted to the Commander of the Forces, as to the formation of depôts for hay at Kulalie and Scutari, *App.* 610.

*Sea Transport.* Observations upon the question of sea carriage to the army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 360——Superintendence of the Sea Transport Service at Constantinople by Admiral Boxer, *ib.*——Great difficulty in procuring sea carriage for the use of the Commissariat, *ib. p.* 360, 361——Letters from Mr. Smith, Deputy Commissary-general at Constantinople, complaining of his inability to procure sailing vessels to carry forage to the Crimea since the storm of 14 November 1854, *ib.*——Mode of obtaining sea transport by the Commissariat department in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 390.

*See* also *Agent for Transports. Sailing Vessels. Shipping. Transport Service.*

"*Sea Nymph,*" *The Ship.* Despatch of the "Sea Nymph" to Sinope, in the early part of November 1854, to procure planking for huts for the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242.

*Seamen and Marines.* It would have been a great object to have saved the cavalry from transport duties if seamen could have been hired, or labourers obtained from Constantinople for that purpose, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 114——Number of seamen and marines landed from witness's portion of the fleet to assist the army, *Admiral Deans Dundas, p.* 306.

*See* also *Crews of Vessels.*

*Seaton, Lord.* Inability of Lord Seaton to attend the Board of General Officers, on the ground of ill-health, *p.* 2——His directions to the Quartermaster-general as to removing all barriers of etiquette or form in the issue of clothing, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 268.

*Sebastopol.* Determination of the Government at home to make a descent upon the enemy's coast, and to attempt a rapid military enterprise against the stronghold of Sebastopol *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241——It was nothing but the disastrous explosion in the French batteries that prevented the assault upon Sebastopol on the 17th October 1854, *ib. p.* 242.

*Sebastopol Committee.* Copies of correspondence given in evidence by Commissary-general Filder, 17th April 1856, relative to the misstatements of the Earl of Lucan before the Sebastopol Committee, *App.* 528.

*Second Dragoons.* Period the requisition was made for huts, and when the regiment was partially hutted, the issue not being enough for the whole regiment, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 112——Reason of the Second Dragoons remaining without their clothing so long a time after the order had been given for them to be supplied, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 259——Cause of delay in the supply of blankets to; date of order, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 268.

*Siege Train.* The Commissariat had nothing whatever to do with the siege train, beyond furnishing the ammunition animals, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 378.

*Semi-Official Letters.* Extracts from semi-official letters, &c. quoted by Commissary-general Filder, C. B., before the Board of General Officers at Chelsea, *App.* 585.

*Separation from Knapsacks.* Observations of the Board upon the separation of the men from their knapsacks on landing in the Crimea, *Rep.* ix, x——Explanation of the circumstances attending the separation of the men from their knapsacks on landing, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 263-265.

*Seventeenth Lancers.* The men were all hutted by the middle of March, having commenced the beginning of February, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 112——Statement showing the number of disposable men of the 17th Lancers on the 16th December 1854, *ib. p.* 187.

*Seventeenth Regiment.* Number of blankets supplied to; explanation of the evidence given before the Commissioners on that subject, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

*Seventh Fusileers.* Evidence of Dr. Alexander before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea, respecting the number of hours the 7th Fusileers were in the trenches, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172——Position of the 7th Fusileers with the army in the East, and manner in which they were supplied with clothing and camp necessaries, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 257.

*See* also *Yea, Colonel.*

*Seventy-seventh Regiment.* Evidence of Dr. Alexander before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea respecting the number of hours the 77th Regiment were in the trenches, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172——Supply of blankets to; answer to evidence on that subject given before the Commissioners, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Sheep.* Statement of the number of cattle and sheep imported into the Crimea by the Commissariat from November 1854 to 31st March 1855, and of the number lost at sea, *App.* 539, 540.——*See* also *Live Stock.*

*Sheepskin Coats.* Period of the issue of sheepskin coats to the troops, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 282——After the 15th January the issue of sheepskin coats rendered the issue of watch coats unnecessary, *ib. p.* 283——Men would not take the great coats when they could get sheepskins; there was no want of sheepskins; 1,000 remained after all were supplied between December and the end of January, *Boyd, p.* 309.

*Shelter for Horses:*

1. *Cavalry Brigade.*
2. *Construction of Shelter.*

1. *Cavalry Brigade:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers upon the charge preferred against the Earl of Lucan of neglect in affording shelter for the horses of the cavalry under his Lordship's command, *Rep.* iii.

Exertions of Lord Lucan in forwarding the sheltering of the horses of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 32, 33. 96——Observations upon the remissness of the cavalry in not affording shelter for their horses in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 54, 55——Period when the cavalry commenced putting up shelter for the horses in the Crimea, *Colonel Low, p.* 68——Means adopted to afford temporary shelter for the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Major Thompson, p.* 57.

Opportunities which the country round Kadekoi offered for affording the means of shelter for horses, *Rawlinson, p.* 79-81; *Bracebridge, p.* 82-84——Issue of orders by the Quartermaster-general on the 8th and 12th November 1854 to Lord Lucan, to provide shelter for his horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 85, 86——Lord Lucan was desired, under the circumstances, to do the best he could, without reference to number and without reference to anything, *ib. p.* 97——Want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising shelter for the horses, might apply to either or all the officers, and not to one in particular, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 114.

Officers were not deterred from giving shelter to their horses by any act of Lord Lucan, *Major-general Scarlett, p.* 144; *Colonel Douglas, p.* 144——Means resorted to by Lord Lucan for affording shelter to the horses of the Heavy Cavalry Brigade during the winter of 1854-55, *Major Conolly, p.* 156-160——Statement of Colonel Tulloch in support of the charges preferred against Lord Lucan of neglect in affording shelter to the horses of the Cavalry Brigade during the winter of 1854-55, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 164-174——Observations upon the charges preferred against the Divisional General of the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea of want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising some plan for the shelter of the horses during the winter of 1854-55, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 181-195.

Occasion of Lord Raglan directing the Cavalry Brigade to prepare shelter for their horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 188——Order issued by the Divisional General entreating commanding officers of cavalry to endeavour by every means in their power to give shelter to their horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 189——On the 11th February every horse of the Cavalry Division that had survived, was under cover, and that in the very depth of winter, *ib. p.* 190——Why adequate shelter could not have been procured for cavalry horses by means of canvas, *Major Keane, p.* 302.

2. *Construction of Shelter:*

Opinion of the Board of General Officers that the Quartermaster-general is exonerated from blame in regard to the want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising temporary shelter for the horses, *Rep.* xiv.

Duty of the Quartermaster-general to provide shelter for the horses under any circumstances, provided he has the means of doing so, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 114——Inability of the Admiral to spare carpenters from the fleet in sufficient numbers to have constructed shelter for the cavalry, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 148, 149——Further statement as to the means taken by the Quartermaster-general to shelter the horses; difficulties he had to encounter, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 339——Occasion of the Quartermaster-general giving directions for an engineer officer to be placed at Lord Lucan's disposal to assist in the construction of shelter for the horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 251, 252.

*See* also *Canvas. Cavalry Horses. Horses. Temporary Shelter.*

*Shelter for the Troops.* Observations of the Board of General Officers with regard to the degree of responsibility attaching to the Quartermaster-general's department for providing shelter for the troops, *Rep.* xiii, xiv——Extract from the London Report of the Crimean Commissioners, relative to the supply of means of shelter for the troops, *Sir R. Airey,*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Shelter for the Troops*—continued.

*p.* 240——Account of the exertions made to give shelter to the troops in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, and the difficulties which they had to contend with, *ib. p.* 241, 242——Measures taken by the Quartermaster-general for affording shelter to the troops immediately that it was determined to winter on the heights, *ib. p.* 242, 243.

*See* also *Huts and Hutting.*

*Shewell, Colonel.* Answer of Colonel Shewell, of the 8th Hussars, respecting the period of the commencement and completion of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 51.

*SHIPPING:*

1. *Damage by Storm.*
2. *Transport Service.*
3. *Conveyance of Troops.*

1. *Damage by Storm:*

Account of the damage done to the shipping in Balaklava Harbour by the storm of the 14th November 1854, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 246.

2. *Transport Service:*

Great difficulty in procuring shipping for the purposes of the Commissariat, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 362——Difficulty of inducing owners of private ships to take freight for the Crimea after the storm of the 14th November 1854, *ib. p.* 360——Complaint of Deputy Commissary-general Smith, of being unable to procure sailing transports at Constantinople to convey forage to the Crimea, *ib.* 360, 361.

3. *Conveyance of Troops:*

Inconvenience which arose from the ships after they had landed one body of men in the Crimea being obliged to return to Varna to fetch others, and being a considerable time before they returned to Balaklava, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 264.

*Shipwrights.* Number of shipwrights landed from the fleet to assist the army, *Admiral Deans Dundas, p.* 306——Orders were given that the shipwrights attached to the Naval Brigade should be sent to Balaklava to assist in repairing the vessels of war and transports damaged by the hurricane, *ib. p.* 306.——*See* also *Artificers. Carpenters.*

*Shoeing Horses.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 17 July 1854, directing staff officers to be charged extra when their horses are shod, *App.* 419.

*Short Rations.* Observations of the Board, on the circumstance of the troops in the Crimea being fed during the greater part of the winter of 1854-55, exclusively on salt meat and biscuit, *Rep.* xxii, xxiii——Circumstance of the transport steamers that conveyed the cavalry to the Crimea being short of provisions, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 39.

*See* also *Deficiency of Supplies.*

*Shorthand Writer.* Circumstance of the Crimean Commissioners having no shorthand writer to take down the witnesses' evidence, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 220——Inconvenience attendant upon the Crimean Commissioners being unaccompanied by a shorthand writer, *ib. p.* 230.

*Shute, Colonel.* Observation of Colonel Shute with respect to the completion of the hutting of the cavalry horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 14——Occasion of Major Shute congratulating witness on the completion of the stabling for the cavalry horses, *ib. p.* 189.

*Sick and Wounded.* Proportion of cavalry employed in bringing down sick, and carrying up provisions to the front, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 110——Incorrectness of certain returns furnished by Colonel Hodge and Colonel Mayow as to the proportion of men employed in bringing down the sick, and carrying up provisions, *ib.* 110——Number of sick in December and January, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 295——Assistance rendered by the Navy to the sick and wounded at the battle of the Alma, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 152, 153——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 22 July 1854, directing the names of all officers sick to be affixed to the back of the regimental states, *App.* 420.

*Sickness and Mortality.* Loss attributable to sickness in the Heavy Cavalry, Light Cavalry, and Artillery, for six months, from October 1854 to March 1855, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 108.

"*Simla*" *Transport.* Circumstance of the officer of the "Simla" acquainting the Divisional General that there was no forage on board for the horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 39.

*Simpson, General Sir James.* Appointment of General Sir James Simpson to the duty of investigating the composition of the general staff of the army in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 234——Copy of General Simpson's Report to Lord Raglan, dated 26 April 1855, on the composition of the general staff of the army in the Crimea, *ib.* 234, 235——Letter, dated

Report, 1856--*continued.*

*Simpson, General Sir James*—continued.

dated War Department, 19th February 1855, from Lord Panmure to Major-general Simpson, defining the duties to be performed on his appointment to be chief of the staff, *App.* 467——Letter, dated Head-quarters, Crimea, 26th April 1855, from Major-general Simpson to Field Marshal Lord Raglan, as to the composition of the general staff, *ib.* 467, 468.

*Simmons, Captain J. L. A.* Letter from Captain Simmons to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated 28th May 1854, relative to providing supplies and means of transport for the British army in Bulgaria, *App.* 541.

*Sinope.* Dispatch of ships to Sinope in the early part of November 1854, to procure planking for huts for the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 242——Endeavour of the Commissariat department to procure live cattle from Sinope for the use of the army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 362.

*Sixty-eighth Regiment.* Number of blankets supplied to; answer to the evidence given before the Commissioners on this point, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

*Sixth Dragoons.* Number of huts for this regiment, and when completed, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 112.

*Skins of Animals.* Use made of the skins of the animals slaughtered in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 98–100——Orders issued to the Commissary-general to preserve the skins of all animals slaughtered for the army in the Crimea, *ib.* 100.

*Slaughtered Meat.* Observations of the Board upon the supply of slaughtered meat furnished by the Commissariat for the use of the army in the East, during the winter of 1854–55, *Rep.* xxiii, xxiv.

*Smith, Deputy Assistant Commissary-general.* Letter from this officer to Commissary-general Filder, dated 24th December 1854, showing the difficulty of obtaining artificers at Constantinople, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 289——Letter from Mr. Smith, the Deputy Commissary-general at Constantinople, in November 1854, stating his inability to procure sailing transports to carry forage to the Crimea, *ib. p.* 360, 361——Exertions of Assistant Commissary-general Smith in forwarding supplies from Constantinople to the army in the East, *ib. p.* 370——Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Deputy Commissary-general Smith, dated Balaklava, 28th January 1855, urging supplies of forage to be forwarded by every practicable means, *App.* 533.

*Soiled Blankets.* Several quartermasters of regiments refused to receive soiled blankets; how far they might have been useful, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 273; *Boyd, p.* 310——If the quartermasters had taken soiled blankets, they would have got good ones on returning the other ones into store, *Boyd p.* 312.

*Soldiers:*

1. *Infantry.*
2. *Cavalry.*
3. *Labour of the Soldiers.*

1. *Infantry:*

Evidence of Dr. Alexander before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea respecting the number of hours which the infantry soldier was called upon to work in the trenches, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172.

2. *Cavalry:*

Statement of the duties of an available dragoon with an army in the field, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 187.

3. *Labour of the Soldier:*

In war it is the constant practice to rely upon the labour of the soldier as one of the means by which the wants of the army are supplied; in the Crimea this resource failed, and failed from the stress of military events, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238.

*See* also *Sufferings of the Army.*

*Sounding to Arms.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 22d July 1854, relative to the time to be given regiments between the sounds preparatory to turning out for the field, *App.* 420.

*Spade Labour.* Deficiency of the British soldier in the execution of spade work, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 184, 185.

*Spanish Mules.* Letter from Lord Raglan, dated 18th January 1855, directing the mules imported from Alicante and Malta to be employed in carrying up huts to the front, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 363——Mortality among the Spanish mules in the Crimea from exposure and overwork, *ib. p.* 364.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Spare Sails.* Occasion of the Quartermaster-general applying to the agent for transports at Balaklava to collect all the sails and awning that could be obtained, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 98 ——Number of spare sails usually carried by a man-of-war; inabililty of the ships of the Black Sea fleet to part with any, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 148, 149—— Reason why spare sails could not have been obtained from the merchant shipping lying in Balaklava Harbour, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 185—— As many spare sails as possible were landed for the use of the seamen, *Admiral Deans Dundas, p.* 306——Extent of spare sails on board a three-decker, *ib. p.* 307——Storm-sails, studding-sails, and square-sails were sent on shore for the use of the seamen, together with spars, jib-booms, &c. for putting it up, *ib.*——Letter from Thomas Phinn, esq., dated 13th May 1856, enclosing statement relative to the number of spare sails and quantity of sailcloth supplied to Her Majesty's ships in the Black Sea, *App.* 605.

*Spars and Sails.* Offer made by captains of ships to construct temporary sheltering for the cavalry horses with spars and sails, *Colonel Griffith, p.* 30—— Reason why spars and sails of ships were not resorted to for sheltering of the horses, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 33.

*Squad Bags.* Description of the squad bags, in which the superfluous part of a man's kit is kept, and which would make his knapsack too heavy for actual field service, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 253—— Certain articles belonging to the men were left in the squad bags at Scutari; reason why, *ib. p.* 264 —— Arrangement as to the contents of the squad bags; they were not to accompany the regiments on active service, but to be kept in cantonments, *ib. p.* 266.

Substitution of squad bags in lieu of clothing chests for the use of the army in the field, *Sir Richard Airey, p.* 265——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated Varna, 22d June 1854, ordering the squad bags to be left with the divisional serjeant storekeeper, *App.* 417——Letter, dated Horse Guards, 28th February 1854, to Lieutenant-general Fergusson, respecting the articles to be carried in the knapsacks and squad bags, *ib.* 466.

*Squadrons.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 29th May 1854, relative to the formation of squadrons of cavalry, *App.* 415.

*STABLING:*

1. *Construction of Stabling for the Cavalry.*
2. *Completion of the Stabling at the Depôt.*
3. *French Cavalry.*

1. *Construction of Stabling for the Cavalry:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers upon the charge preferred against Lord Lucan, of neglect in construction of stabling for the cavalry in the Crimea, *Rep.* iii–vi —— Order of the Lieutenant-general for the construction of stabling for the cavalry in the neighbourhood of Kadekoi, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 11—— Impediments offered to the construction of stabling for the cavalry, *ib.*—— Occasion of application being made to Captain Gordon, of the Royal Engineers, to furnish an engineer officer to assist in the construction of stabling for the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea, *Colonel Gordon, p.* 23; *Earl of Lucan, p.* 188 —— Observations upon the charge preferred against the Divisional General of Cavalry in the Crimea of want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising some means of affording shelter to the horses during the winter of 1854–55, *Earl of Lucan p.* 181-195.

Appointment of Major Hall, of the engineers, to the duty of constructing stabling for the cavalry horses in the Crimea during the winter of 1854–55, *Earl of Lucan, p.*188—— Exertions made by the cavalry regiments to construct the depôt stabling, and how prevented by want of nails, *ib.*——Difficulty of procuring boards and planks for the construction of the stables for the cavalry, *ib. p.* 15——Appointment of an engineer officer to superintend the erection of stables for the cavalry horses, *Colonel Gordon, p.* 23.

Exertions of Lord Lucan in forwarding the erection of stables for the cavalry horses under his command, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 32, 33. 96——The erection of stables for the horses is out of the ordinary course of what a cavalry soldier would have time to do, *ib. p.* 96——Memorandum by Brigadier G. Hall, of the Royal Engineers, dated Kertch, 29th April 1856, upon the subject of the erection of stabling for the cavalry in the Crimea, *App.* 607, 608——Sketch of the hutting of two horses of the cavalry in the Crimea, *ib.* 457.

2. *Completion of the Stabling at the Depôt:*

Period of the completion of the cavalry stables at Kadekoi; degree of energy shown by the officers and men in their construction, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 307—— The stabling at the depôt was completed on the Saturday preceding the 17th January, *ib. p.* 14——The whole of the stabling was completed on the 11th of February, *ib.*——Date of the discontinuance of the daily reports as to the progress of each cavalry regiment, with regard to the stabling of the horses, *Colonel Doherty, p.* 34.

3. *French*

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*STABLING*—continued.

3. *French Cavalry:*

Description of the stables built by the French for the shelter of their cavalry horses, *Colonel Douglas, p.* 60——Late period of the French cavalry getting under cover, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 104.

*See* also *Huts and Hutting.* *Shelter for Horses.*

*Stacks.* Description of stacks of forage found in the Crimea when the cavalry first landed, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 39——Means adopted by the Commissariat to keep possession of the stacks of forage found in the Crimea on their arrival before Sebastopol, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 386.

*STAFF OFFICERS:*

1. *Composition of the Staff.*
2. *Performance of Duties.*
3. *Commissariat Department.*
4. *Quartermaster-general.*

1. *Composition of the Staff:*

Circumstance of the Secretary for War appointing a special tribunal to investigate the composition of the general staff of the army in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 234——Copy of General Simpson's Report to Lord Raglan, dated 26th April 1855, on the composition of the staff of the army in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 234, 235——Letter, dated Head Quarters, Crimea, 26th April 1855, from Major-general Simpson to Field Marshal Lord Raglan, as to the composition of the general staff, *App.* 467, 468.

2. *Performance of Duties:*

There never was the slightest disposition among the officers on the general staff in the East to narrow the field of their respective functions, by raising a discussion as to the department by which any duty should be performed, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237, 238——Letter, dated War Department, 19th February 1855, from Lord Panmure to Major-general Simpson, defining the duties to be performed on his appointment to be chief of the staff, *App.* 467.

3. *Commissariat Department:*

Insufficiency of the Commissariat staff with the army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 377, 378——Frequent representations were made to the home authorities of the inadequacy of the Commissariat staff in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 379——Proportion of Commissariat officers required for each division of infantry and each brigade of cavalry of an army in the field, *ib. p.* 384——Number of Commissariat officers employed in the Peninsula, *ib.*

4. *Quartermaster-general:*

Manner in which the officers serving under the Quartermaster-general in the Crimea were selected, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 239——General Order, Sebastopol, 17th November 1855, on Sir Richard Airey's leaving the Crimea, *App.* 467.

*See* also *Adjutant-general.* *Quartermaster-general's Department.*

*States.* Inconvenience of the practice of the brigade and regimental states accompanying the divisional states when sent in, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 10——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 11th July 1854, directing officers commanding brigades to send in brigade states daily, accompanied by the regimental states, *App.* 418——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 25th November 1854, enclosing states and reports of the Light Cavalry Brigade, *ib.* 464, 465.

*Statistical Clerk of the War Office.* Circumstance of Lord Lucan alluding to Colonel Tulloch as the statistical clerk of the War Office, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 52.

*Stealing Stores.* Manner in which the stores were stolen, notwithstanding sentries were placed to protect them, *Boyd, p.* 310.

*Steneskoi.* Orders given for the cavalry to march and take up their quarters at Steneskoi on their arrival in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 39——State of the Light Cavalry Brigade when in camp at Steneskoi, *ib. p.* 47.

*Stewart, Admiral Houston.* Arrangement made with Admiral Houston Stewart for a supply of camp equipage for the army in the East, from Malta, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 240.

*Stockley, Mr.* Circumstance of Mr. Stockley, of the Artillery, being employed to purchase pack animals at Eupatoria for the Commissariat, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 179.

*Stokes, Lieutenant.* Occasion of Lieutenant Stokes, of the Engineers, being ordered to superintend the erection of the cavalry stables, *Colonel Gordon, p.* 22, 23——Occasion of Mr. Stokes, an engineer officer, reporting himself as being sent to assist in constructing stables, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 188.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Stolen Horses.* Of the horses of the commissariat at Varna, to the extent of 3,000 or 4,000 were stolen, and the Government got no account of them, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 180.

*Storekeeper.* Duties of the chief storekeeper of the commissariat at Balaklava attached to the Quartermaster-general's store, *Boyd, p.* 312.

*Storekeeper's Clerk.* Nature of his duties; mistakes in his accounts, from what causes arising, *Boyd, p.* 313.

*Storehouses, Balaklava.* Description of storehouses at Balaklava; their total inefficiency, *Boyd, p.* 308; *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 371.

*Store Ships.* The store ships alluded to in the Commissioners' Report were only hospital ships, and the stores sent on board were for the use of the sick, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 271.

*Stores.* Great want, in the town of Balaklava, of room for the Quartermaster-general's and Commissariat stores, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 98, 99——It is incorrect in the Commissioners to state that the distance was a mile from the stores, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 112——Manner in which the distribution or apportionment of stores becomes part of the duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 254——It frequently happened that articles which the Quartermaster-general had no notice of from the commissariat storekeeper were found in the commissariat warehouse, *ib. p.* 255.

The Quartermaster-general, or anybody in his department, has no control whatever over the stores of the army; they are entirely and completely under the Commissary-general, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 269——General Airey gave authority to his agents to use his own name and that of Lord Raglan for the purpose of removing obstructions, and to facilitate the issues to the troops, *ib.*——Places where the stores were deposited; their exposure to the weather and plunder, *Boyd, p.* 308——Great difference in the number of articles lying on the wharf as Commissariat Quartermaster-general's stores and those afterwards delivered to the troops, *ib.*

Impossibility of telling what the exact quantity of stores in hand was, *Boyd, p.* 310——Further statement regarding the issue department for stores at Balaklava under the Quartermaster-general, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 341——A much smaller amount of stores was returned by the Commissary-general's department to that of the Quartermaster-general than were in store and available for the troops, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 269——Statement on the returns of stores received by the troops and those ordered to be drawn by the Quartermaster-general from the end of November 1854 to the middle of January 1855, *ib. p.* 270, 271.

Statement of watch cloaks actually drawn from the stores during the months of November, December, and January 1854-55, *App.* 472——Statement showing the quantity of warm clothing and stores for which orders had been given to regiments to the 15th January 1855, *ib.*

*See* also *Distribution of Stores. Issue of Stores. Quartermaster-general's Stores. Requisitions. Reserve Stores. Stealing Stores.*

*Storm of 14th November.* Wretched state of the ground occupied by the cavalry after the storm of the 14th November, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 27, 28——Description of the terrific storm that visited the Crimea on the 14th November 1854, and its effects, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 246——After the storm of the 14th November, and for a month or two, seamen could not be induced to go in ships to Balaklava, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 291——Effects of the storm on the 14th November at Vinois Hill and Balaklava Harbour, *Major Keane, p.* 302.

*Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord.* Frequency of communications between Lord Stratford de Redcliffe at Constantinople and Lord Raglan in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 97——Letter from Lord Stratford to Lord Raglan, dated 31st May 1854, relative to providing supplies and transport for the British army in Bulgaria, *App.* 541——Memorandum submitted by the Commissary-general with reference to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's letter to Lord Raglan of 31st ultimo, transmitting to Lord Raglan copy of report from Captain Simmons, R. E., *ib.* 542.

*Streamlet at Balaklava.* Erroneous opinion of Mr. Rawlinson as to the effect of damming up a streamlet in the neighbourhood of Balaklava, to supply the hospital with water, *Major Keane, p.* 303, 304.

*Sufferings of the Army.* Concurrence in opinion with Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, that the sufferings of the army during the winter of 1854-55 are traceable to two causes, overwork and want of transport, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 236——The delays which actually occurred, and which occasioned the extraordinary sufferings of the British army in the East, have now been traced to England, *ib. p.* 238——It was almost inevitable that the expeditionary force in the Crimea, confined during the winter to a bare hill, which had yielded nothing but water, and standing as it did in the close presence of a powerful enemy, should endure very great privations, *ib. p.* 241.

Observation

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Sufferings of the Army*—continued.

Observations upon the privations and sufferings of the men during the winter of the first campaign of the army in the East in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 261——Evidence respecting the sufferings of the Land Transport Corps after the storm in November 1854, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 201. 205——Extract from the London Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea, relative to the sufferings of the troops, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 243.

*Sullivan, Colonel.* Occasion of Colonel Sullivan attending a meeting of commanding officers of cavalry to consult upon the subject of the horses, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 28, 29.

*Sunday.* Sunday was not excepted from the issue of stores from the depôt at Balaklava. *Boyd, p.* 312.

*Supplies:*

1. *Issue of Supplies.*
2. *Seizures from the Enemy.*
3. *Importation of Supplies.*
4. *Supplies on Hand.*
5. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Issue of Supplies:*

Difficulty of obtaining supplies from Balaklava had the troop horses of the Light Brigade been sent to fetch them, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 204, 205——Circumstance of Lord Raglan stating to the home authorities in England that General Estcourt and General Airey had nothing to do with the transport or supplies of the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237——Excellent state of the Commissariat supplies in the Crimea in March 1855, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 382, 383.

2. *Seizures from the Enemy:*

The supplies of all kinds seized from the enemy are just as much under the control of the Commissariat as if they had been bought with money, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237.

3. *Importation of Supplies:*

In the Crimea nothing could reach the army except what was supplied by importation, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238.

4. *Supplies on Hand:*

Every week a tabular statement of supplies on hand was hung up in a conspicuous place in the Quartermaster-general's office, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 285.

5. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Table showing the periods of time occupied in the execution of orders required to be executed in England, *App.* 468——Copies of correspondence given in evidence by Commissary-general Filder, 17th April 1856, relative to the alleged deficiency of forage supplied to the cavalry in the Crimea, *ib.* 528.

Copy of correspondence which Commissary-general Filder stated to the Board of General Officers would be given in in explanation of the measures taken by him for providing supplies and transport service of the British army in Bulgaria, *App.* 540-543——Statement of Sir C. E. Trevelyan in explanation of the arrangements made by the Treasury in reference to the supply of forage for the army in the Crimea, *ib.* 544-551——Copy of a letter from Commissary-general Filder, covering remarks on those parts of the Report of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch which relate to the duties of the Commissariat department, *ib.* 562-584.

*See* also *Commissariat Department. Deficiency of Forage. Delay. Forage. Fresh Meat. Hay. Issue of Stores. Quartermaster-general's Department. Rations.*

*Suppression of Evidence.* Exclusion of some parts of the Report originally made to the Secretary-at-War from that laid before Parliament, on the ground that the Commissioners had no authority for going into such points, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 174.

*See* also *Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry. Wetherall, Colonel Edward.*

*Surveys.* Duty of the Quartermaster-general of an army in the field with respect to obtaining the most accurate surveys of the country which is the theatre of war, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*Sword Knots.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 29 May 1854, directing officers to wear their regulation sword knots, *App.* 416.

"*Sydney*," *The Ship.* The "Sydney" sailed from Balaklava on the 6th October with serjeants on board to collect the knapsacks, *Colonel Gordon, p.* 348.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

T.

*Tea.* Evidence with regard to the quantity of tea in store and in the supplies issued to the troops, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 381——Issue of supplies of tea to the troops in the Crimea from the Commissariat stores, *ib. p.* 381, 382.

*Temporary Shelter.* Observations of the Board of General Officers upon the charge preferred against Lord Lucan of want of promptitude and ingenuity in devising for the cavalry horses some means of temporary shelter during the winter of 1854–55, *Rep.* iii–vi——Exoneration of the Quartermaster-general from blame in regard to devising means for affording temporary shelter for the cavalry horses, *ib.* xiv——Offer made to put up a temporary shelter for the cavalry horses by the captains of ships, *Colonel Griffiths, p.* 30 ——Opportunities offered for affording temporary shelter to the cavalry horses encamped upon the plateau above Kadekoi, *Rawlinson, p.* 79–82; *Bracebridge, p.* 82–84——Issue of orders to Lord Lucan on the 8th and 12th November to make temporary shelter as best he could for the horses under his command, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 85, 86—— Observations upon the charge preferred against the General commanding the cavalry in the Crimea of want of promptitude or ingenuity in devising some means of temporary shelter for the horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 181–195——Instructions issued from the Quartermaster-general's department as to the erection of temporary stables, *Colonel Gordon, p.* 105.

*See* also *Horses. Shelter for Horses. Stabling.*

*Tenth Hussars.* Occasion of the colonel of the 10th Hussars being remonstrated with about the ground they had taken up for their horses on their arrival in the Crimea from India, *Rawlinson, p.* 80——Opinion that the 10th Hussars showed far more judgment to let their horses stand in the open air than behind trenches, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 185.

*Tents.* Neglect of the Board of Ordnance to supply the tents ordered by the Quartermaster-general, *Rep.* xii——Reason of the tents supplied to the army in the East being of an inferior quality, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 240——At first it was intended to advance without tents; but the discomfort occasioned to the troops by the dreadful night of the 14th November induced Lord Raglan to order that the tents should be landed, *ib. p.* 241——Occasion of Lord Raglan ordering the tents to be brought together in a mass on the beach, and carried back on board ship, *ib. p.* 242——Account of the destruction of the tents and marquees by the storm of the 14th November in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 244.

Letter from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 23 April 1855, stating the cause of the delay in sending out the tents to the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 245——Lord Raglan authorised the purchase of any number of tents that could be obtained from the Turkish Government, finding that the tents from England did not arrive, *ib. p.* 246——A number of tents were repaired on board ship; the worst tents were cut up to repair the others; the boatswains and sailmakers said they had no canvas to spare, *Boyd, p.* 313——Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 9th June 1854, directing the cavalry regiments to be provided with tents, *App.* 417.

*See* also *Bell Tents. Camp Equipage. Marquees.*

*Theatre of War.* Duty of a quartermaster-general of an army in the field to acquire the fullest information that he can as to the geography, climate, military and general resources of the country, which is the theatre of war, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 235.

*Thirteenth Light Dragoons:*

1. *Completion of Shelter for the Horses.*
2. *Disposable Men.*

1. *Completion of Shelter for the Horses:*

Cause of the difference of opinion with respect to the period of completion of the stables of the 13th Dragoons, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 189——The hutting for this regiment commenced about the 10th February, and finished about the end of March, *ib. p.* 113.

2. *Disposable Men:*

Statement showing the number of disposable men of the 13th Light Dragoons on 16 December 1854, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 187.

*Thirty-fourth Regiment.* Answer to evidence before Commissioners as to the supply of blankets to this regiment, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

*Thirty-ninth Regiment.* When the regimental clothing came out, this regiment had two or three sets of clothing, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 296.

*Thirty-third Regiment.* Evidence of Dr. Alexander before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea, respecting the number of hours the 33d Regiment were in the trenches, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Thompson, Major.* Answer of Major Thompson, of the 5th Dragoon Guards, respecting the date of the commencement and completion of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 51——Examination of Major Richard Thompson respecting the state of the horses in his regiment, in the month of December 1854, *ib. p.* 56, 57——Further examination of Major Richard Thompson respecting the temporary shelter afforded the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 78——Observations on the evidence of Major Thompson respecting the means taken for affording shelter to the cavalry horses during the winter of 1854-55, *ib. p.* 167.

*Timber.* Difficulty of procuring timber for the construction of the cavalry stables, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 15——Great difficulty in procuring timber at Constantinople for Commissariat purposes in the Crimea owing to the great demands for our own service, and those of the French and Turks, *Commissary-genral Filder, p.* 290——Extract from evidence before the Sebastopol Committee relative to the difficulty of obtaining timber for hutting the troops, *ib. p.* 290.

"*Times*" *Newspaper:*

1. *Complaint of Lord Lucan.*
2. *Letter of Colonel Yorke.*

1. *Complaint of Lord Lucan:*

Complaint by Lord Lucan of the appearance of an article in the "Times" newspaper touching the present inquiry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 25——Further complaint of Lord Lucan of an article that has again appeared in the "Times," *ib. p.* 37.

2. *Letter of Colonel Yorke:*

Complaint of Colonel Tulloch as to a letter in the "Times," signed by Colonel Yorke, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 105——Colonel Yorke's letter had regard to the leading article in the paper, and not to anything that occurred before the Board of Commissioners, *p.* 107——Letter in the "Times," signed by Colonel Yorke, as to the landing of a portion of the Heavy Brigade in the Crimea, *p.* 107.

*Tools.* General want of pickaxes and tools throughout the whole army in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 91——Promise made by Captain Chapman, of the Royal Engineers, to furnish tools to enable the cavalry to erect stabling for the shelter of their horses, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 188——Letters from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 18th and 23d April 1855, stating the reasons why the requisition of the Quartermaster-general of November 1854, for a supply of camp equipage and engineering tools for the army in the East, has not been complied with, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 244, 245——List of tools and materials required for hutting the troops in the Crimea, and difficulty in obtaining them, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 291.

*See* also *Engineering Tools.* *Entrenching Tools.*

*Tower, Mr.* Unceasing exertions of Mr. Tower in the distribution of the stores to the soldier provided for his comfort through the bounty of Lord Ellesmere, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 258.

*Transport Service:*

1. *Generally.*
2. *Mortality and Loss of Transport Animals.*
3. *Employment of Cavalry Horses on Transport Duty.*
4. *Commissariat Department.*
5. *Quartermaster-general's Department.*
6. *Conveyance of Stores.*
7. *Fleet of Transports.*
8. *Contracts.*
9. *Peninsular and European Wars.*
10. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Generally:*

Observations of the Board of General Officers on the state of the land transport in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, and the inability of the Commissary-general to increase it, *Rep.* xx-xxvi——It was estimated that the transport required for the whole of the forces which landed in the Crimea would amount to 28,000 animals, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241——Physical difficulty of bringing up bales of goods from the sea-shore to the camp pitched on the hills at a distance of several miles, as was the case in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 257——It was not the mere possession of stores, but the command of transport labour, that enabled the parties to distribute the immense stores to the soldier, provided for his comfort through the bounty of Lord Ellesmere, *ib. p.* 258——Delay in the supply of warm clothing to the troops arose from the want of means of transport, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*TRANSPORT SERVICE*—continued.

1. *Generally*—continued.

It was their own fault, or the want of transport, that created the delay in the supply of blankets to the Dragoons, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 268——Comparison between the means of transport which existed in the winter of 1854-55 and 1855-56, *ib. p.* 271, 272——Stores for which requisitions had been received were frequently left with the storekeeper, for want of the means of transport; this caused confusion and mistake in the store accounts, *Boyd, p.* 312——Difficulties in the way of getting the stores conveyed to the army, *p.* 312.

2. *Mortality and Loss of Transport Animals:*

Comparison of the losses of the transport animals and the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 9——Of the horses of the Commissariat at Varna, to the extent of 3,000 or 4,000 were stolen, and the Government got no account of them, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 180.

3. *Employment of Cavalry Horses on Transport Duty:*

Letter from Lord Lucan to Lord Raglan, complaining of the employment of the cavalry horses on transport duties, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 15, 16——Letter from the Quartermaster-general, dated 12 December 1854, directing Lord Lucan to furnish 500 horses for the transport duties of the army from the cavalry, *ib. p.* 25, 26——Employment of the cavalry horses from the 13th of December 1854 in carrying up provisions to the front, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 96 ——Employment of the horses of the heavy cavalry brigade in the performance of the Commissariat transport duties in the Crimea, *Colonel Low, p.* 160-162.

Extent to which the mortality of the cavalry horses is to be attributed to employing them on the transport duty, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 186. 193——Reasons for refusing to allow the horses of the Light Cavalry to be employed on the transport service, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 203-208——Frequent employment of the Heavy Brigade in fetching forage and supplies from Balaklava, *General Scarlett, p.* 214——Reason for not making any application for Light Brigade horses to be sent to Balaklava for forage, *Colonel Doherty, p.* 216, 217.

4. *Commissariat Department:*

Number of animals employed in the transport service in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 9, 10 ——Reason of the failure of the transport service of the Commissariat Department in the month of November 1854, *Crookshank, p.* 224——From the commencement of the war until the formation of the Land Transport Corps the transport for all branches of the service was invariably supplied by the Commissariat, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 236——So entirely was the work connected with the transport considered to be distinct from military business, that when the Commissariat found it necessary to require the aid of officers or soldiers for attending to the operation of the transport, the officers and men so employed received extra pay, at a rate fixed by the Commissary-general, *ib. p.* 236, 237 ——No instance ever heard or known of Mr. Commissary-general Filder objecting to supply transport on the ground that the duty was not within his department, *ib. p.* 237.

Efficiency of the Commissariat transport in Bulgaria, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 358 ——Impediments to the transport, both by sea and by land, by the entire break-up of the weather after the storm of the 14th November, *ib. p.* 359——Desire of Lord Raglan to have as much transport in the Crimea as possible; how prevented by the difficulty of feeding the animals during the winter, *ib. p.* 372——After the battle of Balaklava the Commissariat were obliged to give up their spare transport to convey ammunition to the troops, *ib. p.* 379——Lord Raglan was constantly urging the necessity of more transport for the Commissariat, *ib. p.* 389——Reason of the Commissariat being unable to keep up an efficient transport, *ib. p.* 390——Sufficiency of the transport animals in the Crimea up to the period of the storm of 14th November 1854, *ib. p.* 392.

5. *Quartermaster-general's Department:*

The Quartermaster-general has nothing to do with the very important business of supplying the transport of the army, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 236——Circumstance of Lord Raglan stating to the home authorities in England that General Estcourt and General Airey had nothing to do with the transport or the supplies of the army in the East, *ib. p.* 237.

6. *Conveyance of Stores:*

Letter from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 23 April 1855, stating the inability of that department earlier to comply with the requisition of the Quartermaster-general, owing to the want of vessels for the conveyance of the camp equipage and stores to the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 245.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Transport Service*—continued.

7. *Fleet of Transports:*

An incendiary might have destroyed our fleet of transports with the greatest ease, *Commissary-general Filder*, *p.* 289——Great difficulty in December in obtaining ships for transporting stores from Constantinople to the Crimea, *ib. p.* 291——Letter from Commissariat officer at Constantinople to Commissary-general Filder, dated 23 November, showing the difficulty of obtaining transport vessels, *ib. p.* 291——Manner in which the transports arriving with stores required the use of the boats' crews to land them, more particularly when there was shot and shell to be landed, *Colonel M'Kenzie*, *p.* 293——Witness never saw men work better; they did all they could to assist the army, *Admiral Deans Dundas*, *p.* 306—— Difficulty in finding sufficient accommodation in transports for officers wishing to leave the Crimea, *Captain Heath*, *p.* 397.

8. *Contracts:*

Particulars as to the contracts for the transport service, *Captain Milne*, *p.* 314.

9. *Peninsular and European Wars:*

In the Peninsular War, and in all former European wars conducted by this country on a scale of magnitude, the means of transport had been obtained either by purchases or requisitions made in districts occupied by the forces, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 238.

10. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Return of brigade duties performed by the Heavy Cavalry Brigade, between the 13th December 1854 and the 28th February 1855, *App.* 458, 459——Letter, dated War Department, 19th May 1856, from Sir B. Hawes to the Judge Advocate-general, enclosing a return of transport and ambulance animals foraged in the Crimea, *App.* 459——Letter from Colonel Mayow to the Earl of Cardigan, dated 24th November 1854, relative to sending the troop horses of the Light Brigade to fetch up barley, *ib.* 464.

General return of the state of the Commissariat transport on the 19th February 1855, *App.* 532——Copy of correspondence which Commissary-general Filder stated to the Board of General Officers would be given in in explanation of the measures taken by him for providing supplies and transport service of the British Army in Bulgaria, *ib.* 540-543——Comparison of the number of men and horses of the Heavy Brigade employed on commissariat duties and in conveyance of sick from the front, as shown by the returns of Major Conolly and Colonel Lodge, *ib.* 602-604.

*See* also *Agent for Transports.* *Horse Transports.* *Land Transport.* *Sea Transport.*

*Treasury.* Observations of the Board of General Officers on the circumstance of the Treasury sending out coffee in a green state for the use of the army in the East, *Rep.* xxv——Remarks of the Board upon the requisitions made from time to time by the Commissary-general upon the Treasury for a supply of hay for the army in the East, *Rep.* xxvii, xxviii——Duties of the Commissary-general of an army in the field, as laid down and defined by the Treasury Code of 1st March 1852, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 236——Notion entertained that the Commissariat duty is confined to such operations as are affected by the disbursements of the public money, from the fact of its being a branch of the Treasury, *ib. p.* 237——Dates of the requisitions and letters of the Commissary-general, acquainting the Treasury of the deficiency of forage for the army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder*, *p.* 365.

Neglect of the Treasury to send out a sufficient supply of pressed hay to the Army in the Crimea, *Commissary-general Filder*, *p.* 366——Letter from the Commissary-general to the Treasury, dated 8th October 1854, urging the necessity of sending supplies of forage to the army in the East, *ib. p.* 367——Letter from the Commissary-general to the Treasury, acquainting them of the losses sustained by the storm of the 14th November, *ib. p.* 368——It was the duty of the superintending department in England to have forwarded supplies of forage in conformity with the requisitions of the Commissary-general, *ib. p.* 372——Statement of Sir Charles Trevelyan in explanation of the arrangements made by the Treasury in reference to the supply of forage for the army in the Crimea, *App.* 544-551.——*See* also *Trevelyan, Sir C. E.*

*Trebizonde.* Despatch of ships to Trebizonde, in the early part of the month of November 1854, to procure planking for huts for the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey*, *p.* 242.

*Trenches.* Duty of commanding officers with respect to the construction of trenches for the shelter of the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan*, *p.* 35——Objections to the plan of digging trenches and sheltering horses therein, *ib. p.* 184, 185——Impolicy of employing the men in digging trenches for the cavalry, *ib. p.* 185.

*"Trent" Transport.* Account of the embarkation of the cavalry for the Crimea in the "Trent," *Earl of Lucan*, *p.* 39.

*Trevelyan, Sir Charles E.* Observations of the Board upon the frequent demands made by the Commissary-general upon Sir Charles Trevelyan to send out hay from England

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Trevelyan, Sir Charles E.*—continued.

for the use of the army in the East, *Rep.* xxvii, xxviii——Extract from Sir Charles Trevelyan's evidence before the Sebastopol Committee, relative to the duties of the Commissariat in providing land transport, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 237——Evidence of Sir Charles Trevelyan before the Sebastopol Committee upon the subject of a supply of forage for the army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 365——Extract from Sir Charles Trevelyan's pamphlet relative to the supply of forage to the army in the East, *ib. p.* 366.

Allusion made by Sir Charles Trevelyan as to the sufficiency of the supplies and stores shipped for the use of the army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 367——Letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, dated 18th November 1854, announcing the shipment of hay in the "Belgravia," and promising a continuous supply, *ib. p.* 370——Letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, dated 23d November 1854, intimating that dependence might be placed upon regular and ample supplies of forage being sent out to the army in the East, *ib. p.* 371——Letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, dated 2d April 1855, exonerating the Commissariat department from all blame in the supply of forage to the army in the East, *ib. p.* 372.

Desire of Sir Charles Trevelyan to keep up a Commissariat establishment in England, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 378——Assurances given by Sir Charles Trevelyan that ample supplies of hay should be sent out to the Crimea, *ib. p.* 391——Letter from Commissary-general Filder to Sir Charles Trevelyan, dated 3d June 1854, enclosing correspondence respecting the measures taken for procuring supplies and transport for the British army in Bulgaria, *App.* 540——Statement of Sir C. E. Trevelyan in explanation of the arrangements made by the Treasury in reference to the supply of forage for the army in the Crimea, *ib.* 544–551.

*Troops in Front.* The troops in front were seven miles from Balaklava, so that they could not get their extra stores so quickly as those nearer, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 289.

*Trousers.* Observations upon the apportionment of the article of trousers among the men through the Quartermaster-general's department, *Rep.* xii——Evidence of Colonel Yea respecting the bad quality of the trousers supplied to the 7th Fusileers, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 257——Reason why, after the 15th January, trousers were not necessary to be issued, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 284——Number of pairs of trousers stated by the Commissioners to have arrived at Balaklava on the 28th November, and number actually received by the Commissariat at that date, *ib. p.* 284.

*Trumpeters.* Copy of divisional orders of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 8th and 13th July 1854, respecting the trumpeters of cavalry regiments, *App.* 418.

*Tulloch, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Murray:*

1. *Generally.*
2. *Statements and Examination before the Board of General Officers.*
3. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Generally:*

Circumstance of Colonel Tulloch desiring the answers to the queries submitted by the Commissioners of Inquiry to the Quartermaster-general to be sent to Kazatch Bay, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 251——Opinion that the army ought to feel gratitude to Colonel Tulloch for coming forward in the manly way he has done, to uphold the Report of the Crimean Commissioners, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 177, 178——Unfitness of Colonel Tulloch, from his connexion with the War Office and civil departments of the army, to undertake the office of Commissioner of Inquiry, *ib. p.* 191——General remarks by Sir Richard Airey on his position, in consequence of the absence of Colonel Tulloch, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 323–326——Observations upon the motives of Colonel Tulloch, in preferring the charges against the General of Division of the Cavalry Brigade of the army in the Crimea, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 175——Illness of Colonel Tulloch, and retirement from the inquiry, *p.* 288. 299.

2. *Statements and Examination before the Board of General Officers:*

[Analysis of his Statement.]—Approval of Government of the Report of Sir J. M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch on the Crimean Inquiry, *p.* 49——Reason of the Crimean Commissioners not examining Lord Lucan in regard to Commissariat supplies, *ib.*——Statement of Colonel Tulloch before the Board, on 9th April 1856, *p.* 49-55——Reasons assigned for the deficiency of forage supplied to the cavalry in the Crimea, *p.* 49, 50——Denial of Lord Lucan that any heavy cavalry were landed in the Crimea on 1st October 1854; returns of commanding officers to the War Office, bearing date on that day, *p.* 49.

Statement of the mortality amongst the horses of the Heavy Cavalry, Light Cavalry, and Artillery in the Crimea, *p.* 50——Return made by the commanding officers of the period of the commencement and completion of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *p.* 51——Remarks upon Lord Lucan calling the Crimean Commissioners of Inquiry the one a Statistical Clerk of the War Office, and the other a Commissioner of Poor Laws,

*p.* 52

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*TULLOCH, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ALEXANDER MURRAY*—continued.

2. *Statements and Examination before the Board of General Officers*—continued.

*p.* 52——Comparison of the loss of cavalry horses with the hard-worked baggage animals, *p.* 53——Denial that Lord Lucan had been animadverted upon by the Crimean Commissioners in their report, *ib.*——Observations upon the remissness of the cavalry in not affording shelter for their horses in the Crimea, *p.* 54, 55.

Opportunities offered of obtaining carpenters from the men of war to erect stabling for the cavalry in the Crimea, *p.* 55——Plan suggested of affording temporary shelter to the cavalry horses in the Crimea, by digging pits and covering them with sailcloth, *ib.* ——Quantity of work capable of being exacted from each workman with an army in the field, *ib.*——Examination relative to the evidence taken by witness in the Crimea on which his report was founded, and on that report, *p.* 126-133——Further examination on the same subject, *p.* 134–146——Approval of Lord Panmure and Lord Palmerston of the Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry into the British Army in the Crimea, *p.* 147 ——Letter from General Airey to Sir John M'Neill, dated 4th June 1855, relative to the examination of the questions propounded by the Commissioners, and the preparation of his replies thereto, *p.* 163.

Difficulty of obtaining witnesses to speak to facts that occurred in the Crimea connected with the present inquiry, *p.* 164, 165——Statement of Colonel Tulloch in support of the charges preferred against Lord Lucan of neglect in affording shelter to the cavalry horses in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, *p.* 164–174——Consultation of Dr. Farr, Superintendent-general of the statistical department in the Registrar-general's office, as to the method of calculating the mortality of the cavalry horses, *p.* 164–173—— Observations upon Sir Richard Airey's evidence relative to the shelter of the cavalry horses in the Crimea, *p.* 166——Observations upon the evidence of Colonel Doherty and Major Thompson respecting the means taken for affording shelter to the horses of the cavalry brigade during the winter of 1854-55, *p.* 167.

Observations on the testimony of the witnesses in favour of the use of sailcloth in an emergency for affording shelter to horses, *p.* 167–171——Observations upon the evidence of certain witnesses relative to the means devised for affording shelter to the horses of the Cavalry Brigade during the winter, 1854-55, *p.* 168, 169. 173——Observations on the statement of Sir Edmund Lyons, in regard to the apparent want of sailcloth in the British fleet, *p.* 170——Observations upon the evidence of the witnesses respecting the employment of crews of vessels lying in Balaklava Harbour, in the construction of stabling for the cavalry horses, *p.* 171——Observations upon the evidence of Major Benson, respecting the shelter afforded to the cavalry horses of the Light Brigade during the winter of 1854-55, *p.* 172.

Evidence of Dr. Alexander before the Commissioners of Inquiry respecting the fatigue duties performed by the infantry soldiers of the army in the East, *p.* 172——Observavations upon Colonel Griffith's evidence, *p.* 173——Consultation of Dr. Farr, the superintendent of the statistical department at Somerset House, *p.* 173——Evidence of Major Conolly relative to certain incorrect returns of Colonel Hodge and Lieutenant-colonel Mayow, *ib.*——Observations with respect to the delay in obtaining hut accommodation for the men of the Cavalry Brigade in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, *p.* 174 ——Approval expressed by the head of Her Majesty Government of the conduct of the Commissioners throughout their investigations, *ib.*——Exclusion of some parts of the Report originally made to the Secretary for War, from that laid before Parliament, on the ground that the Commissioners had no authority for going into such points, *p.* 174.

In every indication as to where blame appeared to rest, the Commissioners endeavoured to frame the report in the most guarded manner, *p.* 174——Of the horses of the Commissariat at Varna, to the extent of 3,000 or 4,000 were stolen, and the Government got no account of them, *p.* 180——Occasion of the Duke of Newcastle sending for witness to see whether he could assist in fitting the hutting for the troops, *p.* 182——Manner in which the Minutes of Evidence were taken and recorded by the Commissioners on the Crimean Inquiry, *p.* 219, 220——Evidence of the commanding officers of the Light Cavalry Brigade, of the deficiency of the supply of forage for the horses in November, 1854, *p.* 220, 221——Comparative mortality of the horses of the Light Cavalry Brigade and the Heavy Brigade, *p.* 221.

Examination of Colonel Tulloch respecting the original note of the evidence of Colonel Wetherall, taken before the Commissioners in the Crimea, *p.* 248–251—— Manner in which the evidence was taken before the Commissioners, and opportunities given to the witnesses to make alterations, *p.* 278, 279.

3. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Letter from Colonel Gordon to the Judge Advocate-general, 22d May 1856, forwarding Colonel Tulloch's memorandum of the 16th May, and remarks by Colonel Gordon in reply thereto, *App.* 521——Explanations submitted to the Board of General Officers by Colonel Tulloch, relative to the evidence of Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall, dated 16th May 1856, *ib.* 522, 523——Letter from Sir John M'Neill and Colonel

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Tulloch, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Murray*—continued.

3. *Papers laid before the Board*—continued.

Tulloch to the Right Honourable Lord Panmure, dated 21st February 1846, with reference to a letter from the Earl of Cardigan, *App.* 598——Letter from Colonel Tulloch to Lord Panmure, dated 16th February 1846, in answer to a letter from the Earl of Lucan, *ib.* 599.

*See* also *Commissioners of Inquiry. Reports of the Commissioners.*

*Turkish Officials.* Difficulties attending dealings with Turkish officials, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 97.

*Turks.* Occasion of Turks being furnished, after repeated applications, to assist in the construction of stables for the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 12——Reason for discontinuing the services of the Turks in assisting in the construction of the stables for the cavalry, *ib. p.* 14——Occasion of the Turks being sent to Lord Lucan to assist in the erection of stables for the cavalry, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 91——The most obvious method of supplying the want of fatigue parties in the Crimea was by importing workmen from the Euxine and the Bosphorus, *ib. p.* 238——Occasion of the Quartermaster-general directing a number of Turkish workmen to be placed at Lord Lucan's disposal to assist in the construction of shelter for the horses, *ib. p.* 252——Difficulty of getting a sufficient number of Turks to assist in building the depôt stabling for the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 189——Difficulty of getting them away from Constantinople, *Admiral Deans Dundas, p.* 307.

*Twenty-third Fusileers.* Evidence of Dr. Alexander before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea respecting the number of hours the 23d Fusileers were in the trenches, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 172——Explanation of evidence given before Commissioners as to the issue of blankets to his regiment, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

V.

*Valise.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 2d June 1854, relative to the contents of the soldier's valise when packed for service, *App.* 416.

*Valsamachy, Brothers.* Contract made with the house of Valsamachy, Brothers, of Constantinople, for a supply of chopped straw for the army in the Crimea, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 372.

*Varna.* State of the horses of the cavalry brigade when quartered in the neighbourhood of Varna, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 37.

*Vegetables.* Observations of the Board upon the supply of vegetables to the troops in the Crimea by the Commissariat, *Rep.* xxiii——Particulars as to the supply of vegetables to the army in the Crimea in the winter of 1854, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 373——Large quantities of vegetables imported by the Commissariat from Trieste and Venice for the use of the army in the Crimea, *ib.*——Means taken by the Commissariat to supply the troops with vegetable food in the Crimea, *ib.*——*See* also *Preserved Potatoes.*

*Villages and Towns.* It is equally the duty of the Quartermaster-general to provide for the shelter of the horses, whether in villages or in towns, or at a distance therefrom, provided he has the means of doing so, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 114.

*Villiers, Right Hon. Charles Pelham, M.P.* Letter from Major-general Sir Richard Airey to the Right Hon. C. P. Villiers, dated Horse Guards, 22d May 1856, transmitting a paper showing the two reports of Sir John M'Neill and Colonel Tulloch, dated Constantinople 9th and Constantinople 10th June 1855, and a memorandum upon the responsibility for the original supply of camp equipage, *App.* 472–498——Letter from Thomas Phinn, esq., to the Right Hon. C. P. Villiers, M.P., dated 13th May 1856, enclosing statement relative to the number of spare sails and quantity of sailcloth supplied to Her Majesty's ships in the Black Sea, *ib.* 605.——*See* also *Judge Advocate-general.*

*Vinois, General.* Circumstances under which General Vinois' brigade was sent to Balaklava, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 45.

W.

*Waddy, Colonel.* Complaint made by Colonel Waddy, of the 58th Regiment, of his inability to obtain a supply of blankets for his men from the Commissariat stores, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 256.

*Wages.* Two shillings and sixpence a day offered for labourers to come to Balaklava from Trebizonde, but they were earning 4 *s.* at home, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 289.

*Wakeman, Colonel.* Omission of the Crimean Commissioners to examine Colonel Wakeman, Assistant Adjutant-general, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 231.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Walker, Captain.* Employment of Captain Walker, one of Lord Lucan's aide-de-camps, to attend to the foraging of the cavalry, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 38.

*Want of Transport.* Concurrence in opinion with the Crimean Commissioners that the sufferings of the army during the winter of 1854-55 are traceable to the want of transport, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 236.

*Wants of the Men.* Means devised in the Quartermaster-general's office for supplying the wants of the men with regularity and despatch, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 255, 256.

*WAR DEPARTMENT:*

1. *Generally.*
2. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Generally:*

Letter from the Commissary-general to the Under Secretary for War, dated 12th January 1855, representing the deficiency of the supplies of forage for the Army in the East, *Commissary-general Filder, p.* 368, 369——Quantity of forage forwarded by the War Department to the Crimea by order of Lord Panmure, *ib. p.* 381.

2. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Letter, dated War Department, 19th May 1856, from Sir B. Hawes to the Judge Advocate-general, enclosing a return of transport and ambulance animals foraged in the Crimea, *App.* 459——Letter from Colonel Mundy to Major-general Yorke, dated 8th June 1854, upon the subject of the supply of camp equipage to the army in the East, *ib.* 500, 501——Letter from Sir Benjamin Hawes, dated War Department, 13th May 1856, transmitting returns called for by Commissary-general Filder, as to the shipments of hay for the army in the East, *ib.* 586.

*See* also *Minister of War. Panmure, Lord. Peel, Mr. Frederick, M.P.*

*Ward, Sir Henry.* Promptness of Sir Henry Ward in despatching troops to the Crimea from the Ionian Islands, upon hearing of the battle of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 247.

*Wardell, Colonel.* Colonel Wardell lost all his chargers on the passage from Varna to Balaklava, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 46.

*Wardlaw, Major.* Answer of Major Wardlaw, of the 1st Royal Dragoons, with respect to the period of the commencement and completion of the hutting of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 51.

*Warehouse Room.* Inconvenience arising from want of sufficient warehouse room in Balaklava, for the storage of goods sent out from England, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 258, 259.

*Warm Clothing.* Observations of the Board on the issue and distribution of warm clothing to the troops in the Crimea during the winter of 1854-55, *Rep.* x, xi——Measures adopted by the Quartermaster-general's office to issue supplies of warm clothing to the troops with regularity and despatch, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 255——Means adopted in the Quartermaster-general's office to further the distribution of warm clothing to the officers and men of the army in the East, *ib. p.* 255, 256——There never was at any moment the smallest difficulty in obtaining an approved requisition for the coats and blankets required for the soldiers, the difficulty was to carry them up to the front, *ib. p.* 259——Explanation of examination before the Commissioners as to alleged delay in the supply of warm clothing, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 267.

General instructions which were received from Sir Richard Airey as to the manner in which the duties were to be carried out as to the issue of warm clothing, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 268——The Quartermaster-general's department originated the issue of the extra warm clothing, *ib. p.* 281——Regimental clothing, had it been there, would not have been distributed to men going down sick; nature of the warm clothing given them, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 396——Statement showing the quantity of warm clothing and stores for which orders had been given to regiments to the 15th January 1855, *App.* 472——Tabular statement of great coats issued and received by the regiments of the army in the East, *ib.* 471.

*See* also *Distribution of Stores. Great Coats. "Prince," The.*

*Warrant.* See *Royal Warrant.*

*Watch Cloaks.* Remarks of the Board upon the issue of watch coats to the men of the army in the Crimea, through the Quartermaster-general's office, *Rep.* xii——Account of the distribution of watch cloaks to the army in the East upon the authority of the Quartermaster-general's department, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 260——Evidence relative to watch cloaks in store has been altered and erased, and finally left out from the printed answers, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 268——Explanation of the discrepancies in Colonel Wetherall's evidence with regard to the issue of watch coats, *Colonel Tulloch p.* 276. 280——Further evidence as to the issue of, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 280, 281——Had witness seen Assistant Commissary-general Archer's returns, it would not have induced him to consent to the erasures

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Watch Cloaks*—continued.

erasures in his evidence, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 281——Number of watch cloaks actually remaining in store, and number as stated in the Commissioners' Report, *ib. p.* 283——Statement of watch cloaks actually drawn from the stores during the months of November December, and January 1854-55, *App.* 472.

*Water.* Shortness of water for the cavalry upon arrival in the Crimea; some of the horses were without water 30 hours, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 39.

*Watering Vessels.* This operation occupied much of the time of the boats' crews in Balaklava Harbour, *M'Kenzie, p.* 293——Difficulty in watering vessels at Balaklava; some vessels have gone to Constantinople to water, *ib. p.* 293.

*Watson, William.* Purveyor's clerk in charge of the first division; examination relative to hospital and Quartermaster-general's stores, *p.* 334–336.

*Weather.* There was no cold weather till December; there was blustering weather and much rain, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 295.

*Weekly States.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 6th June 1854, directing weekly states of detachments of cavalry to be sent in to the General of Division, *App.* 416, 417.

*Weight.* British soldiers do not carry their weight in the best way for the comfort of the men, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 264.

*Wellington, Duke of.* Arrangement made by the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula, with respect to the cavalry foraging themselves where the distance did not exceed three miles, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 41——Opinion of the Duke of Wellington, with respect to the limit of distance which cavalry horses should be sent to collect their forage, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 207.

*WETHERALL, COLONEL EDWARD:*

1. *Generally.*
2. *Examination before the Board of General Officers.*
3. *Papers laid before the Board.*

1. *Generally:*

Circumstance of Colonel Wetherall, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-general, being despatched to Constantinople on the 16th November 1854, to purchase warm clothing and necessaries, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 244——Manner in which this gentleman's evidence, taken before the Commissioners, was mixed up with Colonel Gordon's evidence, *Rep.* xv–xviii; *Sir R. Airey, p.* 248–250——Statement of Colonel the Honourable Alexander Gordon, as to his own and Colonel Wetherall's evidence before the Commissioners, *p.* 249, 250——Examination of Colonel Tulloch, respecting the original notes of Colonel Wetherall's evidence, taken before the Commissioners of Inquiry in the Crimea, *p.* 248–250——Ability and zeal displayed by Colonel Wetherall in discharging the duties of the sub-department of the Quartermaster-general's office in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 255——Explanation by Colonel Tulloch as to alterations in the evidence of Colonel Wetherall before the Commissioners, *p.* 275–280.

2. *Examination before the Board of General Officers:*

[Analysis of his Evidence.]—Period of witness's examination before the Commissioners of Inquiry; length of time which it lasted, *p.* 267——Manner in which the examination was conducted by Colonel Tulloch, *ib.*——Omissions and discrepancies in witness's evidence before the Commissioners, *p.* 267, 268——Alterations and interlineations made in witness's evidence without authority, *p.* 268——Suppression of part of witness's evidence given before the Commissioners, *ib.*——Substance of the instructions received from Sir Richard Airey for the administration of the Quartermaster-general's department; removal of barriers of form and etiquette in the issue of Quartermaster-general's stores, *p.* 268, 269——Manner in which the distribution of warm clothing and camp equipage was arranged, *p.* 269.

Nature of the communication had with Mr. Assistant Commissary-general Archer, *p.* 269——The Quartermaster-general can only be held responsible for the quantities of stores ordered to be issued, and not for the quantities drawn, *ib.*——Manner in which the quantities of stores drawn by the troops depended on the Generals of Division, and as to their being able to spare their men for the purpose, *p.* 269, 270——Statement of the returns of stores received by the troops and those ordered to be drawn by the Quartermaster-general, from the end of November 1854 to the middle of January 1855, *p.* 270, 271——The store ships alluded to in the Commissioners' Report were only hospital ships, and the stores sent on board were for the use of the sick, *p.* 271.

Ammunition and food were considered of more consequence for the troops to be supplied with than clothing, as men could not be spared for both, *p.* 271——Order from head quarters, dated 17th December 1854, to Sir Colin Campbell, relative to an expected attack on Balaklava, *ib.*——Comparison between the means of transport which existed in

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Wetherall, Colonel Edward*—continued.

2. *Examination before the Board of General Officers*—continued.

in the winter of 1854-55 and 1855-56, *p.* 271, 272——Explanation of the charge that sufficient rugs were not supplied to the troops in November and December, *p.* 277——Extract from Report of Lieutenant-colonel Woodford, relative to the issue of Quartermaster-general's stores to the troops, *p.* 278.

Further examination of Colonel Wetherall relative to his printed evidence not containing all that was given before the Commissioners; did not sanction omissions; gave evidence of the nature contained in the parts crossed out, *p.* 280——Further evidence as to the issue of watch coats, *p.* 281, 282——Further evidence in answer to charges in the Commissioners' Report, as to the issue of various stores, *p.* 282-286——Cross-examination by Colonel Tulloch as to witness's evidence in the Crimea being sent to Colonel Gordon for correction, *p.* 286, 287.

3. *Papers laid before the Board:*

Paper of the parts erased from Memorandum of Replies of Colonel Wetherall, *App.* 471——Letter from Colonel Gordon to the Judge Advocate-general, 22d May 1856, returning the original notes of the examination of Colonel Wetherall and Colonel Gordon, *ib.* 512-520——Explanations submitted to the Board of General Officers by Colonel Tulloch, relative to the evidence of Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall, dated 16th May 1856, *ib.* 522, 523.

*Wharves.* The wharves at Balaklava were almost entirely constructed by the crews of the ships, *Colonel M'Kenzie, p.* 293.

*Whiskers.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 23d May 1854, directing the manner in which officers and men shall wear their whiskers, *App.* 416.

*White, Colonel.* Answers of Lieutenant-colonel White, of the 6th Dragoons, respecting the period of the commencement and completion of the stabling of the cavalry in the Crimea, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 51.

"*William Beckett.*" Letter from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 18 April 1855, stating that 1,000 circular tents had been shipped for the Crimea in the "William Beckett," on the 28th March, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 245.

*Windmill Heights.* Memorandum from Sir R. Airey as to removal of Cavalry Brigade to Windmill Heights, 2d November 1854, *App.* 415.

*Wine.* Copy of divisional order of Major-general the Earl of Lucan, dated 31st July 1854, directing the men to abstain from drinking the wine of the country, *App.* 421.

*Winter of* 1854-55. Period when it was decided that the cavalry were to be stationed in winter quarters; this had no reference to the altercation with Colonel Griffiths, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 114——At the time of the embarkation, and from that time until the 17th October, there was no expectation whatever of having to winter in the Crimea, and no final determination to do so was formed until after the battle of Inkermann, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 241——Period when it was first determined that the British army should winter in the Crimea, *ib. p.* 242——Anxiety of the Quartermaster-general and Lord Raglan at the beginning of winter that the troops should get all they required; manner in which their directions were carried out, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 269.

*Witnesses.* Inability of the Board of General Officers to obtain the attendance of several witnesses whom it would have been desirable to examine, *Rep.* ii——Difficulty of obtaining witnesses to speak to facts that occurred in the Crimea, connected with the present inquiry, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 164, 165——Reluctance of witnesses to come forward upon the present occasion, and cause, *Earl of Lucan, p.* 175——Neglect of the Commissioners of Inquiry to examine such witnesses respecting the cavalry whose evidence might have been relied on, *ib. p.* 190.——*See* also *Examination of Witnesses.*

*Wood.* Extract from the London Report of the Commissioners of the Crimean Inquiry, touching the supply of wood to the army in the East for hutting purposes, *Sir Richard Airey, p.* 243——Circumstance of the Quartermaster-general obtaining materials for hutting, comprising 46,365 boards and planks, and 11,699 pieces of scantling, *ib. p.* 244.

*See* also *Boards and Planks. Scantlings. Timber.*

*Wood, Colonel David.* Means devised by Colonel David Wood, of the Artillery, for affording shelter for his horses, *Sir E. Lyons, p.* 152; *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 170——Observations on the praise bestowed upon Colonel Wood, of the Artillery, for the care and treatment of his horses during the winter of 1854-55, *Lord Lucan, p.* 177, 178——Statement showing the mortality amongst the Artillery horses of Colonel Wood's battery during the winter of 1854-55, *ib. p.* 178.

Report, 1856—*continued.*

*Wood, J.* Letter from J. Wood, Esq., secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 18th April 1855, stating the reasons why the requisition of the Quartermaster-general of 28th September 1854, had not been complied with, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 244, 245.

*Wooden Huts.* Extract from the London Report of the Crimean Commissioners, relative to the supply of wooden huts from England for the army in the East, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 240.

*Woodford, Sir Alexander.* Appointment of Sir A. Woodford as President of the Board of General Officers, *p.* 2.

*Woodford, Major Charles.* Letter from Major Woodford, Deputy Assistant Commissary-general, to the Commissary-general, dated 23d February 1855, announcing the death of three of the Spanish mules, *App.* 531.

*Wool.* Reasons why wool for stuffing the paillasses, although possibly procurable, would not have been beneficial to the men, *Colonel Wetherall, p.* 283.

*Work.* If the Quartermaster-general desired to have any work done which can be performed by the unskilled strength of the men, he would make his requisition upon the Adjutant-general for fatigue parties, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 239.——*See* also *Overwork.*

*Working Parties.* Quantity of work capable of being exacted from each workman with an army in the field, *Colonel Tulloch, p.* 55 —— The most obvious method of supplying the want of fatigue parties was by importing workmen from the Euxine and the Bosphorus, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 238.——*See* also *Fatigue Parties.*

*Wounded.* See *Sick and Wounded.*

*Wrappers.* All the cloth wrappers were secured for the use of the cavalry horses, *Boyd, p.* 313.

*Written Representations.* Reason why copies of the written representations to Lords Lucan and Cardigan and the Commissary-general of deficiency of food for the cavalry horses was not furnished the Crimean Commissioners, *Crookshank, p.* 209.

## Y.

*Yacht.* Occasion of Lord Raglan giving permission to Lord Cardigan to sleep on board his yacht, *Earl of Cardigan, p.* 202.

*Yea, Colonel.* Evidence of Colonel Yea, taken before the Commissioners of Inquiry into the British Army in the Crimea, *Sir R. Airey, p.* 257——Reason assigned by Colonel Yea for not making any requisition on the Quartermaster-general for camp necessaries and extra clothing for his men, *ib.*

*Yorke, Colonel John.* (Analysis of his Evidence.)—Date of the arrival of the 1st Dragoons in the Crimea, *p.* 106——Date of the arrival of the Enniskillens, *ib.*——Circumstance of witness addressing a letter to the "Times" newspaper, *p.* 106, 107—— Copy of the article which appeared in the "Times," *p.* 107——Reason of a portion of the Enniskillens being detained on board the "War Cloud," *ib.*——Disapproval of the Board of General Officers of the appearance of Colonel Yorke's letter in the "Times," *ib.*

# INDEX

TO

# REPORT

OF THE

# BOARD OF GENERAL OFFICERS

APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE

STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE REPORTS

OF

SIR JOHN M'NEILL AND COLONEL TULLOCH,

AND THE

EVIDENCE TAKEN BY THEM RELATIVE THERETO.

*(Presented to Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.)*

---

*Ordered, by* The House of Commons, *to be Printed,*
29 *July* 1856.

---

[*Price* 1*s.* 3*d.*]

422.

*Under* 20 *oz.*